

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Joseph A. Rich for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
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Title: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MORALE
AND TEACHING FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN INSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNANCE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND NON-
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CALIFORNIA PUBLIC COMMUNITY
COLLEGE CAMPUSES

Abstract approved: Redacted for Privacy
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The purpose of this study was to gather participant/
campus data, and to measure morale and teaching faculty
participation in institutional governance on the 107
California public community college campuses to determine
if collective bargaining faculty have statistically higher
or lower morale and greater or lesser participation in
institutional governance. In doing this, it was also an
objective to determine whether morale and participation
were significantly related to one another, or to partici-
pant/campus data, or to collective bargaining in order to

originate a theory which would predict the establishment of collective bargaining.

The Purdue Teacher Opinionaire was used to measure morale and the Questionnaire on Faculty Participation in College and University Government was used to measure faculty participation in institutional governance. The results were compiled and analyzed using two one-way ANOVAs, Chi-Square Analysis, and Multiple Regression.

With a random sample of 424 full-time teaching faculty and a return of 297 questionnaires, or 70.05 percent, the following conclusions were reached using the .05 significance level:

1. Morale of collective bargaining teaching faculty was reported as less than those who were not under collective bargaining, although the difference was not statistically significant, so no conclusions could be drawn.

2. Faculty participation was reported as slightly higher by faculty who had entered into a collective bargaining contract, although the difference was not statistically significant, so no conclusions could be drawn.

3. There was a moderate relationship between morale and participation in governance, and although there was a higher correlation for collective bargaining respondents, the difference was not statistically significant and no conclusions could be drawn.

4. The teaching areas of community service and developmental/remedial/ABE were related to collective bargaining. Both of these results may have been factors of location, however, rather than causal. The multi-campus districts were much more likely to be organized for collective bargaining.

5. No predictive theory was warranted regarding collective bargaining since the relationship between morale and participation in governance was statistically non-significant.

The conclusions of this study did not indicate any clear benefits to organizing for collective bargaining because the data were statistically non-significant.

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An Examination of the Relationships Between
Morale and Teaching Faculty Participation
in Institutional Governance on Collective
Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining
California Public Community
College Campuses

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Collective bargaining is a process of shared authority which is used in some institutions to manage conflict which at least one of the parties does not believe can be resolved through more traditional academic structures.

Robert Birnbaum (1980a:121), who authored this description of academic collective bargaining, also suggested that identification of it as a conflict management device did not suggest the possible outcomes. Birnbaum's observations were partly based on the work of Deutsch (1969:7), who noted that conflict might be "constructive" or "destructive." Constructive conflict resulted in solving problems while destructive conflict resulted in dissatisfaction for both parties. Birnbaum (1980a:121) noted that "power, coercion, and deception" were especially relied upon during destructive conflict. He concluded that, "Academic bargaining can thus be either an extremely useful mechanism for institutional change, or a devastating structure for destructive conflict" (Birnbaum, 1980a:125). What was critically needed, according to Birnbaum, was an alternative to destructive orientations to academic bargaining.

Statement of the Problem

Whether collective bargaining is a cause or an effect of institutional conflict is difficult to determine; perhaps, it is somewhat similar to the chicken-or-egg philosophical discussion. Most authors agree with Birnbaum (1980a:121), however, in his estimation that "collective bargaining is a process of shared authority." Can authority, shared in this manner modify conflict? If authority shared in this manner can reduce conflict, then the process of collective bargaining opens the possibility of relieving destructive orientations, raising participant morale, and hopefully delivering better educational results for students and community members. If shared authority does not reduce conflict, then the process of collective bargaining will increase destructive orientations, lower participant morale, and perhaps be responsible for lower educational results.

McCarthy (1980:1), writing in New Directions in Higher Education, observed that, "Conflict is present on every college and university campus in America," and is an inevitable fact of academic life.

Therefore, in order to understand collective bargaining, and its impact, it would be desirable to observe a system of colleges including those which have organized for collective bargaining and those which have not. By measuring opinions of faculty in both groups,

regarding their morale and their participation in institutional governance, it should be possible to examine the relationships that exist and determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the groups.

Full-time teaching faculty were selected for this study in order to determine their current evaluation of their participation in institutional governance and their current morale levels. Previous studies will be discussed in Chapter 2. Those studies measured attitudes of college presidents, board members, union presidents, senate presidents, counselors and some small samples of colleges; but none really attempted to measure the average community college teaching faculty member. These opinion leaders may indeed be important subjects for investigation; but, Sanford (1950) concluded that there was some justification for considering the followers as the most critical group. Hersey and Blanchard (1982:128-129) explained why asking leaders how they are perceived by their subordinates may not be as accurate as other possibilities. They said,

While it is important to recognize that managers have different leadership styles, it is important to remember that style is not how leaders think they behave in a situation, but how others (most importantly, their followers) perceive their behavior followers will behave according to how they perceive . . . behavior. . . . Leaders have to learn how they are coming across to others.

Hersey and Blanchard (1982:108) referred to this phenomenon as "personal power" and they believe that "personal power in an organizational setting comes from below--the

followers." "Followers, in any situation," according to Hersey and Blanchard (1982:131), "are vital, not only because individually they accept or reject the leader, but because as a group they actually determine whatever personal power that leader will have."

Richard C. Richardson, Jr. (1975:ix) favored a shared authority, or collegial, model of governance intended to reduce status symbols and increase morale and communication. Earlier, Richardson, with Blocker and Bender (1972:238), went so far as to recommend increasing participation in governance as a way to avoid collective bargaining. Possibly this recommendation was due in part to a 1967 pioneering study of "faculty discontent" sponsored by the American Association for Higher Education and reported by Garbarino (1975:69), which concluded that,

The main sources of discontent are the faculty's desire to participate in the determination of those policies that affect its professional status and performance and in the establishment of complex, statewide systems of higher education that have decreased local control over important campus issues. . . . In short, the main sources of discontent were governance issues. . . . This suggests that differences in the level of participation in institutional governance might account for differences in the propensities of faculties to organize in different sectors of higher education.

If we accept Richardson's hypothesis, then the teaching faculty at community colleges not organized for collective bargaining should have statistically higher participation in governance and higher morale than those who have organized. If organizing increased participation

or morale beyond the level of non-collectively bargained faculty members, then this study will also show that.

Therefore, the central purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between morale and teaching faculty participation in institutional governance on collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining California public community college campuses. In doing this it may thus be possible to predict when, or if, collective bargaining is eminent at other campuses. This study then addressed the following questions:

1. Does entering into a collective bargaining contract result in significantly higher teaching faculty morale than not entering into a contract?
2. Does entering into a collective bargaining contract result in significantly greater teaching faculty participation in institutional governance than not entering into a contract?
3. Are morale and participation in institutional governance significantly related to one another?
4. Are there any significant correlations between teaching faculty and/or campus background information and morale, institutional governance, and collective bargaining?
5. Can morale level scores, participation in institutional governance scores, and teaching faculty and/or campus background information be predictive of collective bargaining?

Objectives of the Study

In order to fulfill the central purpose of this study, the following five objectives were advanced:

1. To determine whether full-time teaching faculty employed at California public community colleges, organized for collective bargaining, have statistically higher or lower perceived morale than those who are not organized;
2. To determine whether full-time teaching faculty employed at California public community colleges, organized for collective bargaining, have statistically significant greater or lesser perceived faculty participation in institutional governance than those who are not organized;
3. To examine whether there is any statistically significant relationship between perceived morale and perceived teaching faculty participation in institutional governance on collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campuses of California public community colleges;
4. To describe and report any statistically significant correlations between the participant/campus data collected and morale perception, between the participant/campus data and teaching faculty governance perception, and between the participant/campus data and collective bargaining at California public community colleges; and
5. To develop a theory that purports to predict whether there will be collective bargaining on any given

California public community college campus by observing morale scores, faculty governance scores, and participant/campus data.

Such a theory as mentioned in the fifth objective would have to be tested outside of this study at some future date.

The Community College in Higher Education

The community college, first called the junior college, is one of the youngest members of the higher education family; its roots can be traced to Joliet, Illinois at the turn of the twentieth century. From the vision of William Rainey Harper, President of the University of Chicago, has emerged a system of two-year colleges, some 1,250 in number, which "range in size from less than 100 to more than 30,000 students . . . [and] are found in every state" (Cohen and Brawer, 1982:xv).

According to the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges statistics (1955-1980), "The opening fall enrollment of community colleges in 1980 was 4,825,931." Of this number, the state of California enrolled 1,101,648 or approximately one in four at its 107 statewide campuses.

California's involvement with junior-community colleges can be traced to enabling legislation. Cohen and Brawer (1982:14) noted that,

The 1907 California law authorizing secondary school boards to offer post-graduate courses

"which shall approximate the studies prescribed in the first two years of university courses," together with several subsequent amendments, served as a model for enabling legislation in numerous states . . . [and] Fresno took advantage of the law to establish a junior college in 1910

According to the authors,

Subsequent laws in California authorized junior colleges to open as districts entirely independent of the secondary schools, and this form of parallel development continued for decades. (Cohen and Brawer, 1982:14)

California's public system is much like that described by Thornton (1972:116):

Locally controlled community junior colleges are governed in much the same way as other elements of the public schools. A locally elected board of trustees establishes policies for the college or colleges in its district, under the laws enacted by the legislature and the regulations of the state board.

California's public community colleges are part of a tripartite system including the University of California (with nine branches), and the California State Universities and colleges (with nineteen campuses). The California community colleges are coordinated by the Chancellor's Office in Sacramento and the California Community Colleges Board of Governors, and they are influenced by the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC), the State Department of Finance (DOE), the State Legislature (Senate and Assembly), the Governor, and the Education Code (Title V). If anything, the California public community college system might be accused of being overly organized, although

it has been acclaimed as a model system for education in the nation.

California's 107 public community colleges are thus organized into seventy districts which range from the small single campus districts to the behemoth Los Angeles Community College District of nine colleges and an average daily attendance (ADA) of over 69,000 students. The two-year colleges offer diverse curricula leading to degrees in the Associate of Arts and Associate of Sciences, Certificates of Achievement, diplomas, and various certificates of attendance or completion.

Programs are offered in transfer education (leading to a baccalaureate degree at a four-year college), vocational education (sometimes referred to as career or occupational education), continuing education (for those already employed or having received a degree), adult education (for those who need to finish their high school studies or receive instruction in English as a Second Language, or citizenship for naturalization), community service education (for those who wish to learn a hobby or enroll in personal enrichment classes), developmental education (for those who need to brush up or remediate their basic skills), and general education (for those who wish a broad liberal arts program). In order to accomplish their mission, the public community colleges typically offer extensive counseling and financial aid assistance. With an "open-door" philosophy, which allows any perspective

student to enroll who can profit from instruction, low or no tuition (tuition has been approved for California community colleges for fall 1984), and a comprehensive curricula, the California public community college system is the largest two-year system of higher education in the world (McCurdy, 1981:11).

Governance, Morale, and Collective Bargaining Defined

Eells (1931), writing over a half a century ago, noted that,

. . . although boards of trustees and administrators may have been able to govern without apparent conflict; issues of financing, staff morale, and conformity with state laws have always been present. (Cohen and Brawer, 1982:96)

Governance

According to Monroe (1972:303):

Governance is a comprehensive term to describe all aspects of the control and direction of the colleges, including the state constitution, statutes, state boards of education or higher education, local boards of control, the administration, and in some institutions, the faculty and the student body.

The latter part of Monroe's definition, that is, whether faculty participate in the governance of their educational institutions, may be related to the "staff morale" issue Eells mentioned in 1931.

Morale

"[Morale] may best be conceived of as a continuous variable," according to Bentley and Rempel (1967:1). They went on to elaborate that, "The level of morale is then determined by the extent to which an individual's needs are satisfied, and the extent to which the individual perceives satisfaction as stemming from the total job situation." It is this researcher's belief that morale is significantly related to participation in governance, and greater faculty participation results in higher morale. Likewise, higher levels of morale indicate significantly greater participation in governance. A ten-year study by the Institute of Higher Education at Columbia University Teachers College (Magarrell, 1982:1) also came to this conclusion although the Institute's study was based on fewer colleges and only ten community colleges.

Collective Bargaining

The term "collective bargaining," according to Kochan (1980:27), was first introduced by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their book entitled Industrial Democracy, published in London, in 1902. Monroe (1972:339) defined collective bargaining as:

. . . the process by which the conditions of employment are agreed upon by a series of negotiations between members of the administration and board and members of the faculty. The agreed upon provisions are then written into a

binding contract. Public employees can participate in establishing their terms of employment in a democratic manner by forming an employee's association and entering into collective bargaining with the employer.

In California, the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC, 1983:v) described collective bargaining by noting that it

. . . involves the mutual obligation of an employer and an exclusive employee representative to meet at a reasonable time and formally negotiate on issues of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment defined to be within the scope of bargaining, under conditions designed to resolve impasse and result in the adoption of a written agreement.

During the last two decades faculty have attempted to increase their participation in governance by organizing and bargaining collectively (Ikenberry, 1971:14; Garbarino, 1975:69; CPEC, 1983:12-13). Poole and Wattenbarger (1977: 8-9) stated that, "One of the most important questions regarding collective bargaining is what changes in governance policies has the process really brought about." Has collective bargaining changed faculty participation in governance? Has collective bargaining changed faculty morale? Because collective bargaining is an evolving process, and because of state statutes prohibiting interference, it seems best to look at how a system has responded to collective bargaining legislation in order to get an accurate picture of both existing collectively bargained and non-collectively bargained colleges. California's public community college system of 107 colleges,

representing approximately one-fourth of all community college education in the nation, offered the prospects of such a systemwide analysis.

Other Definitions

Full-Time Teaching Faculty

The standard teaching load for full-time instructors according to the California Community Colleges Chancellor's Report (1982) was approximately fifteen classroom teaching hours per week for a 175 day academic year.

The reason why teaching faculty were chosen rather than a more inclusive list of counselors, librarians, department chairmen, coordinators, and administrators was the desire to see the effects of collective bargaining on the regular classroom teacher.

Community College Campus

A community college campus is a location which is self-contained, having a distinct name and personnel. Outreach centers were eliminated as campuses using this definition since mostly part-time faculty teach at those locations.

Statistically Significant

According to Snedecor and Cochran (1967:30), a test of significance establishes whether a study's results are

statistically significant. It is:

. . . a calculation by which the sample results are used to throw light on the truth or falsity of a null hypothesis, is made. A quantity called a test criterion is computed: it measures the extent to which the sample departs from the null hypothesis in some relevant aspect. If the value of the test criterion falls beyond certain limits into a region of rejection, the departure is said to be statistically significant. (Snedecor and Cochran, 1967:30)

This study was computed using a significance factor of .05.

California's Community Colleges and Collective Bargaining

Prior to the establishment of collective bargaining in California, faculty members in the community colleges had the right to "meet and confer" with their employers as legislated via the Winton Act (c. 2041, Stats. 1965).

Senate Bill 160 (Rodda) of 1975 was the enabling legislation which extended collective bargaining to the employees of the public schools and community colleges and became known as the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) [c. 961 Stats. 1975, codified as, Chapter 10.7 Cal. Government Code Section 3540 et seq (West, 1980)].

According to the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC, 1983:6), in its 1983 booklet, the "Pressure for the enactment of the EERA developed as a result of employee dissatisfaction with the limited protection they received under the Winton Act" CPEC (1983:7) felt that the "Legislature intended to model

the new statute after the NLRA and the decisions of the NLRB interpreting that Act." Although there are a few minor differences, the acts are very similar.

California's 107 public community colleges are organized into seventy districts and the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining at Baruch College in New York lists fifty-six community college districts in California as having exclusive bargaining representatives for units including faculty members (Douglas and Kramer, 1982:2-6).

CPEC (1983:67) did not attempt to predict the impact that collective bargaining would have on California post-secondary education because ". . . knowledge about its results in the Community Colleges is limited." It did feel, however, that,

The adoption of collective bargaining as the method for regulating the relationships between faculty and administration in postsecondary institutions represents a fundamental procedural change from traditional approaches to academic governance, and this change has given rise to a variety of legitimate concerns about the possible substantive impact of collective bargaining on academic institutions.

Moreover, the Commission concluded that, ". . . the attitudes of the participants can shape the outcome of the collective bargaining process" (CPEC, 1983:69).

CPEC (1983:70) noted that,

. . . collective bargaining is unlikely to bring revolutionary change to California postsecondary education. Nevertheless, it probably will intensify existing pressures for change and alter to some degree the governance relationships with

institutions as well as between institutions and the State.

This study therefore attempted to measure and analyze the existing perceived teaching faculty morale levels and perceived teaching faculty participation in institutional governance levels of both groups of respondents--those organized for collective bargaining and those not organized. In order to do this, the Purdue Teacher Opinionnaire (PTO) and the Questionnaire on Faculty Participation in College and University Government (AAUP), both standardized questionnaires, were utilized to gather data from all 107 California public community colleges on teaching faculty morale and teaching faculty participation respectively. In addition, participant/campus data were also solicited.

Hypotheses

The data gathered with the PTO, AAUP, and participant/campus questionnaires were treated statistically to test the following hypotheses:

1. There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived morale of California public community college teaching faculty organized for collective bargaining and those not organized for collective bargaining.

