An Abstract of The Thesis of


Abstract approved: 

Nancy R. Rosenberger

This thesis is an exploratory and descriptive study of the relationship between a US military base and Kin Town, Okinawa, Japan, presented in the form of ethnography. Guided by James Scott’s theory of “weapons of the weak,” it explores the relationship between the two in terms of how the townspeople deal with the hegemony of the military base in the context of their daily life. Especially, it attempts to examine whether the townspeople’s strategies to live with the base can challenge the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help create peace in the world. This thesis first describes the historical process in which a complex relationship between the two has emerged. Focusing on three important characteristics of pre-war Kin, close knit communal membership, “the home of emigrant pioneers,” and communal land management, it illustrates how Kin has changed and/or has not changed in relation to the construction of a military base in the town. Secondly, this thesis describes how the townspeople perceive the base and their relationship with the base. Pointing out that the base is never perceived by the townspeople as a mere military institution, it shows that the base is perceived as both “the root cause of problems” and the most important financial resource with imposing international power. It argues that this paradoxical situation has created many dilemmas in the town, including the townspeople’s ambivalent view regarding the hegemonic claim. Thirdly, this thesis shows that, with such perceptions of the base, the townspeople have developed various strategies to live with the base. Non-native Kin bar owners have developed the “American Bar System” and practice the hiring of Filipino women to interact with military personnel. Native Kin people employ the strategies of disassociation from the base and “independent” protests to live with the base. In addition, this thesis also examines native Kin people’s “money redistributing system” and their reconstruction of the town as “the home of emigrant pioneers” in the framework of strategies to live with the base. It argues, however, that while these strategies enable the townspeople to live with the base, they
cannot challenge the hegemony of the base and its hegemonic claim. Finally, this thesis shows how the history of the relationship, the townspeople's perceptions of the base, and their strategies to live with the base are related to each other. It also presents a scenario of how the townspeople can challenge the hegemony of the base and its hegemonic claim by expanding James Scott's theory and the townspeople's present strategies. The scenario is then translated into specific recommendations for the town.
Living with a Military Base: A Study of the Relationship between a US military base and Kin Town, Okinawa, Japan
by
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I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request.

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Hideki Yoshikawa
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Meeting the Town

On a sunny August afternoon of 1993, Mr. Haga, a junior clerk of the Kin Town office in Kin Town, Okinawa, Japan, took me for a brief tour of the town. In that summer, I was working as an intern in the Office of Town History Compilation, a subsection of the Development and Planning Section of the Town Office. At the same time, I was also conducting my thesis research on the town’s relationship with the US military base, Camp Hansen, which is located in the town. Mr. Haga was my immediate supervisor and one of my informants.

Kin Town is a rural town with a population of about 10,000 people, located in the central part of the island of Okinawa, the southern most prefecture of Japan. The town faces the Pacific Ocean eastwards and sits in front of the mountains of Onna which divides this central part of the island east and west. The town is often called Kichi no Machi, or “base town” because of the presence of the US military base in the town. The base, together with other military training areas, takes up 60% of the town’s total area (2,254 hector out of the town’s 3,756 hectors) and provides a home for 3,000 to 5,000 US Marines. The base was first established as a front line air field for the US military during WW II and later the air field was converted into a permanent military base, presently known as Camp Hansen. The relationship between the town and the base is almost half a century old.

As we drove through the town and visited the five communities of the town, Mr. Haga gave me general information and his opinions about the town and each community. He also introduced me to the Kuchou, the head of each community. After visiting the Yaka community, our third community, Mr. Haga took me to the footsteps of the mountains of Onna. The road to the footsteps was a winding, but well-maintained road paved with

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1 To protect my informants, I use pseudo names.
2 My internship was a part of the requirement for the Master’s Program in Applied Anthropology at Oregon State University.
asphalt. Mr. Haga told me that some grants from the Japanese government for “hosting” the base in the town were used to pave the road with asphalt. At one point, from which we could see clearly the whole picture of the east side of the mountains, Mr. Haga stopped the car. Then, he pointed to numerous spots of red dirt color exposed on the green slopes of the mountains. He explained to me that these spots were burned and damaged areas due to US military’s bombing practices over the years. “They are destroying the mountains too,” he said. Then, he asked me whether I knew the famous Ryuka (Okinawan poem) about the mountains of Onna by Onna Nabi. As I was surprised by the question, he smiled and said “it goes like this. ‘Over the mountains of Onna, there lies my lover’s village. Push the mountains away, bring the village to me.’” While I was still puzzled, he looked at me and cynically said “even Onna Nabi would not have wished the mountains being ‘pushed away’ like this.”

On the way back to the office, I was thinking about this incident over and over: the burned areas in what used to be majestic and beautiful mountains, the poem, what Mr. Haga said, and how he said it. I knew that I had just seen a glimpse of the relationship between the town and the base. The town, incorporated into the world politics of “peace through militarization,” had to deal with many hidden aspects of militarized peace, in this case, destruction of nature. To Mr. Haga, the base was a destroyer of nature. And he, who found himself at the powerless end of the international political scene through militarized peace, had to accept in his own cynical way whatever international politics would bring to the town. How do he and other townspeople perceive the base? What does the base mean to them? How do they deal with the presence of the base? What does “peace through militarization” really mean to them? By asking these questions, I was absorbed into the mental equation that Kin Town was a “base town.”

As I became more familiar with the town and townspeople and more comfortable with my intern work, I was pleasantly surprised by another aspect of the town. The town has the history of being the first community in Okinawa to send emigrants overseas in the early 20th century and also having produced a number of successful emigrants overseas. Kin Town is proudly described as Immino Sato, “the home of emigrant pioneers” by the majority of the townspeople. In fact, in the office where I worked as an intern, the staff

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3 Onna Nabi was a famous Okinawan female poet of the 18th century. She lived in Onna Village which was located in the west of the mountains of Onna. Her lover, Kin Machigani, lived in what is now Kin Town in the east of the mountains. This poem is well known in the town, and in fact during the town’s annual autumn festival, Mr. Kin Machigani is chosen annually.

4 The term, “peace through militarization,” is a translation of the Japanese phrase, Gunjityoku o Toshite no Heiwa. It is often used in discussions of the relationship between militarization and peace in the world. The term implies that we have peace in the world because countries like the US. have sufficient military capability to counter military threats from other countries. The meaning of the term is similar to those of “strategic stability,” “militarized peace” and “balance of power.”
members were engaged in a project on Kin emigrants overseas, sending some members to South America and the Philippines to research histories of Kin emigrants overseas. The office was filled with many documents and books on Kin emigrants overseas and there were always exiting and interesting discussions on Kin emigrants by the staff members, as well as by curious and enthusiastic visitors from the town. They were discussing stories of successful Kin emigrants overseas as well as their hardship and unfortunate lives. They were tracing their kinship ties with Kin emigrants overseas with a sense of respect and appreciation for these Kin emigrants. I was slowly but surely beginning to appreciate the town as "the home of emigrant pioneers," or at least, the staff members' enthusiasm and effort to portray the town as such.

At the same time, however, I also felt uncomfortable about what I perceived as a discrepancy between the office staff's enthusiasm in portraying the town as the "home of immigrant pioneers" and the existence of the base in the town's "backyard." To me, growing up in Okinawa, witnessing and experiencing the complex relationship between US bases and Okinawa, Kin Town was always a base town. It was a symbolic place for Okinawa where international politics was converted into people's daily life in complex ways through the presence of US military bases. And it was because I perceived the town as a base town that I, as an Okinawan anthropologist, wanted to study the town's relationship with the base. On the other hand, however, there were those enthusiastic staff members and townspeople who were studying and reconstructing the town as "the home of emigrant pioneers." I often wondered whether they really saw this town as "the home of emigrant pioneers" rather than a base town, although I could not ask them directly at that time.

As time passed by, however, I began to notice many other aspects of the town and townspeople's life which were often shadowed by the apparent image of the town as a base town. I began to pay attention to small but well maintained agricultural fields, seemingly pristine rivers drifting towards the coast, farmers who were working on developing new products with Beni Imo (red sweet potatoes), and young men and women practicing Eisa dance for the summer festival. It was then that my simple mental equation of Kin Town as a base town started collapsing. Instead, Kin Town began appearing to me as a place where elements of a base town, which I had known as an Okinawan, and elements of Kin Town as Kin Town (I could not find an appropriate word), which I had not known, seemingly coexisted with each other. I met a picture far more complex than I had expected.

How do the townspeople perceive the base? How do they live and deal with the presence of the base? What does "peace through militarization" mean to the townspeople? Although my initial questions still remained the same, I realized that I had to ask these
questions and try to answer them within this newly understood context of Kin Town as both a base town and "Kin Town."

**Four Approaches to the Ethnography**

This study is an exploratory and descriptive study of the relationship between Kin Town and a US military base, Camp Hansen. I use an ethnography to present this study. That is to say, my description and analysis of the relationship will be based upon the data that I have collected mainly through participant observation and semi-structured interviews in the every day context of the relationship between the town and the base (see Hammersley 1990:1-3 for discussion on ethnography).

While presenting itself as an ethnography, this study can be characterized by four different but interrelated approaches. First of all, this ethnography incorporates a cultural history approach. The incorporation of cultural history into this ethnography is intended not only to provide "background" information on the present relationship between the town and the base as seen in many synchronic ethnographies. It is also intended to illustrate persistent cultural aspects that the townspeople have shown in their understanding of the relationship between the town and the base and in their strategies to live with the base. The town's cultural history prior to and after the establishment of the base is constantly interpreted and reconstructed by the townspeople not only in their own historical terms but also in relation to the present situation of the relationship between the town and the base (see Cohen 1980:217; Moore 1987:728; and Sahlins 1983 for discussion on history in present context). In other words, the town's cultural history exists as a reality in the past and it also exists at present as a way for the townspeople to live with the base. Therefore, discussion of change versus continuity (or resistance to change) is treated as one of the major themes of this ethnography, as suggested by many anthropologists who attempt to incorporate history in their ethnographies or ethnography in history (see Ohnuki-Tierney 1990).

Second, this ethnography takes an interpretive stance with the understanding of partiality in ethnography. That is to say, while my descriptions of the townspeople's (emic) understandings of the base, the relationship, and their strategies to live with the base are presented as partial; my (etic) analysis and explanations of the relationship are presented as my interpretation. The incorporation of this interpretive stance in the ethnography is basically due to the realization that "we can no longer know the whole truth, or even claim to approach it" (Clifford 1986:25). As this realization is accentuated in the recent context of
anthropology, anthropologists have become more conscious of our limitation of access to information as well as our own perceptions and belief systems shaped by our institutional status and training: these in turn color the process of gaining the data and the data itself (see Clifford 1986; Marcus 1986; and Pratt 1986). As I will discuss in Chapter 3 in more detail, the reality of fieldwork in Kin Town was, admittedly far more complex than I was able to capture as a whole, and gathering data was often very difficult. There were some taboo subjects in the town, which I was not able to capture enough information on, but found extremely important in understanding the relationship between the town and the base. Moreover, my own ideological and political stance on “peace through militarization,” which is different from the town’s overall political stance, also came into play in directing my field work, understanding, and presentation of the relationship between the town and the base. Furthermore, my theoretical orientations definitely force me not only to look at particular aspects of the relationship but also to analyze them in particular ways. Given these conditions, the incorporation of the interpretive stance into the ethnography reflects my attempt to reach the middle ground between objectivity and subjectivity.

However, my intention in arguing that my ethnography is partial and interpretive is not an excuse for invalidity of my understanding of the relationship. As Clifford (1986:24) argues, we should not subscribe to the idea that any description is as good as others because these are all interpretive. My interpretations of the relationship make a valid argument in terms of the data which I have at my disposal. This point leads to the third approach I take with regard to the presentation of the ethnography. This ethnography is written with the intention that it will be presented to the townspeople of Kin as well as to military personnel on the base. This approach serves two main purposes. First, it will test the validity of my understanding of the townspeople’s (emic) perceptions of the base and strategies to live with the base against the very eyes of the townspeople themselves. As it is often pointed out that many ethnographies would not pass the judgment of the natives (e.g., Linstead 1993:103), it is extremely important to have the townspeople judge the validity of my understanding of the townspeople’s (emic) knowledge of the relationship. Are my understandings of the emic knowledge accurate and meaningful to the townspeople? As I ask these questions, I give back the authority of emic knowledge to the townspeople (see Lette 1987:63). Secondly, as Johannsen (1992) explores the possibility of interpretive applied anthropology, this approach seeks the possibility of my ethnography being used to create a discussion between the townspeople and the base. My intention and hope is that my interpretive etic knowledge on the relationship between the town and the base can help both town and base sides create a better environment in which a meaningful relationship between them can be built. However, again, my interpretive stance gives the
townspeople the power to decide whether or not my interpretive emic knowledge can be useful in their dealing with the presence of the base.

Finally, this ethnography incorporates an interactive approach between theoretical, political, and applied dimensions of anthropology. Theoretically, this ethnography uses concepts found in the study of power relations such as hegemony and strategies of powerless as its main analytical tools (see Scott 1985). This ethnography argues that hegemonic claims can be accepted and rejected by the same powerless group simultaneously because they are seen by the powerless people in different contexts. Thus, this ethnography tries to show strategies of the powerless in light of multiple contextualization of hegemonic claims. Moreover, this ethnography attempts to illustrate some strengths and limitations of strategies of the powerless. Politically, this ethnography questions the present policy of “peace through militarization” played out in the context of Kin Town. It also points to the limitation of the townspeople’s present strategies to live with the base. As an interaction of theory and political practice, this ethnography argues for creation of a new definition of “peace,” and recommends to the townspeople new strategies to live with the base. These recommendations, principally political, will be derived from the theoretical and analytical discussions of power relations, especially with regard to the concepts of hegemony and strategies of the weak. The incorporation of this approach in this ethnography reflects my conviction that ethnographies in applied anthropology can have theoretical, political and applied dimensions.

The rest of the thesis is divided into seven chapters. In chapter 2, a review of two different types of literature will be presented: one focusing on relationships between US military bases overseas and their “host” communities and the other focusing on strategies of the powerless to live with the powerful in their unequal power relations. In Chapter 3, a brief discussion on the methodology and limitations of my research in this ethnography will be provided. In Chapter 4, a cultural history of the town and its relationship with the base will be presented. At the end of the chapter, an interpretive discussion will deal with the question of what has changed and what has not changed in the course of history of the relationship between the town and the base. In Chapter 5, the townspeople’s perceptions of the base and their relationships to the base will be discussed. The base as a military institution with international power, “the root cause of problems,” and the most important financial resource for the town is examined from the townspeople’s points of view. At the end, an interpretive summary and discussion will be presented to examine the concept of hegemony in light of the townspeople’s acceptance of the base as an inevitable reality in the town. In the discussion, the concept of the multiple contextualization of hegemony will be introduced. In Chapter 6, the townspeople’s everyday strategies to live with the base will
be discussed. Two populations of the townspeople, namely bar owners and native Kin people, are chosen to contrast their different strategies. At the end, an interpretive summary and discussion will be presented to examine whether the strategies of the townspeople can challenge the hegemony of the base and how they are related to the multiple contextualization of hegemony. In Chapter 7, two aspects of the townspeople's life, which on the surface appear unrelated to the presence of the base, but at a deeper level are related to the presence of the base, will be examined as their “communal strategies” to live with the base. The “money redistributing system,” which has emerged from native Kin people’s traditional communal land management system, and their reconstruction of the town as “the home of emigrant pioneers” will be discussed in terms of the interaction between the town’s history and native Kin people’s strategies to live with the base. At the end, an interpretive summary and discussion will examine whether the communal strategies can challenge the hegemony of the base and how they are related the multiple contextualization of hegemony. In Chapter 8, a concluding discussion on the relationship between the base and the town as well as my recommendations for the town will be presented. It will highlight the interplay between history, base, the town, and power relations. It will also provide a scenario in which the townspeople can challenge the hegemony of the base and the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help create peace in the world. The need for redefining “peace” and for creation of an official communication channel between the town and the base will be discussed in the form of recommendations.
Chapter 2

Literature Review: In Search of Perspectives

In this chapter, I will present a literature review as I search for perspectives to better understand the relationship between Kin Town and the base. The literature review consists of two major sections. The first section focuses on studies dealing with the relationships between US bases overseas and their “host” communities. This section provides an overall picture of how relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities have been studied. It focuses on how studies with different perspectives, namely perspectives from above, perspectives from below, and perspectives of deconstruction, present variant views of the relationships. The second section focuses on studies dealing with strategies of the powerless to live with the powerful in unequal power relations. This section provides a theoretical and analytical framework which I will employ to describe the relationship between Kin Town and the base in this ethnography. These two sections are considered as complementary to one another, thereby providing a unifying guide line to this ethnography.

The Relationships between US Bases Overseas and Their “Host” Communities

Studies dealing with the relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities present different and often contradictory pictures, depending on researchers' theoretical orientations, level of focus and political views. On the one hand, as US military bases overseas are often understood as means to protect “national security” and “national interests” and ultimately to help achieve peace in the context of international politics, the relationships between US bases and host communities are understood as a necessity to help the bases achieve these objectives. Such understandings of the relationship between US bases and host communities are often made from the perspective of macro level international politics and political economy, which I call “perspectives from above.” On the other hand, as US bases are also seen as integrated parts of their host communities, the relationships are often discussed not only in terms of economic and political effects of these bases on the communities, but also in terms of social, cultural, and environmental effects on the communities. Such understandings of the relationships are often made from community level perspectives, which I call “perspectives from below.” Studies with
perspectives from below often provide negative pictures of US bases for the host communities. Furthermore, as US bases are recognized as socially constructed entities and as the various basic assumptions about US militarization are brought into question, the relationships are also examined in a new light of social deconstruction perspectives. Studies with social deconstruction perspectives often can challenge even the distinction made between the contradictory pictures of the relationship presented by both studies with perspectives from above and below. In the following, therefore, studies dealing with the relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities are divided into three subsections. The first subsection deals with studies which discuss the relationships in the context of international politics (studies with perspectives from above). The second subsection deals with studies which try to understand the relationships in the context of host communities and from the communities' points of view (studies with perspectives from below). The third subsection includes studies which attempt to understand the relationships with social deconstruction perspectives.

Studies with Perspectives from Above

Studies on the relationship between US bases overseas and their host communities with perspectives from above often revolve around the concepts of national security and national interests. These concepts are mostly defined in terms of international politics and economy and are seen as factors over which international conflicts and power struggles occur. The host community as the unit of analysis, therefore, usually refers to nation states. Studies with perspectives from above provide explanations and analyses of why US bases are stationed (or why they need to be stationed) in the places where they are stationed. They also provide explanation and analysis for how the relationships between bases and their host communities affect the bases strategic functions to protect national security and national interests for both the US and host countries, and ultimately to help achieve peace in the world (e.g., Blaker 1990; Duke 1989; McLaurin and Moon 1989; Sharp 1990a). Explicitly or implicitly, studies with perspectives from above are mostly based on macro level theories such as the capitalist centered theory, which sees militarization as an inevitable consequence of capitalism and state capitalism (e.g., Wallerstein 1989), or the state-centered theory which sees militarization as an inevitable consequence of the power elite's use of state sanctioned force to ensure compliance within the society and to protect it from outside assaults or both (e.g., Doran 1983).
During the Cold War Era, the concepts of national interests and national security were particularly defined by the US and its allies in relation to the presence of the Soviet Union. National interests were discussed in terms of competing concepts and systems employed by the US and the Soviet Union such as capitalism versus communist economy, and democracy versus communism. National security was discussed with the notion that the principal threats came from the Soviet Union and third world revolutionary forces which were also regarded as extensions of the Soviet threat (see Beeman 1989; Sampson and Kideckel 1989 for anthropologists’ discussion on US foreign policy during the Cold War Era). Given such understandings of national interests and national security, the relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities (host nations) were understood and evaluated in terms of how these relationships would affect the bases’ strategic functions to protect and control the national interests and national security of the US and its allies from Soviet threats (Gerson 1991:28).

McLaurin and Moon's (1989) study of the US bases in the Pacific and their relationships to the host countries exemplified such understandings of US bases overseas and their relationships to the host communities (countries) in the Cold War Era. Their study recognized US bases in the Pacific foremost as important strategic sites to protect the US security and interests as well as those of its allied nations from potential Soviet threats. US national interests in the region were defined specifically in relation to the economic growth of Asian-Pacific countries, the political principal of democracy, and the social ties with a growing population of Asian descendants in the US. Accordingly, US national security was argued from the perspective that these national interests should be protected from potential Soviet threats. In addition, the Pacific’s regional political situations such as the Vietnam-China conflicts, Sino-Soviet conflicts, Cambodian conflict, the Korean Peninsula conflict, and finally the problem of mainland and island China were also considered as extensions of the Soviet and US power struggle. With detailed descriptions of the functions and structure (organizations) of the bases, their study described the relationships between US bases and the host communities (countries) as "corporative defense relationships," a notion central to the common security interest in the three geographic categories, northeast Asia, southeast Asia, and Oceania.

Gregor and Arganon's (1987) study particularly focuses on the US bases in the Philippines and the bases’ relationships to the country of the Philippines in the Cold War Era (just before the US withdrawal of the bases took place). US national interests in the

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1 More specifically, bases are understood in terms of their four principal functions. These functions are to project conventional military power, to prepare for and to launch nuclear war, to serve as tripwires guaranteeing a US military response to attack, and to serve as symbols of US power, influence, and ambitions (Garson 1991:13).
Philippines were identified with the recognition that the Philippines was one of the oldest “democracies” in Asia and had an “essentially market oriented economy,” thereby presenting itself as a potential economic “boom belt” in the region (93). Both US national security and the Philippines national security were discussed in relation to Soviet threats as well as other regional conflicts which were also recognized as an extension of Soviet threats. The US bases and their relationships to the country of the Philippines were represented as a necessity since the bases provided strategic functions to deter and contain development of the Soviet threats and regional conflicts, thereby ultimately creating peace in the world.

In dealing with the relationship between the US bases and the Philippines, their study also paid special attention to the anti-base and anti-American sentiments and movements among the Philippine people, which had become apparent since the mid-1970's. Their study identified several factors for the Philippine people's negative perceptions of their relationship with the US bases and the US as a country. These factors included the dependency of the Philippines' economy on the US, human rights violation by the Marcos' regime, and most importantly, the political threats of the bases to Philippines' sovereignty. Yet, their study argued that such anti-American and anti-base sentiments and movements should be weighed against the recognition that the bases remained strategically important sites for the US national security and interests. Therefore, their study concluded that the US should provide the Philippines with economic, political, and military support in order to retain the bases without impeding the sovereignty of the Philippines.

While studies with perspective from above conducted in the Cold War era defined national security and interests in relation to the presence of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War has created the necessity to redefine these concepts for both the US and host communities (countries). Accordingly, US bases overseas and their relationships to the host communities are now being re-examined. Duke's study (1989) on US bases in Europe, conducted in the end of the Cold War period, reflects this new direction. Although his study argued that Europe as a whole still presented the primary forward defense for US national security and interests from Soviet threats, it also recognized that the diminishing power of the Soviet Union, the growing economic power of European countries especially in comparison to that of the US, and European countries' growing interests in their own autonomy, had created a need for new definitions of national security and interests. It argued that the relationships between US bases and European host communities were now being shaped by more “regional” concerns and interests. For example, in the Southern Region countries, where basing rights were initially emphasized in return for economic and military assistance, defense budget cuts in the US had constrained the relationship. In the
Northern countries, the issues of nuclear weapons and whaling made the US basing in the region difficult. In the central region, while the US bases still remain as the largest and most important strategic sites, Germany’s economic strength as well as the country’s concerns with the “social costs” of having US bases in the region, constrains the relationship. Given these regionally specific concerns and interests, the focus of the relationships have shifted from the notion of deterring Soviet threats to the notion of “burden sharing” between the US and host communities (countries), which often has more economic implications than political ones.

Many other studies with perspectives from above on the relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities in the Post Cold War European context now present similar findings and similar arguments to those of Duke’s. The role of economy is perceived as playing a more important role than ever in defining national interests and national security in Europe and in examining the relationships between US bases and their European host countries (Bebermeyer and Thimann 1990; Duke 1990; Molero 1990). The relationships between US bases and their host communities (countries) are now discussed in terms of reduction/withdrawal of US bases although some argue that the benefits of the US bases’ presence outweigh the costs, and the costs of withdrawal outweigh the benefits for the US (Sharp 1990b:48). Moreover, threats to European countries are now perceived not in the Soviet Union, but in legacies of the Cold War era such as the remaining weaponry hardware in the former Soviet Union and international terrorist organizations which might take advantage of such weaponry (Farndale 1990, 433-436). In any case, understanding of the relationships between US bases and their host countries in the Post Cold War era requires radically different analysis and perspectives than ones in the Cold War era (Linnenkamp 1990), which in turn, require new understanding and definitions of national interests and national security.

In short, these studies with perspectives from above attempt to understand and analyze US bases overseas in terms of their strategic capabilities to protect and defend national interests and national security which are mostly defined in terms of international politics and political economy. Accordingly, these studies approach the relationships between US bases overseas and their host countries in terms of how the relationships play out their roles in helping the bases achieve their objectives. Studies conducted in the Cold War Era were mostly characterized by their attention to the threats of the Soviet Union, thereby emphasizing the dichotomy in the East-West power struggle. However, due to the end of the Cold War era, it becomes essential that the relationship needs to be understood and analyzed with more attention to regionally specific interests and concerns. The examination of the relationships between US bases overseas and their host countries in the
Post Cold War context needs to include not only strategic, political, and economical analysis of basing at the international level, but also social, cultural and environmental analysis of basing at regional and more microscopic levels (Joseph 1993 6-21). In other words, US bases need to be reexamined as a part of the host countries, as well as a part of international politics.

Studies with Perspectives from Below

Studies on the relationship between US bases overseas and their host communities with perspectives from below can be characterized by two concurring themes. The first theme is that US bases are rather differently perceived and understood in the context of host communities than in the context of international politics. That is to say, bases are not necessarily understood by the members of host communities in terms of their strategic functions and importance in assuring national security and national interests. Instead, members of the host communities often recognize the presence of the bases in terms of their immediate economic, social, and cultural benefits and costs for the communities. The second theme is that the relationship between the base and the host communities is perceived by the members of host communities as that of unequal power. Decisions and actions with regard to US bases are usually initiated from above (by the US governments and military as well as the host countries counterparts) in international politics, and the relationships between the bases and host communities are also largely influenced by the power from above. Host communities are at the receiving and reacting end of the power relationship. These two major themes prevail in most studies with perspectives from below while each study’s definition for the host communities as the unit of analysis varies in size and character. Some studies treat entire countries as the host communities (e.g., Berry 1989; Garcia 1991; Lolarga 1991; Nelson 1987). Others recognize towns and cities where the bases are located as host communities (e.g., Lolarga 1989; Ramos-Jimenes and Chiong-Javier 1987; Smich 1991). Still others recognize certain population(s) of a host community as its representative (e.g., Arasaki 1986).

Berry's (1989) study, by focusing on the Military Base Agreements (MBA) and amendments added to the MBA, illustrates how two different perceptions of US bases in the Philippines have emerged and changed over the time since the late 1940's. His study’s unit of analysis for the host community is the country of the Philippines. Berry’s study points out that although the presence of the bases was initially understood by both the US government and Philippine public as important strategic sites to deter aggression from
Japan and keep US interests in the country, the two countries' understandings of the bases eventually differentiated as the Cold War progressed. Despite the US military's emphasis on the strategic importance of the bases in relation to Mao's victory in China, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the frequent appearance of the Soviet military in Asia, the Philippine public did not see these international political conflicts as direct external threats to the Philippines. Instead, the Philippine public recognized the bases themselves as a very dangerous element, whose presence might lead their country to become involved in a superpower confrontation.

Berry's study also points out that the bases are perceived by the Philippine people as threats to Philippine independence, sovereignty, and democracy. "Human rights" issues, the "unhampered authority" exercised by the US over the bases, and the "unfair criminal jurisdictional system" regarding criminal offense on and off the bases involving both military personnel and Philippine people all portray US bases as a "colonial legacy." His study argues that the Philippines' new Constitution, established in 1987, reflects the concurring major theme in the relationship between the US and the Philippines: the conflict between the US national security and Philippine nationalism. His study also points out that the focus of the conflict now involves nuclear weapons on the bases, compensation for the bases, and Philippine sovereignty over the bases.

Ramos-Jimenes and Chiong-Javier's (1987) study presents a more micro level analysis of the relationship between US bases and their host communities. In their study, the host communities as the unit of analysis refer to the communities of Pampanga and Olongapo in the Philippines, where US Clark air base and Subic naval base were located, respectively. Their study points out that the bases are often understood and evaluated by the community members not in terms of the bases' strategic functions to protect national interest and national security, but in terms of their economic and social costs and benefits. The benefits created by the presence of the bases include economic opportunities for local individuals, improvement of social services and infrastructure, and increased revenues for the communities in general. The costs are described as being mostly related to the so-called "hospitality trade" (sex oriented business): the presence and threat of AIDS "brought by US servicemen" and "moral degradation" owing to various forms of sexual exploitation are discussed as examples of this particular social cost. The high rate of crime, housing shortage, breakdown of traditional Philippine family values, the unfair justice system concerning criminal activities of US military personnel are also identified as costs of having the US bases in their communities.

Their study however points out that when the costs of having the bases are weighed against the benefits, the communities perceive the bases as more beneficial than costly. As
their study was a part of Philippines preparation for reevaluation of US bases in 1991, the study also presents a proposal dealing with two possibilities of the future of the bases. Their study argues that if the bases are to stay, adequate rental payment should be made and that if they are to leave, the Philippine government should provide alternative livelihood opportunities for the communities with both short and long term development plans. In either case, the final decisions are seen as being in the hands of the US and the Philippine governments, but not in the communities, pointing to the unequal power relationship between the bases and the host communities.

Many other studies on the relationship between US bases and their host communities in the Philippines with perspectives from below present similar findings to the above studies. They examine the costs and benefits of having the US bases in the communities’ contexts as well as the unequal power relations between the US bases and the host communities (see Garcia 1991; Lolarga 1991; for similar discussions).

Smich’s (1991) study of the relationship between Comiso Town, Italy, and a US missile base in the town illustrates that the two major themes are also apparent in the European context. Her study takes into account the cultural context of Sicilian patronage politics and illustrates the development of a very complex relationship between the town and the base in the context of Sicilian patronage politics. Her study first points out that while NATO and the Italian government saw the construction of a US missile base in the town as a strategically important decision against the modernization of Soviet medium range nuclear forces, the townspeople rationalized it as an opportunity for the town's economic revitalization after their protest against the construction failed. Despite the prospect of economic revitalization, however, the study points out, the construction and presence of the base has created many economic, political, and socio-cultural problems in the town. Competitions for military construction contracts as well as other service contracts, carried out in the cultural context of the Sicilian patronage politics, led to bribery among party leaders and it eventually corrupted the town's politics. Consequently most jobs in the construction went to outsiders including the Mafia. The base itself provides only a few employment opportunities for the townspeople and the townspeople are heavily taxed for the improvement of infrastructure required by the presence of the base.

Smich’s study also points out that the national government and US officials, who were troubled by local communist leaders’ opposition against the base, intervened in local politics. They allied with the Socialists and Christian Democrat parties by promising to give them service and construction contracts at the base. Moreover, the presence of the base led to an increase in the number of crimes such as prostitution as well as to communal conflicts due to the base's illegal dumping of waste on town properties. Her study also
raises an important question especially with regard to the notion of security. Despite the fact that the base was supposed to provide security for the town, the town’s security was threatened by the presence of the base because the clash between Libya and US in the Middle East led to an attack on Lampedusa, the site of a US Communications Facility only 150 miles to the southwest of Comiso. Her study also points out that lack of interaction between the townspeople and the base’s unwillingness to understand the town have helped create many other problems. It concludes that the militarization can undermine not only a community’s political and economic life, but also the democratic ideals that it is supposed to defend.

Arasaki’s (1986) study, by analyzing a series of military base land lease contracts, illustrates the history of the relationship between US bases and a particular population of Okinawans, the Okinawan land owners of military bases. The study points out that two different perceptions of land emerged and were sharply contested in the process of the US military and occupational government’s “taking over” of lands from Okinawan land owners. While land (to a large extent Okinawa as a whole) was regarded by the military and governments as a “strategic place to host military bases,” the land represented an inseparable and most important part of livelihood for landowners who were mostly farmers. His study also points out that despite the US government and military’s recognition of individuals’ rights to their own properties, which was part of the larger framework of democratic ideologies the US government and military promoted during the occupation period, the unequal power relationship between the governments, military and land owners eventually led to the government and military’s maneuvering of negotiation of land lease contracts after the takeover of the land. As a result, although most of the land owners initially refused to make land leasing contracts with the US government in the 1950s, the US government and military base as well as Japanese government were able to make leasing contracts with the majority of land owners by the time of the Japan and US security treaty in 1960. His study also argues that the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 only shifted the focus of the governmental maneuver from the US to the Japanese government in terms of making lease contracts.

Arasaki’s study also pays special attention to the so called “antiwar land owners” who have been refusing to make any land lease contract with the Japanese government. It also shows that as a new strategy to take land back, there is an increasing number of Okinawans, 2,000, who have obtained a small piece of base land from these original antiwar land owners to share the original antiwar land owners’ burden. His study argues that over the past 50 years, the meaning of ownership of base land in Okinawa has shifted
from deprivation of livelihood as farmers to symbolic antiwar gestures and struggles for peace.

In short, these studies with perspectives from below present detailed pictures of the relationships between US bases and their host communities in the contexts of host communities from communities' perspectives. These studies show that US bases are often perceived differently in the contexts of host communities rather than in the context of international politics. They also show that the relationships between US bases and host communities are of unequal power. As counter examples, these studies often raise important questions of what "security" and "peace" mean and of whether the bases provide security and peace for the host communities. Studies with perspectives from below, however, also have to face some problems. Many of them remain rather descriptive in nature, often failing to examine the relationships between US bases and host communities in more theoretical and analytical terms. Moreover, given the inevitable political nature of the relationship, these studies have to struggle to deal with their political stances, whether in an attempt to remain neutral or to take sides. Nonetheless, given the post Cold War context in which the examination of the relationship between US bases and host communities is necessarily carried out at both regional and microscopic levels, studies with perspectives from below now have more chance than ever to contribute to the understanding of the relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities.

