AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Title: The Identification and Division of Steve Jobs

Abstract approved:

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Mark P. Moore

On April 1, 1976, Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak entered into a partnership agreement to found Apple Computer. In the decade that followed, Apple experienced remarkable growth and success, as Jobs catapulted Apple to the Fortune 500 list of top-flight companies faster than any other company in history. Under direction of Jobs, Apple, an idea that started in a garage, transformed into a major force in the computer industry of the 1980s. Though Jobs’ leadership undoubtedly influenced Apple’s success during this time, in 1995, he was forced to resign, when conflicts mounted at the executive level. Using Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification and the dramatistic process, this thesis examines Jobs’ discourse through a series of interviews and textual artifacts. First, I provide a framework for Jobs’ acceptance and rejection of the social order at Apple, and then consider the ways in which Jobs identified with employee and consumer audiences on the basis of division. Analysis shows that Jobs identified with individual
empowerment, but valued separation and exclusivity. Jobs’ preference to create identification through division, therefore, established the foundation for new identifications to emerge. The findings of this study suggest that division has significant implications for creating unity.
Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies thesis of Scott M. Anderson presented on May 17, 2012

APPROVED:

Major Professor, representing Speech Communication

Director of the Interdisciplinary Studies Program

Dean of the Graduate School

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Scott M. Anderson, Author
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Introduction

During halftime of the 1984 Super Bowl, the Apple Corporation introduced its Macintosh computer in a sixty-second television spot. The ad, titled “1984,” aired to 96 million viewers and contained dystopian themes similar to those presented in George Orwell’s novel. In Apple’s version of “1984,” rows of men in uniform clothing sat and watched a Big Brother like figure lecture from an overhead screen (Linzmayer 113). Chased by helmeted storm troopers, a heroine ran into the dark auditorium and catapulted a sledgehammer at the giant monitor, which exploded in front of the audience. The cult-like workers were astonished at this sight, and a “refreshing air” passed over the masses as they “saw the light” (Linzmayer 110). In the closing shot, the frame filled with smoke and text appeared with the promise that “1984 will be nothing like ‘1984,’” followed by the name: Apple Computer (Rogers and Conant 54). For Steve Jobs, the goal of “1984” was simple: “I want to stop the world in its tracks” (Hayden 14). The commercial received immediate praise and continued to make an impression on viewers.

_The Washington Post_ called the commercial “an instant sensation” and _Advertising Age_ named “1984” the Commercial of the Decade for the 1980s (Potts H8; Horton 12). More importantly, however, the arrival of Macintosh established a division in the computer industry, from both corporate and consumer perspectives. At a time when IBM dominated the industry, “1984” depicted a minidrama that made Big Brother and Big Blue [IBM] synonymous. Not only did “1984’s” message warn about the inherent dangers of falling victim to corporate
bureaucracy, the commercial and Macintosh sought to return Apple to its “individualistic” origins (Rogers and Conant 54). Similarly, Macintosh initiated a division in the industry’s consumer market. Home users, overlooked as a consumer audience in the corporate driven industry, identified with “1984” and responded favorably to Macintosh. Apple projected to sell 50,000 Macintosh PCs in the first 100 days, but sales surpassed expectations and reached close to 75,000 units sold (Horton 12).

“1984” is one example of which Jobs utilized division to appeal to Apple’s corporate and consumer audiences. During the company’s inception, Jobs’ leadership strategies influenced Apple’s growth and success, as he assembled a team of employees different from other startup companies that emerged throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. At Apple, Jobs recruited diverse people from unusual backgrounds, people that other companies deemed unfit to work in mainstream corporate America. While some early Apple employees had checkered pasts, others barely graduated from high school (Moritz 166; Moritz 214). Additionally, Apple earned a pirate reputation among industry competitors, because Jobs regularly stole employees from other companies and instilled a cutthroat work culture at Apple (Simon and Young 92; Moritz 254). For example, Jobs raided Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center for insight about emerging technology and, on numerous occasions, he stole invaluable trade secrets. At Apple, Jobs’ identification with the workforce was different from the way most
companies operated at the time. This strategy also influenced consumers. For Jobs, the shared interests among corporate and consumer audiences enacted identification, but did so through divisive means. While Jobs created identification with both audiences, his method was uncommon in the context of computer marketing and employee management during the 1970s and 1980s.

When most manufactures sold utilitarian, task-oriented machines, Jobs marketed the computer as an information appliance. This strategy, which represented a division from mainstream marketing, revolutionized the industry, because it targeted new demographics that the industry had not yet explored. Most notably, Jobs naturalized computers into the home, but did so through division. That is to say, Jobs created a rift in the industry's popular consumer audience, a demographic comprised mostly of professional workers in corporate America, but showed consumers unforeseen incentives for computing. In addition to marketing the computer as an information appliance, Jobs employed non-conventional marketing strategies in the company's first year such as advertising in *Scientific American* and *Playboy*, which distinguished Apple from its competition (Moritz 233).

Since the incorporation of Apple in 1976, size and economic growth ensued in the following decade. However, as the company burgeoned, tensions mounted at the executive level and the board of directors forced Jobs to resign in 1985, nine years after he cofounded Apple (Simon and Young 110). Jobs remained quiet after
his 1985 resignation and left Apple to pursue other ventures. After nearly a
decade of silence, he surfaced and started to give interviews.

Using Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification and the dramatistic process,
this thesis examines the discourse of Steve Jobs through a series of his interviews
and textual artifacts, some produced during Jobs’ first tenure at Apple and others
after his resignation in 1985. This research provides inquiry into Jobs’ acceptance
and rejection of the hierarchy of social order at Apple in a way that reveals the
dramatistic process. Moreover, research investigates the ways in which Jobs used
identification to appeal to employees and consumers.

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this study is to identify, define, and describe the use of
identification as a rhetorical strategy in Steve Jobs’ discourse. Using Kenneth
Burke’s theory of identification, this thesis describes the ways in which Steve Jobs
appealed to two distinct audiences: Apple’s employees and consumers. Unlike
most rhetorical studies that speak to how unity serves as a basis for identification,
this study examines how Jobs first established a sense of division through
identification to create unity. Additionally, this thesis investigates Burke’s
dramatistic process, as it ordered the hierarchies of Jobs’ work and personal life.
This research examines the following questions: What are the ways in which Steve
Jobs created identification with Apple’s audiences through division, and how did
Steve Jobs accept and reject the hierarchy of the social order at Apple in a way that reveals the dramatistic process?

Limitations

This thesis explores Apple’s history and details Steve Jobs’ rhetoric from the time of Apple’s incorporation in 1976, until Jobs resigned in 1985. Through close textual analysis of rhetorical artifacts, this thesis attempts only to describe how Jobs’ rhetoric influenced Apple during the company’s first decade. This thesis does not make predictions about Apple’s future or explain the occurrence of any past events experienced by Jobs or Apple.

Throughout the research process, it was difficult to find textual artifacts to analyze. Although Jobs’ interviews account for the primary artifacts analyzed in this thesis, some supplementary artifacts include early keynote speeches and presentations. In any case, all rhetorical artifacts are crucial to the arguments that I make. These early speeches did not exist in textual format, and materialized only online in video at websites such as youtube and vimeo.com. Because of the shortage of resources, I composed transcripts for some speech artifacts that I analyze in this thesis.

Significance of Study

This thesis contributes to the rhetorical discipline in multiple ways. First, there has not been much scholarly work published about Steve Jobs. Additionally, this research addresses how Burke’s concept of identification is used to instill a
sense of unity based on division within a specific audience. Applying traditional communication theories to Jobs’ rhetoric has remarkable value, because corporate discourse lacks the same level of scholarship as traditional public address studies. However, this does not mean that rhetorical inquiry and close textual analysis should not explore other areas of communication or academic disciplines. As Martin Medhurst pointed out, "[W]e must expand our reach beyond scholars of speech and rhetoric...with people in history, political science, sociology...or whomever else takes seriously the investigation of symbolic inducement" (40). Medhurst continued, "[W]e need to encourage more cross-fertilization between public address scholars and those in other fields" (40).

Burke’s concept of identification and dramatism ground the arguments in this thesis. Much of the scholarly work on identification addresses how unity creates a bond within a particular audience. This study adds a different and often overlooked perspective to identification, as Jobs established a sense of division, which ultimately served to unite both key audiences: Jobs’ employees and Apple’s consumers. Division often goes unrecognized as a unification strategy for rhetors, but Jobs used identification to instill a sense of division within his corporate and consumer audiences, which makes this research unique.

I. Literature Review of Steven Jobs

Steven Paul Jobs was adopted shortly after birth in 1955. Without knowledge of his biological parents, Paul and Clara Jobs adopted and raised him as
their own child. The Jobs’ South San Francisco home could not accommodate children, so the family moved to a larger house in Mountain View, California (Moritz 45). Mountain View was rife with engineers, and a neighbor who worked for Hewlett Packard introduced Jobs to electronics. Although Jobs enjoyed extracurricular activities such as technology, he showed less interest in academics.

As early as grade school, Jobs displayed signs of an uncertain academic future. He exhibited problems that exceeded normal behavior for most children his age. Jobs, himself, spoke to his experience with primary education:

School was pretty hard for me at the beginning...I encountered authority of a different kind than I had ever encountered before. And they really almost got me...By the time I was in third grade, I had a good buddy...and the only way we had fun was to create mischief. There was a big bike rack where everybody put their bikes, maybe a hundred bikes in this rack, and we traded everybody our lock combinations for theirs on an individual basis and then we went out one day and put everybody’s lock on everyone else’s bike and it took them until about ten o’clock that night to get all the bikes sorted out. We set off explosives. We got kicked out of school a lot. (Jobs "Oral History" 3-4).

Paul Jobs attested to his son’s discontent at school in Mountain View: "He came home from seventh grade and said if he had to go back there again he just wouldn't go. So we decided we’d better move" (Halliday 205). As a result of this refusal, Jobs’ parents uprooted the family to Los Altos, California.

Jobs moved to Portland, Oregon, to attend Reed College after high school. Poor academic performance, however, led him to “drop out of the baccalaureate program at Reed” after his first semester (Young and Simon 22; Halliday 205).
Robert Friedland, a college friend of Jobs, explained his [Jobs] reputation around campus: "He was always walking around barefoot. He was one of the freaks on campus. The thing that struck me was his intensity. Whatever he was interested in he would generally carry it to an irrational extreme" (Moritz 97). Jobs’ former teacher recalled, “I only vaguely remember Jobs...He kinda faded into the background....[He] was something of a loner [and] always had a different way of doing things” (Young and Simon 18; Halliday 205). Jobs stayed close to campus after dropping out. The following year, he sat in on various classes such as philosophy and calligraphy, and immersed himself in Portland's subcultures (Halliday 205, Jobs "Commencement" 1). He practiced meditation, became a vegetarian, and attended the Hare Krishna temple on Sundays for free meals (Halliday 205; Moritz 98).

Entering adulthood, the uncertainty surrounding his adoption and the location of his biological parents became less of a question and more of a hindrance (Moritz 107). Jobs’ long time girlfriend and mother to his first-born child discussed his torment: "He was sometimes in tears to see his mother" (Moritz 107). He did extensive research about his birth parents only to find out little about them. While Jobs oscillated between work in California and time with friends in Oregon, he sought therapy on one trip from the Oregon Feeling Center in Eugene. For a thousand dollars, a student of California psychiatrist, Arthur Janov, offered twelve-week courses that focused on Janov's methods in his book *Primal Scream*
Jobs pursued therapy to work through the doubt and uncertainty he felt from not knowing his birth parents. Although Jobs left the center unsatisfied, he said that his adoption had one effect on him: "It made me feel a little bit more independent" (Moritz 107).

On April 1, 1976, Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak entered into a partnership agreement and founded Apple Computer. Ron Wayne joined them from Atari, and they agreed not to spend more than $100 without each other's consent (Moritz 148). That same month, Jobs and Wozniak introduced the Apple I prototype at a Homebrew Computer Club meeting, a gathering where electronics enthusiasts met, discussed technology, and showcased their work. Jobs recruited many of Apple’s first employees from these meetings, which convened regularly on Stanford's Palo Alto campus.

While in its incipient stages, Jobs positioned Apple as an outsider, renegade company that offered employees and consumers an alternative to the status quo. Others in the industry recognized Jobs’ early employees as a group of outlaws, and Apple acquired a pirate reputation for stealing trade secrets. For example, the Xerox Corporation's Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) opened in 1969 and produced groundbreaking technology throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. News of PARC’s innovations spread to Apple, and software engineer Bill Atkinson and Macintosh team member Jef Raskin urged Jobs to visit PARC (Linzmayer 74). The presentation impressed Jobs, and he wanted to see PARC’s work first-hand.
To gain access, Jobs approached the Xerox Development Corporation, the company's venture capital branch, with a proposition: “I will let you invest a million dollars in Apple if you will sort of open the Kimono at Xerox PARC” (Linzmayer 74).

By 1973, PARC established its place in Silicon Valley with the Xerox Alto. Xerox created the Alto as the first computer for single person use, in one sense the first personal computer (Linzmayer 74). The Alto integrated bit mapping, a process that created both text and graphics from individually controlled pixels, rather than insert formed characters on screen one at a time (Linzmayer 74). This machine represented superior technology at the time, because other computers functioned through typed commands, and most monitors displayed only letters and numbers (Young and Simon 61). Through Ethernet, another PARC invention, the Alto communicated with other Alto computers and laser printers on PARC’s network. Smalltalk, the machine’s “object oriented” programming language, featured reusable and self-contained modules of code (Linzmayer 74). The Alto also incorporated a mouse, a device created by Stanford Research Institute visionary Douglas Englebart, which a user "moved by hand across the desktop to control the insertion point onscreen" (Young and Simon 61).

In his expose’ on Apple Computer, Owen W. Linzmayer explained that Jobs’ visit to PARC with Bill Atkinson in November 1979 was a pivotal moment for Apple that influenced the company’s future (75). The following month, Jobs returned to
PARC with Apple President Michael Scott, Vice President of Software Dennis Couch, and software engineer Bruce Daniels. Michael Moritz echoed Linzmayer in saying of Jobs’ trips to PARC: “The visits to PARC became one of those few, crucial events that helped bring some clarity to the shape of Apple’s computers” (308). As Moritz noted, Jobs saw technology that solidified the idea that Apple’s Lisa computer would target the office market. First, Jobs tested the innovations on a more expensive computer marketed to businesses, and then developed a more affordable version for general consumers (Moritz 309). Jobs, however, remained modest about his visits to PARC and downplayed his observations to an epiphany: "I remember being at Xerox in 1979. It was one of those sort of apocalyptic moments. I remember seeing the graphical user interface [GUI] stuff; it was so obvious once you saw it. It didn't require tremendous intellect" (Jobs "Oral History" 14). The GUI enabled users to move a pointer to the desired area to view individual windows for different documents, similar to today's standard operating systems. Apple eventually incorporated all these features into its computers.

In addition to innovations, Jobs took fifteen of Xerox’s programmers and scientists with him to Apple (Linzmayer 76). Larry Tessler, Xerox employee turned Apple executive, put on many demonstrations while at PARC, but saw something different in Jobs (Young and Simon 61). "What impressed me," Tessler acknowledged, "was that their questions were better than any I had heard in the seven years I had been at Xerox....[T]hey understood all the implications...and the
subtleties....By the end of the demo, I was convinced that I was going to leave Xerox and go to Apple" (Young and Simon 61). Tessler left Xerox for Apple and became vice president and chief scientist (Young and Simon 61).

The raid for employees did not stop at Xerox. Jobs acquired people from firms such as Intel, National Semiconductor, and Hewlett-Packard (Moritz 248). As recruitment increased, so did the tension within Apple's diverse workforce. A "general friction" materialized between the professional people who came from semiconductor and Hewlett Packard's people who manufactured computers, calculators, and instruments (Moritz 254). In Apple's early years, an affinity for technology represented the only common theme between many employees. Jobs, however, established a sense of division among employees to create unity. At Apple, in other words, employees had strong personal differences, so much that identification solidified through a passion for technology, their only common bond, which united the workforce. Moritz described the accentuated differences among Apple employees:

Though, to one degree or another, they were all tekkies....They differed in age, appearance, background, and ambition. They were attracted to different sorts of lovers and had varying attitudes toward fidelity, pleasure, aesthetics, religion, money, and politics. A couple speckled their speech with obscenities while others almost blushed at the sound of a four-letter word. They were so different that a biologist presented with five chromosome specimens would probably have been surprised to learn the donors were all male and bipedal. (Moritz 189).
The diverse nature of Apple’s workforce, coupled with Jobs’ unrealistic expectations, provided a basis for conflict to emerge. As such, tension among employees often created a hostile work environment. Jean Richardson, a secretary who later became advertising director, charged, “For a couple of years the place was awful” (Moritz 248). Richardson continued, “It was twelve hours a day and weekends. I knew if I took a drink at a water fountain I would miss a beat and slip a schedule. It was almost inhuman. I was at the burnout stage” (Moritz 248).

Apple employees remained highly competitive under Jobs. When Jobs initiated the Macintosh project, his group became Apple’s elite entity. Jobs referred to the team as a pirate gang, considered himself the captain, and stole technology and people from Apple’s other divisions (Young and Simon 87; Linzmayer 93). Linzmayer noted, “Symbolizing Jobs’ defiant attitude and Apple’s internecine rivalry was the Jolly Roger [flag] that flew over the Mac team’s...building...” (93). Jeffrey S. Young and William L. Simon, coauthors of a Steve Jobs portrayal, insisted that Jobs composed his "renegade crew," and hand-selected Apple’s best and brightest workers with little regard for the overall well being of the company (87). One Macintosh team member recalled, “We looked for any place where we could beg, borrow, or steal code” (Linzmayer 93). While leading Macintosh, Jobs watched Apple’s other teams experiment with new ideas, sometimes succeeding and other times failing. Jobs then took the best ideas and
avoided destructive paths, which helped the Macintosh team profit (Young and Simon 87).

Jobs obsessed over appearance. This characteristic, however, enabled him to make innovative products that distinguished Apple from its competitors. Similarly, he created a unique icon to distinguish Apple from other manufacturers.

To design a corporate logo, Jobs consulted the Regis McKenna Public Relations firm. Best known for its "less orthodox courtships" in the business world, McKenna's firm followed the "10-90 rule," which assumes that 10 percent of the population influences the other 90 percent (Achiron and Hughey 59). At first, Regis McKenna was skeptical of Apple's prospect (Moritz 231). Frank Burge, the account executive, explained, "People who knew...Apple wondered if they would make it. We kept saying 'These guys are flakes. They're never going to make it.' Jobs and Wozniak looked like they were on something. It was counter to everything we believed in" (Moritz 231). Despite the agency's early anxieties, McKenna worked with Apple and formed a successful partnership. Apple succeeded with McKenna, "the one man credited with making the word 'apple' signify more than just a piece of fruit" (Achiron and Hughey 59).

Jobs expected Rob Janov, the art director assigned to the Apple project, to fulfill his desire for a "high-quality" and "expensive" looking logo (Moritz 196). While brainstorming, Janov took a bite from one of the apples that he modeled for still life drawings. The Apple with the missing bite became the company logo and
made for a "visual pun" on the word “byte,” which fit appropriately with technology (Halliday 206). To Janov, however, the missing portion distinguished the apple from other fruits such as cherries and tomatoes (Moritz 196). Even with his meticulous concern for aesthetics, Jobs applauded Janov for the logo's "warm and enticing" end result (Moritz 196). Jobs also employed revolutionary advertising strategies to help Apple establish its place in the technology industry.