2. There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived faculty participation in institutional governance of California public community college

teaching faculty organized for collective bargaining and those not organized for collective bargaining.

3. There is no statistically significant difference between the participant/campus data and perceived morale, or perceived participation in governance, or collective bargaining.

Limitations and Assumptions

Since this study measured existing levels of morale and participation in institutional governance it should not be interpreted as causal. That is, this researcher did not attempt to prove that collective bargaining caused greater or lesser participation in institutional governance.

It was also assumed that faculty will respond to the instruments used in this study with approximately equal representation to state percentages of collective bargaining faculty versus non-collective bargaining faculty (roughly 80 percent compared to 20 percent).

Additional statistical assumptions and methods will be discussed in Chapter 3, Method and Procedures.

Conclusion

In conclusion, "collective bargaining is a process of shared authority," according to Birnbaum (1980a:121). Shared authority should increase morale and participation in governance, according to Richardson (1975:ix).

In order to determine whether colleges organized for collective bargaining do have greater or lesser participation and higher or lower morale, it was desirable to randomly sample faculty members from a system of colleges which included colleges organized and not organized and compare them.

The purpose of this study, then, was to gather participant/campus data, measure morale and teaching faculty participation in institutional governance on collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining California public community college campuses to determine if collective bargaining faculty have statistically significant higher or lower morale and statistically significant greater or lesser participation in institutional governance. With this information it may be possible to predict when, or if, collective bargaining is eminent at other community college campuses.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

The literature impinging upon the present study may be divided into three categories: governance, collective bargaining, and morale.

Governance

The beginnings of faculty participation in governance in American colleges and universities, unfortunately, have never been traced with care and thoroughness. Yet evidences of the faculty's role are available. It is known, for example, that since the early eighteenth century, the faculty at Harvard has formed what has been described as the "immediate government"; since the early 1800s the faculty has constituted a body authorized to exercise substantial powers granted it by the corporation.

Corson (1960:98), commenting on faculty participation in governance above, also noted that similar authority in governance existed at Yale and the University of Virginia in the early 1800s.

Monroe (1972:321) noted that,

Faculty participation in the governance of community colleges is a matter of recent origin. Needless to say, it is a controversial issue. But, the controversial matter is not if faculty members will participate, but how they will participate. The trend is definitely in favor of faculty participation, and the community colleges and their boards and administrators should recognize the inevitable.

Robert Lahti (1979:13) believed there were three models of governance in higher education. He listed these

as the collegial model, the bureaucratic model, and the political model.

The collegial, or shared authority, form of governance is built around "self regulation of the conditions under which the professional faculty operate," in return for which the professional accepts responsibility toward his/her clients (Lahti, 1979:12). Baratz (1978:1) considered the collegial model exceptional because:

- 1) The system of shared authority or collegiality is grounded on tacit understandings and its viability depends on mutual trust among the president, governing board, and faculty. This trust relationship is a challenge to achieve.

- 2) When things are going well, with adequate finances, competent human resources, stable enrollment, and an operable growth curve, mutual trust is easier to sustain. However, in difficult times (limited resources, unstable enrollment, saturated teacher employment markets) mutual trust is more difficult to sustain.

- 3) Few members of any faculty are willing to forego the pleasures of teaching, scholarship, and artistic work in favor of spending long hours mastering the intricacies of budgets, personnel records, curricula, and parking problems.

- 4) Administrators under pressure of timely decisions are unwilling to take time to assemble a group of professors who have intricate schedules and who are known in advance to have unique points-of-view regarding the operation and management of a collegiate institution.

The bureaucratic form of governance is typically a pyramidal, rigid, chain-of-command structure with ultimate decision making resting with a president or a board of trustees who derive their power from statutory law. The bureaucratic form of governance is many times referred to as, or compared with, the military, a monarchy, or the United States federal government.

The political form of governance is typified by collective bargaining where the union and management meet and attempt to persuade each other on everything from salary to a required number of class preparations. Lahti noted that community colleges tend to have governance patterns which mix the bureaucratic and political models. He felt that community colleges have a "lack of tradition, an uncharted place in the higher educational hierarchy, instability of environment following the war years and other external influences" (Lahti, 1979:13).

Governance in the California community colleges, and more specifically faculty participation in that process, was discussed by Priest in an article appearing in the Junior College Journal in 1964. Priest (1964:8) reported that:

Faculty members generally felt that their talents in the area of policy formulation were not utilized sufficiently. Administrators were generally uneasy about the dispersion of authority unless there were some systems of accountability to temper the actions of those who participated in policy formulation.

Early faculty attempts to participate in community college governance were typified by the establishment of faculty councils or faculty senates. Unions played a part in this early formation, but as Steger reported in 1965 (Monroe, 1972:322), the colleges which had no strong teachers' unions participated more freely in their faculty council and in matters relating to college management than those colleges with unions in Illinois. Meanwhile,

Lombardi authored two articles regarding conditions in California. In January of 1966, Lombardi (1966a:1) wrote,

The junior college president cannot ignore the logic that, to be successful, faculty-administrator relations must involve more than lip service to the principle of faculty participation in the governance of the college; and that this participation must include the principle that the faculty should have a say in determining the means by which this participation should take place.

Later, in November of 1966, Lombardi (1966b:9-16) noted two moves to infuse more faculty participation. One was the establishment of the California Junior College Faculty Association (now called the Faculty Association of California Community Colleges or FACCC)--an alternative association to the AFT (American Federation of Teachers) and the NEA (National Education Association). Another was legislation providing for a faculty senate (ACR 48). The senate was patterned after the four-year colleges and universities. Many administrators disliked ACR 48 because, unlike the four year schools, there was no inclusion of administrative personnel in the senate. Lombardi (1966:16) noted that the president of a community college, although sharing some of his decision making authority, "has a unique, and uniquely important, leadership role. The success with which he provides leadership determines his effectiveness."

In 1967, the American Association of Higher Education study entitled "Faculty Participation in Academic Governance. Report of the AAHE Task Force on Faculty

Representation and Academic Negotiations, Campus Governance Program," was released. Weber and others (1968:37) noted that, and reported in Research in Education:

Major objectives of the study were to examine factors contributing to faculty unrest and to recommend procedures for improving Faculty Participation in Campus Government. . . . A summary chapter concludes that the main sources of discontent are (1) the faculty's desire to participate in the determination of policies affecting its professional status and performance and (2) the establishment of complex, statewide systems of higher education which have decreased local control over important campus issues. A system of campus governance is recommended which is built on the concept of "shared authority," with faculty and administration jointly concerned for a wide variety of issues including educational and administrative policies, personnel administration, and economic matters.

Garbarino (1975:69) concluded that the AAHE Task Force Report

suggests that difference in the level of participation in institutional governance might account for differences in the propensities of faculties to organize in different sectors of higher education.

The American Association of University Professors has exhibited the greatest influence on faculty participation in governance. In its 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, the AAUP published desirable norms of faculty participation. To compare the stated norms with reality a survey was undertaken in 1969 by the Survey Subcommittee of Committee T on Faculty Participation in College and University Government. The original survey was revised and during the winter of 1970-71 a national survey was undertaken. The survey instrument itself was

designed to measure the level of faculty participation in thirty-one decision areas. The levels of faculty participation--Determination, Joint Action, Consultation, Discussion, and None--were used. According to the AAUP (1972:73)

. . . on the average, faculty participation in college and university government in the United States is viewed by faculties and administrations as being at the level of consultation, a far cry from the ideals envisaged by the 1966 Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities. However, the wide range of participation from institution to institution makes it eminently clear that it is possible to achieve such ideals.

The AAUP study also revealed that faculty participation was greatest in major research oriented universities and least in technical institutions and junior or community colleges.

Keeton (1971) supported the shared authority concept for employer as well as the employee. He felt that the best employer response to professional concerns was to develop a decision-making process based upon the college and university model of shared authority.

Monroe (1972:314) explained in part why the community college was lacking in faculty participation in governance when he noted that, "The community college inherited its administrative patterns from the public high schools where the community colleges were originally housed." Monroe (1972:325) did not place all the blame on administrative patterns, however, as he explained that,

Somewhere, a balance must be found between the authoritarian practices of community college boards and presidents and the oligarchial

tendencies of faculty councils and unions. The shared-power concept ought to be the ideal goal.

Richardson, Blocker, and Bender (1972:213) agreed with Monroe's cry for balance when they noted that,

To deal with the forces set in motion by the administrative structure, institutions develop a system of governance which has as its principle function the sharing of authority among the internal constituents, establishing a system of checks and balances which will prevent the administrative structure from dominating the decision-making process.

In 1973, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973:40) reported that, "In many colleges, particularly in community colleges and some former teachers colleges, faculty members never have had much influence through committees and senates." The Commission (1973:41) went on to advocate for shared authority when it stated,

It is our view that faculties in most, if not all, institutions should have approximately the level of authority recommended by the American Association of University Professors.

While community colleges were generally relegated to least participative in various studies, Aussieker (1974:40-49) discussed the uniqueness of the California community college system, which at that time had no collective bargaining law. Aussieker (in Garbarino, 1975:186) noted that,

The California experience is also instructive about the non-legal factors working against bargaining agent representation. These factors are extensive faculty organization input on state legislation affecting community colleges and on the actions of the California community college chancellor and board of governors (the state public two-year institution governing board and

administrative unit); the "most-favored" segment of higher education treatment by the California state legislature and governor; widespread, historical reliance on effective internal faculty representation and bargaining schemes in local governance; and a mature and relatively stable community college system overall.

Perhaps all was not as rosy as Aussieker reported, because Helling (1975:16-17), just one year later, stated that, "If the community college is to continue to flourish we must not return to a losing model--participatory governance." All of this was on the eve of a collective bargaining law in California which was enacted in 1975.

In 1976, the editors of the journal, New Directions, devoted an entire issue to community college organizations and how they were dealing with collective bargaining as a governance form. Burrioni (1976) discussed the historical perspective. He noted that,

Higher education has used the "collegial model" which originated in Europe and worked quite well until the last ten to twenty years. Professors shared in the process of decision making only when they had time and felt a problem was related to classroom directly. With the rise of unionization and the decline of resources (funding) more and more professors have begun to demand representation in all decisions made, since all decisions affect learning. (Burrioni, 1976:84)

Since collective bargaining, Burrioni believes the collegial form of organization will no longer work. He added that the "adversary form" is really alright if all parties understand the consequences of their actions. Anthony (1976: 12-19) attacked the typical, bureaucratic system of decision making evident in most community colleges. He

wrote that community colleges have gotten too big and too centralized to be effective any longer. His answer was to decentralize. Anthony felt that a decentralized structure was necessary for decisions and democratic behavior. He warned, however, that this should not be confused with autonomy. According to Anthony, academic freedom is often confused with both autonomy and, eventually, license. Rossmeier (1976:78-87) agreed with Anthony and recommended a system of participatory governance. Faculty should be elected by each internal group, according to Rossmeier, if the multi-unit college is to survive and operate in an orderly manner.

Although autonomy may be desired by faculty, Moody (1978:69) reported that,

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education argues that "autonomy" in the sense of full self-governance does not now exist for American higher education, nor has it existed for a very long time --if ever. Autonomy is limited by law, by the necessary influences and controls that go along with financial support, and by public policy in areas of substantial public concern. Autonomy in these areas is neither possible nor desirable.

Lahti (1979:12) added that,

The long-standing ideology of governance practices among higher education institutions is the collegial or shared authority model. The essence of this practice is the autonomy and self-regulation of the conditions under which the professional faculty operate.

He felt that

If college professors were given a choice of governance by collegiality or governance by collective bargaining the majority would likely select shared authority because of the autonomous

relationships long enjoyed by the college faculty.
(Lahti, 1979:15-16)

He concluded that, ". . . collective bargaining is being considered as a protective mode of academic governance in many higher education institutions" (Lahti, 1979:15-16).

Despite several institutions adopting shared governance, Richardson (1979) noted a faculty hesitation, perhaps because of many years of bureaucratic decisions. He stated that,

Even where established with the best of intentions, governance procedures have been perceived by faculty to serve more as instruments of propaganda and cooptation than as bona fide instruments for faculty involvement in decision making.
(Richardson, 1979:17)

Richardson (1979:20) went on to admonish community college faculty when he wrote that, "Faculty should pursue the establishment of shared authority structures for issues related to the educational program as a high priority." He further warned that,

If teaching in the community college is to be considered a professional as opposed to purely technical activity, the expertise of faculty must become a factor in decisions related to instruction and the educational program. (Richardson, 1979:21)

Where participation in governance is not granted, it will be taken via collective action. Kochan (1980:145) noted that,

Among those who do desire greater participation or influence, only those who are unable to influence their work environment through more informed, individualistic, or employer-initiated programs are likely to turn to unions as an alternative

. . . there is a perceived desire for participation and a perceived lack of other effective alternatives for participation on the job.

Kochan's remarks were not based upon hypothetical situations, but instead reflected his studies with several different groups of workers, both professional and blue-collar. Kochan (1980:145) reported that,

Positive correlations and regression coefficients were found between desire for participation and an index of the difficulty of changing conditions on the job. The desire for participation was an especially important correlate of support for unionization among white-collar workers.

There is an advantage to faculty participation and shared authority in education. According to Wolotkiewicz (1980:165),

An advantage of faculty involvement in college and university affairs is that it provides a source for a wide variety of ideas and alternatives. It is commonly believed that participation will strengthen the feeling of allegiance toward the institution. A third advantage is . . . involvement in making a decision will lead to greater willingness on the part of faculty to have the decision implemented and abide by it.

She went on to hypothesize that,

In the long run, faculty might find that collective bargaining will decrease their involvement in governance decisions because of the adversarial relationships it may create between faculty and administration. (Wolotkiewicz, 1980:176)

Wolotkiewicz (1980:177) concluded that,

Some faculty members and representatives want to combine collective bargaining with participatory governance and shared management. Institutional management will probably be recreant in its trust if it accepts this position. Collective bargaining embodies an obligation to achieve an agreement on compensation and working conditions within the

framework of the purposes and intended work outputs of the enterprise. In collective bargaining agreements in business, management retains its basic authority and responsibility to plan and direct the enterprise. In collective bargaining agreements in a university, dual management authority and responsibility in an adversary relationship may well be impossible and undesirable.

Birnbaum (1980b) believes that academic bargaining can manage conflict. He noted that,

Both internal and external pressures prompt the institution to increasingly involve faculty in meaningful roles in decision making, but the structure and norms of such institutions inhibit the development of effective shared governance mechanisms. For such institutions, collective bargaining offers a means of unfreezing current organizational systems, readjusting authority and decision-making patterns, testing new modes of participation, and moving toward shared authority. (Birnbarm, 1980b:7)

Some critics of collective bargaining note the legal limitations caused by state statutes prohibiting certain exercise of decision-making. Birnbaum (1980b:20-21) countered this argument by rationalizing that,

In general, the differences between faculty influence in those institutions in which faculty fully participate in governance and those where they do not is not legal. In almost all institutions, administrators have legal authority for certain decisions delegated to them by the trustees who have final authority for the governance of the institution. Where faculty influence is high, therefore, it is not because administrators have no power, but because, recognizing that the degree of influence they have is inversely proportional to their use of it, administrators willingly forego it.

Birnbaum (1980b:247) concluded that,

Because of its ability to change campus processes and structures, and its presumption of legal equality at the bargaining table, it may well be that academic bargaining is the only way that

institutions characterized by administrative primacy or administrative dominance in decision making can move toward a governance system of shared authority.

A recent study of faculty participation in two-year and four-year colleges and universities by Armstrong (1981:1020) in Florida verified that,

Faculty participation levels in Florida as well as nationally, rise on a continuum from community colleges to comprehensive universities to doctoral degree-granting universities to major research oriented universities which achieve the highest levels of participation.

Armstrong (1981:1020) noted that,

The highest levels of faculty participation in governance among the selected community colleges were reported for unionized colleges, while the lowest levels were reported for those colleges which have formally rejected faculty collective bargaining.

Armstrong's conclusions were based on a sample of 273 academic department chairpersons in ten selected Florida institutions. The chairpersons completed the Faculty Participation Questionnaire (FPQ), an instrument constructed to solicit information concerning faculty participation in governance practices based upon nineteen items chosen to reflect the Yeshiva Model of Academic Governance. Yeshiva University is an institution in private higher education which was declared by the courts to have shared governance and thereby was not eligible to have collective bargaining. The Supreme Court ruled in this instance that the faculty, in fact, governed the university. Whether Armstrong's questioning those in

administrative positions about the participation of those beneath them was accurate or representative can be argued. It is this researcher's opinion that it would be more desirable to randomly sample the faculty rather than their bosses (chairpersons) to determine the faculty's participation.

One of the most recent reports regarding academic governance was compiled by the Carnegie Commission. The Chronicle of Higher Education (October 13, 1982) reported that the Carnegie Commission (1982:10) ". . . noted in this report that a large share of the work and authority of academic governance is, quite properly, delegated by trustees to administration, faculty, and students." The Commission (1982:10) observed that, "Faculty participation has declined, and we discovered a curious mismatch between the agenda of faculty councils and the crisis now confronted by many institutions." The Carnegie Commission (1982:10) suggested that,

The inadequate state of campus governance should not be attributed to faculty alone. Some administrators still appear to be too authoritarian or too bureaucratic to consult openly and honestly with colleagues.