Studies with Social Deconstruction Perspectives

Relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities are also understood and analyzed from social deconstruction perspectives. Studies with social deconstruction perspectives recognize that military bases are socially constructed as such and so are the relationships between them and their host communities. Studies with social deconstruction perspectives introduce a specific voice or multiple voices which are otherwise suppressed in the dominant social constructions of military bases and their relationships to their host communities (see Linstead 1993:111). In doing so, not only they reveal the socially constructed nature of military bases and their relationships to the host communities, but also challenge the established understandings of the relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities. Moreover, unlike the previously mentioned studies with perspectives from below which rely for their analytical strength upon the distinction from studies with perspectives from above, studies with social
deconstruction perspectives are capable of even challenging the validity of such distinction (see e.g., Enloe 1990; 1991; 1993; Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1992; Takamine 1984).

Enloe's studies (1990; 1991; 1993) pioneer the employment of a social deconstruction approach and a feminist approach in understanding of militarization and the relationships between US bases overseas and their host communities. Her main thesis is that as a result of social construction, the military is regarded as an "innate masculine institution" and women, whether they are soldiers' wives, girl friends, prostitutes, or local women, are often excluded from studies of militarization. Moreover, even in studies where women are included, she argues, they are still taken as secondary to the "more important issues of national security." Her studies point out that in order for militarization and international politics to work, it requires genderization of political and military institutions: the military is dependent upon wives and girl friends at home, as well as their girl friends and prostitute in the host communities. Therefore, without the understanding of women and their relationships to men, studies of military and international politics are incomplete. Her studies also point out that since race and class distinctions play a very important role not only in the relationship between different genders but also among the same gender, attention to race and class distinctions is necessary in the social deconstruction of militarization.

Sturdevant and Stoltzfus' (1992) study of prostitutes working near US bases in the Philippines, Korea, and Okinawa reflects and extends in detail Enloe's feminist perspectives. They argue that without a study of base-generated prostitution, understanding of US militarization is not complete. By incorporating ethnographic approaches (oral history and interviews) in their study, they reveal similarities and differences of these women's relationship with US soldiers in the different base communities overseas.

They trace the origin of the relationship between the US military and prostitution to devastating effects of war on local communities and to the US military's creation of "rest and recreation" (R&R) policy in Asia at the end of WW II. As the war drastically changed the economies and demographics of the local populations directly involved in the bars, local women were inevitably forced to engage in prostitution to support their families. In this situation, R&R was established and absorbed these women. They point out that most of these prostitutes working near bases are still from poverty-stricken families of rural areas. Many of them are forced to become prostitutes by local business owners and gangs using money loan systems to control those women. They argue that the US military saw and still sees sexual labor provided by local women to military personnel as, if not necessary, an inevitable part of militarization. They also point out that the international political economy
plays an important role in deciding who becomes a prostitute and who does not. It is Filipino women, but not Okinawan women, for example, who work in Okinawa as prostitutes for the military, as Japan’s economic and political superior position is secured in international politics. They also illustrate how those prostitutes deal with their negatively perceived sexual labor: many prostitute women have become able to separate their minds from their bodies as their strategy for survival.

They conclude that what these host communities call “base economy” is actually in large part that of prostitution: therefore, to the extent that the local economy is dependent upon those prostitutes, the local governments, US military and government take part in the continuation of the prostitution-centered economy. They also argue that what underlies the relationship between US bases and prostitution is the masculinized idea of militarization in which prostitution is regarded by the local governments, the US military and government as an inevitable part of militarization (see also Dierking 1991 for Sex oriented business and the military relationship in Guam; Truong 1990 for sex oriented business and military in Southeast Asia).

Takamine’s (1984) study of “unknown US soldiers” in Okinawa presents a picture of US soldiers in Okinawa which is far more complex than the stereotypical picture of US soldiers held by the Okinawan public. While acknowledging and dealing with the negative stereotypical portraits of US military personnel in Okinawa, his study also illustrates cooperation and positive relationships established between US soldiers and Okinawans. His study points out that anti-base and antiwar movements by US military personnel took place in Okinawa during the Vietnam War period and these military personnel cooperated with Okinawan people as well as with American antiwar civilian activists in their protest against the Vietnam War. His study also reveals that black Muslim movements among black soldiers took place in Okinawa and their movements established an allied relationship with some Okinawans through the shared identity of “oppressed people” in their own societies. As for reasons why such movements and cooperative relationships between US soldiers and Okinawans took place, it is argued that due to the draft system, there was more diversity in US military personnel in Okinawa during the Vietnam War than at present. His study also argues that the present recruitment of military personnel, which is often more related to socio-economic conditions of the recruited than to patriotism, has changed the constituency of military personnel in Okinawa as well as their relationship with Okinawan people (see Nelson 1987 for similar discussion on changes in the characteristics of US military personnel in the German context.)

In short, these studies with social deconstruction perspectives reveal hidden or less mentioned aspects of the relationships between US bases and host communities, thereby
challenging the established understandings of the relationships as well as the premises which these understandings are based upon. However, like many other studies with deconstruction perspectives in general, they have to face some challenges. First, studies with social deconstruction perspectives often have to deal with their own power struggle against studies with other more established perspectives, especially studies with perspectives from above. They have to show why their understandings of military bases and their relationships to host communities are as valid as those of studies with perspectives from above. This requires these studies with deconstruction perspectives to go beyond the rather simplistic argument of power inequality between themselves and the studies with perspectives from above. Secondly, because of their capability to deconstruct and destabilize the established understandings of the relationships between US bases and their host communities, these studies with social deconstruction perspectives have to be aware of the implications of their studies on the actual situations and the people involved. For example, what would be the implications for a host community of arguing that the local government and the people play a major role in sustaining the prostitution centered base economy (Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1992)? This deconstruction of the existing understanding of the relationship, regardless of its intellectual and academic endeavor, may not create positive results in actual situations unless it is carefully articulated. Instead, it might exacerbate not only the relationship between the base and the host community, but also the possibility of the host community to solve the problems of prostitution. Therefore, it is necessary to take into consideration the possible effects and implications of such deconstruction of the relationship on the host community. Nonetheless, in the context of the Post Cold War era, studies with deconstruction perspectives can make more than ever important contributions by providing alternative understandings of the relationships as well as alternative definitions of national security and national interests.

**Studies on Strategies of the Powerless in Unequal Power Relationships**

While the above section discusses how the relationships between US bases and their host communities have been studied from three different perspectives, this section focuses on studies dealing with strategies of the powerless to live with the powerful in unequal power relationships. What connects the previous section to this section is that the relationships between US bases and their host communities are often of unequal power, bases being powerful and the host communities being powerless. This section serves as
this ethnography’s theoretical and analytical orientation as the ethnography tries to capture the everyday strategies of the townspeople of Kin to live with the base.

Emphasis on understanding strategies of the powerless to live with the powerful is a theoretical and analytical reaction to the theoretical domination by the concepts of hegemony and false consciousness in the study of power relations. Hegemony is the process of ideological domination in which the ruling class dominates both means of physical production and symbolic production. False consciousness is a process by which the powerless incorporate the symbolic production presented by the powerful (Scott 1990:315). In this sense, false consciousness is a product and a mechanism of this process of ideological domination. However, Scott (ibid.) questions the implicit assumption of hegemony:

[T]he problem with the hegemonic thesis, at least in its strong forms as proposed by some of Gramsci's successors, is that it is difficult to explain how social changes could originate from below. Even in the relatively stable industrial democracies to which theories of hegemony were meant to apply, their strongest formulation simply does not allow for the degree of social conflicts and protest that actually occurs (78).

Especially in anthropology, ethnographic focus on strategies of the powerless to live with the powerful was also a result of anthropological practices which take place at the grass root levels in their field research (Vincent 1990:400). Vincent, echoing Scott’s view, points out that the study of power relations with the dominant focus on the notion of hegemony “systematically repressed in conventional accounts the recognition of the material basis of cultural resistance and opposition” (ibid.: 402). As the concepts of “strategies of the powerless” and “weapons of the weak” have come to play a major role in the study of power relations, these concepts are also redefined and expanded with a growing body of case studies (e.g., Ong 1987; Scheffel 1989; Colins Scott 1989; James Scott; 1985, 1990; Skalnik 1989 for case studies).

James Scott’s (1985) study illustrates the power relations between the rich and poor in Sedaka Village in Malaysia which was created and shaped by the introduction of the Green Revolution, a form of capitalist expansion in the world. As his study focuses on the poor’s everyday strategies to live with and deal with the rich, he provides two important theoretical contributions. First, he redefines the concept of class resistance by introducing the notion of “weapons of the weak.” Unlike the previous concept of resistance which required organized and structured forms, class resistance with “weapons of the weak” includes “any acts by member(s) of a subordinate class(es) that is or are intended to mitigate or deny claims made on that class by superordinate classes, or to advance its own
claims" (ibid.:290). This definition of resistance allows Scott to capture the strategies of peasants rising as "vast and relatively unexplored middle-ground of peasants politics between passivity and open, collective defiance" (ibid.). This definition includes both individual and collective acts and ideology as expressed in symbolic forms. Moreover, this definition focuses on "intention" of resistance but not on the success or failure of resistance, since failed resistance seldom leaves its traces. To Scott, therefore, strategies of resistance by the weak are found in everyday life ranging from clandestine arson and sabotage to foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, surrender, and so forth (ibid.:29). Moreover, he argues, the forms of resistance that the weak takes are designed to obscure the weak's intentions or to take cover behind an apparent meaning (see Scott 1990:199 for more discussion).

Second, Scott recognizes the possibility of bringing about social changes through "weapons of the weak" in the resilient and disguising nature of "weapons of the weak" and in the hegemony's own contradictions/conflicts within itself (1985:336-337). He points out that since such everyday forms of resistance are often invisible, they do not present any immediate threat to the powerful, thereby not seriously being challenged by the powerful. Even if the "weapons of the weak" fail to achieve their objectives or bring about radical changes, the strategies, by virtue of being everyday resistance which is rooted in their dominated life, will remain (see Scott 1990 for more detailed discussion of successful strategies of changes). More importantly, Scott argues that social changes or ideological bases necessary for such change are seen as not necessarily coming from outside the hegemony as many claim. Instead, he argues, changes occur because the hegemony itself consists of many different interpretations and conflicts and can be a major source of internal disintegration. Moreover, changes can occur if hegemony fails to guarantee itself by providing the powerless with what it promises or at least a portion of what it promises (ibid.: 337). These two theoretical points are now being employed and seen in much other "resistance" literature.

The case studies in Outwitting States (Skalnik ed. 1989) illustrate various power relations taking place between people and the "State." These studies share the view that powerless people are not passive recipients of power inequality in their relation to the "State" (the powerful). Rather they are active players who employ their own various

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6 Scott (1990: 198) develops a summary of power relations in terms of domination and resistance. In this formula, he distinguishes forms of Public declared resistance from forms of disguised, low profile, undisclosed resistance (Infrapolitics): the latter includes poaching squatting, (everyday forms of resistance), masked appropriation, anonymous threats (direct resistance by disguised resisters), rituals of aggression, tales of revenge, gossip, and rumor (hidden transcript of anger, aggression, and disguised discourses of dignity), and millennium religions, folk religion, myths of social banditry and class heroes, world-upside-down imagery (development of dissident subcultures).
strategies to “outwit” the state. In these studies, the power is especially identified with the state which possesses the capacity for carrying out decisions and activities ostensibly on behalf of a whole society by specific state agencies that have a monopoly over use of threat or use of organized violence. The notion of power is also distinguished from that of authority, which is legitimate without the backing of power, voluntarily recognized by all and diffused, truly residing in and exercised by the people. Therefore, “outwitting of state” is recognized as a result of interaction between power and authority and it refers to a situation in which the state power is transcended by a different kind of power “providing identity for the community (Skalnik 1989:8-9). Of the studies in Outwitting the State, two case studies are of special interest here since they present different types of power (or outwitting) of the powerless to deal with the “state,” the government of Canada.

Scott’s (1989) study on the relationship between the James Bay Cree Indian and the state of Canada illustrates the incorporation of a modified ideology of reciprocity as an important strategy of the Cree Indians to deal with the state of Canada. The ideology of reciprocity stems from the Cree Indian culture and is also widely recognized as a major logic according to which relationships in archaic society were structured. The ideology of reciprocity has enabled the Cree Indians to secure a means of material benefits and autonomy while the ideology of reciprocity has also been modified by the Cree Indians themselves to their changing relationships with the state of Canada. The state in turn incorporated the ideology of positive reciprocity as a model of interethnic relations. During two historic events, the starvation of 1930’s and the building of hydroelectric infrastructure in the 1970’s, however, the model collapsed and a crucial aspect of the ideology was revealed. That is, in order for reciprocity to take place effectively, not only exchange values of materials have to be determined by negotiation between the Cree Indian and the State, but also the practice of exchange has to be accompanied by the perception that one is more yielding than the partner. In other words, the success of reciprocity as a model for continuous interethnic relations now requires the establishment of metaphors (or ideological justification) that create equilibrium in the exchange of statehood and patrimony.

Scheffel’s (1989) study on the Russian Old Believers of Alberta and their relationship to the state presents another form of the strategy of the powerless to live with the powerful. In this case, their strategy is described as “semi avoidance.” The Old Believers were always prepared to travel around the globe in search of places where they would be free or relatively free from state oppression. Their mobility provides them with a means to deal with powerful states. They avoided supporters of the new state religion and vowed not to share anything with them by moving away from it. In Canada, they can no

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7 The concept of power here is defined along the line of Max Weber (Skalnik 1989: 8-9).
longer practice avoidance in its full sense and have to combine it with some forms of collaboration with the state. Therefore, their "semi avoidance" consists of, for example, not demanding for a post office or municipal services, or state provided old age pensions and social security services while remaining in Canada.

Ong's (1987) study of the relationship between a transitional factory and Malay female workers adds to studies of strategies of the powerless. She deals with two other important dimensions, namely recognition of multiple layers of power relations and recognition of moral and ethical aspects in such studies. Her study focuses on how the Malay female workers caught between the penetration of capitalism culture and the traditional culture deal with the situation in which they find themselves. The powerful here refers to the transitional factory as well as its capitalistic culture which influences and incorporates into itself many aspects of the traditional Malay society. Ong argues that the introduction of capitalist culture has created new multiple social strata and regenderized the society through channels of education and labor market pressures; these are part of capitalist culture and capitalist discipline, but are not part of the Malay culture. Therefore, she argues, the Malay female factory workers have to deal with multiple layers of power relations with different players, not only in the factory setting, but also in its larger societal setting.

Ong illustrates that, caught between changes brought by capitalist culture and traditional Malay culture, the Malay factory women use both self control and spirit possession to express their new identities, to empower their relations with men and with the wider society, and to diminish control by dominant power structures. These strategies are seen as stemming from their traditional culture as well as the newly introduced corporate culture itself. She argues that these strategies proceed against neither capitalism or the state per se, but against moral oppression as well as a deep sense of moral descending, insisting on an ancient equality rooted in common (ungendered) humanity. Spirit attacks are, therefore, "indirect retaliation against coercion and demands for justice in personal terms within the industrial milieu" (ibid.:220). Ong's study in this sense points to the importance of understanding moral and ethical dimensions, especially with regards to gender equality, in the study of power relations.

In short, the above studies provide a theoretical and analytical framework in which to find how to understand strategies of the powerless to live and deal with the powerful. They argue that the power of the powerless which is manifested in strategies of the powerless are different from that of the powerful; many strategies of the powerless are often invisible to the powerful, rooted in their daily life and their cultural traditions. Moreover, these studies point out that the objectives that the strategies of the powerless try
to achieve range from improvement in their daily life to radical social changes to moral and humanistic ideological changes in the global economy. However, any application of this theoretical and analytical framework to empirical ground requires the following points. First, discussion of the power and strategies of the powerless should be done with thorough discussion of “hegemony” since it is “hegemony” that strategies of the powerless are intended to deal with. “Hegemony” should be contextualized in such a way that the relationship between the strategies of the powerless and “hegemony” becomes clear. Second, the question of when and where the weak’s daily life or cultural tradition become strategies or vise versa needs to be answered carefully since their daily life and cultural tradition and strategies may be interchangeable. Whether there is any “intention” to challenge hegemony on the part of the powerless is a crucial clue. Finally, if it is accepted that some strategies of the weak can challenge the hegemony successfully, at least a successful scenario of such strategies of the weak needs to be provided by this theoretical and analytical framework.

Summary of Literature Review

The above two sections of literature review, complementary to each other, provide a guideline for this ethnography of the relationship between Kin Town and the US military base, Camp Hansen. In the first section, how the relationships between US military bases overseas and their host communities have been studied from three different perspectives were reviewed. As this ethnography tries to capture and present the relationship in the context of the town and from the townspeople’s perspectives, this ethnography follows studies with perspectives from below. How the base is differently perceived by the townspeople from that of international politics and how the unequal power relationship comes into play in the relationship will be dealt with in this ethnography. This ethnography will also benefit from both studies with perspectives from below and studies with deconstruction perspectives. Studies with perspectives from above will provide a framework of international politics with regards to why and how the base came into existence in the town as well as discussions of national security and national interests. Studies with deconstruction perspectives will direct this ethnography to deal with hidden or less studied aspects of the relationship. In the second section, several studies on “strategies” of the powerless to live and deal with the powerful were reviewed. This section was presented to complement the fact that studies with perspectives from below are often theoretically and analytically limited to comparisons of different perceptions and
power inequality between US bases and their “host communities.” The studies in this section therefore provide a theoretical and analytical framework which enables this ethnography to capture the relationship between the town and the base through the townspeople’s strategies to live with the base. The concepts of “weapons of the weak” or strategies of the powerless will guide this ethnography to seek strategies of the townspeople in their daily life which stem from the townspeople’s perceptions of the base and their power relationships with the base. Moreover, as discussed in the second section, some possible problems with this theoretical and analytical framework of “strategies” of the weak will be addressed in this ethnography. The contextualization of “hegemony” and the question of distinction between “strategies” and daily life and traditional life will be dealt with carefully.
Chapter 3

Methods, Data, and Limitations

The data on which this ethnography is based can be categorized into two types, ethnographic data and non-ethnographic data. Ethnographic data refers to the data that I collected through participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Non-ethnographic data refers to the data collected which came from various forms of publications such as guide books, governmental statistics, history book, and brochures. Many of the non-ethnographic data are published by the town office and various organizations in the town as well as by the prefectural government of Okinawa, Japan. While these two different data are complementary to each other, the ethnographic data was used primarily for descriptions, explanations, and analysis of the present day relationship between the town and the base, and the non-ethnographic data primarily for reconstruction of the history of the relationship between the town and the base. In the following, I will first discuss the methods of data collection and the nature of the data. I will also discuss some important limitations of my methods of data collection as well as of the data itself. These limitations in turn reflect and constitute the partiality of the ethnography itself.

Ethnographic Methods and Ethnographic Data

Since the nature of my study is descriptive and exploratory and since I intended to present my study in the form of ethnography, I chose participant observation and semi-structured interview as my main methods of data collection. My data collection took place from mid July 1993 to early October of 1993. During this period, I was engaging in my internship, holding a dual position of intern/researcher, in the Office of Town History Compilation in the town office. My data collecting activity was regarded as a part of my internship in the office. This internship situation proved overall to be very helpful for me in collecting data, especially considering the limited time period and financial situation of my field work as well as many other difficulties stemming from the nature of my research project. This internship situation provided a relational framework according to which I interacted with townspeople and conducted participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Instead of being in the field by myself and having to establish rapport with townspeople from scratch, I was able to observe and participate in various town activities
and events as a staff member of the town office. I was also able to conduct semi-structured interviews as an intern student who had been approved by the town office to do so.

The main purpose of conducting participant observation was to experience and capture part of the lives of townspeople as primary data, in this case, part of the lives of town office workers. I engaged in various office work including arranging and sorting out historical documents and translating books from English to Japanese. Moreover I was able to attend various kinds of official meetings and events as a staff member of the town office. These meetings and events included meetings for the town history compilation office, Kin Town Festival committee meetings, and soft ball games with military personnel. In addition to conducting participant observations in the public domain as an intern of the town office, I also frequented bars and restaurants, played basketball with the town's youth club, and simply talked to people in and outside the town as a part of my individual activities of participant observation.

My main purpose of conducting semi-structured interviews was to capture in their own words how my informants perceive the base and their relationship with the base and how my informants live with the base. Since I intended to have the constitution of my informants to be reflective of the town's entire population and the contents of interviews suitable to my research purposes, I went through the following phases.

In the first phase, in the first two weeks of the field work, I concentrated on developing a lists of questions and a population diagram which would be used as a guide line for choosing a population sample for interviews. To do this, I talked with town office workers and some other townspeople, examined the town's telephone book, and the town office's annual publication which reports the demographics of the town. Eventually, I developed a list of basic questions, which were very broad and flexible, reflecting the focus of my interviews as well as my intention to not offend informants with sensitive questions. I also developed a sample population diagram which consists of five major categories. These categories are "native Kin male," "native Kin female," "non-native Kin male," "non-native Kin female" and "others." The term "native Kin" refers to those who are descendants of people who resided in Kin before WW II or who are members of the community land owners organizations. The term "non-native" Kin refers to those who came to reside in the town during and after World War II. The term "others" includes US military personnel living on or off the base and Filipino women living in the town. This categorization of the townspeople is however not necessarily rigid with the exception of the "others" category. There have been many marriages between native and non-native Kin people, thus this categorization cannot adequately explain the status of their children. There are also those who live outside of the town but consider themselves as native Kin people.
Nonetheless, these concepts of native Kin people (Kin Chu or Kin nu Shiman Chu) and non-native Kin people exist and townspeople often use these concepts to identify themselves.

The second phase was to look for people to interview. This phase however proved to be difficult since many issues surrounding the presence of the base are very political and often controversial. Given the short period of time of my research, I often felt that I did not have proper rapport to talk with townspeople about some of the sensitive issues. While my initial intention was to choose people for each category of my sample population diagram as randomly as possible, I eventually used a snow ball method to find twenty people to interview. That is to say, I asked a few people in the town office to ask people to be my informants. Therefore, unlike more statistically representative sample populations, my sample population was biased and selective in that they were somehow connected to one another through kinship, friendship, or personal acquaintances of staff members of the office. However, I tried to have my informants represent the five categories as much as possible. The breakdown of my informants and their basic background are indicated in Appendix.

The third phase was to conduct actual interviews. The length of each interview varied from 20 minutes to one hour. Interviews were conducted in informants’ work places (bars and offices) or in coffee shops and restaurants in and outside the town. Some accepted that their interviews would be tape recorded while others did not. Bar owners, who were concerned with the negative perceptions of their business practice especially in the hiring of Filipino women, were particularly reluctant to be tape recorded. In such case, I used my field books to record the conversations. I also tried to make my research questions as flexible as possible depending upon each situation of interviews. I usually started with very basic and often vague questions such as “how do you see the base?” and “how do you deal with the presence of the base?” and let the conversation unfold it. As results of this method, some outcomes of the interviews were not necessarily relevant to my research questions. However, overall, all the interviews provided important data for my ethnography.

Non-Ethnographic Data

During my fieldwork, I collected and examined non-ethnographic data, which came in various forms of public written statements or publications. The non-ethnographic data include books published by the town office and branches of the town office, town office’s
public brochures, pamphlets, land lease contract documents made between the US government and the town and townspeople, conference papers, and transcripts of the town assembly meetings. These documents were available to me mainly due to my position as an intern in the Office of Town History Compilation. In fact, as one of my intern duties, I was assigned to reorganize and make an index catalogue for war related documents and immigration related documents for the office.

My intention in collecting these non-ethnographic data was twofold: First, and primarily, I intended to use them to reconstruct a cultural history of the relationship between the town and the base. While oral histories by some of my informants provide some information for creating a cultural history of the relationship, the town’s history book and other history books published by other public offices, and copies of legal documents provided basic data for my understanding and reconstructing the history of the town and the relationship between the town and the base. Secondly, I also collected non-ethnographic data to complement my ethnographic data. Public statistical data as well as transcripts of the town assembly meetings over the last 40 years provided important information on the town’s relationship with the base. Especially, the monetary dimensions of the relationship such as the “land lease money,” were obtained through non-ethnographic data.

Limitations of the Methods and Data: Partiality of the Ethnography

Admittedly, as pointed out by many anthropologists (see Clifford 1986, Marcus 1986, Pratt 1986), my methods of data collection and data themselves were limited by various factors, and these imitations in turn constitute and reflect the partiality of this ethnography. Obviously, there were time and financial constraints. Three months were not a long enough period to conduct field work thoroughly. And these particular months of year in which the Kin Festival takes place provided rather particular interactions between the town and the base for study. My financial situation forced me to commute from my home in Nago to Kin Town daily instead of living in Kin.\(^8\) Although I sometimes stayed over night in the town to conduct my research, my research tended to be conducted during day time, missing night time interactions between the base and the town. However, many of the limitations in my methods of data collection and data itself were related to the political and sometimes controversial nature of the relationship between the base and the town and my own relationship with the town and the base.

\(^8\) Nago City is about 15 miles away from Kin Town, and I usually took bus and sometimes drove to the town.
First of all, I entered the town, which was already politically charged due to the presence of the base, with my own cultural and political baggage. That is to say, while Kin Town as a whole in general takes a conservative “pro-base” stance, I entered the town with a very critical view of the present situation of military bases in Okinawa and critical view of the town’s “pro-base” stance. Although I am from Nago, Okinawa and Kin Town is very close to Nago, I would be classified as a “liberal” in the political dichotomy of Okinawa with regard to “base issues.” Being a “liberal” is usually associated with the notion of “anti-base” and some other negative political connotations in Kin Town. While I found that at the ideological level many townspeople shared with me the view that “peace through militarization” and the present form of it in Okinawa does not necessarily create peace, I also suspected that any strong expression of my political stance would make my field work difficult. Therefore, I tried to remain neutral, being very careful in interviews not to be too political and ideological. In fact, I expressed my political and ideological opinions regarding the base issues only when asked. Nonetheless, my political stance definitely influenced my field work especially with regards to the selection of informants and some of the content of the interviews. It is important to note that the main reason I was able to have an internship and field research in the town, in this politically charged environment, was due to a change in the town’s office’s political climate from the “pro-base” position to a more alternative seeking position.9

Secondly, there were some “taboo” subjects in the town due to the presence of the base. I was not able to obtain enough information on these subjects to the extent that I could feel comfortable discussing them in detail. For example, there are issues and problems regarding the “money distributing system.” As I will describe later, this system, while having its origin as a communal land property management system in the pre-war history of the town, is regarded as a very controversial system. It has created divisions and uneasiness among the townspeople. While this system is a very crucial aspect of the relationship between the town and the base, talking about the system openly was also regarded as taboo. Given the short period of my time in the field and my consequent lack of true rapport with the townspeople, especially base land owners, I often felt uncomfortable doing in-depth interviews on this system. Therefore, some information on the system was obtained, not necessarily through semi-structured interviews with those who have direct knowledge of it, but through examination of transcripts of the town’s assembly meetings. Moreover, there were also issues and problems with regard to the bar section of the town whose main customers are US military personnel. The hiring of

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9 For this I am indebted to the officials in the Development and Planning Section. They are considered as “new thinkers” in the town.
Philippine women as “entertainers” and their suspected practice of prostitution were considered very problematic but also “taboo” subjects to talk about. In fact, few bar owners were willing to talk about such subjects and many other townspeople could only provide their speculations on these subjects. Therefore, while I conducted semi-structured interviews with bar owners and the data on bar owners occupy a major part in this ethnography, my data are mostly concerned with bar owners' own strategies to deal with military personnel as bar customers, but not with the suspected practice of prostitution in the bar section.

Thirdly, my position in the town office, while overall proven to be very helpful in my data collection, also created limitations in my methods of data collection and the data itself. My participant observation was concentrated in the domain of the town office, especially the Development and Planning Section and Office of Town History Compilation. The majority of my informants were somehow known to be connected with each other in the domain of this particular section of the town office. Moreover, since most members of this section are regarded as “new thinkers” in the conservative town office (in fact some were once regarded as “liberal” by many other townspeople), my data from participant observation and semi-structured interviews conducted in this domain reflect their political views rather than the townspeople’s more conservative views of the relationship between the town and the base. Furthermore, since the relationship between the town office and the land owners associations was not necessarily good, my status of intern for the town office often made my field work difficult. In fact, I was not able to conduct in-depth interviews with any of the representatives of the Kin Town land owners’ association.

Fourth, my non-ethnographic data was not as complete as I would like it to be. For example, while I was able to use the town’s history book (Kin Chou Shi 1982) to examine the relationship between the town and the base and of the town itself, I did not have much data from outside the town to cross examine the town’s version of the history in terms of its accuracy. Moreover, as some important portions of the transcripts of the town assembly meetings were missing at the time of my data collection, I was not able to gain complete information on debates on the land distribution system.

Finally, although my initial intention was to conduct semi-structured interviews with US soldiers and Filipino women as well, I was able to conduct only one interview with a US military officer. Making contacts with US military personnel was difficult mostly due to my time constraint although I was able to carry out casual conversations with some of them. As for Filipino women, I was not able to conduct any in-depth interviews. Since their daily life routines were often constricted by their employers (see Sturdevant and
Stolzfus 1992 for more detail) and "taboo" issues regarding them, I was only able to have a few casual conversations with them.

These above limitations influence my field work. They in turn create and reflect the partiality of my ethnography. And this ethnography should be read as such. This ethnography is not a complete representation of the relationship between the town and the base. Rather it is my interpretation of the relationship based upon my limited methods and limited data.
Chapter 4

Cultural History of the Relationship

In this chapter, I will review the history of the relationship between Kin and the base. I will divide this chapter into two sections. In the first section, I will illustrate the cultural context of Kin before World War II (WW II). Although the beginning of the relationship actually dates to the later part of WW II when a front line air field was created by the US military, the base was not constructed in a historical or cultural vacuum; Kin had had its unique cultural context as a rural farming community before the base became part of it. The close knit communal membership, communal land property management, and immigration from Kin to overseas are discussed as important characteristics of Kin in the pre-war period. In the second section, I will review the history of the relationship from the WW II period to the mid 1970's, shortly after the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. How Kin became a part of the international political scene through the construction of the base, how the presence of the base created the "base economy" in Kin, and how the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 changed the relationship are discussed. In the end, I will present an interpretive summary and discussion of the cultural history of the relationship between Kin and the base. In this interpretive summary and discussion, I attempt to illustrate historical continuities and discontinuities between pre-war Kin and post-war Kin Town in relation to the construction and presence of the base in the town.

Pre-War Kin: A Rural Farming Community with a Proud History

In 1940, five years before the battle of Okinawa in WW II took place, Kin Village existed as a rural farming community with a population of about 8,000 people (Kin Town 1983:3). About 90% of the villagers cultivated sugar canes, sweet potatoes, wheat, beans, and some other vegetables. They also engaged in timber industry, selling timbers to other towns and villages as means of gaining cash (ibid.:443). Unlike today's Kin Town, the pre-war Kin consisted of seven communities including those which now form a separate village, Ginoza Village. It was only after WW II that three of these seven communities with two other newly established communities were reorganized as Kin Village. Therefore,
unless specific references are made with regard to specific communities, Kin Village in the following section refers to the collective unit of these seven communities.\(^{10}\)

One of the important characteristics of the pre-war Kin was that although Kin Village as a whole had experienced the migration of new populations from other parts of Okinawa, the three communities of Igei, Yaka, and Kin, which are at present part of Kin Town, remained as close knit communities. These communities were made up mostly of “native” community members, thereby maintaining the strong communal membership and identity within each community (see Kin Town 1983:663-734 for discussion of history of each community in the town). This situation in these communities is quite a contrast to that of the four communities which now form Ginoza Village, since migrants to these latter communities were well integrated into the communities.

In the late 19th century, Kin Village experienced the migration of a new population into the village for the first time as a consequence of the Ryukyu Shobun of 1879. A number of Okinawan aristocrats, who had lost their positions in the system of the Ryukyu Kingdom, migrated from the Capitol Shuri area to the northern Okinawa including Kin Village.\(^{11}\) Until that time, the members of the all communities in Kin Village consisted mostly of kinship relations. In fact, even marriage between the different communities within the village was not welcomed in Kin Village until the end of the Meiji Era (1910) as people were prohibited by law from moving from one community to another during the later period of the Ryukyu Kingdom (from 17th century to the middle of 19th century) (ibid.:151). It is into this context of close knit communities that Shuri aristocrats migrated and began engaging in farming. These aristocrats were often called Kiryumin, the drifters, being differentiated from local community members. In 1903, Kin Village as a whole had 949 Kiryumin which accounted for 13% of the village’s entire population (Aniya 1991:129).

There were however some discrepancies between the communities in terms of how these new migrants were treated and the number of migrants settled in. In the communities of Ginoza, Kanna, Kochiya, Sokei, which form Ginoza Village at present, native community farmers and Kiryumin were treated relatively the same way. Kiryumin in these communities were able to receive relatively the same share of land properties as native community farmers, and they were taxed the same way as native community farmers. Moreover, after a certain period of time, Kiryumin were able to become full pledged

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\(^{10}\) The three communities which remained in Kin Village were, Igei, Yaka, and Kin. The two new communities were Namisato and Nakagawa. Nakagawa was created mostly by new migrants to Kin and Namisato was separated from Kin community. Kin Village was granted its township in 1980.