The late 1970s and early 1980s opened the computer market up to different types of consumers. Until this point, manufacturers marketed primarily to corporate America, but Jobs saw potential in different consumer audiences: the home and educational users. Speaking to the evolving computer market, Jobs remarked, "Here comes 1984, and instead of huge monolithic computers, you have 7 year-olds playing with computers" (Marbach, Lubenow, Cook, Gibney Jr., and Willenson 50). Once the fascination of hobbyists, computer analysts projected sales to reach three million worldwide in 1982 and fifty million by 1985 (Marbach, Lubenow, Cook, Gibney Jr., and Willenson 50). For Jobs, opportunity materialized in open market share.

With the debut of the Apple II, Jobs risked advertising to a new demographic. The advertisement that introduced the computer displayed a woman "merrily at work beside a chopping board" while her husband used it at the kitchen table to perform functional tasks (Moritz 232). The Apple II marked the future of computers and indicated the potential of technology in new domains:
"The home computer that’s ready to work, play and grow with you...You’ll be able to organize, index and store data on household finances, income taxes, recipes, your biorhythms, balance your checking account, even control your home environment" (Moritz 232). For Jobs, this advertising risk did not pay off as expected, and it forced Apple to re-strategize its ad campaign. Apple, a new and relatively small company, received criticism for its emphasis on the hobbyist market (Moritz 233). Apple, however, changed its advertising approach and recovered from the miscalculation. Although Apple II sales started slow, the machine helped Jobs to catapult his company to the Fortune 500 list of "top-flight" companies faster than any other company in history (Enman D3). As Enman put it, "The industry has seldom seen such a successful product, with $300 million...in sales in just five years" (D3).

When Jobs introduced Macintosh, critics and users applauded Apple for creating a transportable, easy to use, and affordable computer (Mace 5). Moreover, Macintosh broke the mold of “me-too” personal computers that dominated the industry in 1984 (Mace 5). Prior to release, Jobs discussed advertising strategies with other Apple executives. Apple needed to make the personal computer identifiable to consumers. Jobs argued, "The only chance we have is communicating with a feeling....We want to create an image people will never forget. We've got to build it and we've got to build it early"(Moritz 123). To appeal to a wide consumer audience, Apple implemented unorthodox business
strategies. First, Apple introduced Macintosh in a revolutionary television advertisement that rendered their computer more recognizable among the industry's standard machines. Second, Apple marketed Macintosh as an "information appliance," at a time when many people viewed computers as imposing pieces of technology, a division from popular consensus.

As mentioned earlier, Apple's “1984” commercial introduced Macintosh to a general audience of 96 million television viewers. The Chiat/Day Advertising Agency produced the sixty-second Super Bowl spot under the direction of Ridley Scott, who was credited with films such as Blade Runner and Alien (Dvorak 2). Under Scott's direction, the ad went on to win a Grand Prix award at Cannes, a feat seldom accomplished by an American agency (Dougherty 25). Much of the ad's success can be attributed to Scott, who directed on a $400,000 production budget and insisted that the heroine smash the screen with a hammer instead of baseball bat. Scott's intuition proved correct. Steve Hayden, who co-wrote the ad and worked for Chiat/Day, pointed out that “the spot actually foreshadowed the rail of the iron curtain” (15).

“1984” marketed a product to dispel technological fears within a consumer audience, which helped Jobs establish Apple as a niche in the industry, one different and unique from other manufacturers. John Sculley, an Apple CEO from 1983 to 1993 who succeeded Jobs, reaffirmed this notion: "[The ad] leverage[s] the fear of George Orwell's [book] that computers will run our lives" (Larson and
Dolan 1). Hayden concurred, “[T]he intention was to remove people’s fears of technology at time when owning your own computer made about as much sense as owning your own cruise missile” (15). “We wanted to democratize technology,” Hayden explained, “telling people that the power was now literally in their hands” (15).

Chiat/Day did not cast IBM in the role of Big Brother, but Jobs ascribed the position to Apple’s corporate counterpart. The agency, instead, scripted the villain as America’s “collective fear of technology,” not any corporation either real or fictitious (Hayden 15). The ad contained anti-capitalist undertones and “became something of a cult item” (Dvorak 2). The ad also portrayed a theme of youth revolting against Orwell’s Big Brother, which spoke to the population of Americans who identified with the growing anti-big government sentiment of the Reagan revolution (Horton 12). In addition to advertising that strayed from convention, Jobs outfitted Apple’s computers with novel features.

Jobs obsessed over the appearance of computers, a meticulous concern for detail that surfaced in many Apple products. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, black or blue sheet metal housed most computers. Jobs loathed this industrial look and decided to do things differently: "I got this bug up my rear that that I wanted the computer in a plastic case" (Mortiz 194). When metal casing was commonplace, Jobs harnessed Apple's computers in a lighter and less obtrusive exterior. Despite the attitude of hobbyists, one that valued "substance" over
"appearance," Apple’s machines contained aesthetically pleasing and functional components (Moritz 194). Jobs shifted away from the industry standard, but considered what made computers appeal to consumers.

To make the computer more attractive, Jobs visited a popular department store and observed the design of different household appliances (Moritz 194). Jobs envisioned a similar aesthetic with Apple’s products, one that a buyer found simple and easy to use, but most importantly, a product that consumers desired for their homes. On the Apple II, Jobs removed the fan from the power supply to reduce external noise (Young and Simon 37-38). Many at Apple contested this innovation, but Jobs pressed forward with the “radical” idea (Young and Simon 37). To Jobs, a fan’s noise created a distraction, and he was certain that consumers would purchase a computer that sat quietly on top of a desk. Jobs’ intuition proved correct and consumers responded favorably.

Now that the reader is familiar with Steve Jobs and his role in the establishment of Apple, the direction of this thesis turns to a discussion of Burke’s notion of identification and the dramatistic process.

II. Review of Literature on Identification

Steve Jobs’ rhetoric confronted Apple’s audiences with a distinct set of choices: To consumers, Jobs presented a choice on the basis of an alternative. This choice developed in a product that invited consumers to see a friendlier side of computers and invited them to adopt a new worldview about technology.
Similarly, Jobs challenged employees to consider what made Apple a more or less appealing company to work for in the technology industry. In other words, why Apple? The choice can be viewed as a matter of identification. In *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke explained, "Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from each other, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity" (22). Moreover, Burke ascribed the following definition to identification: “A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B” (20). It is possible, however, that “[A] may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so” (Burke “Rhetoric” 20).

As Burke pointed out, "[T]o begin with identification," one must properly understand and, "confront the implications of division" ("Rhetoric" 22). While studying identification, it does not take long to see, “implied in at every turn, its ironic counterpart: division” (Burke “Rhetoric” 23). For Burke, the ambiguous union of identification and division make for the perfect invitation of rhetoric; when utilized effectively, it is difficult to be certain where one starts and the other ends (Burke "Rhetoric" 25).

To identify with another human being, one must understand basic human actions. Or as Burke put it, "You can persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his" ("Rhetoric" 55). For Burke, people use rhetorical matters to
persuade one other, and to achieve persuasion, humans identify their interests with the interests of others ("Rhetoric" 24). However, the persuasiveness of two competing rhetoricians depends on the resources each has at their command (Burke “Rhetoric” 25). In the public domain, for example, resources exceed the speaker’s natural abilities and the speech itself. The outcome depends on the “technical means” of communication, which either aid or obstruct the occasion (Burke “Rhetoric” 25). Burke offered, “[W]e must think of rhetoric not in terms of some one particular address, but as a general body of identifications that we owe...convincingness...to...repetition and dull daily reinforcement...” ("Rhetoric" 26).

In 1952, Marie Hochmuth introduced Kenneth Burke’s concepts to communication scholars with an article that debuted in the Quarterly Journal of Speech. Speaking to Hochmuth’s contributions, Jane Blankenship noted, "Her career spanned more than 30 years, when the discipline, still deeply rooted in the past, moved somewhat uneasily into the future, sparking vigorous and sometimes vitriolic debate about newer directions" (75). Blankenship discussed one of Hochmuth’s noteworthy achievements: "[Hochmuth] Nichols, a child of the neo-Aristotelian tradition that dominated much of the 1940s, introduced the discipline to Kenneth Burke in the 1950s..." (75). Shortly after her death in 1978, Joseph Wenzel celebrated Hochmuth’s accomplishments. Wenzel said, "Mrs. [Hochmuth] Nichols was known to members of her profession...for her exemplary publications,
Hochmuth's critical essay oriented readers toward Burke's approach to rhetoric, discerned his method for analyzing motivation, and explored his application of principles to specific literary works (133). Hochmuth explained, "Burke is difficult and often confusing...[while] often criticized for 'obscurity' in his writings, [he] cannot be understood by casual reading of his various volumes" (144). Hochmuth offered that, for Burke, the basis of rhetoric resides in general divisiveness, which is inherent to all humans, before any class distinctions cause a division (135). Motives for persuasion emerged from these general divisions, which, in turn, led to Burke's notion of the rhetorical situation as one of division that could be overcome by appeals to unity (135).

To understand identification, one must recognize the connection between Burke and classical rhetoric. Hochmuth asserted, "Burke is completely aware that he is not introducing a totally new concept, observing that Aristotle had long ago commented, 'It is not hard...to praise Athenians among Athenians' and that one can persuade by 'identifying' one's ways with those of his audience" (136). For Burke, Aristotle's "commonplaces" or "topics" provide insight to what people generally deem as persuasive (Hochmuth 137). As such, they solidify substantial unity with an audience and embody definitive examples of identification (Hochmuth 137). Burke believed that identification and persuasion are rhetorical ends, which a
speaker uses to appeal to the audience through deployment of stylistic tokens (Hochmuth 136). As a rhetorical strategy, identification allows people to achieve a sense of group membership. Through identification, rhetors employ persuasive acts, which enable the audience to align itself with the speaker's interests. Additionally, speakers identify common interests with audiences to establish rapport (Hochmuth 136).

Virginia Holland addressed the Burkeian notion of identification from two distinct perspectives: first, what the speaker said, and second, why the speaker spoke as he or she did (444). Speaking to the former, audiences examined the different strategies a rhetor employed to "modify" or "sustain" a situation (Holland 449). This practice, in other words, observed a rhetor's "plan of attack," or topoi as Aristotle described (Holland 449). The second perspective, on the other hand, examined how identification functions between rhetor and audience. To address this, Holland asked the rhetor to consider which strategy they used to identify with him or herself. Holland then questioned the audience which strategy they identified with most (449).

Holland argued the importance of the conscientious rhetorical critic, one who considers historical and sociological backgrounds to understand the shared attitudes between audiences and speakers (444). In doing so, speakers identify their purpose with those of the audience and account for the dissimilar attitudes that complicate identification (Holland 444). To see how identification operates,
Holland turned to Burke’s "scheme" on the pattern of Christianity (450). Holland remarked, "It is conceivable that all institutions whether political, educational, or social have within them devices or strategies for unification which are modified variants of the religious pattern" (450).

As Burke explained, the major Christian beliefs patterned within the religion establishes certain devices which unify men and women (Holland 450). Through these devices of the church, people unite in areas of belief, which join them and identify their interests with each other’s, a concept Burke labeled "con-substantial" (Holland 450). This tenet represents a source for a speaker's invention. Sin, symbolically characterized by the Devil and its common enemy of all, unifies people in a belief that all "ills [can] be charged to a scapegoat and the sinner purified by disassociation" (Holland 450). Another tenet, symbolized by "God and Good," unifies a symbolic rebirth (Holland 450). The last tenet, the appeal to convert, unifies others to Christianity (Holland 450).

Gerald Driskill and Jonathan W. Camp explored the Nehemiah Group’s use of identification strategies. Driskill and Camp defined the group as a conglomerate of pastors who joined over 100 churches in an urban renewal effort, and the authors constructed a rhetorical analysis grounded in Burkeian identification (Driskill and Camp 445). To instill unity, the authors observed four different strategies: prayer, assessment of the city's needs and problems, consistent discourse about focusing "outward," and celebration (Driskill and Camp 455-473).
In the Nehemiah Group, Driskill and Camp found that prayer functions as a fundamental, trust-building vessel for pastors. The group's history also points to the way that prayer is preserved as a core unity ritual (Driskill and Camp 455). Assessment of the city's needs and problems functioned as a second identification strategy. Problems that people unified around, evident through explicit and implicit "we" and "our" language, accounted for the problems faced in the city (Driskill and Camp 457). The authors noted, "Growing from the trust developing through prayer meetings, pastors recognized they were not impacting the city" (Driskill and Camp 457). The Nehemiah Group's third identification strategy addressed the importance of an "outward" focus. Needs analyses concluded that churches did not invest enough in the city people who were not church members (Driskill and Camp 460). A focus on music and praise that ended in unity and prayer enacted the last identification strategy, celebration (Driskill and Camp 463).

Similar to other organized religions, the Nehemiah Group subscribes to the notion of Satan as a common enemy (Driskill and Camp 473). Driskill and Camp concluded, "Satan was viewed as the reason for disunity, as the source of division, as the one not wanting the church to come together" (473). Although interviewees mentioned non-participants, they did not publicly "scapegoat" them as a source of disunity (Driskill and Camp 473).

A Burkeian theory of persuasion contains many elements of classical rhetoric. Identification, for Burke, was significant not because it was a means of
achieving persuasion, but because it was the only means of achieving persuasion (Day 273). Dennis Day argued, "We might even say that the concept of identification, which is the key term in Burke's rhetoric, is simply an extension of classical doctrine" (272). Many of the "strategies" that serve Burke's purpose of identification are grounded in classical authors such as Aristotle and Quintilian, and incorporate enthymemes, topics, and figures of speech (Day 271-272). Day ascribed the following definition to Burke's concept of persuasion: "The speaker, by using linguistic 'strategies' which give 'signs' to his hearers that his 'properties' are similar to or identical with their 'properties,' achieves identification or 'consubstantiality' and thereby achieves persuasion" (272).

Building on classical doctrine, Robert Gaines explored the ways in which identification and redemption artistically unite, in his critical essay about Lysias's *Oration XII* against Eratosthenes. Gaines demonstrated that Burkeian notions of identification and redemption could be utilized so that discourse is explained as being joined cohesively and that interpretative problems, which exist for the conventional method of Lysianic criticism, are solved (210). Gaines contended that Lysias's use of identification strategies, specifically unity and division, coincided with the speech as a redemptive act.

In the first twenty-four sections of *Oration XII*, Lysias utilized identification strategies at two levels to associate Eratosthenes with the jury's guilt (Gaines 203). Gaines offered, "[Lysias] substantively identifies the action of Eratosthenes-the
arrest of Polemarchus-with the acts of the other thirty" (203). In this case, all members of the thirty canceled out the course of action taken against him. Additionally, Lysias cooperatively identified the act-purpose ratio of the thirty, with that of Eratosthenes, by means of cooperative identification (Gaines 204). In the second part of the speech, Lysias continued the step toward "redemptive identification" and divided Eratosthenes from the source of the jury's guilt (Gaines 205). Specifically, Lysias distinguished Eratosthenes as a particular agent within the administration of "Four Hundred, the Thirty, and the Ten," but with special consideration that he was not completely removed from the whole by a unique or individual purpose in his actions toward Polemarchus (Gaines 205).

Eratosthenes embodied two necessary elements of redemptive identification: First, to fuel the jury's guilt, Lysias equated Eratosthenes with all "unavenged injustices" (Gaines 207). Second, the jury was defined in opposition to Eratosthenes (Gaines 207). This case illustrates how unity (the association of Eratosthenes with the administration) and division (the separation of Eratosthenes from the jury's guilt) work together to create redemptive identification. Moreover, it highlights the compensatory relationship between unity and division.

Ronald Carpenter examined Burkeian identification through a stylistic lens. While scrupulous attention is given to the concept of rhetorical effectiveness to contain sources of consubstantiality "contingent upon the content and context of
discourse," Burke's perception of "corresponding" and "complimentary" formal identification evolving from the lexical patterns of discourse is frequently overlooked (Carpenter 19). In language, Carpenter noted, "...redundancy is a vehicle by which communication becomes more reliable" (21). Carpenter used redundancy to characterize a string of antitheses or figures of repetition that a rhetor utilizes. Additionally, redundancy influences the reliability of language to make "sensations," "ideas," and "attitudes" shared between persuader and persuadee (Carpenter 21). The basis for the Burkeian concept of formal identification then can be described in terms of "redundancy achieved stylistically" (Carpenter 22). According to Carpenter, if a reader or listener anticipated specifically what would be stated, when the persuader ultimately articulated those words in that order, he or she, in effect, corroborated the conclusion reached already by the respondent (23).

Jay Jordan chronicled Burke's use of identification throughout his various literary works. In The Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke examined identification as a deterministic, thus both useful and destructive, characteristic of discourse in human relations (Jordan 266). For Burke, as Jordan observed, group based identity is "realistic" and relevant to a wide range of Burkeian systems: sacrifice, scapegoating, organizational behavior, political affiliations, and transcendence (267). Jordan echoed Burke and others about the relationship between identification and division: "Identification, ambiguously locating as it does both
division and the tendency to transcend division, presents the possibility for rhetoric, figures the inevitability of rhetoric, and stresses the need for rhetoric in language and in social relations" (269). Now, having looked at scholarly treatment of identification, a turn to practical applications.

Although most researchers approach Kenneth Burke and identification rhetorically, some academics take a different approach. Organizational communication specialist George Cheney selected the workplace as the context from which to evaluate Burkeian identification. Cheney's interpersonal study had a three-fold objective: to synthesize Burke's commentary on identification as the primary social function, extend the audience's idea of rhetoric and identification, and expand the application of identification to include organizational communication (144). For Cheney, the individual-organization relationship provided valuable insight to understand the rhetoric of identification and the function of corporate house organs, which Cheney defined as messages that the organization's top policy and decision makers give to employees (144; 149). Cheney explained, “House organs have been recognized as carriers of business policies, viewpoints, and attitudes” (149). Cheney used the house organ as a communication method to develop a tentative typology of identification strategies for his study.

Cheney observed that corporate workers employed three identification strategies. The first strategy, represented by the common ground technique,
surfaced when rhetors equated themselves with others (Cheney 148). For example, when an organization tells its employees that they share his or her personal values (e.g. being “American” or preserving the environment). Moreover, employees are offered “identity” through personal recognition or company-sponsored groups (Cheney 148). Another strategy emerged when workers created identification through antithesis. This strategy uses an organization’s “enemy” to unite its employees. Cheney said, “Some corporate documents contain passages that emphasize threats from ‘outsiders’” (148). Such portrayals allow corporations to stress identification with “insiders” as a means of uniting the company and emphasizing organizational values (Cheney 148). The assumed or transcendent “we” represented the last strategy. Cheney explained that instances of the assumed “we” and corresponding “they” (symbolizing outsiders) are popular in corporate discourse when shared interests between organizations and employees seem taken for granted (149).

After he isolated the three common identification strategies germane to organizational communication, Cheney applied ten “magazine type corporate house organs” to the study (149). Cheney qualitatively analyzed the house organs, all of which were published from different corporations in a variety of industries, and concluded that they surface most frequently under the umbrella of the common ground technique (149-150). An example from the Arthur Andersen accounting firm’s publication to employees supported Cheney’s conclusion: “We
are highly divisionalized so that our staff people have a home-and our partners
and managers who are directly responsible for their development” (Cheney 150).

