

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Title: Resource Policy Implications of Animal Rights
Activism: A Demographic, Attitudinal, and Behavioral
Analysis

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The thesis analyzes the demographic, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of animal rights activists, placing them in the context of resource policy. It is argued that the animal rights movement combined the Victorian critique of empiricism with a reaction to modernity that was characteristic of other contemporary mass movements. Animal rights activism emerged from a socio-political milieu that legitimized and encouraged political activism in the form of interest groups, and was consistent with American interest group politics. Nonetheless, the movement could not have appeared in its current form prior to the 1960's. Changes in American politics during the last four decades have facilitated the emergence of mass movements, including civil rights and environmentalism.

Survey research indicated that activists were caucasian, highly-educated urban professional women

approximately thirty years old with a median income of \$33,000 (1989). Most were Democrats or Independents and had moderate to liberal political views. They were often suspicious of science. It was concluded that animal rights activism is, in part, a symbolic manifestation of egalitarian social and political beliefs reacting to scientific and technological change.

The California Wildlife Protection Act of 1990 provided a case study of the movement's implications for natural resource policy. Activists were able to ban the hunting of mountain lions and reallocate \$900 million dollars in the California budget toward habitat acquisition. They demonstrated sophistication and finesse in building a coalition with environmentalists. Nevertheless, both movements were divided by fundamental philosophical differences which makes political cooperation difficult.

Animal rights activism was also marked by extraordinary levels of intensity which arose from quasi-religious fervor, and it is suggested that activism fulfills Yinger's functional definition of religion in the lives of at least some of the movement's core constituency. This explains the movement's ability to retain activism in the face of incremental change.

The thesis concludes with a discussion concerning the future implications of animal rights activism in society (312 words).

Resource Policy Implications of Animal Rights Activism:
A Demographic, Attitudinal and Behavioral Analysis

by

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In the late spring of 1987 I was working for a large agricultural corporation in South Florida. With annual sales of well over two billion dollars, Gold Kist Inc., ranked somewhere around 200 on the Fortune 500 list of largest American companies. With Gold Kist at that time raising and slaughtering approximately ten million chickens a week, the chicken business for them amounted to much more than mere chicken feed.

As part of my consumer relations duties I had developed a particular skill for generalization which more than once had assuaged the fears and anger of anxious customers. And yet, over the course of my career I had encountered several issues that seemingly confounded industry expertise. I had a vague feeling that many of these issues were primarily political in nature. It seemed that, while agriculturalists understood production methodology, consumers did not or could not understand how farmers raised their animals. It also appeared that consumers increasingly questioned how their food was produced. Likewise, upon discovering how their meat was manufactured, they often asked why it was necessary to confine and mass produce farm animals. And, strikingly, some consumers seemed willing to take political action to answer their questions.

The animal rights movement eventually challenged my biases and catalyzed my return to school to earn a graduate

degree. It was a particularly humid, sunny day, the type that sub-tropical Miami is known for. While visiting a grocery store, I noticed stickers which had been anonymously placed on packages of Gold Kist chicken. Each was about the size of a quarter, emblazoned with the universal symbol for danger--a red circle bisected with a diagonal red line. The black type read simply "Meat is Murder." Then, later that year, the news reported a seemingly unrelated event in which animal rights activists had "liberated" animals from laboratories at the University of Oregon.

I questioned poultry science academicians and industry leaders regarding the nature of the movement. The response was uniform: The animal rights movement is irrelevant (I have since constructed Jamison's Second Law of Inverse Proportionality: Whenever parochial academicians and industry officials completely dismiss a social movement, it should be taken exceedingly seriously). These dismissals notwithstanding, several questions had crystallized in my mind. Who had placed the stickers on the packages and why had they done so? What had motivated them to equate the production of chicken meat with murder? Why did the anonymous activists in Eugene view their work as liberation? And were the two events somehow related? The search for answers to those questions formed the basis of this research.

Research ultimately requires financial and intellectual support, and in this respect I have been blessed. The

Wilcox, Hansen, and Pacific Egg and Poultry Association scholarships were invaluable in providing financial support for my graduate studies. The Agricultural Research Foundation was instrumental in funding both my survey and policy research. Helen Berg and Pam Bodenroder of the OSU Survey Research Center contributed support and advice in overcoming survey difficulties. Mike Burke provided a patient sounding board for many of my unfettered ideas, and for his professional guidance, instruction, and support I will remain indebted. Liz Webb, Marilyn Welch and Jamie Schaup provided the office support without which no scientific endeavor in modern bureaucratic culture can persevere.

Research also requires fellowship, and I have been blessed with a group of fellow graduate students whose friendship was a gift. John Kirby, Damon Jones, Caryn Thompson, Louise Street, Jorge Schray, Bryan Hogervorst and the entire Graduate Christian Forum all proved to be willing listeners. Their endurance in listening to my embryonic ideas and endless digressions was seemingly infinite.

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I take as my final inspiration and acknowledgement 1
Corinthians 13:13;

*Faith, Hope, and Love, abide these three.
But the greatest of these is Love.*

To David Froman, whose faith in me opened a door for graduate studies and was the blessing I needed: His mentoring taught me far more than knowledge. To Bill Lunch, whose hope in my ability to overcome hyperbole bolstered my intellectual growth: Without his mentoring my journey as a doctoral student would have been far less pleasurable. And to my dear wife Angela, without whose undying love my studies and all my efforts would be meaningless: Thank you.

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Portions of this dissertation have either been published or have been submitted for publication.

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RESOURCE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM: A DEMOGRAPHIC, ATTITUDINAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Overview

In the late twentieth century, many tacitly accepted relationships between humans and the environment have come under scrutiny. One need only look as far as the local newspaper to find evidence of tension between communities which extract natural resources and those that attempt to preserve them. However, the contentiousness and open confrontation which characterizes contemporary environmental and agricultural debates is a relatively recent phenomena.

Historically, cultures have enjoyed varying degrees of consensus regarding nature and humanity's place in the natural world. Whether a society has viewed its environment from a utilitarian or some other perspective, a central, dominant epistemology has helped people to interpret and interact with nature. While it is true that few industrialized cultures have experienced consensual homogeneity, it is equally true that the pace of societal change, and thus the deterioration of traditional consensus, is accelerating.

Inevitably, as the old consensus dissolves and as new values evolve, tensions arise between people who proclaim the new values and those who adhere to traditional ways of

life. We are, to borrow Kuhn's oft cited phrase, in the midst of a "paradigm shift." The thesis which follows is concerned with one particular interpretation of human relationships with the environment, indeed one specific example of shifting values, namely the modern animal rights movement.

The animal rights movement is an intellectual and cultural phenomenon which has landed on modern Western culture's front porch. Like a newborn child abandoned on the doorstep, its seemingly sudden, unanticipated appearance and loud cries have left casual observers startled and perplexed, wondering, "Where did it come from?", "Why is it here?", "To whom does it belong?", and "What do we do now?" This thesis examines the movement's origins, context, membership, impact, and intensity.

The thesis begins with by placing animal rights activism in historical and theoretical context. The animal rights movement did not spring full blown from the brow of contemporary philosophers and intellectuals. Rather, the movement is historically and philosophically linked to its antecedent, the Victorian anti-vivisection movement. Like its predecessor, the contemporary animal rights movement represents a reaction to societal change. Both have manifested themselves in opposition to medical experimentation on animals. But unlike the nineteenth century movement, contemporary animal rights advocates carry

the symbolic cause of animals, and indeed their crusade for societal transformation, out through the laboratory doors and into all facets of our culture.

After reviewing its history, the thesis places the contemporary American animal rights movement in political context. It is argued that animal rights groups are not historical or cultural aberrations, and that these groups arise from within a political system that legitimizes their existence and encourages their participation. Indeed, animal rights activism is wholly consistent with the American interest group-based political system. Nonetheless, it is argued that the movement would not have reemerged in its current form prior to the 1960's. Changes in the political system, e.g. the system's increased accessibility to mass movement politics, are discussed.

Next, survey results concerning the demographics, attitudes and behaviors of animal rights activists are presented. The sampled activists were typically thirty years old, caucasian, highly educated, middle class urban women with strong views and a heartfelt obligation about expressing them. They tended to view themselves as moderates or liberals, and were suspicious of science. The survey also suggested that animal rights activism was indeed a symbolic manifestation of egalitarian social and political views concerning scientific and technological change.

Following the survey results, a case study places animal rights activism in a natural resource policy context. Whereas the survey suggested that animal rights activists were not marginal to the political system, the case study confirmed this observation by establishing that animal rights activists were politically sophisticated and able to realize anthropomorphic egalitarianism as an alternative natural resource policy. Animal rights groups built a political coalition with environmental groups, successfully passing an initiative to ban mountain lion hunting in California. Yet, the case study also identified incongruence and schisms between animal rights groups and their environmental allies.

Both the survey research and the case study indicated that animal rights activists maintained extraordinary levels of commitment and rigidity in their dedication to the cause. Following these findings, the thesis presents evidence of a link between activist intensity and religious motivation. This definition helps explain the quasi-religious language often incorporated in animal rights rhetoric and the origin of the abolitionist zeal common among activists. The thesis argues that a functional definition of religion provides a mechanism through which animal rights groups are able to retain their activists.

The thesis concludes with observations about the implications of the animal rights movement, its social and

cultural setting, and its future. A decision matrix for use by natural resource managers is also presented.

Context

The status of non-human animals in American culture has become a highly visible and contentious area of public policy. Since 1975, animal rights advocates have created a political movement which challenges all facets of the human/non-human animal relationship (Rowan 1993). Efforts by animal rights activists to extend moral consideration and legal protection to animals have included legislative action, protest marches, and direct actions (Herscovici 1985; Animal Welfare Institute 1990; Jasper and Nelkin 1992). As a result, the movement has familiarized the public with the status of animals in modern, industrialized culture (Rowan 1993). Indeed, there is every indication that Americans are becoming increasingly sensitized to the treatment of all animals involved in the production of food and fiber, entertainment, bio-medical research, and natural resource policy (Kellert 1980; Balzar 1993).

The American animal rights movement has experienced considerable growth which includes the creation of a large number of organizations, some of which claim hundreds of thousands of members and annual budgets in the millions of dollars (Kopperud 1989). Historically, the movement has criticized animal-based biomedical research. Yet, it continues to undergo metamorphosis and is notable for the

diversity of its critique (Rowan 1989). In keeping with this metamorphosis, Jasper and Nelkin (1992) have identified at least three types of organizations which have emerged in recent years. Their research has elaborated upon the structure of the animal rights movement, providing an initial overview of the internal dynamics, composition and structure of various organizations within the movement (see Table 1).

Historians and social scientists place the origin of the contemporary animal rights movement in the nineteenth century. The anti-vivisection movement arose out of profound social reactions to increasing technological change and was concerned with the symbolic position of animals as liaisons between recently urbanized humanity and nature. Originating as Puritan reactions to the Industrial Revolution and Victorian materialism, the anti-vivisection movement was responding to perceptions of the increasing human exploitation of, and intrusion into, the natural world (Sperling 1988; Richards 1990).

Lansbury (1985) has illuminated the symbolic political nexus between animals, feminist suffragettes and laborers which coalesced around the statue of an old brown dog, and this symbolism was powerful enough to precipitate anti-vivisection riots in Edwardian England. Hence, political symbolism became central to the mobilization of, and value

Table 1. An interpretive schema of Jasper and Nelkin's (1992) animal rights organizational classifications.

Type	Welfarist	Pragmatist	Fundamentalist
Beliefs about animals	Objects of compassion, deserving protection, with distinct boundaries between species	Deserve moral and legal consideration, with a balance between human and non-human interests; Hierarchy of animals	Have absolute moral and legal rights to personal autonomy, with equal rights across species, especially higher vertebrates
Goals	Avoid cruelty and limit animal populations; adopt animals	Eliminate all unnecessary suffering by reducing and replacing existing uses of animals	Total and immediate abolition of all animal exploitation
Strategies	Reformist legislation and humane education; shelters and neutering	Protests and debate, with pragmatic cooperation, negotiation and acceptance of short-term compromise	Moralist rhetoric and public condemnation coupled to civil disobedience and direct actions
Examples	Humane Society of the United States, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals	Fund for Animals, In Defense of Animals	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Friends of Animals

manifestation among, the anti-vivisection groups. In this way, all animal experimentation came to symbolize the human manipulation of nature. As explained by Ritvo (1987), Victorian-era opponents of animal research

"saw scientific experimentation on animals as a defilement of both nature and human nature, a symbol of what was wrong with a world in which people had assigned the highest priority to themselves, their reasoning power, and the gratification of their desires."

During periods of intense technological change and social displacement, there has often been receptivity to criticism of forces in society such as empiricism that appear responsible for change (Florman 1981). When placed in this context, both the anti-vivisection movements of the nineteenth and twentieth century and the animal rights movement reflect anxiety regarding scientific and technological change.

The Victorian anti-vivisection movement used sensationalized publicity along with popularized exposes of animal mistreatment and apocalyptic literature to mobilize public sentiment against animal experimentation. The movement depended heavily on aristocratic *noblesse oblige* as a reservoir of support, and played heavily upon the Victorian sensibilities concerning pornography and brutality. The anti-vivisectionists opposed the relativistic ideology of science, e.g. science to the Victorian was symbolic of the irreversible pollution and corruption of extant social order (French 1975; Rupke 1987).

Yet, the Victorian movement had little impact upon the use of animals in biomedical research; eventually the movement disintegrated (French 1975). However, the symbolic reaction against the utilization of animals did not disappear altogether. The movement's radical agenda for the transformation of society eventually dissolved back into the social milieu, leaving the reformist animal welfare movement as its legacy (Rowan 1984). The anti-vivisectionists, although extreme in their abolitionist zeal, had sensitized society to the plight of animals. Less committed, and indeed less radical people were nonetheless motivated in part by anti-vivisectionist publicity to join animal welfare groups. Hence, animal welfare groups, which sought reform of societal attitudes towards animals, perpetuated the cause.

Through the turn of the century, animal welfare groups carried the torch, seeking to abate animal suffering. Anti-vivisection experienced a brief reemergence in the 1950's in the form of a social reaction to fluoridation and other scientific phenomena (Rowan 1984). Nonetheless, animal welfare groups continued to predominate. However, beginning in the 1960's, the cause of animal protection was transformed from reformist calls for animal protection into the radical calls for societal redemption.

Whereas the nineteenth century movement focused upon the experimental dissection of living animals, the

contemporary animal rights movement has evolved to question virtually all forms of domesticated and non-domesticated animal utilization and control (Rowan 1984). Like its Victorian predecessor, the animal rights movement has used publicity, exposes and apocalyptic literature to frame the issues surrounding the status of animals in moralistic terms (Jasper and Nelkin 1992). However, unlike its progenitor, the radical animal rights movement extends rights-based claims for moral consideration and legal protection to non-human animals (Holden 1987). While support for animal rights can be found among segments of the social elite, it appears that the contemporary movement originates within the middle-class (Sperling 1988; Richards 1990).

The movement's claim to moral equivalency between human and non-human animals originates in two opposing philosophical schools: Utilitarianism and Moral Rights. First, the utilitarian argument posits that ethical decisions are dependent on their utility, e.g. ethical decisions should maximize pleasure while minimizing pain. Animal liberationists argue that the interests of non-human animals should be equivalent to that of humans in determining ethical decisions (Herzog 1990). Extending the evaluation of utility outward from humans to non-humans can be traced to a school of utilitarian Oxford philosophers originating in the 1960's and 1970's (Nash 1989; Richards 1990). Finding its most popularized expression in Singer's

Animal Liberation, the utilitarian justifications for moral consideration of animals are considered seminal to the movements' current growth (Singer 1975, 1990).

Whereas utilitarian justifications rely on the utility of moral extensionism, the rights argument emphasizes similarities in the sentience and inherent value between higher mammals. Rights-based philosophers consider utilitarian moral considerations of non-human animals to be flawed in two aspects. First, utilitarianism is based on the assumption that types of pains and pleasures are qualitatively different, and second, utilitarianism allows the exploitation of non-human animals if it is deemed necessary for the greater good. In response to utilitarianism's situational protection of animals, Regan (1983) advocates a rights-based approach. He believes that rights are dichotomous and absolute, thus extending protection under all circumstances.

Regan (1983) argues that since non-human animals have consciousness, e.g. expectations and desires, they likewise have personal autonomy. He stated that

"unless or until we are shown that there are better reasons for denying that these animals have beliefs and desires, we are rationally entitled to believe that they do."

He attempts to protect their expectations and desires by granting personal autonomy through the extension of moral claims. Differentiating between moral and legal rights, he states that legal rights are provided to enfranchised

citizens and consist of valid claims that have correlative duties. In his extension of moral rights to non-human animals, however, Regan (1983) argues that social justice calls for the respectful treatment of all beings who have inherent value.

Rowan (1993) argues that the rapid urbanization of American culture since 1920 has facilitated a sentimental longing to return to an idealized rural life with its proximate relationships to nature and animals. Since the 1970s, researchers who have studied primates and cetaceans have concluded that these animals have cognitive ability, complex social groups, and even forms of language. These conclusions, in turn, have further accentuated human empathy with non-human animals. Hence, philosophical justifications for the moral consideration of animals were not widely rejected among the lay public. Evolutionary theory indicated that human and non-human animals were biologically related, scientists indicated that animals were much more similar to humans than previously thought, and philosophers argued convincingly that animals deserved moral consideration. With these factors established within the public psyche, calls for moral and legal protection for animals were a given.

Thus, the contemporary American animal rights movement combines a critique of empiricism, which was characteristic of the Victorian movement, with a reaction to modernity that

has mobilized many modern mass movements (Melucci 1985; Tourraine 1985, 1988). In summary, animal rights has evolved into a political movement that is striking in its breadth and depth. Although philosophically linked to its Victorian antecedent, the contemporary movement differs with respect to its political sophistication and finesse.

Statement of the Problem

There is a paucity of social science data concerning the contemporary American animal rights movement. Richards (1990) argued that research into the demographic, attitudinal and behavioral composition of the animal rights movement has been constrained by at least three factors. First, disciplinary inertia has forestalled investigations. Second, suspicion and anti-science sentiment among the movement's leadership made access to mailing lists and members problematic. Third, constructing an appropriate and representative research frame was difficult.

There are widespread anecdotal accounts regarding animal rights advocates as well as journalistic profiles of some leaders of the movement (Martin 1982; Greanville and Moss 1985; Herscovici 1985; Kopperud 1989; Miller 1989; McCabe 1990; Strand 1993). However, social science research has been limited (Sperling 1988; Jasper & Poulsen 1989; Jasper, Nelkin, & Poulsen 1989). Although previous research has illuminated the historical roots, contemporary emergence and growth of the movement, interpretations were limited by

small sample sizes. The existing social science research indicated that animal rights advocates were middle-class with liberal political beliefs (Jasper & Poulson 1989).

Sperling (1988) stated that

"Although reliable membership data on demographic categories such as social class, ethnicity, educational level, and sex are not available, the movement's greatest strength clearly is not concentrated among a social elite. Observation suggests that the new activists are typically white, college educated, from middle-class urban and suburban backgrounds, in their early to middle thirties, and female."

Although these preliminary sketches provided a starting point for further research, the demographic characteristics, attitudes and behavior of American animal rights activists were obscure. Likewise, little was known about either practical policy implications of animal rights activism or what enabled animal rights organizations to retain activists.

Initial Research Objective

The March for the Animals, held in Washington, D.C. in June, 1990, provided a unique research frame for such an examination of animal rights activism. Previous research utilizing previous demonstrations by animal rights activists was hampered by the number of activists gathered at any one given time and by the sporadic, spontaneous nature of such events. Never before had such a large concentration of animal rights activists gathered together in such a concentrated fashion with so much advance notice. Hence,

the initial objective of this research was to provide a demographic, political, attitudinal and behavioral description of American animal rights activists based upon a large sample size.

Second Research Objective

Upon completion of the first stage of the research, it became evident that animal rights activists had political savvy and were not marginal to the political system. The survey demonstrated that animal rights activists tend to be middle class, well-educated people with strong views and a sense of obligation about expression them. They resembled activists in other political movements, e.g. environmentalism, which have had profound influences on social policy (Buttel and Flinn 1974; Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Luker 1984). Animal rights activists tended to identify with, and contribute money to, environmental groups.

During the 1970s, the animal rights movement drew upon environmentalism as a model for organizational, inspirational, and political composition. The political symbolism of exploited animals has traditionally been an important tool used by environmental groups to attract and focus attention upon abstract environmental policy goals (Wong-Leonard 1992). However, animal symbols were usually subsumed within a greater ecological context. By using animal symbols in this way, environmental groups helped lay

the groundwork for the growth of animal rights groups who were concerned with the exploitation of non-domesticated animals. In other words, environmentalists popularized the cause of wild animal conservation and protection (Jasper and Nelkin 1992).

Nonetheless, animal rights activists have superseded their environmental counterparts by attempting to extend protection to all individual animals within the biosphere. Animal rights activists believe that both domesticated and non-domesticated animals remain unprotected from human malevolence and therefore require public advocacy to protect their interests (Chase 1987).

While animal rights groups may have drawn upon environmentalism for inspiration and as a model for initial organization, animal rights and environmental organizations are not natural allies (Herzog 1993a). Some environmental ethicists have argued that animal rights philosophy is incompatible with natural resource policies predicated upon normative ecosystemic ideals (Sagoff 1988; Hargrove 1992). These ideals include intrinsic value, holistic and systemic evaluations of individual components, and the subjugation of individual concerns to ecosystemic concerns (Leopold 1949; Sagoff 1988; Callicot 1987, 1989). Animal rights, on the other hand, is predicated on normative values which stress the personal autonomy and inherent value of the individual, and subordination of collective concerns to the freedom of

the individual (Singer 1975, 1990; Goodpaster 1978; Regan 1980; Taylor 1981). The policy implications of a rights-based environmental ethic had not been previously researched. Nonetheless, an example was provided by Watson (1992), who advocated active human intervention in non-human disputes:

"If such animals in their amoral behavior harm other moral entities, then...they should be punished as though they were moral agents. I view this punishment as restraining them from doing harm to others. Conceivably...it might make them remember their duties in the future."

The controversy over the place of animal rights in environmental ethics was discussed by philosophers (Hargrove 1992; Zimmerman 1993) during the period in which the second phase of research was conducted. While Hargrove accepted that some rights for some domesticated animals may be acceptable, he nevertheless rejected a rights-based approach as inapplicable to non-domesticated animals (Hargrove 1992). On the other hand, animal rights philosophers had argued that a rights-based ethic was the only viable method of protecting animals from human exploitation (Regan 1983). Nash (1989) attempted to circumvent the philosophical divide by linking environmentalism and animal rights activism.

He placed both squarely within the American liberal political tradition:

"Conceived of as promoting the liberation of exploited and oppressed members of the American ecological community, even the most radical fringe of the contemporary environmental movement can be understood not so much as a revolt against traditional American ideals as an extension and new application of them."

These political projections of symbolic moral meaning upon non-domesticated animals are significant. Natural resource managers are often faced with policy choices pertaining to the interaction between animals and their environment. These choices often involve controlling animals and may involve either lethal or non-lethal methods. Hence, efforts by animal rights activists to extend protection to non-domesticated animals creates new challenges and responsibilities for natural resource managers (Sparhawk 1994).

Managers who have traditionally viewed animals within the ecosystemic context find that the animal rights movement asks them to approach animal control from the perspective of individual animals. The Fund for Animals has gained notoriety for its rights-based approach toward protecting non-domesticated animals. The Fund has actively intervened in animal management policies, ranging from the control of bison and grizzly bears in Yellowstone National Park to the proposed eradication of burros in Grand Canyon National Park (Chase 1987; Jasper and Nelkin 1992). Hence, animal rights

groups have already had important impacts on animal management policies, e.g. The United States National Park Service has experienced the influence of animal rights ideology on exotic goat policy in Olympic National Park and white tail deer control in Gettysburg National Battlefield (Sparhawk 1994; Bachelor 1994).

Thus, the incongruence between individualistic and collective interpretations of resource policies posed several questions which were addressed in the second stage of the research. Were animal rights interest groups able, within the demands of animal rights views, to offer supportive specific resource policies? If so, what were the mechanisms through which they interpreted and implemented policy? Were animal rights groups capable of forging political coalitions with environmentalists? If so, under what circumstances did these coalitions precipitate? The objectives of the second stage of research were to investigate these questions by using the California Wildlife Protection Act of 1990 (Proposition #117) as a case study.

Third Research Objective

The initial survey indicated that animal rights activists were politically active, well-informed and were able to access the political system. The case study indicated that leaders of animal rights groups were politically sophisticated and capable of implementing policy alternatives. The policy research also indicated that

animal rights activists were intensely committed to extending rights to non-domesticated animals, and that they were willing to make significant sacrifices to do so.

Activist intensity was crucial in qualifying California Initiative #117. Activism is important in American politics, and intensity is the precursor to activism (Huntington 1981; Wilson 1990). Nonetheless, both opponents and proponents of the California initiative remarked that the animal rights activists were extraordinarily dedicated, enthusiastic, and zealous. Indeed, Sharon Negri, a leader of the animal rights organization involved in passing the initiative, stated that

"There are no people like animal rights people...They are really true believers!"

French (1975) identified a religious moralism which the Victorians brought to the anti-vivisection cause. Lansbury (1985) described the uncommon intensity of anti-vivisection activists which eventually led to riots in Edwardian England. Furthermore, the accounts of Sperling (1988), Jasper & Nelkin (1992), and Herzog (1993b) have identified uncommon levels of intensity and redemptive moralism among contemporary animal rights activists (Sperling 1988; Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Herzog 1993). Yet, animal rights is certainly not the only movement in American politics concerned with moralism and symbolism, e.g. abortion (Luker 1984). The civil rights, feminist and environmental movements each have relied heavily upon activist intensity

and political symbolism to legitimize their agendas (Lunch 1987).

Wilson (1973) has identified three types of interest groups: material, solidary, and purposive (see Table 2). Political scientists understand the mechanisms through which these groups recruit members. These groups offer a continuum of substantive and symbolic incentives to potential members in an effort to entice their contributions and allegiance (Wilson 1973; Berry 1989). Less well understood is the mechanism through which interest groups or movements retain members (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Preliminary content analysis indicated that the animal rights movement was composed of goal-oriented, redemptive and ideological organizations (Richards 1989). This thesis is concerned with purposive animal rights groups. Purposive groups are idea-based organizations that make predominantly moral arguments.

However, because of their characteristic rigidity, ideological and redemptive groups encounter difficulties with organizational maintenance and cohesion (Wilson 1973; Huntington 1981). Hence, the objectives of the third stage of the research were: (1) to identify the source of the extraordinary intensity reported among animal rights activists, and (2) to identify the mechanism through which redemptive and ideological groups retain activism.

Table 2. An interpretive schema of Wilson's (1973) interest group classifications.

Type	<i>Rewards</i>	Incentives	Examples
Material	<i>Tangible</i>	Value derived from protection or advancement of economic interests; money or other quantitative benefits; job security and safety	Labor Unions (AFL-CIO); Commodity and Producer Groups (Oregon Forestry Council)
Solidary Specific	<i>Intangible</i>	Value derived from denial of benefits to non-members; elected/appointed offices, exclusivity, prestige, scarcity	Country Clubs; Fraternal Organizations; Faculty Clubs
Solidary Collective	<i>Intangible</i>	Value derived from inclusive group communitarianism and identity; protection from outsiders, collective defense of identity, camaraderie, esprit, conviviality	Tribes; Clans; Linguistic, Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Groups
Purposive Goal-Oriented	<i>Intangible</i>	Value derived from association with a cause which demands the enactment of of specific laws, practices or behaviors	Women's Temperance Society; United Poultry Concerns
Purposive Ideological	<i>Intangible</i>	Value derived from association with a cause which espouses broad, systematic critiques and programs; reinforces assumptions about human nature/society	American Civil Liberties Union; The Eagle Forum
Purposive Redemptive	<i>Intangible</i>	Value derived from exclusive, mutual transformation of the self and society; allegiance provides personal redemption; authentic personal commitment; community	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; Oregon Citizens Alliance

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Introduction

The first chapter presented an overview of American animal rights activism. Animal rights activism combines a critique of empiricism with a reaction to modernity. With origins in the nineteenth century Victorian anti-vivisection movement, the modern movement advances a similar agenda which seeks to end the use of animals in bio-medical research. However, unlike its Victorian antecedent, the contemporary movement seeks a fundamental alteration of all relationships involving modern culture and non-human animals. Animal rights activists attempt to accomplish this by encasing their agenda in the rhetoric of rights (Herzog 1990; Carruthers 1992).

The first chapter also stated the questions addressed within this thesis: (1) who are the activists, (2) what are their policy impacts, and (3) what is the source of their uncommon intensity? This chapter discusses the animal rights movement in the context of the American political system. Both proponents and opponents have remarked that animal rights advocates were extraordinarily intense. Social science research supports these anecdotal accounts (Sperling 1988; Richards 1990; Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Herzog 1993a,b). The present chapter addresses activist

intensity and its role in American politics. It provides a rationale for interest group politics, discusses the historical context and structural changes of interest group politics, and outlines various levels of citizen participation in the political system. The chapter concludes by placing animal rights activism in the context of contemporary politics.