\(^{11}\) The Ryukyu Shobun refers to the series of political changes that took place in Okinawa in the late 19th century. The Ryukyu kingdom was officially incorporated into the nation state of Japan as Okinawa.
community members in these communities (Takara 1991:118). On the other hand, in the communities of Igei, Yaka, and Kin, which form Kin Town at present, Kiryumin did not receive a share of the land and were not allowed to participate in most of the communal events. Moreover, in order for any Kiryumin to reside in any of these communities, they had to be approved by the community assembly of each community and they were never allowed to become full pledged members of the communities (ibid.:117-118). Such differential treatment of Kiryumin resulted in a differential population distribution of the Kiryumin between the communities of what is now Kin Town and what is now Ginoza Village. In 1903, while Kiryumin accounted for 29% of the population of the communities which now form Ginoza Village, they accounted only 6.5% of the population of the communities which now form Kin Town (Aniya 1991:129). Moreover, since many Kiryumin lived in somewhat isolated areas of these communities and intermarriage between Kiryumin and native farmers rarely took place up until the end of the Taishou era (1925) (Kin Town 1983:704), the communities of what is now Kin Town continued to be composed of “native” community people. These communities were able to retain the close knit communal relationship within the communities.

From 1938 to 1944, Kin Village experienced a second major wave of migrants into the village as the Okinawa Prefectural Government carried out a cultivation plan in the village. To attract new migrants from the other parts of Kin as well as many other parts of Okinawa, 159 new houses were built by the Okinawa Prefectural Government in the cultivation area in what is now Nakagawa and Kin communities. New migrants were promised pieces of land, which had been owned primarily by the communities and the village. Takunan Kunrensho, an agricultural training center, was also built as a part of the cultivation plan and it attracted 1195 students into Kin Village from other parts of Okinawa (Aniya 1991:133).

However, as Okinawa became heavily involved in WW II in 1944, the entire cultivation plan was halted. The migration of new population into the village was incomplete and integration of the new population into the communities did not take place. The transaction of land to these new immigrants who had already established themselves in the area was not completed either, which would lead to a complicated land dispute later (ibid.:131-133). Again, despite the migration of new populations into the communities, the close knit communal character of these communities remained intact. Consequently, these communities entered WW II as close knit communities mostly linked by kinship relations.

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12 As a reason for the differences in the treatments of Kiryumin by these communities, Aniya (1991:130) suggests that the communities of what is now Kin Town were overpopulated and rather developed, making the distribution of farming lands to the Kiryumin difficult, whereas the communities of what is now Ginoza Village were less developed and had more land to share with Kiryumin.
Another important aspect of the pre-war Kin was that these communities of Kin had practiced communal timbering and had made tremendous efforts to keep and protect their communal and village Somayama (wood land) from the prefectural and national governments’ attempts to purchase them (see Kin Town 1983: 65-94). Following their ancestors’ 300 year old practice of communal land management, the Somayama land was owned primarily by the communities. The communities practiced timbering as the main means of gaining cash. They sold timbers as construction materials and fire woods to other parts of Okinawa. The communal ownership and management of the Somayama land also reflected the fact that in the pre WW II period it was each community, not the village, that functioned as a de facto administrative unit for the village people (ibid.: 629 and see ibid.: 663-734 for discussion on each community).

In 1885, a permission for cultivating the Somayama land was issued by Okinawa Prefectural Governor Narahara. The issuing of the permission was intended to give a new means of living to Shuri aristocrats who had lost their administrative positions due to the Ryukyu Shobun. It was also intended to create a strong agricultural industry in Okinawa as a part of the process of Japanization of Okinawa (ibid.: 75-76). The issuing of the permission, however, led to a massive buy-out of the Somayama land from villages and communities. Not only Shuri aristocrats but prefectural government bureaucrats from mainland Japan participated in the buy-out of the Somayama land. In fact, by the year 1887, two years after the permission was issued, more than half of the land sold in the northern part of Okinawa had been purchased by Governor Narahara’s prefectural government bureaucrats and Shuri aristocrats (ibid.:76).

In Kin Village, however, the situation was different from that of many other villages in northern Okinawa. Led by Kyuzo Toyama, a Kin native democracy activist, the communities of Kin as a whole rallied against prefectural government bureaucrats’ and Shuri aristocrats’ attempts to purchase their Somayama land. As a result, no communal Somayama land in Kin Village was sold (ibid.:77).

In 1899, by issuing Okinawa Ken Tochiseirihou, a new land regulation law (see Kin Town 1983:80-83), the national government now moved towards nationalizing of Somayama land. Although this law would permit farmers to privately own land for the first time, the private ownership was to be accompanied by large property taxes. Therefore, the law was more effective in the national government’s buying out of

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13 The Ryukyu Kingdom began its Somayama land management in the mid-17th century and local communities including Kin were integrated into its management plan (Kin Town 1983:65-92).
14 He was an appointed governor by the national government and he was from the Japanese mainland. The prefectural government was the main vehicle of Japanization of Okinawa and most of the people who held high positions in the prefectural government were from the Japanese mainland as well.
communally owned land than in creating private land ownership. Prefectural Governor Narahara pressed for the nationalization of the Somayama land, suggesting that if the Somayama land was nationally owned, people would not need to pay property taxes for the Somayama land. He also suggested that even if the Somayama land was nationally owned, local people would still be allowed to manage and cut timber in the Somayama land as before (ibid.: 80).

However, again led by Kyuzo Toyama, Kin Village was the first village to voice its resentment against the nationalization of the Somayama land. Toyama insisted that the Somayama land should be owned by individuals, communities, or municipal governments. He also argued that, contrary to Narahara's promise, the proposed nationalization of the Somayama land would prohibit farmers from managing and cutting of timber in the Somayama land (ibid.: 80-82). Kin villagers staged rallies and community meetings, supporting Toyama's idea while police guards were sent by the prefectural government to the village many times to control the villagers. However, the fear of high property taxes eventually prevailed. By 1903, 90% of the Somayama land in Okinawa became nationally owned, and the Somayama land in Kin Village was no exception (ibid.).

In 1906, however, the national government reversed its previous land regulation law since the management of the nationally owned Somayama land had proven to be problematic for both farmers and the national government. Not being allowed to even enter the Somayama land, let alone to cut trees or cultivate in the Somayama land, farmers began voicing their opinions against the nationally owned Somayama system and started illegally cutting trees in the Somayama land (ibid.: 83). To deal with this situation, the government, by issuing a new regulation law, decided to sell back the Somayama land back to individuals, communities, and/or municipal governments. A large portion of the Somayama land was sold back to individuals, communities, and municipal governments.

In Kin Village, most of the Somayama land was sold back to the communities and the municipal government (Ibid.: 86). Since the payment for purchasing back the Somayama land was very expensive, it took 30 years for the communities and the municipal government to complete the payment (Ibid.: 85-86): the payment was completed in 1935, just 5 years before the beginning of WW II. It is also important to recognize that a large part of the money used for the payment was sent by Kin emigrants working overseas, including those in the US (Kin Town 1991:10-11). By the time Kin Village entered WW II, these communities had regained their rights to the Somayama land and had restarted communal management of the Somayama land.

Before this law was issued, private land ownership was not permitted for farmers. Land was owned communally and sale of land was also not permitted. Taxation was done on a communal basis.
The other important aspect of the pre-war Kin is that Kin Village had sent many emigrants overseas, including to the US, and these emigrants contributed money to the development of the village. While the Okinawa prefecture as a whole was known as an emigrant prefecture in Japan (see Ishikawa 1980:153-160 for overview of Okinawan immigrants overseas), Kin Village was particularly claimed as *Iminno Sato*, “home of emigrant pioneers” by the villagers. Kyuzo Toyama, a Kin Native democracy activist, was also regarded as the “father of emigrant pioneers” for his role in organizing and sending Kin and other Okinawan emigrants overseas. While various factors for emigration from Okinawa to overseas have been identified by scholars (see e.g. Ishikawa 1980), the leadership of Toyama and the private ownership of the *Somayama* land, which in turn allowed people to leave their communities, played important roles in the emigration of Kin people overseas (Takara 1991:126-127).

In 1899, the first group of emigrants from Okinawa left for Hawaii: Of the 26 emigrants, 10 were from the Kin community of Kin Village. From that point to the beginning of WW II, emigration of Kin people overseas continued steadily and the number of Kin immigrants overseas increased accordingly. In 1908, there were a total of 453 Kin emigrants overseas, of which 373 were in Hawaii and 53 were in California (Okinawa Ken Kyouiku Iinkai ed. 1974:30a cited in Ishikawa 1991:153). By 1935, 5 years before WW II, there were 1,937 Kin emigrants overseas, of which 881 were in Hawaii and 120 were in the US mainland (Okinawa Ken Kyouiku Iinkai, ed. 1974:22-23 cited in Ishikawa 1991:157). During the 39 year period from the first emigration to 1935, Kin Village send approximately 3,000 emigrants overseas, which included 1,265 who went to Hawaii and 65 to the US mainland (Ishikawa 1991:145-147). As many Kin emigrants in Hawaii moved to the US for better economic opportunities, it is estimated that, by the time of the beginning of WW II, in Los Angeles alone, there were about 350 Kin emigrants including the first, second, and third generations (see Kin Town 1983:444-470).

As most of Kin immigrants overseas first emigrated as temporary workers, they sent and/or brought money with them back to the village. In 1907, the money sent by kin emigrants in Hawaii and the US mainland amounted to over 90,000 yen, which was more

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16 During 1899 to 1937, Okinawa was the second to Hiroshima prefecture in terms of the number of emigrants overseas and the first in terms of the ratio of the number of emigrants overseas to the number of people living in the prefecture.

17 Those Kin emigrants were all male of ages of 20s to 30s and worked in the sugar cane fields of Hawaii as contract labors (see Ginoza Village 1991:137-159 and Kin Town 1983:407-462 for discussion of Kin emigrants to Hawaii and the US mainland in the pre-war period).

18 These numbers are calculated based on the numbers of passports issued in terms of destination during 1899 to 1944. 1,597 went to the Philippines, 139 went to Peru, 45 went to Argentina as well.

19 In Okinawa as a whole, the money send by Okinawan immigrants overseas to Okinawa accounted for about 65% of the total income of the Okinawa Prefectural in 1937 (Kin Town 1983:407).
than the amount of money made by the sugar industry in the village in that same year (ibid.:154). In 1933, the amount of the money sent by Kin emigrants to the village reached over 150,000 yen (ibid.: 156). A large portion of the money was used to revitalize the village’s economy, to build and improve the infrastructure of the village, and more importantly to buy back their Somayama land from the government (Kin Town 1991:10).

By the beginning of WW II, with the money from Kin emigrant overseas, Kin Village had become one of the richest communities in Okinawa. The Osaka Asahi Shinbun newspaper (1938: September 4th cited in Ishikawa 1991:158-159) described the village as the home of emigrant pioneers:

[E]migrants worked hard under the foreign skies and came back to the village with Nishiki. When they came home, they first built gorgeous Okinawan tombs to show their respect for their ancestors. Then, they built their houses with concrete and Kawara tile... In Kin village, one could see a scene of houses with Kawara, a rarity in a rural area. You could also see European style houses... Those emigrants who returned home spend money without hesitation on community wells, community offices, and schools. In this village, the elementary school is built in a European style, the first of its kind in Okinawa.

Therefore, when Kin Village entered WW II, the village was prosperous and proud of its success as Iminno Sato, home of emigrant pioneers.

In short, the pre-war Kin Village was a farming/timbering community. The communities of Yaka, Igei, Kin which now form Kin Town were characterized by their stable and close knit communal membership with less integration of outsiders coming into the communities. Kin Village was also characterized by the village people’s communal management of the Somayama lands and their efforts to protect and maintain their Somayama land. The village people fought successfully against the national government’s attempts to buy their Somayama land. Kin Village was also the “home of immigrant pioneers,” whose success overseas brought the village wealth as well as pride to be Kin people. It was with this cultural and historical experience that Kin Village entered WW II. It was also with this historical and cultural experience that the village would consequently face the construction of a military base within it.

**World War II and Post-War Kin**

Japan’s entrance into WW II signaled the beginning of the process in which Kin Village as well as the rest of Okinawa was incorporated into the international political scene through militarization. The location of Okinawa, which lies to the southwest of Japan and
just north east of Taiwan, made Okinawa strategically suitable for the US military to establish bases for future attacks on mainland Japan. The battle of Okinawa, which lasted from April 1945 to June 1945, was the most extensively fought ground battle on the Japanese soil during WW II. As the battle is often described as a “typhoon of steel,” it had devastating effects on Okinawa. The official estimation of the death total in Okinawa during the battle reached about 94,000 civilians, about 95,000 Japanese soldiers and 12,500 US soldiers, although the unofficial estimation of the death total for civilians was over 150,000. In other words, one fourth of Okinawans lost their lives one way or another in the war. The battle of Okinawa also resulted in a massive destruction of the infrastructure including many agricultural fields, which Okinawa’s main industry relied upon. The discussion of the battle of Okinawa has been complex and often heated due, in large part, to Okinawa’s historical relation with Japan. Many Okinawans have argued that Okinawa was sacrificed for Japan since Okinawans were regarded as inferior to the mainland Japanese. Some Okinawans still hold strong animosity toward the Japanese government (see Ota 1992 and Miyagi 1992 for discussion on the relationship between Okinawa and Japan). Nonetheless, the battle of Okinawa was just the beginning of the whole process of the militarization of Okinawa as the unstable international political scene would follow the period of WW II. Kin Village, which would experience the construction of a military base within it, was in the forefront of this process. Below, I will describe the process by which a military base was constructed and part of Kin Village people’s daily life, and thereby the process by which theirs’ life became a part of international political scene. Since the direction of this process was mostly determined by changes in the international political scene, my ration of the process first describes changes in international politics, and then Kin age’s (then later Kin Town’s) reaction to the changes.

Construction of A Military Base in the Village

In April, 1945, as the US military landed on Okinawa, it started constructing its own front line bases and occupying the bases which had been constructed by the Japanese military. The construction of front line bases was to prepare for future attacks on mainland Japan. With issuing of the Nimitz Declaration, the administrative, executive, and judicial powers of the Japanese government over Okinawa were officially terminated and a US

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20 Ota’s book (1984), The Battle of Okinawa :the typhoon of Steel, describes Okinawa’s experience in WWII.
Military Government was installed in Okinawa (Kin Town 1991:29). The Nimitz declaration, along with the Hague Treaty, would enable the US military government to take over local lands to construct military bases or to abandon them if recognized as unnecessary. Arasaki (1986:24) describes this situation: “after the war, in Okinawa there were first Gunyouchi, military land. Only after the military had ensured lands for its own use, it returned to Okinawans the rest of the local lands which were not necessary and suitable for military use.”

In Kin Village, the US military in April 1945 constructed a temporal front line air field in the Ichibaru area, the town's main agricultural field. It was part of the US military’s preparation for future attacks on the southern part of Okinawa and mainland Japan. The size of the air field was such that it was able to house 100 small-to-mid-size planes at the same time (Kin Town 1991:24). This air field would later become the main area of the present base, Camp Hansen. The construction of the air field had drastically changed the topography of this agricultural field and that of some residential areas near the air field as well. The extent of this topographical change was such that it was impossible for many village people to identify their own piece of land when they returned to their home from retention in intern camps after the end of the war. Moreover, those who had lost their homes due to the construction of the base were forced to be relocated elsewhere (Kin Town 1983:620-621).

From 1945 to 1949, while the US military government engaged in a vigorous program of demilitarization and democratization in mainland Japan, Okinawa was in a recovery process. Most of the aid for the recovery process came from the US government. The Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Area (GARIOA) was set up by the US Military government in Okinawa. The GARIOA provided 2 billion dollars for food, construction, educational training, and political support for the period of 1947-1957 (see Okinawa Kaihatsu Chou 1988). Despite the government’s provision of such aid, however, the US military policy toward Okinawa during this period was characterized by indifference and inaction. As most of the bases in Okinawa lost their immediate strategic significance, they were not used (Higa 1963:7 and also see Miyagi 1986:51-86).

During this recovery period, especially shortly after the war, Okinawans themselves attempted to recover from the devastation of the battle through various means. A non-monetary economy, which incorporated aid materials from the US government as exchange commodities, was developed and practiced for about 10 months shortly after the

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21 In February 1946, the military government began reidentifying ownership of land. However, since most of the documents regarding ownership of land were destroyed in the war, it was extremely difficult to do so and at present there are still some problems of identification of ownership of land dating back to this period (Kin Town 1983:626-628).
war ended (see Arasaki 1992:129-133). Okinawan emigrants overseas who were themselves caught in the war also contributed their support to the recovery of war-torn Okinawa. Various relief organizations were established by Okinawan emigrants in the US, Argentina, Peru, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico, sending money, food, clothing, and school supplies to Okinawa (Kin Town 1832: 624).

In Kin Village, its recovery process was helped by two of the village’s historical and cultural characteristics. First of all, as the “home of emigrant pioneers,” Kin Village was one of the fortunate communities in Okinawa which received tremendous support and aid from its emigrants overseas. Hokubei Kin Club (North America Kin Club) (1968:16) describes Kin emigrants’ contribution to the recovery of the village after the war as follows:

To many Kin people it was a very sad day, April 1, 1945 when the United States landing forces attacked Okinawa. The fighting in Okinawa was fierce and after 80 days, the island was devastated.

As soon as they were finally able to re-establish their daily living patterns, the Kin people in Los Angeles began sending packages and gifts to Kin. Kin school and churches received the following gifts:

1948 stationary supplies to Kin School
1949 One organ
1950 One set of microphones to the Kin Elementary School...

As a response of Kin Village to such contribution from its emigrants overseas, Kin Town (1983:625) notes:

When people in Okinawa suffered from the shortage of clothing and food, parcels from relatives and friends overseas were welcomed and appreciated like rain in the dry season. When children opened the parcels and found clothes for them, they became joyful. The contents of parcels were mostly clothes, canned food, rice and noodles... Such contributions from overseas should be deeply appreciated by the Kin people and we should not forget this.

Secondly, Kin people looked to timbers in the Somayama land as a means to recover from the devastating effect of the war. As Okinawa was in great need of timber supplies to rebuild its infrastructure, timbers in the Somayama land, which the communities in the village had protected for centuries, became a much needed commodity. Although the Somayama land had been heavily damaged by the war and illegal cutting of timber in the Somayama land by people from the outside the village was taking place, the communities in Kin Village attempted to reengage in the timber industry. They began protecting the Somayama land from illegal cutters and making future plans for reforestation
of the Somayama land (Kin Town 1983:514). While Kin village people began their recovery process by incorporating help from its emigrants overseas and their history of the communal Somayama land management, the international political scene had already seen the beginning of the Cold War Era.

As the world's political instability due to the Cold War became more visible, Okinawa with the presence of US bases regained its strategic importance as a "keystone" of the Pacific for the US (see Wing 1991 and Gerson 1991 for discussion of the history of the US bases in the Pacific). The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led the US Military Government in Okinawa to the decision that US temporary military facilities in Okinawa should be replaced with permanent installations. With the establishment of United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) in 1950, which now functioned as the administrative government for the military, the US prepared for a long term stationing of its bases in Okinawa (ibid.).

In Kin Village, the abandoned air field was converted into a shooting practice area for the US military in 1947. As the level of international political tension raised, the level of weaponry used in shooting practice escalated. In 1947, only pistols and carbine guns were used in practice. However, in 1949, as Mao took control over communist China, various types of cannons such as bazooka cannons began to be used. In 1950, when the Korean War started and the US became heavily involved, 155mm and 200mm cannons, which were capable to equip nuclear missile heads, were used for practice in the field. Shooting was now done not only from the ground but also from battle ships in the Kin Bay and from air planes, all aiming at the Somayama land in the village. Tanks also moved into residential areas as maneuvering practices also took place (Kin Town 1991:26-28).

The conversion of the air field into a shooting practice field presented various forms of threat to Kin Village. The village people could no longer practice agriculture in farm lots in the air field. Nor they could rely on financial gain from their Somayama land, which now became the primary target for shooting practice. Many of them were ordered to relocate their homes far from the shooting practice field, so as not to interfere with the

22 Due to the changed topography of the Somayama land by the war and destruction of the village's property documents in the war, identification of properties in the Somayama land became very difficult. Especially, since before the war people migrated to the village for an agricultural plan established by the prefectural government and they had formed new small communities, there were heated disagreements between those new communities and the old communities on property rights of the new comers to the village (Kin Town 1991:13-14).

23 In the USCAR, the Commander-in Chief of Far East functioned as Governor and the Commanding General of Ryukyu Command as Deputy-governor. The US also established the Government of the Ryukyu Islands as the civilian government for Okinawans. It was run by Okinawans but it did not have much administrative power for itself (see Higa 1963:24-260).
shooting practice. More importantly, their lives were threatened by shooting practice because spray bullets and bombing often came into the residential areas. Despite such threats, the village people could not demand compensation from the US military. They were only allowed to protest against such threats based on the rights given by Herbe treaty. However, like most of the Okinawans at that time, they did not know such rights even existed (ibid.: 45).

In April, 1952, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty became effective, officially ending the US occupation of Japan. It was signed by 49 nations excluding China and the Soviet Union. As the tension of the Cold War remained high, the treaty had a dimension to secure the long term stationing of US bases in Okinawa and Japan. The treaty granted the US the right to use bases in Japan without consulting the Japanese government about operations that affected Japanese interests in Asia (Gerson 1991:177). Moreover, despite the Okinawans’ wish for political reunion with Japan,24 this treaty allowed the US to continue to exercise all administrative, legislative, and jurisdictional powers over the Okinawans and Okinawa. Article 3 of the peace treaty declared that:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place [the Ryukyu Islands] under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority.... Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United states have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Okinawa’s geopolitical importance as a “key stone of the Pacific” was now recognized in the framework of the Cold War and legitimized with the treaty. US military bases now became “permanent” parts of Okinawa.

"Taking Over of Land"

The peace treaty at the same time however had another important dimension with regards to the US bases in Okinawa. It officially acknowledged Okinawan individuals' rights to their own land. This meant that the presence of the bases in Okinawa and any expansion and/or creation of bases would have to be justified on some legal basis. In other words, to secure the presence of the bases in Okinawa, the USCAR would now have to

24 72.1 % of the total eligible voters throughout the mainland of Okinawa signed a petition for “reversion of Okinawa” (Higa 1963:8).
make legal contracts with Okinawan land owners (see Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisaku Shitsu 1991: 2-3).

In November, 1952, the USCAR issued Certificate of Acquisition (CA) Ordinance No. 91 in an attempt to make contracts with the land owners. However, since its 20 year leasing period was considered as too long and the lease price too low, only a few land owners accepted this ordinance and made contracts with the USCAR. As a reaction to the failure of this ordinance, in April, 1953, the USCAR issued CA Ordinance No.109 “Land Acquisition Procedure.” According to this ordinance, when two parties failed to make an agreement on contract, the USCAR could give the land owner a 30 day notice to reconsider the contract. If the land owner could not agree to the contract, the USCAR could force the acquisition of the land. This ordinance, however, was only applied to the expansion of new lands for military base construction: it was not effective in dealing with the lands which already had been converted into bases under the occupation law. Then, in December, 1953, the USCAR issued CA Proclamation No.26. This proclamation confirmed the use and occupancy of the military areas previously taken by the United States as an” implied lease” and it provided for the registration of a “certificate of confirmation and rental deposits” to complete acquisition of the land. With the issuing of CA Proclamation No.26, legal bases for land occupation and acquisition were regarded by USCAR as “completed” (Higa 1963: 42-43).

While issuing these ordinances and proclamations, the USCAR began “taking over” land from Okinawan land owners with “guns and bulldozers” to construct and expand military bases (see Kokuba Gumi 1981 for description of one incident in Isahama community in Ginowan Village in which US military came with guns, drainer ship and bulldozers and took over the village’s rice field and filled it with the dirt from the near by beach to make the base for military use). In 1953, 188,000 tsubo of Gushi, Takara, Miyagi, Uehara, and Akamine communities of Oroku Village were taken over and 265 households were ordered to relocate.25 In Isa, Kyuna, Aniya, Arashiro communities of Ginowan Village, 140,000 tsubo were also taken over. In 1954, 135,000 tsubo of Onna Village were taken over. In Maja and Nishizaki communities of Ie Village, 48,000 tsubo were taken over and 152 households were ordered to be relocated (Kin Town 1991:30-31). Then, in March, 1954, to avoid further complications of land contracts, the USCAR publicly announced that it would make lump-sum rental payment for the land to be used indefinitely (Higa 1963:43).

In Kin Village, a notification of land acquisition was issued by the USCAR to the villagers in 1955. The notification demanded that 12,000 acres of land in Northern

25 One tsubo is approximately 3.3 square meter.
Okinawa be acquired. Most of the agricultural fields in Kin Village were included in the proposed 12,000 acres. In a village meeting held in Kin Elementary School, 2,000 village landowners expressed their objection to the acquisition. Kin Town (1991:31-32) describes the village people’s voices as follows:

[W]hen we look at the incident in the Isahama community, it is obvious that the military ignores land owners rights to the land as well as their human rights. If we accept the acquisition, we would be a next Isahama.

[A]lthough we are allowed to do farming in the Hirakawabaru field which is part of the military land, we risk our lives in doing so because of the shooting practices.

If we loose more farming land to the military, how could we survive?

At the same time, however, given the fact that lands had already been taken over and converted into a shooting practice field, the village people recognized that it would be extremely difficult to restart the agriculture and timber industries. Even the lump-sum payment was attractive in comparison to a situation where they could not get any economical advantage by opposing the take over of the lands (ibid.). It was a dilemma to which the Village people would have to find a solution.

Meanwhile, on the prefectural level, protest movement against the land acquisition ordinances and the military government’s taking over of lands was spreading throughout Okinawa. There were community meetings and demonstrations all over Okinawa. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) legislature (Okinawans’ legislative institution) adopted a resolution insisting the famous “four principles.” They were: that the US Government should renounce the purchase of land or permanent use thereof and a single payment of rentals; that adequate compensation should be made annually for the land currently in use; that indemnity should be paid promptly for all damages caused by the US Armed forces; and that new land acquisition should be absolutely avoided. For the Okinawans who had relied on agriculture, losing land meant that they would loose their sole means of livelihood (Higa 1963:41).

As the land issues were not resolved between the Okinawan legislature and the USCAR, the issues were presented to the House Armed Services Committee in Washington DC, which in turn, send a special subcommittee led by Congressman Melvin Price to Okinawa. This subcommittee conducted an on-the-spot investigation and held public meetings for three days in Okinawa. In June 1956, the Price Committee Report was made public. The report re-recognized the strategic importance of Okinawa and acknowledged the legitimacy of the lump-sum payment policy and the necessity of acquiring new lands for military bases.
The Price Report was countered with more vigorous protests from Okinawans. The Okinawa Federation of Land Protection Association was established in September, 1956, to protest against this report. The association and its protest were supported by more than twenty organizations including all political parties in Okinawa (ibid.:50-51). The establishment of the Federation led to the movement of the so-called "island-wide struggle for the land issues" (see Arasaki 1986 for more detailed descriptions of the protest movement).

While the movement of the "island-wide struggle for the land issues" was taking place, many land owners began to voice their approval of the lump-sum payment policy and willingness to sell their land for construction of new bases. These land owners argued that the movement of the island-wide struggle could not bring about any success and there would not be a bright future in farming in the war-torn ground. In 1957, Henoko community of Kushi Village (Nago City at present) made the first land lease contract with the USCAR, providing its wild fields for military use. As the USCAR issued CA Ordinance No. 164 in February, 1957 which forcefully enabled the implementation of the lump-sum payment policy, the US and Okinawan representatives finally reached an agreement. The US government agreed to acquire indefinite or short term leasehold interests in Okinawan land through the GRI. It also agreed to carry out lease contracts by condemnation procedures only after negotiations had failed. Landowners were given the option to accept rentals annually or in advance for a long-term period. These rentals would be re-appraised at five year intervals, taking into account the productivity of agricultural land. The GRI Legislature set a ceiling on these rentals by enacting a Land Rental Stabilization Law (Higa 1963:48). This agreement was basically the same as the US previous land program had demanded except for the exclusion of the lump-sum payment policy. This agreement was, however, seen as the end of the movement of the island-wide struggle. It also set a legal framework according to which land problems would be solved.

In Kin Village, the village people made a final decision regarding the land acquisition proposed by the USCAR in 1957. They decided that not only would the village welcome the acquisition, but also would propose the construction of a base in the village. As most of their agricultural fields and Somayama land had been already taken over and used as a shooting practice field (of the village's 11,200,000 tsubo, 6,170,000 tsubo (54%) had been already taken over),26 they could not see any economic advantage in continually opposing the military government's acquisition of the land. The village people argued that if the present situation continued, "while bombs fall down in Kin Village, dollars never fall down in the village"(Kin Town 1991:32). Moreover, as the neighboring Henoko

26 The occupied area was concentrated in the Kin community (82% of the Kin community).
community, which not only accepted the acquisition but also offered their lands for military base use, became successful with the money from the base, Kin Village people recognized the possibility of economic benefits from a military base in the village. The decision was, however, "a hard and painful decision" for the village people. Deprived of their economic means of agriculture and timber, the villagers rather reluctantly decided to rely on money from the base to prosper the village life (ibid.).

Following the village’s decision in 1959, the air field which had been used as a shooting practice area and temporary base, began to be converted into a permanent base, Camp Hansen. This was the beginning of the development of Kin Village as a "base town," which would rely for its existence upon the so-called "base economy."

The Base Economy

As the strategic importance of Okinawa was redefined in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s in the framework of the Cold War, the temporary military installations in Okinawa were beginning to be replaced with permanent installations. From that period on, Okinawa’s economy was converted to the so-called “base economy.” The construction of bases was the initial aspect of the base economy and it was followed by development of a more diverse and complex economy. Kin Town, now accepting the construction of a military base within it, was in the forefront of the base economy.

From 1950 to 1952, Okinawa experienced a military construction boom. The US government poured 300,000,000 dollars into Okinawa for military base construction, which determined the “base map” of Okinawa in the post-war period (Okinawa Kaihatsu Chou 1988:3). While most of the base construction was contracted to large construction companies from mainland Japan, Okinawan construction companies subcontracted with these Japanese companies. This construction boom not only provided Okinawans with employment opportunities, but also construction technology, which in turn helped rebuild the infrastructure of Okinawa in the post-war period.27

In Kin Village, the construction boom began in the mid 1950’s and continued until Camp Hansen was completed in 1961. The construction of Camp Hansen took up a 8,000,000 square meter land of the village. The US government poured 12,000,000 dollars in the construction, of which some portion was eventually poured back into the village itself. The construction included 130 dormitories, a theater, library and a dam.

27 Much of Okinawan architecture after the war was influenced by the base construction. The use of concrete instead of wood is a good example (see Makishi 1992:9).
During the construction, the Press Cast Concrete Technique was introduced to Okinawa for the first time and 70% of bulldozers in Okinawa were used in Kin Village (Kin Town 1991:33 and see also Kokuba Gumi 1983: 62-74 for description of the construction of the base). Moreover, this construction boom resulted in a sudden increase in the male population of the village. During 1955-1960, the male population increased from about 3,200 to 4,400 as male construction workers moved into the village from other parts of Okinawa. They were a new population in the traditionally close knit communities of Kin Village. Even after the completion of the base in 1961, the numbers of male population in the village remained relatively the same (Okinawa Sougou Kenkyujo 1989:2-3). This meant that many of those who worked in the construction of Camp Hansen stayed in the village even after the construction was completed.

The construction boom in Okinawa was followed by the full development of the base economy. And the base economy became the most lucrative economic mode in Okinawa from the mid 1950’s to the mid 1970’s. The base economy in Okinawa was usually understood as consisting of three categories. The first category was that of base employment. This category included those who were hired directly by the US military to work on and off the bases. During 1955-1971, before the reversion of Okinawa, the types of occupations in this category varied from scientists to fishermen, as all aspects of life in Okinawa were absorbed into this category (Okinawa Kaihatsu Chou 1988:17). The second category was that of land lease money. Before the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, 49% of cultivable lands in Okinawa was converted into bases. As military bases occupied land owned by the national government, prefectural government, municipal governments, and individuals, these different landowners received land lease money from the US government until the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 (ibid.). The third category was that of spending by military personnel off the bases. This category included money spent by the military personnel on food, clothes, recreation, and so forth (ibid.).

The extent to which the base economy played its role in Okinawa from the mid 1950’s to the reversion of Okinawa was overwhelming. In 1955, the total amount of money the base economy produced was $48,000,000, 41% of GDP and 73% of Taigai Uketori Sougaku or the external revenue of Okinawa (ibid.: 5). In 1969, as the War in Vietnam escalated to its peak, the total amount of money the base economy generated was over $200,000,000. It amounted to 33% of GDP and 60% of Taigai Uketori Sougaku, the external revenue (ibid.). In 1967, the base economy employed 64,440 people; 14% of Okinawans (ibid.:17).28

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28 This estimation should be read carefully since the base economy included many other rather clandestine activities.
It is important to note two peculiar aspects of the base economy here. First of all, since the base economy was a US government-controlled-economy with the use of the world's strongest currency, the US dollar,\(^{29}\) it remained extremely stable and productive. While the base economy provided high income for Okinawans especially compared with that of the Japanese, Okinawa did not have any inflation from the 1950's to the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. Moreover, as the US Government imposed no tariff on import goods from the US to Okinawa, and the dollar was strong against the Japanese yen, the Okinawans enjoyed the flow of quality goods from the US and Japan. This, in turn, converted Okinawa from an agricultural producing economy into an import oriented economy. Furthermore, the success of the "base economy" in turn led many Okinawans to support the "base economy" itself as well as the presence of bases in Okinawa. At the same time, however, the success made it difficult for the Okinawans to develop any other alternative economic modes (see Okinawa Kaihatsu Chou 1988:9 for discussion on this aspect of the base economy).