Recognizing the increase in collective negotiations by faculty members, the Carnegie Commission (1982:10) stated,

Clearly, faculty unionization constitutes a fundamental shift in campus governance. We believe, however, that collective bargaining will not violate the traditions of academic life if faculty members on campuses are in charge of the negotiations and if contractual agreements respect

the freedom and professional judgments of individualized teachers. It should be recognized that faculty senates and similar bodies are still needed to deal with the full range of academic and administrative matters that fall within their concern.

The Commission (1982:10) concluded its report by recommending that,

Campuses with collective bargaining should also acknowledge the importance of other existing arrangements for faculty participation in campus governance Colleges and universities may wish to convene governance convocations to consider ways more effectively to involve all members of the academic community in decision making on campus. Today, there is a paucity of thoughtful debate about academic governance

In summary, there are three forms of governance: collegial, bureaucratic, and political. Collective bargaining, a form of political governance according to some, has come more into use because of failures in the other two forms or models. A few authors believe that collective bargaining is a form of shared governance which can co-exist with a collegial form in an institution depending on the internal politics. There is little research currently measuring faculty participation in institutional governance.

Collective Bargaining

History of Collective Bargaining in Education

In 1963 President John F. Kennedy's Executive order 10.988 gave recognition of limited public union rights in

the federal sector. "The Executive Order," according to Gee (1979:373),

adopted a collective bargaining model that recognized the right of federal employees to join unions, and the concomitant right of unions to represent their membership through the collective bargaining process.

The right of public employees to belong to unions and negotiate their wages was not always desirable from the public point of view. In a Seattle case (Seattle High School Chapter No. 200, 1930:994), "The notion that a public employee had no right to engage in collective action was universally adopted by state and federal courts during the first half of the twentieth century."

Collective concern on the part of teachers can be traced to the charter of the American Federation of Teachers in 1916. By 1977 Gee (1979:376-378) reported that over 450,000 teachers had membership in the AFT, while a rival professional association-turned union, the National Education Association (NEA), claimed membership of over 1.7 million teachers. Many other organizations represent smaller groups.

While private industry received considerable attention in union activity and collective negotiations with passage of several labor laws, education was generally overlooked. The National Labor Board, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) extended national legislation, according to Wolotkiewicz (1980:143-144), but only

to the private sector. Even in private educational institutions there was an exclusion of coverage under the Labor-Management Relations Act as a result of a decision regarding Columbia University in 1951 (Trustees of Columbia U., 1951:427).

Later in 1951 another court finally acknowledged the right of teachers to collectively bargain. In *Norwalk Teachers' Association v. Board of Education of the City of Norwalk* (1951:485), a judge ruled that, ". . . In the absence of prohibitory statute or regulation, no good reason appears why public employees should not organize as a labor union."

Collective bargaining in the public sector, and more particularly in the public schools, is controlled by state statutes. The State of Wisconsin enacted the first state legislation regulating public sector employment relations in 1959 (Gee, 1979:384). By December, 1961, the State of New York had enacted legislation similar to Wisconsin's and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) affiliate of the AFT was selected as the bargaining agent for 44,000 public school teachers in New York City, according to Gee (1979:376).

After Kennedy's Executive Order 10.988, the federal government began to open up more options to public employees. Executive Order 11.491 established a Federal Labor Relations Council, and a Federal Impasse Panel. Services for impasse resolution by the Federal Mediation

and Conciliation service was made available to federal agencies and employees, according to Gee (1979:410). In 1978, the Civil Service Reform Act provided for a comprehensive bargaining approach.

Despite the state statutes in Wisconsin and New York and the enabling federal legislation, many states chose not to allow collective negotiations by public employees including teachers. Much of this thinking can be traced to a 1947 decision in Missouri (*Springfield v. Clouse*, 1947: 545) where a judge declared, ". . . qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract." Out of this case and subsequent public discussion two issues arose. Under the "Sovereignty Doctrine" a reason to not grant collective bargaining was, ". . . the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed" (*Springfield v. Clouse*, 1947:545). Another reason, "Illegal Delegation," (*Springfield v. Clouse*, 1947:545) followed with, ". . . the power to make public policy and administrative decisions rests with properly appointed public officials who cannot delegate that decision-making authority."

Most states have adopted collective bargaining legislation, however, and some legislators have argued successfully based on constitutional concerns regarding the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In 1969 the Seventh

Circuit Court (Indianapolis Education Association v.

Lewallen, 1969:2072), ruling in an Indiana case, held that

. . . the right of teachers to associate for the purpose of collective bargaining is a right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution . . . but the right to associate does not necessarily include the right to insist that the public employer and the union bargain together.

Since the early seventies most courts and boards have used a liberal interpretation with regard to collective negotiation rights. Many of these decisions have been over the "scope" of negotiations. Courts have often referred to a 1958 NLRB decision (NLRB v. Wooster Division of the Borg-Warner Corporation, 1958:342) about scope in industry: "Subjects of bargaining fall into three groups: mandatory (subjects labor and management must bargain), permissive (may bargain), and illegal or prohibited (cannot bargain)." The early decisions of labor boards (Angell, Kelley and Associates, 1977:128) tended to support union claims that a particular topic was, indeed, sufficiently a condition of employment to be designated a mandatory subject of bargaining. In 1972 the scope of New York's Taylor Law on collective bargaining (Board of Education v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 1971:109) was interpreted as ". . . the obligation to bargain as to all terms and conditions of employment" The Adelphi (1972:648) decision in 1972 delineated certain management duties by faculty in determining memberships in the unit. A Wisconsin case summed up the ruling in 1976, when it held,

"Exclusive representation is a generally accepted right in both the public and private sectors" (Madison Joint Union School District Number 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 1976:167).

Although certain landmark decisions have favored faculty, in the 1970s the courts began to balance earlier one-sided labor rulings. In *Seward Educational Association v. School District of Seward* (1972:759), the court held that, "Boards should not be required to enter negotiations on matters . . . of educational policy, management prerogatives or statutory duties of the board" In *St. John's Chapter of AAUP v. St. John's University* (1975:1858), the union attempted to bargain the following:

- (1) AAUP 1966 statement on Government of colleges and universities;
- (2) Faculty representation on the Board of Trustees;
- (3) Statement of administrative responsibilities . . . including collegiality, qualifications (academic) for deans, vice-presidents, and responsibilities;
- (4) Selection of presidents and deans.

The director of the NLRB declared that these were not mandatory. In *the Rutgers, The State University v. Rutgers Council of AAUP 2* (1976:15), it was ruled that, "There is no reason why the systems of collegiality and collective negotiations may not function harmoniously."

What is the current state of the art in collective bargaining for the educational sector? According to Gee (1979:380), "It is now estimated that of the three million public school teachers, 80% are organized into some form of collective bargaining unit." In higher education, two-year

colleges tend to be more organized for collective bargaining. Richardson (1979:17) reported that, "In April, 1978, 230 of the 291 public institutions of higher education organized were two-year colleges." Richardson (1979:19) believed that, "Collective bargaining has not, however, proven to be a satisfactory approach for dealing with issues related to the educational programs and institutional methodology." Strikes or threats of strikes have led to provisions for arbitration. Richardson (1979:19) also saw this as a negative outcome of collective bargaining,

When administrators and faculty seek outside intervention to resolve internal difference of opinion they run the risk of inviting lay initiatives which provide little comfort to either side.

Another problem with collective bargaining according to Lahti (1979:14) was that, "There is not total concurrence between union and management officials on their respective roles; in the collective bargaining process, role definition is the catalyst for the bargaining process."

Weston et al. (1978:90-91) noted that, "The terms of collective bargaining agreements are rarely far beyond current practice at public two-year colleges."

Therefore, in tracing twenty years of collective bargaining in education, there have been many court cases over a variety of issues; but despite all this activity,

the agreements themselves seem to merely put into writing that which is common or current practice.

Studies and Articles
Concerning Collective
Bargaining

In a 1969 Carnegie Commission Higher Education survey of college and university faculty (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973:39), 59 percent of those interviewed stated that they would vote for collective bargaining if an election was held on their campuses. Carr and VanEyck (1973:20) established that,

Three considerations have usually been basic to the decision of any group of employees, including college faculty, to engage in collective bargaining. The law must establish the right of the group to require their employer to bargain with them; there must be a substantial measure of dissatisfaction with existing conditions of employment; and someone must be making a positive effort to "organize the work force"

In 1972 Kadish (Ladd and Lipset, 1976:246) epitomized the feelings of many colleges and university administrators when he warned that,

In dividing the university into worker-professor and manager-administrators and governing boards . . . [collective bargaining] imperils the premise of shared authority, encourages the polarization in interests and exaggerates the adversary concerns over interest held in common.

Eleven years later many still feel similar to Kadish.

Howe (1973:82-83) observed that,

- 1) Collective bargaining depends on a peer relationship between participants,
- 2) it involves power, and even potentially a balance of power,

- 3) it is an adversary process, a process in which confrontation on issues undoubtedly occurs and confrontation of positions is likely to occur,
- 4) it is an arduous, time-consuming, and herculean labor.

Howe (1973:75) also felt that "Collective bargaining need not bring about a diminution of collegiality in any fundamental sense." He believed that, "The mechanism [collective bargaining] is conflict-reducing rather than conflict-creating" (Howe, 1973:75). This belief was based upon the attitude that, "Something of value can emerge from the compromise approach to the resolution of issues."

How does collective bargaining affect governance? Rossi (1974) studied the views of trustees and union leaders in Massachusetts and concluded that trustees felt the process did not diminish prior processes used to make decisions or to govern.

Anderson's (1974:14) study "revealed that faculty invariably perceived less confidence, trust, and support being provided than did administrators." He predicted that,

The local faculty senate or council may come into conflict with the exclusive-bargaining-agent concept of the law unless separate areas of jurisdiction can be agreed upon or the council becomes the elected agent of the faculty.
(Anderson, 1974:15)

Anderson (1974:15) concluded that,

Administrators and trustees must recognize that the institutions do not belong to them, that the concept of sovereign immunity is no longer valid, that professionals such as college faculty members, will never again voluntarily submit to arbitrary, capricious decision making.

Lombardi (1974) noted that collegial governance changes when collective bargaining is introduced because collective bargaining makes faculty members employees. This results in more decision-making power for faculty members.

Feuille and Blanden (1974:691) argued that, "a greater role for faculty in the decision-making process through non-bargaining mechanisms should result in less support for labor organizations."

The year 1975 witnessed many articles and writings on collective bargaining. Garbarino's book, Faculty Bargaining, was the most authoritative and up-to-date on collective bargaining to that time.

Garbarino (1975:28) noted that,

The conclusion to be drawn is that collective bargaining by faculty unions is a form of university governance, possibly the form of governance of the future over large areas of higher education.

He added that, "There is no guarantee that a high level of participation will produce results satisfactory to the faculty" (Garbarino, 1975:38). Garbarino attempted to determine from AAUP data collected in their 1969-70 study if unionism and participation in governance were inversely related. He found median participation scores for the organized four-year and two-year colleges were both in the same interval and higher than the median scores for the population as a whole, although the differential was

particularly marked for the two-year colleges. His analysis noted that,

It appears clear that, on the average, the institutions that have unionized had higher levels of participation in governance than the institutional population as a whole. Their unionization may have been the result of a "leveling up" of expectations of lower-level institutions in consolidated systems or in "emerging" institutions. Alternatively, unionism may result from expectations about the proper level of participation that were given greater than the existing above-average level. Unionism may have been a defensive reaction to an actual or expected attack on an existing effective governance system. (Garbarino, 1975:72)

Garbarino, using the 1971 AAUP Government Questionnaire data, matched the responses of a sample of nine community colleges with exclusive faculty bargaining agents and eight California non-unionized colleges. He observed that the level of faculty participation on faculty welfare decisions was significantly greater in unionized colleges, but the level of faculty participation on academic and administrative items was greater in the California non-unionized colleges.

Garbarino also discussed two research efforts (Bylsma, 1969; Angell, 1973) which he said supported the view that faculty participation in the governance of unionized institutions was significantly advanced and made more important by collective bargaining. Garbarino's (1975:251) conclusions were that unionism's impact on faculty participation in academic and administrative matters awaits more refined analysis and that faculty organize for status

in institutional governance, job security, salaries, and other economic conditions. He prophesied that bargaining would be more pervasive than unionism because a union was only one form of representative agency.

Kemerer (1975), in a doctoral thesis, argued that collective bargaining rationalized and standardized governance. He found this very true in personnel decisions and concluded it enhanced existing bureaucracy. He also concluded that none of the stages of collective bargaining advanced collegial governance unless both faculty and administration wanted it to. Noting that most researchers see faculty gaining input through collective negotiation, Kemerer and Baldrige (1975) revealed that the Stanford project showed that collective bargaining increased administrative governance.

Poole (1975) surveyed twenty-three colleges in eight states by looking at policy manuals. His thesis objective was "to determine what influence, if any, collective bargaining has had on specified written policies of governance at selected community/junior colleges" (Poole, 1975:5094A). Poole (1975:5094A) quantified four groups with the following results:

- 1) Those policies on which collective bargaining had no influence: academic freedom, admission standards, degree requirements, management rights, non-reappointment/dismissal policies, tenure policies, and text selection.

- 2) Those policies on which collective bargaining had had some influence: curriculum policies, initial appointment policies,

non-teaching responsibilities, reappointment policies and teacher load.

3) Those policies on which collective bargaining had had substantial influence: administration selection, class size, establishment of the calendar, evening and summer load, grievance procedures, and overload.

4) Those policies on which collective bargaining had not changed the content but faculty had gained a voice in the future direction of the policies: personnel evaluation and promotion policies.

Poole's research dealt with written policies which may be quite accurate, but also may be goals or ideals. Since no interpretation or evaluation of the policies was made, nor did Poole mention if they were followed, it is difficult to ascertain the actions of the parties involved.

Ernst (1975:91-92) wrote that, "When collective bargaining comes to the campus, there will inevitably be substantive and procedural changes in faculty involvement in governance." He felt that where there was faculty participation and significant influence in policy decisions that involvement may be expected to decrease as salary and welfare gains are emphasized. Ernst concluded that the net result would be a loss for faculty seeking "meaningful participation."

Decker (1975:122), studying Rhode Island Junior College, noted that,

A shared authority structure in which faculty and administration have equal voting status was recommended for divisional curriculum committees, peer judgment, accountability for faculty and administrators, general educational goals, criteria for evaluating deans and department chairmen, and community service.

Finally, in 1975, a NLRB case (St. John's Chapter of AAUP v. St. John's University, 1975:1858) the union attempted to bargain for the acceptance of the following:

- 1) AAUP 1966 statement on Government of Colleges and Universities;
- 2) Faculty representation on the Board of Trustees;
- 3) Statement of administrative responsibilities . . . including collegiality, qualifications (academic) for deans, vice-presidents, and responsibilities; and
- 4) Selection of presidents and deans.

The ruling handed down by the NLRB director was that the four were not mandatory to bargain.

Crossland (1976:41) noted that, "Critics of faculty unionization often rhapsodize about 'collegiality' and predict its demise with the advent of collective bargaining." But he summarized all opinions to that time by synthesizing the question to:

Will faculty collective bargaining really redistribute power in the academy, significantly alter the governance of the colleges . . . and usher in a renaissance of faculty leadership? (Crossland, 1976:42)

He even answered his own question by concluding, "It is still too early for a definite answer, but it probably will not" (Crossland, 1976:42).

Johnson (1977:6978A) studied the Pennsylvania State College and University System between 1971 and 1976 and concluded that:

- 1) There has been an increasing centralization of decision making in the state college system;
- 2) that the centralization process began before collective bargaining and, indeed, was

probably part of the impetus for faculty unionization; but

3) the systemwide collective bargaining relationship has further facilitated the process of centralization.

Odewahn and Spritzer (1976:769) questioned 234 presidents of colleges and found that,

The vast majority of (non-affected administrators) believe that faculty unionism has little support either within the institution or in the larger community. Finally, over one-third of these respondents feel that their faculty members should not even be allowed to join a union.

Jacobs (1976:145-146) defined collective bargaining as participatory governance when he observed that there existed a great variety of governance systems and,

These systems range on a continuum from systems with no effective participatory decision-making to systems totally committed to faculty-defined goals and objectives through the use of collective bargaining.

Perhaps the most pessimistic and blunt observation of 1976 was that of Freligh (1976:65) who concluded that, "Collective bargaining fails to do what it was created to do."

Poole and Wattenbarger (1977:8-9) noted that, "the influence of collective bargaining on academic governance policies is not as easy to determine." They concluded that, "In general it can be concluded that collective bargaining is making a real impact on governance policies and procedures" (Poole and Wattenbarger, 1977:11). Their comments were intended to summarize and extend Poole's

policy study completed two years earlier, but failed to add any new research.