In the organizational setting, identification solidifies through recognition of
individual contributions. As a common ground tactic, corporations create clubs to
recognize individual efforts (Cheney 150). Some clubs acknowledge employee
successes and achievements at work, while others celebrate workers who exhibit a
“high level of dedication to quality, and loyalty to both their clients and the
companies” (Cheney 151). However, in the praise of individual accomplishments,
there is always a risk of cultivating divisiveness (i.e. segregation) (Cheney 151).

Corporations often assume congruence between individual values, goals,
and interests and those of the organization. As such, distinctions blur between
individual and organization and between organization and community (Cheney
156). When organizations communicate internally with employees, certain
messages simultaneously reflect a corporation’s public position (Cheney 157).
Typically, workers sacrifice some autonomy when they work for an organization.
At a certain point, Cheney discovered, “the ‘outer-voice’ of the organization and the
‘inner-voice’ of the individual were distinct” (Cheney 157). The employee made a
self-conscious decision to, as Cheney put it, “behave organizationally” (157).

In the landscape of modern business, however, something more is desired.
Cheney asserted that “internal motivation” arises when the two voices speak in
harmony and pointed to one example of an IBM personnel director’s comment
about employees: “[workers have] the opportunity to contribute in their own way to the business objectives” (157). As such, identification is directed toward the organization, but it also derives from the individual. Employees, in other words, make personal contributions that reflect organizational interests (Cheney 157). Apart from the workplace, identification operates in society on multiple levels, one being our modern-day political system.

Judith Trent examined Nixon’s identification strategies in his 1960 and 1968 Presidential campaigns. In both 1960 and 1968, Nixon utilized obvious relations, established common ground, and appealed to American values (Trent 25). As such, these appeals accounted for his identification strategies. Although Nixon’s frequency and deployment of obvious relations and common ground strategies decreased significantly from 1960 to 1968, his appeals to American values stayed consistent, which represented direct attempts to “associate his position with the values or goals commonly held by all Americans— and therefore, by the members of the specific audience he was addressing” (Trent 28).

Nixon’s frequency of stating “American values” decreased from 1960 to 1968, but the strategy remained a widely used mode of identification in both campaigns (Trent 28). “In both campaigns,” Trent noted, “American Values provide the basis for judgments; abstractions about beliefs which were held by most Americans were substituted for more specific proposals of action” (28). Nixon identified through American values in the following punch lines: “Peace
without Surrender," "the value of a dollar," and "the Spiritual Values of America" (Trent 29). The consistency of American values as an identification strategy galvanized "small-town, middle America" voters, the demographic from which Nixon garnered the most support (Trent 30).

In his work with identification, William Benoit surveyed televised spots of Clinton and Dole from 1996, and extended Burke's traditional concept to include attempts to create division (39). In Benoit’s analysis, identification accounted for positive messages, and the study defined division tactics as attacks made by candidates. This analysis elucidated several notions of Burkeian identification, such as association with policies, character traits, and liked groups or individuals, all of which Benoit suggested could create division (48). Benoit concluded that both candidates produced ads designed to associate themselves with desirable policies and character traits, while the candidates associated their opponents with undesirable policies and character traits (48). Interestingly enough, Clinton stressed policy, and Dole emphasized character (Benoit 48). Additionally, both candidates attempted to create division through association: Clinton linked Dole with Gingrich and Dole linked Clinton with liberalism (Benoit 45).

Through analysis of President Bush's Iraq war messages, Kenneth Zagacki found it difficult to "call forth a particular conception of national identity" in foreign policy contexts. Zagacki argued that, in Bush’s case as with others, the problem amplifies when rhetors do not acknowledge or negotiate the ideological
or historical narratives that account for the "material reality" in which foreign subjects find themselves (288). Rhetors must understand that many audiences exist between and among competing narratives, and President Bush did not employ a rhetoric reflexive enough, as Charland put it, to "contain or resolve experienced dialectical contradictions between the world and its discourses" (Zagacki 289). Now that attention has been given to Burke’s concept of identification, it is necessary to address the dramatistic process.

In *Permanence and Change*, Burke discussed human conduct as categorized dramatistically. For Burke, dramatism assumes that human terms or conditions begin in theories of action rather than in theories of knowledge (“Permanence” 274). People are symbol-using animals, a characteristic for Burke that enables the human species to use language as symbolic action to discuss social behaviors and motives (Burke “Permanence” 275). Burke argued that words function to aid human invention and perfection of the instruments and methods for shaping our view of the world (Burke “Permanence” 276). Although other animals have the capacity to interact and use tools, humans are superior because of their advanced language and tool-using abilities. However, language also creates class distinctions.

Burke introduced readers to the term “bureaucratization,” which he explained as a structuring and organizational concept, and he insisted that bureaucracy and hierarchy are closely connected terms (Burke “Permanence”
Burke noted, “Logically, you can’t have a Hierarchy without, by the same token, having a Bureaucracy (in the sense of “organization”)” (“Permanence” 282). It is possible, however, to have a bureaucracy without a hierarchy. Take, for example, the case of a business meeting among co-workers. Although it seems logical that employees would collaborate as equals, unless authority is delegated, organization is difficult to maintain. In both cases of Burke’s symbols of authority, hierarchy and bureaucracy, acceptance and rejection of authority are constructed.

Burke’s model followed the “two great moments of the Christian Religion”: Original Sin and Redemption (Burke “Permanence” 283). Additionally, the model asserts a principle of absolute “guilt,” matched by a principle designed to expunge such guilt, a process that Burke explained as redemption through victimage (Burke “Permanence” 284).

For Burke, the “perfecting” of victimage starts with the “scapegoat principle” (Burke “Permanence” 286). Burke said, “Many people with a naturalist or positivist cast of mind look upon the ritual scapegoat as a mere ‘illusion.’ They recognize its use as ‘natural’ in the sense that savages, children, political-spell binders, story writers and the like spontaneously use such devices...” (Burke “Permanence” 286). All institutional settings, as well as organized religions, contain some element of authority. Unless motives are conceived in terms of a pyramidal structure with corresponding elements of guilt and rejection, it is difficult to see how language is deployed to characterize social behavior (Burke
“Permanence” 289). Mortification also achieves redemption in the Burkeian model. In certain instances, Burke noted, “Such modes of thinking are institutionalized in vows of chastity willingly taken for piety” (Burke “Permanence” 290).

The function of rhetoric, for Burke, initiates with people as they symbolically react to their environment. This reaction, Burke argued, characterized “the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or induce actions in other human agents” (“Rhetoric” 41). The act of using language to induce cooperation focuses people’s attention upon two major concepts of Burke’s rhetorical philosophy: First, verbal symbols as meaningful acts from which human motives can be derived. Second, society operates through a dramatistic process (Brock 316).

As Burke argued, hierarchy structures society through the dramatistic process, a reoccurring cycle, which people continually navigate between stages of acceptance and rejection. Bernard Brock noted, “In society the social, economic, and political powers are unevenly divided,” which causes conflicts to materialize (316). Although hierarchy provides order within a dramatistic society, powers divide unevenly, because certain people possess more authority. The hierarchical structure becomes “bureaucratized,” as Brock noted, when people accept their places in society (317).
Within the hierarchies of a dramatistic society, there are circles of acceptance and rejection in which people negotiate their societal positions. The concept of acceptance arises from a positive reaction to the human situation and rejection from negative reactions (Brock 317). In other words, acceptance results from satisfaction and order, whereas rejection effects alienation and disorder (Brock 317). The dramatistic process thus completes itself through a cycle of guilt, purification, and redemption.

Whenever a person rejects the traditional hierarchy, guilt coincides. In a dramatistic society, everyone experiences guilt, because no person obeys all hierarchical impositions. To one degree or another, in some way, people fail or disobey (Foss, Foss, & Trapp 195). Each social institution—the family, work, school, church, and other “bureaucracies”—functions within its own hierarchy, and when one hierarchy conflicts with another, rejection is inevitable (Brock 317). Because people cannot fulfill all requirements of their traditional hierarchies, guilt inevitably burdens everyone to some extent.

In a dramatistic society, guilt alienates people and causes them to feel less connected to the social body as a whole. In turn, people enact purification, which occurs one of two ways: mortification or victimage. Mortification, the act of self-sacrifice, alleviates people of their self-imposed guilt. Victimage, on the other hand, purges guilt through a scapegoat that symbolized society’s guilt, (Brock 318). In the case of the former, guilt transforms into self-inflicted punishment, self-
sacrifice, or self-imposed denials or restrictions (Foss et al. 197). These forms of mortification slay characteristics, impulses, and deny people their desires, as they pursue new identities or work their way up the hierarchical ladder (Foss et al. 197).

Scholars who speak to mortification address the strategy for its ability to restore balance and order in a dramatistic society. In the research process, two critical essays described the connection between dramatism and mortification: Sonja Foss’s work on the Chrysler bailout and Mark P. Moore’s publication on Illinois Governor George Ryan. Foss noted that Chrysler’s request for federal aid and the government’s bailout of the corporation created a sense of guilt for the company, as Chrysler was forced to publicly acknowledge its failures (77). Additionally, the use of a rebate functioned as mortification for Chrysler, because the company engaged in self-inflicted punishment to purge guilt (Foss 81). Another example, cited by Moore, spoke to Illinois Governor George Ryan’s “rhetorical conversion” against capital punishment and his commutation of death row sentences on January 11, 2003 (“Capital Punishment” 312). While in office, Ryan’s political career was plagued with corruption. His critics claimed that the commutation was an effort to divert attention from this fact (Moore “Capital Punishment” 312). Denouncing the death penalty served two symbolic functions for Ryan. First, he commuted death sentences as an act of mortification. Second,
as he shifted the blame, Ryan used the criminal justice system as a scapegoat (Moore “Capital Punishment” 312).

In contrast, through victimage, a person becomes a selected representative of unwanted evils and is injected with the victimizer’s guilt (Foss et al. 196). In any case, the scapegoat substitutes the victimizer, and the victimizer’s guilt displaces to the scapegoat. In consideration of the scapegoat, one must address its paradoxical significance. The scapegoat combines principles of identification and alienation, which Foss et al. explained: “[T]o serve as a scapegoat, something must share some elements with the victimizers. Yet, at the same time, division operates...driving the two apart by their differences” (198). For redemption to occur, the act of purification must match one’s burden of guilt.

Redemption restores balance in the dramatistic process. At the final stage, redemption signals a change within the rhetor. Here the rhetor purifies and redeems his or her guilt, thus he or she is transformed (Foss et al. 197). A change of identity occurs, as the dramatistic process cycles through, and a rhetor returns to the circle of acceptance.

Method

If the ambiguous union of identification and division makes for the perfect invitation of rhetoric, how did Steve Jobs identify with corporate and consumer audiences on the basis of division, and what does this indicate about division as a rhetorical strategy? To paraphrase Bernard Brock, identification is a tool that can
be used to discover the major attitudes conveyed within a speech (318). Through close textual analysis that highlights the ways in which Steve Jobs identified with Apple's employee and consumers, certain divisive patterns emerged. Moore explained, “As a rhetorical strategy, identification joins a speaker with an audience through the use of ‘signs’ that indicate how the speaker’s given substance or property is the same as the audience’s...identification can alter attitudes and induce cooperation” (“Mythical America” 4). A rhetor’s language exposes the “substance” out of which he or she expects to identify with listeners. Words, spoken consciously or unconsciously, show the attitudes or “stylized answers” to the apparent divisions (Brock 319). This thesis examines Steve Jobs’ rhetoric of identification as to induce cooperation within corporate and consumer audiences on the basis of division.

As such, the method of this study includes the following steps. First, familiarizing myself with Jobs’ text and context is essential to conduct a rhetorical analysis on his discourse. It is necessary to get a complete and objective experience of Jobs and the period in which his rhetoric emerged, so this process includes reviewing a host of textual artifacts. Interviews are the primary artifacts analyzed in this thesis, but supplementary artifacts include early keynote addresses, other scholarly publications on Jobs, and Jobs’ 2005 Stanford commencement address.
Second, selected artifacts are chosen for close textual analysis to find instances of which Jobs created identification through division. Often, multiple readings of the same artifact are necessary to find overlooked cases of identification. Once discovered, each instance of identification is marked.

Third, identification instances are categorized into “consumer” or “corporate” subgroups, the two audiences to which Jobs appealed. After this process has been completed, results will be synthesized among artifacts.

The fourth step analyzes both groups, corporate and consumer, for instances of identification. To find cases of identification, an examination for patterns of consubstantiality is necessary. Consustantiality, for Burke, refers to the notion of substances such as objects, occupations, beliefs, or values, which people have in common with other people. For Jobs, consubstantiality assisted identification in both corporate and consumer audiences, but did so through divisive means, or ways that were uncommon in the context of computer marketing and employee management throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Last, both corporate and consumer audience groups are analyzed for individual and collective patterns. In doing so, similarities between each group surface and Jobs’ preferred identification style emerges.


Gaines, Robert. "Identification and Redemption in Lysias' Against Eratosthenes."  

Jobs, Steve. Oral History with Daniel S. Morrow. Computerworld Honors Program  

Jordan, Jay. "Dell Hymes, Kenneth Burke's 'Identification,' and the Birth of  

Larson, Erik, and Carrie Dolan. "Apple of Press as it Introduces its Macintosh  

Linzmayer, Owen W. Apple Confidential 2.0: The Definitive History of the World’s  


Marbach, William D., Lubenow, Gerald C., Cook, William J., Gibney Jr., Frank, and  
Print.

Medhurst, Martin. “Public Address and Significant Scholarship: Four Challenges to  

Moore, Mark P. “A Return to Mythical America in Campaign 2000: On the Flatteries  
of George W. Bush.” Conference paper at the Western States  


Chapter 2: The Historical and Political Context of Jobs’ Rhetoric

On Monday, January 3, 1983, Time Magazine hailed the personal computer as the "Machine of the Year." Instead of selecting a distinguished human personality for its annual "Man of the Year" spot, Time honored the occasion that changed the way people and technology interacted. This commencement marked a confluence of events that revolutionized the way people used, perceived, and lived with technology as the personal computer’s arrival into the marketplace of technology and the advent of the information revolution (Friedrich 17).

When the Time article appeared on newsstands, a surge of desktop computers had already "beeped" and "blipped" their way into the American office, the American school, and the American home (Friedrich 15). As Friedrich stated in 1983, "The 'information revolution' that futurists have long predicted has arrived, [and]...it promises...dramatic changes in the way people live and work, perhaps even in the way they think. America will never be the same" (15). The information revolution, four decades in the making, had reached fruition.

The first chapter introduced Steve Jobs and the creation of Apple. Discussion now turns to the context in which Jobs’ rhetoric emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s. According to Gerald C. Lubenow and Michael Rogers, Jobs developed into a cultural icon as a result of his success with Apple (56). In addition to the Time publication, other critical events transpired that allowed for
Jobs’ rhetoric to surface. These events can be viewed as rhetorical imperatives that exist as parts of what Burke identifies as a dramatistic process in society. For Jobs, the imperatives, or events that made rhetoric necessary, elicited from him a response of acceptance or rejection. The question can then be asked, how and why did Steve Jobs accept and reject the hierarchy of social order at Apple, according to the dramatistic process?

This chapter examines the social, cultural, historical, and political events that defined the late 1970s and 1980s, and it provides a framework for Jobs’ acceptance and rejection of the social order during that time. The argument I make is that Jobs rejected all systems of organized authority, all hierarchical impositions. Jobs’ rejection of bureaucracy is witnessed in all areas of his life, whether corporate, educational, or political. On the other hand, I show that Jobs accepted individual empowerment.

Acceptance and Rejection

As Burke explained, human conduct is most discussable in dramatistic terms (“Permanence” 274). History, in other words, can be viewed as a drama, and there are plots that revolve around the author and the people involved with the author. Thus, it is appropriate to talk about these situations like a play. Burke argued that hierarchy structures society in the dramatistic process. The dramatistic process, for Burke, is a cycle, which people continually navigate between stages of acceptance and rejection. In a dramatistic society, people
experience acceptance, the result of satisfaction and order, and rejection, the effect of alienation and disorder, as they react to their environment (Brock 317).

The Social and Cultural Imperative of Computerphobia

From the early 1950s until the 1970s, computers operated primarily to assist military efforts associated with the Cold War (Reed 161). Computer technology and how computers functioned, changed, however, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as cultural shifts produced linkages to the home, family, and workplace in a manner that "naturally" integrated the machine into people's daily lives (Reed 161). Despite this transformation, many people viewed the onset of the computer with alarm. This tension, which started in earlier decades and gained momentum throughout the 1970s and 1980s, was expressed in a discourse on the reaction to computer use known as "computerphobia."

According to Greenly, computerphobia manifested in three forms. First, anxiety was experienced through sweaty palms, tension in the back, and other physical symptoms (Greenly 16). Second, tension materialized internally, in which case a person appeared calm but engaged in a negative internal self-dialogue. Last was the uncomfortable user, who experienced reduced concentration. In this case, computerphobia produced discomfort in efficiency and less productivity (Greenly 16). While people had a myriad of reasons to fear the computer, one common phobia was the loss of control to a technology-dominated society, which kept some people at bay altogether (Greenly 16). Some researchers thought the numbers on
computerphobia were conservative and believed that many “closet cyberphobes” hid their fears because of pressures that hailed the benefits of computers (Rice 79).

The integration of computers into society came with mixed feelings. While the machines' political, military, and economic projections were acknowledged with enthusiasm, the arrival of computers into the workplace spawned debates about automation that elicited a strong resistance from some people (Reed 170). In other words, Americans were conflicted in their attitudes toward the computer. People understood that computers were here to stay, but some individuals hesitated to introduce technology into the workplace and had difficulty identifying with computers.

Despite efforts to naturalize technology into the daily lives of American workers during the 1970s and 1980s, many office users still perceived computers as menacing. For instance, some executives refused to read computer printouts until their secretaries retyped them into a standard memo (Friedrich 23). In January of 1983, Ted Stout of National Systems Inc. reported: "The biggest problem in introducing computers into an office is management....They don’t understand it, and they are scared to death of it" (qtd. in Friedrich 23). Rice concurred with Stout about this problem. According to Rice, as technology became more prevalent in the workplace, middle managers feared they had become “information conduits” that did not manage anything and could be replaced by the computers they learned to use (Rice 79).
The attempt to integrate computers into society did not stop with the organization. During the 1970s and 1980s, computers became valued more in academia than in previous decades. Many educators, however, did not know how to use or approach technology. Larry Rosen, trained psychologist and statistics professor, explained the problem: “More teachers are having to get students involved with computers even though they themselves are not truly comfortable with them” (qtd. in Greenly 18). To alleviate concerns, some schools employed inservice training to help teachers familiarize themselves with computers (Bracey 508). This type of training starts after an individual is hired and helps develop skills in a particular area or occupation, computers in this case. In training, teachers reported fears that were self-centered and affective (Bracey 508). Bracey explained that teachers focused on the ways in which computers affected them personally, instead of technology’s outcome on student learning (508). That is to say, academic sentiment toward the computer was not indifferent to a large portion of society’s attitude at the time. People were unable to relate and identify with computers, and they did not see the machine’s incentive as it related to their own lives.