Historical Rationale

A challenge faced by all representative governments is the method through which the individual will gain access to the political system. In parliamentary democracies, the party is the central mediating institution between the individual and the state (Wooten 1985; Wilson 1992). In the U.S., which has a legislative democracy, interest groups are understood to serve as the mediating institution. In the American system, preferential treatment is given to organized interests as opposed to amorphous public opinion (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Wilson 1990).

The American political system is organized around the legitimate participation of interest groups. These groups are voluntary associations through which citizens participate in the political system on a day to day basis, influencing policy and gaining redress of grievances (Berry 1989). From its inception, the founders of the American government grappled with the paradox of public representation. On the one hand, having successfully

separated from a monarchy, they feared an excessively centralized government. On the other hand, the founders understood that pure democracies were historically self-limiting. But more importantly, Madison et al. (1787) identified a tendency among free people to associate into ethnic, religious, economic and ideological factions. Madison believed that individuals in a democracy would naturally organize into groups based on similarities. He also believed that citizens would possess different skills that would naturally favor some of them more than others. Madison feared that one group or coalition of groups, possessing superior faculties or a particularly fashionable ideology, could seize power, thus establishing a tyranny of the minority in which disadvantaged groups would suffer prejudicial treatment. He observed that these factions inevitably attempted to implement and protect their self-interests, causing civil strife. Hence, Madison (1787) argued in *Federalist* #10 that any form of free government must protect against these "mischiefs of faction." He stated that

"There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the cause of faction: The one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."

Madison believed that destroying the causes of faction would be worse than the disease, viz. that removing liberty

was undesirable in libertarian, revolutionary America, and that giving everyone the same passions was impossible. Hence, Madison proposed a system whereby factions of all types would be legitimized and set against each other. In this system, which legitimized and encouraged voluntary associations, Madison intended that interest groups would expend their energies in open and protracted combat with other interest groups, thus diluting the ability of any one faction to dominate politics for an extended period of time. For this reason, Madison (1787) stated that

"The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage...will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State."

What Madison proposed in *Federalist #10* was a system that set interests against themselves. In this way, opposing interest groups would expend so much energy in continuous conflict with each other that no one group would be able to steward sufficient resources to seize power. Likewise, this continual conflict would be fully legitimized, existing within the channels of power, thus marginalizing radicalism and presenting a more accurate reflection of public discourse.

Both conservative and liberal students of the American political system acknowledge that the system which Madison had envisioned has largely succeeded, performing the dual functions of allowing legitimate policy access while tempering political passion (Wilson 1973; Berry 1989).

Public policy in the United States, whether it concerns animals, plants, minerals, or metaphysics, cannot be divorced from its contemporary political culture. Hence, policy is, by definition, the outcome of political contests between opposing factions. In a representative democracy, it is a given that differing individuals will hold differing perceptions of reality based on highly subjective value systems. A political system exists so that these divergent perspectives can seek audience for opinion and redress for grievances. Out of this foray emerges policy. While men do not become pregnant, they nonetheless have a voice in the debate over abortion.

Structural Changes

The American political system has been traditionally dominated by economic interest groups. The system that Madison designed responded exceptionally well to the demands and desires of a growing population which sought material prosperity (Lunch 1987). In response to material and economic needs, informal relationships developed between economic interest groups, the bureaucracies which most directly affected them, and their elected representatives.

These relationships were mutually reinforcing, eventually solidifying into consensual policy forums (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961, 1971).

However, non-economic interest groups have gained increasing access to public policy since the 1960s. The growth of the American economy allowed widespread prosperity and education. These factors in turn eroded attachments between economic interest groups and their constituencies who had relied on them for their representation (Lunch 1987). New technologies and communications used for political purposes, like direct mail and television news, allowed smaller, non-economic interest groups to disseminate their parochial agendas on a wide-spread basis. Television also enables idea-based groups and movements, e.g. the civil rights movement, to familiarize the general public with previously obscure or regional policy debates (Lunch 1987).

In addition, the expansion of the federal government stimulated growth in interest groups. By placing increasing regulatory and substantive responsibilities upon the private and public sector, the federal government created a demand for interest groups to protect and advance their interests in the face of these changes (Berry 1989). Political scientists have identified a rapid expansion of interest groups in response to these phenomena (Berry 1977, 1989; Heclo 1978; Cooper 1985). Concurrently, the increase in number, size and sophistication of purposive interest groups

and the concurrent proliferation of unfiltered ideological and moral agendas since the 1960's have been noted among political scientists (Huntington 1981; Lunch 1987; Berry 1989). Hence, the political system increasingly is asked to address purely ideological and moral questions, and clearly it has become more accessible to groups whose raw intensity would have previously excluded them from mainstream politics.

The growth in interest group size and numbers since the 1960s to some extent reflects a dissemination of technical information on interest group formation, governance and organization (Berry 1989). While many political organizations appear to have benefitted from this expertise (Berry 1989), purposive groups like animal rights organizations have gained particular advantages. Their participation was legitimized and facilitated by wide-spread acceptance of pluralist theory, and mass movements were effective in generating underlying public support (Huntington 1981; Berry 1989). Interest groups also gained access to the new technologies that allowed them to broadcast their particular beliefs to the wider public.

Thus, animal rights groups arise from within the American tradition of interest group politics. Rather than an illegitimate display of partisan extremism, animal rights activism is organized and focused by legitimate voluntary organizations. These interest groups attempt to gain

advantage and protect their self-interests in opposition to those who do not believe that animals have rights. In so doing, animal rights groups fulfill a valuable informational role in the larger political system. Animal rights groups present and frame unpopular or unconventional policy alternatives to the broader culture. In this way, no one faction in society is able to control the input of policy alternatives, e.g. traditional resource-extractive groups would only present self-interested alternatives to the exclusion of differing policies. Hence, animal rights groups bring attention to animal management practices, the intensity of their activists serving to keep the issue in the public forum.

Animal rights groups have successfully framed animal management issues for natural resource managers and society in moralistic terms (Jasper and Nelkin 1992). In effect, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals or the Fund for the Animals establish a position, e.g. opposing the eradication of exotic mountain goats, and therefore set a standard against which animal management policies may be judged. These positions define policy alternatives to animal rights members and potential members, attracting financial and personal support.

One of the most consistent lessons of movement politics in the past two decades is that by making demands that are unlikely to be met by mainstream politicians, recruitment of

new members is enhanced, opportunities for protest and publicity are increased, and the elan of staff and insiders is maintained at a high pitch (Lunch 1987; Berry 1989). Another important aspect of framing issues in extreme terms is the influence it has upon opponents and bureaucracies. Once an issue is framed in ideological or moral terms, economic interests are compelled to respond lest they grant any competitive advantage to their adversaries (Berry 1989). Natural resource bureaucrats likewise feel compelled to respond to fringe issues because their institutional links to constituent groups require reinforcement (Clarke and McCool 1985). Thus, the organizational dynamics among voluntary organizations such as animal rights groups favor demands that are difficult to meet.

Levels of Citizen Participation

The animal rights movement is similar to a number of movements which have influenced contemporary American politics, e.g. civil rights, feminism, consumerism, and environmentalism were precursors to the animal rights movement (Lunch 1987). Indeed, animal rights activists see themselves as the logical successors to the civil rights and environmental movements (Jasper and Poulson 1989; Jamison and Lunch 1992). Structurally, there are certainly many parallels to earlier movements. The animal rights movement, like movements before it, is not monolithic. It contains competing organizations which, while positing similar policy

goals, favor quite different means to accomplish those goals.

In American politics, all citizens are equal but some are more interested in politics than others; most Americans are not very interested in politics or public issues. While most citizens vote in presidential election years, relatively few become involved in the political system unless their own interests are directly affected. There are, however, exceptions. Political activists have had profound influences within the political system in recent years. In this way, animal rights activism is functionally connected to earlier forms of political participation.

However, generalizing that some citizens are active and some are not fails to address the stratification of participation which occurs in democratic societies. There are various levels of participation in open societies that do not necessarily involve voting, such as contacting a government official to seek redress of grievances, working with a bureaucracy to gain constituent services, or contributing money to a cause (Verba and Nie 1972). As a practical matter, however, those who aspire to influence society usually engage in most of these activities in addition to voting and attempting to influence the votes of others. So while there are undoubtedly some activists who, on principled grounds, refuse to vote or participate in

other aspects of traditional politics, their numbers are quite small (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Smith 1987).

In totalitarian societies, there is a rigid line between the few who are allowed to attempt to participate in politics and the many who are limited to symbolic participation. These symbolic gestures consist of reinforcements of (rather than dissent from) the political *status quo*, such as marching in a parade holding aloft a portrait of "the leader." It is one of the marks of an open society that meaningful political participation is possible for citizens in the general population. Meaningful participation can be defined as either the ability to dissent or as participation which has the potential to contribute to changes in public policy (Schattschneider 1942). Through the legitimization of participation, interested citizens may assume prominent policy roles, e.g. Ralph Nader and his single-handed battle to reform automobile safety regulations (Lunch 1987).

Like other movements, animal rights advocates participate in various ways and at a variety of levels. Figure 1, on the following page, represents a schema of differing levels of citizen participation in the political system. The stratification pyramid has four primary levels: The General Public, the Attentive Public, the Active Public, and the Influential Public. The ideological characteristics of citizens in the schema comprise a continuum from the




Figure 1. A stratification pyramid showing levels of citizen participation in American politics (Almond 1950).

intense, stable, and manifest values of influential citizens to the passive, unstable, and latent values of the general public (Almond 1950). Almond's model of political participation provides a useful starting point to analyze the context of animal rights activism.

The lowest stratum of the pyramid consists of members of the general public. At the very bottom are those for whom politics is totally foreign. These "apolitical" citizens make up approximately two percent of the adult population, and seem to have virtually no political information at all. This lowest substratum also contains those citizens who are not registered to vote. In a typical presidential election year, at least thirty percent of all adult citizens will be unregistered at the time of the election. Existing slightly above the apolitical class, these citizens are disinterested in politics, confused by political choices, or simply too absorbed in their daily activities to take the time to register or vote. While some citizens are disaffected and therefore deliberately do not register for ideological or moral reasons, data indicate that unregistered citizens have the least interest in politics, little information about political choices, and are the least likely to participate in politics no matter what criteria are used to measure such participation (Verba and Nie 1972).

The next substratum in the pyramid consists of those citizens who are registered to vote, but do not actually appear at the polls on election day. This stratum is typically almost as large as the one just below it. The proportion of the total represented by each of these two strata varies, usually shrinking in presidential election years and expanding in other years.

Registered non-voters are followed by the substratum which contains citizens whose participation is limited to voting in presidential election years. The electorate expands to its largest size during presidential contests, drawing in voters who are otherwise uninterested in politics. This stratum represents some fifteen to twenty percent of the population. From the presidential voters to the top of the stratification pyramid, slightly more than half the adult population is currently found.

Although many citizens' participation is limited to presidential elections, others participate on a regular ongoing basis. Regular voters go to the polls at least every two years to vote in cyclical congressional elections (e.g. midterm elections) as well as presidential elections. In recent years, about thirty-five to thirty-eight percent of those who could vote have done so in midterm elections.

In each successively higher level of Almond's pyramid, citizens pay increasing attention to politics and participate in ever increasing ways. Indeed, roughly

halfway up among the regular voters citizens begin to make the transition into the attentive public. They increasingly pay attention to politics and public affairs. These citizens pay fairly regular attention to public issues, and occasionally write their elected representatives and a few even contribute money to causes. As these citizens enter the attentive public, they are likely to regularly employ two or more sources of information about public issues. These information sources usually emphasize television and newspapers (Ranney 1983). Higher in the attentive stratum, citizens use additional sources of political news. These include news magazines, all-news or public radio stations, and journals. The size of the attentive public ranges from ten to fifteen percent of the adult population (Rosenau 1974).

The next stratum of the pyramid consists of citizens who are active in politics and government. This active public constitutes only three to five percent of the adult population, and is a subset of the attentive public. The active public is temporal, fluctuating in response to a particular issue. Designation as a political activist requires involvement in a limited set of political acts. Herzog (1993a) defines animal rights activists as

"People for whom the theme of the alleviation of animal suffering has become a major theme in their lives...who have made significant changes in their lives, and...who consider themselves to be activists."

While Herzog's definition provides an overview of animal rights activism in the context of self-selection, a study of American voters conducted at the University of Michigan provides a specific description of political activism. Campbell et al. (1960), defined politically active voters as those who engaged in actions such as joining a political organization, making campaign contributions, or doing campaign work. In effect, activists are active, donating their personal time and money to the cause. And although they remain largely anonymous, their support in the form of letters to Congress, contributions to organizations, and local efforts to influence others can be critical in influencing the political system. This is the lowest stratum in Almond's pyramid where animal rights activism occurs.

It is quite rare for citizens to fulfill Campbell's functional definition of activism. Data from the 1950s indicate that only sixteen percent of voters had put on a campaign button or attached a bumper strip. Only ten percent did anything to assist any candidate, and only three percent belonged to any political organization (Campbell et al. 1960). Engaging in more than one such activity was quite rare. It has sometimes been argued that a larger proportion of American citizens have become politically active in recent years (Huntington 1981). Possible factors mentioned as responsible for this increased activity include

increased educational levels as compared to the Campbell's respondents (Berry 1989), as well as the cyclical reemergence of political passions (Huntington 1981). Nonetheless, politically active citizens are still unusual, and those who engage in more than one or two political activities are extraordinarily rare (Rosenau 1960; Nie et al 1976).

One consequence of the distrust of government generated by the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandals was to open a variety of formal avenues, e.g. "sunshine" laws, for challenging decisions by agencies of government. Those agencies specifically dealing with natural resource and environmental policies have been subject to many more challenges to their policies in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1950s and 1960s (Polsby 1983; Lunch 1987). On the one hand, Huntington's (1981) and Berry's (1989) contention that the proportion of political activists among Americans is now larger than it was in 1955 may be correct. On the other hand, the same number of activists may have utilized increasing government access in a more efficient manner. In the case of animal rights activists and their impact on natural resource policy, it does not matter much. Because of these institutional changes, which have, in turn, facilitated policy challenges, natural resource agencies must now work on the assumption that controversial animal

management policies are likely to be formally challenged in administrative proceedings and in court.

Finally, at the apex of Almond's pyramid is the influential public. While the actual number of members of the influential public is large, their proportion of the population is very small, considerably less than one percent of all citizens. In a recent television interview, James Q. Wilson estimated that approximately 100,000 citizens are influential and have direct policy impact. At this level are found people with direct participatory influence in politics and public policy. In a complex political system, influence comes in many forms. All national elected officials, e.g. presidents and members of Congress, are members of the influential public by virtue of their broad political influence. In addition to these elected representatives, leaders of national interest groups, e.g. environmentalists such as the head of the Sierra Club or representatives of business organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, also have direct influence (Wilson 1973). Nationally recognized figures in the press and broadcasting, such as television news anchors or newspaper columnists similarly occupy the top of the pyramid. Other influentials include top bureaucrats, cabinet and issue-specific sub-cabinet officials, and judges and justices in federal courts.

But just as there are distinctions among citizens who are non-participants in the political system, so there are distinctions among activists and influential political participants. At the highest level are influential national political leaders who exercise power over the widest possible array of public policies, from defense, to the environment, to business regulation. The president, Congressmen, some national interest group leaders and prominent editors and reporters all have comprehensive national influence. Below them are those who have national influence which is limited to broad policy areas, e.g. interest group leaders whose influence is restricted to environmental policy. These distinctions are qualitative, and it becomes possible to array members of the influential public along a continuum from comprehensive to highly specific policy influence. Thus, an expert on animal care would have narrower influence within agricultural policy than the Secretary of Agriculture, but more influence than a research scientist in ethology (see Table 3).

Table 3. Influence continuum on animal rights issues.

Level	Type	Institution	Individual
National	<i>Comprehensive</i>	Congress	Speaker of the House
	<i>Generalized</i>	House Interior Committee	Committee Staffer
	<i>Specific</i>	Department of Interior Fund for Animals	Ethologist Executive Director (Wayne Pachtelle)
State	<i>Comprehensive</i>	Governor	Pete Wilson
	<i>Generalized</i>	House Environmental Quality Committee	Lloyd Connolly
	<i>Specific</i>	California Department of Fish & Wildlife Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation	Wildlife Biologist (Terry Mansfield) Executive Director (Sharon Negri)
Local	<i>Comprehensive</i>	City Manager	
	<i>Generalized</i>	Humane Shelter	Director
	<i>Specific</i>	Volunteer	Activist

A parallel analysis of political power fifty years ago would have included virtually all of those holding such positions, but would not have included the leaders of movements like the animal rights movement. Yet changes in legal doctrine, media technologies and political communications, and legislative accessibility have increased the power of mass movements (Lunch 1987). Now movement leaders often establish or help to establish the agenda for discussion of public issues. At the national level, the leaders of animal welfare groups such as the Humane Society of the United States or animal rights groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals can sometimes have far-reaching influence on national policies that they target for attention. On the other hand, interest group leaders must constantly compete for attention and recognition from both the electorate and political influentials. Political power is as much perceived as actual, and the leaders of animal rights groups struggle to be perceived as exerting legitimate influence on natural resource policy (Berry 1989). The more they are perceived as being powerful, the more power they garner. The inverse is also true. Hence, to animal rights leaders, like the influentials of all movements and national interest groups, legitimate policy successes, no matter how small, become springboards for further power.

Yet, no leader succeeds all of the time, whether their policy focus is broad or narrow. Influential citizens are routinely rebuffed by the political system. White House personnel who leave government routinely write books and articles about the frustration brought about by the elaborate system of checks and balances that limits the influence of any one person or set of people (Stockman 1987). Thus, tension over ascending political leaders and those they have eclipsed is constant as interest groups vie for power and prestige, each attempting to solicit favorable policies and legislation.

However, influence is not found only in the national capital. In a federal system, politics is subdivided by regions, states, and localities. Hence, citizens can gain policy access and influence at all of these levels. Influential citizens at the regional or state level have historically faced little national restriction in exercising localized influence. That independence has significantly eroded in the past twenty-five years (Lunch 1987). Nonetheless, compared to leaders in parliamentary democracies, American influentials at the regional, state, and local levels retain considerable influence (Wilson 1990). This diffusion of political influence has consequences for shaping natural resource policies. Reaching agreement with national-level interest group or congressional leaders upon animal management policies is not

enough to insure that local, state, or regional groups will accept the bargains made in their name by leaders in Washington, D.C., New York, San Francisco, or elsewhere. In practical terms, the increasingly widespread dispersion of the influential public means that consensus at the national level may well be disregarded or rejected at the regional, state, or local level. This is particularly likely when issues generate intense passion, are moralistic or religious, and have the potential to mobilize opposition among opponents of various local, state, and regional interest groups.

Hence, Madisonian interest group democracy has had the intended influence on the mischiefs of faction. Policy change is incremental, usually reflecting broad, consensual shifts in public values rather than temporal swings in public sentiment. In such a system, policy today will very likely follow policy yesterday, and policy tomorrow will resemble policy today. Therefore, interest group leaders who hope to significantly change public policy usually encounter very high institutionalized hurdles.

Animal Rights Activism in Political Culture

First, the access, influence, and impact of members of the active and influential public has grown substantially in the past quarter century. Government agencies concerned with natural resource management must take the concerns of activists and their organizations seriously at both the

federal and local level if their agencies are to satisfy these constituencies. Second, animal rights activism emerges from within, and is wholly consistent with, a tradition of interest group politics which legitimizes dissent, sets conflicting groups against each other, and favors organizational intensity over disorganized concern. Almond's pyramid provides a general schema with which to approach the study of animal rights activism.

Students of natural resource policy who seek to understand the potential impact of movements, the interest groups which comprise those movements, and the citizens who make up their core constituency are confronted with a complex research frame. At what level, or levels, do political organizations influence policy? If politics favors intensity, then which of these levels most directly influence the bureaucratic interpretation and implementation of natural resource policies? How do interest groups impact policies in the legislative arena? Which members of interest groups are critical to political success?

Rosenau (1961), Almond (1950), Pinard and Hamilton (1989) identify the active and influential members of American culture as the origin of new ideas and the engine of policy change. Their views are likely to be intense and stable. Likewise, activists and influentials generally have increased levels of political sophistication (Lynch 1987). Therefore, the research contained in the following chapters

focuses on the active and influential strata of American animal rights groups (see Figure 2), and addressed these questions. First, who are animal rights activists, what do they think, and what are their political behaviors? Second, what are their potential policy impacts? And finally, what is the source of their remarkable intensity?




Figure 2. A stratification pyramid showing thesis focus. While Almond's (1950) model is appropriate for an examination of the entire American electorate, the thesis will address the active and influential members as shown in the offset at the top.

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CHAPTER III

THE RIGHTS OF ANIMALS, PERCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE, AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM: A DEMOGRAPHIC, ATTITUDINAL, AND BEHAVIORAL PROFILE OF AMERICAN ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

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Abstract

This paper reports original research examining characteristics of the active followers of the American animal rights movement. Typical respondents were caucasian, highly-educated urban professional women approximately thirty years old with a median income of \$33,000 (1989). Most activists were democrats or Independents and had moderate to liberal political views. They were often suspicious of science and made no distinctions between basic and applied science or public versus private animal-based research. The research suggests that animal rights activism is in part a symbolic manifestation of egalitarian social and political beliefs concerning scientific and technological change.

Introduction

The animal rights movement in the United States has experienced notable successes in recent years, including the creation of a large number of organizations, some of which

claim hundreds of thousands of members and annual budgets in the millions of dollars. While the movement's contemporary emergence has been uniformly characterized by criticisms of animal-based biomedical research, the movement continues to undergo metamorphosis. Presently the animal rights movement is notable for its diversity. And while it encompasses a plethora of single and multi-issue interest groups that are concerned with animal utilization in entertainment, recreation, agriculture, and research, it is in the area of biomedical research using animal subjects that activists have been able to affect the greatest regulatory impacts (Rowan 1989). Politically, lobbyists for the movement have been active in pursuing legislative goals, including the repeal of pound seizure laws at the state and local level and amendments to the Federal Animal Welfare Act which have regulated the use of animals in scientific research (Animal Welfare Institute 1990). The movement has also mobilized a large-scale letter writing campaign; letters concerning the treatment of animals now comprise the third largest volume of mail to the U.S. Congress (Kuntz 1990).

In the Summer of 1990 the increasing popularity of the movement was dramatically illustrated when animal rights organizations staged an unprecedented march on Washington, D.C. that attracted approximately twenty-five thousand marchers. The ability of the relatively immature animal rights movement to muster this level of support is

illustrative of the movement's continued growth and may be indicative of the its increasing political efficacy. As American science is discovering to its surprise and chagrin, this is clearly a movement of considerable size, political sophistication and strength.

But who are the American animal rights activists? Are they young or old, rich or poor, urban or rural? What are their values and political views? Is this a movement of people on the fringe or in the mainstream of society? And what are the views of the activists regarding science and technology? There are anecdotal accounts of animal rights activists and journalistic profiles of some leaders of the movement, but except for some ethnographic work there is little social scientific data on American animal rights activists¹.

The March for the Animals (hereafter "the march") offered an unprecedented opportunity to interview large numbers of activists conveniently. The march was organized, coordinated and chaired by Peter Linck of the National Alliance for Animal Legislation and its Educational Fund, with support from co-chair Tom Regan and others². Participant recruitment occurred by means of advertizing in movement literature (e.g. *Animals' Agenda*, *PETA News*, *Action Line*, etc.), march leaflets and booklets, and through informal activist networking³. The official objectives of various groups associated with the march included the

establishment of a "Declaration of the Rights of Animals", the mobilization of the movement's factions, and non-specific lobbying on Capital Hill on the day following the march. However, the unstated objectives of a mass protest can be as important as the "official" publicity releases. A reading of the pre-march literature as well as conversations with activists on the day prior to the march indicated that this was indeed the case.

Ideologically-oriented interest groups and movements often require passionate fellowship experiences to maintain group cohesion and motivation (Wilson 1973). This appeared to be a primary motivation behind the march. The march was publicized among activists as "a day of compassion, commitment and celebration." The unofficial goals of the march included gaining national publicity for the movement, establishing a visible presence in Washington in order to influence future animal legislation, and providing an opportunity for fellowship and peer reinforcement among the numerous factions contained within the movement (Miller 1989; "March for the Animals" 1990). Animal rights leaders also felt the need for their own march as a means of differentiating the movement from environmentalism, which had just celebrated the twentieth Earth Day. Revitalization of activists---rejuvenation of enthusiasm for the cause---at the march cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, one activist stated that her motives for attending the march were the

opportunity to share her experiences with liked-minded individuals as well as the reinforcement of her beliefs. We were able to collect demographic, attitudinal and behavioral data on these animal rights activists; we report our initial findings here. Our respondents are likely to be more committed and to have stronger views than most members of animal rights groups. Nonetheless our sample provides an initial profile of both the perceptions and demographic characteristics of the most visible component of animal rights groups. These activists expended significant personal resources to travel to and participate in the march: This indicates an extraordinary level of commitment and enthusiasm which should interest those who may believe that animal rights is epiphenomenal. We have related these findings to broader developments in the relationship between science and society. Most of the animal rights advocates we interviewed are highly skeptical of the value of science. They perceive scientists, as do some critics, as authority figures whose power is not legitimate because science is not directly accountable to the public at large. It follows that a number of the marchers told us they think of the animal rights movement as a successor to the civil rights, feminist, and environmental movements.

This article is divided into four sections: First, we offer a brief overview of the historical context for the movement, along with the activities, size, and significance

of the animal rights movement in the past decade. Second, we explain the methodology used to collect our data. Third, we report our findings. Fourth, we briefly discuss the context for this movement in American social and political life and assess the future of the animal rights movement.

Historical Context

Two social movements concerned with human use of animals came into existence in the nineteenth century. The reformist Humane movement and the radical Anti-vivisection movement both arose out of profound social reactions to increasing technological change, and were concerned with the symbolic position of animals as liaisons and mediators between humanity and nature. Each movement was reacting in part to perceptions of the increasing human exploitation of, and intrusion into, the natural world (Sperling 1988). Thus, scientific animal research became symbolic of human intrusion into all things "natural". Importantly, continuity existed between the early humane movement and other social reform movements (Lansbury 1985). Lansbury illuminated the symbolic political nexus between animals, feminist suffragettes and laborers that was central to the anti-vivisection riots in Edwardian England. Indeed, many of the same people were involved with both animal and human rights reform. Thus, the symbolism of a helpless animal under the glaring cruelty of the vivisector's knife was at once synonymous with both the intrusiveness of technology

and the victimization of disenfranchised beings. This symbolism became central to the mobilization of, and value manifestation among, the divergent Humane and Anti-vivisection groups. During periods of intense technological change and social displacement, there has often been receptivity to criticism of forces in society, such as science, that appear responsible for change. When placed in this context, both the anti-vivisection movements of the nineteenth and twentieth century and the animal rights movement reflect increasing social anxiety regarding scientific and technological transformation.

In contemporary America, the Humane movement has sought reform and moderation in the treatment of and behavior towards animals. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) reflects this outlook. Until recently the Humane movement, which reflects a utilitarian ethical position, accepted animal-based research. Because of this tacit acceptance, the reformist movement has not posed a significant political or ideological threat to science. Indeed, the U.S. Humane movement was historically quite pro-science (Rowan 1984). However, the contemporary animal rights movement has evolved to question virtually all forms of animal utilization. Sperling points to many parallels between the ideological views of the anti-vivisection movement and the animal rights movement. Thus, while it is possible to trace the influence of anti-

vivisection in contemporary animal rights philosophy, little empirical research has been done on the contemporary animal rights movement. Previous works suggest that allies of the animal rights movement are found on both the right and left, including feminists, environmentalists, and the urban/suburban middle class.

The emergence of the contemporary animal rights movement is often dated from 1975. The publication of Australian philosopher Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (1975, 1990) provided a rational treatise for those who object to human use of animals. Singer's book was the first contemporary work on the subject to gain widespread popularity. Then, in 1981, the American movement achieved notable publicity with an expose' of the treatment of monkeys at a Silver Springs, Maryland research center. Alex Pacheco, a founder of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), volunteered to work as a lab technician and subsequently made widely publicized claims about purported cruelty to primates being used for research there (McCabe 1990). And in 1984, publicized video footage of head trauma experiments at the University of Pennsylvania further increased public awareness and activist outrage over laboratory treatment of animal research subjects. While the contemporary development of the animal rights movement could not be singularly described as one of unilinear attacks on science, clearly scientific research on animals was coming

under increasing public scrutiny and becoming increasingly controversial.

Since that time the animal rights movement has evolved to incorporate various ideologies that encompass both moderate single-issue groups and more radical groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front. Indeed, all facets of the animal rights movement have played significant roles in the advancement of animal protection (Rowan 1989). Yet to date it has been the more extremist elements of the movement which have generated the greatest visibility for movement grievances against the scientific community. These have influenced public perceptions, consequently increasing moral and financial support for the movement. Because of this visibility and the concurrent publicity the radical factions, the issues have been framed in moralistic terms (Jasper and Nelkin 1992). Thus, an understanding of the history of the public debate requires discussion of extreme activism.