Hardt (1978) studied the impact of collective bargaining and unionism on governance in selected community colleges, giving particular attention to senates, division and office chairpersons. Hardt interviewed chief executive officers, deans, and the president of senates and unions. Unfortunately he limited his study to only two institutions. The study contrasted two colleges which Hardt labeled centralized and decentralized. In the study he found that,

The centralized community college president's power had decreased, trustees' involvement in administrative matters had increased, and conflict between faculty and administrators had been continuous since the adoption of collective bargaining, whereas in the decentralized community college the president's power had increased, trustees' involvement had remained unchanged and conflict had been avoided on some issues, due to informal accommodations reached between the administration and union. (Hardt, 1978:698A)

Hardt (1978:698A) continued and forecast that,

Unless the weaknesses that embarrassed the senate and collegial process are overcome, the faculty is unlikely to increase substantially by existing means its participation in decision making, for the senate's de gratia powers of persuasion will likely not succeed where the de jure powers extended by collective bargaining have failed. The faculty's strong egalitarian sentiment that inhibits critical decision-making, the relative youth and dramatic growth of community colleges and the lack of tradition and stability indicate that a satisfactory answer to governance is not imminent.

Lee (1977) surveyed presidents and union chairpersons at unionized two- and four-year institutions regarding the effect of unionization on academic governance. Her study concentrated on the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. She found that, "Unionization seemed to increase faculty role in institution-wide decision making, although it did not increase, and even tended to decrease, the number of faculty involved in governance" (Lee, 1977:4606A). She concluded that governance did not really change at colleges where faculty exhibited a strong role before unionization, while participation in governance by faculty who formerly had no role was increased by unionization.

Marks (1979:4763A) studied sixteen four-year colleges and universities and determined that,

No significant differences in perceptions of changes in governance were reported between faculty at institutions having different bargaining agents or between administrators at institutions having different bargaining agents.

Marks (1979:4763A) did find important or highly important differences,

. . . in the perception of governance changes on nearly all issues between faculty at unionized and no-agent institutions and between administrators at liberal arts colleges and comprehensive universities.

He concluded that by comparing the faculty and administrators at the two categories of colleges revealed significant or highly significant differences on some governance issues.

Napolitano's (1979) findings were not as definitive as Marks'. Napolitano's study examined the impact of collective bargaining on governance at U.S. colleges and universities having collective bargaining contracts as of 1975. According to Napolitano's (1979:125A) data,

Collective bargaining is affecting campus governance in myriad ways and there is close agreement on the part of presidents and faculty agents as to what is happening in some areas and wide disagreement in others.

Weston (1978:90-91) studied community colleges and observed that the terms of collective bargaining agreements were rarely far beyond current practice at public two-year colleges.

Alvarado (1979) studied seventy-seven two-year public colleges nationwide. He found that,

There is little evidence that, in the community college where faculty members ordinarily do not serve actively in policy making and academic decision-making, unionization contributes to increased faculty participation in the formal decision processes of the institution. (Alvarado, 1979:7177A)

He also observed, however, that while the faculty members individually appeared to have lost influence over academic decisions, they collectively seemed to have gained power and influence through formal negotiations. This was especially true regarding such matters as faculty appointments, promotions, and advancement to tenure. Alvarado concluded that faculty unionization was a major determinant in patterns of governance in the community college.

Lombardi (1979) stated that collective bargaining was merely accentuating the trend of greater state control over community colleges. He concluded that collective bargaining thus was here to stay and rather than destroying collegiality it provided opportunities for presidents to demonstrate leadership.

Kaplin (1979:96) warned that a shift from "academic" to "economic" issues in higher education (current status) might cause a reorganization in both budgetary priorities and governance procedures. He felt that even having a past practice clause, a common negotiating item, might not insure against governance changes. He noted that many practices such as tenure and faculty participation might disappear. Identifying the two points of view then, he said, collective bargaining might lead faculty and administration into an industrial model eliminating collegiality or collective bargaining might be adopted or "domesticated" with minimal change in academic practices. He concluded that the most important issue was to what extent would faculty be involved in institutional governance and how could that be accommodated in a bargaining agreement through a past practices clause (Kaplin, 1979:105-106).

Harris and Grede (1979:380) studied vocational education at community colleges and observed that, "Shared local and state governance and control are the best guarantee of excellence in career education." Their fear

of collective negotiations and unionism was evident when they stated,

As collective bargaining and union activities in general are adopted by the faculty and by other job families on campus, the idea of a college as a common effort among scholars becomes untenable. (Harris and Grede, 1979:381)

Swift (1979) studied master contracts of eighteen community colleges in Minnesota and found faculty involvement in institutional decision making was impaired (Cohen and Brawer, 1982:119).

Michaelis (1979) gathered information regarding collective bargaining and faculty participation in institutional governance at the Kansas public community colleges. He sought responses from faculty, administration, and trustees. His results indicated faculty attitudes differed markedly from both administrators and trustees on both collective bargaining and institutional governance. He concluded that faculty perception of their role in governance was not affected by collective bargaining.

Richardson and Riccio (1980:60) noted that,

the studies by Angell, Falcone, and Poole have generally found a consistent increase in faculty involvement in decision making among institutions organized for collective bargaining.

Using a modified AAUP Government Survey they sent questionnaires to 107 institutions (none from California) regarding governance changes as a result of collective bargaining. In personnel issues they found that,

Prior to collective bargaining the estimate for union leaders was at the level of discussion while administrators placed the level closer to advisory recommendation. The post-collective bargaining estimate for both groups of respondents is consultation. (Richardson and Riccio, 1980:61)

When Richardson and Riccio (1960:61) looked at academic issues they observed that,

Faculty union leader estimates before collective bargaining involvement of faculty were somewhat lower than administrators while their post-collective bargaining estimates are somewhat higher. Both faculty union leaders and administrators place the before collective bargaining level as advisory recommendation and the post-collective bargaining estimate as consultation.

On administrative issues the researchers found that,

Faculty union leaders estimated the level of involvement before collective bargaining as discussion. Administrators placed the level of involvement closer to advisory recommendation. Both groups agreed that advisory recommendation characterized the post-collective bargaining status. (Richardson and Riccio, 1960:62)

Overall Richardson and Riccio (1960:64) found that,

With few exceptions, administrative estimates of faculty involvement before collective bargaining are higher than union leader estimates, while the post-collective bargaining perceptions are reversed.

They concluded that, "faculty are significantly more involved in decision making now than prior to collective bargaining" (Richardson and Riccio, 1960:64). An interesting prognosis from the researchers was the hypothesis that the changes being experienced by collectively bargained colleges were also occurring in institutions not organized for collective bargaining.

Douglas (1980) surveyed academic senate presidents and California Teachers Association (CTA-NEA) presidents at community colleges in California to determine their roles in meeting faculty needs. Starting with a random sample of fifteen colleges and obtaining only five responses, the survey indicated that CTA presidents had roles which were confined to the negotiation of terms and conditions of employment, while academic senate presidents retained influence over scholastic affairs.

Spicer (1981) completed a comparative analysis of faculty, administrative and student attitudes regarding governance at union and non-union Jesuit (Catholic) colleges. Using a case study interviewing technique, Spicer concluded that the collective bargaining impact increased faculty participation in governance.

Thornton (1982) also looked at Catholic four-year colleges. Using the AAUP Questionnaire with a one-way ANOVA (analysis of variance) and a Kruskal-Wallis tool, he reported that, "No significant difference was found between the Elections Group (or its components, the Collective Bargaining Group and the No Agent Group) and the Control Group" (Thornton, 1982:4742A). Thornton (1982:4742A) concluded that,

It cannot, thus be demonstrated from the present evidence that collective bargaining elections (and, a fortiori, unionization) diminish or enhance faculty participation in institutional decision making in Roman Catholic related four-year institutions of higher education.

Rosales (1981), in the most recent look at California attitudes, looked at California community college counselors' perceptions of their role changes under collective bargaining. Using a Chi-Square Analysis with a total sample of 1,174 (822 under collective bargaining and 352 not under collective bargaining) she found that counselors under collective bargaining felt their role in institutional decision making was enhanced to a greater extent than those counselors not under collective bargaining.

In summary, collective bargaining studies have shown mixed results. At first, most "studies" warned of losing collegiality and participation in governance. Perhaps these views were mostly expressed in the opinions of the then current community college and other higher education administrators. Later, more quantitative research efforts, including those of Rossi, Garbarino, Bylsma, Angell, Lee, Alvarado, Falcone, Poole, Richardon, Riccio, Spicer, and Rosales seemed to verify an increased participation in governance (shared authority) and no significant loss of collegiality. Some researchers, however, found little or no change, perhaps even a loss in participation by faculty. Those included Kemerer, Baldridge, Johnson, Odewahn, Spritzer, Hardt, Marks, Swift, and Thornton. It seems reasonable to conclude that collective bargaining is a form of governance which can increase or decrease faculty participation.

Morale

The morale of the faculty has always been a concern of college and university administrators. As Eells pointed out in 1931, and was quoted earlier in Chapter 1,

. . . Although boards of trustees and administrators may have been able to govern without apparent conflict; issues of financing, staff morale, and conformity with state laws have always been present. (Cohen and Brawer, 1982:96)

The classic study in morale was reported by Likert in 1967. Although studying industry and industrial settings, his findings have been extended to educational institutions. Likert's study showed that the participative "System IV" companies, like today's Type Z organizations, were more profitable and the employees fared better emotionally than the autocratic 'System I' companies' employees (Ouchi, 1981).

Bentley and Rempel (1967) constructed a tool (the Purdue Teacher Opinionnaire or PTO) measuring teacher morale at Purdue University. They described morale as that which, "may best be conceived of as a continuous variable" (Bentley and Rempel, 1967:1). They explained that,

The level of morale is then determined by the extent to which an individual's needs are satisfied, and the extent to which the individual perceives satisfaction as stemming from the total job situation. (Bentley and Rempel, 1967:1)

Noting the importance of measuring teacher feelings and attitudes, rather than asking third parties (administrators, trustees, deans, citizens, etc.), Bentley and Rempel

(1967:2) stated that, "What is important in morale is what the person believes and feels, rather than the conditions that may exist as perceived by others." Therefore, the Purdue instrument was structured so an instructor can "make qualitative judgments and express his feelings about the persons and things in his environment that may be related to his morale" (Bentley and Rempel, 1967:2).

Kintzer, Jensen, and Hansen (1969), studying the multi-institution junior college district, concluded that, "highly centralized colleges were characterized by maximum uniformity, impartiality, and efficiency; however, the risk of depersonalization and low morale increased" (Cohen and Brawer, 1982:97).

Corwin (1970:25), looking at organizational conflicts in high schools, observed that,

A conflict model must assign priority to power. Tension is likely when power is distributed differently among segments of the organization and when there are disparities between the system of power and prestige.

Corwin (1970:31) concluded that conflict is not

necessarily detrimental to either the organization or the overall morale of its members: in fact, conflict provides one way of upholding valued principles and for that reason can be both useful and personally satisfying.

Best (1973) completed a study which looked at possible relationships between decisional conditions/decisional deviation and teacher morale. Best used the PTO and the Alutto-Belasco Decisional Participation Scale to see if there was a correlation between morale and decisional

participation. He found "Significant differences [existed] among the decisional conditions in overall morale and the single dimension of rapport with principal" (Best, 1973:5425-A). He also indicated that a teacher's position in "organizational outcomes" is related to his/her perception of teacher level of involvement of decision making.

Richardson (1975) favored a shared authority, or collegial model of governance which was intended to reduce status symbols (such as titles) and increase both morale and communication. According to Richardson (1975:ix),

Instead of being at the bottom of a pyramid, faculty and students are part of a community of equal partners. Authority is not delegated downward as in the bureaucratic model; rather, trustees share their authority with students and faculty as well as with administration. Students and faculty members communicate directly with the board rather than through the president.

Hasle (1977) completed an assessment of differences in morale between union and non-union community college faculty in Oregon. He looked at two campuses and matched faculty belonging to unions and not belonging to unions. Hasle found that there was no significant difference in morale between union and non-union faculty, between campuses, and no significant interaction effect between campuses and membership. However, five individual factors had significant differences or interaction including: Rapport with Administrators, Satisfaction with Teaching, Rapport among Teachers, Teacher Salary, and School

Facilities and Services. The author stated that he believed that unequal distribution of power and authority gave rise to faculty unions. Conflict, as interpreted by Hasle, was normal, and conflict between unions and college administrators was beneficial to resolution of differences. Hasle (1977:ii) commented that, "Collegial relationships between administrators and faculty are difficult because collegiality is a relationship that exists between group members that share ideas, goals and values." In his study, Hasle (1977:5-6) observed that, "Group morale may be higher in organizations where differences are openly declared and sub-group identity and goals are clearly perceived." Hasle (1977:68) used the PTO to assess morale in his study and he concluded that,

A related research topic that would probably yield valuable information on intra-institutional relationships would be that of comparing faculty morale with faculty interest in being involved in institutional decision making.

He hypothesized that such an analysis might indicate if involvement in decision making is an important factor in faculty morale.

Harris (1978) also used the PTO along with the Administrative Climate Questionnaire (designed for that study) to determine if there was a relationship between instructor morale and administrative climate at six public community colleges. With a sample of 108 full-time instructors, chosen at random, and using a Pearson Product-Moment Coefficient, Harris (1978:3400A) determined that,

"The correlation between instructor morale scores and administrative climate scores was positive and statistically significant beyond the .01 level."

A study by Chang in 1978, reported by Cohen and Brawer (1982:100), noted that,

At its best, a decentralized structure (shared authority) encourages campus initiative and creativity, allows each campus to respond to the community and students more rapidly, fixes responsibility at a lower structural level, fosters the development of leadership among campus administrators, and enhances staff morale by a greater degree of local participation in decision-making.

Researching unionization and collective bargaining, Gee (1979:436) made a strong comment about morale being affected by conflict when he noted, "No matter how loudly advocates of public sector bargaining protest, collective bargaining in the public sector at present is not an effective conflict-resolution mechanism."

Miller (1979:167) commenting about multi-campus systems and centralization (versus shared authority and participation), stated that, "Excessive centralization can lead to slower and poorer communication, inefficiency, inadequate understanding of the positions of others, distrust, and poor morale."

Gatlin (1980) made a comparative study of the Florida public community colleges regarding governance structure, faculty satisfaction, and collective bargaining perception. According to Gatlin (1980:914A),

The purpose of the study was to determine the level of participation as it existed and to examine factors affecting faculty satisfaction that are perceived as areas needing change to increase participation and raise satisfaction levels.

Another purpose of the researcher was to study whether collective bargaining was a viable alternative mode of internal governance. Gatlin (1980:914A) concluded that,

The colleges, including six colleges that have elected a faculty union, were undecided as to the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a viable alternative, or adjunct, to internal governance structures.

Birnbaum (1980b:7) noted that,

. . . it may be expected that the more bureaucratized the institution before bargaining, the greater the discontinuity and therefore the greater the conflict after unionization.

Commenting on Garbarino's 1975 study, Birnbaum believed that unionization had tended to occur on campuses with higher-than-average levels of faculty participation in decision making, rather than on campuses below average on these variables. Birnbaum (1980b:28-29) concluded that this "may indicate that unionization may be related to general rather than specific concerns." One of the views regarding collective bargaining is that faculty will vote to enter collective negotiations in order to increase morale or satisfaction levels. Birnbaum (1980b:29) observed from his research that,

If faculty enter bargaining to increase their level of satisfaction, and bargaining cannot control the critical forces that generate faculty concern, it may be expected that bargaining may lead to increased frustration and militancy of

the bargainer, and thus move the parties toward destructive conflict.

Horn (1981) completed a comparison of faculty governance, welfare, and attitudes at Florida community/junior colleges with and without collective bargaining. He noted that "Faculty at collective bargaining schools reported a statistically significant lower measure of job satisfaction than did faculty at non-collective bargaining schools" (Horn, 1981:1458-A). Horn's study consisted of studying ten colleges (five collectively bargained matched with five not bargained). Horn (1981:1458-A) looked at

data . . . from faculty handbooks and other documents provided by the colleges, the reports of the Florida Department of Education, and a survey of attitudes of faculty members at the institution.

Horn (1981:1458-A) found that,

Faculty at collective bargaining schools reported a statistically significant lower measure of trust in the administration, lower rating of job satisfaction, lower rating of administrative openness and lower rating of the level of cooperation experienced now as compared to the past than did faculty at non-collective bargaining schools.

The most recent and longitudinal study on morale was completed by the Institute of Higher Education at Columbia University Teachers College. According to Jack Magarrell (1982:1), writing in the Chronicle of Higher Education:

The study found, it is the faculty members' involvement in planning and in the governance of their institutions that has the greatest effect on their morale, on their commitment to the purposes of the college, and on their support of its administration.

The Columbia study lasted ten years and looked at ninety-three colleges and universities and included opinion of more than five thousand faculty members. The decade of 1970 to 1980 was the period of study. The study revealed that faculty "feel less involved in the important decisions about running their institutions," and "faculty morale is especially low at community colleges" (Magarrell, 1982:28). The director of the Columbia study, Richard E. Anderson, noted that faculty opinion was assessed using standardized measurements developed by the Educational Testing Service. Comparing 1980 to 1970 assessments, faculty members reported their college system of shared governance declined from 64 percent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1980. According to Anderson, the ten community colleges in the study "showed a dramatic decline in institutional spirit, concern for innovation, and democratic governance" (Magarrell, 1982:28). Looking at morale alone, the community colleges fared worse than the total sample. Although the total group felt that morale was lower (61 percent felt it was high in 1970 and 51 percent felt it was high in 1980), "the proportion of community-college faculty members who agreed that faculty morale was high dropped from 65 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 1980" (Magarrell, 1982:28).