Secondly, the base economy with the military's "rest and recreation" (R & R) policy created a massive service industry, of which a large part was mainly catered to the military personnel. This industry, especially before the reversion of Okinawa, involved the Okinawan women's selling of sexual labor to US military personnel. According to the Legal Affairs Bureau of the Government of the Ryukyu, the number of reported female prostitutes in 1969 was 7,362 while the actual number was suspected to be as twice as high as that figure (Takazato 1984 cited in Sturdevant and Stolzfus 1992:251 and 307).\(^{30}\) This number also included Okinawan women's selling of sexual labor to Okinawan males. In other words, one in thirty or one in forty Okinawan women sold their sexual labor during this period. At the same time, the annual income from the selling of sexual labor during this period was estimated as 50,400,000 dollars, exceeding 43,500,000 dollars generated by the sugar cane industry, the largest industry in Okinawa in 1970 (Takazato 1984 cited in Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1992:252).

In Kin Village, effects of the base economy were apparent in all the three categories. First, the money from the leasing of lands to the military base, which started in 1953, became a stable income source for the village, its communities, and individual land owners. Although the initial amount they received was not substantial, the lease money steadily increased during this period. Secondly, the presence of the base created employment opportunities for the village people on and off the base as maids, construction workers, and

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29 Until 1958, B-yen was used. However, after the 1958 the US dollar became the currency of Okinawa.
30 Takazato's paper was presented at the International Abolitionists Federation, 2nd International Congress, Vienna, Austria in 1984. Takazato is a leader in Okinawan women's movements and works as a councilor in local government offices.
gardeners. The base-related occupations were now replacing the village's traditional occupations of agriculture and timber. Thirdly, the base economy created a service industry in the Shinkaichi section where bars, clubs, and brothels were built for military personnel. The creation of this service industry was very significant to the village people in the sense that it created totally new occupations such as bar owners and hostesses (Kin Town 1983:750) and brought about a demographic change in the population of the village.

The development of the Shinkaichi section started in the early 1960's as US Marines began being stationed in the village after the completion of the construction of Camp Hansen. The area called Yahazubaru, which had been a wilderness area, was converted into a "rest and recreation" area. Consequently, from the mid 1950's to the late 1960's, the village experienced an increase of 2,000 in the female population, reflecting that many Okinawan female workers moved into the village to work in the Shinkaichi section. Most of these workers were from Miyako, Yaeyama, and other parts of Okinawa, where economic opportunities were fewer for women. There were only a few Kin people engaged in these occupations in the Shinkaichi section (Kin Town 1983:703). This increase in the female population in the village was a second wave of new population of Okinawans into the traditionally close knit communities of Kin Village (The first were Okinawan construction workers. US military personnel were not considered as immigrant here because they were not Okinawans). According to the occupational statistics by Okinawa Sogou Kenkyujo (1989:4), in 1960, 978 people were engaged in the tertiary industry and they accounted for 23% of the entire employment in the village. Of those in the tertiary sector, 568 worked in the service sector which included bars and clubs for military personnel. In 1965, the number of people working in the tertiary industry increased to 1,946, accounting for 51% of the entire employment in Kin Village. Of those working in the tertiary industry, 815 people worked in the service sector. (ibid.).

While the exact figures of income generated in the Shinkaichi section during the 1960's to 1970's are hard to estimate, oral histories of Kin people illustrate the economic success that the Shinkaichi section experienced during this period. Especially, the economic prosperity of the late 1960's, which was brought by the war in the Vietnam, was often described by the townspeople as "Vietnam Boom:" A Bank executive described at a women's association his experience of the Vietnam Boom:

During the Vietnam Boom, I was working at our Kin branch office. I would go to the Shinkaichi section to get deposit money and bar owners would give me cash money. My business bag was always full of dollars.

31 Okinawa Sogou Kenkyujo (1989:4) points out that, until recent years, there had been lack of reliable statistics regarding incomes generated in the town in general and the Shinkaichi section in particular.
And when a pay day came, I would have to go to the Shinkaichi section many times on the same day to get deposit money.

Kin Chou Shoukougyou Kumiai (Chamber of Commerce) (1981:46) also describes that "with the money one earned one night, one literally can build a 20 tsubo house." At the same time, some of the money generated in the Shinkaichi section were also poured into the rest of the village as bar workers spent money on daily goods and food. Many Kin people often described this economic connection between the Shinkaichi section and the rest of Kin by saying "when Shinkaichi was getting money, the rest of Kin Village also got Onkei (benefits) from them."

While most of these bars and clubs sold drinks and foods, prostitution was part of the Shinkaichi's economy. Although the exact number of prostitutes and money generated by them are not available, statistics regarding the "A sign system" is illustrative of the practice of prostitution in the Shinkaichi section at that time. The "A sign system" was introduced by the USCAR in January 1963 to regulate the practice of prostitution as well as the general operation of bars and clubs in Okinawa. It was designed to improve the sanitation of establishments and to "protect" military personnel from contacting venereal disease. Those establishments which were able to meet regulations and restrictions set up by the USCAR were given "A signs" as symbol of approval. This system was practiced until the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 when the Japanese law which includes the prohibition of prostitution became applicable in Okinawa. According to Kin Chou Shakougyou Kumiai (Kin Social Chamber of Commerce) (1981:38), in 1962, 23 of the 50 establishments in Kin Village was denied "A signs" due to their failure to meet sanitary regulation. However, in 1963, all the 73 establishments in Kin Villa which had applied for the "A sign" were granted "A signs." The number of "A signs" issued in the Shinkaichi section was the largest number in Okinawa's base towns (ibid.). Although there have not been many studies or reports done on the prostitution practiced in the Shinkaichi section during this period, it was definitely an important part of the base economy in the town.

In short, the entire village was influenced by the introduction of the base economy. Land lease money, base related occupations, and the Shinkaichi section now became part of the once rural agricultural community. Along with the development of the base economy, new populations such as male construction workers and female bar employees also became a part of the village as they were absorbed into the village by the base economy.

32 If establishments failed the examination by the Hokenjo (health department), they would be issued "VD" cards and their their business operation would be denied. Similar practices have been and still carried out in "base towns" in the Philippines and Korea (see Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1992).
Towards the Reversion of Okinawa and After the Reversion

While the base economy became an important part of Okinawa, the movement of the reversion of Okinawa, that is, the political reunion of Okinawa to Japan, was also spreading throughout Okinawa in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. The reversion movement in Okinawa was initiated during the “land dispute movement” in the early 1950’s. It was also highlighted in the Anpo struggle by mainland Japanese in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. It was however in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s that the intensity of the movement escalated to its peak. The movement was, however, in many ways ironic and problematic. While Okinawans became dependent upon the base economy, the reversion movement demanded not only that the US occupation of Okinawa be terminated but also that the US bases should be reduced in size or completely removed from Okinawa. Kin Town with the base was in the middle of such an ironic dilemma.

The reversion movement in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s had many complex dimensions. Some saw the movement as a continuation of the protest movement of the 1950’s against the US take over of lands. Others regarded it as a protest against the unjustifiable treatment of Okinawan employees on the bases. Still others saw it as a reaction of the Okinawans to Japan’s economic success and her increase in the standard of life obtained through this economic success. It was also an anti-war movement against the war in Vietnam. It was also an anti-base movement in that the presence of bases threatened the daily life of people (e.g., In 1969, a B-52 bomb plane crashed into an elementary school in Ginowan Town). It was these complex dimensions of the movement that attracted many people despite that the fact that Okinawa was dependent upon the base economy (see Arasaki 1986). The reversion of Okinawa was however probably naively perceived by most Okinawans as the solution to all of these complex problems.

In Kin Village with the presence of the base, the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was anticipated to have immediate impacts on the village people. While the reversion of Okinawa was seen by most of the village people as positive in the political sense that they would become Japanese citizens and put an end to the US occupation of Okinawa (see e.g., Kin Chou Fujin Kai 1984:48, Kin Town 1983:319), its economic implications to the base economy concerned many village people. While many village people recognized the

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33 In the Anpo struggle, the sovereignty of Japan and the possible presence of nuclear weapons in Japan were the main topics of discussion in relation to the bases in Japan as well as in Okinawa.
34 The “conservatives” demanded that the bases in Okinawa be reduced to the same size of bases in mainland Japan while the “liberals” demanded the complete removal of the bases from Okinawa.
35 Many anti-war activists from the US and mainland Japan came to Okinawa to participate in the anti-war movement. Some military personnel from US bases on Okinawa also participated in the movement. (see Takamine 1984 for further discussions on this matter).
reversion of Okinawa as inevitable, different populations of the village reacted differently to the coming of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Those who ran their businesses in the Shinkaichi section were considered as the most vulnerable to the reversion of Okinawa for their livelihood depended solely upon the presence of the base in the village. They established an anti-base-removal committee in 1968 to protest against the reversion of Okinawa. They prepared themselves to confront the Base Employees Organization (Union) which was on strike and supported the reversion of Okinawa (see Kin Chou Shakougyou Kumiai 1981:46). Other village people who were not directly related to the “base economy” also prepared themselves for the reversion of Okinawa by attending lectures and workshops on the Japanese yen economy and the Japanese Constitution (see Kin Chou Fujin Kai 1984:47-48).

In 1972, the reversion of Okinawa took place: Okinawa became a part of Japan and the Okinawans became Japanese citizens. The reversion of Okinawa was, however, seen by the Okinawans with mixed views. While it ended the occupation of Okinawa by the US military government, bringing Okinawa and the Okinawans under the administrative, judicial, and legislative systems of the Japanese government, it did not (or could not) necessarily bring all the changes the Okinawans had hoped for. The most apparent was the fact that it did not bring about changes on the presence of US military bases in Okinawa. Instead, the 1960 Anpo treaty established between the US and Japan was now to be applied to the bases in Okinawa. The treaty allows the presence of US bases in Japan, therefore now in Okinawa, and it directs that the Japanese government now take the financial responsibility of some portions of the US base operation in Okinawa (see Okinawa Ken Kichi Taisaku Iinkai 1993:5-6). In other words, while the reversion of Okinawa weakened the anti-American sentiments among Okinawans and mainland Japanese and shifted the economic burden of the base operation in Okinawa from the hands of the US to that of the Japanese government, it did not change the presence of US military bases in Okinawa. The reversion of Okinawa in this sense made more sense to the US Government than to many Okinawans (see Miyazato 1986:199-203 for discussion on the reversion of Okinawa).

In Kin Village, like many other base towns in Okinawa, the reversion of Okinawa brought little change on the presence of the base itself. Although some operations were now taken over by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and some portion of the base were promised to be returned to the village and its people, it was apparent that the base was to stay in the village’s backyard. However, at the same time, some important changes were also beginning to take place. “Land lease prices” for the bases were now evaluated and paid for by the Japanese government. Therefore, negotiations for lease prices were now
held between the village, the Japanese government, and the Ministry of the Self Defense, but not with the US government and military. More important, the land lease money paid in Okinawa as a whole increased by about 600% immediately after the reversion of Okinawa (Arasaki 1986:72). The amount of lease money paid for Camp Hansen was now elevated to 617,262,000 Yen in 1972 (Kin Town 1991:87). As the lease money would steadily increase thereafter it would become a crucial financial resource for the village. Moreover, various forms of national grants were also to be given to the village for its "hosting" of the base (Kin Town 1991:93).

People who ran businesses in the Shinkaichi section now would have to be concerned about the exchange rate between Japanese Yen and US dollar, as the Japanese Yen became the currency in Okinawa. They were now eligible for various loans and other support from various Japanese business organizations and public organizations (see Kin Chou Shakougyou Kumiai 1981 and Kin Chou Shoukou Kai 1992). At the same time, however, under the Japanese law, prostitution was now prohibited in the Shinkaichi section: the "A sign system" which had regulated the bar businesses and practice of prostitution in the Shinkaichi section was now gone.

Moreover, being under the judicial, administrative, and executive systems of Japan, the village government and its people now started to take the action of protest and make demands regarding problems caused by the base and military personnel, instead of the actions of mere petition and request (Kin Town 1991:46). Reparations and compensations for any incidents and problems caused by the base and military personnel on duty were now paid by the Japanese government which now took the responsibility for such incidents and problems (see Okinawa Kaihatsu Chou 1988:60-74). In short, although the reversion of Okinawa did not change the fact that the base was in the backyard of the village, it put the relationship between the base and the village in a new context.

**Interpretive Summary and Discussion**

In this chapter, I have presented a cultural history of the relationship between Kin and the base. In the first section, I presented three characteristics of pre-war Kin as a historical and cultural context in which a military base would be constructed. They were, namely, close knit communal membership, the communal Somayama land management, and the "home of emigrant pioneers." In the second section, I presented a cultural history of how the base, Camp Hansen, was constructed in the village, thereby putting the village

36 The exchange rate was one dollar = 305 yen in 1972.
into the international political scene. I also described how the village became absorbed into
the "base economy" and how the village and its people experienced the reversion of
Okinawa to Japan. As the process in which the relationship was created was almost always
initiated from above, namely by the US government, US military, and the Japanese
government, I presented a picture of the process in which the village and its people reacted
to the changes brought about by various changes in the international political scene. Now,
I will present an interpretation of the history of the relationship between Kin and the base.
As suggested by many anthropologists (e.g., Cohen 1980; Moore 1987; Ohnuki-Tierney
1990), my focus here is on the discussion of continuity versus discontinuity: I will focus
specifically on how the three characteristics of the pre war Kin discussed had changed or
had not changed in relation to the construction of the base in the town.

To start with, it is important to note that the following three characteristics of pre-war
Kin are not necessarily the only references from which comparison between the pre-war
Kin and post-war Kin can be made. There are many other distinctive characteristics of Kin
from which such comparison between the pre-war and post-war Kin could be made.
Those include the Kin dialect, ritual practices, communal organizations, food, and so on
(see Kin Town 1983:735-760 for more a detailed description of the comparison between
the pre-war Kin and post-war Kin). However, these three characteristics are recognized by
many townspeople at present as important historical and cultural characteristics of Kin. In
fact, these three characteristics are the ones extensively dealt with as such in Kin Chou Shi
(Kin Town History) (Kin Town 1983), the official history book of the town. It is the
townspeople’s present recognition of these characteristics as important historical and
cultural aspects that makes them reference points from which the following discussion on
continuity verses discontinuity in relation to the presence of the base will be made.

In the pre-war period, first of all, the village and its communities practiced land
property management to control their Somayama land and they protected their Somayama
land from the Japanese government’s attempts to take it over. However, during and after
the war, their Somayama land as well as their agricultural fields were taken over and
converted by the US military government into military bases and training areas. As the
village people’s effort to keep their Somayama land failed, they decided, rather reluctantly,
to live with the base. There is a sharp contrast between pre-war Kin and post-war Kin in
terms of the village people’s ability to protect their Somayama land from outside forces. As
proud and successful as the village had been in the pre-war period, the village and its
people could not protect their Somayama land from the situations created by international
politics. It can be interpreted as a history of defeat for the village. However, at the same
time, the US Military Government’s taking over of lands did not change one important
aspect of owning the Somayama land: the Somayama land still provided financial resources for individuals and the communities of the village, no longer as timberlands or agricultural lands but as shooting targets and military base. As the price for the land lease to the base increased steadily, especially after the reversion of Okinawa, the economic aspect of owning the Somayama land became more important to the village. Moreover, as the village people engaged in a series of negotiations for land lease contracts with the US military government and later with the Japanese governments, the notion of individuals’ property rights and the concept of democracy became imbedded more than ever in the village people’s understanding of their relationship with the Somayama land (Kin Town 1983:106). Owning the Somayama land was now understood not only in terms of “traditional practice” but also in legal terms. In other words, the connection between the village people and their Somayama land remained strong despite and due to the construction of the base in the village.

Secondly, although pre-war Kin village consisted of communities of close knit membership without extensive integration of non-native kin people into the communities of the village, the construction of the base and the base economy brought to the village new populations from other parts of Okinawa. Now, not only US military personnel were present in the village, but also construction workers and bar business people from other parts of Okinawa moved to live in the village. They engaged in various modes of the base economy which were also new to the village. While the economic connection between the new populations and the rest of the village was often recognized, however, real integration of these new populations into the communities of Kin did not necessarily take place. Instead, these new populations often remained unintegrated into the village and the Shinkaichi section became a distinct community within the village. Kin Town (1983) writes:

Although the Shinkaichi was built, it seems strange that only few Kin people worked in the Shinkaichi section. Most of the people in the Shinkaichi section came from other villages. Especially people from Miyako Island occupied the majority of the population there. As a result, Kuicha dance (Miyako’s traditional dance) was introduced into the Kin village festival. People from Miyako, Yaeyama, and other villages now form this peaceful community (702).

In other words, while the presence of the base had created a situation in which these three populations, native Kin people, new populations (non native Kin people) from other parts of Okinawa, and US military personnel were present in the village, it did not change the close knit relations among the traditional community members. As it will become clear later, the close knit relations among the traditional community members were strengthened
as the presence of these non native Kin people became as the “other” people from which Kin people distinguished themselves.

Thirdly, in the pre-war period, Kin was known as the “home of emigrant pioneers,” sending many emigrants overseas. With the money Kin emigrants overseas sent back to the village, the village as a whole became one of the most prosperous communities in Okinawa. During the war, however, overseas emigration from Kin as well as from Okinawa as a whole was halted. Even after the war was over, the number of overseas emigrants from Kin and Okinawa continued to decline except for the period from 1954-1963 in which the Government of the Ryukyu Islands promoted emigration overseas. After the reversion of Okinawa, there were only few Kin people emigrating overseas (ibid.: 467-489, see also Kaminura 1980:178 for discussion on decrease in the number of emigrants overseas from Okinawa). However, it is undeniable that Kin emigrants played important roles in rebuilding the village after the war and establishing the relationship between the village and the base. Kin Village received financial and emotional support and aid from Kin emigrants overseas during the recovery period and such support to Kin continued throughout the occupation period of Okinawa. Moreover, those Kin emigrants who returned to Kin from overseas also played an important role in the village’s post war experience in relation to the construction of the base. Mr. Seihou Matsuoka was especially important as the former chief executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands from 1964 to 1968. He was a Kin native who emigrated to the US, was educated at Columbia University, and returned to Okinawa. His conservative views and pro-American views influenced public opinion among Kin villagers (Nakachi 1993:14). Although more elaborate studies regarding the role of Mr. Matsuoka in the construction of the base in the village are needed, it is undeniable that he helped establish the village’s relationship with the base. In short, despite the fact that overseas emigration from Kin was halted during the war and there were few Kin migrants to overseas after the war, Kin Village remained as the “home of emigrant pioneers” in various forms during and after WW II.

The cultural history of the relationship between the town and the base reveals the complex process in which some aspects of pre-war Kin had changed and other aspects of pre-war Kin remained in relation to the construction of the base. The present relationship between Kin town and the base is built upon this historical process of the relationship between the village and the base. And as we will see later, the stability and changes manifested in the historical process still play important roles in shaping the present relationship between the town and the base.
Chapter 5

Perceptions of the Base and the Relationship in the Post Cold War Era

The dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolized the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new world order. The impact of this political change has been apparent in various parts of the world and at every level of international politics. Kin Town, with the presence of the US military base, Camp Hansen, in its backyard, is no exception. The end of the Cold War has created a possibility that the US military would withdraw Camp Hansen from the town, along with other US bases in Okinawa in the near future. With the anticipation of withdrawing of the base from the town, the town government has started making a master plan for reutilization of the military base after it has been vacated (Nakachi 1993:1). Private business owners in the town who have been dealing with military personnel as their main customers are now reviewing their business practices, contemplating that switching to a more Japanese customer oriented business might be the only way for them to survive.

At the same time, however, the post Cold War period also witnesses many other international conflicts, the Gulf War, tribal conflicts in Somalia, nuclear crisis in North Korea, the Serb and Bosnia conflict in former Yugoslavia. They are regarded as new types of international conflicts in the post Cold War Era, characterized by more regional nature of conflict. With these turbulent international political situations, the town also receives the signals that Camp Hansen would remain in the town as an important strategic site for the US government and military, and the Japanese government. Trapped in this complex dynamics of international politics, the townspeople share a strong sense of uncertainty. Many wonder what will happen to the base and ultimately to their lives which have become so dependent upon the presence of the base since the reversion of Okinawa.

The townspeople’s uncertainty about the future of the base and ultimately of their lives reflects the fact that, for the townspeople of Kin Town who live with the base in their backyard, Camp Hansen is never a mere strategic institution to protect national interests and national security of the US and Japan in the Pacific region (see Gerson 1991 and Wing 1991). To the townspeople, the base is a paradoxical entity which presents itself both as the “root cause of problems” and the most important financial resource for the town. These paradoxical aspects of the base are also interwoven with the townspeople’s recognition of the base as a symbol of international power and of the unequal power relations between the base and the town. In this chapter, I will describe how the
townspeople perceive the base and their relationship with the base, and how their different perceptions have been created. I will also describe how these perceptions have created various dilemmas in the town. And finally in the form of an interpretive summary and discussion, I will discuss how the different perceptions of the base between the townspeople and international politics is dealt with in the context of the town.

The Base as a Military Institution with International Power

For the townspeople of Kin, Camp Hansen is a constant reminder of the fact that Kin Town is a part of international politics through militarization of the town. By noticing changes in the number of military personnel on the town’s streets or changes in the intensity of military bombing practice on the mountains, townspeople could anticipate at least that “something is going on in the international political scene.” However, at the same time, the base is also a constant reminder that the town and townspeople are at one end of international politics, where power is always exercised upon them by international politics, namely the US government and military and the Japanese government. By recognizing the unequal power relationship between the town and the base (and international politics which the base represents), the townspeople perceive the presence of the base in the town as an inevitable reality that they have to accept and live with.

Given the fact that 60% of the town has been converted into a military base and training areas, the militarization of the town is unmistakably recognizable. Camp Hansen, with a size of 50,536,000 square meters is used for housings, offices, and training of mostly US Marines. It is the largest Marine camp in Okinawa and it is under the Third Marine Division, the only division of its category outside the US, a fact which implies its strategic importance (Umebayashi 1994:70). The base includes 47 training areas for general training and for shooting practice of live ammunition and two facilities for disposing explosives. Besides Camp Hansen, there are also three other training areas in Kin Town. Kin Blue Beach Training Area, with a size of about 416,000 square meters, is used as a landing training zone for tanks. Ginbaru Training Area, with a size of 533,000 square meters, is used for camp training, blank shooting, communication training and helicopter training. Finally, Kin Red Beach Training Area is used as a harbor to bring training facilities to Camp Hansen (see Kin Town 1991:35-43. Okinawa Ken Kichi

37 The Third Marine Division, the headquarters of the Third Brigade, the Fourth Marine Regiment and the Third Supporting Division, the Seventh Communication Battalion and the Third Marine Division for both water and land are stationed at Camp Hansen.
The townspeople's recognition of the base and these training areas as a military institution is certainly constructed by this physical presence of the base and training areas in the town.

The extent to which the townspeople understand the base as a military institution is, however, limited. The absence of a military specialist in the town (the town office) (Nakachi 1993:18), the secrecy of military policy, and lack of interaction between the town and the base in general help constitute the limitation of the townspeople's understanding of the base as a military institution to the townspeople. The freedom of information act has now just began to make information on many military bases available to the public (See Umebayashi 1993 and 1994 for this issue in Japan). Therefore, the townspeople's understanding of the base as a military institution is mostly constructed through what they perceive from the other side of the fence and rarely through their interactions with military personnel. Two informants describe their limitations of understanding of the base as a military institution.

It is a Marine base. You see Marine Corp. (their terminology), tanks, and military trucks in the base through the fence. You see them outside the base moving from one training area to another. But I am not sure what is really going on inside the base. We cannot go inside the base. It is a military thing. But it must be a very important base for Japan and the US; otherwise it would have been gone a long time ago.

It is a base for the Marines. They are trained in this base. When a military training begins, you see many military trucks with cannons and military personnel moving on route 339, the town's main road. Oh they also have bombing practices. From almost anywhere in the town, you can see, hear, and feel bombs landing on the mountains. When they do have a bombing practice, they also close the prefectural road 104 early in the morning. So we have to use the detour road. So you know when they have a bombing practice on that day. This is a base with a bombing practice area. But I do not know exactly what the base's functions are. I do not pay much attention to such things.

While their understanding of the military functions of the base is limited, the townspeople nevertheless share the view that the base plays an important role in dealing with international conflicts. This view is in large part a result of the base's history in terms of its roles in the previous wars and international conflicts. The townspeople recognize that US soldiers were deployed from the base to engage in combat in Vietnam, Iraq and various parts of the world. However, even their recognition of the base as an important military

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38 This is also true at the prefectural level, mentioned by Umebayashi in the Okinawa Peace forum 1994.
institution in the world politics is still often constructed, not through direct interactions between the base and the town, but through the media. The townspeople would often be informed of the roles of the base in international politics through the media first. And then, they would become able to relate the changes they see in the number of military personnel on the streets and intensity of military training to changes in international politics.

The recognition that the base plays an important role in international politics, however vague, is often extended to render the townspeople to see some connection between the town and international politics. And the kind of interaction each member of the townspeople has with the base and/or military personnel determines the nature of the perceived connection between the town and international politics. Those who work in the town office or are the town's politicians recognize political connection between the town and international politics through the presence of the base as they experience "first hand participation in the international politics." For example, the 1989 visit of vice President Dan Quayle to the Town Office, as a part of his visit to the base, gave an opportunity to the town office people to meet the vice president in person. In 1992, a delegation from the town office accompanied Prefectural Governor Ota and other prefectural delegation to the Washington DC to discuss the future of the base and the town. One male town official explains the unique situation of the town office in relation to their understating of international politics:

It is because we have Camp Hansen in this town that we can meet those important people. When Vice President Quayle came to the town office, the security was very tight and I really realized that he was a very important person, and that our town really has an important relationship with the US government and military. When our representatives went to the Washington DC together with representatives of the prefectural government to discuss the future of the base, I was again reminded that this town with the base was really important in the international political scene. Without the base, these things could not have happened.

To the town officials and representatives who have the opportunity to experience "firsthand participation in international politics" with nationally and internationally important persons, the town and townspeople have an important part to play in international politics.

Bar owners and small business owners who interact with military personnel as their customers also recognize the connection between their life and international politics through the presence of the base. To them, the connection between the town and their life and international politics, however, is often understood in relation to their immediate economy. A female bar owner explains why she pays attention to international politics:
In a way I pay attention to the world politics. Of course I do not know much about politics, but if something is going on in the world, like the Gulf War, it really affects our business. The number of customers, Marines, goes down as they are deployed from the base to other areas of the world... This town is, whether you like it or not, a base town, connected to the world.

While the presence of the base as a military institution in the town gives townspeople the sense of connection between the town and themselves and international politics, the townspeople also recognize that their relationship with the base and international politics (which the base represents) as one of unequal power: The townspeople see themselves as being at the powerless end of the relationship where decisions regarding the base and ultimately their life are made and imposed on them by international politics (by the US military and government and the Japanese government). Moreover, since the unequal power relationship has been so prominent throughout the history of the relationship between the base and the town as described in Chapter 4, most of the townspeople have come to recognize this unequal power relationship as an inevitable reality for them to accept and live with. As they share the notion that “there is not much you can do about it (the presence of the base),” they realize that it is the town and themselves that have to adjust to whatever international politics brings to the town through the presence of the base. This point is well illustrated by one town official’s observation of the town’s future with regards to the possibility of removal of the base from the town:

There is talk about removal of the base from the town. I do not know whether it is going to happen or not. It is up to them (the Japanese and US governments) to decide what would happen to the base and consequently to this town. Although we try to do our best at the regional or municipal level, we are usually put in the position to react, but not to initiate.

The recognition of the unequal power relationship and the townspeople’s limitations in working within the unequal power relationship are, however, felt differently by different populations of the townspeople, reflecting different kinds of interactions they have with the base and military personnel. For town officials and town representatives, the unequal relationship becomes most visible when they interact with representatives from the Japanese government, US military and US government in dealing with the so called “base issues.” As they have to work from “their place” in the hierarchy of international politics, they recognize the limitations of their political power. One town official explains:

To deal with issues of the base, we have to work with the prefectural government and national government as well as the US government. But in order for us to even meet higher rank officials, who have some power to do anything, you have to be in accordance with what the national government
and the US government expect you to be. If they realize that you are in any way anti-base, they just send lower rank officials who do not have any power to do anything but only listen to what we have to say. That is only a gesture. That’s going nowhere. In our town, our mayors have been conservative and taken the ‘pro-base’ stand, so we have been successful in terms of meeting higher rank officials and bringing some financial support to the town. But it is still frustrating because you really cannot communicate what you want to say.

In other words, town officials and representatives often find themselves in a complex hierarchical structure of international politics, interweaving prefectural, Japanese and US governments and the military. This hierarchical structure, which itself is a reflection of the unequal power relationship between the base and the town, reinforces the unequal power relationship between the base and the town as well as their perception of the relationship as such.

The possibility of town officials and representatives being brought into the hierarchical structure of the unequal political power relationship is not, however, confined to occasional “official interaction” between town officials and representatives from the Japanese and US governments. Rather this possibility is perceived as being always present in many aspects of the town’s daily life. One town official’s explanation of how he has to deal with an auto accident involving townspeople and military personnel illustrates this point:

When there is a traffic accident involving a US soldier and a Kin person, we have to go to the base and talk with high rank officials there, and we have to talk with officials of the Japanese Self-Defense Ministry as well as local police. All the actions involved in this process should be in accordance with the treaties between the US and the Japanese governments. It is just too much for us to deal with that. And by spending too much time on such matters, you don’t have time or energy left to deal with the town’s own matters which I think are much more important from the town officials’ point of view.

In other words, even a small problem can be escalated into an “international problem” if it involves both Kin people and on or off-duty military personnel. Since such problems have to be dealt with in the hierarchy of the unequal power relationship as well as in accordance of the international treaties, town officials and representatives have to represent the Kin person involved in the accident. Town officials and representatives are often overwhelmed by the task they have to perform and often find themselves inadequately equipped to deal with it. In fact, to avoid complications, sometimes small accidents and incidents involving both Kin people and military personnel are not reported to the governments or the full
details of accidents and incidents are often not reported. Nevertheless, the question of to what extent the municipal government is really capable of dealing with the base and many other ramifications of the “base issues” is often raised (Kikumura, Kinjou and Yagi 1990: 92). For town officials and representatives, the notion “there is not much you can do about it” refers to their limited political ability and capacity.

For bar owners and business owners who interact with military personnel individually as their business customers, however, the political nature of the unequal relationship between the base and the town is often colored by the immediate economic nature of their relationship with military personnel. That is to say, their understanding of the relationship between the town and the base is often converted into that of the relationship between individual business owners and individual customers. Moreover, given the ever increasing value of the Japanese yen against that of US dollar, many bar and business owners have long recognized that the relationships between themselves and individual military personnel as well as townspeople and military personnel has changed. One informant’s observation on military personnel as bar customers points to such a changing relationship:

I sometimes feel pity toward those Americans. They used to have a lot of money. But now they do not seem to have enough money. When I go to bars in the Shinkaichi section, I now see many townspeople or other young Okinawans. Most of the townspeople could not go to bars and clubs in the Shinkaichi section 10 or 15 years ago because they did not have enough money back then. Now, I see US soldiers sitting alone sipping whiskey. They (US soldiers) used to have many hostesses around them all the time... Now they only order one or two glasses. It's too expensive for them (to drink in the Shinkaichi section). I sometimes feel that even their body sizes are shrinking as well compared to those years ago.

As the economic status of individual military personnel as bar customers has changed from that of the powerful and rich to that of the poor, the perception of the relationship between the townspeople and military personnel in the realm of bar business has changed accordingly. The unequal power relationship between the base and the town, which is still apparent in the political domain, is no longer apparent in the economic domain of the bar scene.

Bar owners and business owners, however, do not feel any kind of empowerment over their relationship with military personnel. Instead, many of them feel constrained and even impoverished as the strong value of the Japanese yen has forced many military

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39 During my fieldwork, there was an drowning incident involving Kin students. They were rescued by Marines from Camp Hansen. The town office decided to give the Marines an certificate of honor for their rescue effort. However, since the drowning took place in an area which is restricted to military use only, details of the incident were not released to the public.
personnel to spend less in bars and clubs and to stay on the base. In fact, many bars and clubs are facing a critical point of terminating their businesses. Bar owners and small business owners recognize that their relationship with military personnel and the base itself is determined mostly by the economic relationship between the US and Japan, but not by themselves. They also recognize that they are the ones who have to adjust to the changing relationship brought by the international economic relationship between Japan and the US. For them, the notion that “there is not much you can do about it” refers to the fact that their relationship with the base is mostly determined by the international political and economic relationship between the US and Japan.

In short, to the townspeople, the base represents their involvement in international politics through the militarization of the town. While the townspeople’s understandings of the base as a military institution is limited, they recognize in their own ways that the base plays an important role in international politics. The townspeople’s recognition of the importance of the base in international political sense in turn allows the townspeople to see some connection between themselves and international politics. The townspeople are aware that their lives are somehow connected to international politics through the presence of the base. At the same time, however, the townspeople also recognize that the relationship between the town and the base is of unequal power. Their interactions with military personnel and high rank officials are manifestations of unequal power relationship between the town, the base, and the international politics which is represented by the presence of the base. The unequal power relationship, prevailing throughout the history of the relationship, is seen as a reality that the townspeople have to accept and live with.

**The Base as “the Root Cause of Problems”**

The townspeople’s perception of the base as a military institution with international power is often complicated by another perception of the base: “the root cause of problems.” The expression, the root cause of problems, not only points to constant occurrence of military accidents and criminal incidents committed by military personnel in the town, it also points to other intangible problems that the presence of the base is seen to cause in the town. To the townspeople, the base does not provide what it is supposed to provide, namely security. Instead, the presence of the base is perceived as creating insecurity in the town. It is this contradiction that frustrates and angers the townspeople. However, at the same time, due mainly to their understanding of the unequal power relationship between the town and the base and to the accompanying notion that “there is
not much you can do about it,” these problems associated with the base are also often recognized as inevitable parts of the reality of a base town.

