

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Title: Claims to Universal Possessiveness through Exclusive Discourses
Medieval and Early-Modern Narratives of Othering

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This thesis examines the discursive seeds of the European endeavor to supremacy and dominance by tracing the germination of Eurocentrism and European exceptionalism in two different eras. Through close attention to textuality, I suggest a rhetorical continuity between the medieval and the early modern eras by focusing not directly on their historical and political actions, but rather on their shared conceptual rhetorical history of encounter, identity, and otherness. Although traditional critical accounts of European hegemony often focus on the 18th and 19th centuries as the historical framework where the European universal authority and global power were fulfilled, I trace the emergence of these phenomena from earlier ideological contexts through a close-reading methodology and a contemporary theoretical apparatus. In the first chapter, I discuss the medieval polemic narratives about religious difference and the ways this difference was articulated through mythic narratives. In the second chapter, I extend this analysis to include the status of the global English power and how it emerged through the early modern pre-colonial gaze, and the perceptual-relational consequences of that gaze.

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Claims to Universal Possessiveness through Exclusive Discourses
Medieval and Early-Modern Narratives of Othering

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I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request.

Eman Abu Aiada, Author

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Introduction

What might be the connection between two different eras separated by hundreds of years and potentially different impetuses for a global rise of power and dominance? While the medieval period is regarded as a pivotal time in the history of universalizing the Christian dogmatic and moral religious values through the Crusades, the early modern period begins a global outreach for the purpose of political-economic expansion that provides the foundation for the rise of English colonial-imperial power. The continuity between the missionary or religious Crusades and the military-political colonial efforts is manifested in the development of a shared discourse of defining and representing foreign peoples through othering. The establishment of the superior ideologies that provide the foundation for European hegemony are traceable across multiple exclusionary narratives, which often represent difference in light of European superiority. Through the resulting production of otherness, major European writers in medieval and early modern periods attempted paradoxically to accomplish universality through religious, cultural, and political exclusive narratives.

The main methodological framework of this thesis focuses on specific textual forms in medieval and early modern periods and discusses the linguistic discursive seeds that proceed the definite rise of European power structures. Beyond critiquing the historical and political dimensions of the Crusades and the colonial-imperial power, this project aims mainly to discuss the establishment of the European hegemonic identity through discourse. Although these relations of domination are more commonly identifiable in later periods than in the pre-racial and pre-colonial historical periods, the idea that earlier narratives proceed the concrete practices in form and context, poses a challenge to examine the precedence of these concepts from medieval and early modern times. Tracing the Eurocentric rhetoric of othering through propagandizing across different literary and cultural narrative practices illuminates a certain continuity between the medieval focus on religious differences and the early modern

pre-racist prejudicial ideological lens— both of which eventually set the stage for modern racialized structures.¹

The medieval devotion to the exclusivist Christian identity relied on and resulted in positioning other non-Christian religions as invalid and heretic. This hierarchal construction is visible in depictions of Islam and Judaism through Christian claims of ownership of knowledge about both religions – a claim that lends itself towards mythologizing both religions. To unpack this process of mythologizing, I discuss ignorance as ideological and cultural phenomenon in *Dialogue Against the Jews* by Petrus Alfonsi, and *The Deeds of God through the Franks* by Guibert de Nogent. The two medieval writers in their claim to know and write the truth held different kinds of conscious or deliberate ignorance that ultimately factored into building a mythicized religious knowledge of other faiths. The purpose of my argument is to show how archetypal elements of myth are manifested in two formal paradigms: Nogent’s ignorance pretending to be knowledge, and Alfonsi’s assumption that his knowledge is complete while it is not. What these texts end up producing is an ideology that views the other through a polemical rhetorical process of mythologizing.

Focusing on the specific concepts of Islam as a distant threat in the medieval time, and the Christian lack of doctrinal knowledge about the religion itself, helps to explain this process. R. W Southern surveys the west initial medieval encounter and perception of Islam through three important phases: “ignorance,” “reason and hope,” and “vision and hope.” He argues that the medieval ignorance of Islam has constructed a reality in which “men inevitably shaped the world they do not know in the likeness of the world they do know”

¹ See Geraldine Heng, “The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages I: Race Studies, Modernity and the Middle Ages,” (*Literature Compass* 2011: 258-74) and “The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages II: Locations of Medieval Race,” (*Literature Compass* 2011: 275-93), and Kim F. Hall, *Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

(31), and this “gave Islam a place in three of the great traditions of European thought and sentiment, those of political history, apocalyptic vision, and *popular imagination*” (33; italics mine). Claiming ignorance as a position in producing knowledge and interpretation had a significant impact on the Christian and the Western European perception of the geographically far Muslims, as it is manifested in the medieval attempts to depict Islam and the figure of Mohammad through the lens of myth.

The way ignorance framed and directed the relationship to a distant religion such as Islam, can be triangulated with the medieval Christian relationship to the most definitive domestic other— European Jewry. The metaphor of triangulation suggests that the medieval perception of both Islam and Judaism was ultimately part of an integrated dynamic of othering, even though it was operating differently. The relationship to Jews was affected by conflicting signals of proximity and distance. The identity of Jews in the medieval thought was founded on two main signifiers: the sin of the deicide, and the geographic complexity of being both physically proximate and intrinsically dispersed. Ignorance becomes a major factor in the demonization of Jews and the Jewish community through the medieval focus on “theological discourse of Jewish alterity,” which in effect shows how “the individual body was thought to mirror the status of the community as a whole” (Akbari 152). Medieval narratives show how the collective body of Jews was encountered and configured through antagonistic ignorance.

While medieval Christians lacked a doctrinal knowledge about Islam, the rhetorical framing of Judaism was not as much about Judaic doctrines as it was about the Jewish people themselves. Despite these distinctions, both religions were ultimately positioned in contrast to the Christian single unified body of truth. The physical proximity of the Jewish community suggests that the Christian relationship to Jews might have been informed by knowledge and understanding, but it nonetheless was profoundly shaped by epistemological difference and

ignorant alienation. By unpacking the relationships between knowledge, truth, and ignorance, I present the archetypal configuration of both distant Islam and local Judaism in medieval factual narratives as they were formalized through mythic elements.

Because medieval Europeans encountered religious difference from a position of lacking knowledge or imperfect knowledge, the accessible means to explain the world was by mythologizing the unknown. Ignorance is a necessary component of mythologizing— part of what constitutes myth is a certain not knowing that is refocused as knowing, specifically through ideological myths. As defined by George Packer, “ideology knows the answer before the question has been asked.”² The meaning of the mythic archetype embodies this definition because it provides a permission not to know the other based on the assumption that there is already complete knowledge about them. It is a permission of ignorance on some level.

This end of the construction of European identity was shaped through a rhetorical binary construction of otherness. Linda Lomperis characterizes Christian European identity in the medieval period and argues that Europeans were “in the midst of a period of flux and were themselves only beginning to take on the identity configurations that they would assume in the next, early modern phase of the world system” (161). Although the author focuses more on the medieval Christian identity, she also indicates how it is part of a larger “European cultural or social identity” (ibid). There is an indication that early-modern European identity was rooted in the medieval time. I characterize the articulation or the mechanism of this identity by tracing the attempts to control language and discourse in order to discredit different others, which is manifested in medieval religious polemic narratives. To go further with this point, I suggest that even though this earlier tentative identity-formation is indicated to be stabilized in the early modern period, there are important elements of the

² http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/04/25/110425taco_talk_packer

European identity that were still in the process of emerging. The English colonial-imperial dream that starts to take shape in the early modern period through global discovery and mercantilism suggests another important factor that was not yet fully stable.