In summary, morale has always been a concern to college administrators, faculty, students, and trustees. Early studies indicated that participation affected teacher satisfaction. There is mixed research on whether

collective bargaining increases participation and, therefore, enhances morale. The Purdue Teacher Opinionnaire has been used by several researchers as an indicator of faculty morale. The only long range study on morale indicates that community college morale has fallen greater than other segments of higher education. It is interesting to note that one of the differences between community colleges and the other segments in higher education during the 70s was the tendency for community colleges to organize for collective bargaining.

Conclusion

The present study is concerned with governance, collective bargaining, and morale. Governance can be collegial, bureaucratic, or political. Collective bargaining is a form of political governance which some researchers believe can exist in a collegial setting. Despite several studies concerning the effect of collective bargaining, there is no clear definitive indication whether collective bargaining community colleges have more or less faculty participation in institutional governance than non-collective bargaining community colleges. Although some authors believe that lack of job satisfaction or morale may be instigators or reasons for college faculty members to organize for collective bargaining, there is also no large-scale system-wide study indicating whether collective bargaining community colleges have greater or

lesser faculty morale than non-collective bargaining community colleges. Hasle (1977:68) believed that "comparing faculty morale with faculty interest in being involved in institutional decision making" might indicate if involvement is an important factor in morale. This study then measured both morale and participation in institutional governance for collective bargaining campuses and non-collective bargaining campuses in order to discover relationships that exist and to predict future movement to collective bargaining.

CHAPTER 3

METHOD AND PROCEDURES

This chapter includes a description of the research procedures followed and the statistical tools employed for this study. Sampling procedures, research instruments and statistical tests are outlined and discussed.

Sampling Procedures

Standard statistical procedures for sampling were used in this study including: randomization, assumption of a normal distribution, common variances, and use of equidistant interval data (via transformation).

Randomization was completed by, first, assigning numerals to each faculty member at each of the 107 California community colleges; second, eliminating all non-teaching faculty including administrators, counselors, librarians, chairpersons, and coordinators; third, using Snedecor and Cochran's (1967:543-546) "Table of Ten Thousand Randomly Assorted Digits" selecting a three digit number every third digit, and filling the slot until all slots in the random sample were completed. The method of selection was to proceed across the columns and then down the rows until the total sample was selected.

Participant/campus data were collected in ten areas including: sex, age, education, years of teaching experience, teaching area, campus type, organization

membership, student body size, existence or non-existence of collective bargaining, and agent (if collective bargaining existed). Sex was divided into the two normal categories. Age was broken down into five groups similar to Hasle (1977): (1) 20-30, (2) 31-40, (3) 41-50, (4) 51-60, and (5) 61+. Education was categorized in three degrees: B.A. or Equivalent, M.A. or M.S., and Ed.D. or Ph.D. These three degrees and/or equivalents are necessary for California certification/credentialing as a full-time instructor. Teaching experience was divided into four periods: (1) 1-5 years, (2) 6-15 years, (3) 16-25 years, and (4) 16+ years. These periods correspond to periods approximately equivalent to apprentice, journeyman, and master as discussed by Spivey (1977). Teaching areas were: transfer, vocational/career, community service, and developmental/remedial/ABE (Adult Basic Education). These areas are the normal categories in California public community colleges. Campus was divided into single college districts and multi-campus college districts similar to Richardson (1977) and Hasle (1977). Memberships were listed in seven groups: the American Association of University Professors (AAUP); the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); California Federation of Teachers/American Federation of Teachers (CFT/AFT); the California Teachers Association/National Education Association (CTA/NEA); the Faculty Association of California Community Colleges (FACCC); an independent

campus association; and other. These are the major collective affiliations in California. Student body size was asked in terms of average daily attendance (ADA) and was broken down into 3,000 ADA or less, 3,001-10,000 ADA, and 10,001+, the State's designations of small, medium, and large community colleges. Collective bargaining was asked in a yes or no fashion. Finally, if collective bargaining existed, the respondent was asked to fill-in the agent's name. A copy of the participant/campus data items is included in the Appendix as a part of the total questionnaire.

Description of Instruments

Morale

Faculty morale was measured in this study using the Purdue Teacher Opinionnaire (PTO), created by Bentley and Rempel in 1967. The PTO contains one hundred items and respondents were asked to indicate agree, probably agree, probably disagree, or disagree after each statement. The PTO is a nationally tested standardized instrument designed to yield a total score indicating a general level of teacher morale as well as ten factor scores. The ten factors which made up the total morale score were identified by Bentley and Rempel and modified language similar to that used by Hasle (1977) follows in parentheses: Teacher Rapport with Principal (Administration), Satisfaction with

Teaching, Rapport Among Teachers (Instructors), Teacher (Instructor) Salary, Teacher (Instructor) Load, Curriculum Issues, Teacher (Instructor) Status, Community Support of Education, School (College) Facilities and Services and Community Pressures. The language modification was necessary because no higher education format was available from the authors. This modification has been used by others including Hasle (1977) and does not affect the items' content. A copy of the PTO is included in the Appendix as a part of the total questionnaire.

The PTO has been used over seventy-five times since its creation, according to Buros (1974). Validity and reliability are reported as equal to or greater than 90 percent by Hasle (1977). The PTO has been discussed and used by many researchers including: Best (1973), Hasle (1977), and Harris (1978).

In order to consider the PTO results as integral scale the scores were transformed using the Fischer-Yates Procedure and the Table of Expected Values of Normal Order Statistics as listed by Courtney (1982:80). What this meant was that each response received a numerical equivalency. "Agree" answers were given the value of 1.02938. "Probably Agree" answers were given the value of .29701. "Probably Disagree" answers were given the value of -.29701. Finally, "Disagree" answers were given the value of -1.02938. Values were reversed for negatively worded items as per instructions in the PTO (Bentley and Rempel,

1967:8) including: 1, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 25, 30, 31, 34, 40, 42, 45, 54, 56, 60, 71, 72, 76, 79, 81, 85, 98, and 99.

Governance

Faculty participation in governance was measured in this study using a modified version of the Questionnaire on Faculty Participation in College and University Government (AAUP), created by the American Association of University Professors and first used in 1969-1970. The AAUP questionnaire is a nationally tested standardized instrument designed to measure the overall level of faculty participation in governance. The AAUP survey has been used many times and has been studied intensively by Garbarino (1975), Riccio (1976), and Thornton (1981). Both validity and reliability are considered to be adequate for the present study. The modified version used in this study was also the format employed by Garbarino (1975), Riccio (1976), Adler (1977), and Richardson (1977) in their individual studies of both two-year and four-year colleges. The modified version contains twenty-eight items and is divided into six major Decision Making Areas including: Faculty Status, Academic Policy and Operation, Selection of Administrators, Financial Planning, Committee Structure and Operation, and Student Affairs. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of involvement on each item by placing an X under the appropriate level. The levels were: None,

Discussion, Advisory Recommendation, Consultation, Joint Recommendation, Joint Action, and Faculty Determination. A Not Applicable category was used to indicate an area not appropriate to the respondent's institution. A copy of the modified AAUP is included in the Appendix as a part of the total questionnaire.

In order to consider the AAUP results as integral scale the levels were transformed using the Fischer-Yates Procedure mentioned under Morale and in Courtney (1982:80). What this meant was that each response received a numerical equivalency. "None" answers were given the value of 0. "Discussion" answers were given the value of .19052. "Advisory Recommendation" answers were given the value of .38833. "Consultation" answers were given the value of .60285. "Joint Recommendation" answers were given the value of .84983. "Joint Action" answers were given the value of 1.16408. Finally, "Faculty Determination" answers were given the value of 1.66799.

Population and Sample

The population for this study was the total full-time teaching faculty at the 107 California public community colleges. (One of the colleges, Los Angeles Metropolitan College, listed no full-time teaching faculty for a program which was held overseas at military and other government installations. Therefore, faculty at 106 campuses became the total population.) Catalogs from each of the

California public community colleges were used to identify current full-time teaching faculty. Each name of a teaching faculty member was numbered and coded for each college. In order to solicit representation from each of the 106 campuses which employed full-time teaching faculty the researcher blocked so that four random slots from each college campus, or a total of 424 individuals, became the sample from which opinions were requested via a mailed survey.

The sample size necessary for the research performed was selected based upon the recommended cell size of sixty-four as suggested by Cohen (1969:374-382). This sample size assured a power level of .80 and an effect size of .25 with an alpha level of .05; these criteria being recognized as adequate for the analysis. At the same time, values as low as .25 were able to be studied in order to establish statistical significance using the selected sample size.

Independent and Dependent Variables

The independent variable for this study was the existence or non-existence of a collective bargaining contract which was determined from the participant/campus data sheets.

One dependent variable was the respondents' PTO (Morale) scores. The other dependent variable was the respondents' AAUP (Governance) scores.

Test Statistics

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was selected as the test statistic to test for significant differences between (1) faculty member mean score responses to the PTO, as well as, (2) faculty mean score responses to the AAUP.

The assumptions for the ANOVAs were that the dependent variable mean score responses of the PTO and AAUP were normally distributed, the variances within and between the mean scores were common and equal, and the sample of faculty members was randomly drawn as indicated in the sample ANOVA table (Table 1).

The mathematical models for the two one-way ANOVAs were similar with the fixed effect changing. For "Morale" the model was:

$$Y_{ij} = \mu + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Table 1. Analysis of Variance Table for Computing F Statistic

Source of Variation	df	SS	MS	F
Between Groups	1	SS_B	SS_A/df_B	MS_B/MS_W
Within Groups (Error)	Random Sample	SS_W	SS_W/df_W	
Total	-	-	-	

Note: $\alpha = .05$; df = 1, Sample; df = degrees of freedom, ss = sum of squares, ms = mean squares, F = F Statistic, SS_B = sum of squares between, SS_W = sum of squares within, df_B = degrees of freedom between, MS_B = mean squares between, MS_W = mean squares within.

Where

μ is an unknown constant

α_i is a fixed effect due to morale

ϵ_{ij} is a random variable characterized as NID $(0, \sigma^2)$

For governance the α_i changed to "governance" as the fixed effect.

The alpha level, power level, and effect size remained the same for both ANOVAs. The alpha level (α) was .05. The power ($1-\beta$) was .80. The effect size (γ) was .25.

Chi-Square Analysis was used to measure the participant/campus data and relationships to collective bargaining, morale, and governance. The Chi-Square tables were set up for all participant/campus data similar to Table 2.

The mathematical models for all participant/campus data followed the same general mathematical model:

$$\chi^2 = \frac{(f_o - f_e)^2}{f_e}$$

Table 2. Chi-Square Table for Analysis of Participant/Campus Data (Sex) According to Presence or Absence of Collective Bargaining

	Collective Bargaining	No Collective Bargaining	Totals
Female	N	N	N
Male	N	N	N

Where

f_o is the observed frequency

f_e is the expected or null-hypothetical frequency

Σ is taken over all the categories

Finally, multiple regression was used to predict collective bargaining theory. The multiple regression mathematical formula was:

$$Y = \beta_o + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \underline{\beta X} + e$$

Where

Y = Collective Bargaining

$\beta_1 X_1$ = Morale

$\beta_2 X_2$ = Governance

$\underline{\beta X}$ = Participant/Campus Data

e = Error

Hypotheses

As discussed in Chapter 1, there were three categories of hypotheses developed for this study and stated in null format. In order to test the null hypotheses, alternate hypotheses were also advanced.

Morale

$H_o: \mu_A = \mu_B$ There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived morale of California public community college teaching faculty organized for collective bargaining and those not organized for collective bargaining.

$H_A: \mu_B > \mu_A$ The morale of non-collective bargaining faculty is statistically significantly greater than those organized for collective bargaining.

Governance

$H_O: \mu_I = \mu_{II}$ There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived teaching faculty participation in institutional governance of California public community college teaching faculty organized for collective bargaining and those not organized for collective bargaining.

$H_A: \mu_{II} > \mu_I$ The faculty participation in institutional governance of non-collective bargaining faculty is statistically significantly greater than those organized for collective bargaining.

Participant/Campus Data

$H_O: f_e = f_o$ There is no statistically significant difference between the participant/campus data and perceived morale, or perceived participation in institutional governance, or collective bargaining.

$H_A: f_e \neq f_o$ There is a statistically significant difference.

Summary

Standard statistical procedures were used for the study. Two standardized instruments, the Purdue Teacher Opinionnaire (PTO) and the Questionnaire on Faculty Participation in College and University Government (AAUP), were used to measure the dependent variables--morale and

participation in governance. From a total population of all full-time faculty at the 106 California community colleges (one college had no faculty who were full-time), a random sample of 424 faculty members were sent questionnaires which gathered information regarding participant/campus data, morale, and governance. Test statistics used included the one-way ANOVA, Chi-Square Analysis, and Multiple Regression. Hypotheses were advanced and stated in the null format with alternative hypotheses.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

In presenting the data, Chapter 4 was divided into six sections. The first section discusses the participant/campus data. Section two analyzes morale. Section three looks at governance. The fourth section observes morale and governance together. Section five examines the participant/campus data in relationship to morale, governance, and collective bargaining. The last section of analysis discusses the predictive dimension of the study.

Participant/Campus Data

Expected frequencies for Chi-Square measurement were based upon information derived from two sources, the California Community College Annual Report on Staffing and Salaries 1981-82 (1982), and the California Community College Report on Faculty Employment (1982). Based upon these reports it was expected that 65 percent of the respondents would be male while 35 percent would be female. About 2.8 percent were expected to be between 20 and 30 years of age, while 25.6 percent would be between 31 and 40, 33.1 percent would be between 41 and 50, 29.2 percent would be between 51 and 60, and 9.3 percent would be 61 or over years of age. It was expected that 15.2 percent of the respondents would have an education which included a BA degree or equivalent, 71.9 percent would have a MA or MS

degree, and 12.9 percent would have an EdD or PhD degree. For teaching experience it was expected that 18 percent of the respondents would have between 1 and 5 years of teaching experience, 53 percent would have between 6 and 15 years of teaching experience, 25 percent would have between 16 and 25 years of teaching experience, and 4 percent would have 26 or more years of teaching experience. For teaching area, it was expected that transfer teachers would make up 44 percent of the sample, 28.5 percent would be vocational/career teachers, 1.6 percent would be community service teachers, and 13.9 percent would be developmental/remedial/ABE teachers. For campus type, it was expected that 72.9 percent of the respondents would come from single-campus districts, while 27.1 percent would come from multi-campus districts. Membership data were not available for expected frequency statistics. It was expected that 21.7 percent of the respondents would be from campuses having ADA of 3,000 or less, 47.2 percent would be from campuses having ADA of 3,001 to 10,000 students, and 31.1 percent would be from campuses having greater than 10,001 ADA. Respondents from collective bargaining campuses were expected to make up 79.7 percent of the sample return, while 20.3 percent were expected to make up the non-collective bargaining return. The agents were expected to be represented by three groups in the following percentages: NEA should be 54.9 percent, AFT should be 35.2 percent, and Independents should be 9.9 percent. Please see Table 3 for the frequencies.

Table 3. Table of Expected Frequencies in Percentages of Participant/Campus Data of Full-Time Teaching Faculty on California Public Community College Campuses

Participant/Campus Data	Percent
Sex	
Female	35
Male	65
Age	
20-30 years	2.8
31-40 years	25.6
41-50 years	33.0
51-60 years	29.2
61+ years	9.3
Education	
BA or equivalent	15.2
MA/MS	71.9
EdD or PhD	12.9
Teaching Experience	
1-5 years	18.0
6-15 years	53.0
16-25 years	25.0
26+ years	4.0
Teaching Areas	
Transfer	44.0
Vocational/Career	28.5
Community Service	1.6
Developmental/Remedial/ABE	13.9

Table 3 (continued)

Participant/Campus Data	Percent
Campus	
Single-Campus District	72.9
Multi-Campus District	27.1
Memberships	
AAUP, AFSCME, CFT/AFT, FACCC, Independent, CTA/NEA, others	Unknown
Student Body Size (ADA)	
3,000 ADA or less	21.1
3,001-10,000 ADA	47.2
10,001+ ADA	31.1
Collective Bargaining	
Yes	79.7
No	20.3
Agents	
NEA	54.9
AFT	35.2
Independent	9.9

The total useable return for this study was 297, or 70.05 percent. All 106 campuses having full-time teaching faculty responded with at least one completed questionnaire.

Sixty-seven of the responding faculty were from non-collective bargaining colleges, while 229 respondents

were from collective bargaining colleges. One respondent failed to specify his/her college. The number in each group is roughly equivalent to the State estimates for collective bargaining (80 percent collective bargaining and 20 percent non-collective bargaining according to Douglas and Kramer, 1982:2-6).

Approximately 29 percent (N = 85) of the total respondents were female, while 71 percent (N = 206) were male. This breakdown was true for collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining respondents. According to the California Community College (1982:10) Annual Report on Staffing and Salaries 1981-82, approximately 65 percent of all community college full-time faculty are male, while 35 percent are female. Therefore, this study tended to over-represent males by 6 percent. Although this was a limitation of the study, since both collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining respondent males were likewise over-represented the discrepancy was considered minimal and was assumed to not have had a major effect on the study's results.