The presence of the base is often associated by the townspeople with the high rates of criminal incidents caused by military personnel and military accidents in the town. Although such incidents and accidents happen, involving only military personnel as both victims and assailants, incidents and accidents involving townspeople or other Okinawans as victims and military personnel as assailants are most visible to the townspeople. All of my informants have vivid memories of such criminal incidents and military accidents, thereby recognizing the base as “the root cause of problems” in their immediate senses:

I never have any direct relationship with US personnel but I have this image of them as scary and violent people. Especially when I was a kid, I thought of them as scary people. I heard that there were always fights between Okinawans and US military soldiers and fights between black soldiers and white soldiers in the Shinkaichi section (the bar section). I remember being very scared when I heard that an Okinawan taxi driver was murdered and Okinawan women were raped (native Kin female, 34).

A military truck crashed into my friend’s house years ago and recently a military truck again crashed into a car repair shop on the route 338. I don’t think it is safe to drive when military trucks are on the road. I don’t think they know how to drive on the left (non-native Kin male 30).

I remember when I was a junior high school student, a girl from the same grade in my school was hit with a rock in the head and raped by a US soldier on the beach. And recently (April, 1993), my ex-classmate was murdered by a US military personnel in the Shinkaichi section. It is very scary to live with the base° (non-native Kin female, 34).

Kin Town (1991: 115-126) provides the following statistics regarding incidents and accidents in the town caused by military personnel and military forces from 1972 to 1990:41

(1) Dropping of bombs and bullets from the military training areas onto residential areas and non-base areas---14 cases;
(2) Murders caused by military personnel---4 cases;
(3) Rapes---4 cases.42

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40 This incident devastated the townspeople again and exacerbated the tension between the town and the base. Due to this incident, the annual Friendship Day in which the base was open to the public was canceled this year 1993.
41 Since the data on military accidents and incidents from 1946 -1990 are listed in Kin Town (1991:115-126), I only list incidents and accidents from the reversion of Okinawa 1972 to 1990.
42 These numbers are officially recognized numbers. Actual numbers are expected to be higher than these.
There have been also a large number of reported and unreported robberies, destruction of local properties, assaults, and thievery committed by military personnel in the town (see Kin Town 1991:115-126 for detail).

It is important to note that as the base area covers all the different communities of the town and different kinds of interaction between townspeople, military, and military personnel take place in these communities, the kinds of incidents and accidents tend to vary depending upon the location of each community. In the Yaka and Igei communities, most of the incidents and accidents are related to bombing and shooting practice since these communities are located in the direction of the target mountains. Spree bullets and debris of bombing into the communities still remain as the main concern of the communities, although such incidents now have become very rare. In the Kin community, where the Shinkaichi section (bar section) is located, robbery, thievery, assault, and fighting are common incidents and accidents. In the Nakagawa community, where the cannon batteries are located for bombing practices, the noise from shooting is the primary concern to the community.  

The townspeople have been attempting to comprehend for themselves why such accidents and criminal incidents occur so frequently as they try to have at least some grip on this dangerous reality of living with the base. For military accidents, the townspeople often attribute them to the military’s failure to discipline their lower rank personnel and the nature of the base use, which includes shooting and bombing practices (ibid.:44). While the townspeople understand that some accidents can happen in military training, they often question the validity of bombing practices held in the base and the safety measures the military takes in their practices. For example, the use of 155 mm cannons, whose shooting range is about 11.5 km, in training in the town is often questioned. While the shooting range of these cannons is about 11.5 km, the distance between the practice targets in the mountains and the cannons batteries is about 3 to 4 km and the Igei community is located just behind the target area mountains. It has been argued that a little mishandling of the cannons could cause bombs to fly into the residential area. Despite the town’s demand that bombing practice should be stopped, the practice not only continues but has been intensified in recent years.

For the high rates of criminal activities by military personnel, the townspeople have many different speculations and opinions about why military personnel commit such crimes and why the military cannot control and fail to discipline their own personnel:

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43 Nakagawa Elementary School is located only 400 meter away from the shooting batteries. The school is equipped with a noise proof system provided by the Japanese Self Defense Ministry.
I heard that many of them are not well educated and come from lower classes of society and they are still young. They do not know how to control themselves. Those who commit crimes are reflections of the violence in the US. Officers can not control them (native Kin male in his 40s).

Military life may be stressful mentally and physically, and their life in Okinawa may not be as pleasant as life in the US, but that should not excuse them for committing crimes in the town (non-native Kin female, 24).

We have become richer than they because the Japanese yen is stronger than the US dollar. There are many incidents of robbery and thievery committed by military personnel because now we have more goods than they do (native Kin male in his 40s).

Whether these speculations and opinions are valid or not, they point to the townspeople’s attempts to understand and rationalize why these crimes occur. Since such crimes are rarely committed by townspeople, especially rape and murder, the occurrence of such crimes committed by US military personnel is often beyond the comprehension of the townspeople. These crimes are often regarded by the townspeople as “America’s” problems, implying “foreigness” of the military base and US military personnel. Moreover although the base is claimed by US military and both US and Japanese governments as providing security for Japan and the US, the frequent occurrence of such crimes has definitely made the townspeople question the legitimacy of such claim, a point which I will discuss later.

To deal with such accidents and incidents caused by the military and military personnel, the town office and many townspeople take actions of protest whenever such problems occur (see Chapter 5 for their “independent protest” against such incident and accidents). However, most of the townspeople perceive that their protest has not been effective in preventing occurrence of such incidents and accidents. In fact, the occurrence of incidents and accidents committed by military personnel and the townspeople’s protests against such incidents and accidents have become a “routine” part of the town’s relationship with the base. One town official explains:

Whenever such a criminal incident or accident occurs, the mayor, other town officials and I as representatives of the town, go to meet the military’s representatives and representatives of the Japanese government, the Ministry of Self Defense. We demand that such an incident should not be tolerated and should not occur again. Then, we discuss how to deal with the accident. But it does not really change anything. They (the military) temporarily do not allow military personnel to go outside the base as some kind of warning or punishment. But that is it. Then, some time later, another accident or incident happens again. Then we meet with those same
people again, discussing the same thing. It seem always the same. It's like a routine comedy.

To the townspeople, insecurity caused by accidents and incidents has become a part of their daily life. The failure of their protest against such accidents and incidents and the continuing occurrence of such incidents and accidents are again often met with the prevailing notion that “there is not much you can do about it.” What underlies the townspeople’s perceptions of “routinized insecurity” in the town and their acceptance of it is their recognition of the unequal power relationship between the town and the base. In fact, by recognizing the routinized insecurity as inevitable, many townspeople have become numb to the routinized insecurity. One female informant’s observation illustrates this points:

When my female friend came to the town, I took her near the Shinkaichi section. She asked to me stay with her all the time because she was afraid of military persons. I am used to living in this town with the base and military persons. But for her who is from outside the town, the town was a dangerous place. Then, I realize that I am living in a dangerous town and that I have become numb to it.

I have become totally numb about the town being not safe. I don’t think much about it. But when a terrible incident occurs like the murder case in April, then I realize that I am living in a dangerous place.

While the perception that the base is the root cause of problems is most vividly associated with these incidents and accidents committed by military personnel and caused by military practices, the presence of the base is also seen as causing many other tangible and intangible problems in the town. First of all, the townspeople perceive that the presence of the base, especially its bombing practices, has created enormous environmental problems. While the townspeople have long recognized the negative environmental effects caused by the bombing practices, the increase in the general public’s attention to environmental issues in recent years have raised the townspeople’s consciousness of the environmental problems caused by the presence of the base. The bombing practice which is held at least once every month over prefectural route 104 has destroyed the ecology of the Onna mountains over the years. And numerous cases of mountain fires caused by bombing practice have been reported to cause additional environmental damages in and outside of the base area (see ibid.:115-126). As the mountains have lost trees due to fire and bombing practice, the mountains are no longer able to hold water. When it rains, the “red dirt” from the mountains is drawn in to the Kin Bay, creating the “red dirt” pollution. While the exact extent of the damages on the environment has not been examined by the US

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44 The prefectural route 104 is closed during bombing practices.
military, the Japanese government, or municipal government, it is estimated that from 1972 (the after the reversion of Okinawa) to 1992, over 30,000 bombs have landed on the mountains of Onna (see Kin Town 1991:131-135 and Okinawa Kichi Taisaku Shitsu 1993:210-212).

The presence of the base is also perceived by many townspeople as having prevented the town’s development, especially development of alternative economies. While the town tries to become more independent of the base economy, development of any other alternative economy has not been successful. Given the fact that the base and the training areas take up 60% of the town’s total area, which is the most usable and fertile land, the town has had difficulty creating and implementing any agricultural development plans. Moreover, any housing development plans to attract other populations from other parts of Okinawa have not been successful either. The presence of the base in the town has created negative images of the town especially with regard to the high rate of criminal incidents and the occurrence of bombing practices in addition to the limited land space. One town official's comment illustrates this point:

With the base occupying our most usable lands, we hardly have any land left for development. If we want to have any development plan in the town, you have to either put landfill in the Kin bay to create a space for development or ask the US military to return the lands. The first one just costs too much money and the town alone cannot do it. For the second one, you have to deal with the US government and the Japanese government because of the treaty. And if the land is owned by private land owners you have to deal with them too. We can have many plans but it is just extremely difficult to implement them.

The need for developing an alternative economy is recognized especially in relation to the fact that Okinawa as a whole is successfully converting its economy from a base economy to a tourist oriented economy and the base economy no longer guarantees employment for the townspeople. From 1972 to 1990, in Okinawa as a whole, the percent of income that the “base related economy” produced in the GDP changed from 15.4% to 5%, while that of the tourist oriented economy rose from 8.1% to 10.7%. In terms of Kengaijushu, external revenue from outside the prefecture, the base economy only accounts for 8.0% while the tourist oriented economy accounts for 16.7% (Okinawa Kichi Taisaku Shitsu 1993:281-284). Meanwhile, in Kin Town, their average income remained one of the lowest and unemployment remained as one of the highest in Okinawa (Kin Town 1993). The suggestion that Kin Town can be a tourist place is often expressed by some townspeople. They see the base and the Shinkaichi section as main tourist attractions. However, the high rates of crime committed by military personnel make this
suggestion difficult to actualize. One informant summarizes this point from her experience with her friend:

I have a friend who studies tourism in school in Tokyo. I talked to her about the possibility of my town becoming a tourist place because it is in Okinawa, a tourist destination, and it is unique with its American flavor. But she told me that in her school, Kin Town is taught as a dangerous place because of the high rate of crimes by military personnel. So they would not recommend that their customers go to Kin unless they would be responsible for their own risks.

The presence of the base is also perceived by many townspeople as causing "moral decay" in the town. Moral decay is often regarded as being associated with the presence of the "sex industry" in the Shinkaichi section whose main customers are US military personnel (see Ramos-Jimenes and Chiong-Javier 1987 for discussion of "moral degradation" in the base towns in the Philippines' context). In relatively large bars and clubs of the Shinkaichi section, nude (topless) dancing (floor dancing) is performed by Filipino "entertainers" and the selling of sexual labor by Filipino women to military personnel is widely suspected by many townspeople. In the town, there are about 200 foreign civilians living and the majority of them are Filipino females, most of them working in the Shinkaichi section (see Chapter 6 for more discussion on this aspect). While a small numbers of the townspeople (mostly male) who "visit" these bars and clubs out of curiosity, many townspeople regard the sex industry as "part of the military thing" and avoid going to such bars and clubs. The majority of the townspeople are concerned with effects of the presence of such industry on the townspeople. In the late 1980s, for example, the possibility of the spread of AIDS panicked the Shinkaichi section as well as the town as a whole. It was seen as a symbol of moral decay in the town especially in relation to the suspected sex industry in the Shinkaichi section. It opened up a series of discussions in the town assembly on the sexual practice of military personnel in the town (see Kin Town Assembly 1987 5th meeting). As a result, the blood donation from US military to the town and Okinawa as a whole was halted and tight control on Filipino women was proposed. However, since the townspeople recognize that people living in Kin themselves run these businesses, they are often reluctant to criticize the presence of the sex industry openly.

Moral decay is also perceived as a clash of different sets of culturally appropriate behaviors existing in the same place, namely those of Okinawans and of Americans (US military personnel). For example, the behaviors of military personnel jogging with their shirts off and kissing women (Filipino women) on the streets in the Shinkaichi section are not considered culturally appropriate behaviors in Okinawa. While many townspeople
have become used to seeing these behaviors of military personnel and regard them as "American behaviors," some still question the insensibility of the military and individual military personnel to the local customs and behaviors. These behaviors of military personnel are, however, often considered too foreign to have any direct influence on the townspeople. In contrast, there are certain behaviors of US military personnel which are considered by military personnel as rather normal but are seen by the townspeople to have negative effects on the townspeople. The behaviors of chewing gum while talking or engaging in work and of eating while walking by military personnel are good examples. They are considered to have negatively influenced students of Kin Town to "behave like Americans," causing moral decay among the students. In fact, the town's education committee conducted a study on such behaviors of Kin students (Kin Chou Kyouiku Iinkai 1989). The study was a reaction to the article in The Okinawa Times, a prominent newspaper in Okinawa, in 1985 which criticized Kin students' behavior of chewing gum, and drinking pop while walking back home from school. The town's educational committee study pointed out that these behaviors of the town's youth were influenced by the behaviors of military personnel (ibid.). Eventually, the education committee implemented restricted policies against such behaviors of students (Kikumura, Kinjou, and Yagi 1990:25-28). This incident points to the extent to which some normal or ordinary behaviors of military personnel can become a cause of moral decay in the town due mainly to different sets of culturally appropriate behaviors existing in the same place.

Recently, moral decay is also perceived as being associated with many Okinawan and Japanese tourist women's dating practices with military personnel in the town. Many townspeople generally do not regard dating between Okinawan and/or Japanese women and US military personnel positively (see Chapter 6 for more detail of this aspect). Many townspeople are concerned with an increase in the number of Okinawan and Japanese tourist women who come to the town to "seek" military personnel for dates. Those women's "American-like behaviors" in their interactions with military personnel such as kissing and hugging in the public are considered as "inappropriate" for Japanese and/or Okinawans. Moreover, many townspeople are also concerned with how such dating practices influences military personnel's perceptions of the town's women as well as Okinawan women. One Kin female's comment on women who "seek" Americans illustrates this point:

I don't like them (Okinawan or Japanese women who 'seek' military persons) being here in this town and being such 'loose women.' Because of them, Americans thinks that all the women here are like these loose women. Because of them, they (military personnel) approach any woman they see in this town as if they can get date with them. Because of them,
even good Americans who just want be friends with us are being labeled with bad images.

In short, the townspeople’s perception of the base as the root cause of problems is constructed through their experience of living with the military base. Frequent occurrence of military accidents and criminal incidents committed by military personnel, environmental problems, development problems, and moral decay all play important roles in the townspeople’s perception of the base as such. At the same time, however, many townspeople also share the perception that these problems are also an inevitable part of a base town and therefore, “there is not much you can do about it.” What underlies their perception of these problems as inevitable aspects of a base town is again their recognition of the unequal power relationship between the town, the base, and international politics. These negative effects of the presence of the base as well as their recognition of the unequal power relationship have caused the feeling of despair and apathy among the townspeople. This is especially true for the town’s young generations. According to one research conducted by the town office in 1993 (see Kin Town 1993), 30% of the Seijin (those who became 20 years old in 1993) who participated in the town’s 1993 Seijin Shiki ceremony (coming of age ceremony) expressed that they did not want to live in the town. Over 50% indicated that they could not see much bright future in their town. In fact, many young adults, who unlike older generations have more opportunities to leave the town, seek their lives outside the town.

The Base as the Most Important Financial Resource: The Dilemma

The townspeople’s perceptions of the base as a military institution with international power and the root cause of problems are more complicated and often offset by their other perception of the base: that as the most important financial resource for the town. As the town and townspeople still heavily rely on the base economy, most of the townspeople perceive that the town and the townspeople cannot survive economically without the base. While many recognize that they have to prepare for the possibility of the withdrawing of the base from the town, for the time being, they continue to rely economically on the presence of the base. As the townspeople perceive the base as both the root cause of problems and the most important financial resource for the town and its people, they find themselves trapped in a dilemma.

Evidence of the base as the most important financial institution for the town and townspeople is overwhelming. The evidence can be divided into three categories as the
base economy is often understood as such (see Okinawa Kaihatsu Chou 1988:17). First of all, the town government and individual landowners annually receive a large sum of money from the Japanese government for leasing of their land to the base and the training areas. In 1989, for example, of the town's fiscal revenue of 4,620,871,000 yen (4.6 billion dollars), 1,096,503,000 yen (1.0 billion dollars) came from leasing of the town's and its communities lands to the base. This amounts was 23.73% of total revenue. In addition, 295,748,000 yen (290 million dollars) came in the forms of national grant for the town's offering of land to the base and Japanese Self-Defense Force facilities. Furthermore, the town also received 876,432,000 yen (870 million dollars) as a national grant for maintenance projects near the defense facilities. In other words, about 40% of the town's annual income were base-related income (Kin Town 1991:33-34). Such large sums of income have tremendously improved the town's infrastructure over the years. Besides improved town roads and water and sewage systems, the town has modern community centers, gyms, libraries, sport parks, and other community facilities. Kin Town (1983:624) claims that, "with the base-related money from the national government, the town infrastructure has become one of the most well developed communities of its size not only in Okinawa but also in the world."

Moreover, there are 1,849 individual landowners leasing their land to the base in Kin Town and nearby villages and city. In 1992, these landowners received a total of 4,335,000,000 yen. There are also 128 Kin landowners in the Ginbaru training areas who received 55,000,000 yen. There are 192 landowners in Kin Blue Beach who received 37,000,000 yen. There are 21 landowners in Kin Red Beach training area who received 8,000,000 yen (Okinawa Kichi Taisaku Shitsu 1993:17-48). According to Nakachi (1993:12), 2,999 households in Kin Town, which is 49% of total households, lease their land to the military base and the training areas in one way or another. While the amount of lease money each individual landowner receives varies from person to person, the lease money is considered as a helpful "additional income." One informant who owns a piece of land in Camp Hansen explains his view of the land lease money:

I receive 160,000 yen (1500 dollars) annually for my land in Camp Hansen. I think many other receive about the same or more or less. It is not much. There is no way I can live on this. I have to work. But it is still very helpful, like a bonus.

It is important to note that the land lease money for the town and individuals and various grants for the town are not regarded as mere lease money. The land lease money

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45 70% of the private landowners in Okinawa receives less than 1,000,000 yen and 50% less than 500,000 yen (Kikumura, Kinjou, Yagi 1989:132).
and government grants are also regarded by most of the townspeople as “compensation” for their land being used to “host” the military base and the training areas and for their living with the “root cause of problems” (Kin Town 1991:34). The lease money is also regarded as a symbol and legacy of their ancestors’ struggle to protect and keep their land against the Japanese government during the late 19th century and early 20th century (ibid.: 33), as I have described in the previous chapter.

Another form in which the base presents itself as a financial resource is the spending by military personnel in the town. Given that there are 5000 military personnel with an 800-900 dollar monthly salary stationing on the base, it is estimated that they could pour at least 2,000,000,000 yen into Kin Town annually (Okinawa Sogou Kenkyujo 1989:10). Military personnel are considered by the town’s business people as one of their most important customers. This is especially true for the Shinkaichi section, where bars, clubs, and restaurants are dependent almost solely upon military personnel. Although the strong value of the Japanese yen against the US dollar has led to a decline in the number of military personnel customers, thereby a decline in the incomes for the Shinkaichi section, it is estimated that the Shinkaichi section still generates an amount of 260,000,000 Yen for the members of the Social Service Association in 1993 (Yara 1993b). In other words, the spending by military personnel provides income for about 500 workers working in 160 bars, clubs, and restaurants in the Shinkaichi section. In fact, this sector is still the most lucrative economic sector in the town.

The other important financial resource for the town and the townspeople is employment by the base. About 217 people of Kin Town in 1989 worked for US bases in Kin Town and other towns although the number of the base employees were declining (The Kin Town Assembly 1989:77). In 1993, Camp Hansen employed 393 people (Okinawa Kichi Taisaku Iinkai 1993:33) and it can be estimated that about 30% of them are from Kin Town.

Given the town’s and individual townspeople’s heavy dependency on the base economy, which has been in place for over 30 years, the majority of the townspeople share the perception that the town as a whole cannot survive financially without the presence of the base. This perception of the base as the most important financial resource for the town is often in direct conflict with the other perception that the base is the root cause of problems. These different and often contradictory perceptions of the base have indeed placed the town and townspeople in a dilemma. And in this dilemma, the town and the townspeople as a whole have taken an inactive “pro-base” position with regard to the presence of the base. That is to say, the town as a whole has not officially demanded removal (relocation) of the base from the town even though they protest against problems
caused by the presence of the base in the town. Although Igei community, which is located in the direction of the targets of bombing practice and experiences dangerous military accidents, has recently demanded complete removal of the base, this inactive pro-base stance is shared by the majority of the townspeople. In fact, until recently, even suggesting demand for removal (relocation) of the base from the town was considered as a taboo in the town (Nakachi 1993:1). One landowner's reaction to my question as to why he takes an inactive pro-base position points to their dilemma and their pro-base reaction:

There is nothing good about having the base in the town except for the lease money. And I know that there are many people in Okinawa who are critical of us for not voicing strong opposition to the presence of the base. But you have to eat. Do you know you have to eat first? Even if the base land was returned suddenly, we would not be able to do farming on the land again. It's been almost 50 years since we lost the land to the base.

A bar owner, while recognizing many other townspeople's resentment against the "moral decay" their business and the base are associated with, also expresses their "pro-base" position:

Dealing with the base and military personnel is a means of business, the way we make a living, whether you like it or not. As long as the base stays in this town, our livelihood relies on the presence of the base.

Both informants' comments on the presence of the base point to the recognition that they live in a dilemma and their inactive pro-base stance itself is a reflection of the dilemma. Moreover, at the same time, these comments also indicate that even this dilemma is perceived as an inevitable part of a base town. And what underlies their acceptance of the dilemma as such is again the townspeople's recognition of the unequal power relationship between the town, the base, and international politics and the notion that "there is not much you can do about it."

More Dilemmas: Kin Town in the Context of Okinawa

It is important to note further that while the townspeople live in a dilemma, their dilemma is not necessarily recognized only in the context of the town. Rather their dilemma is often brought up and discussed in relation to the context of Okinawa as a whole, where strong anti-base and anti-war sentiments exist along side with the undeniable reality that many Okinawans still economically dependent upon the presence of US bases. It is in relation to this larger context of Okinawa that the townspeople's dilemma of living with the base has gained more complex dimensions and the town's pro-base stance encounters criticisms from other Okinawans.
First of all, the townspeople have to deal with the general public's perception that their heavy reliance on the lease money from the base has created *Futourousha*, or "non-working people" in the town. That is to say, since base land owners can get money from the base, there has emerged a situation as well as a misconception that these land owners can live off "the land lease money" alone and need not work. Or at least, as Nakachi (1993:14), a Kin native himself, describes, the lease money created a situation in which "because of the large income from the bases, people have lost the desire to work.”

Although the perception of base land owners as *Futourousha* is not restricted to Kin Town and can be seen in other base towns in Okinawa, the presence of a large number of land owners in the town makes the issue of *Futourousha* more visible and problematic in the town. The term, *Futourousha*, is usually referred to in adult males but not females since males are often associated with inheritance of land and considered as the bread winners of family. One informant who works in the town but is not originally from the town (female 30 years old) explains her perception of the native Kin males in relation to the notion of *Futourousha*::

> Many adult males here seem not to have stable jobs. My father runs a construction company and tried to hire Kin people. But they could not stay long in the company. They just quit if they don't like the job. They have lease money from the bases so they do not need to worry about money. With the lease money, all they do is just drink and play.

Another informant who also is also from outside the town explains her perception of Kin males:

> Since they (Kin males) have lease money, they want to keep the money to themselves. If they were married they would have to share the lease money with wives. That's why there are many single adult males in this town.

Many townspeople themselves are well aware of negative effects of land lease money on land owners as well as on themselves. The term, *Damin* (spoiled people), is sometimes used by some of my informants to cynically address themselves and other land owners. The use of the term, *Damin*, indicates that there are indeed some people who actually do not work but play and drink with land lease money. Moreover, the phrase *Gunyouchi Ryou o Tsukae* (use the lease money) is often expressed, again cynically, by some townspeople as means to solve problems. The use of this phrase also indicates that the town's heavy reliance on the "land lease money" has made some townspeople unwilling to participate in solving problems by themselves.

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46 Dr. Nakachi is from Kin Town and did his graduate work in the US.
This issue of Futourousha however needs to be discussed more carefully. As described before, there are not many landowners who can rely solely upon the lease money for their livelihood. Many of the landowners only receive small amounts of money and they engage in or are willing to engage in work. At the same time, however, the presence of the base has prevented development of an alternative economy in the town, thereby creating high unemployment rates. Moreover, in the recent years, the high values of the Japanese yen against the US dollars have reduced the numbers of base employees from the town. Given this context, the issue of Futourousha should be better understood as a manifestation of the dilemma of living with the base rather than simply a sign of “spoiled people.”

Secondly and more importantly, the townspeople’s dilemma of living with the base becomes more complex as the townspeople have to deal with the notion that the town has become rich in the process of militarization and war. This notion is extremely problematic for the townspeople since the townspeople perceive themselves as victims of militarization and war, especially WW II and they also express an anti-war stance. One informant’s observation of the relation between war, the town’s economy and anti-war or anti-base sentiments in the general public of Okinawa illustrates this point:

Well, during the Vietnam War, this town was doing well economically. I know many Okinawan people were very anti-base and anti-war at that time. But many people in the Shinkaichi section build homes during that time. Our family ran a second hand shop, selling used military clothes or other military surplus. We did very well too. We build a home with the money we made during that time. But it is hard not to think about the irony because when there is a war, we make money. Well, that’s maybe how the world works and I cannot do anything about it.

One day, I went to a display of photo pictures. These pictures were taken by a Japanese photographer, Kyouichi Aisawa, who took many pictures of war. He died in the Vietnam War while doing his job. Anyway the display was of his pictures and his clothes during the Vietnam War. Looking at these pictures, I really felt Mujun (contradictory or irony). We were making money because these people were dying in the war.

Her comments reflects the town’s dilemma at both ideological level as well as material levels.

However, it is also true that, in relation to the larger context of Okinawa, the town’s dilemma is often overshadowed by the town’s inactive pro-base stance: the town’s inactive pro-base stance, which is nevertheless a manifestation of the dilemma, is often contrasted with strong anti-base and anti-war sentiments of the Okinawan public of as a whole. The town’s and many townspeople’s heavy reliance on the base economy, which is often seen as having created Futourousha and wealth from militarization and war, is often criticized as...
though it has compromised the town and the townspeople (see Kikumura, Kinjou, and Yagi 1990:69-104). It is true that Kin Town is often referred as a microcosm of Okinawa since Okinawa as a whole still faces the same dilemma the town faces. However, Okinawa’s overall economic shift from the base economy to a tourism oriented economy has put Kin Town in a very peculiar position in the larger context of Okinawa. Kin Town has become an easy target of anti-war and anti-base sentiments prevailing in this new economic context of Okinawa. As the above informant’s comment points out, however, the notion that “there is not much you can do about it” prevails in their understating of the town’s dilemma in relation to the larger context of Okinawa. In fact, this unfair judgment from the outside, however difficult to deal with, is recognized again by the townspeople as an inevitable reality of a base town.

**Interpretive Summary and Discussion**

I have described how the townspeople of Kin perceive the base and their relationship with the base in the town. In the context of their town, they perceive the base in terms of its economic benefits and social costs as well as its imposing political power as an international military institution. As they accept the political power behind the presence of the base, they also accept the presence of the base as well as many problems and dilemmas associated with it as inevitable realities to live with. These are all familiar phenomena in many “base towns” (see Chapter 2). Here, my interpretive discussion directs attention to the dynamics of the different perceptions of the base from above and from below. My question is this; in their accepting of the presence of the base in the town as a reality, do the townspeople also share the perception of the base from above, the hegemonic claim, that the base is there to protect national security and national interests for the US and Japan, thereby creating "peace" in the world? If so, to what extent and how does this perception from above, the hegemonic claim, penetrate among the townspeople? In other words, does the hegemonic claim penetrate in such way that the townspeople accept the presence of the base not by force but by consent as the concept of hegemony suggests ?(See Scott 1985:315 for discussion of hegemony).

First of all, it has become clear that the townspeople’s acceptance of the presence of the base is not predicated upon their incorporation of the hegemonic claim. If anything, the townspeople’s acceptance of the base can be characterized by the fact there is apparent lack of incorporation of the hegemonic claim itself. Instead, the hegemonic claim is often questioned by the townspeople against the very perception and experience of the base as
"the root cause of problems" and to a lesser extent against the perception of the base as the most important financial resource for the town. One informant's argument with regard to the hegemonic claim illustrates this point well:

If the base is here to provide national security and to protect national interests, and to help create peace in the world, this town, with the presence of the base, should be the safest place in the world. But, with the presence of the base, this town has become a very dangerous place to live in.

His argument echoes many townspeople's opinions with regards to the hegemonic claim: they recognize that the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim is not found in the context of the town, their daily life (see Nelson 1987 and Smich 1991 for similar discussions). No matter how the hegemonic claim is presented to them by the national governments and military, it cannot deny the townspeople's understanding and experience of the base as the "root cause of problems." However, this does not mean that the townspeople totally reject the hegemonic claim.

On the contrary, the townspeople recognize the fact that the base is recognized in terms of its hegemonic claim in the context of international politics and the continuing physical presence of the base in the town in a circular way legitimatizes the hegemonic claim. One informant's reaction to my question regarding the competing perceptions of the base between the hegemonic claim and the townspeople's own perceptions illustrates this point:

You have to equip yourself with a sound reasoning to explain why the base or militarization is not creating peace in the world. You can say that the base is not good to our community and other base communities, but we really don't know whether the base is also creating problems in the international politics. The base is recognized as a means to create peace in international politics. Without bases, I don't know if the world would be a better place or not.

The statement by the informant illustrates two important points. First, given the fact that the hegemonic claim still exists and is used to support the presence of the base, the hegemonic claim is accepted by the townspeople as true or legitimate in the context of international politics but not in the context of the town's daily life. Second, in accepting the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of international politics, the townspeople inevitably accept the political power behind the hegemonic claim as the authority that makes the hegemonic claim the "truth" in the context of international politics. The relationship between knowledge, truth, and power is well observed by Foucault who sees the creation of "truth" in relation to systems of power: the systems of power produce and sustains "truth," while "truth" induces and extends the effects of power (Foucault 1984:74 in
Rabinow ed.). Therefore, the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of international politics is recognized and accepted, although unexamined thoroughly, as the townspeople recognize and accept the power behind it. At the same time, however the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of the town is questioned by the townspeople as they examine the claim against their experienced realities of the base. In other words, the townspeople do not accept nor reject the hegemonic claim as a “truth” cutting cross the two contexts. Instead, they doubly contextualize the hegemonic claim, denying it in the one context and accepting it in the other.

Therefore, rather paradoxically, to answer my question, so long as the townspeople continue to see the hegemonic claim in the two separate contexts, the context of international politics and that of their daily life, the hegemonic claim can play a major enforcing role in the townspeople’s acceptance of the presence of the base. At the same time, as the townspeople recognize and accept the political power behind the hegemonic claim, they have to separate the two contexts and live in the two separately, thereby recognizing and accepting the hegemonic claim in the context of international politics while denying it in the context of the town’s daily life.

What are the implications of this double contextualization of the hegemonic claim for the townspeople’s strategies to live with the base? As I will describe strategies of the townspeople to live with the base in the next chapter, one will see that the townspeople's strategies are confined to the context of the town, where the power of the dominant can not legitimatize the hegemonic claim and does not intervene in the legitimacy of the townspeople’s own perceptions of the base.
Chapter 6

Kin Town as a “Base Town”: Everyday Strategies of Living with the Base

As the townspeople perceive the base as a military institution with international power, as the root cause of problems, and as the most important financial resource for the town, how do the townspeople deal with and live with the presence of the base in the town? In this chapter, I will try to answer this question by looking at “strategies” of the townspeople to live with the base in the everyday context. The notion of strategies needs to be made clear here. First, the term strategies implies that they are employed by the townspeople in order to make given situations better for themselves. Second, they are employed by the townspeople with the recognition that they are living in a base town. In other words, strategies are means intentionally employed by the townspeople to make their life better in the base town (see Scott 1985: 290). I will especially focus on strategies of two populations of the town, bar owners and native Kin people. These two populations are differentiated here by their different kinds of interaction with the base and military personnel and by their social identities in terms of whether they are native Kin or non-native Kin. Consequently these two populations employ different strategies to live with the base. As the bar business depends upon the constant interaction with military personnel, bar owners have developed their own bar system, “the American bar system,” which incorporates many aspects of American bars and hiring of Filipino women. On the other hand, native Kin people, whose daily life does not necessitate interaction with military personnel, have employed the strategy of disassociation from the base and military personnel. They also employ the strategy of “independent” protest by which they protest against base-related incidents and accidents without associating with any other political organizations in Okinawa.

Non-native Kin Bar Owners

In the Shinkaichi section of the town, there are about 160 bars, clubs, and restaurants of which many deal mostly with military personnel as their main customers. According to Kin Chou Shoukou Kai or Kin Town Chamber of Commerce (1992), about one thirds of the establishments in the section are categorized as bars and night clubs and
During day time, the Shinkaichi section is quiet. Most bars and clubs are closed while a few off duty military personnel and Filipino women visit video shops, souvenir shops, grocery shops, and/or restaurants. During night time, from dawn to one or two AM, however, the Shinkaichi section becomes lively as the “night life society” resumes. Neon signs in English flash the names of bars and clubs such as “Rock America” and “East Coast.” Loud music of American rock ‘n roll comes out on to the streets from inside these bars and clubs. Many military personnel who are relieved from day’s work on the base come down in the section to socialize. Inside many bars and clubs, dark lighting, juke boxes, the counter bars, menus and posters in English, American music, and pool tables resemble those of American bars and clubs. Some larger bars and clubs also have stages for dancing shows and a little open space in the floor for dancing. The phrase “this is not Japan, this is America” is often used to describe the “Americanization” of the Shinkaichi section. The “night life society” and this “Americanization” of the entire bar section are some of the strategies the Shinkaichi section as a whole has adopted to deal with military personnel as their main customers. A closer look at the inside bar scene, however, reveals bar owners’ particular relationships with the base and military personnel and their particular strategies to deal with the base and military personnel.