When we get closer to the early modern period, the distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans becomes more political and national rather than mainly religious. The pre-colonial English ideological perception of foreign peoples, demographics, races, religions, and nations was shaped explicitly through a strong motive to shape English identity and hegemony. Through the exploratory-commercial nature of early modern time, major English writers and travelers turned their observations of the newly discovered worlds into binary hierarchal accounts in order to establish a larger political endeavor.

I discuss the effects of the English portrayals of different peoples specifically through the genre of travel writing. I examine multiple travelogues introduced in Richard Hakluyt's work *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1589), and the cultural discursive effects they produce. Here I focus on the different uses of the terms "savage," "cannibal," and "barbaric," and the ways these categories were reinforced through narrative and catalyzed as rhetorical tools to lessen and dehumanize the encountered indigenous communities. By looking at East and West communities as presented in the genre, we can make a comparative reading and also capture a clearer perception of the pre-colonial discourse and its generality. We see the same dynamics when we look at Western otherness, with interesting differences, but fundamentally the same patterns of cultural, economic, and eventually political domination. The generated imaginative cultural perceptions through these specific narratives shows how the transcendental English lens allows or prevents cultural and ideological barriers and creates hegemonic influences.

Weaving Edward Said's postcolonial study with my textual analysis and with other contemporary critics helps to explain and map the genealogy of colonialism and imperialism

and the attitudes that underlie them in these pre-colonial texts. Viewing these texts through a contemporary theoretical apparatus and deploying a contemporary theory into an earlier historical frame makes the genre an important part of the colonial genealogy and the promotion of the imperial dream— the dream that eventually shapes the realities and the relations that later animated racism, nationalism, and orientalism. These concepts constitute and operate with each other, and this theoretical framework helps establish a historical theoretical narrative that connects these modern dominant discourses to earlier superior lenses.

This chapter is also in part a case study for the use value of Orientalism outside of the geographical context of the Orient and also outside of the chronological context of the years of colonialism. The argument is not just a diagnosis of the pre-colonial gaze and the seeds of cultural-political domination in the genre of travel writing in particular, but methodologically it is also a case study and an example of Orientalism as a theoretical frame outside of both its traditional time frame, and its traditional spatial frame.

Whereas the medieval and early modern periods are two different eras with two different paradigms of knowledge, seeing the aspects of their narratives as the seeds of Eurocentric discourses is relevant to examine their trajectory into modern realities. Although the lens varies and the time change, the rhetoric of othering is nonetheless similar in many ways. Despite the different conceptual reasons or origins of trying to establish universality, both the medieval religious polemic narratives and the early-modern pre-colonial travel writings I discuss, factor into what ends up shaping and defining European hegemonic discourses and practices. Although both periods are similarly regarded as pre-enlightenment and pre-racial temporal contexts, they still plant the seeds of modern realities and theories of race and nation through their conceptions of otherness.

But it is in the logic of myths, like dreams, exactly to welcome radical antitheses. For a myth does not analyze or solve problems. It represents them as already analyzed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled images, in the way a scare-crow is assembled from bric-a-brac and then made to stand for a man.

Edward Said *Orientalism*.

The Structure of Mythologizing

Polemic Medieval Rhetoric of Epistemological and Geographical Differences

The Middle Ages was a critical time for the Christian establishment of epistemological and theological knowledge of other religions. The contours of the relationship between Christianity, Islam, and Judaism became increasingly defined by the Christian drive to claim a universal perspective of authority through the intense period of the Crusades. One of the primary markers of the Middle Ages is the discourse through which the Christian strategic definitions of other religions was accelerating. The pressure on establishing the Christian religious identity was not only stimulating a territorial domination, but also produced a collective fixation on defining other religions through polemic narratives in order to achieve absolute moral authority. This rhetoric did not only facilitate the doctrine to spread Christianity through the Crusades but has also constituted a set of archetypes in medieval literature in which other religions, namely Judaism and Islam, were portrayed as deviating from the singular Christian religious truth. The difference that both Judaism and Islam presented to the medieval world, reaches a level where it becomes an “unacceptable difference,” and thus it poses a threat that needs to be resolved.³ The epistemological, rhetorical, and narrative othering seen in cultural and textual forms, follows the experience of threat predicated on the conceived deviation from the Christian theology.

³ For further information on the context of that “unacceptable difference,” see, Ames, Christine Caldwell. *Medieval Heresies: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. pp. 1- 26

The universalizing discourse and rhetoric underlying the idea of the Crusades incorporates the physical military force of spreading Christianity across the globe alongside the spiritual alienation and propagandizing of difference. This ecumenical rhetoric was fortified via the deep investment in positioning Christianity and different faiths in a binary relationship of truth and faithlessness, in which all other religions are decidedly positioned on the faithless side. This binary was mutually interacting with and affected by the relationship between ignorance and knowledge production in articulations of different faiths. While the Crusading act was the physical embodiment of this hypothetical intersection between these factors, medieval literary narratives were appropriated for the reinforcement of both the theoretical and the practicable Christian religious exclusivism.⁴

Islam and Christianity battled for survival during the medieval period both physically in the Crusades, and conceptually through religious rhetorical practices. The relationship between the two religions was governed by theological differences and a conflict between two rising political and religious powers. Islam recognized Christianity as a religion and offered concrete knowledge about the Christian faith based on the Quran; the Scripture confirms the Virgin Birth but departs from the belief that Christ is part of the Godhead, rather a messenger of God among all the other messengers, including Mohammad. The following Qur'anic verse states the main doctrinal differences between the two religions:

O People of the Scripture, do not commit excess in your religion or say about Allah except the truth. The Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary, was but a messenger of Allah and His word which He directed to Mary and a soul [created at a command] from Him. So believe in Allah and His messengers. And do not say, "Three"; desist - it is better for you. Indeed, Allah is but one God. Exalted is He above having a son. To Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth. And sufficient is Allah as Disposer of affairs. (4:171).

⁴ See, Andrew Latham. "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions, and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom" *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 55 Iss. 1 (2011).

The Quran presents Christ as a holy Prophet, yet it categorizes the attribution of Christ as God, alongside the Trinity itself, as two polytheistic practices and a misunderstanding of the true message of Christ. In the Quran, there is a comparative access to knowledge and epistemological positioning manifested in introducing the main Christian doctrines. While the text presents the Christian doctrinal practices in multiple verses, Christians were not able to make a similar epistemological claim because they had a limited access to theological knowledge about Islam. Consequentially, medieval religious figures and thinkers were seeking a way to introduce Islam — not by suggesting a similar rhetoric of acknowledging Islam as a religion and refuting its practices perhaps, rather by other dynamics of knowledge production that this essay will attempt to unpack.

Christians in the medieval period perceived Islam primarily as an increasing political and military force. The medieval historian R. W. Southern argues that from a Christian medieval stand point, “the existence of Islam was the most far-reaching problem in medieval Christendom” (3). The lack of religious knowledge about this emerging global “problem” posed a pressure on establishing a permanent structure that allows for navigating the relationship to a competing distant religion. The suspicion mainly revolved around the fundamental essence of Islam:

As a theological problem it called persistently for some answer to the mystery of its existence: what was its providential role in history - was it a symptom of the world's last days or a stage in the Christian development; a heresy, a schism, or a new religion; a work of man or devil; an obscene parody of Christianity, or a system of thought that deserved to be treated with respect? (3).