Table 4 shows the similarity of respondents from both collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining colleges

The largest group of participants listed their ages as falling within the 41-50 years of age range. This was true for both those participants from collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campuses. Nearly 37 percent of

Table 4. Breakdown of Sex of Participants by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campus with N = 291 (Percentage in Parentheses)

Sex of Participants	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of No Collective Bargaining	Total
Female	66 (.295)	19 (.284)	85 (.292)
Male	158 (.705)	48 (.716)	206 (.708)
Total	224 (.770)	67 (.230)	291 (1.00)

the respondents were in this range. This compares with the state-wide report of 33 percent (California Community College, 1982:8).

The next largest group was the participants who listed their age range as 51-60. The study contained approximately 27 percent of the participants in this range. There was a slightly greater percentage of collective bargaining campus participants (27.6 percent) than non-collective bargaining campus participants (24.2 percent). Both groups were slightly less than the state-wide group of 29.2 percent.

The third largest group was the participants who reported their ages as falling within the 31-40 years of age range. The study's total of a little over 25 percent is almost identical to the State report. There was a slightly larger percentage in the non-collective bargaining group (27.2 percent) than the collective bargaining group (24.4 percent).

The fourth largest group of participants listed their age range as 61 and over. The study's total of 9.4 percent in this category is almost exactly the same as the State report of 9.3 percent. Collective bargaining participants accounted for 10.2 percent, while non-collective bargaining participants amounted to 6.5 percent.

The smallest group of participants listed their age range as 20-30 years. The total study of 1.7 percent relates closely to the State average of 2.8 percent. The non-collective bargaining participants were slightly larger at 4.8 percent, while the collective bargaining participants were slightly smaller at .9 percent.

Therefore, ages of the participants in the study resembled state-wide age ranges in percentages very closely. Table 5 shows the similiarity of respondents from both collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campuses.

The majority of the participants in this study (74 percent) held either the Master of Arts or Master of Sciences Degree. Both those at collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campuses were very close to this percentage (74.3 percent and 72.7 percent respectively). There was a greater percentage of participants from non-collective bargaining campuses than collective bargaining campuses who listed their education as BA or Equivalent (16.7 percent and 11 percent respectively). In the doctorate (Ed.D. or Ph.D.) category, there was a greater

Table 5. Breakdown of Ages of Participants by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 287 (Percentage in Parentheses)

Age of Respondents in Years	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of No Collective Bargaining	Total
20-30	2 (.009)	3 (.048)	5 (.017)
31-40	55 (.244)	17 (.274)	72 (.251)
41-50	83 (.369)	23 (.371)	106 (.369)
51-60	62 (.276)	15 (.242)	77 (.268)
61 and over	23 (.102)	4 (.065)	27 (.094)
Totals	225 (.784)	62 (.216)	287 (1.00)

percentage of participants from collective bargaining campuses than non-collective bargaining campuses (14.7 percent and 10.6 percent respectively). See Table 6 for the numerical count and percentages.

Table 6. Education Level by Degrees of Participants by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 284 (Percentages in Parentheses)

Education Levels by College Degrees	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of No Collective Bargaining	Total
BA/BS or Equiv.	24 (.110)	11 (.167)	35 (.123)
MA/MS	162 (.743)	48 (.727)	210 (.739)
Ed.D. or Ph.D.	32 (.147)	7 (.106)	39 (.137)
Totals	218 (.768)	66 (.232)	284 (1.00)

In California the Master's Degree is the normal requirement for a community college credential to teach full-time. Since multi-campus districts tend to be organized more for collective bargaining (to be discussed later) and multi-campus districts tend to be located in larger metropolitan areas, where doctorate granting institutions are also located, this may be a reason for the greater percentage of doctorates on the collective bargaining campuses.

The instructors responding to this study were almost evenly divided between the 6-15 years of experience category and the 16-25 years of experience category. Approximately 40 percent of the total response (.399) listed their years of experience teaching as 16-25 years, while almost 37 percent of the response (.368) placed themselves in the 6-15 years experience group. A greater percentage of respondents from collective bargaining campuses (.414) listed the 16-25 years of experience, while the next largest group (.352) listed the 6-15 years of experience category. The respondents from non-collective bargaining campuses were reversed with the greater percentage (.422) responding from the 6-15 years of experience group, while the next largest group (.344) responded from the 16-25 years of experience level.

Those having 26 years of experience or more amounted to about 19 percent of the sample, with those from collective bargaining campuses being a little greater

(.194) and those from non-collective bargaining campuses being a little fewer (.172).

The fewest respondents (.045) listed their teaching experience as 1-5 years. The respondents from non-collective bargaining campuses were slightly greater in percentage (.063) than respondents from collective bargaining campuses (.040). See Table 7 for the actual numerical count and resulting percentages.

Table 7. Teaching Experience of Participants in Years by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 291 (Percentage in Parentheses)

Teaching Experience in Years	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of No Collective Bargaining	Total
1-5	9 (.040)	4 (.063)	13 (.045)
6-15	80 (.352)	27 (.422)	107 (.368)
16-25	94 (.414)	22 (.344)	116 (.399)
Over 26	44 (.194)	11 (.172)	55 (.189)
Totals	227 (.780)	64 (.220)	291 (1.00)

Most of the respondents listed their teaching area as either transfer or vocational/career. Respondents who checked their area as transfer amounted to about 42 percent of the study, although those at non-collective bargaining campuses were a little greater (.463) than those at collective bargaining campuses (.413). Those individuals involved in vocational/career teaching were likewise about

42 percent of the study. However, there was a greater percentage of return from collective bargaining campus teachers (.436) than from non-collective bargaining campus teachers (.358). No reason for this slight discrepancy could be found.

Those teachers who checked their teaching area as developmental/remedial/Adult Basic Education accounted for about 10 percent of the return. The non-collective bargaining group was greater here (.164) than the collective bargaining group (.076). This variation will be discussed later in this study.

The smallest category of teaching area reported was the community service area where a little more than 6 percent of the respondents listed this as their teaching area. The return from collective bargaining campus respondents was quite a bit larger (.076) than the non-collective bargaining campus respondents (.015). This might be due to the fact that economic cutbacks and State defunding of "personal enrichment" classes in California caused greater elimination of full-time community service teachers. The larger, multi-campus districts serving metropolitan areas tended to retain many of these "community service" personnel by instituting fees to cover costs, while the smaller single campus districts did not. Since many of the multi-campus districts also have collective bargaining, that would account for the difference in the two groups. This will be discussed later in this

chapter. See Table 8 for the numerical responses and resulting percentages for teaching areas.

Table 8. Teaching Areas of Participants by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 292 (Percentage in Parentheses)

Teaching Areas of Participants	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of No Collective Bargaining	Total
Transfer	93 (.413)	31 (.463)	124 (.425)
Vocational/Career	98 (.436)	24 (.358)	122 (.418)
Community Service	17 (.076)	1 (.015)	18 (.062)
Dev/Remedial/ABE	17 (.076)	11 (.164)	28 (.096)
Totals	225 (.771)	67 (.229)	292 (1.00)

Respondents were almost equally split between single campus college districts and multi-campus college districts. Approximately 48 percent of the respondents checked that they were in single campus districts, while 52 percent were in multi-campus districts. There was a great difference in response percentages for this item as 75 percent of the single campus college district teachers were not under collective bargaining whereas over 60 percent of the multi-college districts were under collective bargaining. This will be discussed further in this chapter. Table 9 gives the complete counts and respective percentages.

Table 9. College Districts of Participants by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 292 (Percentage in Parentheses)

Campus Types	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of No Collective Bargaining	Total
Single College Districts	89 (.397)	51 (.750)	140 (.479)
Multi-campus Districts	135 (.603)	17 (.250)	152 (.521)
Totals	224 (.767)	68 (.233)	292 (1.00)

Approximately 41 percent of those responding listed their campus as medium-size student bodies having between 3,001 and 10,000 average daily attendance (a way of measuring full-time student equivalencies in California for State funding). Another 41 percent listed their campuses as large-size student bodies having more than 10,000 average daily attendance. The remaining 18 percent of the respondents listed their campuses as small-size, having 3,000 or less average daily attendance. There was little or no difference in the representation/responses from collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campus respondents. Table 10 lists the actual numerical responses and equivalent percentages.

While all respondents reported an affiliation with some group, the largest group of respondents belonged to the California Teachers Association/National Education Association (CTA/NEA), and many respondents held

Table 10. Student Body Sizes of Participants by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 287 (Percentage in Parentheses)

Student Body Size in Average Daily Attendance	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of No Collective Bargaining	Total
3,000 or Less	39 (.176)	13 (.200)	52 (.181)
3,001 - 10,000	91 (.410)	26 (.400)	117 (.408)
Over 10,000	92 (.414)	26 (.400)	118 (.411)
Totals	222 (.774)	65 (.226)	287 (1.00)

memberships in more than one organization. CTA/NEA respondents amounted to almost 39 percent of the total. Those under collective bargaining equalled a little over 40 percent, while those not under collective bargaining were a little over 33 percent. The next largest group of respondents listed their affiliation as the California Federation of Teachers/American Federation of Teachers (CTF/AFT). Almost 21 percent of the total respondents were affiliated with CFT/AFT, although 25 percent of those under collective bargaining were CFT/AFT. Only 6 percent of the CFT/AFT were at non-collective bargaining campuses.

The Faculty Association of California Community Colleges (FACCC) was listed as the affiliate of over 16 percent of the respondents including about 12 percent at the collectively bargained campuses and 30 percent at the non-collectively bargained campuses.

The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), independent (campus), and other (various) groups only amounted to 24 percent of the respondents and most of these were at non-collectively bargained campuses (.310 versus .223). What this implied was that there was a less likely chance of collective bargaining at campuses where faculty belong to the AAUP, their own independent (campus) group, or some of the other professional or smaller affiliations. Table 11 shows the complete breakdown which totals greater than the 297 respondents because of the multiple memberships reported.

Table 11. Association Membership of Participants by Collective Bargaining and Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 371 (Percentage in Parentheses)

Associations of Participants	Number of Collective Bargaining	Number of Non-Collective Bargaining	Total
AAUP	3 (.010)	2 (.024)	5 (.013)
CFT/AFT	72 (.251)	5 (.060)	77 (.208)
CTA/NEA	116 (.404)	28 (.333)	144 (.388)
FACCC	35 (.122)	25 (.298)	60 (.162)
Independent/Campus	37 (.129)	14 (.167)	51 (.137)
Other (Various)	24 (.084)	10 (.119)	34 (.092)
Totals	287 (.774)	84 (.226)	371 (1.00)

CTA/NEA was the sole bargaining agent for 101 respondents and also shared representation for the faculty

members with FACCC at one college and four members' representation was shared with CFT/AFT. CFT/AFT was the sole bargaining agent for 86 respondents and shared representation with CTA/NEA at four as mentioned above. Local independent organizations were reported as representing 27 college members. FACCC was the sole agent of one faculty member. Finally, nine respondents failed to specify a bargaining agent. What this showed was that CTA/NEA or CFT/AFT represented the majority of full-time faculty respondents who were collectively bargaining in California. It also showed that there were some respondents who have chosen to organize for collective bargaining through their own independent or campus groups.

Morale

The first objective of this study was to determine whether full-time faculty employed at California public community colleges, organized for collective bargaining, have statistically significant higher or lower perceived morale than those who are not organized.

There was a total of 296 respondents to the PTO instrument. Those at collective bargaining campuses amounted to 229 teachers and their morale scores ranged from a -40.58 to a +98.226 with a mean of 35.84. Teachers at non-collective bargaining campuses amounted to 67 respondents and their morale scores ranged from a -12.00 to a +89.00 with a mean of 37.62. The maximum possible score

on the PTO was +102.94 and the minimum possible score was -102.94. Neither extreme was recorded and the mean score for all respondents was 36.240. Table 12 lists the above information.

Table 12. Morale Scores of Respondents Completing the PTO Instrument

	Collective Bargaining N = 229	Non-Collective Bargaining N = 67	Total N = 296
Morale Means (Averages)	35.840	37.620	36.240
Morale High Scores	98.226	89.000	98.226
Morale Low Scores	-40.580	-12.000	-40.581

Note: Maximum possible = +102.94; minimum possible = -102.94.

The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine this objective. The null hypothesis (H_0) was that there is no statistically significant difference between the morale of California public community college teaching faculty with collective bargaining and without collective bargaining. The alternate hypothesis (H_A) was that the morale of non-collective bargaining faculty is statistically significantly greater than those with collective bargaining. Table 13 shows that the null hypothesis was retained. The analysis was based upon 229 responses from faculty under collective bargaining, 67 not under collective bargaining, with 1 respondent failing to respond to

the instrument completely. These returns are roughly proportionate to the California community colleges under collective bargaining and not under collective bargaining.

Table 13. ANOVA Table for Comparison of Morale of Faculty Using PTO Scores at Collective Bargaining Campuses with Those at Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with N = 296

Source of Variation	df	ss	ms	F
Between Groups	1	165.2165	165.2165	.2446
Within Groups	294	198600.0000	675.5560	
Total	295	198765.2165		

Note: $\alpha = .05$; $df = 1, 294$. Computed $F = .2446$; Tabular $F = 3.8800$; Decision = Retain H_0 and Reject H_A . df = degrees of freedom, ss = sum of squares, ms = mean squares, F = F statistic.

With 1 degree of freedom between groups and 294 within groups, the computed F for morale was .2446, which was less than the tabular F of 3.8800 and resulted in the retention of the null hypothesis and the rejection of the alternate hypothesis.

Governance

The second objective of this study was to determine whether full-time faculty employed at California public community colleges, organized for collective bargaining, have statistically significant greater or lesser perceived faculty participation in institutional governance than those who are not organized.

There was a total of 286 respondents to the AAUP instrument. Those at collective bargaining campuses amounted to 222 teachers and their governance scores ranged from 0 to 35.79 with a mean of 16.19. Teachers at non-collective bargaining campuses amounted to 64 respondents and their governance scores ranged from 0 to 33.50 with a mean of 15.93. The maximum possible score was +46.70 and no one responded at this level; while the minimum possible score was 0 and responses were received from both collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining teachers who rated their participation at this low level. Table 14 lists the above information.

Table 14. Governance Scores of Respondents Completing the AAUP Instrument

	Collective Bargaining N = 222	Non-Collective Bargaining N = 64	Total N = 286
Governance Means (Averages)	16.190	15.930	16.133
Governance High Scores	35.790	33.500	35.791
Governance Low Scores	0	0	0

Note: Maximum possible = 46.70, minimum possible = 0.

The one-way ANOVA was again used to determine this objective. The null hypothesis (H_0) was that there is no statistically significant difference between the faculty

participation in institutional governance of California public community college faculty under collective bargaining and not under collective bargaining. The alternate hypothesis (H_A) was that the faculty participation in institutional governance for the non-collective bargaining faculty is statistically significantly greater than for those under collective bargaining. Table 15 shows that the null hypothesis was retained. The analysis was based upon 222 responses from faculty under collective bargaining, 64 not under collective bargaining, with 11 respondents failing to respond to the instrument. Again this is roughly equivalent to the State averages.

Table 15. ANOVA Table for Comparison of Participation in Governance of Faculty Using AAUP Scores at Collective Bargaining Campuses with Those at Non-Collective Bargaining Campuses with $N = 286$

Source of Variation	df	ss	ms	F
Between Groups	1	3.3236	3.3236	.0692
Within Groups	284	13638.5048	48.0229	
Total	285	13641.8284		

Note: $\alpha = .05$; $df = 1, 284$. Computed $F = .0692$; Tabular $F = 3.8800$; Decision = Retain H_0 and Reject H_A . df = degrees of freedom, ss = sum of squares, ms = mean squares, F = F statistic.

With 1 degree of freedom between groups and 284 within groups, the computed F for governance was .0692, which was less than the tabular F of 3.8800 and resulted in the

retention of the null hypothesis and the rejection of the alternate hypothesis.

Morale and Governance

The third objective of this study was to examine whether there was any statistically significant relationship between perceived morale and perceived faculty participation in institutional governance on collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campuses of California public community colleges. Multiple Regression was used for this examination. The PTO score was entered on step one of regression. Table 16 shows the resulting F as .25739. This was based upon 1 degree of freedom for the regression and 283 degrees of freedom for the residual. The Multiple R test resulted in .03014. The standard deviation was .41623. The coefficient of variability was 34.1 percent. The beta elasticity measured .0416817.

Table 16. Regression Table for Morale Using PTO Scores

	df	ss	ms	F
Regression	1	.04459	.04459	.25739
Residual	283	49.02909	.17325	
Total	284	49.07368		

Note: $\alpha = .05$; $df = 1, 283$. Multiple R = .03014; R Square = .00091; STD Deviation = .41623; Coefficient of Variability = 34.1 percent; Beta Elasticity = .0416817; df = degrees of freedom, ss = sum of squares, ms = mean squares, F = F statistic.