Most of these bars and clubs in the Shinkaichi section are privately owned small businesses. According to the list of the Kin Chamber of Commerce, most bar owners are female in their 40s and 50s. As described before, most of the bar owners are from nearby villages or towns, attracted by economic opportunities in the Shinkaichi section. Therefore, they are regarded as non-native Kin people by both themselves and native Kin people although many of them reside in the town. While only a small number of the present bar owners actually experienced the so called “Vietnam boom,” many agree that the economic prosperity the Vietnam war produced in the Shinkaichi section was the most important reason that they started bar business in this area. One bar owner’s story points to this:

Before I started this business, I owned a sawing shop, of which customers were Okinawan bar hostesses in the Shinkaichi section. During the Vietnam war, this town became very prosperous economically. I often heard that bar owners made more money than they could put into their safes. I also heard that when the Shinkaichi section made money, the town itself consequently became prosperous. Anyway, I had a son who wanted to go to college. And I realized that in order to send my son to college, I would have to make

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47 These establishments except for "tea house" or cafe all serve alcohol. Some clubs and bars put on entertainment shows.
more money than I was making. So I started working in a small bar then
moved on to larger ones. Then, I bought this bar.

To many bar owners, military personnel are their foremost customers, the most
important source for their livelihood. In the bar scene, many bar owners, along with 2 to
4 Okinawan employees in their 40s and 50s, serve military personnel drinks and snacks,
play music and provide Karaoke service. In some larger bars and clubs, bar owners also
provide military personnel with dance shows performed by Filipino women. To the bar
owners, however, the same military personnel are also “potential trouble makers” who
might cause fighting and destroy bar property. And, although this rarely happens, some
might even commit crimes such as robbery and theft. In fact, the perception that the base is
the root cause of problems is in the minds of many bar owners.

The fact that military personnel are both main customers as well as potential trouble
makers for bar owners is complicated by two factors rooted in the nature of their business.
First of all, while the gender and ethnic divisions between US military male personnel as
customers and Okinawan and Filipino women as bar hostesses are apparent in their
operation of bar business and are perceived as enhancing the bars’ economic profits, the
situation is also perceived as potentially susceptible to the occurrence of trouble. Without
the presence of Okinawan males and American females, as some bar owners describe, bar
women are seen as more likely to be get involved in trouble caused by military personnel.
Secondly, while serving more alcohol to customers leads to more profits on the bar side,
alcohol is also seen as a potential trigger for military personnel to cause some trouble.
Given this situation, bar owners have developed various strategies which are applied to
control the delicate balance between military personnel as customers and potential trouble
makers.

The removal of the front doors from the bathrooms in bars symbolically illustrates
one strategy in which the bar owners attempts to minimize destruction of their property by
military personnel. In fact, the destruction of bar property is one of the most frequent
forms of troubles caused by military personnel in the bar scene. One bar owner explains
why she has removed the door from the bath room stall:

When they become drunk and upset, like when our employees refuse to
dance with them, they do not show their anger directly to the women. But
they go to the bathroom and just destroy the bathroom to release their anger.
So, I took the door away and keep the bathroom this way. This way, you
can watch out whether they do destroy it or not. But when inspectors from
the Health Service Department come to the bar for inspection, I would have
to put it back.
While such an adjustment of the bathroom enables the bar owner to “watch over” the behaviors of military personnel, thereby preventing the possibility of destruction of property, it also helps the bar owners to observe interactions between their women employees and military personnel in the bathroom. Bar owners are often concerned with the safety of Filipino employees as well as possible “business interactions” (sexual encounters), which the bar owners do not want to take place.

The occasional appearance of Okinawan male employers, usually husbands of the owners, in the bar scene is another strategy to prevent fights and destruction of bar property by military personnel. While bar women and military personnel are usually alone in the bar scene, these Okinawan males often make visits to the bar scene “to make sure everything is O.K.” These men usually do maintenance jobs in the bars during the day time. When the bars become busy with many customers, they become helpers preparing drinks and snacks. When a fight involving military personnel occurs inside the bars, they also become bouncers to control the fight.

"The American Bar System"

While the above strategies are aimed at preventing trouble from occurring, some strategies are more oriented toward securing and enhancing the economic aspect of their relationship with military personnel. “The American bar system,” which bar owners have established through their interactions with military personnel over the years, is an example of such strategies. On the surface, the American bar system appears as if it is a mere imitation of America bars since it incorporates many aspects of American bars. The customer orders a bar worker a drink. As the customer receives his drink, he pays the bar worker money for his drink. Moreover, the medium of communication is English in the American system bar. The bar owners as well as their employees have minimal but necessary level of English conversation skills to communicate with military personnel. This seemingly normal practice of bar business is, however, different from that of ordinary Japanese bars. One bar owner explains her bar system:

In my bar, we use the ‘American bar system’ of serving drinks. You order one drink, we will give it to you as you pay in cash. We don’t use the bottle keep system and the Kake system in here like many other Japanese bars do.

48 Some bars have “dark rooms” in which sexual labor can be purchased. This bar owner was concerned with the occurrence of sexual labor in her bar.
While it is true that imitating American bars' serving of drink may be in itself a strategy to enhance the economic benefits of the bars, their "American bar system" of serving drinks, not Japanese system, has deeper levels of economic rationality. A comparison of serving of drinks between their American bar system and ordinary Japanese bars illustrates this point. In Japanese bars, *bottle keeping* is widely practiced. In this practice, the customer orders one bottle of whiskey and he pays money for the whole bottle of whiskey, which is more expensive than ordering one glass of whiskey. However, after the customer has ordered his bottle of whiskey, the customer can keep it in the bar for a long period of time, and he can come back to the bar and drink from his/her own bottle. Although the customer still has to pay for other services such as ice and water, in the long run, the customer can save money by ordering one bottle of whiskey than by ordering a glass of water at each time he wants to have drink. In the Japanese *Kake* system, once a customer is recognized as a patron by the bar owner, he can order and drink without immediate payment. The customer can make payment for his drink when he is able to pay. Both practices, *bottle Keeping* and *Kake*, however, require the establishment of a long and trusting relationship between the bar owner and customers.

On the other hand, their American bar system, in which the customer pays for a glass of drink as he orders and receives it, does not require an establishment of such a long and trusting relationship. To the bar owners who deal with military personnel, "it makes more sense" to operate the American bar system than those Japanese practices. To the bar owners, the American bar system guarantees "cash on a daily base." It is suitable for dealing with US soldiers who are often deployed to other places and do not stay in the same base more than one year. Moreover, as the military has two pay days in a month, whereas most of Okinawans get their salary once a month, the bar owners can expect twice each month to make money. In other words, the deployment patterns and salary patterns of military personnel are well understood and applied to the American bar system.

Along with their American bar system, bar owners also have developed American like behavior towards military customers. Many bar owners seem expressive and direct in terms of their interaction with their customers. They appear not to hesitate to "speak out." From a Japanese perspective, they seem more American than Japanese. One bar owner explains her observation of her own attitudes and behaviors towards customers:

> When I deal with US soldiers, I express to them straight 'yes' or 'no.' It is easy to deal with American soldiers this way. They understand 'no' means 'no' and 'yes' means 'yes.' I have become like an American in this way. For Okinawan customers, this doesn't work. For example, I told my employees that if customers tried to touch you, just hold their hands and say
'no' to them. American soldiers usually stop trying if the employee said 'no' to them, but, Okinawan customers, they would still keep trying.

To the bar owners, expressing “yes” or “no” directly and unambiguously proves to be an effective means to communicate with military customers. While this behavior is often described as being like an American, implying incorporation of such attitudes of Americans, it also can be understood as a means for bar owners to get rid of any communication ambiguity stemming from their limited English skills. In other words, their behavior of expressing “yes” or “no” directly and unambiguously is seen to protect them from unwanted behaviors and helps their bar business to operate smoothly. Indeed, this behavior is another strategy of bar owners, developed along with their American bar system, to deal with military personnel as both customers and potential trouble makers. However, as the bar owner describes above, this “American like” behavior is quite a contrast to behaviors found in other Japanese/Okinawan bars. In most of Japanese/Okinawan bars, communication between bar workers and customers hinge upon more subtle means of communication. One’s “no” is not necessarily taken as “no” by the other. The bar owners understand that expressing “yes” or “no” directly is not preferred by Okinawan customers. For those bar owners who have become like Americans, therefore, it is easier to deal with US soldier customers than with Okinawan customers.

**Hiring of Filipino Women**

Another important strategy of bar owners is the hiring of Filipino women in their bars. These Filipino women are forced by their country’s economic difficulties to seek jobs overseas such as in Japan (see Tezuka 1989 for studies on immigrant workers in Japan). They now replace Okinawan women who have moved into other occupations or retired from the bar business. In fact, it is Filipino women, not Okinawan bar owners, who, as hostesses and “entertainers,” mostly interact with military customers in the bar scene. By hiring Filipino women, Okinawan bar owners now can avoid any direct interactions with military customers, thereby reducing the possibility of getting involved in “some trouble.” At the same time, they can also secure the continuous operation of their bar business. In Sturdevant and Stoltzus’ (1992:308) words, “the Filipino women provide a barrier that ensures the safety and well-being of Okinawan society.”

The hiring of Filipino women in the bars is a strategy made possible in a large part by the unequal economic power relationship between Japan and the Philippines. Bar owners attribute the hiring of Filipino women instead of Okinawa women to the economic reality that hiring Okinawans or Japanese is much more expensive than hiring Filipino women. In fact, the hiring of Filipino women coincided with the period following the reversion of Okinawa when the strong Japanese yen became the medium of exchange. It is however important to note that this period also coincided with the application of the Japanese prohibition law of prostitution in Okinawa. One bar owner explains:

After the Vietnam war was over, we started this business. First, we had Okinawan employees and Okinawan bands. But soon we realized it was too expensive to hire Okinawans. So in the mid or later 1970's we started hiring Filipino bands and then hired Filipino dancers.

These Filipino women are first recruited by “entertainment agencies,” which are run by Okinawans or Japanese. Then they are subcontracted to individual clubs and bars in the Shinkaichi section as well as other bars in the town and nearby towns. One owner told me that to employ 7 dancers for three months, she had to pay 3,000,000 Yen ($30,000) as “tax” and additional 600,000 Yen ($6,000) to their agencies. To the bar owners, even though they pay 150,000 Yen ($1,500) to hire each Filipino woman in the bar, the hiring of Filipino women still makes “more economic sense” than hiring of Okinawan women.

Inside the bar, Filipino women often hold dual jobs. They work as hostesses, serving drinks and snacks, and dancing with customers. They also work as “entertainers,” performing dance shows sometimes with their top on and other times topless. While performing dances is included in their base salaries, the Filipino women’s salaries are also based on commission. How many drinks their customers order themselves and how many drinks the women have the customers buy them are the main basis of their salaries. The women’s drink is usually cola or tea with ice in a shot glass and it costs 5 to 10 dollars. Since it is not alcohol, they can consume more. They ask US soldiers to buy them as many drinks as possible to make money. Sometimes, in order to have them buy more drinks, many Filipino women allow military personnel to engage in physical contacts such as dancing, kissing, and touching.\(^{50}\) It is suspected that some bars allow sexual labor to be practiced inside the bars. The women’s monthly salary is about 80,000 Yen ($800) and they send a large potion of the salary to support their families in the Philippines (Yara, 1993b).

\(^{50}\) See Sturdevant and Stolzfus (1992: 240-299) for more detail.
Besides, economic benefits of hiring Filipino women rather than Okinawan women, bar owners regard Filipino women as more “suitable” as hostesses to deal with US military customers. One bar owner explains what she means by “suitable:”

They can speak English so that they can communicate well with US soldier customers. And they know this is business that they have to do. So if US soldier customers come into the bar but do not have enough money to buy them drinks, these Filipino girls just leave the customers. But if they realize that the customers have money, they are really nice to the customers. They really treat customers differently, depending on how much money customers have. This is O.K. with me. And their way of treating customers is acceptable to our customers because our customers are US soldiers. If our customers were Okinawans or Japanese, the way these Filipino girls treat customers would not be acceptable to them. They would complain and bad rumors about my place would be spreading quickly. Then I could no longer run this business.

Filipino women’s ability to use English and their “more business like” attitude are seen as suitable to military customers. And military customers’ way of “treating of women,” including acts of kissing and hugging, also is recognized as suitable to Philippine women. Moreover, the youth of Filipino women, of whom most are in their 20s, is also considered as suitable to military customers since most of the military customers are also in their early 20s. Their young age becomes particularly an important factor since in contrast most of the Okinawan bar owners and employees are much older than military personnel.

Furthermore, their economic needs and their ethnicity as “Filipino” are also regarded by bar owners as making Filipino women suitable hostesses. In other words, all the characteristics which distinguish Okinawan bar owners from these Filipino women make the Filipino women suitable to interact with military customers. Creating the “others” in the Filipino women, Okinawan bar owners now distance themselves from these Filipino women as well as from military customers while still being able to operate their bar business (see Enloe 1989:65-92 for discussion on the question of who become “bar women” in base towns well as division between the women).

While the bar owners employ Filipino women as their strategies to deal with military personnel as customers, the bar owners also have strategies to deal with these Filipino women. Besides adapting English as their medium of communication, many bar owners have developed strict ways to control Filipino women inside and outside the bar. With collaboration between bar owners and recruiting agencies, Filipino women are often prohibited to go out alone and often confined during the daytime in their apartment rooms, which are provided by bar owners and recruiting agencies. This prohibition of going outside is often explained as “a preventing measure to protect these women from any problems.” Moreover, inside the bar, some bar owners keep detailed records of how many
drinks or snacks these Filipino women ask military personnel to purchase and take notes on their work performances. These records and notes are, in turn, used to determine their salaries later. These practices of keeping records on drink and snack orders and of taking notes on their performances are applied only to Filipino women, not to Okinawan workers in the bars. These practices are also rarely found in many other Japanese bars in the town. One bar owner explains her practice of taking notes on the performances of Filipino women:

This is the way we do business with them (Filipino women). You keep everything recorded on paper. So later, with this record, you can evaluate their work. By showing the record to the workers, you can justify the money you pay to them. Otherwise, we could not understand each other. We speak different languages and we are from different countries. You don’t do this with Okinawans or Japanese employees. They (Okinawans and Japanese) would not like to be treated like this.

The difference in their treatment of Okinawan employees and Filipino women is attributed to the difficulty of “establishing the same kind of relationship with Filipino women as with Okinawan employees.” The difficulty in turn is attributed to the differences in language, ethnicity, age, and economic needs. However, these differences are exactly the characteristics that make Filipino women bar employees more “suitable” to military customers than Okinawan women. Again, Okinawan bar owners create the “others” in these Filipino women, thereby distancing themselves from these women. This distance from, or the “otherness” of the Filipino women, enables the Okinawan bar owners to employ and control the Filipino women as bar hostesses and “entertainers” inside and outside their bars (see ibid.). As the unequal economic relationship between Japan and the Philippines continues, Okinawan bar owners maneuver the unequal relationship for their advantage in hiring of Filipino women. In other words, the bar business of the Shinkaichi section, which faces military personnel as both foremost important customers and potential trouble makers, is mediated by the hiring of Filipino women.

Strategies or Obstacles

While Okinawan bar owners employ the American bar system and the hiring of Filipino women as their strategies to live with the base, these very strategies also present themselves as major obstacles for the bar owners in the present economy of the Shinkaichi section. Many bar owners share the view that they can no longer rely solely on military personnel as customers and they need to attract Japanese and Okinawan customers as well.
Some bar owners have even questioned the feasibility of bar business itself in the future. However, at the same time, they agree that their American bar system is not “suitable” to Japanese customers and the hiring of Filipino women may not be economically feasible if they change to a more Japanese style of bar operation. Many also share the view that there are no other alternative jobs available to them in the town and even if there are some jobs available, they are “too old” to learn the new jobs. These are important reasons why many of them are hesitant to change their business or even to accept Okinawans and Japanese as their customers. Bar owners describe their views on the idea of changing business practices:

I have become like Americans because I have been dealing with Americans for a long time. And it is easier for me to deal with Americans (US soldiers) than Okinawans or Japanese. Changing to the Okinawan style of bar would be very difficult.

It is true that our business is going downhill. But it is just hard to change this business practice and start another one. I do not know any other ways to make a living and I am too old to learn new stuff. Well, my son is now on his own so I don’t need to worry about him any more. He may find a job not in Kin Town but another place. But I think I will be working in this business in this town as long as I can.

Bar owners’ inability and/or unwillingness to change business practices can also be recognized in relation to their sense of “responsibility” as the owners of bars. Many bar owners recognize that running a bar business is important not only for themselves but also for their Okinawan employees and Filipino women. One bar owner explains:

Well, I am doing well in this business. I have built my own house and have bought pieces of land by doing this business. But when I look at my employees, Okinawan employees, and Filipino employees, I feel that I have the responsibility to take care of them by continuing this business. These Okinawan employees, who have been working in this business for such a long time, they are old and do not have any other special skills. If I quite this business, where would they work? The only jobs they could find are changing sheets as hotel maids or sweeping streets. And, these Filipino girls, they have to work to support their families back home. This job is tough and not pleasant. But I think I provide them at least a place to work. In fact, many of them (Filipino women) who went back home come back to my place.

This sense of the “shared fate” of bar business provides bar owners an incentive to continue their bar business. It is, in turn, in the sense of the shared fate that bar owners find commonalities between themselves, Okinawan employees, and Filipino women. As many bar owners recognize that their bar business might not survive so long, especially
given the possibility of withdrawal of the base from the town, they also recognize that these women are all in the same boat, struggling for their economic survival. The distance from the Filipino women, created though the differences in language, ethnicity, and age, now crumbles as bar owners identify themselves, Okinawan employees, and Filipino women all as “base women.” This view of base women as a collective entity may be a source for empowerment of these women.

In short, bar owners employ the American bar system and the hiring of Filipino women as strategies to live with the military base. These strategies are predicated upon the bar owners’ perception that military personnel are both their foremost customers and potential trouble makers. These strategies are employed to secure their economic benefits as well as their well being. To the extent that these strategies are products of various unequal power relationships created by international economy and politics, these strategies also present difficulties for bar owners in the changing economy of bar business.\(^{51}\)

**Native Kin People**

Unlike the daily life of bar owners and restaurant owners in the Shinkaichi section, the daily life of many native Kin people does not involve direct interaction with military personnel and the base.\(^{52}\) Their occupations such as farmers, construction workers, public office workers, small papa-mama grocery shop owners, do not necessitate such interaction. The language barrier as well as the de facto segregation of residential areas from the military base, despite their close proximity, also makes the occurrence of such interaction difficult. Moreover, as the town’s and native land owners’ land lease negotiation processes now involves the Japanese government, rather than the US government and military, any interaction between native Kin people and the base regarding the “lease money” is also eliminated. In other words, their financial reliance on the base does not require direct interactions between the town and the base.

On some special occasions, however, some interactions between native Kin people and military personnel do take place. Native Kin people may have opportunities to interact

\(^{51}\) It is important to note that the bar owners were initially very reluctant to be interviewed. They were extremely concerned with their business practice being exposed to the media through my research. The suspect of illegal hiring practice and prostitution and the way bar owners and agencies treat Filipino dancers have recently become the focus of the media attention. In fact, I was told that research done by a student on the Filipino dancers in the Shinkaichi section became the focus of the media and one bar owner was often followed by a camera crew.
with military personnel on special occasions such as Kin Chou Matsuri (Kin Town Festival) and/or Friendship Day as a symbolic gesture of "international friendship." Or they may interact with military personnel on an individual basis. In fact, some native Kin people (males) have established friendship with military personnel. Nonetheless, interactions between native Kin people and military personnel and the base are usually minimal and limited within these particular frameworks. However, a closer look at native Kin people's lack of interaction with military personnel and the base reveals that this is not merely a result of the incompatible lives of the two, but is also a manifestation of the native Kin people's strategy to live with the presence of the base, namely disassociation from the base.

Disassociation from the Base

Despite the fact that the base exists in the town's backyard, there is not only a lack of formal relationship between the two, but also a lack of effort on the part of the town and native Kin people to establish such a relationship with the base. At the town level, there is no official, public institution or system which actively functions to facilitate or to establish a formal relationship with the base. Although Kichi Taisaku linkai (base measure committee) is set up under the town assembly, the main function of the committee is to deal with base related incidents and accidents and to negotiate land lease contracts. It is essentially a problem solving committee and does not extend its function to seek or to create a formal relationship with the base. The town office itself also does not have any specific section to actively facilitate or establish a formal relationship with the base. While the development and planning section is assigned to deal with "base issues," this section also mainly deals with base related incidents and accidents. In fact, since this section's main function is to oversee development and planning of the town, the section's ability to deal with base related incidents and accidents is very limited.

The lack of officials and public institutions to facilitate or establish a formal relationship between the town and the base is not necessarily a result of the town

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52 As described before, the term "native Kin" is now used rather loosely. It can now include descendants of the Kiryumin, the drifters (see Chapter 4). However, it still usually excludes those who came to the town for the economic opportunities in the Shinkaichi section provided by the presence of the base.

53 Friendship Day is a day of international interaction, sponsored by the military. On this day in June, the base is open to the public so that Kin people as well as many other Okinawans can visit the base. Kin Chou Matsuri is the town's summer festival and it runs through a weekend in late August. During the festival, many events such as a parade, a Karaoke contest, and Eisa dance, are participated in by both Kin people and military personnel.
government's lack of understanding of the importance of creating such relationship or its inability to create such a relationship. Rather, it should be understood as a reflection of the perception of the base as the root cause of problems. Many town officials and native Kin people share the view that any interaction between the town and the base would lead to an increase in the number of incidents and accidents in which townspeople are victims and military personnel as assailants. In this sense, the town as an official public entity cannot approve any publicly sanctioned relationship with the base unless the relationship is proven to be "safe and meaningful." At the same time, the lack of officials and public institutions to establish a formal relationship with the base is also a reflection of the fact that the town office and the town assembly are mainly made up of native Kin people. As their life does not require interactions with the base and military personnel, many of those native Kin town officials and town assembly representatives do not see the necessity for interaction with the town and the base on daily bases. In other words, the lack of official or public institutions to create a formal relationship with the base is a strategy of the town government to live with the base. This point becomes very clear when one considers the fact that there have been many attempts by some townspeople and the base to establish a formal relationship between the town and the base.

Kin Chou Shoukou Kai (Kin Town Chamber of Commerce) and Kin Chou Shakougyou Kumiai (Kin Town Social Chamber of Committee), which represent bar owners and some other service industry employers, have been strong advocates for establishing of a formal relationship between the town and the base. They recognize that a formal relationship between the town and the base would lead not only to economic benefits for them but also to a better understanding of each other. Some members of the Kin Town Chamber of Commerce have suggested that the town should create a Koryu center (friendship center) and/or some public system for facilitating a good interaction and relation between the town and the base (see e.g., Kin Town Assembly 1985:155-157, 1988:235-239). Recognizing the negative perceptions of the base by the town office and native Kin people, those who advocate establishing a formal relationship with the base look to "educated" and "high rank military personnel" as potential participants from the base. One town assembly representative argues this point:

We have quality military persons who are educated and graduates of colleges. We should be able to ask them to teach something for us. We should not waste such opportunities. In this way, we can have a safe relationship.54

54 The same kind of argument have been presented in the town assembly meetings. (see e.g., Kin Town Assembly 1985:170).
Meanwhile, the Kin Town Chamber of Commerce has established an informal relationship and network with the base. Through this informal relationship and network, the Kin Chamber of Commerce renders its support to and participate in Friendship Day sponsored by the base. It also plays an important role in bringing about participation of US military personnel in Kin Chou Matsuri (Kin Town Festival). Bar owners (women) themselves have also established informal networks with wives of military offices. Through their informal networks, they engage in English conversation practices, the hobby of dyeing cloth, and dinner parties. The town office has rendered “its support” financially to such informal relationships and networks as a courtesy of a “host community.” However, since, in part, these relationships and networks are not town sanctioned official relationships, they are often vulnerable. Every time some incident or accidents committed or caused by military personnel occur, these informal relationships and networks tend to disappear. In fact, Friendship Day in 1993 was canceled and bar owners’ informal network groups with wives of military offices were broken up, both due to the murder of a Kin man by a military personnel in April of 1993. Nevertheless, the Kin Town Chamber of Commerce recognizes that without official sanction or official approval, any permanent relationship between the town and the base has been hard to come by. The Kin Town Chamber of Commerce and the Kin Town Social Chamber of Commerce continue to advocate for the establishing of a publicly sanctioned relationship and a “friendship center,” which can withstand such base related incidents and accidents.

At the same time, the military side has also shown interests in creating such a friendship center or any other systems to establish a formal relationship with the town. Their active participation in volunteer work such as the cleaning up of the town’s beaches and in various town events and their invitation for the townspeople to the “Friendship Day” all reflect the military side’s eagerness to have a better relationship with the town. They have been seeking support and approval from the town for its existence and its role in international politics. They have tried to persuade the town that many military personnel are well mannered and educated and would be active participants in establishing a good relationship with the town (see, Kin Town Assembly, 1985:166). While acknowledging the difficulties the town and the base face in creating a better relationship, one military official gives this suggestion:

We understand their sentiment against us and that they do not like the presence of the base in their town. But I wish that they could see the base as their economic opportunity and we could establish a good relationship with each other. The Marines have changed a lot over the years. Look at this section, where we spend outside the base, you only see bars and clubs and shops that sell American stuff. It seems that, they think, we are only
interested in those. I would like to know more about their culture and to buy something Okinawan. There are many other Marines who think as I do. There is a lot of things you can do to create a good relationship. For example, they could put an information center in front of the gate so that we could understand more about the town and its people.

These arguments for establishing a town sanctioned relationship or an institution or system to facilitate such a relationship are, however, not shared or supported by the town office and native Kin people. The town office and native Kin people find that the Chamber of Commerce’s arguments are too economically oriented and self-serving. Given the perception that the base is the root cause of problems, they also see that the military’s arguments are still unproven although they recognize that “not all Marines cause problems.” In fact, Mayor Nakama has argued over and over again against the establishment of a publicly sanctioned relationship with the base, unless it is guaranteed that there will be no base related accidents and incidents. Excerpts of Mayor’s response in a meeting of the Town Assembly illustrate this point:

(B)efore we can even think about establishing a relationship, we should be guaranteed that base related incidents and accidents be eliminated. We have been arguing this for a long time. As much as we would like to have a friendship and exchange with the base, if this present situation, in which even a murder takes place, persists, we cannot agree to the idea of establishing such a relationship with the base. (Kin Town Assembly 1985:169)

(T)hey (the military side) argue that, instead of looking at these lower rank soldiers, we should look to those higher rank officials and we could establish a relationship with the base through these higher rank officials. But I argue that why they do not look at their own lower rank military personnel and do something to prevent (base related) accidents and incidents from occurring. Because they do not take a close look at and take care of their own lower rank personnel, there are always incidents and accidents. We cannot establish a relationship while base related accidents and incidents continue to occur. It may be easy for the assailant to say “let’s be friends,” but not for the victim. (Kin Town Assembly 1985:170-171.)

As I suggested one town official that the town should more actively participate in establishing a good relationship with the base, the town official reacted passionately by saying:

Do you really think we can interact with them (military personnel and the base), without fear, without worry, without any constrain of the power relationship. I don’t think so. I don’t think we can have a safe and meaningful relationship with the base and military personnel. If you live in this town long enough you would find it for yourself. And how would you benefit from such a relationship?
Therefore, the lack of any public institution or any public system to facilitate and establish a formal relationship with the base needs to be understood as a strategy of the town as a whole to live with the base. This strategy is predicated upon the perception that the base and military personnel cause problems for the town. By not having a formal relationship with the base, the town disassociates itself from the base. By disassociating itself from the base and military personnel, the town and many native Kin people can prevent and protect themselves from getting involved in many problems caused by military and military personnel. Moreover, by disassociating itself from the base, the town, especially the town office, needs not be worried about their power relationships with the base, the US government, and Japanese government. “Unnecessary efforts and energy,” which would be required for the town office and assembly to deal with base related accidents and incidents in the unequal power relationship, are not needed as long as there are no base related accidents and incidents. Indeed, the town’s strategy of disassociation from the base is a form of active non-participation in building a relationship with the base. The town as a whole resists an outwardly positive relationship because it would mask the negative and military personnel might not be held accountable for incidents and accidents. At the same time, however, it should be recognized that the town’s disassociation from the base is made possible by the fact that the town’s financial reliance on the base, in the form of lease money, does not require direct interaction with the town and the base. Rather, the financial resource of lease money is guaranteed in the framework of international treaties between the Japanese government and the US government.

While the town as a whole tries to avoid unnecessary interaction with the base and military personnel, interactions between native Kin people and military personnel at the personal level are also discouraged. Various strategies are taken by many native Kin people to disassociate native Kin people from military personnel and the base. Native Kin people’s disassociation from the base and military personnel through these strategies is again predicated upon the perception that the base creates many problems in the town (see Chapter 5). However, there are differences between native Kin men on the one hand, and youth and native Kin women on the other hand in terms of how they are discouraged in their interaction with military personnel. These differences indicate different perceptions of interaction between the native Kin people and military personnel, which are indeed gender and age specific. Therefore, it is important to understand these differences in the strategies of native Kin people to live with the base as well as in the perceptions leading to the employment of such strategies.

As for native Kin men, their interactions with military personnel can take place without much concern from other community members although such interactions are not
necessarily encouraged. In fact, some native Kin men have developed long time friendship with military personnel who have lived in the town for a long time. They occasionally invite each other home to socialize. One can also see that some Kin men and military personnel socialize with each other as acquaintances by drinking together in bars in the Shinkaichi section. These is also an ex-US military personnel who lives in the town and works as a fisherman with local fishermen.

The presence of such interactions and relationships and the native Kin people’s relative acceptance of them can be attributed to two factors. First of all, their interactions and relationships are of the same gender. As the notion that a man can deal with another man better than a woman exists among the townspeople, the townspeople tend to see that there would be less problems between men to men relationship and interaction than women and men. This notion is in turn created by the gendered understanding of militarization not only on the military’s part but also on the townspeople’s part. This point will be elaborated later as native Kin women’s interactions and relationships with military personnel (or lack of them) are discussed. Secondly, in these same gender interactions and relationships between native Kin men and military personnel, the base comes to be perceived and understood as an important international institution with international power rather than as the root cause of problems. With this positive perception and understanding of the base, native Kin men’s interactions and relationships with military personnel are seen as symbols of their “connection” to the base, an important international institution with power. In turn, their connection to the base gives them a certain sense of importance and power (see Chapter 5 for discussion of power and connection to the base). Access to the base and actual entrance to the base are especially considered as symbols of the privileged since access to the base is usually limited. Those who have the “base pass” such as base workers, traders, and a few town officials are allowed to enter the base. In fact, being able to go to the restaurant on the base is of symbolic importance among Kin men to show their connection to the base. Moreover, native Kin people’s interactions and relationships with military personnel as friends or even just as acquaintances are also seen in favorable terms. Native Kin men, who interact and have social relations with military personnel, are often seen as having social skills and ability to use English. In fact, there are some subtle competitions among base workers, town officials, and other Kin men, who interact with military personnel, in terms of “who is the better English user” and who know more about the base and “America.” These subtle competitions indeed reflect the high value put on interactions with military personnel as well as the connection to the base as an internationally important institution.
Unlike townsmen, the town’s youth (students) and native Kin women are constantly cautioned not to interact with military personnel and encouraged to disassociate themselves from military personnel. As for the town’s youth, since the daily lives of the youth (students) do not involve direct interactions with military personnel, the townspeople are more concerned with “negative influences” from military personnel on the youth. Many of the town’s youth are often directly warned by their parents and community members not to go to the Shinkaichi section where the possibility of getting involved in accidents and incidents is seen as high and moral decay is perceived to be widespread. Those youth who go to the Shinkaichi section to play video games or pool games are labeled as Furyou or juvenile delinquents. Given the close network of the communities, the warning and labeling can work to discourage the youth from going to the Shinkaichi section although some older students still go to the Shinkaichi section. Moreover, “night patrol” is often conducted in the Shinkaichi section by parents and teachers to oversee student activities and to discourage them from playing there.

As for native Kin women, especially young women, interactions with military personnel are highly discouraged and various strategies to disassociate women from military personnel are practiced. In addition to direct warnings not to interact with military personnel, Uwasabanashi (rumor or gossip) and Adana (name calling) apparently function to discourage native Kin women from interacting with military personnel (see Scott 1991:140-152 discussion of gossip and rumor). Uwasabanashi (rumor or gossip), while on the surface remains unharmful, can transform information about suspected interactions of native Kin women and military personnel throughout the community by word of mouth. Name calling, which is usually used by the young generation to depict relationships between native Kin women and US military personnel in degrading ways, identifies who is “dating” with military personnel. These strategies work well to disassociate townswomen from military personnel since the town is small and an individual’s close kinship affiliation is usually known to other native Kin people. Female informants explain how the spread of rumors and name calling in the town play a very effective role in discouraging them from interacting with military personnel:

This town is very small and everybody knows everybody. They know not only you but also your parents and your relatives. I heard that not long time ago, when people greeted each other on the street, they would ask how you were doing, where you were going, and what you were doing and many other questions. It was a custom of the town because this town was so close. It is still a close knit town. So if somebody find out you are drinking out in the Shinkaichi section, this person calls your home, your relatives, and others. So the very next day, everybody in the town knows you were drinking last night and thinks that you are playing around (with
military people). I know they care about you because of the base and military people. But it is very hard to live in this town because of such scrutiny you have to put up with.