Islam appeared to Christian thinkers as a puzzle or an anomaly: was it a complex idea, a set of rules for individual and national ethics, or a manifestation of belief — an inquiry that for the sake of Christianity to continue forward, needed to be firmly identified and resolved. If it

was a “schism” then it would be a threat to Christianity, and if it was a similar system of belief, it could be an ally for Christianity and perhaps make it more universal. However, an explanation for this perplexity was not easily accessible, and thus “the statement of the problem became more complex, more rational, and more related to experience” (Southern 108); in response, medieval Western thinkers “developed habits of mind and powers of comprehension,” through the focus on ungrounded or incomplete concepts (109). The evolution of these “habits of mind” is visible in the narrative practices of some medieval thinkers such as Guibert de Nogent and Petrus Alfonsi. These writers tried to establish knowledge acquisition that was not genuinely a knowledge acquisition, rather a corruption of knowledge and a mythologizing of Islam, as well as other religions.

Something other than knowledge, therefore, becomes the ground for forcing a theological conception of Islam by some of those who claimed intellectual positions. Through circulation of specific archetypes, these writers were able to claim and produce an accepted theological knowledge out of ignorance. The same stories about Mohammad’s deceptiveness and sexuality circulated in medieval texts such as Nogent’s *The Deeds of God through The Franks*, and also Alfonsi’s *Dialogue against the Jews* (in sections that focus on Mohammad). Edward Said argues that “since Christ is the basis of Christian faith, it was assumed— quite incorrectly— that Mohammed was to Islam as Christ was to Christianity. Hence the polemic name “Mohammedanism” given to Islam, and the automatic epithet “imposter” applied to Mohammed” (*Orientalism* 60). This is an example of the ungrounded stereotypes that emerge from medieval writing on Islam through the polemical fixation on the same narratives of Mohammad as a deceptive Prophet and Islam as a heretical religion.

While medieval Christians were trying to determine how to connect to Islam as a distant counterpart, they were also invested in defining the relationship with the more nearby Jewish religious communities. If we look only at the relationship between Islam and

Christianity, it might be argued that the Christian lack of knowledge about Islam could be justified by the geographical distance, but if we look at Jews for instance, who were geographically in the midst of medieval Europe, the relationship between knowledge and ignorance becomes more complicated and bears further considerations. The local position of Jews in the medieval world inverts the idea that distance justifies ignorant alienation — and the resulting othering of people. In fact, as I shall discuss later, Jews' proximity fueled a much more intense and complex suspicion and estrangement of Judaism from the Christian community.

While presumed theological differences determined the Christian relationship to Islam, the perception of Jews was ideologically and epistemologically configured as part of “a *historical* process of alienation and antagonism rather than a dogmatic-theological clash of beliefs” (Funkenstein *Perceptions of Jewish History* 170: original italics). Amos Funkenstein suggests that the medieval Christian relationship to Judaism was not only informed by ignorance of the Jewish dogmatic knowledge or beliefs, but by a fundamental “historical antagonistic” context. The Jewish body was not only conceived and presented as strange and mythologized, but in the Christian doctrine the sin of deicide becomes the center and the orbit around which the Jewish identity was evolved and identified. This draws a distinction between the historical perception of Jews as opposed to the dogmatic-theological perception of Islam; however, with both Islam and Judaism, the lack of knowledge was not really contingent on spatial dimensions, rather epistemological and theological ones that were nearly equal in an ignorance of the doctrines of both religions.

There was an ongoing reciprocal relationship between medieval religious and ideological knowledge of otherness or lack thereof, and the emergence of mythologizing. These three integrated dynamics were all forming and informing each other. The lack of necessary knowledge, or the deployed ignorance, produced distorted and fearmongering

images of Muslims and Jews that focus on othering through devaluing of religious doctrines, without necessarily relying on concrete or real acquaintance. Medieval narratives filled this knowledge gap with hypothetical assumptions, imaginary details, fabricated stories, and continues archetypes. These, then, were major elements of mythic narrative which have largely emerged from the medieval world and served to force ideological interpretations of Islam and Judaism.

The figuration of both religions serves as an explanatory force for the way myth originated and developed through a system of archetypes in the Middle Ages. In medieval religious narratives, both Jews and Muslims were situated as archetypes through an imaginative set of characteristics presented as factual certainty. The focus on explaining or mystifying Islam through a corrupted fictionalized figure of Mohammad, and Judaism through collective bloody religious rituals (e.g., the Blood Libel), are the effects of the medieval mythologizing of other religions.⁵ The process of mythologizing originated and accumulated through taking real religious practices, values, and figures, and turning them to something that transcends or transgresses, and often corrupts that particular original tradition or figure. As a consequence of this configuration, both the domestic and foreign religious other became epistemologically distant mythic others.

The mutual interaction between the universalizing claim of the Crusades and the singularizing claim of absolute religious truth are both manifest in the medieval development of mythologizing. This atypical co-existence in what might seem like contrast between the singular and the universal, is what promotes and sustains the narrative of myth. In order to understand the process of myth-making or mythologizing, there is a need to define myth first; however, the difficulty of that lays in the idea that there is no one solid definition or stable

⁵ See, for example, Alan Dundes *The Blood Libel Legend: A Casebook in Anti-Semitic Folklore* (1991), and David Biale *Blood and Belief* (2007).

context of myth. Myth is a complicated unstable relationship between knowledge and ignorance because the fundamental process of mythologizing operates dynamically along the spectrum of knowing — and not knowing.

According to Claude Lévi-Strauss, “myth is language, functioning on an especially high level where *meaning* succeeds practically at 'taking off' from the *linguistic ground* on which it keeps rolling” (210; italics mine). Myth contains a linguistic perpetual essence, and also a metalevel understanding that develops in a broader conceptual horizon. There is a large context to the role of myth related to the specific meaning a culture chooses to associate to that myth. Whatever the specific cultural elements of myth are, they are distinct from an ordinary story because they become cross-culturally recognizable. Part of what distinguishes myth from other narratives or from a simple representation is that the mythic narrative has an ongoing archetypal collective force that circulates and intensifies. Even after it “takes off,” Lévi-Strauss suggests that the significance of myth lays in its arbitrariness and its ability to take different structures and shapes, and still encompass the same phenomenal capacity in shaping rigid social structures and collective world-views. Even though the specific language of myth might change substantially, the meaning stands still. The sensory key components of myth operate on a small scale compared to its transcendent cultural meaning because myth’s “substance does not lie in its style, its original music, or its syntax, but in the story which it tells” (210). The story is the discourse that these mythic narratives effectively produce which becomes a continuous archetype shaping collective relations of otherness. In other words, mythic narratives are particular and singular while mythic meaning is universal.

In the religious context particularly, myth is the interplay between two imperatives: “a myth expresses and confirms society's religious values and norms,” and “it provides a pattern of behavior to be imitated” (Honko 49). To serve these two specific purposes, the expression of religious myth relies on being interpreted as factual in order to be received and

appropriated as having an explanatory religious value. The intense pressure to establish the bounds of Christianity, for example, lead to myth's important role in establishing the medieval religious textual form. Because the medieval lenses were primarily religious, the accessible means to explain the world or explain the unknown was achievable through mythologizing different religious identities.

In "Basic Types of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemics in the Later Middle Ages," Funkenstein asserts that "religious polemics, written and oral, public and private, became sharper and more dangerous after the twelfth century than ever before in the Middle Ages" (373). In light of this paradigm shift that Funkenstein remarks, medieval religious narratives became concerned with the process of defining Christianity in relation to different religions. Given the historical conceptual frame of the twelfth century as a pivotal time for this process, I seek to track the realm of this cultural-literary shift through the proliferation of certain archetypal tropes of both Islam and Judaism in medieval written texts of the era. This process of mythologizing was used as a medium to express, embody, and codify corrupted ideological and theological knowledge about both religions.