Extremist factions of the movement have carried out numerous and well-publicized raids against targets in the scientific community. On April 16, 1987, arsonists caused \$4.5 million in damages to the Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory at the University of California at Davis. On April 2, 1989, a number of buildings on the University of Arizona campus were broken into and set on fire, causing \$200,000 in damage and resulting in the "liberation" of more

than 1,000 animals. On July 4, 1989 the lab and office of sleep-disorder researcher John Orem at Texas Tech University was attacked. Equipment was vandalized, and research data and five cats were stolen. In January, 1990, the home of a Columbia University scientist conducting animal research was burned after a series of animal rights threats (Mangan 1990). All-told, extremist factions of the movement have committed over 70 illegal acts against research facilities since 1981, and estimates of the damage approach \$10 million (Erickson 1990).

However, the publicity-generating activities of extremists are by no means indicative of the legitimate legislative efforts of the preponderance of animal rights organizations. Within the political mainstream, there have been a number of legislative successes by the animal rights movement. Among these have been the repeal or review of pound-seizure laws in a number of states, and the passage of restrictive amendments to the Federal Animal Welfare Act in 1985 and 1987 (Clingerman, Gleason, and Swanson 1991). Animal rights lobbyists and groups successfully opposed a bill in the 101st Congress that would have protected scientific research facilities. Thus, the scientific community has become increasingly aware of the security concerns, legislative restrictions, and publicity associated with the movement. Indeed, Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan has said that the animal rights

groups have "tried to foster a siege mentality among our scientists and at our nation's laboratories" (Kuntz 1990).

To date no large-sample scientific survey information on the most active followers of the American animal rights movement has been available. Estimates by pro-animal utilization organizations place the number of animal rights groups at 600, with combined assets of \$50-\$60 million (Kopperud 1989). PETA, the largest and most visible of the radical groups, reports a membership of approximately 350,000 and an annual budget of \$10 million (Myers 1990). The movement leaders we interviewed at the march in Washington place the number of active supporters of animal rights at approximately 8-10 million. Whatever the actual number of supporters may be, the movement is substantial and continues to grow.

Methodology

The survey instrument was eight pages in length and took approximately fifteen minutes to administer⁴. Interviewers read from pre-printed copies of the questionnaire. Respondents were given response cards for most questions and instructed to give the letter corresponding to their response for each question. Interviewers recorded all responses directly on separate copies of the questionnaire for each respondent. We initiated four hundred and twenty-six interviews; we had seven refusals, and seven of the interviews were interrupted

or terminated prior to completion (n=412, a 97% response rate).

The randomization procedure was a modified stratified systematic sampling technique developed in consultation with the Oregon State University Survey Research Center. At the edge of the rallies, our interviewers were randomly numbered, lined-up and spaced evenly. Each interviewer proceeded into the crowd the number of yards equal to their assigned number. The interviewers then selected the person closest to them. They counted three persons to the right, identified themselves, insured that each respondent had not been interviewed previously, and initiated the interview⁵.

A Demographic Profile

Previous accounts of the animal rights movement have characterized its activists as being well educated, but the extent of their education has been unknown ("What Sort of Person Reads AGENDA?" 1983). The respondents were highly educated. Seventy-nine percent had received some college or university education. Thirty-one percent did not complete their undergraduate degree while twenty-two percent had an undergraduate degree. Seven percent had some graduate education, but had not completed an advanced degree. Fully nineteen percent had an advanced graduate or professional degree, such as an M.S., Ph.D., or law degree (see Table 4). Anecdotal and ethnographic accounts of the racial composition of the movement had suggested it consisted of

white activists. This was confirmed. Ninety-three percent of respondents were white and two percent were black, while American Indians, hispanic Americans and asians each accounted for one percent. Two percent of the respondents reported their race/ethnicity as "other".

One explanation for the predominantly caucasian composition of the animal rights movement are the socio-economic differences in income, mobility, education, and time availability between the white activists and minorities. Indeed, the racial composition of the march closely mirrors the racial composition of various other social movements in this country. However, the march was held in Washington, D.C., which has a majority African-American population; likewise the Washington metro area has a large percentage of African-Americans proximate to the march location. Indeed, a significant population of middle-class African-Americans was proximate to the march. Yet very little participation by this group was revealed. Thus,

Table 4. Highest education level completed (n = 407).

<i>Education Level</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Eighth grade or less	0.98
Grades 9-11	3.93
High school graduate or general equivalency diploma	12.53
Technical or trade school beyond high school	3.69
Some community college	6.14
Two-year community college degree	6.88
Some four-year college or university	18.18
College or university degree (B.S., B.A., etc)	21.87
Some graduate school	7.13
Graduate or professional degrees (Ph.D., law, M.S., M.A., etc.)	18.67

the lack of participation of black Americans in the contemporary animal rights movement cannot be explained *solely* in terms of socio-economic factors. An alternative explanation for the lack of minority participation might be that more immediate political concerns thoroughly dominate the political agenda. As a result, issues such as animal rights fade to obscurity in minority communities. While this may indeed be the case, speculation on the lack of minority representation in the American animal rights movement is problematic due to lack of research.

Respondents had annual household incomes of between twenty and forty thousand dollars, with a mean income of \$37,400 and a median income of \$33,000 (see Table 5). Journalistic accounts have suggested that most animal rights activists are female, and this was confirmed as well (Kopperud 1989). Sixty-eight percent of those interviewed were female while thirty-two percent were male. The age of most respondents was between twenty and fifty years old with a mean age of twenty-nine. Interestingly, a large fraction of the marchers were younger. For example, over a third of our sample consisted of people under thirty years of age. (see Figure 3).

The activists frequently reported being employed in professional jobs. Forty-four percent of our sample consisted of professionals such as nurses, doctors, architects, lawyers, engineers, professors, administrators,

Table 5. Total annual household income before taxes in 1989
(n = 407).

<i>Income</i>	<i>Percentages</i>
Under \$10,000	10.07
\$10,000-\$19,999	8.85
\$20,000-\$29,999	17.94
\$30,000-\$39,999	16.46
\$40,000-\$49,999	11.79
\$50,000-\$59,999	10.57
\$60,000-\$69,999	6.39
\$70,000-\$79,999	5.65
\$80,000 or more	8.11
Don't know/no answer	4.18




Figure 3. Activist age in years ($n = 407$).

and so on. Respondents were employed in a wide variety of other occupations as well. It has been speculated that many activists do not work outside the home, but our data do not support this. Sixty-nine percent of our respondents classified their current job status as "working for pay" while fourteen percent are full-time students. Only four percent reported their job status as not working outside the home, and of this four percent, only fifteen respondents were housewives.

Our data support Jasper and Nelkin's (1992) contention that the activists are predominantly from urban areas. Sixty-six percent of the activists lived in metropolitan areas, suburbs, or cities with populations of more than fifty thousand people, while nineteen percent lived in towns of between ten thousand and fifty thousand people. Ten percent of the respondents lived in towns of less than ten thousand, while five percent didn't know or didn't answer.

Some scientists may believe that animal rights activists are acting out of ignorance, but this was not substantiated by our data. Our respondents get their information about important public issues from a variety of sources. When asked for their most important source of information about public issues, twenty-seven percent identified newspapers, twenty-two percent identified television, and nineteen percent identified magazines. Scientists may likewise believe that activists rely upon

movement magazines or direct mail distributed by the animal rights groups for their information. Our data does not support this contention. Nineteen percent of the respondents reported that magazines were their most important source of information, fifteen percent reported direct mail, and six percent reported other sources such as word-of-mouth. Over ninety percent reported routine use of more than one source. Use of more than one source of information about public affairs is unusual and indicates a high level of interest in public affairs. Compared to the general public these activists show significantly higher interest in public policy and are notably less reliant on television for political information (Ranney 1983).

Attitudinal and Behavioral Data

Central to much of the literature within the movement is a rejection of the view that humanity has dominion over the environment. In eurocentric cosmology *dominion* means that people have religious and ethical authorization to use animals for food, fiber, and as beasts of burden (White 1967). For example, the word "dominion" appears in the book of Genesis: "You shall have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the heaven, and all creatures that move on the earth" (*Genesis 1:28*). While animal rights philosophers sometimes recognize the problem such traditional approaches pose for their position, they clearly reject both religious and secular arguments that rely upon human "dominion" as

justification for animal utilization (Regan 1986; Linzey 1987; Singer 1990).

At the march we sought to measure the extent to which this rejection of human dominion has moved from the movement's opinion leaders outward to activists in general. Our survey data, reinforced by informal interviews with movement activists, indicate that rejection of human dominion over the environment is a unifying theme among the divergent animal rights groups. When asked if the main cause of animal exploitation is belief in human dominion over the environment, eighty-seven percent of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed.

During much of this century, research practices were accepted by the general public as a necessary tool of science (Bronowski 1978). Yet protests against animal-based research have intensified over the last fifteen years. Our survey measured the reaction of the activists to different levels of animal-based research. The activists were generally opposed to research that utilizes animals, regardless of the level of harm to the animal or benefit to human beings. However, not all animal rights activists are opposed to all animal experimentation. The respondents were asked a series of questions that measured their approval level regarding scientific research that incorporates animal experimentation. Fifty-six percent of the respondents either disapproved or strongly disapproved of scientific

research that uses animals but does not harm them.

Interestingly, fully twenty-six percent of the animal rights activists approved or strongly approved of such research.

This level of approval suggests that some common ground may exist between animal rights activists and scientists who utilize animals for lab research. But physiological and psychological harm seems to be the turning point for animal activists that may otherwise support animal research. Fully eighty-four percent either disapproved or strongly disapproved of animal research that causes harm to the animals. In follow-up interviews conducted after the march, those invasive procedures that appear to the activists to be responsible for causing harm to the animal are the focus point of activist opposition to biomedical research.

The research tested the hypothesis that animal rights activism is in part mobilized by highly personal experiences with pets and motivated by concern for pet-like animals. The survey sought to measure the activists' emotional attachment to pets. When asked if they approved of keeping pets at home, fully eighty-seven percent either strongly approved or approved of doing so. Nine percent of the respondents were neutral about pet ownership, while only four percent opposed or strongly opposed keeping pets at home. Likewise, responses to open-ended questioning indicated that intensely emotional experiences with pets were a significant mobilizational force in the activists'

lives. Yet these views are in direct conflict with statements of animal rights opinion leaders. Ingrid Newkirk, a prominent leader of PETA, states that pet ownership is an "absolutely abysmal situation brought about by human manipulation" (McCabe 1986). And Singer (1975), in the original introduction to *Animal Liberation*, takes pains to disclaim any sentimentality towards pets, or interest in keeping them. While this discrepancy regarding the status of pet ownership is significant, it is by no means atypical of the internal ideological inconsistencies that characterize interest groups. Among ideologically motivated groups, it is not unusual for leaders to be conceptually purist and ideologically advanced compared to supporters or even occasional activists. For example, samples of leaders of ideologically motivated groups have shown them to be less willing to compromise than their membership, and considerably more "purist" than voters who support their agenda (Wilson 1973; Lichter and Rothman 1983; Berry 1989).

We also attempted to identify the feelings of activists towards various occupations and groups by using feeling thermometers. Feeling thermometers are survey instruments that gauge respondent perceptions of phenomena by establishing a scale that allows respondents to indicate their responses by self-selecting a value on it. Our scale ranged from 0 to 100, with a 0 response indicating a very cool or negative response and 100 indicating a very warm or

positive response. Animal rights activists felt most positively towards environmentalists, with a mean score of eighty-eight and a median of ninety-seven. Activists also felt favorably disposed towards feminists, with a mean score of seventy and a median of seventy-six. Activists gave veterinarians a mean score of seventy and a median of seventy-four.

We anticipated a gradual decline in feeling thermometer scores from high to low, but found instead a dramatic drop to disfavored groups, including scientists. There simply were no middle scores. The activists felt negatively towards scientists, giving them a mean score of twenty-eight and a median score of twenty-one. Scientists ranked with politicians and businessmen as the groups that solicited the most negative responses (see Table 6).

In order to further measure the activists' perceptions of science, we utilized a survey question that the National Science Foundation (NSF) has relied upon over time to measure perceptions of science. When asked if they felt science does more "good than harm" or more "harm than good," twenty-six percent of our respondents felt that science does more good than harm. Fifty-two percent of the activists believed that science does more harm than good. These data strongly contrast with samples among the general public.

Table 6. Views concerning differing occupations and groups.

<i>Occupation/Group</i>	<i>(n)</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>
Animal rights advocates	408	92.50	99.69	14.05
Environmentalists	403	87.85	97.32	18.16
Feminists	380	69.49	75.53	26.19
Veterinarians	401	69.82	73.86	23.71
Farmers/ranchers	392	29.81	25.09	25.68
Scientists	394	28.13	21.25	26.95
Politicians	401	26.48	23.16	22.09
Businessmen	396	24.61	19.82	22.46

In polling conducted by the NSF in 1985 (and in keeping with a consistent pattern over time) fifty-eight percent of the public felt that science does more good than harm, while only five percent felt that science does more harm than good (Barke 1986).

Politically, the activists tend to be moderately liberal or liberal (see Figure 4). We also asked the marchers for their political party affiliation. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents were independents, thirty-five percent were Democrats and fourteen percent were Republicans. Interestingly, eleven percent indicated "other", which may be indicative of the levels of non-traditional political identification within the movement (Jasper and Nelkin 1992). We then further clarified party preference by asking respondents who described themselves as independents if they "lean" towards Democrats or Republicans. Thirty-three percent of those who initially described themselves as "independents" lean towards the Democratic party, eight percent lean towards the Republican party, and fifty-nine percent didn't lean towards either party (e.g. "true" independents). It should be noted that voters who describe themselves as independents and then admit that they "lean" towards one party vote for that party more often than voters who identify themselves weakly with the same party to begin with.




Figure 4. Political ideology ($n = 397$) NOTE: (1 = most conservative, 9 = most liberal).

Thus, the "independent Democrats" vote for Democratic candidates more consistently than self-reported "weak Democrats." Our data indicate that most animal rights activists are self-defined liberals with Democratic or independent affiliations and Democratic voting records.

If the animal rights debate can be described as a value-laden political confrontation over the proper relationship between animals and humans, then the political activities of the animal rights movement manifest values that are critical of a number of precepts necessary for science. Thus, the most significant potential impact of the animal rights movement on science is reflected in the high level of political activity among the activists. They are politically active and have both the time and inclination to be involved in politics and social movements. This was illustrated by their participation in the march. We asked activists if they approved or disapproved of various political activities sometimes used to advance the cause of animal rights. We then asked our respondents in which of these activities they had participated. Ninety-eight percent of the activists strongly approved or approved of contributing money to animal rights groups, and fully ninety percent of the activists had already done so. Ninety-nine percent strongly approved or approved of writing to elected representatives about animal rights, and seventy-four percent had previously contacted their elected

representatives on this subject. But perhaps the most significant level of political activity was the proportion of the activists that had campaigned for pro-animal rights candidates. Ninety-six percent of the activists strongly approved or approved of campaigning for candidates who favor animal rights, and thirty-eight percent had already done so. Compared to the general public, or even campaign contributors, this level of political activity is truly extraordinary (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). Thus, the marchers were characterized by profound commitment to the movement and to continued action within the political system. Our survey indicates that if the marchers in Washington are any indication, American animal rights activists are intense in their views, possess marked political sophistication and participate in the political process in many ways.

Conclusion: Animal Rights Activists in Context

Our data parallel those from studies of other political causes and movements which have found activists to be middle class, well educated people with strong views and a sense of obligation about expressing them (Buttel and Flinn 1974; Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Luker 1984,). Another parallel is that animal rights activists, like political activists of both the right and left, are motivated by concerns which run deeper than their surface sympathies for the political symbols around which the debate revolves. Luker (1984)

discovered in *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* that often the emotional issue in question is merely a convenient hook upon which to hang strongly felt political beliefs. We suspect that this is the case with the animal rights debate. It is true that respondents demonstrated a marked compassion for animals, and this cannot be dismissed as sentimentality. Yet their intensity suggests motives which reach beyond feelings for animals. While conversations with movement activists suggest that feelings about pets are closely associated with mobilizing most of them, it is by no means clear whether concern for animals is the motivation for the activists' continued allegiance.

We strongly suspect that there is a connection between the animal rights movement and reactions to broader issues in social and political life. In this, we find the work of Sperling (1988) and Lansbury (1985) intriguing. Sperling has illustrated the role played by animals as symbolic liaisons between people and nature, and has pointed out that in times of rapid technological change and social displacement, animal abuse (including animal research) becomes symbolic of humanity's estrangement from, and intrusion into nature (Sperling, 1988). Lansbury illuminated the importance of political symbolism in the anti-vivisection riots in Edwardian England (Lansbury, 1985). Following Sperling and Lansbury, we would expect to find

that the American animal rights movement is in part a symbolic manifestation of egalitarian political values.

In *The Rights of Nature*, Nash (1989) illustrates the evolution and progression of "rights" theory outward from its patriarchal beginnings. Nash provides a theoretical context for the emergence of animal/ecological rights; his approach implies that animal rights is the logical extension of egalitarianism to the natural world. So Nash suggests a connection between eco-liberation movements and classic American liberalism. In *The American Ethos*, McClosky and Zaller (1984) present quantitative research describing historic American public attitudes regarding capitalism and democracy. They conclude that a central core belief of American liberalism is egalitarianism. Following Sperling (1988), Lansbury (1985), Nash, McClosky and Zaller we suspect that the American animal rights movement should have currency on the left in American politics, and our data confirm that most of the respondents define their political views as being left of center⁶. Indeed, the marchers were much more prone to be self-defined liberals and Democrats than conservatives or Republicans.

Most of our respondents were very skeptical about science. They did not make distinctions between science as practiced at the Los Alamos Laboratories or General Electric and scientists trying to solve public health problems. Distinctions between big science and little science, or

weapons research versus basic biological research were little in evidence in our interviews⁷. In response to open-ended questioning at the end of the closed-end questionnaire, "scientists" were often generalized as men in white coats responsible for dreadful research on animals. Respondents also perceived scientists in much the same light as other traditional symbols of authority. As noted earlier, whereas thermometer scores for environmentalists and feminists were high, the scores were quite low for politicians, businessmen and scientists (see Table 6). These findings are consistent with animal rights, feminist, and environmental literature (Daly 1978; Gray 1981; Adams 1990). The suspicion of science among animal rights marchers was also reflected in their answers to the question "Does science do more good than harm or more harm than good?" The general public perceives science as clearly beneficial while the activists perceived science as doing more harm than good.

Until recently, scientists may have regarded the animal rights movement as a relatively minor problem. Although there are few data on scientists' perceptions of the legislative efforts of the animal rights movement, a review of the federal policy literature indicates that thus far the movement has been far more effective at raising money and publicity than it has in passing legislation to abolish animal research (Matlack 1991). Thus there may be a

propensity among scientists to dismiss the institutionalized political efficacy of the movement. However, our data indicate that animal rights activists are well-educated, middle class people who have both the time and inclination to be active in the political system. The activists we interviewed often demonstrated extraordinary levels of commitment, which could help them to maintain their efforts despite repeated frustration in the incremental legislative arena.

Animal rights is functionally connected to other movements, notably environmentalism, from which many animal rights activists draw inspiration. In a more practical sense, this connection offers the possibility of successful political alliances in both Washington and state capitols. For example, in California in 1990 animal rights and environmental groups formed a coalition on behalf of an initiative which banned mountain lion hunting and redirected some \$900 million in dedicated funding within the California state budget. They succeeded; the initiative passed in the challenging context of the California electorate⁸. Hence, American animal rights activism, when combined with evolving political sophistication, has been increasingly able to transform highly abstract debates over non-human rights into practical policy success. The scientific implications of this metamorphosis indicate that the movement has thus far been able to adapt to organizational and societal demands

without disintegrating. The resiliency and sophistication of the movement should not be lost on scientists who would dismiss the movement as transitory.

Nonetheless, our data hint that the movement may have a problem, owing to substantial differences between the top leaders of the movement and the active followers regarding pet ownership. The activists overwhelmingly approved of keeping pets, and feelings about pets appeared to be a major mobilizing factor for many of them. In contrast, the top leaders of the movement clearly regard pet ownership as morally wrong. A significant proportion of the activists also differed with their leadership by favoring noninjurious animal-based research that benefits humans. The animal rights leadership also uniformly rejects the utilization of animals for research purposes. A politically skillful leadership may be able to finesse this difference, either by altering the semantics of the issue, (as in the case of substituting "companion animal" for "pet"), by avoiding pet ownership entirely, or by adapting their visual appeals to emphasize the emotional revulsion of research on dogs and cats.

Each of the major American domestic political movements of the sixties and seventies -- civil rights, feminist, and environmental -- struggled with internal debates over the direction the movement should take. In the end, they evolved in the direction of mainstream American politics, and away

from broad, systemic critiques of western society (though those critiques certainly remain and are sometimes explicit). Our work cannot say which of these directions the animal rights movement will take, but it seems clear to us that the movement is, at the very least, similar among the activists it attracts and serious in its goals and potential.

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Notes

1. We will refer to "anecdotal and journalistic accounts" of the movement; for examples of these speculations regarding movement composition and structure see *Animals' Agenda* (1983), Kopperud (1989), Miller (1989), and McCabe (1990). Additional information regarding the attentive public and attitudes on animal protection issues is provided by the direct mail survey of subscribers of *Animals' Agenda* magazine. For further information see Richards and Krannich, *The Proceedings of the North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference*, Edmonton, Alberta, March 27, 1991.

2. For a complete listing of march organizers, including Chairpersons, Advisory Board members, Special Consultants, and the Honorary Committee for the march, see "The March for the Animals" booklet (1990) published by the National Alliance for Animal Legislation and its Educational Fund

3. Personal Communications were essential in establishing the motivations behind the march. Our thanks to all those with whom we communicated, including Peter Linck of the National Alliance for Animal Legislation, Steve Kopperud of the Animal Industry Foundation, Bill Wewer of Putting People First, Frankie Trull of the National Association for Biomedical Research.

4. We were assisted in design and construction of the survey by the Oregon State University Survey Research Center. The questionnaire was pre-tested and revised among students of OSU. We wish to thank Pam Bodenroder, Helen Berg, and the pre-test participants for their input and suggestions. We bear sole responsibility for the research contained here-in. We referred to Dillman (1978) for guidance in question construction and placement.

5. Twenty-one interviewers were recruited from Washington DC area graduate schools and from a Washington DC public-opinion research firm. Most of the interviewers had previous survey experience. Nonetheless, all interviewers received pre-march training. In post-survey discussions with OSU SRC statisticians the crowd dynamics were of particular interest. The rally was fluid, moving in what could best be described as a type of sociological "Brownian Motion". It is felt that this crowd fluidity aided in the randomization of respondents. A videotape we made of the march provides indirect evidence of successful randomization.

6. An emerging body of evidence indicates that this indeed may be the case. For descriptions of the political ideologies of animal rights activists, see Sperling (1988). Also see J. Jasper, and J. Poulsen. "Animal Rights and anti-nuclear protest: Condensing symbols and the critique of instrumental reason." Paper presented at the annual

meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco. (August 1989).

7. One might expect to find a continuum of perspectives ranging from radical to moderate on pressing medical research involving animal subjects. Yet mass movement dynamics can act to suppress moderate views, particularly in public demonstrations. For example, even prominent public figures that were supportive of the animal rights movement received a cool reception if they suggested moderation in relations with organized science. The well-known actor Christopher Reeves appeared at the march; when he supported the utility of animal research concerning AIDS, he was resoundingly booed by the marchers (we were there at the time of this incident; see also Jasper and Nelkin, (1992).

8. See our paper, "The Lab Rat That Roared: The Mountain Lion Initiative in California and the Animal Rights Movement in the Nation," 1992, presented at the 1992 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association in San Francisco (20 March). The paper discusses the political sophistication of the coalition, as well as the redirection of funds away from medical research that was to have been funded by a tobacco tax.

CHAPTER IV

BORN TO BE WILD: THE CALIFORNIA MOUNTAIN LION INITIATIVE AND NON-DOMESTICATED ANIMAL RIGHTS

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Introduction

During the summer of 1990, voters in California approved an initiative to prohibit the hunting of mountain lions. It passed by a margin of fifty-two percent to forty-eight percent. The California Wildlife Protection Act of 1990 (hereafter referred to as Initiative #117) and the steps that led to its passage provide lessons for students of direct democracy, the politics of science, interest groups, and bureaucracy. Perhaps most significantly, the initiative illustrates the potential effects of the animal rights movement on natural resource policy. Indeed, Initiative #117 provides a model with which natural resource managers can examine and predict potential conflicts over non-domesticated animal management policies.

The chronology presented in this manuscript was based upon interviews conducted in Sacramento, Davis, and Berkeley, California in October of 1991. Our informants and their affiliations are listed in Table 7. Unless cited in the text, use of a name refers to information given during an interview.

Table 7. List of informants used to analyze the California Wildlife Protection Act of 1990 and their institutional affiliation.

<i>Informant</i>	<i>Affiliation</i>
Professor Ned Buyukmichi	UC-Davis
Ms. Elizabeth Capell	California Nurses Association
Professor Ed Costantini	UC-Davis
Mr. Terry Davies	California Forest Industry Council
Mr. Kevin Hansen	Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation
Mr. Tim Howe	California Assembly Staff
Mr. Brian Judy	National Rifle Association
Mr. Terry Mansfield	California Department of Fish and Game
Ms. Sheila Massey	California Cattlemen's Association
Mr. Jerry Meral	California Planning and Conservation League
Ms. Sharon Negri	Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation
Mr. Mark Palmer	Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation
Professor Jeffrey Wandesforth-Smith	UC-Davis

Context

Some observers of political and cultural trends may have been tempted to dismiss the animal rights movement as an epiphenomenon, appealing only to a narrow segment in American political life (May 1990). Nevertheless, Rowan (1993) argues that the status of individual non-human animals in contemporary culture has become a visible and contentious area of public policy, and survey results suggest that Americans have become increasingly sensitized to the treatment of domesticated animals in the production of food and fiber, entertainment, and as research subjects (Balzar 1993). Indeed, the contemporary animal rights movement questions the treatment of most domesticated animals (Hargrove 1992)

Paradoxically, since Leopold published *A Sand County Almanac* in 1949, perceptions of non-domesticated animals in the United States have regarded individual animals as members of a species within an ecosystem. Hence, policies concerning non-domesticated animals have focused upon the control and maintenance of specific species along with interactions between those species and their ecosystem (Nash 1989). However, the modern animal rights movement challenges all facets of human/non-human animal relationships, including non-domesticated animal management policies. As a result, the movement to extend moral

consideration and legal protection to animals now affects non-domesticated animals.

Natural resource managers are often faced with policy choices involving the control of animals, and their decisions involve both lethal and non-lethal methods. Managers who traditionally have viewed animals as members of an ecosystem find that the animal rights movement asks them to approach animal control from the perspective of individual animals. This incongruence between the traditional and new interpretations of the place of animals in the biosphere creates tension. More importantly, intervention by animal rights groups in natural resource policy prompts several questions. How should individual animals be viewed within vignettes of natural systems? If conflict arises between the animals' interests ,e.g. exotic or feral species, and the functioning of the ecosystem, how should the natural resource manager respond? The California Mountain Lion Initiative provides clues.

The success of Initiative #117 demonstrates that animal rights activists, when allied with environmentalists, can affect substantial policy change even within the challenging context of a large and diverse electorate. The initiative was passed despite the opposition of resource-extractive interest groups and their bureaucratic allies, e.g. gun groups, sportsmen, farmers, the California Department of Fish & Game. This victory was significant in that gun

groups traditionally have been viewed as the most effective of the single-issue groups, particularly in the West. This manuscript examines the chronology of Initiative #117 and relates these findings to the broader question of non-domesticated animal rights. It examines the political implications of the initiative, concluding with a discussion of the future potential for animal rights/environmental coalitions and suggestions concerning possible actions by resource managers in response to animal rights.

Narrative Chronology

All political initiatives have a history (Cronin 1989). Consequently, Initiative #117 was characterized by a considerable amount of political activity well before its passage; it was the culmination of a series of political activities by animal rights and environmental groups over a period going back to at least 1985, and arguably much earlier.

In 1907, the state of California established a bounty to encourage eradication of mountain lions, then seen as a threat to both farm animals and human beings. Bountied hunting of the lions continued until 1963, successfully reducing their numbers. The bounty program was then ended due to fears that the number of lions might have been reduced to what was described as "threatened" status. In 1969, the mountain lion was reclassified as a "big game animal" by the California Department of Fish and Game

(hereafter CDFG). That status allowed hunters to compete in a lottery for the opportunity to receive a "tag" that would allow them to hunt mountain lions. Over a two year period from 1970-1972, about five thousand mountain lion tags were issued, but only one hundred and eighteen of the animals were killed. Once the mountain lion had been established as a big game animal, the CDFG expended funds from hunting licenses and tags for research. Studies on the number and habits of the mountain lion were initiated, and game surveys were conducted in Monterey County, the Big Sur area on the Northern California coast, and in the Sierra Nevada mountains. However, while the research was being conducted, a moratorium on lion hunting was established. In 1972, limited anecdotal evidence suggested that the mountain lions were probably threatened and perhaps endangered. Hence, the moratorium was proposed as an ecological safeguard until representative data could be gathered. The moratorium was extended four times until the mid-1980's. In 1985, a bill banning mountain lion hunting passed the California state legislature, but was vetoed by Governor George Deukmejian (R). Deukmejian was a conservative with strong ties to gun and hunting groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA).