There is a terminology for women or girls who interact with US military people. It is called ‘Ame Jo.’ Do you know what this means? This is an Okinawan expression and means ‘American eater.’ It is such a degrading term. Once I was seen with an American male friend by one of my brother’s friends. Even though this American was just a friend, my brother’s friend called my brother and informed him that I had been with an American. And my brother called me, accusing me ‘you have become Ame Jo.’ I was really shocked by being called that... This news reached my grandmother quickly, even though she lives in the neighboring village. Since she used to baby-sit children of American military officers, she is personally not harsh on me being friends with Americans. But she warned me that people would talk ill about me, so I should not be friends with American men.

To the extent that these native Kin women feel constrained by the communities’ scrutiny about their interactions with military personnel, the spread of Uwasabanashi (rumor and gossip) and Adana (name calling) is effective in discouraging women from interacting with military personnel. Especially, the term, Ame Jo, which contains derogatory sexual connotations, appears to be very effective in disassociating young native Kin women from military personnel.

The term, Ame Jo, also points to the fact that the relationship between military personnel and native women tend to be understood in terms of sexual implications. Such sexual implications are indeed reflective of their cross gender relationships and are rarely found in the same gender interactions and relationships between native Kin men and military personnel. In fact, many native Kin women are well aware that interactions and relationships between Kin women and military personnel are differently perceived from those between native Kin men and military personnel. One female informant describes this contrast:

If you are male and you interact with military personnel in a bar or anywhere else, it is considered as O.K. People here see you as sociable and capable of speaking English. But if you are female and do the same thing, you are in a big trouble. You are not supposed to interact with them. People here always tell you (females) not to interact with military personnel. They say it’s dangerous. And if they see you with military personnel, you are regarded by others as ‘playing around’ or being ‘loose.’

Unlike personal interactions between native Kin men and military personnel, which are seen in terms of their connection to the base as an international institution and their sociability and ability to use English, interactions between native Kin women and military

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55 This word is a coinage of “America” and Jogu (good eater).
personnel are discussed with the language of “dangerous,” “playing around” or “being loose.” These perceptions of interactions between women and military personnel are again fundamentally related to the fact that these are cross gender interactions and relationships. Then what make their cross gender interactions and relationships different from the same gender interactions and relationships between townsmen and military personnel?

To begin with, the relationship between native Kin women and military personnel is often seen in relation to the fact that there are children born out of wedlock between Okinawan women and US soldiers and many cases of divorce between couples of Okinawan women and US military personnel in the town as well as in Okinawa (Enloe 1991:97 points out that “all military marriages are stressful, but none more so than US soldiers and their girlfriends from Asian countries.” For example, eighty percent of marriages between Korean women and US servicemen end in divorce). This fact has a strong negative influence on the townspeople’s perceptions and understanding of the relationship between military personnel and Okinawan women, especially Kin women. Although I could not obtain statistical data on these aspects of the relationship between townswomen and US soldiers in the town, it is obvious that their unsuccessful marriages and out-of-wedlock children are more visible than those of Okinawan couples in the town. Children born out of wedlock between Okinawan women and American military personnel, as a result of interracial relationships, have distinctive physical features such as different colors of skin and hair. The divorce of women from American husbands are as visible as their marriages in this small town simply because they are racially and ethnically different. Given the fact that the act of divorce itself, regardless of who they are divorced from, is often stigmatized, divorcing from American husbands is often more stigmatized than divorcing from Okinawan husbands. One informant explains her observations of these phenomena:

I have friends who are ‘half.’ 56 They do not know who their fathers are. Well, we treat them nicely but sometimes they are teased as ‘half.’ It is so sad because some of them are still looking for their fathers and the fathers are not taking any responsibility.

I know some women who work in bars in the Shinkaichi section. They were once married to US soldiers and went to the US and lived there. But they did not stay together and so they had to come back to this town. I do not talk with them about their marriages or divorce. But I know people here do not like people getting divorced, especially from American husbands.

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56 Children of interracial marriage. However, it usually means that father is American and mother is Okinawan.
While only a few native Kin women marry military personnel and most of out of wedlock children also came from couples of non-native Kin people (usually bar women) and military personnel, these divorce cases and “half” children become a warning for native Kin people. Many native Kin people perceive that relationships and interactions between Okinawan women and military personnel are more likely to have “unhappy endings.” As divorced women as well as “half” children (females) often end up working in bars in the Shinkaichi section, the perception of relationships between Okinawan women and military personnel as “unsuccessful” is reinforced. Therefore, native Kin people’s efforts to disassociate native Kin women from military personnel through various strategies need to be understood as means to prevent Kin women from engage in unsuccessful relationships.

The relationship between native Kin women and military personnel also needs to be understood in relation to native Kin men. As Enloe (1991) brilliantly illustrates in her discussion on masculinized experiences, native Kin men’s perceptions of the Americans’ “taking their women away” need to be understood. Although this aspect is hard to study due to its nature and I could not have direct interviews with Kin men on this matter, female informants do present how they perceive Kin men’s “wounded masculinity:”

I was told this story by my boss. I think he was drunk at that time. Anyway, it took place 25 years ago and he is now about 50 years old. He was working as a security officer on the base. He watched many Okinawan women going out with military soldiers. He told me that, in front of him, US soldiers and Okinawan women Ichaicha (kissing and hugging). He didn’t like that at all. He was in the 20s and wanted to play but he did not have money to do so. He did not like Japanese (Okinawan) women playing abound with Americans. He was young and did not have power to do that. It was like Menodoku (too much) for such a young men as he was. (non-native Kin female 34)

One of my female friends worked in a bar in the Shinkaichi section. This is one of these bars that are switching their customers from Americans to Okinawans. Many Kin people (male) frequented this bar. But, because she can speak English, the bar attracted many Americans as well. So some Kin customers got angry saying ‘there is no place for us.’ They made a phone call to the bar and she was forced to quite the job. She has moved out of town since then. I think that Kin men do not like Kin women to interact with military persons. (native kin female 22)

In other words, for native Kin men, Kin women become a field in which their power relationship with the base and military personnel is played out. Kin women interacting with and having relationships with military personnel become for native Kin men a symbolic manifestation of their unequal power relationship with the base and military personnel. Therefore, in order to avoid “wounded masculinity,” native Kin men try to
disassociate women from military personnel, thereby abolishing the field in the first place where an unequal power relationship would otherwise occur.

While native Kin women are encouraged to disassociate themselves from the base and military personnel through various strategies, the strategy of disassociation itself should be understood in relation to the presence of the Shinkaichi section. In the Shinkaichi section, interactions between non-native Kin people (bar owners) and military personnel are not only unavoidable but also necessary means for non-native Kin people and Filipino women to make a living. While the Shinkaichi section is seen as creating moral decay because of such interactions, the Shinkaichi section can also be understood as helping native Kin women disassociate themselves from military personnel. That is to say, to the extent the Shinkaichi section can attract military personnel, native Kin people's strategy of disassociation from them is also enhanced. One female informant's joking comment about the presence of the Filipino women in the Shinkaichi well illustrates this point:

When people tell me ‘be careful of Americans’ or ‘do not go to the Shinkaichi section because Americans will pick you up,’ I would jokingly tell them ‘it’s O.K. They have Filipino women for themselves now.’

As the Shinkaichi section as a whole provides a buffer zone for native kin people, especially for women, this zone is utilized in the context that their strategy of disassociation from the base is practiced. Especially, Filipino women now become barriers not only for Okinawan bar workers but also for native Kin women in general as Sturdevant and Stolzfus (1992) point out. Again, “otherness” is created by native Kin people in Filipino women and, to a lesser extent, in non-native Kin women (bar owners). While native Kin women can identify themselves with non-native Kin women and Filipino women in terms of gender, they are still perceived as different from native Kin women. This “otherness” in these women is, in turn, used to justify their interactions with military personnel. Non-native Kin women can marry military personnel and have “half” children. Filipino women can date and have sexual relationships with military personnel. But not native Kin women. In other words, the “otherness” in these women has been incorporated into native Kin people’s strategy of disassociating native Kin women from military personnel and the base.

The “Independent” Protests

While the strategy of disassociation from the base and military personnel prevents native Kin people from getting involved in various problems, it does not completely erase
the actual occurrence of military related incidents and accidents. Crimes such as destruction of property, theft, fight, robbery are still committed by military personnel. Bombing practices still continue to create "red dirt pollution," mountain fire, and noise destruction. To deal with such problems, native Kin people employ the strategy of protests whenever they occur. However, their protests have to be expressed in the paradoxical framework of the base as the root cause of problems and as the most important financial resource for the town. As a result, their strategy has been shaped in a specific way. As described before, except for the Igei community, the protests of the remaining four communities of the town and the town as a whole are mainly aimed at the stoppage of bombing practice and against crimes committed by military personnel, but not at the removal or reduction of the base from the town. Moreover, their strategy of protests is "independent" and often segmented. That is to say, their strategy is not associated with any other political organizations such as unions, students organizations, left political parties, which otherwise are leaders in the protests against the presence of military bases in Okinawa. Bar owners and members of the Kin Town Chamber of Commerce (usually non-native Kin people) do not usually participate in the town's protests. Furthermore, compared with protests made by other political organizations against the presence of the base, which employ the strategies of marching in the streets, demonstration and picketing in front of the gates of the base, native Kin people's protests seem rather subtle and invisible. Native Kin people's protests usually take place inside or outside their own community buildings and take the form of community gatherings and/or formal meetings. In these meetings, representatives from the military, the Japanese government, the local police office and the town office engage in discussions in an attempt to resolve the problems. Statements are also declared and issued by the townspeople to the military, US and Japanese governments. However, no visible confrontation between the townspeople and the base takes place. In other words, their strategy of protests are shaped in a such way that it secures the continuos presence of the base, thereby money form the base while it condemns base related problems.

To illustrate why native Kin people's strategy of protests against the base has gained these specific characteristics, one town official's oral history of his participation in protest movements in the late 70's is provided:

Well, Mr. Okinawa and I were the president and vice-president of the Kin Town Young Men's association about 15 or 16 years ago. We were young then in our twenties. As representatives of the association, we participated in protests against US military's bombing practice over Prefectural route

57 When I observed a protest gathering by union groups and left wing groups at the second gate of the base, police warned me not to get involved with them and not to agitate them. They told me that some members of these groups were so violent that they could harm me.
These protests were participated in mostly by members of union and liberal groups. As natives of Kin Town, we realized that the town depended upon the presence of the base. So our protests were not against the presence of the base itself. We did not demand the removal or reduction of the base. Rather, our protests were aimed at the bombing practices. We demanded that the danger imposed by the bombing practice on the townspeople be eliminated and the ecological damages on targeted mountains should be stopped.

Our participation in these protests was, however, regarded by the elders in the town as being directed against the base itself. It was not a good thing that we protested with unions and liberal groups because they were demanding the removal of the base from the town. Anyway we were then called upon by the president of the Kin Land Owner’s Association. He warned us that our protest should be stopped and reminded that the town needed the base for survival. We were told that if we would keep protesting, we should leave the town.

While we were protesting, we were treated like Murahachibu (outcast) by townspeople. Our participation in these protests put us into isolation from the rest of townspeople. My mother’s shop was boycotted by townspeople. Some of us were accused of being liberal. It was a real hard time for me and my family. Well, because of this, gradually our protest movement died out.

At present, we can openly talk about our opinions against the bombing practice. Time has changed since then. But I often wonder what would have happened to the town if we had continued to protest. There were some people from outside Kin, who went into the targeted mountains to protest against the bombing practice. They risked their lives. But, we did not. When I think of the extent to which those people went to protest, I have to ask myself whether I was really committed to the protest and whether I did what I was supposed to do.

Besides his personal sentiments about participation in the protest movement in the past, his oral history illustrates two important characteristics of native Kin people’s strategy of protests. First of all, given the dilemma that the base is both the most important financial resource and a root cause of problems, native Kin people have to carefully take into consideration what they protest against, what they demand, and who they associate with in the protest. While native Kin people protest specifically against the bombing practice, other political organizations protest against the presence of the base itself as well as the bombing practice. Therefore, any association with other political organizations in protest against the base is seen as bringing “too much political complication” to the town. As a result, native Kin people at present do not associate with any other political organizations in Okinawa in their protests. Rather, they protest “independently.” Secondly, since May native Kin

58 Being “liberal” means being “anti-base” and is regarded negatively in Kin Town.
59 This protest is known as Kisenbaru Tousou. These protesters were captured by the Japanese police and accused of breaking the US-Japan security treaty.
people still live in small communities of close kinship network, individuals’ participation in protest movements is subject to scrutiny by the other community members. Those who violate the communities’ unity by participating individually in “wrong” protests have to face its consequences. In the case of the informant, he was isolated from the community and even his parents and relatives suffered from his individual participation in the protest. In fact, such communal sanction was common in the past. A native Kin representative of the town assembly told me that, in the past, he was denied his scholarship from the town education foundation for his participation in a protest marching with other political groups. Therefore, at present, each community or the town is the unit, not individuals, that carries out independent protests against the bombing practice by the military and crimes committed by military personnel.

To what extent are native Kin people’s independent protests effective? This question has been raised by many native Kin people themselves as well as non-native Kin people. As described in Chapter 5, many regard the independent protests ineffective in preventing occurrence of base related incidents and accidents. In fact, the occurrence of such incidents and accidents and protests that follow have become a routine part of the town’s life. However, some still regard their independent protests as “better than nothing.” Such protests at least result in the temporary restraining of military personnel from going out of the base, thereby reminding the base that the town as a whole does not tolerate military crimes and military accidents. However, at the same time, it is also true that the temporary restraining of military personnel would economically hurt the Shinkaichi section, consequently the town itself. In short, whether one perceives native Kin people’ independent protests as successful or not, they are a particular strategy to live with the base that has emerged from the town’s complex relationship with the base.

Interpretive Summary and Discussion

I have described different strategies of the townspeople to live with the base. Although most of the townspeople share the notion that “there is nothing you can do about it (the presence of the base),” beyond the acceptance of the base as an inevitable reality, many strategies have been developed by the townspeople to live with the base. One population, bar owners, employs the strategies of the incorporation of the American bar system and the hiring of Filipino women. These strategies are aimed at enhancing economic benefits as well as eliminating or lowering the possibility of them getting involved in various problems. These strategies are predicated upon the fact that bar owners
interact with military personnel who are their main customers but are also potential trouble
makers in the bar sense. Another population, collectively native Kin people, employs the
strategies of disassociation from the base and military personnel and “independent”
protests. Their strategies are mainly aimed at avoiding any involvement in base related
problems and in the unequal power relationship. At the same time, they also secure the
town’s relationship with the base as its most important financial resource. These strategies
reflect the townspeople’s genuine creativity and are employed by them with the clear
recognition that they live in a base town. Indeed, it is in relation to the townspeople’s
recognition of living in a base town that their intentions for the employment of these
strategies become clear (see Scott 1985:290 for discussion on the importance of “intention”
of resistance). Now I would like to discuss how these strategies are related to the double
contextualization of the hegemonic claim and whether they can challenge the hegemonic
claim.

To begin with, it is important to note that these strategies of the townspeople to live
with the base share many characteristics with those of other subordinate groups to live with
the dominant groups, which are understood and analyzed with concepts such as “the
weapons of the weak” (e.g., Ong 1987, Scott 1985, 1990) or “outwitting” the dominant
(e.g., Skalnik 1989). The strategies of the townspeople of Kin to live with the base can be
characterized as being “informal, often covert, and concerned largely with immediate, de
facto gains” (Scott 1985:33). Distancing themselves from the base and military personnel
is more an inaction than an action, probably very subtle in the eyes of the military. While a
protest movement in essence is overt, their “independent” protests are carried out with the
effort not to publicly criticize the presence of the base itself. The bar owner’s American bar
system is also subtle and would appear rather normal to many US military personnel who
have not been exposed extensively to the Japanese bar system. As these strategies are
indeed grounded in the townspeople’s daily life, they are aimed at the immediate goals of
securing economic benefits and simultaneously avoiding involvement in various problems
with military personnel and the base. The goals of these strategies reflect the townspeople’s
complex perceptions of the base in the context of the town as both the root cause of
problems and the most important financial resource.

At the same time, however, it has become obvious that these strategies do not
directly deal with the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help create peace in the world.
As these strategies remain as tools for the townspeople to meet their immediate goals, they
are not in principle forces to challenge the hegemonic claim. Rather they are a
manifestation of compromises to live with the contradiction of the hegemonic claim found
in the context of the town. This interpretation of the townspeople’s strategies may differ
from that of Scott that the everyday strategies of the subordinate have the potential to challenge the hegemony and hegemonic claim imposed upon the subordinate by the dominant (1985:32-33). Instead, this interpretation may give a more pessimistic impression about the potential of these strategies to challenge the hegemony and the hegemonic claim. This is mainly because, in Scott’s cases, the hegemony and hegemonic claims are in the same context as the weak, whereas in the context of Kin Town, the hegemonic claim and hegemony are doubly contextualized by the townspeople. That is to say, as long as the townspeople accept the hegemonic claim as legitimate and effective in the context of international politics, while rejecting it as legitimate in the context of the town’s daily life, these strategies remain restricted to the context of the town. In other words, they remain as strategies to meet immediate goals but not to challenge the hegemonic claim itself.

It is important to note, however, that my interpretation of the strategies of the townspeople does not completely deny the potential for these strategies to challenge the hegemonic claim. On the contrary, I recognize that these strategies have the potential to challenge the hegemonic claim at least indirectly. I argue that the potential lies not necessarily in the strategies themselves but in their principle mechanism to incorporate the base and military personnel into the context of the town. What these strategies can do is to pull up military personnel and the base from the context of international politics, and put them in the context of the town, where the hegemonic claim is seen as not working, and have them examine for themselves the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of the town. By treating military personnel as bar customers and potential trouble makers, by distancing from and protesting against them and the base as the root cause of problems, the townspeople can show their doubts about the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of the town. Then, the townspeople have the military personnel examine the hegemonic claim as a truth or legitimate claim cross cutting the contexts of the town and international politics.

At the same time, this indirect way of challenging the hegemonic claim depends upon how military personnel and the base’s side perceive the ways they are treated in these townspeople’s strategies. If they can see the townspeople’s perceptions of the base and military personnel, there are chances that the hegemonic claim can be challenged through military personnel and the base themselves. However, there is always a high possibility that military personnel and the base can simply ignore or not even notice the townspeople’s strategies to deal with the base. They only pay attention to the townspeople’s acceptance of the base’s legitimacy at the international level. In fact, this scenario has been the case in this town. How then can these strategies of the townspeople challenge the hegemonic claim
both in the context of the town and in the context of international politics? I will attempt to answer this question in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 7

Communal Strategies: Creating and Recreating a True Kin Town

While most of the lives of the townspeople certainly revolve around the presence of the base, there exist the lives of the townspeople which do not appear to be related to the presence of the base. This is especially true for native Kin people. That is to say, despite the presence of the base in the town, native Kin people still engage in various communal activities and communal politics with a strong sense of communal membership. They also still thrive on their identities as members of the "home of emigrant pioneers" rather than as members of a base town. These communal aspects of the town seem to reflect the continuity of the town's history preceding pre-war Kin rather than the influences of the presence of the base in the town. In fact, many native Kin people regard these communal aspects as "true aspects of Kin Town."

A close examination of these communal aspects of the town will reveal, however, that they are still connected to the presence of the base in at least two crucial ways. First, these communal aspects of native Kin people's lives are in a large part supported by the financial benefits from the leasing of town's and communities' land to the military base. The financial benefits are distributed among the "traditional" communities by a complex system of money distribution which is, in fact, a new form of the traditional Somayama land management system. Secondly, these communal aspects of native Kin people's lives seem to help them to disassociate themselves from the presence of the base both symbolically and substantially. In turn, for native Kin people, military personnel, the base, and, to a lesser extent, bar owners all become the "others" used to define themselves as native Kin people. In light of these two crucial connections, therefore, these communal aspects of native Kin people's can be understood as their communal strategies to live with the presence of the base. In this chapter, I will attempt to illustrate the connections between the presence of the base and communal strategies of native Kin people's life. I will also illustrate how these same communal strategies of native Kin people have segmented the town's unity as a municipal entity. Finally in my interpretive discussion, I will discuss how these strategies can be understood as forms of "resistance" in relation to the double contextualization of the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help create peace in the world.
The New Form of the Somayama Land Management

As discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, Kin Town has a history of communal land management (Somayama land management) and struggle against the national and prefectural governments to retain their right to manage their Somayama land in the pre-war period. In relation to their communal land management, the communities of pre-war Kin also practiced a rather independent communal administration, with a strong sense of communal membership. At present, the legacy of the communal land management manifests itself most noticeably in the form of the "land lease money." The town annually receives a large amount of money from the Japanese government for leasing both the town's and communities' land to the base. As the town as a whole enjoys the wealth of this financial resource, the town government has been able to run well, providing various public services to the townspeople. The connection between the town's present day financial situation and the town's history of communal land management and struggle to protect the Somayama land is well recognized and highly prized by many townspeople (see Kin Town 1991: 33). However, what is not apparent to outsiders and what is not discussed openly by native Kin people is the fact that the traditional communal land management has been transformed into a money redistributing system. Instead of managing the actual planting and maintaining of trees in the Somayama land, the present money redistributing system administers the use of the land lease money. Through this system, a certain portion of the lease money received by the town government is distributed to each community, except for Nakagawa community, and to members of land owners associations. In other words, it is this redistributing system that enables each community to enjoy financial wealth and independence.

The present system of money distribution has been developed as a result of a long and complicated dispute over how to deal with the land lease money, especially over who should have the ultimate authority to deal with the land lease money. Since it was each community, not the town, that traditionally and customarily owned and maintain the Somayama land before WW II, the communities claimed that they should have the authority to deal with the land lease money. At the same time, however, it is the municipal government that, as the smallest political administrative unit in the Japanese government system, is officially able to receive and manage financial resources from the national government. From this situation, the present system has emerged as a compromise: the system is called Bunshukin Seido (money redistributing system) and it has been legitimatized by a town ordinance after a complicated legal process (Kin Town 1983:113, 1991:34-35).
According to the money redistributing system, the town office, as the smallest administrative unit in the Japanese government system, receives the land lease money from the Japanese government for the leasing of both the town’s land and its communities’ land to the base. However, since it is each community, not the town office, that historically and customarily owned the Somayama land and practiced Somayama land management, each traditional community (Igei, Yaka, Kin, and Namisato) is entitled to 50% of the lease money which is given for the land owned by the community. The other 50% goes to the town office. However, Nakagawa community, which was established after the war, can not receive redistributed money since it had neither communal land nor practiced communal land management (see Kin Town 1983:628-629 for discussion of Nakagawa community taking the town office to the court over the issue of lease money). According to the 1989 town income revenue statistics, of the total of lease money 1,096,503,000 yen (10 million dollars) received by the town office, 501,970,000 yen (4.8 million dollars) went to the four communities which own their communal land (Kin Town 1991:34). Kin community received 186,063,000 yen (1.8 million dollars); Namisato community, 129,615,000 yen (1.2 million dollars); Igei community, 131,272,000 yen (1.3 million dollars); and Yaka community, 55,020,000 yen (0.5 million dollars). These portions of the land lease money are called Bunshukin or redistributed money by the townspeople. The employment of the money redistributing system legitimatizes the communities’ ownership of the Somayama land and points to the communities’ political power stemming from it.

Once the redistributed money goes to each community, the money is first received by each community’s “property conservation committee” or “property committee.” These committees consist of a number of communal leaders, usually elder males. They are descendants of past community members who had the rights to the communal land and fought against the Japanese government’s attempts to buy out the communal land. These committees represent the communal land owners of native Kin people and are recognized as the most powerful institutions in dealing with the money at the community level. After each committee receives its share of the redistributed money, an appropriate portion of the money is then redistributed to each community office, which represents both native Kin people and non-native Kin people living in the community. This redistributed money is used to run community matters. The community office of Namisato community, which has a population of about 2,500 population with approximately 800 households, for example, runs on an annual budget of 120,000,000 yen (1.2 million dollars) in 1993. The community office of Igei community, which has a population of about 725 with approximately 200 households, runs on an annual budget of 60,000,000 yen (0.6 million dollars) in that same year (Yara in the Okinawa Times October 6, 1993). Since the town
office also provides each community with financial support for maintenance and improvement of the overall community matters, these budgets can be seen as additional income for each community.

With its share of the redistributed money, each community office can function as though it was an independent administrative system, although it is still officially under the administration of the town office. Each community office has its executive office in its community building in which a communal executive, secretary, and accountant reside. There are also 5 to 10 community office workers in each community of these four traditional communities. These community office workers are primarily native Kin people who have the right to the communal lands. While in many other communities in Okinawa, community executives are usually volunteers who are retired people, community executives of these communities in Kin Town are chosen through elections. Moreover, while many community executives in Okinawa are paid little, the salary of community executives in Kin Town is about the same as that of sectional chefs in the town office (ibid.).

With the redistributed money, the community offices engage extensively in community projects and programs. The main duties of the community offices include overseeing of the construction and maintenance of community facilities such as community office buildings, the community water system, and streets lights. In other towns and cities, these duties would be run by municipal governments. These community offices used to even be engaged in community road construction and maintenance (ibid.). Some portion of the redistributed money is also used by the community offices to finance various communal activities and events. The children's organization, young adults' organization, and women's association, are all active and well supported by portions of the redistributed money. These community offices also publish community magazines, letters, and community history books. In fact, as the town history compilation office, where I was doing my internship, was conducting its research on Kin emigrants overseas, these communities were also sending their own researchers overseas to study Kin emigrants from their own communities. Furthermore, some portion of the redistributed money received by these communities is invested in financial institutions for future use. Through these community projects and programs supported by the communities' financial independence and wealth, each community has created a strong sense of communal identity among its members, especially native Kin people.

While the money redistributing system provides each "traditional" community with a certain portion of the redistributed money, this system also provides certain portions of the redistributed money for individuals of communal land owners. Once a year, usually during
the *Obon* time in August, the "property conservation committee" or "property committee" of each "traditional" community, but not the community offices, redistributes 100,000 to 300,000 yen ($1,000-3,000) in cash to individual members of the communal land owners. While the redistribution money that each communal land owner receives cannot in anyway substitute their salary from their own occupations, the redistributed money is seen by the communal land owners as a bonus or additional income. Probably more importantly, the redistributed money, as a unifying symbol, solidifies the identity of the communal land owners in relation to the Somayama land and their land owners associations. In fact, after receiving the redistributed money, individual communal land owners hold parties to socialize with each other as well as to show the solidarity of communal identities and their associations.

It is important to note that the membership of these communal land owners associations is very exclusive. A member has to be a descendant of "native community people" (native Kin people) who struggled to keep and protect their Somayama land from the national and prefectural governments during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There are a few outside people who have been admitted for membership to the associations through marriage. However, to be eligible to have his or her own share of the redistributed money, a new member has to be approved by the "property conservation committee" or "property committee" of each community. In Okinawa people are generally conscious about their community membership. In Kin Town, however, membership identification such as *Kin no Shimanchu* (Kin community natives) and *Namisato no Shimanchu* (Namisato community natives) often have more precise meanings than ones used in general in other communities of Okinawa. That is to say, in Kin Town, a native community person usually refers not to a person who lives in the community but to a person who has the right to the community land.

In what ways do the money redistributing system and the redistributed money influence the townspeople in terms of their disassociation from the base and military personnel? To what extent do they help the townspeople disassociate themselves from the base and military personnel? These questions are very important questions in analyzing their strategies to live with the base. However, as described before (especially in Chapter 3), the subjects of the redistributing money system and the redistributed money are very sensitive issues. They are still considered as taboos to openly discuss since they are also seen as reasons for divisiveness and uneasiness amongst the townspeople. Therefore, I do not have sufficient data (interview materials) to discuss them in detail. It is, however,
possible to speculate on a few points here. First of all, as the community offices can provide community members with community jobs, those who hold community job occupations are financially secured. This becomes very important when one takes into consideration the fact that the occupational opportunity is limited in the town due to the presence of the base, and many jobs available are probably connected to the presence of the base. Many of those in the community office are ex-farmers but no longer farm due to the fact their land has been taken over to host the base. By providing them with occupations with decent salaries and social status, the community offices help the community workers to disassociate themselves from the presence of the base and military personnel. In other words, they need not look for jobs on the base or in the Shinkaichi section. Secondly, as each community office provides various community projects and programs through the redistributed money for community members, the community office helps community members, both non native and native Kin people, to disassociate themselves from the presence of the base. By participating in community office sponsored events and activities, many community members might not need to interact with military personnel and the base. Thirdly, through community projects and programs, the community office creates a strong sense of community membership. The strong sense of community membership in turn may help community members to see themselves as members of each community rather than as members of a base town. It may help native Kin people to symbolically disassociate themselves from the presence of the base. These speculations however need to be examined in the future against empirical data.

Still “the Home of Emigrant Pioneers”

As described in Chapter 4, Kin Town has a proud history of being the first village in Okinawa to send emigrants overseas and the town has benefited from the presence of Kin emigrants overseas in many ways over the years. At present, as the town is still proudly described by many townspeople (mostly native Kin people) as the “home of emigrant pioneers,” it is hard not to hear or see some aspect of the home of emigrant pioneers in the town. At the personnel level, letters are exchanged between native Kin people in the town and their relatives in other countries including the US. Some townspeople even visit their relatives overseas regularly and in turn, relatives from overseas also visit townspeople. At the town level, the Office of Town History Compilation is working on a project of Kin emigrant pioneers overseas. The plan of creating an emigrant museum in the town as a symbol of being the home of emigrant pioneers is also enthusiastically discussed.
Representatives of the town participated in immigrant festivals in Hawaii and in 1989, they donated a statue of Kyuzo Toyama to the festival. An elementary school text book for social studies published by the town’s education committee bears a picture of the statue of Kyuzo Toyama on the front cover. The town’s constitution begins with the statement that “we, the people of Kin Town, take pride in being members of the home of emigrant pioneers.” Moreover, as members of the home of emigrant pioneers, the townspeople are encouraged to look towards the world: knowledge of and life experiences in other countries are highly valued among native Kin people. Student exchange as well as professional workshop programs send towns students and townspeople overseas to gain knowledge of and life experiences in other countries. These aspects all reflect the continuity of the town’s history as the home of emigrant pioneers and their effort to maintain the town as such.

The town’s history of being the home of emigrant pioneers and the native Kin people’s effort to maintain the town as such play an important role in shaping the town’s and many native Kin people’s relationships with the base and military personnel at present. As many native Kin people in the town have steady relationships with their relatives in the US, and as some native Kin people even have their own experiences of living in the US, they have already established their “own channels” to the US as a country. As a result, many native Kin people feel that it is unnecessary to interact with the base and military personnel if the purpose of the interaction is only to learn about “America” and English. Given the perception that the base is the root cause of problems, many native Kin people argue that they can bypass the base and military personnel, and through their own channels they can learn or understand English and “America.” One informant responds to my suggestion that the town should establish a relationship with the base for the purpose of the internationalization:

To establish international relationships, we don’t need to look to the base. We have many Kin immigrants overseas, so we are interacting with them and their countries. I think, in this town, ‘internationalization’ means that we establish it through the connection with Kin emigrants overseas. Interacting with the base should not be the only means to be internationalized; and what would be the purpose of ‘internationalization’ through the base? Unless we could see specific purposes and benefits of establishing international relationship with the base, I don’t think that’s a good idea.

This view of internationalization through Kin emigrants but not through the base is also reflected in one female informant’s desire to study English:
I want to study English but it is not necessary to speak with US soldiers. In fact, I did not like English as a school subject at all when I was a student. Because English is the language US soldiers use and I did not like US soldiers who caused a lot of problems in the town. But when I received letters from my relatives in the US, who are descendants of Kin immigrants, these were written in English. Then, I really felt that I wanted to learn and speak English and communicate with my relatives over there.

In fact, through their own channels such as exchanges of letters, actual visits to the US from the town or vise versa, and the town’s various public exchange programs, many townspeople have a very profound knowledge of the US and first hand experience of the US. Some talked to me about the concepts of freedom, democracy, and individualism with admiration as characteristics of the US. Others discussed with me the large scale farming practices of US and the quality of US college education. In fact, as mentioned before, there are some townspeople who have experienced first hand the farming practices in North America. There are also Kin students who have studied and are studying in the US, including some Kin Ph.Ds. At the same time, many townspeople are knowledgeable of many negative aspects of the US. Some explained to me the violent aspects of the US and racial discrimination experienced by Kin relatives in the US. Others showed their concerns about the downward economy of the US in the late 80’s and early 90’s and its effects on their relatives in the US. In other words, for many townspeople, obtaining knowledge about “America” and English do not necessarily require interactions with the base and military personnel. This fact, indeed, undermines the base side’s argument that interactions between the town and the base give the townspeople opportunities to learn English and American culture.

More importantly, as a result of having the town’s own channels to obtain knowledge and understanding about the US, and to experience life in the US, many townspeople recognize that the base and military personnel do not necessarily represent the US as a whole. Rather, they recognize that the base and military personnel represent a particular part and population of the US. To them, the differences between the US as a country and the base are obvious and they are in a position to see these differences. One informant explains his experience of studying in the US:

I lived in Pocatello, Idaho, studying English. People there were different from those military personnel we see in the town. They are normal people, having ordinary occupations. They are old and young. They are men and women. We know the difference between ordinary Americans and marine corps.
This recognition of the US and the base as separate entities is in fact prevailing among many native Kin people. While the base is perceived by many native Kin people as a root cause of problems, the US as a country represents a country of hope and success where many Kin emigrants themselves have made their living. Indeed, this is one important reason why, unlike many other parts of Okinawa where the base and the US often are described in the same terms, many townspeople highly prize things that are American while they perceive the base negatively. As we see below, this recognition of the US and the base as separate entities has a profound effect on how the town as a whole tries to deal with the US.