Petrus Alfonsi's extensive *Dialogue Against the Jews* (ca. 1109), serves as a strong example of the way medieval polemic mythologizing of religious otherness was formalized in narrative. The text is rendered with a peculiar focus on Judaism and Islam as deviated from the Christian singular religious truth. The image of Jews as a direct physical threat to Christianity, and the archetypal figure of Prophet Mohammad as sensual and deceptive, as opposed to spiritual and beneficent, are the polemic rhetorical forces motivating Alfonsi's text. In *The Deeds of God through the Franks* (ca. 1107-1108), Guibert de Nogent, a theologian and historian of the First Crusade also writes an account of the life, prophecy, and death of Prophet Mohammad motivated by a similar reductionist approach. Nogent admits that he does not have authoritative resources for his stories, yet that does not prevent him

from establishing an extensive imaginary that claims to be authentic and factual. The lack of reliable authors or sources to his narrative provides a self-proclaimed authorization for Nogent to fictionalize – and ultimately mythologize — the figure of the Prophet.

Claiming Complete Knowledge through Exclusionary Narratives:

Alfonsi's text is framed with a hierarchal disposition of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The text is a dialogue between Moses, Alfonsi's old religious identity as a Jew and his converted Christian character, Petrus. The dialogue's incorporation of two facades of the self allows Alfonsi to claim a totalizing cross-religious knowledge. The structure of the dialogue produces the effect of locating Alfonsi in two positions: the ignorant past-self, and the knowing converted-self. He presents his new Christian self as the truth-teller and the keeper of the fundamental truth.

The *Second Titulus* opens with Moses asking Petrus about Jewish people's captivity and wondering why they are unable to break the boundaries of that abstract confinement: "you have said we can never escape from captivity in such a way as we hope" (97). By prefacing the dialogue with the metaphor or the allegory of captivity, Alfonsi sets forth the idea that Jewish bodies and souls are trapped in a collective confinement, and that they are aware of that destiny. Petrus answers the question saying, "as long as you deny that Christ is the Son of God or that he came into the world for the redemption of the human race, and as long as you are unwilling to keep his precepts, you will be unable to *be freed* from captivity" (ibid: my italics). He suggests that the only way for Jews to be freed is from the outside, and that with his own adoption of the Christian faith, he has been able to breach the barriers of captivity. He confirms the stability and the continuity of this "great captivity" for the Jews unless they convert to Christianity.

Alfonsi centers the dialogue around the idea of captivity, which is, according to him, a result of Jews' crime of deicide, and "the magnitude of a crime so great is the cause of such a long captivity" (106), and in this they became the archetype of the captive figure. Moreover, Alfonsi suggests that freedom in this sense is bound up in religion and submission in a religious sense. He says to Moses, "as long as you abide in your paternal faith just as in their will, you will without any doubt remain in the same judgment of damnation" (106). Alfonsi is establishing the Christian faith as *the only* faith to have if the Jews truly want to "be freed," and reach salvation and redemption. He formalizes what he thinks the Christian mindset is as the way of truth by setting up the possibility and the foundation of the medieval Christian narrative of conversion — or forced conversion.

Seeing the other as the one who must be converted and shown the truth is the larger implication of Alfonsi's formalization. The text implies how Christianity was used in the medieval period to spread its message as the only truthful message. In *Conversion and Narrative*, Ryan Szpiech argues that the Medieval narrative of conversion has polemical intentions and that these narratives "play a more prominent role in Christian polemics than they do in Muslim and Jewish treatises because they more fittingly reflect Christian notions of revelation, salvation, and time" (6). Projecting the Christian self-consciousness onto other definitions of revelation, salvation, and time, which are key components of most religious beliefs, reinforces Christianity as the ultimate valid system of belief. By virtue of this prerequisite of hierarchy and claimed solidarity, the conversion theme constructs the Christian identity at the expense of other religions.

In relation to establishing the Christian identity and understanding, "the connection between conversion and polemic is most evident in their shared arguments concerning individual and collective identity" (10). The conversion narrative is not just a narrative about a person converting, it is promoting a larger collective force. This unity reinforces the split

between the spiritual identity of Christians and all other religions. By creating a separation where Judaism as a different religion is unified, Jews are further solidified as an archetypal collective that stands in contrast to Christianity. In Alfonsi's articulation, Jewish identity and destiny is founded on deicide. There are two contradicting archetypal patterns in his construction of that identity. On the one hand, Alfonsi confirms Jews' captivity repeatedly, and on the other hand, he also claims that they are dispersed around the world:

What do you think is the reason that God has subjected to perpetual servitude this people, which is dispersed everywhere across the earth, and why has he condemned it with the penalty of so many evils? And another person will answer: on account of a sin such as this, that they slew the Son of God solely because of envy; for this reason they arrived at these evils (109).

Alfonsi suggests that Jews were envious of the Christian message and thus they killed Christ. The narrative of "envy" and "evilness" engages with the mythologizing of the Jews as demonic figures. He claims that Jews' relationship to sin and evilness is the cause of their subjugation, which is manifested in two different directional punishments: confinement and diffusion. These are two possible conflicting narratives and they ultimately represent the same irredeemable outcome of damnation. These two seemingly equivocal geographical spheres were a fundamental impetus for the medieval epistemic conceptualization of the Jewish identity. Suzanne Conklin Akbari argues, "spatial ambivalence, where Jews are imagined as belonging nowhere yet found everywhere, is the geographical expression of the epistemological ambivalence embedded within medieval understandings of the rule of Judaism" (113). In Alfonsi's text, this epistemological ambiguity is advocated through geographical dualism. The simultaneous fixation on geographical proximity and distance is used as a medium to propagandize Jews, who are physically proximate, by mobilizing them theoretically and framing them as scattered across the globe. The rootless wandering is a sign

and a result of their religious emptiness and faithlessness, and ultimately their uncontrolled evil conduct witnessed most powerfully in the Gospel's implication of deicide.⁶

There is a tension between two oppositional directional archetypes, captivity and diaspora — a tension where both predestinations, according to Alfonsi, are reconnected at damnation. This tension becomes a conventional ongoing status in which “the place of the Jews is configured as being perennially in flux, always in the process of either the *centripetal* motion of enclosure or the *centrifugal* motion of dispersal” (Akbari 139: italics mine). Whether it is “centripetal” or “centrifugal” both of those are in relationship to one central thing. The Jews are spinning around the orbit of their sin — which is ultimately to say that they move according to the gravity of Christianity. The spatial circumstances are contextualized within a larger discourse of religious othering because the accusations against the Jews were “usually seen as part of a theological discourse of Jewish alterity, in which the act is seen as a reenactment of the Crucifixion and a hideous parody of the eucharistic sacrifice” (Akbari 151). The act, referred to here, is the constant attribution of Jews as Christ killers, which allows every possible narrative to be turned to one archetypal scheme. Analyzing the tension between the two geographical configurations of Judaism makes visible the construction of the mythologizing process through which Alfonsi tries to set up two incompatible mythic structures and make them coexist in one epitome.

By virtue of his fixation on proving that he is a reliable and a worthy Christian, Alfonsi is immersed in expressing the falseness of other religious beliefs, both Judaism and Islam. In *Islam through Western Eyes*, Jonathan Lyons writes that Alfonsi's text “placed the imprimatur of the leading Western expert, in this case an Arab-speaking former Jew from once Muslim Spain, on the anti-Islam discourse that first emerged within the advent of the Crusades” (69). Alfonsi acquired knowledge about Islam and prophet Mohammad because of

⁶ As suggested in Ecce homo scene in the Gospel of John.

his upbringing in Al-Andalus. In addition to how he relates to Judaism, Alfonsi also tries to establish his identity in relation to his own manipulative interpretations of Islam. Whether he confirms it or refutes it, he defines both himself— and Christianity— in relation to the two other religious identities.