As computers became more common in American economy and culture between the 1950s and 1990s, computerphobia was a hurdle in the mass marketing of the personal computer. Throughout the 1980s, a collection of books was published to help combat computer-related anxieties. For many people, the
computer was unpleasant, and its introduction into some people’s lives caused extreme duress (Reed 174). By the mid 1980s, the term “computerphobia” was included in *The Encyclopedia of Phobias, Fears and Anxieties*, a professional reference for clinical psychologists. The challenge to overcome computer anxiety in consumer audiences became more complicated for manufacturers.

As Jobs saw it, “The technological revolution [became] more intertwined everyday with our...society” (qtd. in Sheff 182). Though Jobs did not reject the notion of computerphobia, he saw the problem more as one of control. In 1995, while reflecting on his experience with Apple, Jobs expressed the following attitude toward technology: “It is so much more hopeful to think that technology can solve the problems that are more human and more organizational and more political in nature, and it ain’t so” (Jobs “Oral History” 9). For Jobs, the problem was not with technology, the problem was the way that technology was disseminated to the masses.

Jobs outlined the problem in 1994, when he spoke to *Rolling Stone*: “It’s not a faith in technology. It’s a faith in people....Technology is nothing. What’s important is that you have faith in people, that they’re basically good and smart, and if you give them tools, they’ll do wonderful things” (qtd. in Goodell 77).

Reflecting on the early days at Apple, Jobs acknowledged that the Apple position was to change things. Jobs stated: “[Apple] was basically this relatively small company in...California, taking on...IBM, and saying ‘Wait a minute, your way is
wrong”” (Jobs “Oral History” 13-14). As Jobs has noted, “Computation and how it relate[d] to people [was] in its infancy...[and Apple was] in the right place at the right time to change the course of that vector a little bit” (“Oral History” 10). Computerphobia, for Jobs, was a symptom of much larger problem: too much power in the hands of the wrong individuals.

Jobs rejected the corporate establishment, in part, for how it introduced computers and technology to American consumers. As Jobs saw it, anyone could manufacture and sell a computer, but people’s reactions to technology was determined by the manner in which it was presented. There were a number of companies that sold computers, but no manufacturer showed people the incentive of the computer for their own lives. Until control was taken away from the industry’s most prominent companies, society would remain afflicted by computerphobia.

A New Organization is Born

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, changes in organizational structure ushered in new business practices for the modern corporation. During this time, the composition of typical corporations changed, as did the CEOs who headed major businesses. For example, company identification was replaced by more personal and pragmatic loyalties to smaller companies. According to Barnett and Magdoff, this shift was attributed, in part, to the way that the workplace and the home became daily substitutions for self-presentation (417). That is to say, many
people employed one set of values at work and a different set of values at home. Because of this disparity, the allegiance to large corporations attenuated, and the opportunity for entrepreneurship emerged. Moreover, during this transition, CEOs and their organizations adapted to a new corporate climate, one that catered to investor capitalism.

For three decades after World War II, in the era of managerial capitalism, the average CEO was an "organization man" who worked his way up the ranks and was no better known to the public than the “average dentist” (Khurana 62). In the 1980s, however, everything changed when a decline in corporate profits initiated a new era of investor capitalism. Investors looked for CEOs who brought a unique approach to business, and the relationship between startup companies and investor capitalists was unique (Khurana 62; Bankman and Gilson 290).

Venture capitalists offered financial assistance, but they often had superior information regarding a particular subset of employee innovations (Bankman and Gilson 290). The venture capitalists themselves were also different. Instead of finance professionals, many venture capitalists were electronic entrepreneurs who specialized in technical and financial support (Saxenian qtd. in Dobkins 162). Saxenian explained that the availability of venture capital in Silicon Valley was unmatched anywhere else in the country (qtd. in Dobkins 162). As Khurana pointed out, in the 1980s, charisma distinguished one CEO from the next, and charismatic CEOs had a set of personal qualities that inspired awe and submission.
in others (Khurana 60-62). Venture capital funding depended essentially on employee personal characteristics (Bankman and Gilson 290). For instance, when it came to the computer industry, knowledge alone did not guarantee industry success, which made a charismatic CEO essential to the organization.

As this transformation occurred, a new corporate lexicon emerged with words such as "mission," vision," and "values." This historical conversion changed the traditional conceptions of business, and a new rise of populist capitalism flourished, whereby average Americans started wide-scale investing (Khurana 62). To satisfy the public’s appetite for business news, the mass media increased its coverage of corporate events to include a focus on personalities and easily comprehensible narratives (Khurana 62). In 1979, for example, Lee Iacocca was elected chairman and CEO of Chrysler and will likely be remembered as the first modern example of a charismatic business leader (Khurana 62). Khurana argued that Steve Jobs gave a more contemporary spin to Iacocca's trademark inspirational leadership: "Revered for his success in introducing people to the personal computer—which he dubbed the Star Wars-like 'force' that could guarantee our 'freedom'-Jobs created a corporate culture that has become widespread" (62).

Apart from celebrity status, charismatic CEOs differed from their predecessors in a couple ways. More often than not, chief executives of the 1980s were entrepreneurial founders or brought into the company from the outside.
Unlike a company man of past generations, the charismatic CEO offered a vision of a "radically different future" that captivated and motivated people for a "journey to the new promised land" (Khurana 62). A charismatic leader was a skilled public speaker, inspired employees to work harder and gain the confidence of analysts, investors, and the often skeptical business press (Khurana 62). In short, the charismatic business leader, the CEO that defined 1980s, was expected to perform miracles.

As the 1980s effected transition and change for many American businesses, Jobs accepted the fact that charismatic individuals were a necessary component to successful organizations. He understood that, if Apple wanted to compete, they would need more than just a good product. For Jobs, passion was everything: “Unless you have a lot of passion about this, you’re not going to survive...[Y]ou’ve got to have an idea, or a problem or a wrong to right that you’re passionate about otherwise you’re not going to have the perseverance to stick it through” (“Oral History” 22). Anyone could assemble computers, but passion and charisma helped to distinguish one manufacturer from the next.

Jobs’ passion resided in finding individuals who made valuable contributions to the organization. As Jobs explained, “The contributions we tried to make embodied values not only of technical excellence and innovation...but innovation of a more humanistic kind” (“Oral History” 10). Jobs understood that his work was a reflection of the creative talents of the individuals he employed.
Jobs said, “[T]hings became...clear that they were the results of human creation and not these magical things that just appeared in one’s environment...” (“Oral History” 4).

The industry was rife with manufacturers, and Jobs accepted that, in order to be successful, quality people were necessary. Jobs attested to his talent and responsibility for finding gifted individuals: “I’m best at...finding...talented...people” and “I always considered part of my job was to keep the quality level of people in the organizations I work with very high...I consider one of the few things I actually can contribute individuality” (qtd. in Lubenow and Rogers 52; “Oral History” 9). The corporate climate evolved throughout the 1980s, and Jobs accepted that the individual was an indispensible commodity to the organization.

_The Computer Comes Home_

As technology integrated into daily life for many Americans, manufacturers employed celebrities to help consumers identify with computers, an effort they believed would make the computer appeal to a wide audience. IBM, for example, humanized their image with a Charlie Chaplin lookalike. Chaplin’s inclusion referenced his 1936 film, _Modern Times_, which was a statement about a world increasingly dominated by technology and hostile to the average person (Reed 175). Apple linked itself with Dick Cavett, Texas Instruments signed comedian Bill Cosby, and Commodore hired William Shatner. By 1982, nearly two million
American households were equipped with a personal or home computer, and as one popular journal described it, man and machine were "making friends at last" (Reed 176).

Since the 1970s, middle and upper class consumptions patterns changed significantly from earlier decades. In 1980, for example, demographic changes opened new markets to consumers, specifically individual buyers. In part, this pattern coincided with the high divorce rates of the 1970s. As Wilcox explained, before the 1960s, Americans valued marriage by duty, obligation, and sacrifice (83). All that changed, however, in the 1970s when traditional conceptions of marriage yielded to an emphasis of finding a “soul-mate” (Wilcox 83). This change, which stressed subjective happiness and an emotional relationship with one’s spouse, contributed to the increasing divorce rate (Wilcox 83). As divorce rates burgeoned, there were more single than married households, which led to an increase of discretionary income among middle-class families (Barnett and Magdoff 416; Reed 177). In other words, more single people had money to spend on consumer goods and electronics, a change from previous decades.

Technology, at one time a luxury, became affordable for many people. Home computers, VCRs, and stereos infiltrated middle and upper class households (Barnett and Magdoff 416). For example, Sony’s Walkman spawned a cultural phenomenon, which changed the boundaries between private and public domains. The Walkman created a "private cocoon" of sound in public. People hummed,
sang, and whistled, often off key, as if nobody heard (Barnett and Magdoff 418).

Portable computers were more common note-taking devices in public meetings, despite the keys' distracting noise (Barnett and Magdoff 418). This development changed the computer from "a cold distant, and feared...machine...and transformed [computers] into socially-friendly and family friendly machines" (Reed 177). In the 1980s, unlike times past, women became a consumer market for some manufacturers. Although strides were made to combat social concerns regarding computers and technology, many women in the 1980s still struggled to join the computer revolution.

Throughout the decade, manufacturers instituted various marketing techniques to appeal to women specifically. For example, Qume computer used pastel colors to adorn its keyboard function keys and laser printer buttons (Reed 180). Software companies marketed gendered applications such as recipe databases and dinner party seating programs (Reed 180). Computer manufacturers also bought more space in women's magazines. This change in consumption resulted from an increased number of women who worked from home, which forced the industry to recognize and address the female market. The revolution also encouraged women to view the computer not as a "masculine tool," but as "just another...appliance" (Reed 180). Activities called "Computer Parties" emerged in large cites like New York, in which women gathered to learn about
computers in the comfort of their homes. These parties were fashioned similar to a Tupperware party and helped women alleviate computer fears.

As Jobs remembered, “the goal of the 1980s...was really individual productivity,” claiming that someday, “[c]omputers will be essential in most homes” (qtd. in Goodell 73; qtd. in Sheff 50). Jobs accepted the computer’s place in society, and he knew that computers would change lives. Although computer technology would continue to evolve, Jobs recognized that people hesitated to welcome computers into their lives, whether at home, at school, or at work. Jobs explained, “We [Apple] think that computers are the most remarkable tools that humankind has ever come up with, and we think that people are basically tool users. So if we can just get lots of computers to lots of people, it will make a qualitative difference in the world” (qtd. in Sheff 58).

In the 1980s, technology became more common in American homes, but many people did not identify with computers. Jobs believed that humans were tool users who saw computers as foreign objects, but he understood that most people used and operated appliances, so “[Apple’s] original vision...was to make...an [information] appliance, [and] to get this [computer] out there to as many people as possible” (“Oral History” 13). As Jobs saw it, if people used computers in a similar manner to other devices that were used regularly, it would become less obtrusive. In describing the computer’s integration into the American home, Jobs proclaimed, “Apple was...the first 'lifestyle' computer” (“Oral History” 13).
A Time of Self-Exploration

In May of 1985, twenty-four year old author David Leavitt wrote "The New Lost Generation," an autobiographical essay that debuted in Esquire Magazine. Leavitt’s essay reflected his experiences, which captured the changing moods of society from the 1960s until the early 1980s. Although Leavitt offered a bleak outlook on the current state of his generation, he remained hopeful for its future. Kirk Curnutt explained that Leavitt was one of the first writers identified as a representative for post-baby boomers, and in his essay, Leavitt ascribed a "detached, ironic voice" to his contemporaries (95). In Leavitt’s observation,

The...generation was born both too late and too soon. It belong[ed] in part to the sixties, in part to the eighties and [sat] somewhere uncomfortably in between....[T]he sixties was the age of naive hopes and the eighties [we]re the decade of ironic hopelessness, [but] the seventies bred a generation of sceptic pretenders (85-90).

For Leavitt, it was ironic that his generation wanted to rebel, yet missed the 1960s by two decades. By the time people were old enough to participate, the revolution dissolved and left society in a state of dissolution (Leavitt 87). This attitude, however, allowed for an elusive moment in American history, a moment that catered to individuality and self-expression.

People in the U.S. identified with individualism, and the symbols and services that catered to this mind state set a benchmark for the world economy to follow. America, a culture obsessed with the "supposedly" autonomous self, became an international litmus test for new links among self-image, altered
realities, and the purchase of goods and services (Barnett and Magdoff 421). As such, people expressed themselves and negotiated their identities through a series of substitutions, which included high technology, fashion, and drugs. And while such substitutions created alternate depictions of one's self and reality, they provided immediate recognition and drove consumption (Barnett and Magdoff 413). To put it another way, Americans expressed themselves through exploited individualism, and for many people, the purchase of goods and services was the conduit through which individuality was attained. These symbols of individuality served a dual purpose. First, they functioned as products that fed the economy and the desires of popular culture. Second, and more importantly, such commodities became symbols of identification for people throughout the 1980s.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of self-expression started to surface for many Americans. And according to Collins, America witnessed a rise in "therapeutic, expressive individualism" by the 1980s, with self-help personalities like Tony Robbins. Avant-garde style was epitomized by a "trickster" type deconstruction of social character, the self-made individual who did not conform to the order and rules of large corporations (Barnett and Magdoff 414). This concept, however, had an adverse effect. While the individualist who rebelled against the system became "for a brief Andy Warhol 15 minutes, a hero to college students," many Americans became limited in their ability to understand the structural aspects of social problems, or accept the idea that their tax money ought
to be used to fix such issues (Barnett and Magdoff 414; Collins in Ponce de Leon 308). That is to say, the rejection of hierarchy and bureaucracy, or the symbols of authority as Burke would have it, became popular at this time. While many individuals did so, however, they failed to see benefits of hierarchy and bureaucracy such as safety and order.

For Jobs, this was a critical moment for America. Jobs recalled America’s time of transition: “It was clear that the Sixties were over, [and] a lot of people who had gone through the Sixties ended up not really accomplishing what they set out to accomplish, and they didn’t have much to fall back on” (qtd. in Sheff 176). This reality, sobering for many individuals, allowed for new worldviews to emerge. Jobs explained, “There was a constant flow of questioning about the truth of life…. [People embraced] a sense of experimentation and a sense of openness-openness to new possibilities” (qtd. in Sheff 175). This transition in American culture allowed for individual experimentation, a critical facet of Jobs’ worldview.

The Historical Breakup

On January 1, 1984, the prospect for “new possibilities” materialized when Federal Judge Harold Greene imposed conditions on the American Telephone and Telegraph Company to split itself into seven independent regional companies. The judge’s actions, the catalyst for the infamous “Bell Breakup,” ended nine years of litigation that started when the FCC brought an antitrust suit against AT&T for its control of the local Bell System companies and their networks (“AT&T Breakup
Approved” 35). Bell was criticized for its stranglehold in the equipment and long-distance markets, and the FCC believed this breakup, which marked the end of a 70-year American monopoly, would yield better communications services at lower prices for consumers (Wu 194; Burnham 8). For many people, the result was a point of contention. Initially, consumers dealt with marketing ploys and paid more for service. The breakup, however, allowed the industry to evolve with innovation, which consumers experienced in better products and greater ease of use (Naughton 25).

In a compromise worked out with the Justice Department, AT&T divided into eight sections. The firm held onto its long distance services, Bell Labs, and Western Electric, a manufacturing subsidiary (Wu 194). The seven remaining regional companies were partitioned into independent firms. The antitrust settlement required Western Electric and other operating companies to compete for all orders, and the state Public Utility Commissions made companies consider every supplier, rather than favor one vendor in particular (Drucker 16). Prior to the breakup, Western Electric, AT&T’s second unit, did not have any competition, because Bell System bought everything it turned out. It was not run for profit, but as a supplier for operating companies. Now, under the new system, it had to deal with credit losses, inventories, and marketing expenses (Drucker 16). Moreover, global telephone equipment suppliers entered the American market and pushed products to the new companies that resulted from the breakup. International
companies such as NEC from Japan, Ericsson from Sweden, and others from Great Britain, Germany, and France competed with American IBM, who also moved into the telephone business.

Two years earlier, in 1982, the government surrendered a similar antitrust case against IBM. On the last day of the Johnson administration, the government accused IBM with monopolizing the country’s computer business and took action to split the company up (Brown and Mayer A1). The government tried prove that size was a crime, and charged that IBM maintained seventy percent of the general computer market in the 1960s through illegal practices such as premature announcements of new products and price-cutting offensives (Brown and Mayer A1). After thirteen years of confusion, however, the case against IBM proved without merit (Drucker 4).

Merrill Brown and Caroline Mayer explained that the actions taken against AT&T and IBM concluded a postwar era of antitrust law, in which the government challenged the limits of federal antitrust laws by objecting to the right of large corporations’ to exercise their economic power as they saw fit in the marketplace (A1). Peter Drucker noted the effect of government intervention with IBM: “The...antitrust suit against IBM, the one the government abandoned in 1982...was brought at the very moment when the Japanese...became serious competitors in mainframe computers worldwide” (4). Forced from their position at the top of the mainframe market, IBM was pressured to do something it once condemned: enter
the personal computer market (Drucker 4). In AT&T’s case, the breakup started a new era in the telecommunications industry, as it unleashed AT&T from earlier government restraints that restricted the company from offering computer services or any other non-telephone related services. After the breakup, AT&T gained access to the computer and information industries, which included cable and electronic newspapers (Brown and Mayer A1).

AT&T, however, did not concede initially to the government’s promotion of competition in the telephone markets. In brief, AT&T came up with one scheme after another to contest the FCC and rid competition during the 1970s. For example, in the case of any “foreign attachment” such as a fax machine, Bell filed a tariff that required the competitor to establish a “protective connective arrangement” (Wu 192). The tariff was masked under network protection, but it ended up as an additional cost and regulatory burden for competitors. According to economist and Bell veteran Gerald Faulhaber, this scheme allowed AT&T eight more years of industry monopoly (Wu 192). Although the Nixon administration took initiative to breakup Bell in both the Justice Department and the White House Office of Technology Policy, President Reagan finalized the split.

Throughout the litigation process, the FCC continued to inflict pressure on AT&T and frustration mounted for the firm. AT&T held the position that an implementation of restrictions would effect broad changes within the industry, so they maintained the need to control all elements of telephony. For instance, in a
submission to the FCC, Bell argued for control over the quality, installation, and maintenance of the telecommunications industry, since the companies were expected to operate and improve the telephone system (Wu 189). This notion echoed AT&T pioneer and president Theodore Vail, a dedicated believer in a “One Company, One System” operation, who set the foundation for the Bell monopoly in the early 1900s (Wu 54). Bell could have run the business differently, but Vail insisted that the non-free market arrangement of a closed system yielded higher dividends for all, and for Bell, this meant a dedication to public service in accordance with the state. Peter Drucker explained that, since the early days of Vail, AT&T always considered itself a “private company in the public service rather than a private business” (13). So, the FCC’s motion to breakup Bell, a company that prided itself in public service, was not received amicably.

Consumers anticipated the repercussions of divorce from stable and predictable Bell. Many people feared that Bell’s reliability would be interrupted by changes and rate increases. One Los Angeles resident expressed her pre-divestiture concerns in a letter to the Los Angeles Times: “Our telephone service is going to get a lot worse, and it’s definitely going to cost us a lot more” (Keppel 1). Rates were expected to double or triple in certain areas of the country, which caught the attention of people on Capitol Hill. Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey explained that computer-illiteracy among students from low income families could cause “new and distressing divisions in our society” (Burnham 8).
Massachusetts Democrat Edward Markey echoed Senator Lautenberg when he said that if the telephone service became a luxury, the country could develop into “an information aristocracy and underclass” (Burnham 8). As post-breakup problems unfolded, many people started to see the value in a centralized system.