The AAUP score was entered on step two of regression. Table 17 shows the resulting F as .22731. This was based upon 2 degrees of freedom for the regression and 282 degrees of freedom for the residual. The Multiple R test resulted in .04012. The standard deviation was .41682. The coefficient of variability was 34.1 percent. The beta elasticity was a $-.0288788$. Both tables are based on 285 useable responses. The results appear that although related, the relationship between morale and participation in governance is moderate.

Table 17. Regression Table for Participation in Institutional Governance Using AAUP Scores

	df	ss	ms	F
Regression	2	.07899	.03949	.22731
Residual	282	48.99470	.17374	
Total	284	49.07369		

Note: $\alpha = .05$; $df = 2, 282$. Multiple $R = .04012$; $R^2 = .00161$; STD Deviation = .41682; Coefficient of Variability = 34.1 percent; Beta Elasticity = $-.0288788$; df = degrees of freedom, ss = sum of squares, mx = mean squares, F = F statistic.

The scattergram for the PTO scores and AAUP scores for those who answered "no" to collective bargaining (63 total) showed a correlation of .30903 with an intercept of 20.31595 and a slope of 1.09287 demonstrating a linear relationship. The same scattergram for those who answered "yes" to collective bargaining (222 total) resulted in a

correlation of .42225 with an intercept of 9.65883 and a slope of 1.62012, also demonstrating a linear relationship. Although there was a higher correlation for collective bargaining respondents, the difference was not statistically significant.

Participant/Campus Data and Morale,
Governance, Collective Bargaining

The fourth objective of this study was to describe and report any statistically significant correlations between the participant/campus data collected and morale perception, between the participant/campus data collected and faculty governance perception, and between the participant/campus data and collective bargaining at California public community colleges. Chi-Square Analysis was used for the analysis of the participant/campus data. The null hypothesis (H_0) was that there is no statistically significant difference between the participant/campus data and morale, or governance, or collective bargaining. The alternate hypothesis (H_A) was that there is a statistically significant difference. The results were as follows:

Sex

Computed Raw Chi-Square = .03051
 Tabular Chi-Square (1 df) = 3.84000
 Decision: Retain H_0 and Reject H_A
 No statistically significant difference for sex
 was observed.

Age

Computed Raw Chi-Square = 5.46409

Tabular Chi-Square (4 df) = 9.49000

Decision: Retain H_0 and Reject H_A

No statistically significant difference for age was observed.

Educational Level

Computed Raw Chi-Square = 1.94495

Tabular Chi-Square (2 df) = 5.99000

Decision: Retain H_0 and Reject H_A

No statistically significant difference for educational level was observed.

Years of Teaching

Computed Raw Chi-Square = 1.98568

Tabular Chi-Square (3 df) = 7.82000

Decision: Retain H_0 and Reject H_A

No statistically significant difference for years of teaching was observed.

Teaching Area

Computed Raw Chi-Square = 8.34263

Tabular Chi-Square (3 df) = 7.82000

Decision: Reject H_0 and Accept H_A

There is a statistically significant difference for teaching area.

College Campus Type

Computed Raw Chi-Square = 25.99718

Tabular Chi-Square (1 df) = 3.84000

Decision: Reject H_0 and Accept H_A

There is a statistically significant difference for college campus type.

Student Body Size

Computed Raw Chi-Square = .20171

Tabular Chi-Square (2 df) = 5.99000

Decision: Retain H_0 and Reject H_A

No statistically significant difference for student body size was observed.

Union Membership

Because of multiple memberships this item was not pursued for Chi-Square Analysis.

Collective Bargaining Agent

Since only collective bargaining respondents were in this category, no Chi-Square Analysis was pursued.

Regression was used to attempt to determine the relationships for the two rejected participant/campus null hypotheses. The scattergram for the PTO scores and AAUP scores of those from single campus districts had an intercept of 9.21476 and a slope of 1.73681 showing a linear relationship resulting in a correlation of .44228. The scattergram for the multi-campus districts showed a correlation of .33701 with an intercept of 16.25993 and a slope of 1.19251. This indicated that respondents from multi-campus districts were more likely to be organized for collective bargaining than single campus districts. Although there was a moderately higher correlation between morale and participation on the single-campus districts, it was not statistically significant.

Teaching area was delineated into four groups including transfer, vocational/career, community service, and developmental/remedial/Adult Basic Education. The scattergram for transfer respondents resulted in a correlation of .45796 with an intercept of 13.93348 and a slope of 1.47957. The scattergram for vocational/career respondents resulted in a correlation of .33315 with an intercept of 15.81499 and a slope of 1.37210. The scattergram for community service respondents resulted in a correlation of .44040 with an intercept of -2.81805 and a slope of 1.86629. The scattergram for developmental/remedial/Adult Basic Education respondents resulted in a correlation of .47005 (the highest correlation found) with an intercept of .42850 and a slope of 1.96224. On the surface this would seem to indicate a relationship between teaching areas and collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining. However, an examination of the responses shows that community service respondents overwhelmingly tended to be at collectively bargained campuses (17 to 1), developmental/remedial/Adult Basic Education respondents tended to come from non-collectively bargained campuses, and transfer and vocational/career areas were proportionately represented. What this indicated was that community service faculty, since they tended to be more prevalent in larger metropolitan multi-campus districts, were more likely to also be under collective bargaining agreements rather than to be a cause of collective bargaining. The difference in the

developmental/remedial/ABE percentages may be explained by the existence of a greater concentration of developmental/remedial/ABE instructors in the more rural single campus districts which also tend to not be under collective bargaining. The above analysis seems to indicate that the differences in teaching areas were a function of the type of campus rather than the existence or non-existence of collective bargaining.

Prediction

The fifth objective of this study was to develop a theory that purported to predict whether there would be collective bargaining on any given California public community college campus by observing morale scores and faculty governance scores. Because the use of multiple regression analysis showed that there was no statistically significant relationship between perceived morale and perceived faculty participation in institutional governance on collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campuses of California public community colleges, a reliable theory for predicting the advent of collective bargaining was not warranted.

Summary

This study received responses from each of the 106 California public community college campuses having

full-time faculty. The total return of 297 faculty responses represented 70.05 percent of the sample.

The first objective of this study was to determine whether full-time faculty employed at California public community colleges, organized for collective bargaining, have statistically significant higher or lower perceived morale than those who are not organized. It was found that there was no statistically significant difference.

The second objective of this study was to determine whether full-time faculty employed at California public community colleges, organized for collective bargaining, have statistically greater or lesser perceived faculty participation in institutional governance than those who are not organized. It was found that there was no statistically significant difference.

The third objective of this study was to examine whether there was any statistically significant relationship between perceived morale and perceived faculty participation in institutional governance on collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining campuses of California public community colleges. It was found that although there was a higher correlation for collective bargaining respondents, the difference was not statistically significant.

The fourth objective of this study was to describe and report any statistically significant correlations between the participant/campus data collected and morale

perception, between the participant/campus data and faculty governance perceptions, and between the participant/campus data and collective bargaining at California public community colleges. It was found that teaching area was related to college campus type, and college campus type was related to collective bargaining at statistically significant levels. It was reasoned that faculty in the community service teaching area were more likely to be located in larger metropolitan areas where the multi-campus collectively bargained colleges were also located. The developmental/remedial/ABE faculty were reasoned to be located more in the rural areas where the single campus non-collectively bargained colleges were located. Therefore, neither teaching area was felt to be a function of collective bargaining.

The fifth objective of this study was to develop a theory that purported to predict whether there would be collective bargaining on any California public community college campus by observing morale scores and faculty governance scores. Since no statistically significant differences were found, no theory of prediction was advanced.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

Summary

This study was proposed in order to observe a system of community colleges consisting of those colleges which had organized for collective bargaining and those which had not. The process was to collect participant/campus data, and to measure opinions of faculty in both groups regarding their morale and their participation in institutional governance. The intent was to examine the relationships that existed and to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between the two groups with respect to perceived morale and perceived participation in institutional governance. It was hypothesized that faculty members at non-collective bargaining community colleges would have statistically significant higher morale and greater participation in institutional governance than those under collective bargaining agreements. Finally, it was hoped that through the analysis of morale and participation in governance a theory could be developed to predict the onset or likelihood of collective bargaining.

Two instruments were used to gather data for this study. The Purdue Teacher Opinionaire (PTO), developed by Bentley and Rempel (1967), was chosen to assess community college faculty morale. The Questionnaire on Faculty

Participation and University Government (AAUP), developed nationally by the American Association of University Professors, was selected to measure faculty participation in institutional governance. The data were tested using the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) F statistic tool twice. Chi-Square Analysis was used to measure the relationships to the participant/campus data which were also collected. Lastly, Multiple Regression was used to attempt to predict collective bargaining theory.

Three categories of hypotheses were developed in this study. The null hypotheses were:

1. There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived morale of California public community college teaching faculty organized for collective bargaining and those not organized for collective bargaining.

2. There is no statistically significant difference between the perceived faculty participation in institutional governance of California public community college teaching faculty organized for collective bargaining and those not organized for collective bargaining.

3. There is no statistically significant difference between the participant/campus data and perceived morale, or perceived participation in institutional governance, or collective bargaining.

The one-way ANOVA for morale was used to test for a statistically significant difference between the morale of California public community college teaching faculty with

collective bargaining and without collective bargaining. There was no statistically significant difference.

The one-way ANOVA for governance was used to test for a statistically significant difference between faculty participation in institutional governance of California public community college teaching faculty under collective bargaining and not under collective bargaining. Here also there was no statistically significant difference.

The third category involved Chi-Square tests to see if there were statistically significant differences between the participant/campus data and morale, or governance, or collective bargaining. In two participant/campus areas there were statistically significant differences in regards to collective bargaining; these were teaching area and type of college campus.

It was found that the teachers in the community service area tend to be more in collective bargaining colleges, while there is a greater percentage of developmental/remedial/ABE teachers at non-collective bargaining campuses. Both of these facts were felt to reflect the geographic areas. That is, community service faculty tend to be located in metropolitan areas where the multi-campus collective bargaining colleges are located, while developmental/remedial/ABE faculty tend to be located in the rural areas where the single campus non-collective bargaining colleges are located. Faculty in multi-campus colleges tended to be organized for collective bargaining,

whereas faculty in single campus colleges tended to not be organized for collective bargaining. These are descriptive observations and should not be interpreted as causal in the experimental sense.

Multiple regression demonstrated no statistically significant difference in the correlation between morale and participation in governance for collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining groups. Therefore, no predictive theory relating to the likelihood of collective bargaining was warranted.

It is important to note, however, that although collective bargaining faculty members had a higher mean score for faculty participation in institutional governance (16.1907 versus 15.9321), the non-collectively bargained faculty members held a higher mean score for morale (37.6209 versus 35.8356). Whether collective bargaining resulted in this higher participation and lower morale is impossible to document because the data were statistically non-significant. The standard deviation for faculty participation in the collective bargaining group was 6.9927, while that for the non-collective bargaining group was 6.7047. The standard deviation for faculty morale in the collective bargaining group was 26.7163, while that for the non-collective bargaining group was 23.3145. However, the data were statistically non-significant.

Implications

Morale and Governance Levels

Had the results been statistically significant, hence not subject to the suspicion of chance occurrences, we might observe that both the reported average participation levels and the average morale levels at California public community colleges left open the question as to whether significantly increased faculty participation would result in significantly higher morale because both levels were very low. Retention of the null hypotheses left open the question anyway.

Both the collective bargaining group and the non-collective bargaining group reported the average faculty participation was closest to the "consultation" level, and quite removed from the American Association of University Professors recommended level of "faculty determination." In addition, both groups' reported average morale levels of 35.8356 for collectively bargained faculty and 37.6209 for non-collectively bargained faculty fell quite short of the maximum possible 102.938. The morale levels were roughly similar to other national morale studies reported by Bentley and Rempel.

Respondents' Observations

Some of the participants in this study offered unsolicited observations along with their returned surveys. As one respondent said, "many items are negotiable items through collective bargaining." It is true that many, if not all, items on the AAUP questionnaire become negotiable as a result of a collective bargaining agreement.

Another participant noted that collective bargaining "is part of an ongoing problem here that I do not have enough information in the Decision Making area to answer intelligently.

The questions in the AAUP instrument must have presented some difficulty for many instructors. As one related, "Most of the decision making questions are hard to answer because we are under contract. At present a new contract is being negotiated and answers may change." He went on to add that, "As a faculty member . . . I have input to the AFT but that is all." This statement appears to support the concerns of many in education that collective bargaining increases the unit leader(s) participation, but may decrease the individual faculty member's perceived participation.

One respondent broadened the basis of problems concerning morale by noting that, "The hit list [a list of defunded courses released during the fall of 1982] and lack of funds from Proposition 13 [a California tax reduction

initiative passed in 1978] influenced most of my answers." She went on to add, however, that "I also feel collective bargaining should be done at the chancellor's office as with the California State College System." This respondent's last remark may reflect the views of other faculty members concerning a campus polarization between faculty and administration which has been attributed to collective bargaining by both groups.

Another participant leveled aim at government legislators at the state capital when he said, "The major source of our current difficulties in California bears an indelible stamp 'made in Sacramento,' I believe." He went on to note that, "Local communities have surrendered control to our elected officials, who are too worried about their personal objectives to worry about education."

The longest commentary, running two typewritten single-spaced pages, came from a faculty member at a collectively bargained multi-campus district college. He listed three factors as relevant for the breakdown between faculty and administration. They were affirmative action, Proposition 13, and collective bargaining. Of collective bargaining he observed that it led "to an adversary role between administration and faculty. I had not expected this to happen, but I was too naive when it was proposed." He concluded that "without any question, administration [at his college] goes out of its way to make sure that faculty

will never have any meaningful input in any decision-making that goes on anywhere within."

Based upon this researcher's conversations by telephone with other respondents and some personal interviews, these negative feelings are not atypical or extreme.

Researcher Observations

Although not confirmed by this study, in the opinion of this researcher, collective bargaining was offered as a panacea or utopia for instructors in higher education and has not lived up to its expectations. If we in California are to learn from this experience and the experiences of others in New York, Michigan, and elsewhere, we must realize that any process such as collective bargaining, or meet-and-confer, or mediation, or arbitration is not a solution or a guarantee of rights. When power is shared or participation in governance is great, this can only occur when those in the highest positions willingly choose to do so, not when those governed sit across the table and demand it. Unreasonable demands at the table result more in polarization, lack of trust, and hostility to true participation.

Morale is one of the "enduring" problems. This researcher believes that significantly increasing faculty participation in governance will increase faculty morale. Because this study was unable to reveal the existence of either high participation or high morale, it remains to be

demonstrated that this belief has merit. This study has not, however, disproved it either.

Morale might also be increased in additional ways. The community college president and highest administrators who voluntarily teach a course at least once a year; eat in the faculty dining room with faculty; visit and evaluate faculty in the laboratory and classroom; take an active part and interest in faculty committees; attend college cultural, artistic, and vocational events in addition to the traditional men's athletic contests; go out onto the campus every day; communicate regularly in writing and speaking with faculty; forego a few of the traditional service club luncheons, afternoon golf games, and plush transportation and insurance perks; and learn to delegate authority to faculty groups may be able to increase their local campus and faculty morale. Collective bargaining can never insure that these things will happen; only the true leaders of the present and future community colleges can do so.

It remains to be seen if increasing faculty participation beyond consultation at either collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining colleges would result in higher morale. It is also impossible, given the results of this study, to determine whether signing a collective bargaining contract in California has increased, decreased, or changed participation or increased, decreased, or changed morale. Because of the low levels of reported participation and

morale for both groups, it could be postulated that administrators and trustees who wish to attempt raising faculty morale at community colleges would do well to consider raising faculty participation in the twenty-eight areas suggested by the AAUP. Since levels may be low state-wide, increasing faculty participation in institutional governance appears to be a reasonable alternative. No one can know for sure until someone risks the increased participation.

Observations Based Upon Current Recommendations

After the collection of the data for this study, several observations, comments, and recommendations appeared in the literature. Three articles appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education regarding collective bargaining. One was a statistical report of current bargaining units and one analyzed the Carnegie Fund's Report on Academic Governance, while the third discussed the Columbia study which detailed a national decline in morale.

What lies ahead? The Chronicle of Higher Education (April 18, 1982:2) reported that, "Although more than 157,000 faculty members now belong to certified collective bargaining units in higher education, only two new full-time faculty bargaining units were certified in 1981, the lowest in the past decade." However, in 1982 the entire faculty of the California State Universities and Colleges

system joined the ranks of certification. This will significantly increase the national statistics and may reflect continuing low levels of morale and participation.

The Carnegie Fund's Report on Academic Governance (Carnegie Commission, 1982) noted that faculty participation in governance had declined. The report also stated that "faculty unionization constitutes a fundamental shift in campus governance" (Carnegie Commission, 1982:10). It was felt that,

Collective bargaining will not violate the traditions of academic life if faculty members on campuses are in charge of the negotiations and if contractual agreements respect the freedom and professional judgments of individual teachers. (Carnegie Commission, 1982:10)

The recommendation was made that, "Colleges and universities may wish to convene governance convocations to consider ways more effectively to involve all members of the academic community in decision making on campus" (Carnegie Commission, 1982:10). With the decline of morale documented by the Columbia study (Magarrell, 1982), administrators and trustees in the community colleges would do well to heed the Carnegie Fund's recommendations.