Alfonsi assures his claim to theological knowledge about Islam when Moses asks why Alfonsi has not converted to Islam, “for you were always, as I said, associated with them and you were raised among them; you read [their] books, and you understand the language” (146). Alfonsi indicates that knowledge is the thing that enables him to convert to Christianity, not Islam, when he answers:

Although the web of your discourse, which has so much elegance and sweetness, is not less convincing than if Mohammad himself were present, for those who consider the delights of the body the highest good, nevertheless it is strange that you hope to instruct me in this, in order to convince me of that in which you believe I can in no wise be deceived. For you are certain that it is not unknown to me who Mohammad was, how he falsely fashioned himself a prophet with a clever deception, and who his advisor was in contriving this (150).

In this response, Alfonsi equates both Moses and Mohammad in order to lessen the validity of Mohammad’s religious value. Mingling the two discursive voices together vocalizes Mohammad’s voice with a speech that Alfonsi himself writes — and argues against— to eventually claim that Islam is a misleading message wrapped in “elegance and sweetness.” The Islamic discourse is implied to contain a deceptive façade in order to attract and mislead people, and Mohammad himself is the leading advocator of bodily pleasures, “for those who consider the delights of the body the highest good.” Alfonsi’s focus on physicality is a stable technique used to establish a straightforward binary between sensuality and spirituality. The embodiment of Islam as a corporeal doctrine is applied in order to deny that it is actually a religion.

Alfonsi presents the two tropes of sensuality and “clever deception” together and towards the same purpose of devaluation. The idea or the archetype of deception is related to

the validity of religious knowledge and religious discourses. The accusation of deceptiveness provides Alfonsi with a powerful rhetorical apparatus due to his claimed cross-religious positionality. He argues that he knows the religion itself and the deception that has been made by Mohammad. He claims that he is the one entitled to own the expertise of Mohammad's purpose. Alfonsi implies that Mohammad is the figure of clever deception which suggests that Mohammad does not have access to the true revelation, and thus he is lost and wants others to be lost. This lack of "the true path" connects epistemologically back to the representation of Judaism as geographically unstable and sharpens the universal discourse of the un-awakened lost non-Christians.

In the medieval rhetoric, the centrality of deception was a common trope associated with both "far Islam" and proximate Judaism. The manipulative cleverness and ability to deceive suggests a corruption of fundamental religious knowledge. Alfonsi declares his knowledge of both religions insistently and he employs this knowledge to cast doubt on Mohammad's prophecy, and to confirm Jews' captivity. For him, Jews and Muslims are a threat to Christianity specifically because of their predisposition to deception. Thus, being clever and knowledgeable fosters Alfonsi's ethical values whereas it devalues others. Alfonsi claims to theological knowledge by way of personal experience, not through the ability to declaim the doctrine for instance. By virtue of his personal experiential authority with the three doctrines, he is able to make broad claims about theology.

There is a concrete relationship between knowledge and conversion, and in positioning himself as knowledgeable, Alfonsi exploits this relationship. In the introduction to the contemporary edition of the dialogue, Irven M. Resnick writes that Alfonsi "insists that his conversion was instead a simple response to his discovery of religious truth," in which he "seeks to explain not only why he abandoned Judaism but also why he did not choose to enter the community of Islam" (17). Alfonsi insists repeatedly that he converted to Christianity, not

Islam, because of knowledge not ignorance. Weaving the three figures together, Alfonsi, Moses, and Mohammad, suggests a universal perspective of awareness, however; the religious exclusivism that Alfonsi seeks to produce through this collapsing is individual and partial. He transforms three different religions into one authorial voice, which is ultimately his own Christian voice.

Alfonsi's account of Mohammad is full of misrepresentations and twisted truths as they appear in the Quran. While he claims that Mohammad deceived his wife and took her money, and he wanted to be a king, the history of the first revelation of Islam is completely different. He presents these ideas and asks: "how should Mohammad, who is not comparable to any of the prophets in any plausible way, be accepted among the prophets, then?" (153). The dialogue produces a simplistic archetypal relational figuration of Islam through the discussion of Mohammad, and Judaism through the focus on the Jew's captivity and damnation. In the overall framing of the text, "evidence and conclusions are accepted selectively" in order "to fit some intractable ideological commitment" (DeNicola, 41). Archetype is a reduction and a simplification. It takes complex figures and simplifies them or reduces them. Turning the Jews to the enemies of Christianity, and the Muslims to a false and misleading religion, reduces their different religious identities to sets of archetypes. Alfonsi takes complex theologies and identities and turns them to one category: anti-Christian.

Ignorance as an Intellectual Position:

The fixation on the figure of Mohammad as an archetype also animates Guibert de Nogent's *The Deeds of God through the Franks*, a written history of the first Crusades composed of five books. Unexpectedly, the first book introduces a discussion of Islam and Mohammad which supports the idea that in order for Nogent to set up the Christian narrative of the Crusades, there is a need to characterize Islam and its falseness first. Nogent begins his

narrative about Mohammad acknowledging that he has no direct or experiential knowledge of Mohammad or Islam. Even though he declares his ignorance, he still crafts an elaborate account of depictions based on stories that he has heard:

According to popular opinion, there was a man, whose name, if I have it right, was Mathomus, who led them away from belief in the Son and in the Holy Spirit. He taught them to acknowledge only the person of the Father as the single, creating God, and he said that Jesus was entirely human. To sum up his teachings, having decreed circumcision, he gave them free rein for every kind of shameful behavior. I do not think that this profane man lived a very long time ago, since I find that none of the church doctors has written against his licentiousness. Since I have learned nothing about his behavior and life from writings, no one should be surprised if I am willing to tell what I have heard told in public by some skillful speakers. To discuss whether these things are true or false is useless, since we are considering here only the nature of this new teacher, whose reputation for great crimes continues to spread. One may safely speak ill of a man whose malignity transcends and surpasses whatever evil can be said of him (23).

Nogent uses an anecdote evidence to restructure and affirm the credibility of his claims.

Although his account is not formally witnessed, he still makes intense claims with his awareness that these claims are not grounded in fact. He relies on the language of collecting different kinds of narratives from different speakers in order to reinforce a reliable authorial voice for himself. He gathers and arranges different information “according to popular opinion,” assembles these opinions, and also writes that he will “sum up [Mohammad’s] teaching,” as though he indeed had the complete knowledge about it. He unhesitatingly self-justifies his narrative: “since I have learned nothing about his behavior and life from writings, no one should be surprised if I am willing to tell what I have heard told in public by some skillful speakers.” His narrative is oriented around popular opinion, reputation, and things told in public by what he assures are “skillful speakers.” There are different layers of questions about credibility here. Whether or not Nogent indeed heard these claims from skillful speakers, or whether these are indeed reliable speakers, they become an authority on his narrative. His narrative may or may not be accurate because the accounts he relies on are anonymous; he is nonetheless invested in showing its accuracy. By acknowledging his

ignorance, he still has an authorial voice and it gives him permission to fill the gap with a mythic narrative.

He applies this articulation to contextualize his preconceptions of the Prophet and the religion as a whole, and argues, “to discuss whether these things are true or false is useless,” and “one may safely speak ill of a man whose malignity transcends and surpasses whatever evil can be said of him.” For Nogent, there is no need to ask about the truth of his narrative because he already knows the Prophet is evil— or more than evil. He directly claims an archetypal knowledge by assuring that he knows what archetypal figure Mohammad was. Thus, describing Mohammad as unimportant and profoundly immoral ultimately invalidates Islam as a belief.