However, by 1985, a number of environmental and animal rights groups had joined in a coalition to lobby for protection of the mountain lion. The "Mountain Lion

Coalition" had lobbied the hunting ban through the legislature. But when the bill was vetoed, those most concerned about the issue, particularly the coalition's lobbyist and its leading activist, concluded that they needed a more focused organization. Therefore, the principals in the coalition founded the Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation (hereafter MLPF) in 1986.

The Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation, which later became the "Mountain Lion Foundation," was an explicit animal rights organization which sought to end the hunting of mountain lions on moral grounds (Mansfield and Weaver 1989). The MLPF followed the example of other interest groups by gathering primary financial support from direct-mail fund appeals and secondary support from foundations (Berry 1989).

Meanwhile, with the end of the moratorium on hunting, the CDFG proposed returning to the pre-1972 lottery system for distributing hunting permits. CDFG biologists contended that the biological evidence, which was subjected to peer review, indicated that lion populations was sufficient to allow hunting. The MLPF claimed that the evidence of recovery in the lion population was insufficient to justify renewed hunting. Although the relative quality of these claims was disputed by both the CDFG and MLPF, it was clear that the scientific data was largely irrelevant to the leaders of the initiative campaign. This was not a

scientific controversy, but a political one (Hansen 1990; Mansfield and Weaver 1989). As soon as the CDFG moved to re-establish the lottery for hunting tags, the department was challenged in court by the MLPF. As is typical in circumstances where bureaucracies attempt to mandate disputed policies (Clarke and McCool 1985; Wildavsky 1988), scrutiny by MLPF lawyers uncovered initial procedural errors in the CDFG rationale (Hansen 1990). By repeated legal challenges, the MLPF was able to forestall actual issuance of hunting tags.

By 1988, it had become clear to leaders of the MLPF that the legal strategy preventing a reopening of the hunt would not succeed indefinitely. According to Mansfield, the state's attorneys were correcting the procedural errors cited by the courts. In time, under the existing law, mountain lions would be hunted again. The votes might have been present in the 1988 legislature to pass another bill to ban the hunt, but Deukmejian would clearly veto it. Indeed, the institutionalized system of checks and balances, e.g. the executive veto of adversarial legislation, was having its intended effect: thwarting sudden policy shifts.

Organizationally, the MLPF had become stronger, having acquired more than thirty thousand contributors from 1985 to 1988. During this 3-year period, the visibility of the controversy was increased by a MLPF media campaign. Through direct mailings as well as publicity events designed to

capture weekend soft news coverage, the MLPF popularized the mountain lion issue outside of the traditional natural resource policy sub-government. Raising the visibility of the issue worked. According to a subsequent Field poll, opposition to mountain lion hunting evidently struck an emotional chord among many Californians.

More importantly, as part of these preliminary attempts to sensitize the California electorate to mountain lion hunting, the MLPF had circulated advisory petitions throughout the state for presentation to officials in Sacramento. Although those petitions had no legal standing, they had been invested with great significance by the activists who had circulated them. The advisory petitions also allowed animal rights leaders to gauge differing initiative wordings and formats, thus determining which style was most appealing. And, as MLPF founder and leader Sharon Negri put it, the experience "blooded the faithful" as they collected signatures at shopping centers, sports events, door to door, and so forth. In effect, the advisory petition campaign had eased the MLPF's activists into concrete political activism. While not entirely by conscious design, the MLPF nonetheless had mobilized and trained a force of hundreds of motivated volunteer petition circulators and political activists.

These factors encouraged MLPF leaders to pursue the initiative approach. The ability of the MLPF to mobilize

petition drives also attracted the attention of environmental groups, which viewed these drives as evidence of the animal rights movements' political abilities. Nevertheless, the MLPF had serious misgivings. First, undertaking an initiative would require a high-visibility publicity campaign. This would place the issue under public, and therefore political scrutiny. While the issue's public prominence would increase, there would be a danger of discovering an unacceptable political reality, i.e. what if, upon publicizing the plight of the mountain lion, the preliminary polling was wrong and nobody cared? It would appear that preserving the mountain lion lacked public support. As Negri put it, "We could have lost the issue forever."

Second, initiatives have not easily qualified for the California ballot. In 1990, a California statutory initiative required more than 430,000 qualified signatures simply to reach the ballot. Alternatively, California also allows groups or individuals to circulate petitions which would result in amendment of the state constitution if successful (Owens et al. 1970). But in either the case of initiatives or amendments, the size of the California electorate mandates extremely large petition signature totals. As a practical matter, the MLPF understood that many of the collected signatures would be disqualified. It is routine for many non-voters to sign petitions, but since

they are not registered their signatures do not qualify (Cronin 1989; Mapes 1994a). As a result of this signature inflation, more than 650,000 gross signatures were needed in order to reach the necessary net of qualified voters.

The MLPF's third doubt involved fear of its opponents. If an initiative could be qualified, the MLPF and its allies would have to confront powerful opponents in the election. Most notably, an initiative to ban any form of hunting was expected to draw the attention of the NRA and other gun groups, which are noted for their fund raising ability, intensity, and legislative prowess. The initiative would likewise attract the attention of other natural resource constituencies that were effected by the initiative. These included hunting enthusiasts, farmers, and timber groups.

Despite these misgivings, the MLPF recognized the it possessed certain advantages. One factor that weighed heavily in favor of pressing the initiative was that the MLPF, like other animal rights groups, had a cadre of intense supporters who were willing to work in canvassing and campaigning. The dry-run petition drives had also trained the MLPF's political activists.

One additional consideration provided the final impetus to go forward with the initiative. Following the 1988 elections, a statewide poll was conducted privately to determine the level of potential support for a ban on mountain lion hunting. The results were overwhelmingly

positive, even stronger than the MLPF leaders had expected. MLPF leaders reported that the preliminary polling showed some eighty percent of the California public would support a hunting ban. The critical survey question asked respondents how they would vote on a proposition to "prohibit (or allow) hunting of mountain lions." Eighty-one percent favored a measure to prevent hunting, sixteen percent were opposed, and three percent were not sure. This extraordinary level of support was later confirmed by a public poll conducted in 1988 by Mervin Field.

Nonetheless, despite the MLPF's political advantages and supportive polling data, intense activist support and interest group organization are not guarantors of success (Cronin 1989). Political skill at framing issues and manipulating symbols is a critical but often under-appreciated factor in political success. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan both enjoyed widespread public approval. Yet, public approval does not by itself translate into political success. Both Roosevelt and Reagan were skillful at manipulation of national symbols to serve their ambitious, yet differing, agendas (Smith 1987).

As for the MLPF, it possessed both the skill and the will to influence cougar policy. Sharon Negri was credited by both her allies and opponents with enormous energy and ability. More than anyone else, Negri was responsible for the creation of the MLPF, its growth and eventual success.

And Negri's ties to previous environmental campaigns provided her with useful experience in symbolic politics.

With a cadre of well-trained, intense activists and the political skill to increase their chances of success, the MLPF held an organizational meeting in early 1989 to decide whether or not to bring the initiative. The MLPF was fortunate to enlist the help of Bill Yates, who was a seasoned lobbyist and attorney. Though he was less visible to the public than Negri, Yates brought knowledge of the "inside game" in politics which was very important to the organization (*California Cougar News* 1991).

To use James Q. Wilson's term, Negri and Yates were "political entrepreneurs" with formidable political skills. Wilson outlines a theory in which entrepreneurial politics can sometimes overcome the inertia, caution, and frustrating incrementalism that normally characterize the American political system (Wilson 1973; Wilson 1992). Such entrepreneurial skill became evident as Negri and Yates built a political organization to propel the initiative. They recruited Jerry Meral, a renowned political organizer, who had a reputation for masterful orchestration of environmental initiatives. Indeed, the chief lobbyist for the NRA referred to Meral as "Mr. Initiatives-R-Us." Closer examination of this pejorative pseudonym reveals the underlying assumption held by both opponents and proponents that Meral was unusually skilled in his ability to use

direct democracy as a tool of change. He had managed a number of successful environmental initiative campaigns in California and therefore had a practical knowledge of manipulating natural resource policy.

By early 1989, campaign organizers believed that an initiative to protect mountain lions could succeed. At the organizational meeting, the MLPF was joined by a member of the California state legislature, Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly. Connelly, a liberal Democrat, represented the Sacramento district. Though he was a legislator, Connelly was by nature an outsider who had often turned to initiatives to pursue his specific policy goals.

Another of the myriad skills needed for a successful initiative-driven agenda is proficiency in interpreting polling results (Cronin 1989). The critical talent is neither generating a random sample nor in drafting good questions. The most exacting and difficult skill is in interpretation of the data. Indeed, seeing through a month's numbers to the implications for the next month or next year is considered to be essential in interpretation of results (Dillman 1978). Connelly had earned a reputation for rare interpretive ability with survey data. According to participants in the meeting, Connelly reviewed the polling data and urged them to "grab the brass ring" of political opportunity. Connelly believed that the MLPF would lose the issue if action was not taken. To the leadership of the

MLPF, the political maxim *carpe diem* - "seize the day!" - rang true. The decision was made to go forward.

Having decided to press ahead, the MLPF and its allies faced a serious financial shortfall. According to the California Secretary of State's office, initiatives in California at that time normally "cost" more than a million dollars simply to qualify for the ballot. And yet, the financial constraints on direct democracy in California are typical of what faces initiative campaigns. The prohibitive costs associated with gathering signatures and publicizing the issue usually means that sponsors of successful initiatives tend to be well-financed, economic interest groups that can afford the cost of hiring pollsters, initiative managers, organizers, petition circulators, and media consultants (Cronin 1989). Critics of direct democracy argue that initiatives favor economic interests who can out spend their ideological or moralistic opponents (Berry 1989). In other words, in politics, "Power follows money, and money follows power!"

This critique of the autocratic power of money in politics is not new. In response to the perception of elitist manipulation and control of American politics during the late nineteenth century, political Progressives early in the 20th century introduced initiatives, referenda and other direct democracy measures. These were intended to reinforce democratic institutions (Wilcox 1912; Cronin 1989).

Contrary to their populist intentions of allowing "everyman" to access politics, most signatures for such measures are now collected by paid petition circulators (Mapes 1994b). They are generally paid between twenty-five cents to a dollar for each signature collected (Cronin 1989; Mapes 1994b). Consequently, most interest groups that can afford to put an initiative on the ballot represent well-connected and relatively affluent segments of society (Mapes 1994a).

The proponents of the mountain lion initiative confronted this political reality. The MLPF, though stable and institutionalized compared to many local animal rights groups, did not have the money to take the standard approach. Nonetheless, in the face of financial shortfalls, Meral devised a creative solution. As he had done in conjunction with efforts to assemble support for and qualify initiatives in prior years, Meral offered to sell provisions in the prospective initiative to environmental groups which were likely to be sympathetic. Specifically, he offered to write provisions into the initiative directing future funding for broadly defined "habitat protection." In return, the environmental groups made campaign financial commitments. Meral had used a similar technique in 1988, when an initiative that increased tobacco taxes by twenty-five cents per pack of cigarettes was similarly parcelled out in the early stages of the campaign. In that instance, health advocacy groups were the focus. Nonetheless,

environmental groups were involved as well, and thus had experience with buying provisions within initiatives.

Therefore, the MLPF offered various environmental groups pieces of the dedicated funding included in the draft initiative. As presented to the public and to MLPF activists as well, the initiative intended to stop hunting of mountain lions. But most political insiders perceived that the salient features of the initiative were contained in redirection of funds in the state budget. The initiative specified that thirty million dollars per year for thirty years be dedicated to wildlife habitat preservation and acquisition. The money was redirected from other uses, e.g. approximately 15 million dollars in un-allocated funds from the new tobacco tax that the 1988 initiative created. Additional funds from bonds, personalized license plates, a wildlife restoration fund, and a number of other sources were designated as available to reach the thirty million dollar target. Most notably, funds that could benefit the CDFG were redirected from the agency toward the initiative. These rededicated funds were expected to be sufficient, but the initiative allowed the legislature to supplement them with general fund appropriations if desired.

The language of the initiative went further than specifying rededicated funding and legislative punishment of the MLPF's bureaucratic opponent, the CDFG. It specified the levels of funding which predetermined state agencies and

state "conservancies" would receive. These conservancies, e.g. quasi-governmental agencies created to preserve environmentally sensitive lands for the public, were and are closely tied to regional environmental groups and serve as *de facto* environmental organizations. Hence, it was possible for the sponsors of the initiative to appeal to environmentalists for campaign funding on a *quid pro quo* basis. For example, as specified by Section 2787-3c, the Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy was reserved five million dollars per year in the initiative, reflecting support for the initiative from Southern California environmental groups.

The parceling out of initiative provisions in exchange for support was obviously attractive to both the MLPF and various groups concerned with natural resources. Nevertheless, the initiative sponsors either turned down or overlooked some potential provisions during the drafting period because supporters could not or would not provide appropriate funding. Perhaps the best example of this type of exclusion came when animal rights advocates for the California Bighorn Sheep, a threatened species, asked that a hunting ban on that species also be included in the initiative. The sponsors of the initiative knew that intense opposition by hunting groups could be fatal to their chances, so the price of adding the Bighorn Sheep to the initiative ban was set at half a million dollars. Activists

who wanted the sheep included under the protection of the initiative were either unwilling or unable to offer that amount, and the sheep was not included. Yet, even if the money had been available, MLPF leaders might well have refused to include the sheep for fear of confusing the issue. Nonetheless, a number of bargains were struck during the period when the initiative's provisions were being crafted.

Among sponsors of the Mountain Lion Initiative, this procedure was defended as offering a mechanism for poorly funded groups, whose primary motivation was altruism, to get their ideas on the ballot in the face of well-financed, business-oriented opposition. In effect, animal rights activists claimed that *quid pro quo* allocation of initiative provisions adhered to the spirit of Progressive era reforms. Negri argued that marginal interest groups could not gain legislative policy access, and hence challenge extant policy consensus without creative flexibility. Hence, she argued that marginal groups should be allowed every available mechanism to place their ideas before the broader electorate.

The MLPF's efforts notwithstanding, it is inaccurate to portray manipulation of the initiative process as a liberal phenomena. Other examples of creative flexibility in funding initiatives have been provided by conservative groups that also lacked the requisite funds to pay for

signatures. Conservatives have frequently used direct-mail efforts which combine short petitions containing only a few spaces for signatures with fund-raising appeals (Lunch 1987). The supporters of the Mountain Lion Initiative mimicked this conservative device, combining direct-mail fund raising with enclosed petitions sent to committed activists. However, they found that among ordinary contributors, the direct-mail approach hurt either fund-raising or signature collection. Therefore, this approach was abandoned as a major vehicle in the campaign.

The success of the marketing technique used to finance the Mountain Lion Initiative did not go unnoticed elsewhere among political influentials. Conservatives were outraged at the technique of *quid pro quo* political financing of legislation, and moderates were troubled by its implications. The reaction was so fierce that one year after the success of Initiative #117, a bill to ban trading of initiative provisions for campaign financing was signed into law by Governor Pete Wilson (R) (Walters 1991).

At least one additional aspect of the initiative reflected the political sophistication of its sponsors. By 1989 the CDFG and the MLPF had become adversaries because of their dispute over sustained management versus preservation of mountain lions. The institutional connections between the CDFG and hunting groups were particularly obnoxious to the leaders of the MLPF. The CDFG was historically linked in a

consensual policy sub-government to resource-extractive constituencies, e.g. hunters and fishermen, whose licenses and tags funded the CDFG and whose political support protected the CDFG from opponents. The MLPF's animal rights ideology placed it squarely in opposition to resource-extractive groups like hunters. Hence, the MLPF not only sought to preserve mountain lions, but also attack an agency (CDFG) that it viewed as a policy opponent. One reason for the fund re-dedication in the initiative was to punish CDFG by removing its authority over a number of funds. Control over those funds was vested in the hands of competing agencies like the state Department of Parks and Recreation which were much more sympathetic to the views of the MLPF. Indeed, if the Mountain Lion Initiative eventually passed, MLPF leaders intended to "reform" the CDFG. This meant breaking the links between the agency and its traditional resource-extractive constituencies by changing the complexion of the Governor-appointed California State Board of Fish and Wildlife.

Once the initiative had been drafted, petitions had to be circulated to get the signatures needed to place it on the ballot. The Mountain Lion Initiative was highly unusual and perhaps unique in contemporary political experience because the organizers did not employ paid petition circulators (Mapes 1994b). This alone indicated the uncommon intensity of animal rights activists. While the

MLPF did hire eleven organizers who coordinated the work of the signature circulators, it did not pay for signatures. Since the number of signatures needed was counted in the hundreds of thousands, the MLPF relied upon the unique intensity of animal rights activists working as petition circulators. Most of them had gained experience with signature collection during the earlier advisory petition phase. Their commitment to the effort was extraordinary. Some left their jobs for three months during the summer in 1989 in order to circulate petitions full-time. In this spirit, Sharon Negri commented, "There's no people like animal rights people."

The organizers concentrated their efforts in urban areas of the state where they had been particularly successful gathering signatures during the advisory phase. Even at this early stage, the initiative organizers had the advantage of endorsements and support from a variety of show business celebrities, many of whom had become prominent in California politics. The support of celebrities has become an integral part of publicity generation among purposive interest groups. For example, at the "March for the Animals" in Washington, D.C. in 1990, Christopher Reeves was one of those chosen to address the marchers and the media because of popular appeal (Kotkin and Grabowicz 1979; Jasper and Nelkin 1992). The MLPF used similar spokespeople to gain media attention.

Due to hundreds of highly committed petition circulators, an astute publicity campaign, and public sympathy, the Mountain Lion Initiative qualified for the ballot in record time. Using Cronin's (1989) general estimates of cost per signature in initiative campaigns, the MLPF's volunteer signature gatherers saved approximately three hundred thousand dollars. These savings in turn allowed the MLPF to concentrate funds in the campaign.

Yet, the qualification of Initiative #117 was only one part of a simultaneous, and largely unpublicized, strategy. The campaign on behalf of the initiative had, in a sense, begun before the first petitions were printed. Meral, the campaign manager and organizer, self-consciously broke one of the informal rules among political insiders by showing private polling results to the opposition. His intention was to disarm potential opponents and to persuade them that opposing the initiative would be futile. Meral particularly wanted to avoid acute opposition from hunting groups. Of course, he expected that they would formally oppose the measure, but there is a salient difference between pro-forma opposition and an active campaign.

The opponents, including gun groups, the California Farm Bureau, and many natural resource industry groups were slow to actively oppose Initiative #117. In part, this was due to their perception that the measure probably would pass. The MLPF's disclosure of the strong early poll

support for the measure appears to have had at least some of the desired effect. More importantly, the MLPF's opponents had more pressing concerns. In June, 1990, there were a number of initiatives on the California ballot. Two of them concerned the sensitive issue of district reapportionment. The National Rifle Association and other gun groups felt that their interests would be most adversely affected if Democrats continued their dominance of the California state legislature and congressional delegation. As a result, the NRA directed most of its energy into the initiatives intended to change the state's redistricting process, thus diluting its opposition to Initiative #117.

Meral, Negri and Yates clearly identified the NRA as their most fearsome opponent. Yet, to their surprise, the NRA's storied intensity was never became focused upon Initiative #117. Another factor which may have reduced the vigor with which the NRA opposed the initiative was that the organization had just suffered a major defeat when the California state legislature approved a ban on assault-style weapons. A lone gunman in Stockton, California, had used an assault rifle to attack elementary school children in their playground during the spring of 1989. Five children died and dozens were wounded. The resulting public outrage overwhelmed even the NRA and its allies. The organization lost some members and contributions when it defended assault weapons. More importantly, the NRA lost some of the elan

and aggressiveness in politics for which it has become well known (Gross 1989).

Beyond the NRA's problems, the opponents of Initiative #117 confronted the necessity of developing persuasive arguments against the initiative. After all, they would be opposing measures to protect a charismatic megafauna. This effort had to be coordinated among the numerous "No on #117" groups. In addition to the gun groups, agricultural organizations including the California Farm Bureau, the Grange, the California Cattlemen's Association, and the California Timber Association, and a number of others were prominent in opposition. For farmers, of course, mountain lions constituted at least a potential threat to livestock. Their concerns were not alleviated by what they perceived to be lax provisions in the initiative to allow hunting lions in cases of livestock depredation. In their opinion, these provisions were overly restrictive and would *de facto* ban taking the mountain lions in all but extreme circumstances. For timber interests, the vague definition of "habitat" was too broadly defined, and represented a mechanism through which timber opponents, viz. environmentalists, could use state funds to purchase and thus preserve prime timber land.

The "No on #117" campaign began as a cacophony of strategies. Initially, farm and natural resource groups publicly emphasized the risk from lions to their livestock, but privately, group leaders and representatives wanted to

focus on the wildlife habitat acquisition contemplated by the initiative. They worried that such acquisition would reduce the land available for their use. A number of themes might have been emphasized, but the opposition groups eventually decided to stress the potential for redirection of funds away from medical care.

This tactic came as something of a surprise to the sponsors of the initiative, who had feared that a case in which a mountain lion had mauled a child in Orange County, California would be seized upon by the opposition to stir up public angst against the lion (Seidensticker and Lumpkin 1992). Although surprising to the MLPF, the "No on #117" de-emphasis of the potential threat to humans posed by mountain lions was based more upon research than upon political intuition or social altruism. Only fifty-three documented attacks had occurred in North America between 1890 and 1990 (Dutcher 1992). In addition, focus group research and early polling indicated to opponents that their best chance to defeat the initiative was by reframing the issue, hence de-emphasizing the lions *per se*.

Having qualified the initiative, the MLPF was bolstered by positive tracking results. Their early polling during the active campaign indicated an impending victory. Nonetheless, the MLPF's excitement was tempered by political reality. It is routine that initiatives, including initiatives that propose radical policy changes, are

substantially ahead in the polls at the outset of public debate (Cronin 1989). The ideas advanced by sponsors are relatively isolated from potential attacks by opponents, and therefore sound unusually appealing. In effect, prior to organized attack, the proponents have *carte blanche* to frame the issue before the public, and do their best to present their "low-cost, high-benefit" agenda. In addition, the electorate usually does not focus on ballot measures until shortly before the election. Hence, many initiatives enjoy large leads in the polls just a few weeks before they are defeated. Yet, most initiatives fail and the failure rate for those that are actively opposed is very high.

Support for a strongly opposed initiative usually experiences significant erosion. Opposing interest groups counter the biased information forwarded by initiative sponsors by presenting their own biased version of the "high-cost, low-benefit," initiative. The public debate is thus framed by opposing viewpoints, opposing interpretations of facts, and opposing perspectives of right and wrong policy. In this way, the electorate is theoretically exposed to the various sides of the debate and is thus more capable to decide. But, gathering opposition to initiatives has another effect: Initiatives that seemed unbeatable even a month before election day regularly fail. Initiative #117 largely followed this pattern. The campaign against the initiative reduced support from more than three-quarters of

those polled to a fifty-two percent margin of victory on election day.

The initiative might well have lost had its opponents focused on it earlier or devoted more resources to the campaign against it. Both the opponents and supporters of Initiative #117 agreed that the "No on 117" campaign was not as well organized or focused as it could have been. Meral was very direct in his assessment of the opposition: "If the NRA had really wanted to defeat us, they could have."

Distractions caused by the reapportionment initiatives and assault rifle ban were one reason opponents were not as active as they could have been. But perception played a vital role as well. The perception among both opponents and supporters that Initiative #117 was going to pass made it more difficult for opponents to raise money and gather commitments against it. Nonetheless, the opponents assembled a long list of organizations opposed to the initiative and out-spent the #117's supporters. Finally, however, given the narrow margin by which Initiative #117 passed, both sides agreed that the superior commitment, intense enthusiasm, and initial political skill of the proponents was decisive. Yet, whether for reasons of opponent ineptitude, supporter sophistication, or some combination of both, the initiative passed.

Analysis of the vote shows that it followed an urban-rural split, passing in the most urbanized California

counties and failing in rural counties. For example, even in politically conservative Orange County (the suburbs just south of Los Angeles), the initiative passed with fifty-three percent of the vote. It received large margins of victory in traditionally liberal urban Democratic counties, such as San Francisco (sixty-eight percent) and Alameda (fifty-eight percent) in northern California. But it failed in agricultural counties, even in traditionally Democratic counties, such as Placer (fifty-seven percent against) and Fresno (fifty-nine percent against). Not surprisingly, those counties, such as Tehama, in which mountain lions were most likely to have large populations, voted against the initiative (see Table 8).

Table 8. Voting pattern of The California Wildlife Protection Act of 1990 by selected region and county.

Region and County	Yes%	No%	Total Vote Cast
<i>Northern Urban</i>			
Alameda	58	42	227,500
San Francisco	68	32	134,000
<i>Central Agricultural</i>			
Fresno	41	59	88,600
Placer	43	57	41,000
<i>Southern Urban</i>			
Los Angeles	60	40	1,053,300
Orange	53	47	373,500
<i>Northern Rural</i>			
Tehama	23	77	12,500
Shasta	26	74	36,500

Political Coalitions and Conflicts Between Animal Rights Groups and Environmental Groups

As suggested in the narrative chronology, the coalition between California animal rightists and environmentalists was critical to the success of the initiative. Animal rights groups had tried to directly influence policies before. The state of Massachusetts provides evidence of the failure of other animal rights sponsored initiatives prior to Initiative #117. Massachusetts voters have traditionally been identified as liberals and thus receptive to government regulation of private enterprise. Thus, in 1988 when animal rights advocates tried to enact restrictions on the treatment of farm animals through an initiative, opponents initially gave the initiative a better than fifty percent chance of passing (Wewer 1993). However, even in liberal Massachusetts, the voters rejected this explicit animal rights measure 79-21 (Shurland 1990).

The MLPF leadership in Sacramento was aware of the failure of unalloyed animal rights ballot measures elsewhere. They often commented that the alliance with environmentalists, which had been cemented by the *quid pro quo* money for "habitat", was critical to the success of the Mountain Lion Initiative. In part, the alliance engaged politically savvy active and influential members of the environmental movement. The inclusion of environmentalists also made it possible for the initiative sponsors to appeal to a wider constituency than the animal rightists could have

reached on their own. Viewed from this perspective, it may seem that animal rights advocates used their environmental allies to further non-domesticated animal rights.

However, California environmental scholar Jeffrey Wandesford-Smith asked pointedly, "Who was using whom?" He noted that mountain lions had not been hunted in California for many years and even though a resumption of the hunt was possible, it was unlikely given the political climate. What then, was the point of the initiative? In the view of many environmentalists Initiative #117 opponents, the main objective of the initiative was re-direction of funds in the state budget. Analysis of spending patterns stemming from the initiative lends credence to their argument. While to date the rededicated money provided by the initiative has gone for "habitat" acquisition, some of this has not been lion habitat.

An interesting phenomenon in interest group politics is that natural resource policies are inevitably vague, requiring the input of affected interest groups to aid bureaucratic interpretation and implementation of the legislation (Clarke and McCool 1985). In effect, interest groups provide expertise to bureaucrats who are mandated to regulate natural resources (Berry 1989). In Initiative #117, MLPF sponsors deliberately wrote the provisions regarding habitat using vague and ill-defined language. In so doing, they knew that *de facto* environmental

institutions, e.g. conservancies, which were specified to receive funding in the initiative would also be given latitude to define habitat. A review of the first year's spending reveals, among other things, purchase of four acres of "aquatic habitat" at a cost of \$700,000 and \$6,700,000 spent to purchase eleven acres in urbanized areas of Southern California. Southern California environmental groups and groups interested in the preservation of the California coast contributed to the effort to qualify the initiative for the ballot and the later campaigned on behalf of Initiative #117. The CDFG contended that such acreage was not mountain lion habitat. Indeed, this type of sweeping land acquisition was characteristic of the use of redirected funds for nebulous habitat purchase. The first report on habitat acquisition spoke broadly of "protection of natural areas, parks and wildlife habitat" (*California Cougar News* 1991). Taken from the perspective of the number of lions saved versus the amount of land preserved, environmentalists used the energy, enthusiasm and intensity of animal rights activists to circulate petitions for an initiative, the main thrust of which was to dedicate funds for environmental purposes.