Although some inconveniences went unresolved for years, the Bell Breakup generated a revolution in computing, telephony, and networking (Wu 195). The Bell example depicted all that is bad before the eventual good of an open industry. On the one hand, the Bell monopoly was efficient in providing universal phone service. The problem in Bell’s case, as Wu explained, is that “such well-oiled machines do not...initiate the...creative destruction that revolutionizes industries and ultimately multiplies productivity and value” (195). Wu added that, “where information is the ultimate commodity, the multiplier effect is incalculably great” (195). Despite visionaries such as Vail, whose mission was to serve society and protect the general economy, innovation will always challenge popular interest.

For Jobs, the breakup of Bell System set a standard in the information industry, one which promoted competition and innovation. In Jobs’ view, “[I]t takes a crisis for something to occur in America” (qtd. in Sheff 182). And according to Jobs, “[D]eath is the most wonderful invention of life [because] [i]t purges the system of old models that are obsolete” (qtd. in Sheff 183). The death of corporate monopoly, as Jobs saw it, allowed new companies to build on the remnants of the
old system, while competition and innovation improved the industry. It is no surprise, then, that the Bell Breakup was heralded by Jobs.

Jobs’ acceptance of the breakup arose from his rejection of centralized systems of authority. For example, he railed against corporate monopolies, explaining that “[t]he sedentary view is that of large companies” (Jobs “Oral History” 22). Jobs continued, “What happens when a customer goes away and a monopoly gets control…is that the level of service almost always goes down”; over time, “[c]ompanies…somehow lose their vision…. [and] no longer have an inherent feel or passion about their products” (“Oral History” 8; qtd. in Sheff 56).

Regardless of the era, Jobs remained consistent in his view on corporate power. Jobs compared IBM’s stranglehold during 1970s and 1980s to Microsoft in the early 1990s: “I see tremendous parallels between the solidity and dominance that IBM had and the shackles that that…impos[ed] on our industry and what Microsoft is doing today,” Jobs said, and “America is leading the world in software technology right now, and that is such a valuable asset for this country that anything that potentially threatens that leadership needs to be examined” (qtd. in Goodell 75-76).

Decentralization

During the 1970s, certain technological innovators identified with economists Friedrich Hayek and Leopold Kohr, who both decried centralized systems of authority and industry monopolization. Hayek saw the efficiency in
monopolies, but believed that centralized systems of power failed to appreciate human limitations (Wu 200). With all necessary information, central planning maximized the best possible arrangements, but it failed to account for all relevant facts of local, regional, and national conditions to arrive at an informed decision. Kohr, on the other hand, began his work in the 1950s and campaigned against empires, large nations, and "bigness" in general (Wu 200). For Kohr this idea exceeded a social problem, because "[w]henever something [was] wrong, something [was] too big" (qtd. in Wu 200).

Although the internet’s foundation developed out of necessity, its creators started to see morality in an open system. This awareness spread with the understanding of what a universal network needed to evolve, function, and advance without restraint. In the final draft of the TCP protocol, internet co-founder Jon Postel inserted the following declaration: "Be conservative in what you do. Be liberal in what you accept from others" (qtd. in Wu 201). This ideology, which bore opposition to bigness characteristic of the era, was philosophical and spiritual.

In the same vein as Postel, three professors of computer science, David Reed, David Clark, and Jerome Saltzer, attempted to explain what made the internet so powerful. In their groundbreaking paper, "End-to-End Arguments in System Design," the professors argued the potential in decentralizing decisional authority. As they saw it, this power shift would give the network users the "ends,"
and the network itself would be the "middle," which was non-specialized to serve
the "ends" in any way imaginable (Wu 201). Although it cannot be said that the
network pioneers of the 1970s subscribed to the ideas of any particular thinker,
Hayek and Kohr's arguments reverberated the computer science vision for the
future, ideological backlash against centralized planning, that is.

For Jobs, the rejection of centralized systems of authority and the
acceptance of a “decentralized” philosophy for the industry went hand in hand. He
understood that “if [Apple was] going to be successful, [they had] to approach this
from a grassroots point of view” (qtd. in Sheff 57). The need for change was clear,
and Jobs believed that open systems fostered innovation. Jobs explained, “I think
you have a responsibility to do really good stuff and get it out there for people to
use and let them build on the shoulders of it and keep making better stuff” (“Oral
History” 23). Jobs was aware that, “in order to continue to be one of the major
contributors, [Apple would] have to be a ten-billion dollar company” (qtd. in Sheff
56). Jobs responded: “[Apple's] concern [was] how we bec[a]me that...” (qtd. in
Sheff 56).

A Renaissance in Silicon Valley

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the myth that defined California’s Silicon
Valley developed around the achievements of David Packard and Steve Jobs
(Bankman and Gilson 290). According to Saxenian, Silicon Valley rewarded risk
taking, and anyone with a new idea was encouraged to start his or her own firm
(qtd. in Dobkins 162). For instance, Hewlett-Packard developed on Stanford’s campus, and the company was established under unlikely circumstances. As Saxenian put it, "If Fred Terman, an MIT Graduate, had not taken an electrical engineering professorship at Stanford, and then helped out two of his graduate students, William Hewlett and David Packard, with a $538 loan, the legend might not have happened" (qtd. in Dobkins 163). Apple, on the other hand, was the original revolutionary, the "protocountercultural" firm that diversified the industry, and, in the 1970s, brought open computing, then just an ideological commitment, into mass production and popular use (Wu 270).

Palo Alto's Roland also epitomized Silicon Valley's mythic hero: A charismatic engineer with an idea; who left his job with an established company; started a firm that became an industry leader; and became rich (Bankman and Gilson 290). People in this community took the myth seriously, because success materialized for many individuals. As such, it was not uncommon for people to leave their jobs and start over with a new pursuit (Bankman and Gilson 290). Silicon Valley rewarded people for their creativity. Saxenian said it best: “In Silicon Valley, the culture did not scorn those who failed, but only those who failed to try” (qtd. in Dobkins 163).

The Silicon Valley renaissance changed how people interacted with technology, but the revolution did not happen over night. The close proximity to Stanford contributed to successful start-up companies. As Saxenian observed,
"Stanford University cultivated a more entrepreneurial atmosphere in what was basically an agricultural setting; corporate tradition was never a priority" (qtd. in Dobkins 161). In addition to entrepreneurship and innovation, rapid change and fragmentation were hallmark characteristics of Silicon Valley companies in the 1970s and 1980s (Dobkins 161). During this pivotal time for the industry, the corporate structure of Silicon Valley was "chaotic," and "entrepreneurs start[ed] new organizations-or disorganizations-which [broke] the mold of the accepted structure" (Saxenian qtd. in Dobkins 161). In the new organization, employees were expected to work nonstop, not to just manufacture and sell products but to "realize the vision of the messianic leader" (Khurana 62).

Jobs, who accepted his place in Silicon Valley, acknowledged “there wouldn’t have been an Apple if there hadn’t been a Hewlett-Packard” (qtd. in Lubenow and Rogers 55). During the 1970s and 1980s, Jobs explained, “[i]t took a bunch of rambunctious upstarts, working with very little resources but a certain amount of vision and commitment, to do it” (qtd. in Lubenow and Rogers 52). Jobs recognized Silicon Valley’s location as a contributing factor to the growth of the computer industry during the 1980s: “I give a lot of credit to the universities, probably the most credit of anything to Stanford and Berkeley,...[for] attract[ing]...good students...from all over the United States....[T]here [was] a constant influx of new, bright, human resources” (Jobs “Oral History” 24”; qtd. in Sheff 174).
Jobs’ statements about Silicon Valley reinforced his individualistic worldview. He credited the universities for attracting “new” and “bright” students from all over the country. The human capital, or “human resources” as Jobs noted, were unmatched anywhere else in the United States. This distinction allowed for Silicon Valley to develop into the mecca of the computer industry. For Jobs, Silicon Valley harbored some of the most creative and intelligent people in the world.

The Politics of Change

Outside of Silicon Valley, America experienced significant political changes during the 1970s and 1980s. Decentralization in Washington, for example, spawned widespread changes in education. To paraphrase Davies, the common theme was decentralization, as power moved away from committee chairs and party leaders, and toward expanding subcommittees, each with its own particular programs and interest groups (628). In the 1970s, Davies explained, “The club-like hierarchical world of mid-century congress had disappeared, replaced by one that at the same time encouraged policy entrepreneurship by lobbyists, staffers and junior legislators, and protected their innovations from subsequent political attack” (628).

Jobs accepted this landmark achievement for education because it attacked bureaucracy and stripped an organized system of authority and power. Speaking to the problem in 1995, Jobs remarked, “The problem [with education] is the unions. The unions are the worst thing that ever happened to education because
it's not a meritocracy. It turns into a bureaucracy, which is exactly what has happened. The teachers can't teach and administrators run the place and nobody can be fired” (Jobs “Oral History” 6). Jobs rejected all systems of organized authority: corporate monopolies, unions, and political systems. For Jobs, organized authority threatened individual empowerment individual, a critical facet of Jobs’ worldview.

For Jobs, this victory for education was a victory for technology. In the early 1980s, “[Apple] saw the...rate at which the school bureaucracies were deciding to buy a computer for the school and it was real slow” (Jobs “Oral History” 14). Jobs feared that a whole generation of kids would go through school before they got their first computer. Then, in January 1983, Apple launched the Kids Can’t Wait program, an initiative that distributed close to 10,000 computers to California schools. As a result, every eligible elementary and secondary school in California received an Apple IIe computer, at no cost (Uston 178). Jobs understood that computers and technology would continue to assist in the learning and development process. Jobs commented: “[B]y 1979, I was able to walk into classrooms that had 15 Apple computers and see kids using them”; he proceeded to state, “those are things that are really the milestones” (qtd. in Sheff 179). Jobs contended, “[c]omputers...will revolutionize the way we learn,” and they “have the potential to be a real breakthrough in the educational process when used in conjunction with enlightened teachers” (qtd. in Sheff 181; qtd. in Sheff 50).
Jobs accepted that technology alone could not change education. As he saw it, the individual made the difference. Addressing his contributions to education, he noted: “I’ve helped [put] more computers in more schools than anybody else in the world and I [am] absolutely convinced that is by no means the most important thing....The most important thing is a person” (Jobs “Oral History” 6). Although computers had the potential “to be a real breakthrough” for learning, Jobs gave impetus to the individual’s role in the education process. His view on education, here, further emphasized his worldview at the time, an acceptance of individual empowerment.

*The Reagan Factor*

The 1970s were plagued with record unemployment and inflation, as well as an embargo on oil that prompted rationing and shocking prices at the pump. To complicate matters, the 1973 stock market crash crippled the U.S. economy with slow economic growth, a period regarded by some as the worst event since the Great Depression (Perron 1363). As such, Ronald Reagan, who began his two-term presidency in 1981, inherited a myriad of problems, which included double-digit unemployment and inflation, and interest rates that soared above twenty percent (Keko np). Despite a turbulent start to the 1980s, one that threatened to spiral the country into greater economic crisis, America and its political climate evolved to remedy these problems.
Some historians credit Reagan as an agent of change, who brought the country out of an economic slump and galvanized support from new demographics, while others contend that larger cultural shifts were responsible for solving America’s problems during the 1980s. Reagan, for example, found support from baby boomers that identified with him, and some claimed he represented their newly discovered interest group on the basis of women’s issues and handicapped people’s concerns (Barnett and Magdoff 421). For Collins, however, America moved to the political right while the broader culture moved left, away from a bourgeois regime that governed for most of the twentieth century, “toward a new more secular, postmodern multicultural, and therapeutic order” (Collins qtd. in Ponce de Leon 307). Historian Gil Troy recalled that the 1980s were a time when attitudes, values, and forms of behavior deviated from the norms that dominated American life during the 1950s and early 1960s (Ponce de Leon 312). For instance, social conservatives rallied to defend traditional norms in earlier decades, but consumer culture and broader economic changes outpaced convention at an ever-increasing speed (Ponce de Leon 313). This cultural transformation started in the 1960s and 1970s, but reached its apex in the 1980s, with the help of Reagan’s policies and leadership (Ponce de Leon 307).

Reagan took a pragmatic leadership approach as chief executive, which effected crucial changes throughout the decade. Ehrman noted that, under Reagan, substantial gains were achieved for blacks, women, gays, and immigrants, despite
the culture wars that surfaced in the second half of the decade (Ponce de Leon 306). For example, on July 7, 1981, Reagan nominated Sandra Day O’Connor to the U.S. Supreme Court. O’Connor’s appointment, which replaced retiring associate justice Potter Stewart, was confirmed by a unanimous vote in the U.S. Senate (Dingus 232). As the first female Justice on the Supreme Court staff, O’Connor paved the way for more women to become federal judges (“Women on the Bench”).

The end of the Cold War marked another victory for Reagan. As Collins pointed out, Reagan took the initiative to “win” the Cold War and end Communism (qtd. in Ponce de Leon 309). In order to restore America’s reputation and inflict new pressure on the Soviet Union, he increased military spending and made efforts to project U.S. power abroad (Ponce de Leon 309). Reagan increased economic and diplomatic pressure, which prompted Mikhail Gorbachev and other top Soviet leaders to see the need for USSR internal reforms. Reagan’s initiative led to glasnost, perestroika, and eventually the collapse of Communism (Ponce de Leon 309).

Some historians viewed Reagan’s presidency as a cultural and political phenomenon. Gil Troy remembered the 1980s as a "new era of good feelings," when "most Americans felt better about themselves and their country" (qtd. in Ponce de Leon 312). In Troy’s observation, Reagan was "uniquely qualified" to serve as symbolic leader, with experience as a public spokesperson and as a movie
star (qtd. in Ponce de Leon 311). Reagan’s ability to dominate the culture was crucial to his political success and protected him from some of his more contested policies. Troy spoke to Reagan’s unifying effect on conservatism: "[Reagan] resonated with America’s increasingly consumption-oriented and hedonistic culture" while embracing "conservative libertinism" (qtd. in Ponce de Leon 312). While Reagan was in office, some people viewed him as a hero of a cultural revolution.

Reagan’s hero status was defined by his "supposed" position as a political outsider. Although Reagan tended to portray himself as removed from Washington, the majority of his staff consisted of experienced politicians who controlled the president and "wouldn't let Reagan be Reagan" (Dubose 916). As Dubose pointed out, Reagan's cowboy persona was noticed at home and abroad, which helped the public view him as an antipolitician (Dubose 916). This visage obscured Reagan's connection to centralized government and made Reagan appear heroic even when the government's actions were not seen as such. Reagan's embodiment of the cultural and political elements led Americans to refer to the entire culturally and politically dominant themes of the 1980s as “Reaganism” (Dubose 917).

Jobs was familiar with being an outsider. As such, Reagan and Jobs were consubstantial in a belief that progress and change evolved from rejection of the hierarchical impositions within a particular system, or from a negative reaction to
the social order. That is to say, Reagan and Jobs identified with leadership on the basis of being removed from authority and separated themselves from the hierarchy of social order. Reagan, who avowed a “cowboy persona” and positioned himself as a Washington outsider, and Jobs, who identified as a renegade, epitomized in a countercultural mind state that spearheaded a revolution in computing, shared in the belief that progress could be achieved when one removed him or herself from the system of which they were part.

Given Jobs’ status with Apple, some people speculated his prospect as a politician after he resigned in 1985 (Lubenow and Rogers 56). When questioned about a role in politics, Jobs rejected the idea: “People from both parties have called and chatted about it. But I think the best use society can put me to is to really do what I know how to do” (qtd. in Lubenow and Rogers 56). Throughout his career, Jobs distanced himself from organized power structures, especially those political in nature. Jobs explained that “[n]one of the bright people [he] knew in college went into politics” because “in terms of making a change in the world, politics wasn’t the place to be” (qtd. in Sheff 182). The political system represented a bureaucracy that challenged individuality; in politics, it was difficult for one individual to make a difference.

Jobs did not have good experiences with politicians. On one occasion, Jobs pointed out the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the political system: “I found that the House Members are...less intelligent than the Senate and ...more knee-jerk to their
constituencies....Maybe that’s what the framers wanted. They weren’t supposed to think too much, they were supposed to represent. The Senators are supposed to think a little more” (“Oral History” 15). For Jobs, the problem in politics was that the individual was silenced. Here, Jobs’ remarks on politics reinforced his greater worldview, a rejection of any hierarchy that challenged individual empowerment.  

Conclusions

During the 1970s and 1980s, landmark changes occurred in all areas of American life. As such, the social, cultural, historical, and political events of this time shaped Jobs’ rhetoric and provided a context for his rejection and acceptance of social order. For example, Time’s 1983 “Machine of the Year” article was a milestone for Jobs, and the publication altered the conception of computers for many Americans, but this instance, in addition to many others, helped him develop into an iconic symbol of American culture. In doing so, Jobs rejected of all systems of organized authority and accepted sources of individual empowerment.

The context of Jobs’ rhetoric was influenced by individualism, fragmentation, and rejection of authority, notions that advanced in the 1970s and 1980s. Through the events of both decades, Jobs rejected organized power structures and the bureaucratic shortcomings of hierarchy and order, whether the corporate monopoly, the teachers union, or the political system. For Jobs, bureaucratic inefficiencies were an impediment to individuality. In turn, Jobs hailed individualism and fragmentation as the solution to such problems. The
irony, however, is that Apple was bureaucratic, albeit with a different set of norms and different social order, which Jobs established. Jobs accepted his role as a charismatic leader, a CEO whose mission was to motivate people on the journey to a brighter future. As Jobs saw it, his role as an individual, and the role of individuals who worked within the organization, was indispensable. The following statement reflected Jobs’ attitude best: “It’s not a faith in technology. It’s faith in people” (qtd. in Goodell 77).
Works Cited


Chapter 3: The Identification and Division of Steve Jobs

This analysis examines the origin and use of identification as a rhetorical strategy in Steve Jobs’ discourse. The purpose here is to unearth the basic values upon which Jobs grounded his preferred method of identification, which most commonly originated in division. Toward that end, this analysis provides insight to Jobs’ value system and worldview. Examination of three interviews given by Jobs during his first tenure at Apple and after his forced resignation in 1985 reveal five topical areas: origin; consumers; marketing; employees; and philosophy on business. These topics elucidate his preferred style of identification. Within these topical areas, Jobs expressed himself consistently, with a preference to create identification through division. In any case, discourse reveals that Jobs valued separation, which in turn, in light of division, represents a strategy for identification. By identifying with employees and consumers on the basis of exclusivity and separation, Jobs established Apple as an outsider, renegade company that offered employees and consumers an alternative to the status quo.

First, the analysis examines the source of Jobs’ identification, and then discussion turns to Apple consumers, employees, and Jobs’ thoughts on business.