This rhetoric describes the role of mythologizing and archetype in establishing structures of religious otherness. Nogent categorizes the figure of the Prophet— and ultimately the religion as a whole— as one stable predicted identity with relationship to malignity and evilness. He decides on a false narrative and he embellishes that narrative since he assumes that he knows the Prophet. In fact, he does not only assume it, he forcefully wants to show that he knows it. In *Understanding Ignorance*, Daniel DeNicola discusses the interaction between knowledge and ignorance with a specific attention to willful ignorance, and suggests that “in a culture of ignorance, appalling ignorance not only flourishes, it is flaunted, even celebrated. It becomes an ideological stance.” (23-4). Ignorance, then, is not always a simple state or expression and it embodies the potential of an ideology that can build knowledge through lack of knowledge. The phenomena of using ignorance as a rhetorical force, and further emphasizing it in order to claim a subject’s insignificance, is embedded in Nogent’s account of Mohammad.

The willful ignorance that we can track in Nogent’s account has constructed dogmatic assertiveness in which Islam was seen through the blurring lens of myth and superstitious

practices. Nogent takes bias and places it as theory or foundation, and however blind it is, it gives him permission to build fundamental polemic archetypes from that. There is a deliberate awareness of the lack of necessary connotations and reliability, nevertheless managing to sharply construct a concrete distorted perception of Mohammad and Islam. In other words, he adopts a claim to knowledge by claiming not to know.

He also portrays and uses other figures from the Prophet's surrounding to put words in their mouths and make them say what he wants to say in order establish a universal effect for his narrative. He presents the Prophet's wife in the context of his depiction through a secondary narrative:

... she was married to her seer, and the formerly wretched Mahomet, surrounded by brilliant riches, was lifted, perhaps to his own great stupefaction, to un hoped-for power. And since the vessel of a single bed frequently received their sexual exchanges, the famous prophet contracted the disease of epilepsy, which we call, in ordinary language, falling sickness; he often suffered terribly while the terrified prophetess watched his eyes turning upward, his face twisting, his lips foaming, his teeth grinding. Frightened by this unexpected turn of events, she hurried to the hermit, accusing him of the misfortune which was happening to her. Disturbed and bitter in her heart, she said that she would prefer to die rather than to endure an execrable marriage to a madman (23).

A considerable number of archetypal figurations are circulating in this passage. The way the Prophet's marriage and the figure of his wife are utilized to eventually say that Mohammad is simply a "madman," further defames and reduces the Prophet's figure. Mohammad's wife, Khadija Umm-Al-Mu'minīn (Mother of Believers) was among the first believers and supporters of Mohammad as noted in the Quran. She was the first woman to believe in Mohammad's prophecy when he came to her terrified after the first revelation.⁷ The prophet in the Hadith says, "she believed in me when no one else did; she accepted Islam when people rejected me; and she helped and comforted me when there was no one else to lend me a helping hand" (Al-Bukhari).⁸ However, the figure of Khadija and her marriage to the

⁷ Sūrat al-Muddathir in the Quran.

⁸ Ibn Al-Atheer, Ali. *Usd al-Ghabah*. Vol. 5. Cairo: Dar Ihya Al-Turath Al-Aaraby, 1996.

Prophet were highly misrepresented in many different Western narratives of Islam across different times. In medieval narratives particularly, the accounts of Mohammad are “worth examining for the intricacy with which they develop an image of the Prophet designed to taint any real knowledge of Islamic theology,” in which the “figure of the Prophet appears both as devious, manipulative magician, and as an upstart slave who, due to a successful marriage, rises to power” (Akbari 224). Interestingly, Nogent’s account not only incorporates all these elements, it also carefully knits them together in a storytelling setting. The narrative is formed as storytelling with a high level of concreteness supported with dialogue and direct quotations. The literary devices help in enhancing the factual narrative Nogent wants to establish, and to eventually communicate his essential ideas. In order to make his concepts more available, he illuminates them with mythic narrative. He elaborates the fabrication by making it appear and read more plausible. The effect of introducing all these literary devices represents Lévi-Strauss’s articulation of myth and the way mythic discourse is structured through the “linguistic ground” and the “story” it produces.

The sexualized figure is another sentimental mythic trope associated with the religious figure of Mohammad. Nogent deprives the Prophet of any possible religious value and reduces him to being only a sexual infected body and a grotesquely distorted figure. This is where the archetype becomes more and more visible because we can trace its continuity across different time contexts and different narratives, in both Alfonsi and Nogent’s accounts. Nogent ends his narrative about Mohammad with the story of the Prophet’s body being eaten by pigs. He does not only fictionalize and mythologize the figure, he also fictionalizes the prophet’s death:

But now to describe how this marvelous law-giver made his exit from our midst. Since he often fell into sudden epileptic fit, with which we have already said he struggled, it happened once, while he was walking alone, that a fit came upon him and he fell down on the spot; while he was writhing in this agony, he was found by some pigs, who proceeded to devour him, so that nothing could be found of him except his heels. While the true Stoics, that is, the worshipers of Christ, killed Epicurus, lo, the greatest law-

giver tried to revive the pig, in fact he did revive it, and, himself a pig, lay exposed to be eaten by pigs, so that the master of filth appropriately died a filthy death. He left his heels fittingly, since he had wretchedly fixed the traces of false belief and foulness in wretchedly deceived souls (24).

This scene is rendered as a tautological explanation. Nogent is certain about the filthy nature of the Prophet because he died the way Nogent believe he died. He associates this imaginary story with an interpretive value to confirm his assumptions that “the master of filth appropriately died a filthy death.” He uses the death as evidence to the circularity of his narrative; he bases the fiction he is writing on his preconceptions and also uses this fiction as evidence for the preconceptions. This is a mythic narrative in the sense that myth has an explanatory function through which it provides a narrative that offers an explanation for the unexplained or the unexplainable. The figuration of the pig or the swine as the cause of the Prophet’s death, is an interesting mediator between different religious frameworks. Pigs indicate different things in Islam and also in Judaism than they do in Christianity. They have different archetypal meanings or comparative values, and in Nogent’s account, the Christian value is imposed on the Islamic restrictions of consuming pigs. By applying his interpretation of his own fabricated story, he forces the link between the death of the religious figure and the Islamic rules in order to emphasize the “filthy death,” which rhetorically corrupts the image of the Prophet.

Even though Nogent acknowledges upfront that he does not have knowledge and he admits a position of ignorance, his narrative operates in a concrete relationship to certainty. His notion of willful ignorance, of all the claims that he presents while knowing that they are not grounded in verifiable truth or authenticity, rather in a fabrication of popular opinions—are elements of mythologizing. There is an interesting relationship between mythologizing and authorship in his rhetoric. The lack of reliable sources or authors is similar to the way myth develops and circulates through the collective. His narrative produces a discourse comparable to the nature of mythic discourse as an indispensable abstract quality that

determines the fundamental character and substance of the unspecified or the unknown. He contextualizes his narrative as rumors or as popular opinions to socialize the narrative, and he weaponizes this collective discourse to allow him to make further fictitious claims. The anecdote structure is thus set up as an instrument to assist the validity and the truth of Nogent's narrative.