The question of who was using whom revealed a larger point about the coalition in support of the Mountain Lion Initiative. Animal rightists and environmentalists were both happy to have the support of the other, but both sides

viewed the other with qualms. While the coalition in support of Initiative #117 was successful, that success did not necessarily indicate that the animal rights movement and agenda had yet been fully integrated into the broader environmental movement. Despite issue-specific cooperation, differences remain. Regardless of the wishful thinking of activists who advocate a marriage of animal rights and environmentalism (Grunewald-Rifkin 1992; Pachelles 1993), Initiative #117 indicated that the two movements are not natural allies.

The major problem from the perspective of politically experienced environmentalists was that the animal rights movement often seeks goals that are not realistic. For example, the MLPF's leadership understood that an outright ban on hunting would have been popular among the activists who circulated petitions for the Mountain Lion Initiative. The MLPF leadership had very real reasons for concern. In a membership survey, the MLPF found that twenty-two percent of its members had been motivated to join out of a desire to ban all hunting. Indeed, Sharon Negri stated that animal rights activists are "true believers," who sought the extension of rights to all animals, and she believed that the extraordinary depth of activist commitment could have qualified a hunting ban on the ballot. Nevertheless, during the campaign for Initiative #117, politically sophisticated

animal rights activists recognized that an outright ban on hunting would be voted down widely in California.

In part because of the intensity of many animal rights activists, a number of environmental leaders and activists expressed concern that their movement could be identified as extreme by close association with the animal rights agenda. Statements provided by both animal rights and environmental leaders indicated that environmentalists were fearful that popular perception of animal rights as a movement dominated by ideological and redemptive elements could pose a threat to any allied mainstream organizations. Environmentalists often found animal rights activists to be myopic in their parochial pursuit of animal protection. In other words, animal rights activists "Couldn't see the species through the animals!"

On the other side, animal rights advocates had expressed concern lest the moralistic and abolitionist character of their movement be lost in the pursuit of political acceptability. This concern was not new. Similar angst over the moral purity of the cause echo within animal rights circles (Regan and Francione 1992). This is a familiar predicament for groups that emerge out of movement politics, particularly as they begin to achieve a certain amount of acceptability and success in the wider sphere of politics. In other words, the MLPF leaders were similar to

many movement leaders in that they constantly wrestled with the direction and character of their movement (Gross 1992).

In the case of the Initiative #117, animal rights leaders faced a familiar interest group dilemma. Wilson (1973) indicates that purposive, moralistic interest groups like animal rights groups have extraordinary difficulty in adapting to the rigors of incremental politics. By their nature, ideological and redemptive organizations are rigid, which makes political pragmatism both institutionally difficult and symbolically impure (Wilson 1973). The MLPF could respond by remaining an essentially ideological organization, and thereby offering a systematic critique of society that extends to all aspects of life. Such a policy choice is usually marked by ethereal, temporal and incomplete success (Wilson 1973). Likewise, the MLPF recognized the moralism of their activists, and was faced with retaining or discarding the redemptive nature of their core constituents. To many animal rights activists, the injunctions incorporated in their belief system are central in their daily lives and conduct, and personal redemption is at least as important as societal change. Animal rights activists can find precedents, if not solace, in the experience of other mass movements that confronted the dichotomy of pragmatism versus purity. One alternative to the sweeping policy interpretations forwarded by ideology and societal redemption was the environmental movement's

gradual shift toward more mainstream goal-oriented status by seeking specific, realistic policies within the political system (Wilson 1973).

Beyond these practical political considerations, there were important conceptual divisions between leading environmentalists and animal rightists. Those divisions exist because proper relations between human beings and nature are viewed quite differently in these movements.

Philosophical Conflicts Between the Environmental and Animal Rights Movements

The success of Initiative #117 demonstrated the potential for political strength in the environmental - animal rights coalition. The environmental movement brought experience and legitimacy to the "Yes #117" campaign while the animal rights movement provided a cadre of true believers. Activist zeal was instrumental in gathering signatures and raising funds, as well as the other myriad tasks required for the initiative process such as distributing voter information and canvassing. The coalition was able to muster sustained support to carry the initiative to a victory.

In the case of Initiative #117, the coalition appeared to be a logical coupling of similar interests, both of which were concerned with the protection and preservation of the non-human natural world. The environmentalists gained funds for habitat which were secured through dedicated funding.

This arrangement reinforced environmental links to, and in some cases created, constituency groups. Animal rights groups were able to successfully end the human utilization of an animal over the objections of strong material interests and bureaucratic agencies tied to those interests. This was unprecedented. Never before had the animal rights movement been able to completely prohibit hunting of a species. Initiative #117 also provided a tremendous morale boost for the animal rights movement. The success of this coalition did not go unnoticed. Sharon Negri reported that she was overwhelmed with requests for speaking engagements, and although she has withdrawn from active participation in the Mountain Lion Foundation as of 1991, she continued to receive inquiries from animal rights groups.

Research indicates that environmentalism and animal rights are functionally related in their reactions to empiricism and modernity (Jasper and Poulsen 1989; Richards 1990; Jasper and Nelkin 1992). Likewise, demographic research has identified institutional relationships between animal rights and environmental groups (Richards 1990; Plous 1991; Herzog and Kaplan 1991; Jamison and Lunch 1992). But prior to the success of the Mountain Lion Initiative, the animal rights and environmental movements had little previous record of cooperation. Why did such an apparently attractive coalition not form prior to Initiative #117? Why

has the environmental community failed to fully accept the animal rights community as a natural ally?

Beyond the immediate political calculations, the inability of the two movements to cement relations has been driven, in part, by deeper, profoundly different philosophical perspectives concerning the non-human world. Each movement views the world through its own spectacles, which have been ground to the specifications of different intellectuals. Such differences have been manifest thus far primarily in academic circles. Nevertheless, in those debates, the animal rights and environmental movements have proven to be far from natural allies (Hargrove 1992; Zimmerman 1993).

In *The Rights of Nature*, Roderick Nash (1989) chronicles the evolution of environmental thought. He connects the animal rights movement and classic American egalitarianism. Nash traces the evolution of rights theory outward from the white males of the American Revolution to slaves, females, and ultimately non-human animals and all of nature. To animal rights theorists such as Tom Regan, Nash's (1989) progression of rights from humans to non-humans is not only logical but inevitable (Regan 1983). Animal rightists believe that the spread of egalitarianism from human to non-human animals is logical and inevitable. Thus, many animal rights philosophers, and activists as

well, project anthropomorphic egalitarian beliefs into the non-human natural world.

However, Nash (1989) stops short of validating animal rights as an acceptable environmental ethic. Instead, he argues that the animal rights movement is a necessary, if temporary, precursor to the environmental movement, a part of the evolution of a more holistic moral community. Nash's attempts to reconcile animal rights and environmentalism notwithstanding, a dichotomy exists between egalitarianism on the one hand and collectivism on the other. Whereas Regan holds that the interests of individual animals takes precedent, many environmental philosophers have a far different perspective concerning the relationship between people and nature. In *A Sand County Almanac*, Aldo Leopold (1949) concisely posits a cornerstone of philosophical ecology:

"All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts...The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land."

Leopold's biocentrism extended ethical consideration to all of nature. A number of contemporary ecophilosophers, including Devall and Sessions (1985), Callicot (1987), and Sagoff (1988) follow this line. They argue for the interconnected relationships of nature; that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; and that human and non-human animals are a subset of the larger organic whole.

Consequently, environmental philosophers regularly contend that symbiotic interconnectedness is -- or should be -- the normative goal in defining the ethical relationship between people and nature. This philosophy manifests itself in many contexts. For example, National Park Service (NPS) administrative policy published in 1968 outlines management predicated on such beliefs:

"The concept of preservation of a total environment, as compared with the protection of an individual feature or species, is a distinguishing feature of national park management."

While ecological philosophers emphasize the integrity of the system as a whole, animal rights intellectuals contend each individual animal in the system can make equal moral claims. So, on the one hand, animal rights, if they are to exist at all, are predicated on governmental protection of individual rights and claims. On the other hand, ecology emphasizes a type of biological collectivism in which individual liberty must often be sacrificed for the greater good.

Therein lies a dilemma. Animal rights theoreticians believe that natural resource policies predicated on biocentric ecology and ecosystems management are not acceptable. Indeed, Regan characterizes ecological holism as "environmental fascism." (Regan 1985). Other animal rights philosophers such as Peter Singer see the basis of rights in the possession of sentience, effectively limiting moral and legal consideration, and thus governmental

protection, to higher vertebrates. To Regan and Singer, the dominant ideas in environmental thought as well as natural resource policy lead to the devaluation of individual life.

Conversely, some environmental philosophers ridicule the anthropomorphic egalitarianism of animal rights. How, they ask, can humans project political constructs such as rights upon the non-human world? And how, they ask, would disputes between conflicting rights be settled... by predator-prey arbitration? Sagoff believes that holistic natural resource policies inevitably sacrifice individual interests to the interests of the biologic community. He ridicules animal rightists who defend the individual at the expense of normal, systemic, organic processes (Sagoff 1984).

Some effort has been expended to reconcile the two beliefs. Fisher (1987), Callicott (1988), and Pachelle (1993) exemplify the attempts of academicians and animal rights advocates to resolve the differences. And yet, a divide remains, if not in the lives of individual citizens who support both movements, then certainly in the philosophical mandates for each movements' existence. The fact remains: Rights are an abstract political construct, are dichotomous, and largely incompatible in non-human relationships.

Hence, a profound schism in theory exists between the animal rights and environmental movements. One believes in

the inherent value and equality of the individual while the other believes in the superiority of the whole. Animal rights philosophers favor natural resource policy that protects the individual interests of animals while most environmental philosophers favor policies that seek systemic goals.

Conclusion

What are the lessons of Initiative #117? First, timing is important to political success or failure. Animal rights leaders in California were fortunate that important peripheral issues diluted their opponents' attention. Had there not been political distractions, the initiative stood a greater chance of being defeated. Second, and more importantly, Initiative #117 exemplifies a specific convergence of disparate environmental and animal rights interests which is necessary to precipitate political coalition. Environmentalists gained habitat, which reinforced their systemic biases. Animal rights activists gained the protection of animals, which reinforced their individualistic biases. The necessity of this convergence to political alliance and success, although obvious, cannot be over-emphasized. Animal rights, although seeking an identity as a distinct social movement, needs the legitimacy of environmentalism. The environmental movement, which enjoys widespread popularity coupled with mainstream legitimacy, often uses animals as powerful symbolic

representations of deteriorating ecosystems. Thus, the two movements are theoretically capable of cooperation in instances where the interests of individual charismatic megafauna coincide with ecosystemic objectives.

It is a given that both animal rightists and environmentalists gained specific quantitative benefits through the passage of the Mountain Lion Initiative. However, one other qualitative factor favors political cooperation. Both animal rightists and environmentalists had concrete political reasons to collaborate with one another in the campaign on behalf of the Mountain Lion Initiative. Because conservative opponents, e.g. former Governor Deukmejian, were hostile to the goals sought by both movements, the environmentalists and animal rights activists had reason to cooperate.

In politics, the threat posed by ferocious opponents can often do more to bring about coalitions between disparate interests than a year's worth of Renaissance weekends and bridge-building conferences. This was certainly the case in California, and the perceived threat posed by conservative groups which favor use of the environment and animals will remain a significant catalyst favoring animal rights/environmental cohesion. Nevertheless, the control of feral and exotic species, and the management of burgeoning ungulate populations in the absence of predation, are examples where the coalition is likely to

disintegrate. In instances where animals and ecosystem are in conflict, coalitions between the two movements are extremely problematic.

Hence, animal rights activists should seek to subsume their agenda within a greater environmental context. They may accomplish this by using a variation of the "canary in a coal mine," argument, viz. that individual animals are indicative of ecosystemic health. By doing so, they attach their objectives to the environmental agenda and thus hope to associate themselves with a more mainstream movement.

Third, the MLPF showed patience and finesse by not over-reaching. Initiative leaders focused their attention upon a single animal which could be successfully protected. In other words, the MLPF picked a fight they could win. They likewise showed extraordinary political skill in reconciling their activists' zeal for broad, over-arching changes in animal management policies with pragmatic, incremental politics. The MLPF leadership overcame internal organizational demands for ideological purity by focusing their activists upon the pursuit of a single noble cause. They gradually sensitized their activists to the mountain lion issue, using dry-run initiatives to train members and identify cooperative, pragmatic activists. Through this largely unintentional screening, they partially avoided the demands of more rigid ideologues. The leadership of animal rights groups in future political battles should emphasize

single issues which are likely to capture public sympathy and place animal rights within mainstream public sentiment. They might also propose dummy initiatives, which perform the two-fold purpose of training and screening activists.

For the movement's opponents, the task of defeating such skillful and specific animal rights legislation is problematic. First, focus is important in responding to the animal rights challenge. They should anticipate further animal rights initiatives and incorporate this inevitability into their legislative strategy. Heeding the cliché that forewarned is forearmed, political opponents of animal rights would do well to take animal rights seriously. Animal user groups should identify animal rights as a legitimate, growing political movement which is capable of enacting very real changes in policy. They should identify which specific animals and issues provide the animal rights movement with salient opportunities.

Second, they should clarify and frame the differences between the validity of using species as indicators of ecological health, and the inevitable death of individual animals. In doing so, opponents should uniformly oppose both covert and overt animal rights initiatives as early and as strongly as possible. Largely due to the "No on #117" campaign's early lack of focus and opposition, the MLPF's early and largely transient polling lead appeared more substantial than it would prove to be on election day, but

it did intimidate many potential opponents. Support for most ballot initiatives eventually erodes, and early opposition is critical to accelerate erosion.

These factors all provide valuable lessons to future students of natural resource policies. But the most important element in Initiative #117's success was the extraordinary political skill of its leaders coupled with the extreme intensity of movement activists. Animal rights leaders were decisive and charismatic, willing to take chances and exhibited supreme entrepreneurial skill. Likewise, the efforts of animal rights activists were central to the qualification and campaign for the initiative. Without the intensity of the activists, the financial costs of the initiative would have been prohibitive.

What are the implications of Initiative #117 for the future of the animal rights movement? Each of the movements from the sixties and seventies, e.g. civil rights, feminist, and environmental movements, struggled with political dilemmas similar to those now encountered by the animal rights movement. Each movement in turn confronted the perilous evolution from ideological/redemptive organizations to mainstream interest groups. In each case, what Wilson (1973) characterizes as "goal-oriented" political organizations emerged from the struggle. Debates are now underway among animal rights leaders that will shape the

future direction of the movement, either toward the realization of achievable political goals or toward systemic critiques of society, and thus, policy marginalization.

The success of the Mountain Lion Initiative in California provides evidence that those natural resource managers who have been inclined to dismiss the potential impact of the animal rights movement have been mistaken. The acid test of any movement in our democracy is the capacity to win seriously contested elections. The animal rights movement met that test with its victory in the initiative campaign in 1990. The movement has engaged the energies of thousands of committed activists who are not counter-cultural dropouts or politically disaffected miscreants. Social science data (Richards 1990; Jamison and Lunch 1992; Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Herzog 1993a,b) and survey results from the MLPF membership indicate that movement activists are well-educated, middle class, sincere people who have the time and the inclination to be highly active in the political system. Hence, as demonstrated by differing policy outcomes associated with the defeat of the Massachusetts Initiative and the success of Initiative #117, animal rights activists are gaining political sophistication from trial and error participation in mainstream politics.

What are the implications of the Mountain Lion Initiative for future natural resource management? Animal rightists are burdened with non-traditional positions

regarding natural resource science as well as deeply ambivalent allies in the mainstream environmental movement. While environmentalists have emerged as the principal policy allies of national natural resource agencies (Clarke and McCool 1985), natural resource managers, particularly at the national level, are not accustomed to separating animal rights from environmentalism. Instead they are used to viewing animal issues as a subset of larger environmental issues. But animal rights activists bring alternative interpretations of proper wildlife policy which differ from the bureaucracy's traditional environmental constituents (Sparhawk 1994; Bachelor 1994). Hence, this incongruence leaves natural resource managers in a policy conundrum: How should public agencies charged with the management of public lands manage animals on those lands in the face of the opposing policy perspectives presented by environmental and animal rights constituents?

At first glance, the divergence between environmental and animal rights thought appears far removed from the everyday policy disputes which natural resource managers face. To professionals who deal with nature "as it is," as opposed to "as it should be," the esoteric debate over the proper role of animals in post-industrial culture seems light years away. Yet, natural resource managers are not free from disciplinary bias. Rather than consciously viewing nature in the normative terms proposed by animal

captured in the present, attempting to manage animals with imperfect models and abstract theories (Chase 1987). In the process, managers substitute their own normative interpretations of nature. Human values like sympathy, empathy and moral consideration for animals often become lost in positivistic deliberations over population dynamics and arcane formulas.

Whatever their motives, the efforts of animal rights activists to preserve mountain lions dragged natural resource policy out of the traditional consensual policy triangle and squarely into the public forum. This success means that animal rights groups should be viewed by managers as potential constituents rather than policy opponents. The MLPF, through a mixture of political finesse, sophistication, and intensity, pried its way into natural resource policy.

In the larger political context, managers must anticipate increasing effort by animal rights groups to intervene in policies using Initiative #117 as a model. They must also accept future successes by animal rights groups to influence animal policies. Yet, in contrast, managers may also expect that short-term coalitions may become more difficult if abstract differences between the movements cannot be reconciled or ignored (Bartlett 1991; Grunewald-Rifkin 1992).

While the musings of academics may not resonate among the general public, their differences certainly are much more apparent to the leaders and the politicians associated with each movement. The axiom, "The philosophical leads the applied", is appropriate in the case of the philosophical debate between animal rights and environmentalism. Such ideological disputes, thus far largely confined to campus debates, provide some indication of the distrust and suspicion between environmental and animal rights groups. A practical example of these differences is provided by each movement's response to NPS policy. The lethal control of bison and elk in Yellowstone National Park has sometimes been deemed appropriate by NPS managers. Park Service managers, many with backgrounds in environmental biology and wildlife science, have attempted to stabilize the ecosystem by predation and hunting (Chase 1987). While the environmental community dislikes human intervention in natural processes, it recognizes the legitimacy and necessity of managing animal populations. Managing non-domesticated animals sometimes requires killing them. But the animal rights community seeks to prevent the killing of these animals, even if the ecosystem suffers.

A similar rift between environmentalists and animal rights advocates has developed in Olympic National Park. The NPS contends that, inside the park, exotic mountain goats are damaging the native flora of the alpine zones.

The NPS, with the support of environmentalists, may eradicate the goats from the park. But advocates for the animal rights organization "Fund for Animals" are attempting to stop any plans for eradication (Pachelle 1993).

Over and over, these extreme philosophical conflicts between animal rights advocates and environmentalists are reflected in public policy. Students of natural resource policy should anticipate that what may appear to be theoretical disputes and academic hair-splitting will increasingly translate into concrete policy disputes. Whether in Olympic or Yellowstone National Parks, whether in the Hawaiian Islands or in a local wildlife refuge, ecosystemic and anthropomorphic ideals will conflict (Knickerbocker 1994). Resolving these conflicts in a fashion acceptable to both movements, although not impossible, is rather problematic.

Finally, managers should remember that animal rights arises from within an urban population whose sole experience with non-human animals usually comes in the form of heavily anthropomorphized pet animals or cartoon characters (Kellert 1984; Adams 1990; Wong-Leonard 1992). Hence, activists identify non-human animals as having some degree of moral equivalency with humans (Richards 1990; Balzar 1993). Having philosophically justified the extension of moral consideration to domesticated animals, activists continue the outward expansion of anthropomorphic egalitarianism

(Pachelle 1993). In other words, animal rights activists see little qualitative difference between people and animals; advocates like Singer (1975) logically ask

"if discriminating against people is wrong, regardless of their status, why isn't it wrong to discriminate against non-humans?"

Carrying moral extensionism to its logical ends, animal rights activists ask if domesticated animals deserve rights, why not wild animals?

For natural resource managers, the question is not whether animal rights is a legitimate and feasible approach for non-domesticated animals. This is because millions of ordinary citizens believe that there is little difference between humans and non-human animals (Balzar 1993). Hence, the issue for managers involved in animal control and management policies becomes one of understanding animal rights as an alternative interpretation to ecological and scientific wildlife management.

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CHAPTER V

UNDERSTANDING ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM AS A RELIGION

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Introduction

In American politics, intensity matters. Both Madison and Tocqueville noted that American politics was characterized by intense passion (Madison 1787; Tocqueville 1835). At the same time, it is a truism that our politics is an alloy of organized constraint, a distinctive mixture of zeal and pragmatism. Recently, however, the passion has been unleashed. The growth in number, size and sophistication of purposive interest groups and the concurrent proliferation of unfiltered ideological and moral agendas since the 1960's has been widely noted among political scientists (Wilson 1973; Huntington 1981; Lunch 1987; Berry 1989). One of the implications of this phenomenon is that the political system is being asked increasingly to address purely ideological and moral questions. Mainstream politics has become more accessible to groups whose raw intensity would have previously excluded them.

The American animal rights movement exemplifies this developing political fervor. Its activists are characterized by uncommon levels of commitment to the cause

and zeal for social redemption (Sperling 1988; Jamison and Lunch 1992; Jasper and Nelkin 1992). The movement, which traces its contemporary emergence to 1975, combines a critique of scientific empiricism that was characteristic of the Victorian anti-vivisection movement with the reaction to modernity that has mobilized many modern social movements (French 1975; Richards 1990). Like its companion mass movements, the animal rights movement draws upon nascent political interest which its leaders attempt to intensify and channel into political action. But, in addition, the animal rights movement draws upon latent emotions which, in turn, stimulate a remarkable level of activism. The resultant normative goals of the activists often require extraordinary levels of personal conviction (Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Herzog 1993).

What are the sources of this intensity and commitment? Once mobilized, what keeps an animal rights activist motivated toward the transformation of society's relationship with animals? And, should the movement fail to redeem society, what course of action will it take? While Jasper and Nelkin have identified the moralism which drives the movement, and Sperling, Herzog and others have noted the seriousness and integrity with which the activists approach the redemption of society, each stops short of framing the activism in religious terms. Paradoxically, in their

anecdotal accounts, animal rights activists themselves have not been so hesitant.

One reason that the literature has not identified religion as a possible explanation for animal rights activism is that opponents of the movement have labeled its members everything from pantheists to animists to gnostics to atheists (Herzog 1991; Limbaugh 1992; Cerio 1993; Strand 1993). These partisan attempts to marginalize the concerns of animal rights activists notwithstanding, we believe that employing a functional definition of religion helps to uncover the source of their intensity, describe their motivations, and forecast the movement's future course. Our intent is neither to label nor to ridicule the arguments that the movement has raised concerning the status of animals in industrialized culture. Rather, we hope that our analysis will be useful in stimulating understanding of the movement and in providing clues to its future evolution.

Context

Animal advocate and lawyer Gary Francione (1992) has co-authored a guide for young animal activists who object in conscience to classroom vivisection and dissection. Students are advised that their objection is a constitutionally protected exercise of religious belief. That Francione claims such activists are acting out of religious belief may surprise many. Surveys indicate that most animal activists are not religious; they are not members of traditional

churches and they think of themselves as atheist or agnostic (Richards 1990; Herzog and Kaplan 1991).

Francione and Charlton (1992) argue, however, that "the law does not require a belief to be 'theistic' or based on faith in a 'God' or 'Supreme Being'" in order to be protected. If a belief is a matter of 'ultimate concern' and occupies in the lives of its adherents 'a place parallel to that filled by...God' in traditionally religious persons, then it passes the test for religious belief. "Most animal advocates," he concludes, "possess a deeply spiritual commitment to justice for the oppressed and a general revulsion toward violence against sentient beings". The Supreme Court, as Francione and Charlton (1992) point out, has adopted a "functional" definition of religion:

"The Court has recognized that in order to determine whether a set of beliefs constitutes a religion, the appropriate focus is not the substance of a person's belief system (i.e., whether a person believes in a personal God of the Jewish, Christian or Muslim traditions), but rather, what function or role the belief systems plays in the person's life."

The distinction between substantive and functional definitions of religion was articulated for social scientists by Milton Yinger (Yinger 1970). It is a distinction that allows us to analyze seemingly secular movements as religions because they function as religions; that is, they are social groupings in which people find meaning in life through a system of beliefs, symbols, rituals, and prescriptions for behavior.

Francione leaves it to individuals to determine if their beliefs function as religious belief. His advice, however, opens up an intriguing line of inquiry about the movement itself: Could published statements and unpublished interviews lead one to conclude that animal rights activism has the markings of religion? Based upon previously published statements and informant interviews, we have identified analogs of the elements of conversion, community, creed (system of belief), code (prescriptions for behavior), and cult (symbols and rituals) as they are found both in traditional western monotheistic religion and in the animal rights movement. We begin with a personal story.

Mary was a university professor. At the time of the interview, she had traveled in a van with several other activists to Washington, D.C., to express her support for the animal rights movement at the June 10, 1990 "March for the Animals." She wore a tee-shirt emblazoned with the now-infamous picture of a monkey strapped to a metal frame, open-mouthed as if in terrified anticipation of the vivisector's knife. Her disheveled appearance belied her happiness, inner resolve, and equanimity. Mary was open and sincere, enjoying the opportunity to talk about her beliefs. The long journey had provided all those involved an opportunity to contemplate their reasons for supporting an abstract political ideal such as animal rights. Mary

referred to the trip as a "mission," as an attempt to place the plight of animal suffering in the American psyche:

"Sure, I want to change things, but it takes time for people to see the light. I also want[ed] to share my experiences with others who have felt the same way. My dog was poisoned by a neighbor, and that really angered me. When I called the police, they said that all they could do was charge [the neighbor] with a misdemeanor. That really hurt. Here was my dog whom I loved dearly, and let a stranger kill him, and all it warrants is a misdemeanor! This seemed so unfair, so wrong, so I tried to change things through the city council. All I found was ridicule and a belittling attitude. Maybe our presence here can help change things."

Mary's experience was not unique. Many of the others traveling in the van felt ostracized because of their personal beliefs. Each of the activists who had made the journey had, in his or her own way, experienced the isolation which comes from a commitment to radical personal transformation. Yet, for Mary, what began as an attempt to gain justice for the death of her animal companion had evolved into something more, something greater than herself.

"After that [the poisoning], I came to the realization that society really didn't care about animals, that people view animals as things to be used up. The level of that realization hit me in a really hard way. I was depressed and discouraged, and I didn't understand how people could be so cruel and unfeeling. It wasn't just a problem with me, or with my neighbor, it was a problem with society. Everywhere I turned, I saw animal suffering permeating the world."

Mary had previously experienced vague misgivings about the status of animals in modern society, and she related that she had effectively suppressed those feelings with

rationalizations. However, the poisoning of her dog crystallized for her what was to become an encompassing moral mandate: End animal suffering. Mary had embarked on a journey of personal and societal redemption:

"Once I began to realize and come to grips with the magnitude of the situation, and the amount of animal suffering, I was no longer down. I felt determined. Knowledge is responsibility, so I took responsibility for changing things. I felt a sense of power, a sense of discovery, a sense that I had uncovered something that was really special. And I no longer felt down all the time. I knew that if I couldn't do much else, I could change the way I live. "Think globally, act locally," you know?"

When asked about how her life had changed once she had decided to join an animal rights group, she recounted a gradual socialization with other interested people.

"I began to meet other people who had similar experiences. They all had personal experiences, [in which, once] they realized what was happening [to animals], and they talked about it openly, they were trivialized or even ridiculed by their friends and relatives. So in a way, we just wanted to get together and share our experiences. You know, it was a way for those of us who believed that we had uncovered a moral outrage, that we had in a way become morally enlightened, to share our experiences. So we would have meetings in the beginning to just talk out our feelings. And of course, it was a way for us to make an impact."

Mary reiterated this belief forcefully, stating that the animal rights movement, like all moral movements that are ahead of their time, was being subjected to societal scorn and condemnation for challenging the moral status quo. And she acknowledged that, like others in the movement, she needed passionate fellowship experiences to rejuvenate her

emotional commitment, reinforce certainty about her beliefs, and strengthen attachment to her values.

For Mary, the personal struggle to confront the plight of animals in modern culture has often been hard. When asked to describe her daily regimen, her mood became tentative. She related her dilemma:

"I really know that I should try to become a vegan. But it's hard. It's so difficult to avoid using animal products of any kind. I have friends who are vegans, and they are really good natured about my own situation, my own struggle. They've been there. But it is really tough because society just takes animal suffering for granted. I feel bad about it [using animals], but I justify it because I'm doing as much as I feel I can at this stage in my life.

Mary's personal epiphany regarding the suffering of animals, her desire to share that epiphany with others of like mind, and her commitment to a strict code of behavior illustrate the components of a functional definition of religion. Mary's pain at the loss of her dog and her disillusionment with the totality of animal suffering coalesced into the coherent, cosmological keel in her life. Having uncovered what was for her a depressing truth, she sought out others with whom she could share her experience. Having worked through the depressing enormity of animal suffering, she proposed the reformation of societal attitudes toward animals. And realizing that conversion is ultimately personal, she resolved to adhere to a personal ethic of minimizing suffering to animals.