The Origin of Jobs’ Identification

From early in life, Jobs identified with the notion of individuality and uniqueness. As Walter Isaacson noted, after learning of his adoption, Jobs felt detached and separate from his birth family and the world (11). Although issues of
abandonment surfaced and led him to question his own existence, his adoption empowered in him a sense of individuality, and as Isaacson explained, he sensed that "he was special, a chosen one, an enlightened one" (119). As such, Jobs' adoption suggests one possible source of his identification through division, in the physical life he experienced as a child. Whether this is factual cannot be proven. The important point, however, is that his adoption, and his feelings surrounding his adoption, provide a possible explanation for the origin of his identification.

The counterculture movement in the San Francisco bay area, which occurred during Jobs' youth and well into the existence of Apple, provides another possible source for his identification. As Mikal Gilmore noted, San Francisco in the late 1960s became a sign of cultural divide, demarcated largely across generational lines (np). The tumult of the Vietnam War caused youth to reconsider ideals of peace, politics, aesthetics, and community. For many, these predilections manifested in a desire to create a new culture--a counterculture--with separate ethics and exclusive practices. Historians estimated that, by the end of summer in 1967, some 200,000 people visited San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury district to participate in the movement that fostered individuality and experimentation (Gilmore np). Then, during his youth, Jobs grew up in a diverse culture fueled by rock and roll, psychedelic drugs, and permissive sexuality, all of which originated in his backyard--the San Francisco bay area.
In Jobs’ discussions of the bay area, geography and location certainly influenced his worldview. Jobs recalled, “[T]he beatnik happened in San Francisco ....This is where the hippy movement happened. This is the only place where Rock 'n Roll really happened” (“Oral History” 18). Although somewhat passive about his participation in such movements, he acknowledged the profound effect of their origin: “California has a sense of experimentation and a sense of openness---openness to new possibilities....[I]'s not better or worse; it's just different--very different” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 175). As he saw it, this sense of experimentation made the San Francisco bay area unique, since similar circumstances could not be found anywhere else.

Jobs valued higher education, namely the University of California Berkeley and Stanford, for its unique contributions to the bay area. He pointed out, ”The Valley is positioned strategically between two great universities, Berkeley and Stanford” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 174). And according to Jobs, “Both of these universities attract not only lots of students but very good students...from all over the United States....So there is a constant influx of new, bright human resources” (qtd. in Sheff 174). In a separate interview, Jobs explained the influence of these universities on the bay area:

You’ve...got two awesome universities drawing smart people from all over the world and depositing them in this...place where there’s a...bunch of other smart people....There’s a lot of human capital pouring in....People seem pretty bright here relative to the rest of the country....[I]'s just a very unique place and it’s got a track
record to prove it and that tends to attract more people (Jobs "Oral History" 18).

The bay area, with its diversity and universities, spawned remarkable developments in technology. For Jobs, this quality separated California from the rest of the country. He remarked, "[T]hink of the innovation that's come out of this area, Silicon Valley and the whole San Francisco Berkeley Bay area, you've got the invention of the integrated circuit...the personal computer...[and] object oriented technology....All that happened in this bay area" (Jobs "Oral History" 18). Jobs recognized the effect that geography had on the computer industry and greater technological revolution: "Little by little, people started breaking off and forming competitive companies...and that's why the Valley is here today" (qtd. in Sheff 174). In other words, people identified with the bay area on the basis of its uniqueness. Although “unique” does not necessarily constitute division, in this case it materialized as an exception to the rule, which separated the bay area from the rest of the country and influenced its innovation and developments. As the unique nature seemed to celebrate a sense of division, a culture, which was often characterized as chaotic and fragmented, developed groundbreaking technology that people identified with on a global scale.

*Consumer Identification*

In the second fiscal quarter of 1984, Apple debuted Macintosh, a computer that Jobs believed would change the way that people and technology interacted. Prior to release, Apple, a relatively new and unproven company, struggled to gain
momentum to industry rivals, IBM most notably. Jobs, however, knew that computation was nascent in development. As he saw it, Apple provided the opportunity for change: “We are in the right place at the right time to change the course of that vector…” (Jobs “Oral History” 8). In addition to its groundbreaking features, which included object-oriented technology, a mouse, and advanced graphics capabilities, Macintosh symbolized a cultural revolution, or as Mark Potts exclaimed, “a crusade to transform the computer industry and rescue it from domination by International Business Machines Corp.” (H8). Macintosh then divided Apple from the competition, other companies that failed to show consumers an incentive for computing, because it asserted an ideological message of freedom and enlightenment through a unique experience for every user. Elisa Williams spoke to Jobs’ aim for Macintosh: Apple wanted “to build easy-to-use machines that, like the television, would sit in every living room and become a part of everyday life” (K01). More than anything, with Macintosh, Jobs brought ease of computing to the masses, but he did so through divisive means.

One month after release, in February 1984, the verdict on Macintosh was still out. Some analysts snubbed Apple for its lack of compatibility with IBM because, at the time, this divided a general consensus. For Jobs, Macintosh celebrated the future of computing, but represented a division from the way that most computers operated at this time. This future, as Jobs saw it, did not include compatible machines. Instead, Jobs would supervise the user experience in a
controlled ecosystem. Jobs explained the reason for division: First, he feared that “IBM would fold its umbrella on the companies making compatible computers and absolutely crush them” (qtd. in Sheff 58). “[T]he product vision that drives this company,” Apple Computer, represented the second and more important reason for division (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 58). This exclusion separated Apple from its competition. For Jobs, Macintosh asserted exclusivity and represented a different ideology, which centered on how computers should function.

If anything, Apple’s incompatibility posed a risk and potential liability to business. Macintosh marketing director, Mike Murray, beseeched Jobs for a compatible product. Although Jobs’ approach ensured that Macintosh remained under his control in an environment that met his standards, Murray feared that exclusivity would make it difficult for Apple to secure its place against IBM and IBM compatible machines (Isaacson 139). Jobs, however, opposed compatibility to the extreme; he even made Apple’s product line incompatible. As Walter Isaacson observed, this philosophical belief related to his desire for control (137). Isaacson explained Jobs’ theory on exclusivity: “He believed that for a computer to be truly great, its hardware and its software had to be tightly linked” (137). When a computer ran software that worked on other systems, Jobs believed it sacrificed functionality (137). Macintosh met Jobs’ standard because, unlike the competition, its operating system worked independently on its own hardware. Apple designed
Macintosh to function end-to-end, a “whole widget” with software and hardware that worked by itself, which made it a superior product.

This division on the basis of exclusivity proved ironic. One the one hand, Macintosh offered users an individual and unique experience, one not possible with any other computer. Jobs, however, regulated this experience. That is to say, while Apple championed exclusivity and offered consumers a more personalized product than competitors, users heeded to Jobs’ control. Apple had a superior product in Macintosh, which sought to revolutionize computing, but users could never integrate other software or hardware into their computing experience, that is, they were limited to the confines of Apple, and even Apple’s products lacked compatibility with each other. In a sense, Jobs did the same thing for which he criticized Microsoft. Speaking to Rolling Stone in 1994, he said, “I see tremendous parallels between the solidity and dominance that IBM had and the shackles that that was imposing on our industry and what Microsoft is doing today” (qtd. in Goodell 77). Apple was rigid. People who chose Apple surrendered compatibility, and when users avowed Apple, Jobs chained them for life. The manacles that Jobs put on users restricted people from venturing outside of the Apple family. Although he had a different idea of control, in the sense that Apple did not try to dominate the market, Jobs facilitated the user experience with close supervision.

Many consumers responded favorably to Jobs’ division. After testing the machine at a tradeshow, Robert Dieter, an executive of the Home Federal Savings
and Loan Association, explained his decision to implement Macintosh into Home Federal’s 160 branches (Hayes 29). Torn between Apple and IBM, he said, “Whatever it is has to be easy to use, and [Macintosh] is easy to use....I’m Impressed” (Dieter qtd. in Hayes 29). And although some consumers decried Apple for lack of compatibility, Jobs’ effort to separate Apple on the basis of exclusivity, many lauded Macintosh’s simplicity and ease of use. Despite conflicting opinions, Apple received a popular consumer response. By shipping 70,000 Macs in its first 100 days, Apple exceeded its expectations by 20,000 units (“Apple Shipments of Macintosh” 4). Shipments for Macintosh looked to increase, and Apple prepared to double its output to 3,000 units produced daily by 1985 (“Apple Shipments of Macintosh” 4).

The scholarly work on Apple’s “1984” ad campaign is limited. Sarah Stein argued that “1984,” the Super Bowl commercial in which Apple introduced Macintosh to the general public, asserted an ideological message of revolution and freedom (180). Using the ideological constructs of Maurice Charland, Stein contended that the ad narratives constructed viewers as subjects or acquisitive agents, who submitted to cultural faith in machines and in technological progress (Stein 176-189). Although “1984” promised rebellion, the message was subverted by market hegemony (Stein 189). By means of inclusion, the ad challenged viewers to assume the role of “information freedom fighters” who endeavored the brainwashing of a despot, IBM in this case (Stein 174). In her analysis, Stein
observed that “1984” provided multiple opportunities for identification, such as the identification of Big Brother and Stalin with IBM/Big Blue, and identification with the female runner on the basis of a heroic narrative figure, similar to the role of Dorothy in the *Wizard of Oz* (Stein 183-184). What Stein did not observe, however, is that the ad appealed to consumers on the basis of division.

For Jobs, Macintosh established a division in the computer industry, and enabled people to change the ways in which they identified with technology. Jobs explained, “If we were going to get computers to tens of millions of people, we needed a technology that would make the thing radically easier to use and more powerful at the same time, so we had to make a break” (qtd. in Sheff 59). Under the current conditions, Apple succeeded with hobbyists and electronics enthusiasts, because this demographic consisted of “the early innovators of technology [who] stay[ed] up all night learning how to use their computer” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 59). The problem, however, was that Apple “would never reach the majority of people” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 59).

Macintosh challenged consumers to look past convention, to change their thinking and adopt a new mind state about technology. As Jobs saw it, why should IBM or anyone else tell consumers how to use computers? While corporate America believed in computing, most people remained dubious about the need for a home computer. Dona Meilach, a computer instructor and author of computer-related literature, explained the skepticism: “Anything you can do with a computer...
you can do with pencil and paper. I don’t think a lot of people need computers for themselves today. A lot of people only want computers, like they want a video set, because they want what’s in” (qtd. in Torres A1). At the time, this attitude prevailed, and many people did not see necessity in personal computing. Jobs understood the implications of challenging a general conception, one that viewed computers as utilitarian machines. According to Jobs, “When you ask people to go outside of the mainstream they take a risk…. [T]here has to be some important reward for taking that risk or else they won’t take it” (qtd. in Goodell 74). These comments require further attention. When people “go outside the mainstream,” they challenge a popular conception and show dissatisfaction with established norms, thus a rejection of the social order. In this case, Jobs invited consumers to reject a universal truth, the assertion that utility and function restricted technology, and in turn create identification on the basis of ideas that contradicted everything society understood about technology.

Jobs established a sense of division on the basis of a choice that provided consumers with an alternative. This choice can be viewed as a matter of identification. As an alternative, Macintosh asked people to look at computing differently; it invited users to reject the popular notion that utility limited computers to the workplace. This proposal then challenged consumers to adopt a different set of values and beliefs. That is to say, when they subscribed to a popular conception, consumers accepted a universal truth, but Jobs proposed a
rejection of this belief, and asked consumers to take leap into the unknown. To identify with other people, one must understand basic human actions. As Burke pointed out, “You can persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (“Rhetoric” 55). For Jobs, identification constituted persuading consumers, so he showed them an incentive for personal computing.

To naturalize computers into the home, Jobs separated Apple from other manufacturers and designed a machine on the basis of simplicity. Jobs believed, “[I]t takes a crisis for something to occur in America” (qtd. in Sheff 182). The exigency in this crisis materialized as the inability to relate or identify with technology, computers in this case, which Jobs saw as essential. Computer retail store owner David Peterson explained it best: “[W]e’re in the information age, but what does that mean” (qtd. in Torres A1)? Most people did not understand computers, and more importantly, failed to recognize their revolutionary implications on our lives. Peterson continued, “75 percent of the people who buy home computers are dissatisfied a year later because they don’t know how to run them” (qtd. in Torres A1).

The solution was to make a break, to show people that computing was not an onerous task understood only by skilled professionals. Macintosh, unlike any computer that preceded it, afforded users an individual and unique experience with technology. People, for the first time, identified with computers for reasons
beyond work. As such, Macintosh empowered in people a sense of individuality. With Macintosh, Jobs explained, “You don’t simply communicate with words, you have special...styles and the ability to...express yourself” (qtd. in Sheff 50).

Jobs identified with consumers on the basis of simplicity, and he created an easy to use product that made the computer synonymous with other, common appliances that people used on a regular basis. As a self-identified producer of technology, Jobs sought to familiarize a generation with computing. Speaking to Rolling Stone, Jobs explained this sense of identification: “I’m a tool builder. That’s how I think of myself. I want to build really good tools that I know in my gut and my heart will be valuable” (qtd. in Goodell 77). Jobs elaborated on this identification in a separate interview:

We think that computers are the most remarkable tools that humankind has ever come up with, and we think that people are basically tool users. So if we can just get lots of computers to lots of people, it will make some qualitative difference in the world. At Apple, [we want to] make computers into appliances and get them to tens of millions of people (qtd. in Sheff 58).

The above statements coincide with Jobs’ separation strategy of identification, that is, with the preference to create identification through division. Through an association with common appliances, people identified with computers through other, simple forms of technology. Jobs reduced computers to rudimentary objects, a blender, toaster, or dishwasher as such, which in their time revolutionized daily life, but transformed into natural parts of our environment.
This reduction is a divisive and ironic way to characterize technology, because it separated the computer from all of its complexity.

To create identification with consumers, Jobs divided Apple from other manufacturers and at the time a general conception about technology. To establish a sense of division, Jobs equated the computer, then the most remarkable invention to date, with inventions that appeared obsolete or outmoded, that is, the reduction of technology to common appliances that people understood. This identification strategy transmitted a fresh depiction of technology because, while it separated the computer from its capabilities, it enabled people to understand and relate to computing. While Jobs humanized the computer in the psyche of the general population, he did so through divisive means. By separating the computer from function, sophistication solidified in the minds of consumers through simplicity, but in so doing it helped them identify on the basis of technology. Moreover, it distinguished Apple from other manufacturers, and for the first time a general public saw a friendlier side to technology. Here Jobs remained consistent with his other methods of identification, which routinely originated in division.

With Macintosh, Jobs separated Apple from other manufacturers and divided the computer from technology. As Computerworld’s Glenn Rifkin explained, “Suddenly, we woke up and accepted that computers are part and parcel of our day, like refrigerators, telephones and automobiles” (55). Rifkin
continued, “It is not a matter of owning one...; it is a matter of contact,” or identification for Jobs, “on all levels” (55).

*Division in Jobs’ Marketing*

In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, corporate America influenced manufacturers of computers more than any other demographic. Few companies saw promise in marketing a mini-computer, a computer designed for personal use, beyond the workplace, and those who did failed to create an identifiable product. Corporate sales dominated the early 1980s. During this time, banks, financial firms, and life insurance companies provided the most business for the computer industry, and by 1984 the average Fortune 1000 company owned 400 to 600 computers (Colony in Bergheim and Chin 49). Chemical Bank, for example, ordered $1.5 million per quarter in personal computer equipment, which accommodated their 1,000 DEC, IBM, and Wang machines (Bergheim and Chin 49). Similarly, Travelers Insurance, who ranked among the top 10 insurance companies in assets, planned to buy 10,000 IBMs by 1985 (Bergheim and Chin 49).

Despite the force of corporate business, Jobs infiltrated young markets with new strategies. He understood the financial implications of corporate sales, factors he believed essential to Apple’s survival, but also explored other demographics. His statements and beliefs about marketing are essential to an understanding of his preferred strategy for identification. This sense of identification also originated in division and separation.
In Jobs’ opinion, manufacturers did not market computers effectively to corporate America. The problem, as he saw it, was one of identification. The corporation, on the one hand, identified with computing solely on the basis of productivity. But in marketing the computer, manufacturers failed to show consumers any incentive beyond utility. As such, the problem was two fold. The computer’s design, and manufacturers’ approach to marketing, implied a workhorse, a machine to manage information while saving time for the corporation, not to revolutionize business or change the individual’s work experience. Therefore, consumers had no reason to expect anything different from manufacturers.

For Jobs, computers did not appeal to businesses for the right reasons. He outlined the problem to Rolling Stone in a discussion on corporate marketing: “Business has focused on shrink-wrapped software on the PCs, and that’s why PCs haven’t really touched the heart of the business” (Jobs qtd. in Goodell 75). That is to say, with computers, employees did not see their work as valuable, but rather felt just like number crunchers. While computers exceeded humans in capability, would they replace human labor, would workers become expendable? Although employees identified with the concept of time management, computers, as Jobs saw it, would change the landscape of the modern corporation, a factor in which he identified with before the market followed.
Jobs took a different approach in marketing to corporate America. In his view, manufacturers misdirected their aim to sell to businesses. He identified the problem as one of scale. When other manufacturers focused on interconnectivity for the corporation, and tried to create a platform of compatibility and connectivity for an entire business, Jobs advocated intra-connectivity and empowerment on a smaller scale. As he saw it, Macintosh was the agent of change to modernize computing for the corporation. Jobs explained, “It's Macintosh's job to really penetrate the business marketplace....If we are going to be successful, we've got to approach this from a grass-roots point of view” (qtd. in Sheff 56). Jobs outlined the differences between Apple and its competition: “IBM focuses on the top down, the mainframe centric approach to selling in businesses” (qtd. in Sheff 56). With networking, for example, “rather than focusing on wiring up whole companies, as IBM is doing, we're going to focus on the phenomenon of the small work group....[T]he vast group of people who need to be computerized includes that large number of medium and small businesses” (qtd. in Sheff 56).

Jobs' identification with the corporate market evolved from his perception of a problem. Rather than acknowledge marketing that worked for other companies and recognize possibilities to capitalize on effective strategies, he identified why marketing failed to touch “the heart of the company.” Moreover, he marketed to a different sector of the business world, individuals and small groups. For him, businesses did not fully understand the capabilities of computing. In his
view, computers changed how employees interacted with each other, their work, and the way in which organizations operated. For Jobs, these characteristics would revolutionize business. The personal computer, Jobs contended, was “going from being a tool of computation to a tool of communication” (qtd. in Goodell 75). Although he made these statements in 1994, nearly a decade after his removal from Apple, they illustrated Jobs’ identification with marketing on the basis of a problem. His comments on crisis mentioned earlier in this chapter further supported his worldview: “[I]t takes a crisis for something to occur in America” (qtd. in Sheff 182). What many people did not recognize as a problem, Jobs perceived a full-blown crisis. That is to say, the manner in which computers appealed to corporate America subverted technological progress and undermined the goal of this revolution. If the problem went uncorrected, a catastrophe would ensue.

Jobs identification with marketing on the basis of a crisis represented a divisive strategy to appeal to consumers. The important point here is that Jobs’ identification stemmed from the perception of a problem, what he saw as wrong and required fixing, rather than something that worked but needed improvement. This problem enabled Jobs to penetrate the market from a different perspective. His identification with marketing emerged from a divisive view on the manner in which other computer manufacturers appealed to corporate America. In other words, Jobs identified with marketing on the basis of the shortcomings of other
manufacturers, that is, competitors who failed to make an identifiable product, which in his mind constituted a crisis.