Myth as an Ideology:

Edward Said's definition of myth in *Orientalism* is a central vision through which the figure of Mohammad was viewed in the Middle Ages in general, and in Nogent's narrative in particular. Said describes myth as a system of principles and ideas — namely ideology— in which things “are already analyzed and solved, that is, it presents them as already assembled images” (312). This definition is process oriented — it describes the ongoing stages of mythologizing, with ignorance as an integral participant in this formation. We can trace this process representationally in Nogent and Alfonsi's narratives in which the mythologizing of the Prophet's figure and the religious traditions are intimately connected. Both writers assemble their accounts through collecting and presenting different voices and putting them together. Said points out the implications of the mythologizing process through the ways it manages to construct a physical realm out of nonsensicality “in the way a scare-crow is assembled from bric-a-brac and then made to stand for a man” (ibid). For a man to become a myth it means he almost becomes an archetype, and the figure of Mohammad in both Nogent and Alfonsi's articulation is literally man-made. Both writers perceive the figure of Mohammad, disassemble him as a man with particular foibles and behaviors, and then use that to build their own conception of the figure towards creating the binary of Christianity/Islam. The truth of both the Prophet and the religion are completely lost in this account. The medieval visualization of Mohammad turns him to a figure “viewed as the

disseminator of a false Revelation,” and “the epitome of lechery, debauchery, sodomy, and a whole battery of assorted treacheries, all of which derived "logically" from his doctrinal impostures” (Said 62). The focus on the religious identity of Mohammad and the attempts to devalue the figure itself, eventually produce simplistic archetypal structures of the religious values as a whole.

In the introduction to *Mythology in the Middle Ages: Heroic Tales of Monsters, Magic, and Might*, Christopher R. Fee defines the mythologizing process as a mechanism for founding and conveying collective legitimation: “myth might be said to refer to particular cultural manifestations of the collective unconscious that explain and/or explore themes of universal significance” (xvii). In this specific definition, myth is a manifestation and a core aspect of the “collective unconscious.” The establishment of myth assumes totality and absoluteness in its sweeping understanding of otherness. The dialectics of mythologizing is to present specific partial understandings as a whole, and the individual as universal, while it is not.

In relation to the role of myth in othering, it is important to center on the idea of the collective because it suggests that mythologizing is not a simple individual act, rather it has a larger impact on distinguishing collectives — and substantially othering. Myth had a crucial role in the construction of the medieval narrative: “medieval narratives tend to comprise a vibrant blend of the mythic, legendary, and folkloric, and it is not always easy to distinguish among these” (xvii). These intertwined archetypes were perceived as cultural and religious signifiers of the medieval literary texture. In regard to myth in particular, “the medieval world also developed unique mythic structures concerned with how the institutions of men should perform in a Christian context” (ibid). The relationship to religious otherness forces the development and transmission of mythic structures; it illustrates how men should conduct and fulfill their religious identity in correspondence with a contextual religious belonging,

which ultimately stimulates myth production. Myth, then, was used in the medieval world to establish religious identity and religious otherness, and written narratives participated in transmitting and circulating polemical archetypes to the collective. The archetype is not just of the Jew or of Mohammad — it is always in relationship to the norm and promotion of Christian identity and theology.

Both epistemological and practicable manifestations of myth, then, depend profoundly on the existence and the production of archetypal truth-value elements. Myth depends on the archetype and it also creates the archetype. The archetype embodies and conveys simplicity, and thus reduction. It captures an object or an idea that might be multiple and complicated and turns it to singularity and simplicity— and ultimately alienation. The production of archetypal religious images through ignorance is made possible by treating ignorance as a position of intellectual strength, and as a ground for saying something rather than a ground for saying nothing. This is an example of the process of mythologizing by virtue of myth functioning as an ideology. Myth is the corrupted knowledge presented in Nogent's and Alfonsi's texts. The seeds of myth are in the intersection of both writers' ignorance and claim to knowledge. The seeming stability of the religious archetypes is made possible specifically because these writers claim knowledge of the religious doctrines and figures of other religions, while they do not. The same structures and archetypes circulate in the two texts and they produce the mythic discourse through an explicit claim of being factual. Given that mythological formulations do not lose their essence across different narratives, they were utilized to control relationships to distant and proximity. Such attempts to navigate and discursively control epistemological and theological relationships to distant and proximate religious others were practiced and mediated through a deliberate polemic medieval rhetoric throughout the era.

“It is as if in viewing himself in the looking glass of art, a cultivated European of the Renaissance or seventeenth century saw in himself the savagery he feared to encounter as he set out on his sea voyages.”

— Earl Miner, “The Wild Man Through the Looking Glass”

The Discovery of Different Bodies:

Early Modern Pre-colonial Appetites and the Narrative Details of Othering

Travel literature is an intriguing genre with a very long history. It predominantly takes the form of a cultural narrative centered around, and profoundly fed with, the manifestation of otherness along with the complexity of “a conscious commitment to represent the strange and exotic in ways that both familiarize and distance the foreign” (Blanton 5). The conflicted co-existence of familiarizing and de-familiarizing other bodies is a very important dimension of a larger ideological understanding of otherness. Due to the narrative structure of almost all travel writing which is conveyed only through the narrator’s single voice that controls the writing, this conflict operates most clearly in the traveler’s gaze. The momentum of this gaze is ultimately translated into textual construction of other bodies and identities.

Travel-writing is thus generated with a strong interconnection between the traveler’s conceptualizing of others and the framing of the narrative, in which the encountered realities are represented through textuality. This interconnection is highly manifested in early modern English travel writing which was produced alongside a specific focus, force, and tension, as part of a global territorial, economic, and political expansion. Under this schema, there was a high volume of tension around different encountered bodies, claims of barbarity and cannibalism, and the provocative use of violence, which were all interwoven into the fabric of early modern travel textuality. These threads and categories grew to become scientific modern theories and relations of difference manifested in the intersection of racism, nationalism, imperialism, colonialism—and ultimately orientalism. Through this set of

present, yet at the time unnamed “isms,” English travel narrative developed and accumulated an extensive ideological imperative.

Postcolonial lenses examine these historic and much debated political realities of race and nation and the ways they are observable through literature and language, which in turn shape relations with otherness. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* is a major postcolonial study thought by some critics to be incompatible or inapplicable to historical periods that predate the historical frame of Orientalism.⁹ Although it is often suggested that Said’s arguments does not apply to pre-colonial times, mainly because the concept of Orientalism reflects the age of high imperialism, I propose that the connotations of Said’s discussion of the Western construction of the Orient are relevant and applicable to earlier time periods — and also outside the geographical boundaries of the Orient. The European perception of the Orient that ultimately became a cultural imaginary, had its origins and seeds in earlier times. Part of the roots of the construction of imagined geographies overall is manifested in the similarities between the cultural-political binaries Said explores in his work, and the generated split between the intellectual transcendental European and the corporeal “other,” as it was demonstrated in earlier European texts and discourses.

Said’s argument is principally about dominant cultural and political modes and practices. He introduces and puts forward the embodiment of “culture hegemonic both inside and outside Europe,” which is demonstrated in “the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures” (7). Said frames his project as an investment in the ways hegemony functions, and for that, he concludes: “what I should like also to have contributed here is a better understanding of the way cultural domination has operated” (*Orientalism* 28). He explicitly engages with the possibility of

⁹ See, for example, Nabil Matar’s *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (Columbia University Press 1999), and Richmond Barbour’s *Before Orientalism* (Cambridge University Press 2003).

establishing a broader understanding of the history of cultural and political domination.

Although his argument is focused primarily on the relationship between the West and the Orient, the overall historical and cultural understanding Said manages to explain and analyze, stimulates and advances the potential of transmitting his work and connecting it to the process of hegemonic growth in multiple different contexts.