Ironically, the native Kin people's effort to maintain the town as the home of emigrant pioneers and their efforts to obtain knowledge of America and English without direct interaction with the base and military personnel are made possible in large part by the presence of the base itself. Like many other public programs and activities well funded by the land lease money, programs and projects which help maintain the town as the home of emigrant pioneers are funded with portions of the land lease money. For example, the Office of Town History compilation Office, where I did my internship, was able to send their own staff and contracted researchers overseas to the South America, North America, and the Philippines to do research on Kin immigrants in the summer of 1993. The founding for the research project came from the land lease money. According to one of the contracted researchers, "it is really rare for a town of this size to be able to fund such extensive research project" and "it is the resourcefulness of the town that enables such research to be carried out." Moreover, the town's educational programs for English and American culture send Kin students to the US annually and the founding for the programs also come from the lease money. One town official's comments illustrates how the town's effort to remain as the "home of emigrant pioneers" and the presence of the base are interconnected through the land lease money:

We realize, as (members) of the home of emigrant pioneers, the importance of learning about other countries. Since we are fortunate to have a good financial resource from the base, we (the town) can send some of our students to the United States as exchange students during summers. We send them to the states like Oregon and Washington and let them study English and American culture there.

We have our own teaching program with which we hire a good qualified English teacher from an English speaking country. And the teacher teaches

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61 Local education committees and the prefectural education committee have a similar programs to provide English education for Okinawan students. It is however not common to have such program at the municipal level.
at our local school. We can pay the teacher about 4,000,000 yen annually. I think it is a very good pay. In our own way, not with the base, we want our children to study English and learn American culture.

In other words, with financial resource from the base, they can not only maintain the town as the home of emigrant pioneers, but they also can disassociate themselves from the base and military personnel. In this sense, while their history of the home of emigrant pioneers is connected with the land lease money, both history and land lease money work together to help native Kin people disassociate themselves from the presence of the base.

It is important to point out the symbolic dimensions embedded in the native Kin people's portraits of themselves as members of the home of emigrant pioneers as well as members of the traditional communities. While the native Kin people's strategies described in the previous chapter help them to physically disassociate themselves from the base and military personnel, their portraying of themselves as such help them to symbolically disassociate themselves from the presence of the base. By creating or recreating the town as home of emigrant pioneers, or traditional communities, they maybe trying to regain the control over their identity, history, and future, at least in a symbolic way, from the presence of the base. In this sense, native Kin people's portraits of themselves as members of the home of emigrant pioneers and members of traditional communities can be understood as communal strategies aimed at themselves and the whole process in which the town has become a base town from the “true Kin.” These strategies are a symbolic battle against the perception of the town as a base town, which is put forth not only by the military, government, and the other general public, but also the townspeople themselves (see Scott 1990 Chapter 6 for discussion of symbolic battles manifested in various forms of cultural representations).

**Divisiveness in the Town**

While the redistributing money system and the town’s remaining as “the home of emigrant pioneers” can be seen as communal strategies of the town to live with the base, they also have created divisiveness, uneasiness, and even animosity amongst the communities and the townspeople. The money redistributing system especially has become very controversial, to the extent that it is often regarded as a taboo to talk about in the town. As the question of who has the authority over the land lease money is disputed in the town’s political arena, divisiveness becomes apparent between the town government and the Kin Land Owners Association, between the communities, and between native Kin
people and non native Kin people. Consequently, the symbolic significance of the town as "the home of emigrant pioneers" also becomes a factor of divisiveness between native Kin people and many non native Kin people who do not share the history of "Kin emigrant pioneers."

The split between the town government (the town office and town assembly) and the Kin Town Land Owners Association manifested itself in a most abrupt way when the town government and the association broke up their formal tie in the early 1980's. The split was regarded as mostly stemming from the power struggle between the two over political influence in the town. The Kin Town Land Owners Association represents the communal land owners associations as well as individual land owners in the town. It is considered as the most influential political and social entity in the town although the town government remains as the official political entity of the town government. The Kin Town Land Owners Association's political power, especially in relation to the town government, stems from the fact that the communal land was historically owned and still is owned by the "traditional communities." With its own two story office building in the Kin community, the association oversees all matters of land issues in the town. The executive and secretary of the association work in the office building on a full time basis. The breaking up of the formal tie between the Kin Town Land Owners Association and the town government was attributed to the issues of the participation fee to join the association and the proposed reduction in the number of town assembly representatives. The town office argued that the participant fee of .6% of the lease money was too expensive for the town office to pay to be a member of the Kin Town Land Owners Association. Meanwhile, the Kin Town Land Owners Association objected to the proposed reduction of the numbers of representatives since some land owners feared that they might loose their status of town assembly representatives. These issues were in fact manifestations of the power struggle between the two and they eventually led the town government, through a decision by the town assembly, to withdraw its membership status from the Kin Town Land Owners Association. (see Kin Town Assembly 1991: 9-25 and 218-222).

The breaking up of the formal tie between the town government and the Kin Town Land Owners Association is very unique and controversial, especially in comparison to the situations in other base towns in Okinawa. In other base towns in Okinawa, municipal governments and local land owners associations retain strong relationships, working together to deal with issues surrounding land lease money. They also jointly hold their membership in the Okinawa Prefectural Land Owners Association, the largest unit of land owners association in Okinawa. This is not the case in Kin Town. In fact, both the Kin
town office and the Kin Town Land Owners Association individually belong to the Okinawa Prefectural Land Owners Association.

This split between the town government and the Kin Town Land Owners Association has created additional difficulties in creating and implementing development plans. Many discussions concerning base land have not had successful outcomes. One town official informant often expressed to me his strong opinion supporting the idea of re-establishing a relation with the Kin Town Land Owners Association:

We (the town government) really have to reestablish a formal relationship with the association. Unless we become a member of the association, the town office could not say anything regarding land issues. We have to work together. We really need to rejoin the association.

Although many people echo the informant’s opinion, the split between the two seems to remain. Moreover, since the communal land owners associations in the “traditional communities” often take sides with the Kin Town Land Owners Association, the relationships between the town government and communal land owners associations have also become problematic.

Divisiveness and uneasiness are also found among the communities as well. They are often attributed to the fact that, with the exception of Nakagawa community, each community with its share of the distributed money and political power stemming from it can function independently of the town government and the other communities. Divisiveness and uneasiness among the communities become especially visible when town projects which involve different communities are brought up and perceived differently by the community peoples. For example, in the late 1980’s the town office’s plan to develop a pork raising farm in a section of Kin community created a political dispute in the town. Those especially involved were Namisato community and Kin community, since Kin Community and Namisato community are adjacent to each other. The members of Kin community supported the plan while the Namisato community argued against it. This dispute resulted in a resolving of the town assembly, showing the political power of the communities (see Kin Town Assembly 1988:). While the dispute was seen as a development issue on the surface, many townspeople recognized that what underlay this dispute was the political power struggle between the two communities, and between the communities and the town government. The power struggle was in turn understood as a result of the continuing disputes over share of base land in the both communities. Since Kin and Namisato used to be one community, the breaking up of the community into the two created difficulties in terms of the demarcating of communal land. One business man,
who commutes from another town to work in the town, observes the divisiveness of communities from his own personal experience:

This town is very divisive. Especially, Kin and Namisato communities do not get along with each other well. I heard that historically they were not really good to each other. I do business with both communities. One time, representatives from both communities were planning to take a field trip to the same place and I was arranging the trip. Since they would be going to the same place, I recommended that they should go together and it would be much cheaper that way. But they insisted that they would not want to go with each other and go separately. Even from such things, one can see these communities not getting along with each other.

Among the five communities of the town, Nakagawa community is very unique and often a center of dispute over the redistributing money system and the redistributed money. Nakagawa community, which became a member of Kin Town after WW II, does not have any Somayama or other communal land. As a result, Nakagawa community can not receive a share of the redistributed money. Instead, Nakagawa community receives financial support from the town government in the form of “aid money” which does not enable Nakagawa community to function to the same extent as the other communities. Nakagawa community often faces a lack of funding for community programs and projects. This in turn has created uneasiness amongst many members of the Nakagawa community towards the other communities. The head of Nakagawa community told me that the practice of the money redistributing system was not fair to the members of Nakagawa community:

The town office should treat my community the same way it treats the other communities. I understand the history of the communal lands property management. But we are also residents of this town too. So personally, I think, the ‘redistributed money’ should be managed at the town level, not at the community level and it should be equally redistributed to each community.

Divisiveness and uneasiness are also found at the personal level especially between native Kin people and non-native Kin people. They are often attributed to the money redistributing system, which operates on the premise of the distinction between native and non-native Kin people and play an important role in buying and selling of land in the town. Many non-native Kin people feel that they are not welcomed in the town by native Kin people and they also find that they are treated differently from native Kin people. For example, the term, Kiryumin, which was originally used to refer to aristocrats who lost their occupations in the Shuri capital and migrated to rural areas such as Kin, is still often used by native Kin people to refer to and distinguish themselves from non-native Kin
people. The implications of the term are “outsider” and “drifter” and has many other negative connotations. Moreover, many non-native Kin people also find it extremely difficult for them to purchase land in the town, thereby building a home and settling down in the town. This is because, land is a limited commodity in the town, and buying and selling of it is often under the intense scrutiny of the communal land owners associations as well as community members, which are connected to each other through the money redistributing system. A non-native Kin informant describes his dissatisfaction of being treated differently by native Kin people with regards to the money redistributing system:

The first time I heard the term, Kiryumin (the drifter), I was really surprised because I had never heard such an old term before. It was being used like 100 years ago, wasn’t it? Anyway they do treat people differently depending upon whether you are real Kin people or new comers... I have also heard that they have name lists of who is Native Kin according to which they distribute the “land lease money.” People who are not members of the Kin Native have a hard time buying lands and leasing lands in this town. If the town wants more business or wants to revitalize itself, the town has to be more open to new comers like us.

Beside the money redistributing system, divisiveness and uneasiness between native Kin people and non-native Kin people is also attributed to the nature of business that many of non-native Kin people engage in. As many of the non-native Kin people work in the Shinkaichi section as bar and club owners and other small private business owners, their business as well as they themselves are often seen by native Kin people as causing a “moral decay” in the town. Bar owners and small business owners who deal with US military personnel as their main customers realize their businesses are not welcomed by native Kin people (see Kin Town Assembly, 1979:29-32 for historical disputes over this issue). Bar owners often express their dissatisfaction with the town government and the communities for their lack of support to the town’s “most lucrative business section.” In fact, many bar owners have not been able to receive any financial aid from the town government even though they face economic difficulties. Their frustration becomes more complicated as they see themselves as an important part of the town’s base economy.

Non-native Kin people’s dissatisfaction with the different treatment they receive from native Kin people can also be seen in relation to the town’s claim as home of emigrant pioneers. Many non-native Kin people are, in fact, indifferent to the town’s (native Kin people’s) claim while some other show uneasiness towards the town’s claim since it excludes them from the town’s history as well as the town’s present. Two non-native Kin informants, one bar owner and one owner of a small service sector business, give their opinions about Kin Town being the home of emigrant pioneers:
I know little about this town being the home of emigrant pioneers. I like this town and I intend to live in this town. But I do not consider myself a Kin person in the same sense that they (native Kin people) say about themselves as members of the home of emigrant pioneers. (bar owner)

I have been living in this town for 12 years and I plan to continue living in this town. I see myself as a resident of this town. But I feel that I have been treated and still treated as Kiryumin, (the drifter or outsider) by native Kin people. If this town is proud of being the home of emigrant pioneers, they really have to think about those of us who came to this town and live here as emigrants and treat us fairly. (small business owner)

In other words, although native Kin people's portrait of themselves as members of the home of emigrant pioneers functions as their strategy to live with the base, this strategy has created much divisiveness and uneasiness among non-native Kin people. The unshared history of the home of emigrant pioneers has excluded non-native Kin people from being part of Kin Town. In this process, from a native Kin people's view, bar owners have become synonymous with a base town from which many native Kin people want to disassociate themselves. However, at the same time, from a non-native Kin people's view, like the money redistributing system and redistributed money, the town's history of being the home of emigrant pioneers has become an obstacle between them and native Kin people. This is especially problematic for those non-native Kin people who have decided to live the rest of their lives in the town.

Interpretive Summary and Discussion

In this chapter, I have described some aspects of the native Kin people's life, which, on the surface, appear to be a continuation of the history of the town, but in fact, are related to the presence of the base. The money redistribution system, which has been transformed from the communities’ traditional Somayama land management system, now functions to redistribute the land lease money among the communities and individual communal land owners. With the lease money, each community and communal members engage in communal activities which in return solidify the sense of communal membership among the community members. Moreover, the town’s history of being the home of emigrant pioneers has created a situation in which many native Kin people now have their own channels to the US through their emigrant relatives living in the US. This situation in turn not only enables these native Kin people to recognize the differences between the US military and the US as a country, but also encourages native Kin people to identify
themselves as members of the home of emigrant pioneers rather than those of a base town. The town’s creation or recreation of itself as the home of emigrant pioneers is also supported by portions of the lease money from the base. I have described these aspects of the town as the native Kin people’s communal strategies to live with the base for they appear to help native Kin people substantially as well as symbolically disassociate themselves from the presence of the base. Furthermore, I have described how these communal strategies have divided the town. There are divisiveness and uneasiness between the town government and the Kin Town Land Owners Association, between the communities, and between native Kin people and non-native Kin people. Now I would like to discuss how these aspects of native Kin people’s life can be understood in terms of resistance to the hegemonic claim and how the double contextualization of the hegemonic claim effects these communal strategies.

To begin with, it is important to note that although I interpreted these aspects of the town as strategies to live with the base, it is difficult to determine where these aspects end as manifestations of the continuity of the town’s history and become “strategies” for the townspeople to live with the base. These aspects of native Kin people’s life can be understood as mere manifestations of the continuation of the town history rather than as native Kin people’s strategies to live with the base. In fact, unlike the strategies described in the last chapter which are employed with the townspeople’s clear recognition that the town is a base town, these aspects described in this chapter are often preferably seen by native Kin people mainly as a continuation of the town’s history and as having little to do with the presence of the base. Kin emigrant pioneers and the communities’ struggle to keep their traditional Somayama land and management and Kin emigrant pioneers are all part of the town’s history. To the eyes of many Native Kin people, these aspects should continue to thrive and to be understood as such regardless of the presence of the base. In one informant’s words, “the base came into the town’s history, not the other way around,” although the presence of the base definitely has influenced and changed these traditional aspects of the town. However, I argue, this very fact that native Kin people continue to see and create their own history in the face of the presence of the base reflects the strategic nature of these aspects. The continuation of the town’s own history or their daily town life and the native Kin people’s preference to see them in light of their own traditional identity are in fact mechanisms of empowerment often found in “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1990: 166-172). However, the townspeople’s intention of resistance underlying these communal strategies may not be directly against the hegemony and the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help create peace in the world, as Scott (1985:290) suggests. Rather, the townspeople’s intention of resistance is directed against the hegemony’s creation of a
base town in Kin Town. In other words, the intention of resistance, which Scott sees as the most important criterion for resistance (ibid.), is complex and operates at different levels.

The relationships between the communal strategies and the town’s history and identity points to the very nature of strategies by the powerless (see Scott 1985:32). These strategies are subtle, covert, and grounded in the town’s daily life, history and traditional identity. To the eyes of military personnel, it may just appear that native Kin people are living “their own life.” These strategies are also aimed at accomplishing the immediate goals of stabilizing their communities by disassociating themselves from the base and securing the financial benefits from the land lease money. Indeed, they reflect native Kin people’s genuine creativity as well as the complex and paradoxical situation they are in.

Unlike the strategies described in the previous chapter, however, these strategies do not deal directly with military personnel and the base. Rather, as I argued, these strategies are aimed at the townspeople themselves and the process in which the town is becoming a mere base town from the “true Kin Town.” With these strategies, by disassociating themselves from many aspects of the town as a base town, by putting themselves back in the context of Kin, by creating and recreating Kin Town as a true Kin Town, native Kin people may be reclaiming the control over their daily life, their identity, and their future destination despite the presence of the base, whose future is uncertain due to the end of the Cold War.

At the same time, it is clear that these strategies do not directly challenge the hegemonic claim and hegemony. These strategies are more likely to remain as tools for the townspeople to create a true Kin town for themselves. In fact, the very fact that these communal strategies do not involve military personnel or the base may make these communal strategies less challenging to the hegemony and hegemonic claim than the strategies discussed in the previous chapter. Again, this interpretation of these communal strategies may differ from that of Scott that the everyday strategies of the powerless have the potential to challenge the hegemony and hegemonic claim (1985:32-33). This interpretation may give a more pessimistic impression about the potential of these communal strategies to challenge the hegemony and the hegemonic claim. This is mainly because, the double contextualization of the hegemonic claim makes these strategies less relevant in terms of challenging the hegemony and hegemonic claim. That is to say, as long as the townspeople accept the hegemonic claim as legitimate and effective in the context of international politics while rejecting it in the context of the town, these strategies remain principally in the context of the town or more precisely in the context of the native Kin people’s mind. Of course, there is a possibility that by putting the base and military personnel into the town’s historical context, these strategies might have the military personnel and the base examine the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of the
town. These communal strategies might lead the base and military personnel to examine why the townspeople try to create the town as the home of emigrant pioneers and strong independent communities instead as a base town. This possibility is however slim and the distance between the town and the base makes it very difficult to take place. Then, how can they challenge the hegemonic claim and hegemony? This question will be dealt with in the concluding chapter.
Chapter 8

Interpretive Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

An Interplay of Town, Base, People, History, and Power

In the proceeding chapters, I have presented a picture of the relationship between Kin Town and the US base, Camp Hansen, as I asked the questions: How do the townspeople perceive the base? How do they deal and live with the presence of the base? And what does "peace through militarization" mean to the townspeople? The picture has been constructed and presented from three different angles: history, perceptions, and strategies. Throughout the proceeding chapters, I have attempted to show the connection between history, perceptions, and strategies as played out in the unequal power relationship between the town and the base. While doing so, I also have kept my interpretive stance. From the first angle, that of cultural history, I have shown that the construction and the presence of the base did not and does not take place in a historic or cultural vacuum. Instead, I have illustrated that the interaction between pre-war Kin and the construction and the presence of the base created a cultural context in which the present relationship between the town and the base would evolve. I focused especially on three characteristics of pre-war Kin, namely the close knit communal relationship, communal management of Somayama land, and "home of emigrant pioneers." I also discussed how the base was constructed in the town in the context of the land dispute struggle in Okinawa, and how the "base economy" was incorporated into every aspect of post-war Kin. In my interpretive discussion, I have argued that the three characteristics of pre-war Kin have remained as important cultural characteristics throughout the history of the relationship between the town and the base. The close knit communal relationship remained strong despite the fact that the construction of the base had brought new populations of male construction workers and female bar workers into the town. I have also shown that although the actual practice of the Somayama land management disappeared, the Kin people's attachment to the Somayama lands remained strong due to the townspeople's negotiation process with the base and governments over the Somayama land and the lease money the townspeople receive from leasing the Somayama land to the base. I have also shown that the town's history as the "home of emigrant pioneers" continued as many emigrants from Kin contributed emotional and monetary support to the recovery of the town right after the war.
and some important decisions to host the base were influenced by some of the returned Kin emigrants from the US.

From the second angle, that of perceptions, I have illustrated that the base is never perceived by the townspeople simply as a military institution. Rather, the base is perceived as both the root cause of problems and the most important financial resource with imposing international power. These different perceptions have created many dilemmas in the town as the townspeople recognize the presence of the base as inevitable. The townspeople’s understanding of the base as a military institution is limited and constructed mainly through observation of the physical presence of the base in the town. The townspeople also recognize and accept the power stemming from the base’s status as an international institution through the townspeople’s interaction with military personnel and the history of the unequal power relationship. The townspeople’s perception of the base as the root cause of problems is a result of the continuous occurrence of military accidents and crimes committed by military personnel as well as other intangible problems associated with the presence of the base. The perception of the base as the most important financial resource for the town stems from the fact that individual land owners and the town receive lease money for providing land to host the base and many individual business owners depend upon military personnel as their main customers. Because of the perception that “there is nothing you can do about the presence of the base” prevailing among the townspeople, many perceive the base and many dilemmas created by the base as an inevitable reality that they must live with. In my interpretive discussion, I have focused on the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help create peace in the world, and the relationship between the hegemonic claim and the townspeople’s perceptions of the base, as the root cause of problems. I have argued that the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim was accepted by the townspeople in the context of international politics, but rejected in the context of the town’s daily life. I use the term, “double contextualization of the hegemonic claim,” to describe the situation in which the townspeople struggle with the contradiction between the hegemonic claim and the reality that they face with the presence of the base.

From the third angle, that of strategies, I have shown that, despite the perception that “there is nothing you can do about the presence of the base,” the townspeople have developed their own strategies to live with the base in a paradoxical situation. I have focused on two different populations of the town, female bar owners and native Kin people. As these bar owners’ lives are dependent upon interaction with military personnel whom the bar owners see as both their main customers and potential trouble makers, they have developed the “American bar system” and hiring of Filipino women as bar hostesses. For native Kin people, whose daily lives do not necessarily involve interaction with
military personnel, their strategies include disassociation from the base and independent protest. The strategy of disassociation from the base is employed so as not to get involved in various forms of insecurity associated with the base as well as the unequal power relationship with the base. It is also employed as a protest against base related incidents and accidents which continue to occur. The strategy of independent protest is a means with which the townspeople could protest against military accidents and incidents committed by military personnel, but also secure the presence of the base in the town. In my interpretive discussion, I have argued that these strategies are subtle, covert, and embedded in the townspeople’s daily life, and serve to help the bar owners and native Kin people to achieve their immediate goals of both financial security and physical security. These characteristics of the strategies are indeed very similar to those of other powerless groups illustrated by Scott (1985; 1991). However, at the same time, I have also argued that these strategies can not challenge the hegemonic claim and hegemony, “peace through militarization,” and the base and international politics. The very nature of these strategies, subtlety, covery, embeddedness in the daily life, and their primary concern for the immediate goals of financial and physical security, does not lead the military personnel and the base to examine the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of the town. Moreover, the double contextualization of the hegemonic claim by the townspeople make these strategies irrelevant to challenge the hegemonic claim.

In addition, I have also illustrated what I call “communal strategies” of the townspeople, especially native Kin people, to live with the base. These communal strategies include the redistributing money system and redistributed money and the reconstruction of the town as “home of emigrant pioneers.” The redistributing money system, which is a new form of the Somayama land management system, guarantees each community its share of the land lease money. With its share of the redistributed money, each community is able to provide various activities and events for community members to engage in, thereby functioning as a rather independent community with a strong sense of communal membership. The reconstruction of the town as a “home of emigrant pioneers” provides the townspeople with a means through which they can disassociate substantially and symbolically themselves from the presence of the base. Through the townspeople’s own relationships with Kin emigrants overseas, they have learned and still learn English and American culture without interacting with the base and military personnel. However, at the same time, I have shown that these strategies also have created divisiveness, uneasiness, and even animosity between the municipal government and the town’s land owners association, between the communities, and between native Kin people and non-native Kin people. In my interpretive discussion, I have argued that these communal
strategies can be understood as interactions between the town’s history and the town’s present situation, therefore they present similarities to the strategies of the powerless groups discussed by Scott (ibid.). These communal strategies are again subtle, covert, and embedded in the town’s history and they rely for their strength upon the interaction between history and strategies. They show the townspeople’s genuine creativity based upon the history of the town. I have argued that these communal strategies are employed by the native Kin people to engage in symbolic and substantial battles against the whole process of militarization of the town, through which the town has become a “base town.” They are indeed mechanisms of self empowerment. At the same time, however, I also argued that these strategies are again limited and can not challenge the hegemonic claim and the hegemony. The very nature of these strategies does not require that the base and military personnel take part in the examination of the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of the town. The double contextualization of the hegemonic claim also makes these strategies less relevant tools to challenge the hegemonic claim.

A Scenario for Challenging the Hegemonic claim

As it should have become clear by now, my view on the townspeople’s strategies to live with the base is somewhat different from Scott’s (1985) views on “weapons of the weak.” Although I agree with Scott in that these strategies are employed by the townspeople to achieve the immediate goals of financial and physical security, I have also argued that these strategies cannot and do not challenge the hegemonic claim. In fact, these strategies are aimed principally for self-empowerment in the context of the town. This understanding of the strategies of the townspeople is more pessimistic than the Scott’s view on the “weapons of the weak” that the strategies of the subordinate have the potential to challenge the hegemonic claim imposed on them by the dominant (Scott 1985:32-33). However, this does not mean that I reject any possibilities or potential of these strategies to challenge the hegemonic claim. Nor does this mean rejection of the necessity to challenge the hegemonic claim. As long as the contradiction between the hegemonic claim and the reality of the base as the root cause of problems continues to exist, I argue that the hegemonic claim should be continuously examined and challenged. I also argue that the key to challenge the hegemonic claim still lies in the strategies of the townspeople to live with the base. After all, these strategies have emerged from the paradoxical situation in which they live. They contain possible mechanisms to challenge the hegemonic claim even though these strategies need be modified to be able to challenge the hegemonic claim.
Therefore, I would like to present a scenario in which these strategies may challenge the hegemonic claim.

In order for these strategies to be able to challenge, even indirectly, the hegemonic claim, two problems have to be solved. First, the hegemonic claim should not be doubly contextualized. The townspeople should see it as a principle which is applicable to both contexts of international politics and the town’s daily life. That is to say, the base should be held accountable for the hegemonic claim in both contexts of the town’s daily life and international politics. Then, and only then, the townspeople can forcefully seek the accountability of the military and the governments which impose the hegemonic claim through the presence of the base in the town. Perceiving the hegemonic claim as a principle which should be applicable to both contexts of international politics and of the town is possible since it is the military, the governments, and other hegemonic powers that seek the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim. As long as the townspeople pursue the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in both contexts, the hegemonic claim can be examined by the hegemony itself. This argument is principally in agreement with and based upon Scott’s (1985:336-337) argument that hegemony itself has its own contradictions and such contradictions constitute hegemony’s weakness and the potential for the hegemony to be challenged. In this case, the hegemony’s contradiction is that although the base is supposed to help create peace and security, the base has brought insecurity and therefore no peace in the context of the town (see the subsection, studies with perspective from below in Chapter 2).

Secondly, the base and military personnel as well as other hegemonic players in international politics have to be made to get involved in the examination of the hegemonic claim in the context of the town. To do so, the strategies of the townspeople and the reasons behind the strategies need to be known to the base and military personnel. Why the townspeople have to disassociate themselves from the base, why they have to carry out their independent protest, why bar owners operate the “American bar system,” and why they have to hire Filipino women, need to be explicitly articulated in relation to the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help achieve peace in the world. As I have argued, while these strategies have the potential to lead military personnel and the base into the context of the town, these strategies often fall short of having military personnel and the base examine the hegemonic claim in the context of the town. This is mainly because military personnel and the base can simply ignore the townspeople’s understanding of the base in favor of accepting the hegemonic claim only in the context of international politics. In fact, this scenario has been the case in the town. However, at the same time, these strategies, being subtle and covert, have failed to incorporate explicitly individual military personnel into the context of the town and make them examine the legitimacy of the
hegemonic claim from the townspeople's point of view. Therefore, in order for the strategies to become more effective in bringing the base and military personnel in the context of the town where the hegemonic claim would be examined, the strategies have to become more apparent and public. In other words, the weapons of the weak need to be made known. I argue that this is a possible and necessary step to challenge the hegemonic claim precisely because the hegemonic claim is made by the hegemony, US military and both Japanese and US governments, not by the townspeople. The contradiction between the hegemonic claim and the townspeople's understanding of the base as the root cause of problems again becomes a crucial force to challenge the hegemonic claim as Scott (ibid.) points out.

While these problems need to be solved, it is also important for the townspeople to actively participate in redefining what constitutes “peace.” Given the fact that the fragile political situations in the East Asia caused by North Korea and China are still regarded as reasons for the continuous presence of military bases in Okinawa, “peace” is again defined only at the level of international politics. The hegemonic claim is still imposed upon the townspeople. However, at the same time, it is also true that the townspeople themselves have not been able to present their own view on “peace” effectively and forcefully as an alternative to the definition of peace presented by the hegemonic powers, US military and both US and Japanese governments. To challenge the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim in the context of the town, it is imperative that the townspeople themselves be an active part of redefining what peace means. I argue that the townspeople have the ability, from their experience of living with the base and having survived WW II, to provide a new definition of “peace.” In this regard, Joseph’s discussion on “progressive politics” which is based upon the notion that global policies can not be separated from domestic renewal (see Joseph 1993 Chapter 7) can be adopted to the process of defining of peace in the town. A new definition of “peace” should include, economic security, social welfare, local democracy, sustainable development, and environmental concerns at the local level. “Peace” should not stay at the level of international security and interests. “Peace” should also be defined from below, or at least “peace” should be defined in the contested dialogue between views from below and above.

**Recommendations for the Town**

There are three recommendations I would like to propose to the town. These recommendations are based upon my analysis of the relationship between the base and the
town, especially my understanding of the strategies of the townspeople to live with the base. I argue that these strategies are genuine inventions of the townspeople and the principles of these strategies contain enough strength to give new guidelines to make a better relationship between the town and the base. However, at the same time, these strategies need to be expanded on the basis of their principles to incorporate the larger picture of the relationship between the base and the town. These strategies especially need to take more advantage of the contradiction between the hegemonic claim about the base made by the international politics and the townspeople’s own understandings of the base. Therefore, my recommendations focus on how to challenge the hegemonic claim through the establishment of three public institutions and through creation of a new definition of "peace."

First, starting within the town, I recommend that the town establish a base-related issues committee which, unlike the present day problem solving committees, would take the initiative in formulating and articulating the townspeople’ views on “peace” and future plans regarding the base. As I have argued, different populations of the town interact with the base differently and their interactions have created different perceptions of the base and strategies to live with the base. These different perceptions and strategies have in turn created divisiveness and uneasiness among the townspeople. By incorporating both Kin native and non-Kin native peoples’ views of the base and interactions, this committee should work toward reassociation among the townspeople and create the town’s official views and future plans regarding the relationship between the town and the base. It should function as a place where a dialogue can take place among the townspeople, both native Kin people and non-native Kin people, without any internal political constrains stemming from the land lease money and the money redistributing system.

Second, I recommend that the town establish an interaction center in which dialogue between the town and the base can take place. This interaction center should not necessarily be a “friendly” atmosphere. Rather it should be a place in which serious discussions and dialogue on “peace” and future plans regarding the relationship between the town and base can take place consistently. More specifically, this interaction center should function as a place where the townspeople with military personnel can challenge the hegemonic claim that the base exists to help create peace in the world. As I have argued, the townspeople’s view of the base as the root cause of the problem has not been effectively presented to the base and military personnel while the townspeople doubly contextualize the hegemonic claim. As a result, the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim has not been examined by the base and military personnel in the context of the town. This interaction center should change this situation. That is to say, through this interaction
center, the townspeople should bring the base and military personnel into the context of the town. The town’s history, culture, and present situation with the base should be actively presented to the base and military personnel through this center. By doing so, the center should incorporate the base and military personnel in the context of the town and have military personnel examine the legitimacy of the hegemonic claim and meaning of “peace” in the context of the town as well. Therefore, this interaction center needs to be equipped with English skills and an understanding of American military base culture, in other words, “peace specialists.” Moreover, this interaction center should function as a place where collaboration between the town and the base against any crimes committed by military personnel can take place. Through this center, demonstration against crimes and accidents can be initiated and carried out by both the townspeople and military personnel as described in Takamine’s study (1991).

Thirdly, I recommend that the town establish an international network with many other base towns in the world. Through such a network, the town would exchange information on bases and their relationships with them and the town would participate in redefining of “peace” at the level of base towns in the world. Such an international collaboration among base towns would lead to the creation of a new kind of power, international power, for the townspeople. As I have argued, the town is trying to promote internationalization through the notion that Kin Town is “the home of emigrant pioneers.” Establishing an international network with many other base towns would indeed fit nicely the town’s effort to be internationalized and it would create a new direction toward which Kin Town as “the home of emigrant pioneers” would move in the future. In other words, Kin Town would be a home of international power to deal with the presence of the base through the recognition that Kin Town is the “home of emigrant pioneers.” However, establishing such an international network requires the town to produce “peace specialists” with the ability to communicate internationally.

These recommendations can be achieved by establishing an overarching institution which is capable of achieving the functions described above, rather than establishing three separate institutions. I believe that engaging in more explicit dialogue with the base and military personnel is a necessary means to challenge the hegemonic claim. I also believe that this town has enough resources and human power to engage in my recommendations as they have shown in their struggle to live with the base in the past 50 years.
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Appendix

Notes on the Informants

Two native Kin women

One works in a construction company in a nearby village. The other works as a nurse at a hospital in a nearby city. They are in their 30s.

Four native Kin men

Two of them are working in the Town office. They are in their late 30s and early 40s. Another works in the Kin Town land owners association office and is in his 60s. The other runs a coffee shop in a nearby city. He is in his 50s.

Five non-native Kin women

Of the five women, three are bar owners from the Shinkaichi section. These bar owners are all in their 40s and 50s. Of the three bar owners, two still deal with military personnel as their main customers. The other deals with Japanese/Okinawans as her main customers. Of the two non-bar owners, one works in a travel agency in Kin and is in her 30s. The other, with her husband, runs a small business in Kin. She is in her late 30s.

Three non-native Kin men

One works in a travel agency and is in his 30s. He commutes to Kin Town from a nearby town. Another one runs a small business in Kin and is in his late 30s. The other is head of Nakagawa community. He is in his 50s.

Three semi-native Kin men.

Two work in the tow office and are descendants of Kiryumin. They are in their late 30s. The other one is a son of a native Kin women and an Filipino man. He is in his early 30s.

One Semi-native Kin woman.

She is a daughter of a native Kin man and a non-native Kin woman. She works in the town office and is in her early 20s.
One Filipino woman
She works in a bar and she is in her early 20s.

One US military personnel
He is with the Marines and is a ranked officer. He is in his 30s.