The Elements of Functional Religion

Conversion

Western monotheistic religions, and Christianity in particular, originate in an experience of conversion such as Mary's. Coming from a biblical expression meaning "to be turned around," the word "conversion" tells us that the experience is something that happens to a person which is powerful enough to reverse one's life. Enlightenment comes with the force of revelation, stopping converts in their tracks and turning them around so that from a new viewpoint they see a whole new world. Conversion, according to theologian Bernard Lonergan, is the transformation of a person and his or her horizon (Lonergan 1972).

Religious conversion in the western tradition brings one into alignment with The Universal Truth. This new knowledge relativizes all life's woes, even the problem of innocent suffering. A second dimension of conversion turns one from acting out of needs and pleasures to making decisions on the basis of newly perceived values. Living by such values (e.g., the value of non-violence) often means giving up immediate and personal gratification. Though a derivative of religious conversion, this second and moral dimension of conversion can occur by itself (James 1958). When that happens, as it does most often in the animal rights movement, the convictions and behaviors it generates

may appear to be like those associated with a traditional religion.

In his classic study of religious experience, William James defined conversion as "the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior, and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior, and happy..." (James 1958). He draws this definition from several accounts in which converts look back on their pre-conversion uneasiness and aimlessness as being the result of wrongdoing and sin. That same guilt, evidenced by Mary, also figures in the story of Kathy, an official with an animal rights organization.

Kathy was an articulate and highly intelligent spokesperson whose polished appearance looked more at home on Madison Avenue than on Telegraph Avenue. Contrary to stereotypes commonly promoted by animal use organizations, her views on the protection of animals were thoughtful and well-reasoned. She approached the debate over the status of animals with a quiet and sincere confidence which comes from a carefully constructed and, for her at least, correct moral ideology. Like Mary, Kathy could point to a single highly emotional revelatory event when she became aware of the nature of animal suffering. Whereas Mary identified the death of her dog at the hands of an unfeeling society as her formative moment, Kathy's conversion epiphany came at her own hands.

"I had a very early interest in animals, in having them around. My grandfather was a farmer who had farm animals, so I had contact with animals of all kinds. When I was ten years old, I found an abandoned litter of puppies on Halloween night. I befriended the pound keeper, who eventually killed the animals by asphyxiating them. Even then, that made me feel bad, so I started writing animal organizations and collecting literature...I began learning about organizations to help animals."

Kathy remained interested in animals after graduation from college. Her goal was to obtain a job with a humane organization: "I wanted to write specifically on animal population control and animal care." Kathy's vision of the abandoned animals remained vivid, and the vague sense of guilt she felt over not doing more was only partially assuaged by activity in humane organizations. The ideological transformation from having an abstract interest in animal welfare to a soul-swaying allegiance to the cause of animal rights was deeply personal and particularly graphic.

"It was 1981, and I had just graduated with my English degree. The Humane Society of Santa Clara County had a progressive director, so I figured this was my chance to fulfill my ambitions. I went to work for the Humane Society writing and training volunteers. I had also begun receiving literature from People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. I was still omnivorous at this point, and had no real problems with eating animal products. Then, somebody gave me a copy of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation*, and I was captivated by the logic of his arguments. He made a very convincing point as to why animals should not be discriminated against. And then, I received literature, innocently enough, from the International Federation for Animal Welfare [IFAW]. They were doing an exposé on dog-meat markets in Asia. I still remember it vividly. I was reading this mailing postcard from IFAW while

eating a ham sandwich. There was a picture of this dog, his legs tethered, a tin cup over his muzzle; then it hit me! I made the connection; before, everything seemed to be OK, but now, I realized that treating animals as objects was bad. It was like someone had opened a door."

Kathy's revelation was luminous and emotional. She felt somewhat sick at the pig meat she had just swallowed as the enormity of her discovery set in.

"I knew then and there that the way we view animals is the way we are taught. I felt incredible sadness, and at the same time incredible joy. I knew that I would never be the same again, that I was leaving something behind. I understood immediately the implications that this would have on my life. But I also knew that I would be a better person, that I had been cleansed, and that I would no longer have to feel guilty over feeling compassion for suffering animals. I knew that it was now alright to tell others that it's OK to believe. It was as if I was coming out of a closet; there was no more shame or guilt."

Kathy related this story with an energy previously absent from her measured and thoughtful remarks. It was clear that she was moved by the extraordinary power of her conversion. For her, life could not remain as it was.

Community

Converts create communities. Having foregone an old order, they seek inclusion in a new. They gather together, share their common view, and sustain each other's commitments. If converts regard their transformations as complete, they tend to form a community that cuts itself off from the unconverted world. They are more likely to have dysfunctional relationships with their natural families,

acquaintances and friends whom they have left behind.

Yinger (1970) identifies such communities as *sects*.

Many animal rights activists come together on a regular basis to recount their personal tribulations and triumphs. Students for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, a student organization on university campuses around the country, provides evidence of the centrality of fellowship. At meetings, participants take turns informally relating their experiences to the group. Both Mary and Kathy described this desire for communion with others of similar experience. Mary understood the need for support and began meeting with people who, like her, grappled with their personal transformation.

"As I tried to relate my frustration over my dog's death to my friends, they didn't understand. Some of them even laughed. They said, "It's only an animal!" That was really disheartening for me. So I eventually became cautious over telling non-activists about my experience."

Like Mary, Kathy also experienced separation from her previous relationships.

"I had a sense of being "called out." I know that it doesn't sound credible, but that's what it was. I had trouble relating to some people. People would stare when I would order [vegetarian food] in restaurants. It was embarrassing for me, and very uncomfortable. And I'm always explaining myself to people, and that gets tiresome. However, people who are genuinely interested are worth talking to. It's a struggle and it wears you down, wanting to stay around people who think like you do, but wanting to talk to others about it [animal rights], and some not listening."

Kathy held no illusions about her situation. She understood that her personal commitment would not be accepted by everyone, and she also approached her transformation with clarity and probity.

Kathy and Mary, like Mary's companions on the trip to Washington, experienced varying degrees of isolation from individuals who didn't share their beliefs. However, conversion doesn't necessarily entail separation for those who are converted. If converts think of themselves as people undergoing continual transformation, then their resulting community remains "in the world," just as "the world" remains in the members awaiting transformation. Members maintain positive interactions with family and friends. In this case of inclusive membership, the community is what Yinger calls a *church*.

Caryn was a 30-year-old university statistician in New Zealand. Raised in Canada by supportive and nurturing parents, Caryn exudes confidence and good humor. Caryn was similar to Mary and Kathy in that she is well-liked among her peers and professionally respected. She was not the fanatic lampooned by animal rights opponents. She did, however, openly count herself as a sympathizer of animal rights, classifying herself as an "ethical vegetarian" who chose her lifestyle based on a personal epiphany. Like the other informants, Caryn pointed to a singular revelatory event in which she decided to forgo the consumption of meat.

She related that, watching her brother lay a captured fish on the dock of their summer lakeside vacation retreat, she was deeply moved and disturbed by its slow suffocation. After this sensitization to needless suffering, Caryn had her epiphany while watching her family rip apart the ligaments and sinews of a Sunday dinner chicken: "After seeing my brother tear apart that chicken, I decided not to eat meat anymore." Caryn related that:

"I became aware of animal suffering when I was young. That's when I saw the suffocating fish. It wasn't until later that I made the conscious choice to become a Christian. But ever since the fish, I've tried to minimize any suffering that I may cause. I have a friend who feels the same way and is an "animal rights activists". She is pretty extreme, and it's caused some problems between her and people who eat animals. She pretty much tells them they are wrong. You know that's not me, but we get along fine."

Unlike the other informants, Caryn described herself as a "born-again Christian." Her story poses an intriguing and unexplored question: How do animal rights sympathizers who belong to traditional religions reconcile their new-found ideal to their extant beliefs? Caryn has found that the transcendent mysteries of her Christian faith leave enough leeway to accommodate the animal rights beliefs. When asked if she has ever experienced conflicts between her beliefs about animals and her Christianity, Caryn stated:

"I don't see a problem between the two beliefs. They compliment each other. Christianity calls for compassion for all of God's creation, and we are given stewardship over animals to care for them. Animal rights complements that."

Though the existence of a biblical basis for animal rights is debatable (Linzey 1987), Caryn has made an amalgam of traditional Christian and new animal rights beliefs that allows her to interpret the world positively and relate to those in it.

Creed

Though many animal activists do not recite a profession of faith in God, they have beliefs that may be compared to traditional Christian doctrines. At first glance their creed seems obvious and simple: Animals have the right to live their lives without human interference, or, at least, they have the right to be considered equally with humans in the ethical balance that weighs the right and wrong of any action or policy (Singer 1975, 1990; Regan 1983). We propose, nevertheless, that the commitment of many animal activists to political guarantees of rights for animals is part of a larger system of beliefs about life. That system includes beliefs about nature, good and evil, suffering and death. Mary, Kathy, and Caryn each depicted the world as tainted, a place where the suffering of animals at the hands of humans is wrong and can be abated. Each placed at least partial blame for this suffering upon the shoulders of a blind and unfeeling humanity. Mary related that "everywhere I turned I saw suffering permeating the world."

Caryn stated that:

"there seems to be so much needless pain caused by people. If people realized the level of suffering that they cause, they would probably do something about it."

Kathy also acknowledged the distressing totality of suffering in the world, and, while advocating an ecological perspective which links humanity to the non-human world, she placed ethical obligations and failures singularly upon humans.

"Humans are one species among many. We're not owners of the planet. All of life is interconnected. And like us, other animals have a desire to lead their own lives. They want to be left alone. We are all linked by a shared desire to lead a personally fulfilling life as we define it. However, unlike animals, humans have choices, we can make decisions. This is wonderful! People cause so much suffering for selfish reasons. Once we [humans] have knowledge of alternatives to animal suffering, why don't we use them?"

In Kathy's interpretation, pain is evil and its alleviation is good; humans are related through evolution to animals, but ethically constrained from using them because humans, alone, are aware of the pain such use causes. When asked why her extension of compassion ceases at animals, she replied:

"My beliefs are still evolving. It's impossible to get away from animal use! I would like to become perfected, but we live in an imperfect world. You've got to draw the line somewhere. So you do the best you can. If you've got twelve feet to walk, and if you've only walked four feet, you've only got eight feet to go! But each step helps to alleviate animal suffering."

One objection to the concept of animal rights raised by some environmental ethicists is that acknowledging such rights does not dispel arbitrary discrimination, but merely displaces it. In other words, rights are by nature dichotomous. Whether one discriminates on the basis of species or sentience, animal or plant, indeed organic or inorganic, he still discriminates (Sagoff 1984; Nash 1989). Each of the informants has in her own way struggled with this problem. Yet, all employed the same litmus test to help make the distinction. They drew a distinction between animals that possess eyes and those that do not. Kathy said, "I personally draw the line at an animal that can see me and evades humans." Similarly, Caryn responded that "there's something about eyes that makes it personal. They can see me." Mary reinforced this distinction: "It seems that animals *see* [emphasis added] what people will do to them!" For the informants, the animals' ability to recognize humans as a threat, and therefore something to be evaded, accentuates the divide between human and non-human nature.

The divergence of these beliefs from Western religious beliefs might appear slight, but it is significant. Jewish and Christian believers take their instruction about life from the constant refrain in the first chapter of *Genesis*. "And God saw that it was good." Successive chapters of *Genesis* tell of the marring of creation through human sin. A

fault line between good and evil now runs through all creation, including the human heart. The world is not simply good or evil, but ever ambiguous. Humans, though prone to doing wrong, are still responsible and capable of doing good.

We notice on close examination, however, that animal rights activists like Mary and Kathy speak of the goodness of nature, not of all creation. They celebrate the heavens and the earth, the sun and the moon, the birds and the beasts, but not humankind. In Christian cosmology, the boundary between good and evil divides the human heart and makes everything in creation ambiguous. In contrast, Animal rights activists see nature's goodness as opposed to human evil. Thus, humans are singularly to blame for animal suffering.

Animals, of course, are part of nature. Their goodness lies in innocence. The wolf may stalk the lamb and one species of bird impale another for its dinner, but these animals are not evil by intention. An editorial page letter in *New York Newsday* (1992) lectured columnist B.D. Colen:

"Unlike you, the cockroach has never done anything deliberately malicious in its life- unlike every human that ever lived. I actually have more moral grounds to murder you, than you have to, say, swat a fly."

For animal rights activists, the human species itself is the problem; innocence can be found only in animals. Just by existing, humans are detrimental to animals. Ingrid

Newkirk, leader of PETA, expresses it most forcefully as cited by Brown (1983):

"I am not a morose person, but I would rather not be here. I don't have any reverence for life, only for the entities themselves. I would rather see a blank space where I am. This will sound like fruitcake stuff again, but at least I wouldn't be harming anything. All I can do- all you can do- while you are alive is try to reduce the amount of damage you do by being alive."

Newkirk draws back from the precipice of absolute despair about human existence in order to encourage her followers to take responsibility for doing good. Despite her pessimistic estimation of the human potential for doing anything except avoiding harm to animals, she prescribes action that will bring about nothing less than the biblical vision of paradise. She seems to believe that humans can bring about a world where lamb and lion will lie down together, where, "man will live in harmony with nature, (and) where when two animals fight, human beings will intervene." (McCabe 1990)

Some animal rights activists' beliefs, which may seem so strangely out of touch with the amoral suffering in nature, may originate from the peculiar fact that in contemporary society all death occurs offstage. Most people today live in cities. We tend to be surprised by first hand experience of death. Death occurs in hospitals and nursing homes, and even the death of pets is hidden from our eyes. We buy our food and clothing in nicely wrapped packages, seldom thinking of how it comes from the slaughter house

that converts a pig into pork or a cow into beef. Since few of us see lions mangling gazelles or bears ripping apart salmon to obtain their roe, animals are not predators but fluffy and fuzzy friends propped up on the bed.

Art works reveal that people of other ages lived with death as a companion. Medieval people were fascinated by big fish eating little fish, a fact of nature that became something of a metaphor for life. Christian attitudes toward suffering and death have been ambivalent. On the one hand, biblical notions of stewardship and compassion have helped shaped Western culture in its extraordinary medical advances. On the other hand, traditional Christian religion is at home with the cycle of life and death. Christians have always believed that redemption comes through suffering and new life emerges from death. The animal rights movement, in contrast, seems to want to purify the world of suffering and death caused by humans.

Believing entails spreading the faith, and animal rights activists, like some Christians, are proselytizers. Herzog (1993b) has found that there is an evangelical component to the involvement of almost all animal activists. They follow Newkirk in having enough confidence in their own humanity to try to make converts and bring about the liberation of animals. Kathy said that "Seeing the light come on for somebody is really rewarding!" and Caryn, who feels compelled to share the good news, exemplified the

great commission given to Christians in the gospel of Matthew: "Go forth, make disciples of all nations" (Matthew 28:16-20). She emphasized that:

"We [Christians] can't just hold on to the salvation we've been given. We are supposed to tell others about our beliefs, and protecting animals is part of that, so if it [animal rights] comes up, I tell them why I'm a vegetarian."

Code

Conversion places animal rights believers under the sway of value -- the newly recognized importance of animals esteemed for their own sake rather than their usefulness to society. No longer do activists drift in the mainstream of consumer culture, pulled this way and that by what they thought were needs and pleasures. Conversions always entail new ways of living that come to be codified in guidelines and rules. For example, gentile believers in the early Christian church were instructed by the apostle James at the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15:20) to

"abstain from food polluted by idols, from sexual immorality, from the meat of strangled animals and from blood."

It is not surprising, then, that animal rights activists, whose conversion is primarily moral in nature, have elaborate codes of behavior. Their publications are filled with advice for vegetarian and vegan cooking, cruelty-free shopping, cruelty-free entertainment, and cruelty-free giving.

The codified edicts of animal rights are demonstrated by an all-encompassing statement of faith professed by the most pure activists: "Animals are not ours to eat, wear, experiment on, or use for entertainment!" (Bertsch 1994). Finding its ultimate expression in the form of veganism, this lifestyle consciously forgoes the use of materials which have, in any way, caused animal suffering. Unlimited in scope, veganism provides an elaborate superstructure with which animal rights activists support their life. Bordering on asceticism, the constraints placed on personal behavior, and the resultant emotional demands of compliance, can be extraordinary (Sperling 1988; Herzog 1993).

Kathy defined a vegan as:

"A person who doesn't use, to the greatest extent possible, any products that come from animals. It's impossible to get away from animal use...but if an alternative is available, they use it."

Such legalism confronts the activist with a dilemma: The impossibility of the task is acknowledged, but it must be attempted nonetheless. With the minimizing of pain and suffering as a normative goal, strict codes of conduct are followed for the sake of redemption.

Cult

Christians through the centuries have organized their worship around the teachings of the Bible and communion. Some churches have emphasized the former, others the latter. While nothing so formal as listening to the inspired text or

eating a sacred meal characterizes the gatherings of animal rights partisans, elements of those gatherings nevertheless resemble the twofold ritual behavior of Christians. Caryn recounted an experience she had while attending an animal rights meeting:

"I was shy, not very assertive. I don't classify myself as an activist, but I went along with a friend. When we got there, the meeting began with people talking about the problems they had had. It reminded me of an AA [Alcoholics Anonymous] meeting."

Mary related a similar story:

"Most of the meetings I go to usually follow along some sort of pattern; we usually talk about ourselves, and sometimes people will talk about slipping up, but everyone is real supportive. There's no real problem. We usually always talk about upcoming events and plan things. But one of the main things I get from the meetings is a real emotional charge; you know, we all reinforce each other."

The Christian Liturgy of the Word includes exhortation, confession, and prayers for the needs of all. When animal rights activists gather, they often share news clippings, letters, and personal stories that tell of conversion and encourage participants in their commitment. As mentioned by Caryn, the introduction and welcoming of new and potential members are often an integral part of animal rights meeting. Similarly, Mary mentioned the personal profession as part of the gathering. Often someone will acknowledge the discovery of some lifestyle choice that has infringed upon the well-being of animals and will resolve to amend his or her life. Less frequently, someone will confess particular and

culpable failures in the manner of animal activist and writer Alice Walker (1988):

"Since nearly a year ago, I have eaten several large pieces of Georgia ham, several pieces of chicken, three crab dinners and even one of shrimp."

Intriguing is the absence of any ritual of absolution comparable to the generalized declarations of God's mercy in Protestant services or the personal forgiveness of sin in the Catholic reconciliation rite. Our informants' accounts frequently mention guilt. Caryn admitted a fondness for cheese, and rationalized that:

"I can live with myself because it [cheese production] doesn't kill the animal, and it's tough to get the vitamins and minerals from a vegan diet."

When asked if she would use available alternatives, Caryn replied that she would. Kathy also talked of working through her weakness:

"Sometimes there are alternatives available, and I'll still use an animal product. I've never, ever been tempted to eat meat since I made my personal choice. But, there are times when I've used products that may have been tested on animals or that contained some animal by-products."

Like Alice Walker, Mary confessed to specific sins which were accompanied by a sense of guilt. During her interview, Mary was animated and relaxed, but as she described her house she paused at her kitchen and took pains to describe her regimen there. When asked if she ate meat, she leaned over and quietly whispered, "I eat chicken, but I don't tell anybody."

It seems that animal activists have only one method of assuaging guilt, and that is by ratcheting up their commitment and resolve. The absence of absolution, which gradually softened the rigorous tone of Christian fervor in the early centuries, may serve to fuel the movement's momentum. When asked, Kathy repeatedly acknowledged that early on in her conversion to animal rights she sometimes had difficulty with the behavioral code that she had accepted. In response, and in order to avoid personal conviction for causing suffering, she ratcheted up her activism. Kathy agreed that the maxim "If it is to be, it is up to me!" accurately described her attitude.

Sperling (1988), Jasper and Nelkin (1992), and Herzog (1993) document this phenomenon. New converts are drawn into the movement through a highly personal epiphany and are at first tentative in their approach to activism and the vegan ethos. After confronting the enormity of societal transformation, they confront their own complicity in animal suffering. Yet, ending animal suffering in their own lives proves to be difficult. With no exterior source of atonement, they see increased activism as an act of penance. As Mary relates:

"After joining a group, I was depressed at the amount of suffering that I, personally, had caused. I had never viewed eating animals as bad. I knew that the least I could do was become involved."

The connection between religion and eating is ancient and widespread. Sacred feasting, which offers communion with God, and holy fasting, which accomplishes cleansing from selfishness, raise a simple biological fact to spiritual significance: We are what we eat. Although animal rights activists have no ritual meals, eating for them is very much a redemptive act. Through vegetarianism and veganism they purify themselves while liberating animals. "The more I got involved, the more my diet changed. And the more my diet changed, the more involved I got" (Herzog 1993b).

Not just rituals, but also symbols play a large role in religion. Animal symbols are especially significant.

Christians have looked on the pierced lamb as an image of Jesus. This image offers redemption to the believer who can see what sin has wrought and who chooses to identify with the innocent victim rather than the perpetrator of violence.

Animal rights activists use pictures of monkeys strapped in chairs, cats wearing electrodes, and rabbits with eye or flesh ulcerations. Looking on these innocent victims and identifying with them can bring about change and redemption (Sperling 1988; Jasper and Nelkin 1992). In her study of anti-vivisection in England, Susan Sperling (1988) has pointed out that Victorian women saw animals as symbols of their own victimhood.

Women then as women now were upset by:

"The perceived manipulation and corruption of nature by human technology, for which the scientific use of animals is a key symbol. In both periods. . . revitalization of society is believed to hinge on the abolition of the abuse of animals."

In her exploration of the Edwardian-era anti-vivisection movement, Coral Lansbury (1985) describes the nexus of disparate political interests which coalesced around the statue of an old brown dog. She elucidates the powerful symbolism which animals held in Edwardian industrial culture:

"Dogs were not simply people; they were more faithful, loving, and sympathetic than human beings. They were the children who never grew up to criticize or abandon their parents, the servants who were always obedient and grateful for a pat or a plate of scraps, the company whose greatest joy was to share your company."

Animals are also powerful symbols of universal peace and harmony. In the 7th century before Christ, the prophet Isaiah proclaimed God's intention for the end of time: "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and young calf with the lion...and the lion shall eat straw like the ox...." This messianic vision, as proclaimed by Ingrid Newkirk, continues to inspire animal rights activists.

Analysis and Forecast

We have argued that the animal rights movement functions as a religion. This thesis explains its phenomenal

growth. In times of rapid social change, people are cut loose from traditional communities of meaning. They are open to the offer of alternative communities which provide a filigree of meaning through which they can interpret their world. In their search for meaning, they may be attracted to absolutes such as those found in religion (Wallace 1972; Sperling 1988). A functional definition of religion aids in understanding the dedication of animal rights adherents to abolitionist goals and radical action. Their uncommon passion constitutes religious zeal -- a zeal fueled by conversion to a distinctive world-view that is embraced most often as an alternative to the Judeo-Christian way of looking at nature, the role of suffering, and the nature of God.

Finally, the thesis helps explain how the movement retains its cohesion in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Central to the stories of our informants is a profound sense of guilt at discovering personal complicity in the suffering of animals. The movement places moral culpability squarely upon their shoulders, and its rhetoric exacerbates their sins. Then it offers itself as the ultimate form of absolution (Hoffer 1951). With a creed that presents a disheartening picture of their world and a code of behavior which is at once unattainable and noble, believers are drawn into further activism as a source of penance. Both Mary and Kathy related how, upon confronting

the enormity of their mission, the only recourse was to ratchet up their activism. The movement offers absolution through increased activism, and the increased activism refuels its zeal.

If our thesis that the animal rights movement functions as a religion is correct, it contains a caveat for those opposed to the movement. It does no good to point out, as some animal users have, that the Bible enjoins humans to exercise dominion over animals. Such a doctrine is part of the "old time religion" that the animal rights movement would replace with their own. Nor -- if opponents prefer to steer away from "religious" argumentation -- does it do much good to urge on animal rightists the benefits of animal research. For the believer in animal rights, the ends, no matter how wonderful, never justify the means. What is the rejoinder when Ingrid Newkirk declares: "Even if animal research resulted in a cure for AIDS, we'd be against it"? (Barnes 1989).

Our thesis that the animal rights movement wears the face of religion has not only analytical value, but also predictive power. We can look to the course run by quasi-religious movements to find answers to intriguing questions about the animal rights movement's future. In *Political Organizations*, James Q. Wilson (1973) generalizes about the courses followed by redemptive organizations that put

forward systemic critiques of society coupled with calls for societal and personal transformation. Wilson states:

"Redemptive organizations never attain their larger ends. Though a society may occasionally be captured by an ideological organization, it is never transformed by a redemptive one. Hence, redemptive groups are forced to choose among collapse, inward-looking sectarianism, or acts of rage and despair."

Mary, Kathy, and Caryn all believed that the extension of some degree of rights to animals is inevitable. Like activists of all political persuasions, they believe that they have the moral high ground and that time is on their side. What should happen, however, if the movement should fail to achieve its redemptive aim? One way in which the movement might lose its momentum, if not its aim, is suggested by research revealing that personal experiences with pet animals play a significant role in initially sensitizing future activists to the plight of animals in modern society (Richards 1990; Jamison and Lunch 1992). No doubt the movement will meet increased resistance as people who have been attracted to it by the love of pets realize the cost of the changes it calls for.

From our informants we cannot infer that the movement, foiled or at least stalled in advancing its cause, will pursue the option of acting out rage and despair. More likely alternatives are what Wilson calls inward-looking sectarianism and collapse, or what we name sectarian exclusiveness and ecclesial inclusiveness. The movement's

leaders face a clearly defined choice that is rare in politics. In an attempt to retain their membership, they can remain doctrinally pure and risk permanent political marginalization. Or, on the other hand, in an attempt to move into the mainstream of American life, they may become politically pragmatic and risk alienating their core of zealous activists whose intensity serves to recruit new members, police behavior, and fulfill the numerous maddening details of politics like canvassing and petition circulation.

Already we are witnessing conflict about a strategy for survival. In the pages of *Animals' Agenda*, Gary Francione and Tom Regan have argued that even though the steps taken by the movement may be gradual, they must always be ideologically pure (Regan and Francione 1992). Just as American abolitionists could have no truck with those who wanted more humane treatment of slaves, so, according to Francione and Regan, animal rightists cannot work with those who call for a "gentle" use of animals. Enactment of any welfarist position, they contend, actually impedes the animal rights agenda by distracting people from the real goal.

Ingrid Newkirk, on the other hand, has pleaded for building coalitions and excluding no one from the cause of animals (Newkirk 1992). Achievements of welfarists become the springboard for further advances by animal rightists. In

Newkirk's approach, all activists become pilgrims walking the same messianic road, and every act of compassion toward animals brings them closer to the day of victory for the movement. Wilson (1973) observes that:

"By their nature, organizations relying on either ideology or redemption to hold and motivate members tend to attract persons prepared to make deep and lasting commitments to the cause, if not the particular organization. Ideological and redemptive organizations display little flexibility about their objectives or, if the objectives are changed, the transformation exacts a heavy price in associational conflict and personal tensions, often resulting in *factionalism* and sometimes in *fissure* [emphasis added]."

For the animal rights movement, two moral paths have diverged in the political woods: the one less traveled, an elitist purity, and the other a well-trammeled pragmatism.

How might the movement attempt to retain its distinctive redemptive flavor while evolving into a mainstream political force? First, it could pick and choose its battles, settling for those they can win -- not the end of animal agriculture, but the end of raising veal; not the end of all animal "exploitation," but the end of wearing furs; not the end of using animals in medical research, but the end of sleep-deprivation research or some other type of research that can be presented as an affront to decency.

Second, the movement could develop two tiers of membership. Wilson (1973) states:

"The organization can expand in membership to the extent that prospective members are willing to agree to the doctrine or, in the case of the church, to the creed, but as it expands a distinction develops between those at the center who are doctrinally sophisticated (the inner leadership, the politburo, the priesthood) and those in the rank and file who are to be educated and led."

An elite would hold out for the original vision of societal transformation, keep themselves from any compromise, and pursue a prophetic course. Others, entangled in earning a living, rearing a family, and enjoying friendships, do what they can -- adopt a dog, write a protest letter to a shampoo manufacturer, or buy synthetic clothes.

The early Christian church moved in this direction during the second, third, and fourth centuries. An elite chose to move to the desert and live by the evangelical counsels (blessings for the poor, the meek, and so on). With their vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, they foreswore personal property and wealth, family responsibilities, and even personal autonomy. The way of these monks was declared the way of perfection. For those who were not able to live so purely there developed a second tier of citizenship. Gradually, the word *laos*, which in earliest times referred to all Christians (as in the expression *laos theou* or "the people of God"), came to refer to those who did not follow the monks -- the laity.

The discussion of two-tiered membership leads to final reflection on the movement's leadership. Inevitably, that leadership will pass to a second generation. The nature of that transition might very well be determined by the outcome of its choice of survival strategy. If it evolves from an exclusive, sect-like phenomenon into the inclusive, church-like organization, its charismatic leaders will be replaced by more institutional types. Sect leaders are divinely (self-)appointed; church leaders are selected in some manner by the members. The former rule autocratically; the latter are held accountable through checks and balances. The former gather followers by the strength of their personalities; the latter through good organizational management.