Jobs' philosophy on marketing originated in division, which mirrored his other identification strategies. In the months following his removal from Apple, he shared his views on marketing with *Newsweek*:

> [C]ustomers can’t tell you about the next breakthrough that’s going to happen….\[Y\]ou have to…go and…stow away—you have to go hide away with people that really understand the technology, but also really care about the customers, [and then] dream up this next big breakthrough” (Jobs qtd. in Lubenow and Rogers 54).

To appeal to consumers in such a manner constituted division. Jobs’ claim that, in order to create an extraordinary product, one must care about consumers, grounded his argument. Then, however, Jobs invalidated the claim, when he stated that a development team must remove itself from the customer altogether, or “stow away,” as he described it, to create something remarkable.

Not only is this identification strategy divisive, it is ironic. In the process of making great products, Jobs believed innovation materialized from the absence of a customer. He cared about producing great products for consumers, but shunned input. When releasing something new, companies usually test their products on consumers before going into mass production. Often times, manufacturers hold focus groups for feedback, which can determine how a product will perform if released to the public. Jobs, however, did not avow this business practice. As he saw it, “customers don’t know what they want until we’ve shown them,” nor did he
want their input (Jobs qtd. in Isaacson 143). At Apple, he gave the only word and the final word. If a product met his standards, it was good enough for everyone else.

As Apple burgeoned, Jobs complicated matters with his lack of experience in corporate marketing. This characteristic, however, provided a unique basis for identification, because Apple showed businesses unforeseen incentives for computing. On the one hand, Jobs explained, “We had no concept of how to sell to corporate America because none of us had come from there” (“Oral History” 12). While Jobs spoke candidly about Apple’s division from corporate business, he knew that Apple’s identification with this demographic would determine its success or failure. Jobs explained, “Our attempts to sell to corporate America were just bungled and we ended up just selling to people who...buy a product for its merit not because of the company it came from” (Jobs “Oral History” 12). But this division allowed Jobs to approach corporate America from an alternative perspective, to show corporations different reasons to use computers. To influence corporate sales, Jobs challenged the popular conception of how businesses operated and the ways in which companies utilized computers at work.

In his identification with the business market, Jobs established a sense of division on the basis of induction, not in the electromagnetic sense ascribed by physics but in the philosophy that everything starts with the individual. Whereas other manufacturers took a deductive approach to corporate marketing, one that
asserted what the computer could do for the company, Jobs showed corporate America what workers could do with computers. Jobs expressed this philosophy in one discussion on business: “Our approach is to think of them not as businesses but as collections of people. We want to qualitatively change the way people work. We don’t just want to help them do word processing faster or add numbers faster. We want to change the way they can communicate with one another” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 56). This identification, achieved through inductive marketing, exemplified division, because it approached the business sector from the standpoint of the employee rather than the corporation as a whole.

Rather than avow the dogmatic worldview on corporate computing, one that argued efficiency for the corporation, Jobs, by induction, showed individuals what they could achieve with computers. As division, this strategy distanced Apple from a popular belief, one that Jobs saw as erroneous. He saw the way that manufacturers marketed computers to the business market. For him, the approach restricted businesses from experiencing the computer’s potential. Jobs explained this identification to Rolling Stone: “What I believe very strongly is that the industry needs an alternative” (qtd. in Goodell 75). Simply identifying with the market on the basis of a needed alternative represents a divisive approach. That is to say, Jobs identified with marketing on the basis of a substitute that gave consumers a different product. To substitute, Apple designed easy-to-use products that empowered individuals with creativity. As such, the computer became a tool
of expression for employees and “qualitatively” changed how people worked, a quality that other companies failed to emulate.

Jobs did not contest the productive benefits of computing for businesses but thought that, when technology appealed to corporations on the basis of productivity, manufacturers did not identify with the individual. Corporations did not look past the computer’s capabilities for efficiency and time-management, and manufacturers failed to deliver any other type of product. Apple was different. In a conversation with *Rolling Stone*, Jobs explained his contributions to corporate business and impact on the greater technological revolution: “Individuals can now do things that only large groups of people...could do before....[W]e have much more opportunity for people to get to the marketplace—not the marketplace of commerce but the marketplace of ideas” (Jobs qtd. in Goodell 77). As such, the computer became more a tool of imagination and less an administrative assistant. Jobs identified with the computer on the basis of individuality and the experience that it afforded users, not productive gains for the corporation. He continued, “individuals and small groups [have] equally powerful tools to what the largest, most heavily funded organizations in the world have” (Jobs qtd. in Goodell 77). The Jobsian approach to marketing commissioned Burke’s theory on identification. Here the union of identification (the belief that computers are essential to the corporation) and division (empowering the individual rather than the corporation) makes it difficult to trace where its trajectory started and finished.
Jobs’ identification with the corporate market originated in division, the belief that everything starts with the individual opposed to the corporation. As a rhetorical strategy, his separation tactic is ambiguous and difficult to unpack. Burke explained that the ambiguous union of identification and division allows for the perfect invitation of rhetoric; when utilized effectively, it is difficult to see where one starts and the other ends (Burke "Rhetoric" 25). Jobs’ marketing to the business world exemplified this Burkeian notion. This identification started with division, but it created a new unity. Was individual empowerment a divisive strategy after all, if it benefitted the corporation as a whole? In other words, in light of the end goal, it seems difficult to characterize Jobs’ identification as one of division. On the one hand, he divided Apple from other manufacturers, which created a rift in the corporate market. Although Apple, IBM, Commodore, DEC, and others all sold computers to corporate America, they marketed computers differently. Jobs’ conception of marketing here revealed his sense of identification, one which separated Apple, making it unique and different, but at the same time it created the foundation for a new unity or the ability for consumers to unite in a different set of beliefs.

Jobs saw potential for computers to infiltrate new markets, specifically in education and at home. In this way, he revolutionized the industry, because he recognized uncharted territories that the industry had not yet explored. He explained the potential for new markets to Playboy: “The primary reasons to buy a
computer for your home now are...to do...business work...or to run educational software for yourself or your children....This will change: Computers will be essential in most homes” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 50). Jobs understood that computers would revolutionize our lives, even before many people accepted it as fact. Elisa Williams noted that, while some people questioned the prospect of home computing, by the early 1990s, personal computers sold into the home accounted for 35% of computer sales (Williams K01). She also credited Jobs in the 1980s with “selling PCs to schools...[and] familiarizing a generation with computing” (K01). As Jobs saw it, home and educational users represented the future of computing. In the 1980s, these markets had the most potential, because they accounted for the least developed demographics, which allowed for the most penetration.

Jobs wanted to integrate computers into our lives on every level. His “appliance" metaphor with Macintosh argued for the adoption of computers as simple and convenient tools into the home, while it illustrated the capability and promise of computing in other domains. Earlier in this chapter, Williams noted that Jobs “articulated the goals of a budding industry: to build easy-to-use machines that, like the television, sit in every living room and become a part of everyday life” (K01). Jobs understood the implications of computers on our future. Whether in the workplace, home, or school, people needed to identify with computers. For Jobs, the computer corresponded with everyday life, and as he saw
it, society would rely more on technology in the future. Jobs’ identification with computers on the basis of simplicity, evident in the “appliance” metaphor, eased this transition. If computers became identifiable in the home, they would likely infiltrate other domains without restraint. Jobs believed this identification with computers on the basis of simplicity would proliferate in less explored realms.

For example, Jobs already created identification with a scholastic audience. That is, he succeeded to integrate Apple into K-12 classrooms. He hoped this existing identification would help Macintosh become the computer of choice in higher education, “just as the Apple II is for grade and high schools (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 181).

For consumers, Macintosh became a symbol of identification that represented different things to various groups. For Jobs, Apple had two types of customers: “There were the educational aspects of Apple and then there were sort of the non-educational” (“Oral History” 10). He continued, “On the non-educational side, Apple was...the first ‘lifestyle’ computer” (Jobs “Oral History” 10).

In the 1980s, to many it seemed foreign to associate the computer with a “lifestyle.” How could a machine, seen as foreign and in some cases menacing, represent a way of life? To change this attitude, Jobs showed people a familiar and relatable way to identify with computers. Macintosh came equipped with a mouse and a graphical user interface (GUI), the first retail computer to incorporate such features. Jobs explained this contribution and its effect: “Pointing is a metaphor
we all know” (qtd. in Sheff 52). He said, “We’ve done a lot of studies and tests on that, and it’s much faster to do all kinds of functions, such as cutting and pasting, with a mouse, so it’s not only easier to use but more efficient” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 52). Jobs explained the benefits a GUI: “We’re seeing five-page memos get compressed to one-page memos because we can use a picture to express the key concept” (qtd. in Sheff 56). More than its efficiency, however, Macintosh was a symbol of identification, which represented individuality and self-expression, a separate experience for every user.

Macintosh embodied a unique experience. This development revolutionized technology because, for the first time, people customized their interaction with the computer. With Macintosh, people directed their own adventures. The individual determined his or her experience, which made it separate and unique. Jobs explained, Macintosh “allowed you to intone your words with meaning beyond the simple linguistics” the same way Graham’s telephone did when it outpaced the telegraph (qtd. in Sheff 50). He added that, like the “telephone,” Apple’s “Macintosh lets you sing” with “special...styles and the ability to...express yourself” (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 50).

The above statements illustrate how Jobs established a sense of division by separating the computer from its function as a utilitarian, task-oriented machine. In one sense, he gave the computer a voice, and in the process he also humanized technology. This identification, moreover, divided the computer from a general
conception about technology. That is to say, while most people reasoned about technology in terms of what it could do for them, Jobs showed users what they could do with technology, computers in this case. Jobs discussed the limitations of this general conception: “Computers are very reactive but they’re not proactive; they are not agents....[People] need something more proactive. They need a guide. They don’t need an assistant” (Jobs “Oral History” 5). Macintosh acted as a guide; it did whatever you told it to do. This characteristic enabled people to identify with Macintosh on the basis of creativity and expression, qualities not possible with other machines, which helped establish the computer as a tool of communication and interaction.

In one respect, Jobs separated Apple from technology in the most general terms. For example, Macintosh afforded users a unique experience with fonts, advanced graphics, and simple click-and-drag icons such as a wastebasket, where users discarded unwanted documents or materials. This division made computers appealing because, for the first time, people related to the computer in human terms, not technological. When people correlated deleting data from a hard drive with taking out the trash, they identified with computers on a basic level. Jobs brought technology to a level that ordinary people, who had minimal knowledge of computers, understood.

While other companies tried to humanize computers through ad campaigns, they failed to identify with and market computers on the basis of individuality. In
marketing the personal computer, IBM, for instance, sought to dispel technological anxieties by advertising familiar characters. Using a Charlie Chaplin look-a-like and Hagar the Horrible, an animated comic strip Viking, IBM wanted to “disarm customers’ objections to the technological complexity of its...workstations” (Radding 39). But it took more than marketing to help people relate to computers; it required a product that people identified with in human terms, a machine that responded to what you told it to do, Macintosh as such. Jobs’ Macintosh allowed users to personalize their experiences with technology, something unattainable with other computers.

The personal computer appealed to a home market because of the experience it afforded to users. At home, computers provided countless possibilities, whereas utility limited the computer at work. In the workplace, computers performed menial tasks. For example, running spreadsheets and calculating projections accounted for common uses. At home, however, the computer had endless possibilities. Educational software, games, and creating dinner party seating charts exemplified things to do with a personal computer. Jobs understood these implications. In the home, users customized their individual experience. Although this realization commenced the computer’s unforeseen potential, Jobs saw infinite possibilities. When the personal computer found its place in the home, computing functioned more as self-expression and less a way to manage information.
Jobs’s identification with the home market materialized through division on the basis of discretion. In Jobs’ view, the home, more than any domain, afforded users a personal experience with computing. But he believed the home had public and private places. In a discussion about the home market with *Rolling Stone*, Jobs said, "I think the den is far more interesting than the living room" (qtd. in Goodell 76). While the living room offers a place for gatherings, conversation, and watching television, the den is separate and provides seclusion, that is, an environment for the individual, whether to work or to escape. In other words, Jobs divided the den from the rest of the house, and in turn created identification on the basis of privacy. As Jobs saw it, the computer fit more appropriately in the den, because it catered to the individual rather than the whole family. In the den, a person found isolation from the rest of the home, which afforded the user a personalized experience.

*Employee Identification*

The pirate flag emblazoned atop the Macintosh building revealed the apparent division at Apple and distinguished the hierarchy within the corporate culture. As a symbol of identification, the flag exemplified an icon of culture, or a “culturetype” to borrow Michael Osborn’s terminology, which symbolized different things to varying groups (82). For Jobs and the Mac team, the flag represented a renegade attitude. That is, it created identification on the basis of rebelling against the norms of a traditional corporate structure. The flag, however, positioned the
Mac team at the top of the Apple hierarchy, because it articulated Jobs and his cohort as superior. For everyone else, the flag symbolized inferiority, and it reminded employees of their proletariat status in the workforce. In other words, those employees excluded from the Mac project identified with the flag on the basis of separation, because it divided them from Jobs and his hand-selected team.

More than a symbol of identification, the flag extolled exclusivity and separated the company, because it partitioned employees as elite and inferior. Arthur Rock, an investor capitalist for Apple, spoke to the flag’s divisive effect: By hoisting the flag, Jobs “was telling the rest of the company they were no good” (qtd. in Isaacson 145). The flag then is understood best in light of separation. While it united the Mac team in unique identification, it ostracized every employee not involved with Macintosh. The important point, however, is that, as a symbol of identification, the flag joined both groups on the basis of separate yet similar experiences. Moreover, the flag elucidated Jobs’ categorization of employees, elite and inferior, which established a bond among people and influenced their social experiences at Apple. Each respective group, the Mac team and everyone else, shared a substance, which comprised their similar experiences, thus allowing them to identify with one another. For some people, the flag represented a positive experience, while for others it resulted in the negative. As such, one group of employees affirmed Jobs’ notion of perfection, which made them consubstantial in
success. Everyone else, however, failed to meet Jobs’ expectations and became
consubstantial in feelings of inferiority and inadequacy.

The implied sense of division in the flag gave impetus to the formation of
separates outlooks, which manifested in the experiences of each respective group.
Osborn explained that such symbols “imply shared evaluative outlooks, which are
a necessary condition to mass cooperative action” (82). While a set of
diametrically opposed perspectives, or outlooks on the way that employees
experienced Jobs and his influence on their social relations, divided Apple into two
groups, on its own, each group was consubstantial in its attitude toward the
corporation. That is to say, Jobs’ black and white categorization split Apple into
two factions, yet each group united in shared attitudes, which related to their
successes or failures. This dual-identification then endorsed and grounded certain
behaviors (affirming Jobs notion of perfection) within respective groups, while it
rejected others (failing to meet Jobs’ expectations), a critical facet that Osborn
ascribed to culturetypes (82).

Jobs’ binary way of looking at things articulated his worldview and
endorsed his preferred style of identification, one which originated in division. For
Jobs, as Isaacson explained, people were “enlightened” or “asshole[s],” their work
exceptional or awful (119). This rigid way of categorization comprised Jobs’
worldview. Most people do not see things in monocular perspective. For example,
it is unusual to write off someone after a first encounter, just as it is hasty to anoint
someone to priest status after knowing him or her for only a short while. When a person is evaluated, it is unusual to classify their work as terrific or terrible. In most cases, evaluation spans a continuum of good to bad, not either or. But for Jobs it was simple. People met his standards or were inadequate.

A snap-judgment type of assessment epitomized Jobs’ management style, as he employed identification with productivity through a weeding-out process. This strategy coincided with Jobs’ identification with other topical elements mentioned in this chapter. Jobs relied on instinct to identify talent. In other words, his snap-judgment assessments enabled him to identify people he thought had potential. Similarly, this identification permitted him to write off employees at a moment’s notice. Jobs, who prided himself on finding talented individuals, explained this identification: “What I’m best at doing is finding a group of talented people and making things with them” (qtd. in Lubenow and Rogers 53). This identification strategy unified and divided the workforce.

Jobs employed a dogmatic approach to communication in the workplace. People who worked under Jobs endured his temperament, often rigid and marked by petulance. His cruel and cutthroat demeanor instilled a sense of fear among employees, but it established control. Although a divisive way to appeal to employees, this strategy of identification unified the work force, because it transcended the limitations of individual perspectives, in this case the varying substances of both factions at Apple. As such, employees united in one substance,
a shared substance, which represented the notion of appealing to Jobs and meeting his expectations. While the perspectives of the good (those people inside Jobs’ circle) and the bad (everyone removed from the Jobs cohort) partitioned the workforce, employees united in the shared goal of pleasing Jobs. As a unifying force, Jobs established a sense of division among employees to achieve loyalty. That is to say, in this case, competition and cooperation and conflict and agreement, work together, as they go hand in hand to unite employees. Former Apple employee Joanna Hoffman explained Jobs’ identification with control: "It's a common trait in people who are charismatic and know how to manipulate people. Knowing that he can crush you makes you eager for his approval, so then he can elevate you and put you on a pedestal and own you" (qtd. in Isaacson 121).

The Macintosh team represented Apple’s elite entity. When he assembled the team, Jobs sought insightful and creative individuals, but most importantly, people he thought had potential. Jobs explained the mind state of the Mac group and the outcome of the final product: “[T]he people who made Mac are sort of on the edge”; “Macintosh was a core group of less than a hundred people, yet Apple shipped over ten million of them” (qtd. in Sheff 54; “Oral History” 8). This identification strategy illustrated how a divisive entity, in this case the Mac team, created unity on a grand scale. While this group represented a fraction of the company, Apple achieved boundless success to which Jobs touted Macintosh as a defining product.
In one sense, when he developed Macintosh, Jobs created a company within a company, a faction that was treated differently and exempt from rules that applied to the rest of the corporation. He explained, “The Macintosh team was...a[n] intrapreneurship—a group of people going in essence back to the garage but in a very large company” (Jobs qtd. in Lubenow and Rogers 51). This identification strategy, which Jobs established on the basis of inclusion and exclusion, divided Apple into two groups. His all-or-nothing approach to management favored people of which he approved, but in the process exiled everyone else so that Apple became more polarized. Speaking to Isaacson, Jobs explained, “We were the renegades, and we wanted people to know it” (145). That is, aside from the reputation that the team possessed, which went largely unspoken, Jobs accentuated the differences between his group and the rest of the company.

The above example of identification reinforced Jobs’ worldview. As such, it paralleled his identification with an established sense of division. Jobs here identified with productivity on the basis of a weeding-out process, because he singled out people who affirmed his notion of perfection from those less capable. This identification split the company. In other words, in the division of good from bad, Jobs identified with employees on the basis of separation.

For Jobs, individuals and groups of individuals could make landmark achievements in business. As such, Jobs identified with employees on the basis of
the small group phenomena, because he believed that small teams could effect
changes thought possible by only large groups of people. This identification, which
emphasized individual contributions, further supported his worldview. Moreover,
this identification reinforced Jobs' belief that a crisis yielded positive changes. Jobs
spoke to his experience with small groups: "With our technology...three people in a
garage can blow away what 200 people at Microsoft can do....Corporate America
has a need that is so huge and can save them so much money, or make them so
much money, or cost them so much money if they miss it" (Jobs qtd. in Goodell 75).
By establishing a sense of division on the basis of a perceived problem, in this case
a misdirected aim by other manufacturers in their appeals to corporate America,
Jobs identified the small group as a solution.