Suggestions for Further Study

As a logical extension of this study, the following additional research is recommended:

1. Since this study did not produce statistically significant results the study should be redesigned and

conducted again in order to get statistically significant results.

2. A study should be conducted comparing collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining colleges with regard to salary increases, welfare and benefit changes, and yearly/weekly work loads.

3. The effects of collective bargaining on part-time faculty, students, and classified (non-teaching) staff should be undertaken.

4. A complete follow-up study should be made comparing the original participation in governance at the eight California community colleges surveyed by the AAUP in 1971 to the participation in governance of the same eight colleges after collective bargaining.

5. A broad-based regional study should be completed contrasting attitudinal changes of faculty under different state systems.

6. Morale should be studied and compared on a longitudinal basis for both collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining faculty.

Conclusions

This study set out to address five questions. They are readdressed and resolved as follows:

1. Does entering into a collective bargaining contract result in significantly greater teaching faculty morale than not entering into a contract?

Morale of teaching faculty who have entered into a collective bargaining agreement was actually perceived as less than those teaching faculty who are not under collective bargaining, although the difference was not statistically significant at the .05 level. Therefore, the answer to question one was inconclusive.

2. Does entering into a collective bargaining contract result in significantly greater teaching faculty participation in institutional governance than not entering into a contract?

Faculty participation in institutional governance was perceived as slightly higher by faculty who have entered into a collective bargaining contract than those who have not. This slight difference was not statistically significant at the .05 level. Therefore, the answer to question two was also inconclusive.

3. Are morale and participation in institutional governance significantly related to one another?

There was a moderate relationship between morale and participation in governance, although measured low levels of both morale and participation in governance for both collectively bargained faculty and non-collectively bargained faculty prevented statistical significance at the .05 level. The answer to question three was inconclusive.

4. Are there any significant correlations between teaching faculty and/or campus background information and

morale, institutional governance, and collective bargaining?

The teaching areas of community service and developmental/remedial/ABE appeared to be related to collective bargaining. However, those in community service areas were usually under collective bargaining contracts, while those in developmental/remedial/ABE had greater percentages in non-collective bargaining colleges, and both of these results were analyzed as factors of location rather than causal however. The second significant correlation was in campus type to collective bargaining. The multi-campus districts were much more likely to be organized for collective bargaining. Both of these correlations were true at the .05 level. The answer to question four was yes for collective bargaining.

5. Can morale level scores (PTO), participation in institutional governance scores (AAUP), and teaching faculty and/or campus background information be predictive of collective bargaining?

This study found no statistically significant difference in morale or faculty participation in institutional governance for faculty organized for collective bargaining and those not organized. The likelihood of collective bargaining was greater for those faculty in multi-campus districts. This was the only prediction possible as a result of this study.

Although no conclusions could be drawn from the statistically non-significant data in this study, the review of the literature and this writer's examination of collective bargaining in California community colleges prompts the following observations: there seem to be no clear benefits to organizing for collective bargaining with regard to morale and participation in institutional governance; those who have organized report a lower perceived level of morale, although not at a statistically significant level; and one should consider this in light of possible attempts to organize a faculty to collectively bargain in California.

"Collective bargaining," as Lombardi (1979:127) concluded, "has not destroyed collegiality, and many ways remain for administrators to demonstrate leadership."

Participative governance can occur in either a collective bargaining or a non-collective bargaining atmosphere. Participation is not an either-or issue as suggested by Richardson (1976:59), but one which reflects upon "the effectiveness of the enterprise, and the quality of services delivered."

"Governance is a means and not an end," according to the Carnegie Commission (1973:3). "It should be devised and adjusted not for its own sake but for the sake of the welfare of the academic enterprise." In the long run, "The quality of governance depends in the end, and above all

else, on the people who participate in it" (Carnegie Commission, 1973:3).

Perhaps it is as Kochan (1980:vii) stated,

The field has not successfully made the transition from the descriptive to the more analytical approach. The study of collective bargaining is still, therefore, in what Thomas Kuhn has called its "preparadigm" stage of development.

Morale will remain a concern or "enduring" problem for all those in education. As Eells concluded, and was mentioned earlier in this study,

Although boards of trustees and administrators may have been able to govern without apparent conflict; issues of financing, staff morale, and conformity with state laws have always been present. (Cohen and Brawer, 1982:96)

Finally, the review of the literature shows the analysis of collective bargaining as stated by Birnbaum (1980b:4) who defined it as,

a process of shared authority which is used in some institutions to manage conflict which at least one of the parties does not believe can be resolved through more traditional academic structures.

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APPENDIX

February 24, 1983

Dear Colleague,

All of us are concerned with the direction that our California community colleges are going. Each day we read about state "hit lists," declining revenues caused by reduced tax collections, and attempts by various commissions and agencies to exert influence regarding our curricula and our budgets. Much of this has occurred because of many diverse factors. Several educators feel that faculty participation in the governance process of our colleges has been affected by these situations.

Therefore, we are trying to determine the extent of the average community college faculty member's participation in the process of governance and the resulting opinion about his or her participation. In order to do that, we are requesting your help in supplying some information about your situation at your college. We are attempting to get four faculty members, selected at random, from each of the 107 California community colleges, to provide similar information regarding demographics, governance, and opinion.

We realize that this is an imposition on your time and for that we would like to apologize. In addition, we would like to offer you the attached fifty cents for a cup of coffee, tea, or hot chocolate for the time you are taking from your normal routine to fill-in the information requested. We also have included a number 2 pencil to be used while completing the survey, which you may keep. Although these tokens are small in relationship to your professional time, we hope you will accept them and help us.


After you have completed the survey, please return it in the self-addressed stamped envelope. All information obtained will be confidential and your name is not needed on the instrument. You will notice, however, that your survey has a coded number so that we may be able to contact you if we need to remind you to mail your response back. If you can take the time to complete the survey now, all of the extra work and expense of recontacting you can be saved. If we don't hear from you by MARCH 10th, we will contact you again.

Thank you for your cooperation on this project. The results should benefit all community college faculty in California.

Sincerely,

COMMUNITY COLLEGE
GOVERNANCE PROJECT
J. Rich, Director

JAR



DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

PLEASE FILL-IN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING CIRCLE(S) THAT APPLY:

1. SEX: ☐ Female ☐ Male
2. AGE: ☐ 20-30 ☐ 31-40 ☐ 41-50 ☐ 51-60 ☐ 61+
3. EDUCATION: ☐ BA or Equiv. ☐ MA ☐ EdD or PhD
4. TEACHING EXPERIENCE: ☐ 1-5 yrs. ☐ 6-15 yrs. ☐ 16-25 yrs. ☐ 26+ yrs.
5. TEACHING AREAS: ☐ Transfer ☐ Vocational/ Career ☐ Community Service ☐ Developmental/ Remedial/ABE
6. CAMPUS: ☐ Single-College District ☐ Multi-College District
7. MEMBERSHIPS: ☐ AAUP ☐ AFSCME ☐ CFT/AFT ☐ CTA/NEA
(Check all that apply) ☐ FACCC ☐ Independent Campus Assoc. ☐ Other Please list
8. STUDENT BODY SIZE (ADA): ☐ 3000 ADA or Less ☐ 3001-10,000 ADA ☐ 10,001 + ADA
9. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: ☐ Yes ☐ No
10. AGENT(S) - If yes to # 9: _____

AAUP GOVERNANCE PROFILE

The chart which follows was designed to obtain your opinion about the level of faculty involvement in 28 decision making areas for your institution at the current time. Please read the definitions of the seven levels of faculty involvement. The levels are arranged across the top of the chart so that as you move from left to right the amount of faculty involvement increases.

For each Decision Making Area place an X under the Level of Faculty Involvement in Decision Making which represents your best estimate of your situation. Do not use the Not Applicable category unless a Decision Making Area is not appropriate to your institution. For example, single campus institutions should mark Decision Making Area 11 as Not Applicable.

DEFINITIONS OF LEVELS OF FACULTY INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION MAKING:

NONE - Faculty are informed of decisions made by the administration without faculty participation.

DISCUSSION - Decisions made by the administration after informal expression from the faculty or individual faculty members.

ADVISORY RECOMMENDATION - Decisions made by administration after formally expressed opinion from an administratively selected committee.

CONSULTATION - Decisions made by administration after receiving and considering a written recommendation or opinion from the faculty (acting as a whole or through authorized representatives) functioning within a formal procedure or established practice.

JOINT RECOMMENDATION - Decisions require action from the faculty. Presidential veto of a faculty action may be appealed to the Governing Board.

JOINT ACTION - Decisions require formal agreement by the faculty for positive action or policy determination. Negative action can be accomplished by veto of the faculty. Collective bargaining is normally joint action.

FACULTY DETERMINATION - Decisions made by the faculty or its duly authorized representatives. Technically required approvals or concurrences are only pro forma.

NOTE: The phrase "decisions made by administration" includes decisions made by the Governing Board on recommendation of the chief executive.

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THE PURDUE TEACHER OPINIONAIRE

Prepared by Ralph R. Bentley and Averno M. Rempel

This instrument is designed to provide you the opportunity to express your opinions about your work as an instructor and various college problems in your particular college situation. There is no right or wrong response, so do not hesitate to mark each statement frankly.

Due to the variety of titles employed for community college administrators the terms supervisor, administrator and administration are used in this questionnaire as a general designation for the management personnel to whom you are responsible, i.e., dean, chairman, director, coordinator, etc.

Please record responses on all items. Do not omit any items.

USE A NO. 2 PENCIL ONLY

DIRECTIONS FOR RECORDING RESPONSES ON OPINIONAIRE

Read each statement carefully. Then indicate whether you agree, probably agree, probably disagree, or disagree with each statement. Mark your answers in the following manner:

If you agree with the statement, completely fill in circle "A" ☐ A ☐ PA ☐ PD ☐ D

If you are somewhat uncertain, but probably agree with the statement, completely fill in circle "PA" ☐ A ☐ PA ☐ PD ☐ D

If you are somewhat uncertain, but probably disagree with the statement, completely fill in circle "PD" ☐ A ☐ PA ☐ PD ☐ D

If you disagree with the statement, completely fill in circle "D" ☐ A ☐ PA ☐ PD ☐ D

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Details, "red tape," and required reports absorb too much of my time <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 13. My faculty position gives me the social status in the community that I desire <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 2. The work of individual faculty members is appreciated and commended by our administration <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 14. The number of hours a faculty member must work is unreasonable <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 3. Instructors feel free to criticize administrative policy at our college <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 15. College teaching enables me to enjoy many of the material and cultural things I like <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 4. The faculty feels that their suggestions pertaining to salaries are adequately transmitted by the administration to the board of trustees <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 16. My college provides me with adequate classroom supplies and equipment <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 5. Our administrators show favoritism in their relations with the faculty in our college <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 17. Our college has a well-balanced curriculum <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 6. Faculty in this college are expected to do an unreasonable amount of record-keeping and clerical work <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 18. There is a great deal of griping, arguing, taking sides, and feuding among our faculty <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 7. My supervisor makes a real effort to maintain close contact with the faculty <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 19. College teaching gives me a great deal of personal satisfaction <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 8. Community demands upon the faculties time are unreasonable <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 20. The curriculum of our college makes reasonable provision for student individual differences <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 9. I am satisfied with the policies under which pay raises are determined <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 21. The procedures for obtaining materials and services are well defined and efficient <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 10. My work load is greater than that of most of the other faculty in our college <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 22. Generally, faculty in our college do not take advantage of one another <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 11. The extra-curricular load of the faculty in our college is unreasonable <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 23. The faculty in our college cooperate with each other to achieve common, personal, and professional objectives <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |
| 12. Our administrator's leadership in the college challenges and stimulates our professional growth <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D | 24. College teaching enables me to make my greatest contribution to society <input type="radio"/> A <input type="radio"/> PA <input type="radio"/> PD <input type="radio"/> D |

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25. The curriculum of our college is in need of major revisions (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
26. I love to teach (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
27. If I could plan my career again I would choose college teaching (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
28. Experienced faculty members accept new and younger members as colleagues (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
29. I would recommend teaching as an occupation to students of high scholastic ability (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
30. If I could earn as much money in another occupation, I would stop teaching (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
31. The college schedule places my classes at a disadvantage (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
32. The college tries to follow a generous policy regarding fringe benefits, professional travel, professional study, etc. (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
33. My supervisor makes my work easier and more pleasant (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
34. Keeping up professionally is too much of a burden (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
35. Our community makes its faculty feel as though they are a real part of the community (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
36. Salary policies are administered with fairness and justice (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
37. College teaching affords me the security I want in an occupation (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
38. My supervisor understands and recognizes good teaching procedures (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
39. Faculty members clearly understand the policies governing salary increases (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
40. My classes are used as a "dumping ground" for problem students (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
41. The lines and methods of communication between faculty and the administration in our college are well developed and maintained (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
42. My teaching load in this college is unreasonable (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
43. My supervisor shows a real interest in my department (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
44. Our administration promotes a sense of belonging among the faculty in our college (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
45. My heavy teaching load unduly restricts my non-professional activities (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
46. I find my contacts with students, for the most part, highly satisfying and rewarding (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
47. I feel that I am an important part of this college (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
48. The competency of the faculty in our college compares favorably with that of faculty in other colleges that I know (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
49. My college provides the faculty with adequate audio-visual aids and projection equipment (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
50. I feel successful and competent in my present position (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
51. I enjoy working with student organizations, clubs, and societies (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
52. Our faculty is congenial to work with (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
53. My colleagues are well prepared for their jobs (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
54. Our college faculty has a tendency to form into cliques (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
55. The faculty in our college work well together (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
56. I am at a disadvantage professionally because other faculty are better prepared to teach than I am (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
57. Our college provides adequate clerical services for the faculty (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
58. As far as I know, the other faculty think I am a good teacher (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
59. Library facilities and resources are adequate for the subject area which I teach (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
60. The "stress and strain" resulting from college teaching makes teaching undesirable for me (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
61. My supervisor is concerned with the problems of the faculty and handles these problems sympathetically (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
62. I do not hesitate to discuss any college problem with my supervisor (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
63. College teaching gives me the prestige I desire (A) (PA) (PL) (D)
64. My college teaching job enables me to provide a satisfactory standard of living for my family (A) (PA) (PL) (D)

65. The salary schedule in our college adequately recognizes teacher competency (A) (P) (D)
66. Most of the people in this community understand and appreciate good education (A) (P) (D)
67. In my judgment, this community is a good place to raise a family (A) (P) (D)
68. This community respects the faculty and treats them like professional persons (A) (P) (D)
69. My supervisor acts as though he is interested in me and my problems (A) (P) (D)
70. My supervisor supervises rather than "snoops" the faculty in our college (A) (P) (D)
71. It is difficult for faculty to gain acceptance by the people in this community (A) (P) (D)
72. Faculty meetings called by our administration waste the time and energy of the staff (A) (P) (D)
73. My supervisor has a reasonable understanding of the problems connected with my teaching assignment (A) (P) (D)
74. I feel that my work is judged fairly by my supervisor (A) (P) (D)
75. Salaries paid in the college compare favorably with salaries in other colleges with which I am familiar (A) (P) (D)
76. Most of the actions of students irritate me (A) (P) (D)
77. The cooperativeness of faculty in our college helps make my work more enjoyable (A) (P) (D)
78. My students regard me with respect and seem to have confidence in my professional ability (A) (P) (D)
79. The purposes and objectives of the college cannot be achieved by the present curriculum (A) (P) (D)
80. The faculty in our college have a desirable influence on the values and attitudes of their students (A) (P) (D)
81. This community expects its faculty to meet unreasonable personal standards (A) (P) (D)
82. My students appreciate the help I give them with their work (A) (P) (D)
83. To me there is no more challenging work than college teaching (A) (P) (D)
84. Other faculty in our college are appreciative of my work (A) (P) (D)
85. As a faculty member in this community my nonprofessional activities outside of college are unduly restricted (A) (P) (D)
86. As a faculty member, I think I am as competent as most other faculty (A) (P) (D)
87. The faculty with whom I work have high professional ethics (A) (P) (D)
88. Our college curriculum does a good job of preparing students to become enlightened and competent citizens (A) (P) (D)
89. I really enjoy working with my students (A) (P) (D)
90. The faculty in our college show a great deal of initiative and creativity in their teaching assignments (A) (P) (D)
91. Faculty in our community feel free to discuss controversial issues in their classes (A) (P) (D)
92. My supervisor tries to make me feel comfortable when he visits my classes (A) (P) (D)
93. My supervisor makes effective use of the individual faculty member's capacity and talent (A) (P) (D)
94. The people in this community, generally, have a sincere and wholehearted interest in the college (A) (P) (D)
95. Faculty feel free to go to the administration about problems of personal and group welfare (A) (P) (D)
96. This community supports ethical procedures regarding the appointment and reappointment of members of the teaching staff (A) (P) (D)
97. This community is willing to support a good program of education (A) (P) (D)
98. Our community expects the faculty to participate in too many social activities (A) (P) (D)
99. Community pressures prevent me from doing my best as a college instructor (A) (P) (D)
100. I am well satisfied with my present teaching position (A) (P) (D)