Will charismatic founders such as Ingrid Newkirk and Alex Pacheco be replaced by more organizational types? Already the editors of *Animals' Agenda* magazine have raised questions of organization and accountability (Bartlett 1991; Clifton 1991a,b). By publishing data on the financial assets, ratio of program to administrative expenses, and compensation and benefits for staff of all animal protection groups, they have created pressure for a style of leadership which, though more responsible, will likely dissipate some of the movement's energy.

Conclusion

"Much madness is divinest sense to a discerning eye."

-Emily Dickinson

The American animal rights movement has at times appeared both trivial and significant. Its actions to transform society have ranged from the ridiculous to the sublime. From throwing pies in the face of the Iowa Pork Queen to pleading passionately outside the National Institutes of Health to living lives of quiet asceticism, activists have made their presence felt in most contemporary relationships between humans and animals. As a consequence, the movement's agenda is often dismissed as the fringe lunacy of sentimentalist and emotionally unstable miscreants (Limbaugh 1992).

Social science research contradicts these derogatory stereotypes. The stories of Mary, Kathy, and Caryn, each a well-educated and respected professional, demonstrate the serious commitment to the cause. Though previous research has noted the movement's deep moral concern and earnest desire to redeem society, it has left some interesting questions unanswered. What is the source of this intensity? Once adherents are converted, what keeps them motivated? What factors facilitate group cohesion in its striving for a sweeping and transcendent cause? Should the movement fail to redeem society, what course of action will its members pursue?

We have maintained that understanding the movement as fulfilling a functional definition of religion in the eyes of at least the zealous core of its constituency answers these questions about its intensity, motivation, cohesion, and future course of action. However, we have added a proviso about our language. In the vernacular of modern liberal democracies, religion has come to be type cast as a parochial and peculiarly dogmatic belief system which finds appropriate expression in the lives of individuals rather than in public policy (Fukuyama 1992). Labeling underlying political motivations as religious is sometimes used politically to marginalize those who count themselves as religious adherents. National political strategists in contemporary American culture often scrupulously avoid explicit ties with openly religious groups, lest they seem narrow-minded or extreme. They talk, instead, in secularized terms of family values and a new covenant, attempting to frame their quasi-religious appeal in terms that are, at once, vaguely appealing, familiar, and inoffensive (Wilson 1993). In this way, religious motivation may legitimately enter American politics while attempting to broaden its appeal beyond ecclesiastical boundaries. Henry Hyde (R-IL), a devout Catholic, rarely cites Catholic theology in his objections to abortion. Likewise, the Reverend Jessie Jackson seldom acknowledges to the broader electorate the foundational supernatural mandates for his egalitarian

political agenda. Yet few analyses would deny the religiosity which informs their perspectives. It is in this sense that we have argued that our informants and indeed many animal rights activists, like many participants in the political system, are informed by beliefs that are functioning religiously and that provide a superstructure for their secularized political agenda.

If we can avoid the innuendo and stereotyping that often accompany analyses of the religious motivations for political action, we may obtain a unique perspective on the politics of the animal rights movement. As the French revolutionary Proudhon declared about all issues of public policy, the animal rights controversy, if pursued far enough, turns out to be religious in nature.

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CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Recapitulation

The thesis has presented the results of research concerning the American animal rights movement. The research focused upon animal rights activism, combining survey research, a case study of natural resource policy, and qualitative analysis of active and influential members of the movement. It examined the demographic, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of these members, and placed them in the context of resource policy. The literature indicated that the movement was neither new nor without historical precedent. Rather, the movement was historically and philosophically linked to its antecedent, the Victorian anti-vivisection movement. Like its predecessor, the contemporary animal rights movement combined Victorian sensitivities to societal change which were manifest in opposition to scientific experimentation on animals, with a reaction to modernity which has characterized other mass movements. Similar to the Victorian movement, animal rights is involved in a deeply symbolic debate which perceives animals as cultural icons to represent an idealized natural order. In addition, animal rights resembles anti-vivisection in its systemic critique of society and its calls for personal and societal redemption.

However, the Victorian movement was limited in the scope of its critique. Animal rights, on the other hand, is unlimited in that its calls for moral and legal standing for animals spans from the backyard infatuation with pets to national parks. Unlike the nineteenth century movement, contemporary animal rights advocates projects the symbolic cause of animals into all facets of our culture. To animal rights activists, animals represent nature. Hence, animal rights activists react to alienation and estrangement from the natural world by extending moral values to both domesticated and non-domesticated animals. Having claimed moral values for non-human animals, animal rights advocates are confronted with the practical political dilemma of protecting their symbols' sacred meaning. They have attempted to accomplish this by extending concomitant legal protection to animals.

In effect, movement intellectuals make a compelling case for the extension of rights outward from humanity into the non-human world. They argue that rights are absolute, and thus are the best and most practical means of protecting animals from human exploitation. Philosophers argue that the denial of rights based on arbitrary religious, ethnic, racial and *species* distinctions is discriminatory, and that all higher vertebrates can therefore stake equal claims to moral equivalency. They combine aspects of evolutionary biology, which indicates that humans are inseparably related

to their fellow animals, with liberal egalitarianism, which promotes autonomy and extends universal moral standing.

The thesis places the contemporary American animal rights movement in political context. It is argued that animal rights groups were not historical or cultural aberrations, and that these groups arose from within a political system which legitimized their existence and encouraged their participation. Madisonian interest group democracy placed a premium upon the ability of adversarial factions to organize, protest, seek redress for grievances, and present alternatives policies. Animal rights groups followed in the tradition of other purposive groups which had offered intangible incentives to their members and sought idea-based objectives.

Indeed, animal rights activism is wholly consistent with the American interest group-based political system. Madison predicted that factions would develop, and that these factions would organize to promote and protect their interests. Thus, interest groups like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals are the result of the constitutional legitimization of freedom of association contained in the Bill of Rights.

Nonetheless, American politics responds to intensity. Not all citizens are equally interested in politics, and not all interested citizens are motivated to become directly involved in politics. Thus, identification of a proper

research frame to study the policy impacts of animal rights activism required making distinctions between citizens who are interested, active, and influential in politics. Using Almond's model as a template, animal rights activism was presented in the context of participatory politics. In this model, the top of the pyramid had political ideas which are stable and intense. At the bottom of the pyramid were citizens whose political beliefs are unstable and passive. Therefore, following Almond, the research focuses upon members of the active and influential publics.

These caveats aside, it is argued that the animal rights movement could not have surfaced in its current form prior to the 1960's. Although purposive groups existed throughout American political history, e.g. Women's Temperance Society, they were small and usually ineffectual. Changes in the political system, e.g. its increased accessibility to mass movement politics, increases in regulatory burden, new political technologies, and the success of predecessors like civil rights, consumerism, feminism, and environmentalism, all converged to favor the emergence and increased vigor of purposive interest groups. Animal rights had existed previously in the form of anti-vivisection campaigns, and the deep-seated attitudes which had motivated its historical antecedents had not disappeared. Rather, animal rights as a movement took

advantage of these structural changes and reappeared with renewed vigor.

Survey results concerning the demographics, attitudes and behaviors of animal rights activists indicated that typical respondents were caucasian, highly-educated urban professional women approximately thirty years old with a median income of \$33,000 (1989). Most activists were Democrats or Independents and had moderate to liberal political views. They were often suspicious of science. The research also suggests that animal rights activism is a symbolic manifestation of egalitarian social and political beliefs concerning scientific and technological change. The activists are not marginal to the political system and participated in politics in a variety of legitimate ways. The survey also suggests that animal rights activism is indeed a symbolic manifestation of egalitarian social and political views concerning scientific and technological change.

Following the survey results, the thesis presented a case study which placed animal rights activism in practical natural resource policy context. The case study indicates that animal rights activists are politically sophisticated and able to rely upon anthropomorphic egalitarianism as an alternative basis for natural resource policy. In California, animal rights groups built a political coalition with environmental groups by establishing *quid pro quo*

relationships whereby environmentalists provided financial and organizational support in exchange for allocation of state funds. The coalition successfully passed an initiative to ban mountain lion hunting in California, and redirect \$900 million in the California budget for habitat acquisition.

However, the policy study also identified incongruence and potential schisms between animal rights groups and their environmental allies. Practical political considerations caused friction between the groups. Environmentalists were cautious lest their association with animal rights extremists cause erosion of their credibility. Animal rights advocates were skeptical of the pragmatism of environmentalists, lest the distinctive redemptive and ideological fervor that characterizes animal rights be compromised. These considerations aside, the practical political concerns were indicative of deeper, profoundly differing interpretations of normative environmental values. Animal rights is predicated upon personal autonomy, the ascendance of individualism, and the moral and legal protection of the individual. Environmentalism is predicated upon systemic concerns, the importance of interrelationships, and the supremacy of the whole over the individual. These differences illustrate schisms which divide animal rights from environmentalism.

Both the survey research and the case study indicate that animal rights activists maintain extraordinary levels of commitment and rigidity in their dedication to the cause. Following these findings, the thesis presented qualitative research which suggested that animal rights activism is, in part, motivated by beliefs which fulfill Yinger's functional definition of religion. The analysis helps explain the quasi-religious language often incorporated in animal rights rhetoric and the origin of the abolitionist zeal common among activists. It is argued that among a core constituency of animal rights activists, animal rights serves as functional religion. Activists experienced emotional epiphanies regarding animal suffering, and underwent hard conversion experiences. Having converted, they created communities which reinforced their new values, policed behavior, and advanced their abolitionist political agenda. Animal rights also provides converted activists with a creed which identifies human culpability as the preeminent source of animal suffering. Animal rights activists are called to adhere to an ascetic code of conduct which is, at once, noble and unattainable. Finally, their beliefs system serves as a cult, providing ritualized eating and animal symbols for converts.

Yinger's definition also explains the mechanism through which redemptive mass movements like animal rights may retain their activism and group cohesion in incremental

political systems. The movement places moral culpability upon its activists' shoulders, and its rhetoric exacerbates their sins. With no external mode of penance, it then offers itself as the ultimate form of absolution. With a creed that presents a disheartening picture of their world and a code of behavior which is at once unattainable and noble, believers are drawn into further activism as a source of penance. The movement offers absolution through increased activism, and the increased activism refuels its zeal.

Discussion

This thesis has told a progressive story. Having surveyed 426 animal rights activists, it was concluded that animal rights activism was much more mainstream than had been anticipated. Other social science research was corroborated in that activists were well-educated, middle class Americans with time, financial resources and, most importantly, the will to access and influence politics.

The passage of Initiative #117 in 1990 demonstrated that animal rights groups were gaining political sophistication and were able to implement animal-rights based natural resource legislation. They were able to build a political coalition with environmentalists on an issue-specific basis by manipulating the political process to their advantage. In so doing, they were able to surmount the practical and theoretical obstacles which divide animal

rights and environmentalism. They were also able to overcome the opposition of powerful material interest groups which have traditionally found favor in consensual natural resource policy relationships. The success of Initiative #117 also demonstrated that animal rights leaders were able to overcome the burden of philosophical purity which self-limits all redemptive and ideological groups. The success of the initiative indicates that movement leaders may have begun the transition from redemptive and ideological status to goal-oriented status.

More importantly, the success of Initiative #117, when coupled with the survey data, indicates that animal rights affords a resonant policy alternative. It was concluded that animal rights activists are predominantly urban. Data from the MLPF membership survey supports this conclusion. Furthermore, the Initiative #117 voting pattern followed an urban-rural split. Therefore, the values that differentiate rural from urban life may have influenced natural resource policy. It is postulated that these differing urban and rural values are indicative of distinct epistemologies. If so, this could be significant for agriculturalists and natural resource managers because they constitute a minority whose rural epistemology is at odds with that of the urban majority. In addition, animal rights activism may be, in some cases, motivated by religious zeal. This zeal may be responsible for the redemptive, abolitionist, and

fundamentalist nature of the movement. If this is indeed the case, abolitionist legislation like Initiative #117 makes pragmatic policy resolutions of natural resource and agricultural animal issues very problematic.

Implications for Future Research

The research combined a large sample survey of animal rights activists with qualitative research into the policy implications and origins of intensity of animal rights activism. The data are limited to the active and influential members of animal rights organizations. Nonetheless, the high response rate and variety of methodologies should have increased research validity. Social science research published since the initiation of this thesis supports the validity of the findings (Richards 1990; Plous 1991; Jasper and Nelkin 1992; Herzog 1993a,b). However, design limitations indicated that results should be interpreted with caution.

The demographic profile found by this and other surveys indicates that animal rights advocates in the attentive, active and influential public are well-educated, liberal and upper-middle class. The possibility exists, however, that selection bias was nonetheless present. Animal rights advocates who did not fit the economic profile will be selected against in surveys of direct mail subscribers and marchers. Both frames are based upon the ability to purchase subscriptions and travel to remote protests.

Indeed, animal rights advocates who were unable for socio-economic reasons to protest or subscribe may have been less educated and conservative.

Finally, future research could benefit from the baseline data contained in this thesis. Several important questions emerged from the data and informant interviews. Why were the overwhelming majority of animal rights activists women? Why was the movement dominated by caucasians? Modified sampling designs could address these questions through the inclusion of representative subsamples. How do activist epistemologies compare to the epistemologies of natural resource managers and farmers? Ethnographic research could provide relevant contexts for a large-sample blocked survey cross-comparison between animal rights activists on the one hand and farmers on the other. Future research should attempt to more fully elucidate the origins and basis of anthropomorphic egalitarianism.

Conclusion

"The History of the world is none other than
the progress of the consciousness of Freedom"

-Kant

"The fault, dear Brutus, is not in
our stars, but in ourselves"

-William Shakespeare

The contemporary American animal rights movement has attempted to realize nothing less than the radical extension of egalitarianism. In so doing, animal rights follows in

the political tradition of other mass movements like civil rights and environmentalism which have emerged to influence governmental institutions and change the face of American politics.

Animal rights is a peculiar hybrid of liberal egalitarian ideals with a reaction to modernity. In effect, the animal rights movement has shrouded many of environmentalism's reactions to industrialization and science within the rhetoric of rights. Having framed the animal use issues in moral terms, having usurped the nomenclature of rights in the cause of animal protection, the animal rights movement has left its opponents unprepared to contest its philosophical underpinnings. Agriculturalists are unprepared to discuss political theory, and their tacit reliance upon utilitarian justifications for animal use are increasingly remote to the concerns of the culture within which they must exist. While the American population's urban affluence left it free to pursue self-actualization, agriculturalists appear to be in culture lag. Based upon personal observation of hundreds of farmers and industry personnel nationwide, the agricultural community as a whole is neither capable nor willing to discuss and defend their underlying epistemologies in a coherent and intellectually persuasive fashion. Hence, agriculture stands exposed to post-modern criticism.

Natural resource managers, on the other hand, have formed a symbiotic relationship with their powerful environmental constituency. In exchange for political support, natural resource bureaucracies have provided environmentalists with favorable policies and programs. Indeed, much of natural resource policy is predicated upon assumptions familiar to the environmental community. Paradoxically, animal rights for non-domesticated animals undermines normative environmental ideals, thus challenging natural resource managers to respond. Like their agricultural counterparts, natural resource managers have behaved as if they existed within a cultural void, able to implement quantitative animal management policies devoid of the human sentimentalism which marks their urban constituents. Many managers, who are dependent upon political support for their institutions, are unable to defend their practices to their animal rights constituency.

What is the future of the animal rights movement? The movement may be similar to the early Western Christian church in that it faces a choice between inclusive pragmatism and exclusive sectarianism. Its leaders may gain solace from the evolution of environmentalism from its redemptive and ideological origins toward goal-oriented status. Nonetheless, animal rights as a movement must either compromise or be politically marginalized.

This is not to say that the cultural underpinnings that manifested themselves as the animal rights movement will disappear. Instead they may dissolve back into the social milieu from which they precipitated. Its most significant long-term legacy and its distinctive characteristic may have been its exemplification of challenges to the philosophical structure which supports liberal democracy. Regan and Singer argue a culturally and morally relativistic perspective.

As Fukuyama (1992) points out

"Relativism-the doctrine that maintains that all values are merely relative and which attacks all "privileged perspectives"-must ultimately end up undermining democratic and tolerant values as well. Relativism is not a weapon that can be aimed selectively at the enemies one chooses. It fires indiscriminantly, shooting out the legs of not only the "absolutisms," dogmas, and certainties of the Western tradition, but the tradition's emphasis on tolerance, diversity, and freedom of thought as well. If nothing can be true absolutely, if all values are culturally determined, than cherished principles like human equality have to go by the wayside as well."

Anthropomorphic egalitarianism may be one such manifestation. Animal rights attacks all delineations between human and non-human animals as arbitrary, and in their place posits new arbitrary distinctions based upon sentience, species, or inherent value. Yet, as Nash (1989) so lucidly points out, the ever expanding extension of rights, once uncoupled from its traditional predications, is unlimited in scope and breathtaking in its implications. The uncoupling of rights from their cultural origins confronts

the opponent of animal rights with a dilemma: In order to refute animal rights, it may become necessary to refute human rights as well.

The esoteric debates about theoretical underpinnings of Western rationality aside, animal rights activism must be addressed by farmers and natural resource managers who deal with domesticated and non-domesticated animals. Our culture abounds with examples of differing values coming into conflict over the proper interpretation, and therefore use, of non-human nature. In this context, the job of natural resource managers becomes one of consolidation of these conflicting values into coherent policy.

Our nation's parks, refuges and natural areas are vestigial, mere vignettes of what once was. Indeed, the very concept of wilderness is, upon closer examination, a cultural artifact (Nash 1982). It serves no constructive purpose for managers to dismiss animal rights activism as an illegitimate romantic longing to return to a sentimentalized past which never existed (Chase 1987). Instead, they should view their resources as islands in an urban sea. Their island, like a Gauguin painting, tempts our imaginations with a bucolic, idyllic vision of paradise. Yet, in reality the island is profoundly influenced by the sea's currents, tides, and storms. The slightest sea change profoundly effects the island.

Like that island in the greater sea, natural resources do not exist in an amoral cultural vacuum. People project their values into nature. Natural resource managers interpret and implement these values. Therefore, conflicting values, including anthropomorphic egalitarianism, necessarily have profound impact upon the non-human world. To think otherwise is folly.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

RATIONALE AND RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

In writing the thesis, it became evident that I ran the risk of presenting a unified dissertation in a rather disjointed fashion. This dilemma stemmed from several factors. First, I chose the manuscript thesis option, which allows the use of published and submitted work as the text. My results are contained in chapters three, four, and five, and each chapter was written in a stand-alone style as separate articles. Hence, each contains an introduction, a review of relevant literature, and discussion. This alone facilitated the need for an appendix rationale to explain and tie together the various pieces.

Second, each of the articles involved distinct research frames and styles, and hence, differing research methodology. Chapter three originally contained an elaborate discussion of survey methodology, but this section was greatly reduced by journal editors. The survey research was dependent upon quantitative methodology contained in Dillman (1978) and Scheaffer, Mendenhall and Ott (1990). Chapters four and five relied upon informant interviews, and the methodology for the interviews was taken in part from Agar (1980), Spradley (1980), and Bernard (1988).

Third, each of the articles is written in distinctive styles, using formal, narrative, and conversational styles. The variation in these styles may have caused a disjointed text. Hence, it was evident that care should be taken to explain the reasoning for each chapter's stylistic requirements.

Fourth, and most importantly, the chapters were distinct research projects. Whereas the survey research developed a large sample and followed the sampling axiom, "Whenever and wherever possible, randomize!", the policy research used informant narratives to synthesize an overview and analysis of Initiative #117. Finally, in chapter five, the reader may ask, "Is a sample size of three valid?" Indeed, the interviews with Mary, Kathy, and Caryn were not intended to be representative. However, that is not to say that the inferences drawn from the religious analysis are necessarily invalid. I related Yinger's functional definition of religion and Francione and Charlton's legal reasoning to previously published activist statements, extant social science research, and three informant interviews. My intent was to demonstrate that Yinger's definition is applicable to animal rights activism, thus answering questions relating to interest group theory.

This rationale is intended to provide the reader with a chronological and methodological overview of the research. It describes the methodology of each research project,

discusses some of the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of each project, and relates the findings to emergent social science research. It concludes with suggestions for future research.

Chronology

The initial purpose of the thesis research was limited to an examination of the characteristics of animal rights activists. A literature review indicated that no large sample social science research into animal rights activism existed. Hence, the research intended to provide an initial sample of animal rights activists, thus providing future researchers with baseline data and further research questions. The paucity of existing research at that time limited the focus of the research to broad, descriptive questions. In other words, in the absence of any extant data, a broad net was cast.

The research tells a story of both the intellectual development of its author and of the movement. As the researcher gained knowledge of the movement, the questions followed a logical progression from "What" to "How" to "Why." In effect, the research fed upon itself as each preliminary finding opened several new questions. Upon initially asking "What is it?", the answers suggested that the movement was tapping into deeply-held cultural beliefs and was quite capable of having profound impacts throughout American culture. Thus, the second question became, "How

might the movement influence policies?" The preliminary findings to both the first and second questions in turn suggested a third question: "Why are animal rights activists so intense?" The research flowed smoothly from one focus to another.

Nonetheless, the original intent was not to study animal rights activists in the context of natural resource policy. The survey instrument was in part dedicated to an examination of agricultural policy. However, proximity to a research frame is essential in social science research, and the California Mountain Lion Initiative was both interesting and proximate. The initiative affected both natural resource and agricultural policy through its ban on hunting a predatory animal and its reallocation of \$900 million toward nebulously defined habitat acquisition.

The thesis research further evolved when the United States National Park Service expressed interest in funding research and analysis of animal rights activism in the national parks. The grant likewise involved participation in formulating an Environmental Impact Statement for the USNPS's management of exotic goats in Olympic National Park. Hence, the thesis research, quite inadvertently, eventually used natural resource policy as the context for animal rights activism.

Initial Research

The initial research was conducted using face-to-face interviews. The spontaneous nature of animal rights demonstrations had posed framing problems. Hence, the March for the Animals in Washington, D.C., provided an unprecedented opportunity to examine animal rights activists by concentrating 30,000 of them for an extended period of time. Dillman (1978) provided guidance in question construction and placement, and Scheaffer, Mendenhall and Ott (1990) provided guidance on randomization. Dillman (1978) indicated that face-to face interviews were the most robust and representative survey tools. He lists their strengths as: 1) obtaining a representative sample, and 2) highest quality questionnaire construction and question design. Face-to-face interviews have the following weaknesses: 1) Social desirability bias and interviewer distortion, likelihood that personnel requirements can be met, 2) potential speed of implementation, and 3) cost.

The research design attempted to address the characteristic weaknesses of face-to-face interviews listed by Dillman. The personnel requirements were met by the use of extraordinarily qualified interviewers. The project used the help of The Wirthlin Group (a Washington, D.C.-based polling organization) and faculty at Georgetown University to recruit interviewers. All interviewers had at least a bachelor's degree, and several were graduate students or had

already received graduate degrees. Most of the interviewers had extensive survey administration experience in face-to-face or telephone surveys. Many of them worked full-time for a professional polling organization. The interviewers' experience, education level, and professional training were uncharacteristically high, and undoubtedly helped overcome personnel weakness.

Social desirability bias and interviewer distortion was addressed by training interviewers in questionnaire administration. Through practice interviews and subsequent question-and-answer periods, interviewers were able to understand survey wording, pacing, and manipulation of response cards. The researchers were present and able to answer theoretical or practical questions from the interviewers. The training session also familiarized them with animal rights sensitivities, stressing awareness of their respondents aesthetic concerns. Likewise, during the actual administration of the survey, the researchers were present to answer interviewer questions and concerns.

Speed of implementation was addressed by the concentration of respondents for a set period of time in a predetermined location. This greatly facilitated the ability to minimize non-response bias. In final form, the questionnaire was eight pages in length and took approximately twelve to fifteen minutes to complete. Questions were posed by interviewers, who read from pre-

printed copies of the questionnaire. Respondents were given response cards for most questions. They were instructed to give the letter corresponding to their response for each question. Interviewers recorded all responses directly on a copy of the questionnaire.

The survey presented unique design challenges. How could the research team randomize respondents in the context of a protest march? Which research design would remain robust in the context of a fluid research frame? The research used a modified stratified systematic sampling technique (Dillman 1978). The march consisted of three stages. There was an initial rally at the Ellipse (a park behind the White House), the march to Capitol Hill, and an afternoon rally on Capitol Hill. At the edge of the initial rally, the interviewers were lined-up, separated by approximately twenty feet. The interviewers were randomly numbered one through twenty-three. Each interviewer then identified a landmark across the ellipse to orient their progress through the crowd. Each interviewer then proceeded into the crowd the number of yards equal to their assigned number (e.g. interviewer number five proceeded five yards into the crowd before stopping; number ten proceeded ten yards, and so on). Once an interviewer had gone the required distance, he or she stopped and selected the person closest to them; they then counted three persons to the right and initiated the interview with that person. The

three-to-the-right system was used to avoid the selection of respondents on a non-random basis. The interviewers identified themselves upon initiating the interview to insure that the respondent had not been interviewed previously.

After each interview, the interviewer would reorient relative to the landmark and then move further into the crowd, repeating the randomization procedure prior to the next contact. As the actual march began, interviewers were instructed to remain with the respondent being interviewed. At the completion of the interview, the interviewers then continued in the procession, using coin flips to randomize contact and interviews with marchers that were proximate to their location in the procession. Upon reaching Capitol Hill, the procedure from the initial rally was repeated.

Second Research Project

The second stage of the research involved in-depth interviews in California. The case study stemmed from two serendipitous discoveries made during the survey research. First, the night before the "March," the activists and elites of the movement held a party to commemorate the growth of the movement. The researchers were in attendance. During the party, a prominent animal rights leader announced that animal rights activists were able to pass an initiative banning the hunting of mountain lions in California by using only volunteers. This pronouncement was remarkable in two

aspects. First, the National Rifle Association was known as one of the most powerful of single-issue groups and was certain to oppose a ban on hunting, and the success of the relatively immature animal rights movement was extraordinary. Second, the use of volunteers to collect qualifying signatures was astounding, indicated an exceptional level of intensity. Cronin (1989) indicated that, particularly in big states like California, interest groups almost always use paid petition circulators to qualify ballot initiatives. The ability of the animal rights movement to recruit, organize and maintain the intensity of political activists was indicative of its political viability. In addition to the pronouncements of animal rights leaders, later analysis of data from the "March" indicated that the activists were marked by high levels of intensity.

Analysis of notes from informant interviews conducted during the party indicated that animal rights activists were intensely committed to the cause of animal protection. Following these findings, the researchers traveled to California to examine the ability of animal rights activists to influence natural resource policy. The researchers used established interview techniques, and relied upon Agar (1980), Spradley (1980), and Bernard (1988) for guidance.

Third Research Project

Both the data and the case study indicated that animal rights activists were uncommonly intense. During informant interviews at the Washington "March," several activists used what can only be described as quasi-religious language. In the in-depth interviews, activists referred to the movement as a cause, and they indicated that they possessed esoteric knowledge which led to moral enlightenment. Analysis of responses to open-ended questions on the survey instrument likewise indicated that moralism of some type was a significant motivational factor.

During the interviews in California, both proponents and opponents of Initiative #117 remarked that animal rights activists were extraordinarily intense. Indeed, one leader of the Mountain Lion Preservation Foundation referred to training their activists as "Blooding the Faithful." Other animal rights leaders referred to animal rights activists as "true believers."

Concurrent to the survey and case study discovery of activist intensity, the burgeoning research literature on animal rights activism focuses upon the activists' intensity and the movement's intense moralism. Jasper and Nelkin (1992) referred to the movement as fundamentalists, and Herzog (1993) indicated that personal moral conversion was a central unifying tenant of animal rights activism. These citations, combined with the thesis research, indicated that

animal rights activism was motivated by levels of intensity not unlike that found in redemptive religions. Justice Potter Stewart once stated, "I can't define pornography, but I know it when I see it!" The researcher felt the same way about the religious underpinnings of animal rights activism.

Nonetheless, it took the published treatise by an animal rights leader and lawyer to crystalize the third research objective. Francione and Charlton (1992) argued that animal rights activism fulfilled a functional definition of religion and thus warranted protection under the religious exclusion clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution. As often happens in scientific endeavors, Francione and Charlton's comment provided the serendipitous catalyst to view animal rights activism from a different perspective. The literature review indicated that leaders and activists of the movement had often framed the movement in religious terms, using messianic and millenarian imagery to invigorate their calls for abolition of all animal use. Hence, the third objective of the research was to revisit animal rights activism to see if indeed it fulfilled Yinger's (1970) definition of functional religion.

The qualitative analysis contained in chapter five relied upon published comments by animal rights activists and interviews with three informants. In conducting informant interviews, Agar (1980), Spradley (1980), and Bernard (1988) were once again referred to for guidance.

Extrapolating from such a small sample to all animal rights activists is potentially problematic. Nonetheless, the analysis elaborated upon Francione and Charlton's (1992) observations and suggested that future research could utilize Yinger's (1970) definition as a focus for further disclosing the basis of animal rights intensity.