Jobs believed that size threatened the corporation. Large groups, as he saw
it, jeopardized innovation, so for him a small team was critical. This identification
surfaced in Jobs' comments on corporate structure:

It now takes 100 to 200 people one to two years just to do a major
revision, [causing] all the really creative people who like to work in
small teams...[to be] squeezed out of that business....You can't have
small teams of programmers writing word processors and
spreadsheets--it might upset their competitive advantage (qtd. in
Goodell 75).

Jobs’ identified with employees on the basis of control. To maintain Apple’s
competitive advantage, Jobs guided the development and production process, and
made sure to uphold relationships with individuals. In addition to the most
conducive environment for innovation, the intimate setting of a small group
allowed jobs to scrutinize employees while he tracked the development of a project.

For Jobs, Apple's success depended on its employees. As he saw it, "In the field...the difference between the best person and the worst person is about a hundred to one or more," which made quality workers essential to success of company ("Oral History" 7). During its development in the early 1980s, Apple comprised a different type of worker, "someone who really wants to get in over his head [and] make a little dent in the universe," Jobs recalled (qtd. in Sheff 56). Jobs explained the corporate atmosphere at this time:

The thing that bound us together at Apple was the ability to make things that were going to change the world...[W]e all worked like maniacs and the greatest joy was that we felt we were fashioning collective works of art much like twentieth century physics. Something important that would last, that people contributed to and then could give to more people; the amplification factor was very large (qtd. in Sheff 54).

The aforementioned example illustrates how Jobs created consubstantiality at Apple. While employees joined in the belief that they belonged to something much bigger than any one of them, a union Burke labeled as consubstantial, Jobs acknowledged individual contributions. In itself, building a company around unique individuals does not constitute division; however, the manner in which Jobs viewed individual contributions went unmatched. He found prospect in people that other companies disregarded, individuals deemed inept for corporate
America. Many of these individuals failed at other companies but flourished under Jobs.

In his appeals to prospective employees, Jobs created identification through division on the basis of antithesis. On the surface, this division created an inherent contradiction. What other people viewed as failure and incompetence, Jobs saw as unique and promising. At Apple, Jobs acclaimed the attitudes and behaviors that other companies shunned. Although a divisive strategy, this identification unified a group of individuals. That is to say, it brought together people who corporate America labeled incompetent. Jobs explained the effect of this identification:

“Apple is an Ellis Island company. Apple is built on refugees from other companies. These are extremely bright individuals who were troublemakers at other companies” (qtd. in Sheff 56).

Philosophy on Business

Jobs’ philosophy on business reverberated his other identification strategies that evolved from division. Consistent with his worldview, Jobs identified with business on the basis of individual contributions. In one interview, Jobs explained this identification and its effect: “The contributions we tried to make embodied values not only of technical excellence and innovation...but innovation of a more humanistic kind” (“Oral Hisotry” 8). So rather than privilege technology as the catalyst for innovation, Jobs identified with technological progress on the basis of the people who created technology, or the “tool builders”
as he described. Such people, For Jobs, respected humanity and shared an inclination to advance technology in a socially beneficial manner.

For Jobs, some people in the industry made good decisions that took into account implications about a society’s future with computers, while others disregarded the well being of consumers and subverted technological progress. Speaking to the former, Jobs explained, "It’s a rare person who etches grooves that are other than a specific way of looking at things, a specific way of questioning things" (qtd. in Sheff 56). This type of person, from his perspective, influenced the industry for better and guided innovation. For Jobs, people who made good decisions questioned technology in its current state, with a desire to transform technology for the better, and created products to change lives and enhance the user experience. On the other hand, Jobs observed, "a lot of people who are the most creative in this business aren't doing it because they want to help corporate America," a quality he considered problematic (qtd. in Goodell 74). People who did not contribute to the goals of the corporation posed a threat to progress. In other words, they obstructed innovation and hindered the possibility for social benefit.

As Jobs viewed it, one person often made the difference in business, for better or worse. While technology exceeded the realm of human capabilities, with computers, for instance, that performed tasks seen otherwise inconceivable, Jobs maintained that the future of technology rested in the hands of creative and unique
individuals. This identification surfaced in Jobs’ comments about the human influence: “The most important thing is a person. A person who incites your curiosity and feeds your curiosity; and machines cannot do that the same way people can” (“Oral History” 5).

Examination of Jobs’ statements about innovation illustrated his preferred identification strategy and further endorsed his worldview. In this industry, people content with the current set of conditions failed to advance technology and create revolutionary products. The problem, as he saw it, was complacency. In Jobs’ observation, “People get stuck as they get older….In most cases, people get stuck in those patterns...and they never get out of them” (qtd. in Sheff 56).

Complacency then represented an impediment to innovation. For him, the same problem affected companies that “grow into billion dollar entities [and] somehow lose their vision....They no longer have an inherent feel or passion about the products (Jobs qtd. in Sheff 56).

At the forefront of a technological revolution, Jobs considered it his duty to find talented, creative, and unique individuals, people who understood the implications of computers on society. Jobs’ comments on responsibility help elucidate this identification: “[I]f you are running a company you have responsibilities but as an individual I don't think you have responsibilities....I think you have a responsibility to do really good stuff and get it out there for people to use and let them build...on...and keep making better stuff” (“Oral History” 18).
When people became complacent, they lost the drive to innovate.

To ensure innovation without restraint, Jobs advocated the extermination of old models, products and people that obstructed technological progress. In one sense, Jobs identified with innovation on the basis of mortality, because he valued death for its creation of new life. For innovation to transpire, the industry purged itself of outmoded concepts, which materialized in technology and people who lost the drive to innovate. As he saw it, “human minds settle into fixed ways of looking at the world” (Jobs “Oral History” 16). He continued, “I’ve always felt that death is the greatest invention of life….Without death there would be very little progress” (Jobs “Oral History” 16). Jobs’ perspective was unique, because it assumed that progress depended on the regression and eventual elimination of current conditions. For example, in order to create something novel, something else must cease. More importantly, it privileged something negative for its positive effect.

Jobs comprised a workforce of dogged individuals, people whose determination and competitive nature fueled innovation. As such, the composition of Apple transcended the limitations of an overly satisfied workforce, the complacency that derailed innovation. At Apple, Jobs identified with individuals on the basis of their work ethic and dedication to create revolutionary products. Jobs explained, “half of what separates the successful entrepreneurs from the non-successful ones is pure perseverance” (“Oral History 16). The creation of innovative products then depended on the development process. As Jobs noted,
“[t]o make...revolutionary changes, it takes that combination of technical acumen and business and marketing—and a culture that can somehow match up the reason you developed your product and the reason people will want to buy it” (qtd. in Goodell 74). He explained the inevitability of defeat in the innovation process: “you usually go through a period where everybody tells you that you've completely failed” (Jobs qtd. in Goodell 74). This process to innovate then can be conceptualized as journey. On this journey, people encountered setbacks and complications, but the destination held something remarkable.

Innovation through sacrifice and perseverance had more to do with the creative process than the final product itself. One Apple marketing campaign that exclaimed, “The journey is the reward,” supported this notion. Jobs then identified with innovation on the basis of discovery. In the innovation process, discovery transpired when a person challenged a current set of conditions and rejected the status quo, which often times called for the purging of old systems. In other words, innovation represented a state of mind that called for one to change his or her ways of thinking. Jobs’ following comments reinforced this belief: “Making an insanely great product has a lot to do with the process of making the product, how you learn new things and adopt new ideas and throw out old ideas” (qtd. in Sheff 54). This proposal presented a challenge to both producers and consumers, but established the foundation for a new identification.
Summary

Analysis of Jobs’ identification revealed a consistency in the way that he expressed himself. In any case, Jobs preferred identification through division. This identification surfaced in five topical areas: origin; consumers; marketing; employees; and philosophy on business. The diversity of the San Francisco bay area provided one explanation for the source of his identification. Similarly, Jobs’ adoption justified identification born in division. That is to say, although he felt separate from his birth family and the world, he identified with uniqueness and individuality. Division also appeared in Jobs’ identification with consumers, when he established a sense of division on the basis of a choice that provided consumers with an alternative. This choice begged the rejection of a popular notion about technology, separated the computer from its utility, and associated computers with more simple forms of technology that people understood. With marketing, Jobs established a sense of division on the basis of induction. Rather than avow the general conception, which asserted what technology did for the individual, he showed individuals what they could do with technology. To employees, Jobs identified with productivity through a weeding-out process, and implemented conflict to combat the limitations of an overly satisfied workforce. In business, Jobs identified with innovation through the extermination of old models. To ensure innovation, he believed that an organization must sacrifice complacent thinking and outdated products.
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Williams, Elisa. “Selling Computers to the Masses; Strategy; A decade-old effort to put a PC in every living room is beginning to bear fruit.” *The Orange County Register* 30 Jan. 1994 p. K01. Web 5 Jan 2012.
Chapter 4: Conclusions

Chapter 3 investigated the use of identification as a rhetorical strategy in Steve Jobs' discourse. Analysis focused on the ways in which Jobs created identification with Apple's audiences through division. Examination of Jobs' statements surrounding five topical areas-origin, consumers, marketing, employees, and philosophy on business-revealed his tendency to create identification through division. Furthermore, close textual analysis illustrated that Jobs valued separation. Thus, the patterns of identification that surfaced in these topics suggested Jobs' worldview. To create unity within respective audiences, consumers and employees, Jobs identified with people on the basis of exclusivity and uniqueness. More importantly, however, Jobs' method of identification depicted the way that division ultimately had a unifying effect.

Jobs' background provided one explanation for his preference to create identification through division. While he grew up in the San Francisco bay area, a diverse place that celebrated individuality, uniqueness, and freedom of expression, Jobs valued experimentation and was subjected to circumstances that could not be found in other places. Moreover, his adoption at birth left him conflicted, but had a significant impact on his identification with things he experienced throughout life. While Jobs felt separated from his birth family, his adoption empowered in him a sense of individuality. When he acknowledged these circumstances, Jobs recognized the implications of division as a source of identification. This
realization, which materialized early in life, had a cumulative effect on Jobs’ identification that surfaced throughout his professional career. While at Apple, for instance, Jobs used identification that established a sense of division to create unity with consumers and employees.

With consumers, Jobs established a sense of division on the basis of a choice that provided an alternative. This choice materialized in a unique product, Macintosh, which represented a different ideology about technological progress and enabled users with individual experiences. Macintosh was unique because it contradicted a general conception about technology. That is, it asserted new possibilities for technology and invited users to identify with computers on the basis of an experience, rather than utility. In the early 1980s, many people did not realize how computers would revolutionize the world, and those who did failed to recognize the scope of computing in all areas of life. In this way, Macintosh represented an exception to the rule because it possessed what other machines did not, a personality and individuality, which for Jobs articulated the future of computing. The separation of Macintosh from a popular technological belief began in division, but it established the foundation for a new identification that helped people relate to technology.

Jobs established a sense of division through identification with consumers. This strategy helped people with limited technical knowledge identify with computers. Though Jobs separated the computer from utility, he acclimated an
entire generation of consumers to technology. Through identification that originated in division, Jobs reduced computers to things of common knowledge, ordinary things that people understood. Jobs then enabled consumers to identify with computers on the basis of simplicity. Moreover, with this strategy, Jobs dispelled a negative social attitude about technology. Macintosh, for example, transcended the limitations of computerphobia, the discourse about computer use that explained people’s adverse reactions and fears about computers, because with Macintosh, people saw a friendlier, more relatable side to technology. So not only did Jobs start with division to create unity, he changed a popular social attitude with divisive identification strategies. Jobs developed products that were unique and different, but he allayed many common fears associated with computers, which illustrated the way that division had a unifying effect. Division also influenced Jobs’ marketing strategies.

Jobs explored new demographics and challenged a popular belief about technology. For example, he rejected the assertion that computers had no use outside the workplace, which in turn established the foundation for new identifications in consumer audiences. This identification contradicted what most people in the industry believed. But through division, Jobs provided the opportunity for change and helped people understand that computers fit appropriately in any setting. By marketing the computer in a different way, Jobs created identification that naturalized computers into new domains, such as the
school and home. As such, people recognized new possibilities and unforeseen things to do with computers. Division, in this case, spawned a revolution that influenced how people use computers today.

Jobs employed a divisive approach to marketing corporate America. During the 1980s, most manufacturers failed to create an identifiable product for consumers, largely because many companies marketed the computer as a workhorse. To create unity within one consumer audience, corporate America, Jobs utilized an inductive approach to marketing. Jobs, by induction, showed corporate workers what they could achieve with computing, rather than avow a consensual attitude that approached technology from the idea of what the computer did for the worker, an egocentrism of sort. This identification created a rift in the market but forged a new identification, because it invited people to adopt a different mind state about technology. When he challenged this popular conception, Jobs explained, the computer went “from being a tool of computation to a tool of communication” (qtd. in Goodell 75). People, as such, reasoned about the computer beyond its technical capabilities. Through identification that started in division, Jobs changed the landscape of the modern corporation, because he empowered individuals and small groups with technology that changed the way people worked. This identification revolutionized modern business.

The use of induction in Jobs’ marketing illustrated how division created unity. Jobs provided consumers with an alternative perspective, a different frame
of reference that united people with a new set of ideas. When Jobs rejected a popular, egocentric assertion, he showed consumers that they could do anything they wanted to do with computers. This strategy empowered consumers, as people saw that computers were not just machines at the office that processed data and ran spreadsheets. Corporate workers and other consumer audiences realized that computers had infinite possibilities and, for the first time, people conceptualized other uses for the computer. By first establishing a sense of division, Jobs rejected a general technological conception, but then created identification that united consumers with a new belief that asserted the computer as a tool of expression and creativity.

Jobs did not resent the label of outsider. When he started Apple, Jobs identified people that many companies overlooked, individuals that other manufacturers deemed unfit for corporate America. Through identification that emerged from division, Jobs united a group of unique individuals and showed them the good in being the exception to the rule. Additionally, at Apple, Jobs used this identification to appeal to employees. Jobs valued individual contributions, but he did not treat all employees the same way. In fact, those who shined earned the title of “renegade,” a characteristic mark of identification that Jobs ascribed to Apple’s elite.

Jobs, who viewed separation as positive, partitioned Apple into two groups, his cohort and everyone else. The in-group and out-group mentality created a
general friction in the workforce and accentuated the differences among employees. Jobs, however, established sense of division to motivate employees to work harder. This identification had a unifying effect because it achieved loyalty from workers. While division separated the “renegades” from the rest of the company, employees became consubstantial in the desire to meet Jobs’ expectations.

Identification through division materialized at Apple in Jobs’ binary categorization of employees. One the one hand, Jobs was benevolent toward his inner circle because, for him, these people did no wrong. However, those removed from Jobs’ renegades suffered. While employees supplicated Jobs’ approval and tried to demonstrate adeptness and proficiency, they often failed to meet his expectations. With this identification, Jobs established an expectation among employees; people, as such, always knew where they stood with Jobs.

Separation, generally considered negative, manifested in positive ways at Apple. Although divisive, this strategy fostered innovation. Jobs worked with Apple’s most talented and creative individuals. In doing so, Jobs created an environment that was conducive to innovation. While the renegades on the Mac team worked in the lucubration of 90-hour workweeks, often in isolation from the rest of the company, they represented a division from the day-to-day operations, the company as a whole. This division caused a general friction in the work force. As such, the hard work that Jobs’ team endured to create Macintosh materialized in
the negative for many employees, because it split the company by the Jobs’ group and everyone else. That is, it was not a success that the entire company could share.

When companies prioritized cohesiveness and the reduction of affective conflicts, they became jaded in the ability to make sound decisions. As such, Jobs did not promote cohesiveness, but comprised a divisive work environment with strong personalities and conflicting opinions. The heterogeneous composition of Apple’s workforce, which created sometimes a hostile setting, transcended the limitations of groupthink. Under Jobs, employees never had the opportunity to become complacent. This environment, which evolved from Jobs’ preference for identification through division, contributed to Apple’s success in innovation.

Similar to his identification with other topics mentioned in chapter 3, Jobs’ philosophy on business developed from division. For instance, two tenets defined Jobs’ identification with business: Everything started with the individual and true innovation occurred only through sacrifice. Jobs valued individual contributions and knew that one person in business often made a difference, for better or worse. To ensure innovation without restraint, Jobs employed people who shared his values.

Jobs believed that, for innovation to transpire, a system must purge itself of obsolete models. A shared identification with this ideology established the basis upon which Jobs assessed one’s prospect with Apple. To create unity in Apple’s
workforce, he sought like-minded individuals who had a similar worldview. As such, people who worked at Apple under Jobs were consubstantial in the belief that individual contributions mattered, and they identified with computers on the basis of experience, not utility. In a metaphorical sense, this philosophy asserted the computer as a sherpa on the journey to enlightenment. The individual chose this journey, albeit separate and unique, and determined its destination.

In one sense, Jobs found Apple in the midst of a revolution with a goal “to seek enlightenment” and to “get computers out to tens of millions of people” (Jobs qtd. in Goodell 78; Jobs qtd. in Sheff 52). This identification strategy constituted division, because it associated Apple with a mind state about the future, one concerned with the manner in which technology progressed. Under the current conditions, Apple would never achieve its goal. For Jobs, the computer became less a product of mass consumption and more a symbol of identification that represented an ideology or system of beliefs about the computer’s role to facilitate greater understanding. In Jobs’ case, identification through division separated Apple from technology because, rather than associate with technical excellence, Apple products emphasized humanistic qualities. For Jobs, computers would make a qualitative difference in the world, because they enabled people with individual and unique experiences. One who identified with Apple had the free will necessary to combat forces that obstructed this revolution, forces most evident in the competition, which identified with the computer on the basis of utility. For Jobs, it
was simple. When people merely identified with computers on the basis of function, they never experienced the full potential of technology.

For Jobs, innovation materialized when an industry sacrificed its outdated systems, so in a sense, progress occurred through extermination. This belief reinforced the other tenets of Jobs’s worldview, specifically the notion of productivity through a weeding-out process, which materialized in his identification with employees. In the name of innovation, Jobs sacrificed dated models and complacent thinking, similar to his binary categorization of employees. In either case, Jobs purged Apple of obsolete models, whether people or technology. Innovation invoked progress, but it also separated leaders from followers. As Jobs saw it, “Innovation distinguishes between a leader and a follower” (Jobs qtd. in Kimmel np). This characteristic put Apple at the forefront of the revolution.

As Jobs saw it, Innovation created consubstantiality between producers and users, both in attitude and mind state. Macintosh, for example, embodied innovation, because it revolutionized technology to date, but also sought to recast a popular social attitude. This attitude, from which Jobs wanted to separate, equated the computer with utility. As such, in this innovative process, tool builders (those at Apple) and tool users (those who bought Apple) rejected a consensus, and became consubstantial in the notion of computers as more than machines. Jobs exposed the computer’s latent potential, which in turn separated
Apple from a universal attitude about technology. For Jobs, this identification manifested in the adoption of new ideas and rejection of complacent thinking that coincided with the innovative process. Macintosh, in other words, sacrificed a general conception. While it purged society of misdirected thinking, a skepticism of sort, and disavowed a popular conception, it unified people in a new belief. That is to say, both producers and consumers became consubstantial in their attitudes about technology. They shared a substance, which solidified in a belief that computers were ordinary, household appliances of which people did not need knowledge of their interiors. Therefore, with Macintosh, Jobs illustrated how identification through division unified producers and consumers.
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