Conclusion

At the time of the initial research project, there was no quantitative social science research into the demographic, attitudinal and behavioral bases of animal rights activism. This would not remain the case. During the analysis of data from the survey, Richards (1990) completed her dissertation on a direct-mail survey of the attentive members of animal rights groups. Likewise, Plous (1990) published preliminary results of direct-mail responses from animal rights activists. In 1992, Jasper and Nelkin published a book elaborating their quantitative research involving the movement, and Herzog and Kaplan (1991) as well as Herzog (1993) published both quantitative and qualitative data on animal rights activists.

Each project examined a different frame, and each project was isolated in its attempts to explain the emergence of the animal rights movement. Nonetheless, the data from the researchers combines to portray animal rights activism in strikingly similar terms, and reinforces the composite which is presented in Chapter three.

The quantitative characteristics of the movement have thus been elaborated. Future research should focus upon policy research which explores the implications of animal rights for agricultural, natural resource, and other policies. Likewise, future research should elaborate the functional religiosity of some of the movement's core constituents.

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APPENDIX B

A NATURAL RESOURCE CONSTITUENCY DECISION MATRIX

Introduction

Relationships between people and animals have always been the source of interest and affection. Yet, in the modern age these relationships have become a visible and contentious area of public policy. Indeed, largely due to the success of the animal rights movement, Americans have become increasingly sensitized to the treatment of domesticated animals in the production of food and fiber, entertainment, and as research subjects (Balzar 1993). Increased public interest in animal protection has, in turn, spurred the rapid growth of animal rights groups and the passage of regulations. Nonetheless, animal rights has traditionally focused upon pets, farm animals, and research animals. Recently, however, animal rights groups have also questioned the treatment (or mistreatment) of non-domesticated animals.

Traditionally, the role of non-domesticated animals in the United States has typically been approached at the species level and has focused upon specific species and their interactions within the ecosystem (Nash 1982, 1989). However, the modern animal rights movement has evolved to question all facets of human/non-human animal relationships. As a logical concomitant of moral extensionism, the movement

to extend moral consideration and legal protection to animals now impacts non-domesticated animals.

Natural resource managers are often faced with policy choices involving the control of animals, and their decisions may involve both lethal and non-lethal methods. Hence, various efforts by constituents of natural resource agencies to extend protections to non-domesticated animals creates new challenges and responsibilities. How will managers, who have traditionally viewed animals within the ecosystemic context, interact with a movement which asks them to approach animal control from the perspective of the individual animals? The incongruence between traditional and new interpretations of wildlife in the ecosystem creates tension between animal rights groups, environmental groups, and natural resource agencies (Knickerbocker 1994). Hence, in order to effectively serve a growing and potentially important constituent group like animal rights activists, managers must understand the motivations and policy perspectives shared among these groups.

This paper places the American animal rights movement in the context of natural resource policy. It briefly describes the development of the contemporary movement, presents a review of relevant schools of environmental and animal rights thought, elaborates a philosophical schism which divides the two schools, and presents a decision

matrix with which managers may approach interpretation of animal rights in non-domesticated animals.

Historical Context

The American animal rights movement has experienced notable successes in recent years. This includes the creation of a large number of organizations which claim hundreds of thousands of members and annual budgets in the millions of dollars (Kopperud 1989). While the contemporary movement has traditionally been marked by criticisms of animal-based biomedical research, the movement continues to undergo metamorphosis, and presently the animal rights movement is notable for its diversity (Rowan 1989; Animal Welfare Institute 1990). In keeping with the movement's continued evolution, it has proposed alternative management policies which present resource managers with unique and distinctive challenges. Examples include the movement's calls for protection of feral and exotic animals and ending hunting as a management tool. These controversial policies pose several interesting questions: how should individual animals be viewed within vignettes of natural systems, what are the motivations surrounding the movement to extend rights to non-domesticated animals, and if conflict arises between the interests of animal (e.g. exotic or feral species) and the functioning of the ecosystem, how should the natural resource manager respond? The implications of these alternatives are broad and far reaching, and they have

already had important impacts on animal management policies.

Yet, how did the movement get started? What are its origins? How did the cause of animal protection gain social prominence? Two social movements concerned with human use of animals came into existence in the nineteenth century. The reform-oriented Humane movement and the radical Anti-vivisection movement both arose out of profound social reactions to increasing technological change and were concerned with the symbolic position of animals as symbolic liaisons and mediators between people and the natural world. Originating as reactions to the Industrial Revolution, each movement was responding partly to perceptions of the increasing human exploitation of, and intrusion into, the natural world (Sperling 1988). Alienated Victorians were experiencing unprecedented social upheaval, which in turn lead to highly sentimental, romanticized interpretations of their lost rural life (Lansbury 1985). These sentiments had deep impacts upon social interpretations regarding the "proper" treatment of animals (French 1975).

During periods of intense technological change and social displacement, there has often been receptivity to criticism of forces in society, such as empiricism and its concomitant scientific management, that appear responsible for change. When placed in this context, both the anti-vivisection movements of the nineteenth and twentieth century and the animal rights movement reflect increasing

social anxiety regarding scientific and technological transformation (French 1975; Lansbury 1985; Sperling 1988). Rowan (1993) argues that the convergence of evolutionary theory and utilitarian philosophy during the nineteenth century likewise served to highlight, and subsequently question, the status of animals in newly industrialized western democracies (Rowan 1993).

In contemporary America, the Humane movement has sought reform and moderation in the treatment of, and attitudes toward, both domesticated and non-domesticated animals. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) reflects this outlook. Until recently the Humane movement, which reflects a utilitarian ethical position, accepted most humane controls on non-domesticated animals. In other words, as long as hunting and other forms of lethal wildlife controls minimized pain and suffering, they were acceptable. Because of this implied acceptance, the reformist movement has not presented significant scientific, political or ideological alternatives to natural resource managers.

By contrast, the contemporary animal rights movement opposes the killing of animals for most, if not all, reasons (Regan and Francione 1992). The movement is similar to the anti-vivisection movement in that it opposes the scientific objectification of animals. However, unlike its Victorian

antecedent, the animal rights movement extends rights to all domesticated and non-domesticated animals.

The emergence of the contemporary animal rights movement is often dated from 1975. The publication of Australian philosopher Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* that year provided a rationale for those who object to human use (or misuse) of animals. Singer's book was the first contemporary work on the subject to gain widespread popularity. Then, in 1983, Tom Regan published *The Case for Animal Rights*. In it, Regan (1983) argued that biological similarities between humans and other higher vertebrates mandated similar, and thus equal, moral consideration. Regan (1983) posited that the only acceptable method of assuring equal consideration was the extension of rights to all animals.

Both Singer (1975, 1990) and Regan (1983) argued from an anthropocentric philosophical imperative which held that animals were unjustly exploited. Yet the idea that animals are unprotected from human malevolence, thus requiring public advocacy to protect their interests, has not been restricted to the farm and lab. The Fund for Animals became well-known for its efforts to protect non-domesticated animals. Ranging from Grizzlies in Yellowstone National Park to Burros in Grand Canyon National Park, the Fund for Animals actively intervened in animal management policies (Chase 1987; Jasper and Nelkin 1992).

Since the mid-seventies the animal rights movement has evolved to incorporate various ideologies that encompass a wide variety of groups from moderate single-issue groups to more radical groups such as the Animal Liberation Front. While all facets of the animal rights movement have played significant roles in the advancement of animal protection, to date it has been the more extremist elements of the movement which have generated the greatest visibility for movement grievances against the exploitation (or management, depending on your perspective) of non-domesticated animals (Rowan 1984). These factions have influenced public perceptions, consequently increasing moral and financial support for the movement. Because of this visibility and the concurrent publicity generated by the radical factions, the issues surrounding the moral status of animals have been framed in moralistic terms (Jasper and Nelkin 1992). Likewise, because the moral framing of the issue struck a chord among their urban constituents, natural resource managers have recently been asked to incorporate ethical considerations into their animal management schemes (Sparhawk 1994).

What factors have facilitated acceptance of the movement's message? In the modern era, philosophers have advanced a cogent and salient argument for moral extension to animals. These arguments have found a receptive audience among an American populace whose rapid urbanization

reflected stunning demographic shifts from country to city life. This urbanization, in turn, facilitated a sentimental longing to return to an idealized rural life, with its proximate relationships to nature and animals. Rowan (1993) states that with a philosophical imperative for the moral consideration of animals firmly established, scientific evidence from primate and cetacean researchers indicated these animals had cognitive ability, social groups, and even rudimentary language. This, in turn, eventually caused people to further identify with non-human animals (Rowan 1993). In other words, science indicated that animals were much closer to humans than previously thought, evolutionary theory indicated that human and non-human animals were biologically related, and philosophers had argued convincingly that animals deserved moral consideration. With these factors established within the public perception, calls for moral and legal protection for non-humans were not surprising. These factors have all combined to create an atmosphere of empathetic anthropomorphism toward domesticated and non-domesticated animals (Adams 1990; Rowan 1989).

Animal Rights as an Alternative Environmental Ethic: Theory and Practical Application

Coalitions between environmental and animal rights groups appear to be a logical coupling of similar interests, both of which are concerned with the protection and

preservation of the non-human natural world. Nonetheless, the two movements are distinct in their historical and intellectual origins, and the movements are predicated on different assumptions. The passage of an initiative in California in 1990 illustrates the potential for animal rights/environmental coalitions. More importantly, it exemplifies the deep divide which separates the two movements.

In California in 1990, animal rights groups and environmental groups were able to pass an initiative which banned the hunting of mountain lions and allocated thirty million dollars per year for thirty years for habitat acquisition (Jamison and Lunch, unpublished). Yet, prior to the success of the mountain lion initiative, animal rights and environmental movements had little previous record of cooperation. Why hadn't the apparently attractive coalitions between animal rights and environmental organizations formed with more regularity prior to California mountain lion initiative? Why has the environmental community been reluctant to fully accept the animal rights community as a natural ally? The failure of the two movements to cement relations can be traced in part, to deeper, profoundly different philosophical perspectives concerning the non-human world. Each movement views the world through its own spectacles, which have been ground to the specifications of quite different movement

intellectuals. Such differences have been manifest thus far primarily in academic circles; but in those debates, the animal rights and environmental movements have proven to be far from natural allies.

In *The Rights of Nature*, Nash (1989) chronicles the evolution of environmental thought. He connects the animal rights movement and classic American egalitarianism. Nash traces the evolution of rights theory outward from the white males of the American Revolution to slaves, females, and ultimately non-human animals and all of nature. However, Nash (1989) stops short of validating animal rights as an acceptable environmental ethic. Instead, he argues that the animal rights movement is a necessary, if temporary, precursor to the environmental movement, a part of the evolution of a more holistic moral community. Regardless of Nash's attempts to reconcile animal rights and environmentalism, a schism exists between egalitarianism on the one hand and collectivism on the other.

To Regan (1983), Nash's (1989) progression of rights from humans to non-humans is not only logical but inevitable. Animal rights philosophers argue that the spread of egalitarianism from human to non-human animals is qualitative rather than quantitative. Thus, many animal rights intellectuals and activists project anthropomorphic egalitarian beliefs into the non-human natural world. But, animal rights advocates draw an egalitarian distinction

between higher vertebrates and other animals. This is due to their reliance on sentience, consciousness and intelligence as measurements of inherent value (Singer 1975, 1990; Regan 1983).

However, many environmental philosophers have a far different perspective concerning the relationship between people and nature. In *A Sand County Almanac*, Aldo Leopold (1949) concisely posits a cornerstone of philosophical ecology:

"All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts...The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to *include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land* [emphasis added]."

Leopold's biocentrism extended ethical consideration to all of nature. A number of contemporary ecophilosophers, including Devall and Sessions (1985), Callicot (1987), and Sagoff (1988) follow this line. They argue for the interconnected relationships of nature; that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; and that human and non-human animals are a subset of the larger organic whole. Consequently, environmental philosophers regularly contend that symbiotic interconnectedness is -- or should be -- the normative goal in defining the ethical relationship between people and nature. This philosophy manifests itself in many

contexts. For example, National Park Service (NPS) policy (1968) indicates management predicated on such beliefs:

"The concept of preservation of a total environment, as compared with the protection of an individual feature or species, is a distinguishing feature of national park management."

While ecological philosophers emphasize the integrity of the system as a whole, animal rights intellectuals contend each individual animal in the system can make equal moral claims. So, on the one hand, animal rights, if they are to exist at all, are predicated on the recognition of individual autonomy, and subsequent governmental protection of individual rights and claims. On the other hand, ecology emphasizes a type of biological collectivism in which individual liberty must often be sacrificed for the greater good, subsumed to the demands of the environment.

Therein lies a dilemma. On the one hand, animal rights theoreticians believe that natural resource policies predicated on biocentric ecology and ecosystems management are not acceptable. Regan (1985) goes so far as to characterize ecological holism as "environmental fascism". Other animal rights philosophers such as Peter Singer see the basis of moral consideration in the possession of sentience, effectively limiting governmental protection to higher vertebrates. Nevertheless, to Regan and Singer, the dominant ideas in environmental thought (and natural resource policy) lead to the devaluation of individual life.

On the other hand, some environmental philosophers ridicule the anthropomorphic egalitarianism advanced by animal rights philosophers. How, they ask, can humans project political constructs such as rights upon the non-human world? And how, they ask, would disputes between conflicting rights be settled... by predator-prey arbitration? Sagoff (1984) believes that holistic natural resource policies inevitably sacrifice individual interests to the interests of the biologic community. He ridicules animal rightists who defend the individual at the expense of normal, systemic, organic processes.

Fisher (1987), Callicott (1988), Grunewald-Rifkin (1992) and Pachelke (1993) have attempted to reconcile the two perspectives. And yet, a divide remains, if not in the lives of individual citizens who support both movements, then certainly in the philosophical mandates for each movements' existence. Rights are an abstract political construct, are dichotomous, and largely incompatible in respect to ethical relationships with non-domesticated animals (Hargrove 1992).

So a profound theoretical split exists between the animal rights and environmental movements. One believes in the inherent value and equality of the individual while the other believes in the superiority of the whole. Animal rights philosophers favor natural resource policy that protects the individual interests of animals while most

environmental philosophers favor policies that seek systemic goals.

The axiom, "the philosophical leads the applied", is appropriate in the case of this debate. Such ideological disputes, thus far largely confined to campus debates, may be indicators of the deep-seated distrust and suspicion between environmental and animal rights groups. Because of this distrust, natural resource managers may increasingly be confronted with concrete manifestations of this abstract debate. One example of the schism is provided by each movement's response to National Park Service (NPS) policy. The lethal control of bison and elk populations in Yellowstone National Park has sometimes been deemed appropriate by NPS managers. Park Service managers, many with backgrounds in environmental biology and wildlife science, have attempted to stabilize the ecosystem by predation and hunting (Chase 1987). While the environmental community dislikes human intervention in natural processes, it recognizes the legitimacy and necessity of managing animal populations. Managing non-domesticated animals sometimes requires killing them. But the animal rights community seeks to prevent the killing of these animals, even if the ecosystem suffers.

A similar rift between environmentalists and animal rights advocates has developed in Olympic National Park. The NPS contends that, inside the park, exotic mountain

goats are impacting the native flora of the alpine zones. The NPS, with the support of environmentalists, may eradicate the goats from the park. But advocates for the animal rights organization "Fund for Animals" are attempting to stop any plans for eradication (Pachelle 1993).

So repeatedly, seemingly abstruse philosophical conflicts between animal rights advocates and environmentalists are reflected in real world policy. Whether in Olympic or Yellowstone National Parks, whether at Gettysburg Battlefield or in a local wildlife refuge, ecosystemic and anthropomorphic ideals will conflict. Resolving these conflicts in a fashion acceptable to both movements, although not impossible, is rather problematic. And the ability of natural resource managers to quantify these conflicts has been limited by the lack of a conceptual framework with which to approach animal rights and environmental ethics. The purpose of the matrix below is to provide managers with such a framework, enabling them to identify and predict constituent responses to proposed management plans.

The Decision Matrix

The animal rights movement, like the Victorian anti-vivisection movement, originates in a reaction to empiricism. Both movements respond to the scientific objectification of animals by seeking their protection. However, the contemporary animal rights movement differs

from its predecessor by extending moral and legal considerations to all animals. The movement's anthropomorphic egalitarianism, although traditionally focused upon domesticated animals, has recently been logically extended to non-domesticated animals. In so doing, non-domesticated animal rights has come into conflict with holistic ecology and wildlife management policies based upon ecosystemic concerns.

Under what instances will animal rights and environmental interest coincide? Under what instances will they conflict? What are likely responses by animal rights groups in the face of confrontation between animal rights and environmentalism? The decision matrix draws a distinction between animal rights constituent groups and environmental constituent groups, and is based upon the profound differences which exist between the underlying philosophical tenants of animal rights and environmentalism. Animal rights is predicated upon an anthropomorphic projection of human egalitarianism into the non-human world. The principle values held in a "rights" world-view are individualism, autonomy, the sanctity of the individual animal, and normative moral equality among higher vertebrates. Alternatively, environmentalism is predicated upon a systemic interpretation of nature, and its preeminent values are interconnectedness, holistic ecology, and

relational, collective equality between all elements in the system.

As has been the case in previous natural resource policy disputes, management actions which are deemed necessary to protect and restore ecosystems may require the subjugation of the interests of the individual components of that ecosystem. In cases where animals are involved, animal rights groups seek to intervene in policies which attempt just such a subjugation.

Figure 5 is based upon perceived policy outcomes which impact either the interests of the individual animals or the interests of the ecosystem. It is divided into quadrants. Each quadrant depicts the response of either environmental constituents or animal rights constituents to a proposed policy. The quadrants are divided vertically in respect to the policy impact on animals, with a division between policy outcomes which are perceived to be either favorable or unfavorable to the individual animal. The quadrants are also divided horizontally in respect to the policy impact on the ecosystem, with the division occurring between policy outcomes which are perceived to be either favorable or unfavorable to systemic concerns.

As an example, suppose that research indicates that Animal (A) is having a detrimental impact on Ecosystem (E), and a possible management alternative indicates some range of actions toward A. Suppose that the management plan

indicates that some form of control of A is needed to prevent further damage to, or remediate, E. Using the decision model, it becomes evident that the policy will have an outcome that is perceived to be favorable to E and unfavorable to A. Hence, natural resource managers can anticipate some level of conflict with its animal rights constituency over its potential policy concerning A.

In cases of policy conflict with animal rights constituents, managers can anticipate that animal rights groups will attempt to displace the policy outcome from the northeastern quadrant into the southeastern quadrant, thereby framing the outcome as equally unfavorable to ecosystemic interests. By doing so, animal rights constituents hope to provide environmental constituents with a rationale for creating an issue-specific, adversarial coalition. For example, animal rights constituents can be expected to use a variant of the "canary in a coal mine" argument, viz, that the individual animals in the system are indicative of the systems overall integrity.

In conclusion, the matrix is not intended to predict all possible constituent reactions to all possible resource policy outcomes. Rather, it is intended to provide a general method, albeit initial, through which natural resource managers can predict constituent responses. It provides a preliminary decision matrix which has previously been unavailable to managers. It identifies the necessary

components required for an issue-specific and peculiar cooperation between animal rights and environmental interests into either supportive or adversarial coalitions.




Figure 5. A natural resource constituency decision matrix.

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APPENDIX C

ANIMAL RIGHTS SURVEY

1. **(HAND CARD A)** I'm going to read you a list of some actions people may take to express their opinion about cruelty to animals. As I read each one please tell me if you strongly approve, approve, neither approve nor disapprove, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the action. **(INT: CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH)**

	<u>SA</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DS</u>	<u>DK/NA</u>
a. Contributing money to animal rights groups....1		2	3	4	5	6
b. Writing elected representatives about animal rights.....1		2	3	4	5	6
c. Campaigning for candidates who favor animal rights.....1		2	3	4	5	6
d. Boycotting businesses that sell meat.....1		2	3	4	5	6
e. Protesting at super-markets that sell meat..1		2	3	4	5	6
f. Taking direct actions against businesses or individuals that exploit animals.....1		2	3	4	5	6
g. Other (Specify_____)...1		2	3	4	5	6

2. **(HAND CARD B)** I'd like you to look again at these actions and tell me which ones, if any, you personally have taken. Just give your answer by letter please. **(INT: CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH)**

	<u>HAVE</u>	<u>HAVE NOT</u>	<u>DK/NA</u>
ACTION A.....1		2	3
ACTION B.....1		2	3
ACTION C.....1		2	3
ACTION D.....1		2	3
ACTION E.....1		2	3
ACTION F.....1		2	3
ACTION G.....1		2	3

3. (HAND CARD A) Please tell me if you strongly approve, approve, neither approve nor disapprove, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the following practices. The first one is...

	<u>SA</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>DS</u>	<u>DK/NA</u>
a. Scientific research in which animals are used and harmed but which helps people.....1		2	3	4	5	6
b. Scientific research in which animals are used but not harmed and which helps people.....1		2	3	4	5	6
c. Scientific research that uses animals in any way.....1		2	3	4	5	6
d. Keeping pets at home.....1		2	3	4	5	6

4. In your opinion, does science do more good than harm, or more harm than good?

MORE GOOD THAN HARM.....1
 MORE HARM THAN GOOD.....2
 DK/NA.....3

5. Now I'm going to read you a list of farm animals and ask you to tell me from what you know or have heard how well or how poorly you think these animals are treated on the farm. Please give me your answer on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 means treated very poorly and 100 means treated very well. The first one is...

	<u>SCORE</u>	<u>DK/NA</u>
a. Sheep.....	_____	999
b. Beef Cows.....	_____	999
c. Dairy Cows.....	_____	999
d. Veal Calves.....	_____	999
e. Turkeys.....	_____	999
f. Broiler Chickens.....	_____	999
g. Egg Laying Hens.....	_____	999
h. Pigs.....	_____	999
i. Mink.....	_____	999
j. Horses.....	_____	999

6. **(HAND CARD C)** Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement..."The main cause of animal exploitation is the world view that humanity has dominion over the environment."

STRONGLY AGREE.....1
 AGREE.....2
 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE.....3
 DISAGREE.....4
 STRONGLY DISAGREE.....5
 DK/NA.....6

7. I'm going to read you a list of occupations and groups. I'd like you to think again about a scale from 0 to 100, but this time a 0 would mean that you have a very cold or negative feeling about the group and 100 would mean that you have a very warm or positive feeling. The first group is...

	<u>SCORE</u>	<u>DK/NA</u>
a. Veterinarians.....	_____	999
b. Animal rights advocates...	_____	999
c. Farmers or Ranchers.....	_____	999
d. Scientists.....	_____	999
e. Environmentalists.....	_____	999
f. Politicians.....	_____	999
g. Businessmen.....	_____	999
h. Feminists.....	_____	999

Finally, I'd like to ask a few questions for statistical purposes only...

8. **(HAND CARD D)** Some people are conservative, some are liberal, and some are in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

RECORD NUMBER _____
 DK/NA..... 0

9. Do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent or something else?

DK/NA.....1
 DEMOCRAT.....2
 REPUBLICAN.....3
 OTHER (Specify.....) ...4
 INDEPENDENT.....5

→ 9a. Would you say you lean towards Democrat or Republican?

DEMOCRAT.....1
 REPUBLICAN.....2
 DK/NA.....3

10. I'm going to read you a list of information sources. As I read each one please tell me whether or not you use it regularly for information about public issues. The first one is...

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>DK/NA</u>
A. Television.....1		2	3
B. Radio.....1		2	3
C. Newspapers.....1		2	3
D. Magazines.....1		2	3
E. Direct Mail.....1		2	3
F. (Other.....) ..1		2	3

(INT: IF "R" DOES NOT USE ANY OF THESE SKIP TO QUESTION 12)

11. Thinking of those sources of information you do use regularly, (INT: REPEAT SOURCES IF NECESSARY), which one source is the most important to you? (INT: RECORD LETTER OF SOURCE FROM QUESTION 10).

MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE.....
 DK/NA..... 7

12. As I read you a list of organizations. please tell me whether or not you are member. The first one is...
(INT: RECORD AND IF "YES" ASK:)

And, how many years altogether have you belonged to this organization? (RECORD AND CONTINUE WITH THE LIST)

		Belong?			YEARS
		DK/NA	NO	YES	
a.	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals....	1	2	3	_____
b.	The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA).....	1	2	3	_____
c.	The Humane Society (HSUS).	1	2	3	_____
d.	Friends of Animals.....	1	2	3	_____
e.	Sierra Club.....	1	2	3	_____
f.	Other (Specify_____)	1	2	3	_____
	(_____)	1	2	3	_____
	(_____)	1	2	3	_____

13. Are you employed either full time or part time for pay, self-employed, looking for work, retired, a full time student, or not employed outside the home?

NOT EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE HOME...1
FULL TIME STUDENT.....2
RETIRE.....3
LOOKING FOR WORK.....4
SELF-EMPLOYED.....5
WORKING FOR PAY.....6

→ 13a. Can you tell me what type of work you do ...that is how would you describe your job?

TYPE OF WORK _____
DK/NA..... 99

KIND OF INDUSTRY _____
DK/NA..... 99

14. In what state do you live?

STATE OF RESIDENCE _____
DK/NA..... 99

15. Would you say you live in a large metropolitan area, in a suburb of a large metropolitan area, in a city or town, or in a rural area?

DK/NA.....1
 RURAL AREA.....2
 LARGE METRO AREA.....3
 SUBURB.....4
 CITY OR TOWN.....5

→ 15a. **(HAND CARD E)** Which one of these best approximates the population of this place? Please give your answer by letter. **(INT: DON'T READ UNLESS NECESSARY)**

A. MORE THAN 300,000.....1
 B. 100,000 TO 300,000.....2
 C. 50,000 TO 99,999.....3
 D. 10,000 TO 49,999.....4
 E. LESS THAN 10,000.....5
 DK/NA.....6

16. How about when you were growing up? Did you live in a large metropolitan area, in a suburb of a large metropolitan area, in a city or town, or in a rural area?

DK/NA.....1
 RURAL AREA.....2
 LARGE METRO AREA.....3
 SUBURB.....4
 CITY OR TOWN.....5

→ 16a. **(HAND CARD E)** Which one of these best approximates the population of this place? Please give your answer by letter. **(INT: DON'T READ UNLESS NECESSARY)**

A. MORE THAN 300,000.....1
 B. 100,000 TO 300,000.....2
 C. 50,000 TO 99,999.....3
 D. 10,000 TO 49,999.....4
 E. LESS THAN 10,000.....5
 DK/NA.....6

17. **(HAND CARD F)** Which of the following best describes the highest level of education you have completed? Just give your answer by letter please. **(INT: DON'T READ LIST UNLESS NECESSARY. CIRCLE APPROPRIATE NUMBER)**

A.	EIGHTH GRADE OR LESS.....	01
B.	GRADES 9-11.....	02
C.	HIGH SCHOOL GRAD OR GED.....	03
D.	TECHNICAL OR TRADE SCHOOL BEYOND HS.....	04
E.	SOME COMMUNITY COLLEGE.....	05
F.	TWO YR. COMMUNITY COLLEGE DEGREE.....	06
G.	SOME FOUR YR. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.....	07
H.	COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY DEGREE (BACHELOR'S).....	08
I.	SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL.....	09
J.	GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE.....	10
K.	OTHER.....	11
	DK/NA.....	12

18. **(HAND CARD G)** And which of these categories best describes your total household income before taxes in 1989? **(INT: DON'T READ UNLESS NECESSARY. CIRCLE APPROPRIATE NUMBER)**

A.	UNDER \$10,000.....	01
B.	\$10,000 TO \$19,999....	02
C.	\$20,000 TO \$29,999....	03
D.	\$30,000 TO \$39,999....	04
E.	\$40,000 TO \$49,999....	05
F.	\$50,000 TO \$59,999....	06
G.	\$60,000 TO \$69,999....	07
H.	\$70,000 TO \$79,999....	08
I.	\$80,000 OR MORE.....	09
	DK/NA.....	10

19. **(HAND CARD H)** In which age group are you? **(INT: DON'T READ UNLESS NECESSARY. CIRCLE APPROPRIATE NUMBER)**

A.	19 OR UNDER.....	1
B.	20-29.....	2
C.	30-39.....	3
D.	40-49.....	4
E.	50-59.....	5
F.	60-64.....	6
G.	65 OR OVER.....	7
	DK/NA.....	8

20. **(HAND CARD I)** Which category best describes your ethnic background? **(INT: DON'T READ UNLESS NECESSARY. CIRCLE APPROPRIATE NUMBER)**

- A. WHITE/CAUCASIAN.....1
- B. BLACK/AFRO-AMERICAN.....2
- C. NATIVE AMERICAN/AMERICAN INDIAN..3
- D. HISPANIC/MEXICAN AMERICAN.....4
- E. ASIAN.....5
- F. OTHER.....6
- DK/NA.....7

21. Thank you for your help. Is there anything else you would like to say about animal rights? **(INT: IF NECESSARY, PROMPT REGARDING MOBILIZATION)**

BY OBSERVATION:

22. SEX OF RESPONDENT

MALE.....1
FEMALE.....2