To further understand both the essential and the ultimate structure of the colonial-imperial relationship to otherness in particular, I examine East and West communities as presented in early modern English travel accounts, and through postcolonial and contemporary lenses. There are specific distinctions, but also similarities, in the ways the English textual production articulated East and West nations. For instance, the travelers' view of others as cannibals was associated more with what the English have perceived as the "savages" of the New World, which deviates from their perception of the "barbarians" of the East. Although the English cultural lenses were not applied to others in equal measured ways, it still often served as a unified medium to locate other people in relations of inferiority. This paper attempts to extend Said's established interpretive postcolonial lens to interrogate the way the English pre-colonial gaze and textual formation shaped the figuration of the other—not only the Orient, but also towards other Western indigenous peoples. I suggest that Said's theory bears the possibility to be extended backwards and forwards, and can be applied to different historical periods, and distinct geographical spaces. In other words, it can travel within the specific context of travel-writing.

In *Travel Writing and Empire: Postcolonial Theory in Transit*, Steve Clark suggests that colonialism and postcolonial theory are not bounded in one static historical context, and that "post-colonial theory has made both the experience and the representation of transit a live and urgent issue" (3). Clark refers to the genre of English travel writing in its different

dimensions and time periods, and its connection to colonial and imperial advent.¹⁰ He suggests that travel writing became, by definition, inseparable from where and how English hegemonic ideas and realities originated, precisely because the genre's "representations of otherness themselves become a form of incursion and violence, of interest only for its relative explicitness in demonstrating the workings of colonial power" (3). Viewing English travel writing partly through postcolonial theoretical lenses, makes the genre an important part of the ongoing debate over the evolution of the colonial project, and as a consequence, "travel writing in its British variant may partially repay this debt by helping to define a before, during and after of the imperial voice" (4). In view of the fact that it interweaves the textual origins of a highly intense bureaucratic agenda, often related to critical and unpleasant effects—to put it mildly—it seems that English travel writing is responsible as an early participant in this ideological heritage. Whether or not we agree on the exact moment of the emergence of colonialism, we can see that the political implications of that era are firmly integrated into the literature of the pre-colonial period. The political-cultural-literary terminology of this interconnection, which was documented later in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was manufactured to a significant extent through the early modern English fabrication of a fundamental body of discourse—by the agency of what has been called "Age of Discovery."

In their global travel, what were the English discovering—or perhaps more accurately, what did they want to discover? How was early modern England, in the early decades of its global outreach, approaching and refiguring the newly encountered worlds? Who and what gets to be represented through the rhetoric of discovery, and under what circumstances? In an attempt to answer these controversial questions rigorously, I rely on textual interpretation and discourse analysis of what is commonly identified as pre-colonial

¹⁰ Clark mentions different chronological connections from medieval travel writing to the following establishment of mercantilism in Hakluyt's days, and into the subsequent explicit English colonial practice.

and proto-racial sensibilities, as the environment in which a modern rubric of racial difference was initiated on a global level.

Within the specific context of writing for England, their physical encounters were ultimately refigured and redirected through the writers' phrasing and structure of narrative. By restructuring their observations as narratives, English travelers established modes of relations with others through the exploratory nature of their travels. The language and the encounter intrinsically coproduced and co-defined each other. The encounter with different bodies often stimulated estrangement, suspicion, fear, and violence, which are located in the linguistic effects of the English written reports. By specific linguistic applications like frequent repetitions of the same observations and the use of metonymy (e.g., the emphasis on bodily consumption or cannibalism in order to suggest an intense relationship of difference), these narratives ultimately designated others' identities and cultures for the presumed readers in England.

The function of the language adaptation and the ways it works to construct and serve specific ideas in travel narratives, simultaneously, resonates into the history of colonial and imperial growth. The encounters English travelers end up having— or not having— and are ultimately narrated in travel journals or staged through dramas — rhetorically and historically feed into fundamental political dynamics. The adaption of language and the way it shaped early encounters through the English Renaissance was, and still is, growing and passing into a larger definable cultural trajectory of reading and marking different bodies. The questions of representation and language construction are very crucial to interpreting and attempting to understand the relationship between these political interventions and the literary aspects, most tellingly in travel writing, making colonial and postcolonial theories and studies vital to unpacking the dynamics of this complicated relationship. Postcolonial lenses examine the

genesis and the consequences of this integration through emphasizing the forces and the properties that stimulate the intense growth of these concepts.

I argue below that the language of early modern accounts with different peoples constructs a specific understanding of otherness and Englishness, and also foregrounds and sets the stage for the English craving for economic colonial aspirations and expansions. In his essay "The Wild Man Through the Looking Glass," Earl Miner intriguingly argues that "it is possible to see that trade was the basic justification for imperialism from the seventeenth century to this century," and this justification was practiced and fulfilled specifically because "trade was associated with the growth of knowledge, with civilization, and with worldwide relations between men" (92). The production of knowledge through trade and commerce was ultimately used as a vehicle for establishing English colonial purposes. It is possible to follow the trajectory of this global discourse through one of the most important books on English travel writing, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (First Ed., 1589; Second Ed., 1598-1600).¹¹ Hakluyt's work is a collection of travel journals and narratives including the journeys of such famous English explorers and navigators as Anthony Jenkinson, Martin Frobisher, and Sir Walter Raleigh.

In the introduction to his excerpted edition of Hakluyt, Jack Beeching states that "Hakluyt's master-work reflects the emerging situation: England, a naval power, will seek trade and colonies everywhere" (24). Hakluyt focuses on this motive in his dedications where he mentions several times that the English were seeking not only economic opportunities of trade and commerce, but also to spread their power and Christian faith across the globe. He addresses the Queen of England Elizabeth I, and declares that English men, including Hakluyt himself, "will most willingly at their own charges become adventurers in good numbers with their bodies and goods," and therefore the queen "shall by God's assistance, in

¹¹ Beeching bases his edition on both the first (1589) and second (1598-1600) editions of Hakluyt's work.

short space, work many great and unlooked for effects, increase her dominions, enrich her coffers, and *reduce many pagans to the faith of Christ*” (Hakluyt 37; italics mine). This is an important evidential moment in the text where we can see the fundamental elements that were essential to the definitive high point of imperialism. Through the explicit pursuit of exploration and commercial routes, Hakluyt and the work he produced, set the foundation of English imperialism that only fully comes to fruition at the end of 19th century.

Although for England “empire was merely a dream at the beginning of the seventeenth century,” it is still possible to track the seeds and the genealogy of its formalization through these early modern exploitations and travel reports, which produced formations that “were unstable, but not disjointed – they had a real existence, if not constancy” (Suranyi 19). Colonial and imperial aspirations were not yet fully implemented into practice during the early modern period; however, the fact that it was “merely a dream” does not necessarily mean it did not have impact on subsequent developments and realities. The imperial dream is a hypothetical notion of what was tentatively taking shape—a doctrine that was somehow and somewhere circulating. Because imperialism is relatively a gradual project, it becomes indispensable to understand the early stages of this dream, specifically through the beginning of colonialism. By virtue of this approach, Hakluyt was able to “collect accounts of travel to popularize and propagandize the explorations and conquest of new regions,” and these discoveries were perceived “not only as glorious adventures, but as imperial projects, that coincided with the establishment of outposts referred to as ‘colony’ ‘plantation,’ and ‘settlement’” (Suranyi 19). Alongside the regions, different peoples were simultaneously propagandized through a formal textual reproduction of fear and self-reflexive objectification.

The discursive representation as mediated through textual narration and throughout the English travelogues diminishes the possibility of a mutual multi-vocal encounter with the

other. By virtue of the idea that we have the traveler's single voice, the univocal narration through which the English travel documentation was exercised, profoundly shaped the construction of the encountered cultures.¹² I focus on the way English writers look at different bodies, behaviors, traditional practices, and cultural climates as a driving force, through which a disciplinary colonizing effect is produced. The premise of this argument is not founded on the assumption of intent, of how colonialist or non-colonialist English travelers and navigators were motivated in their actions, rather of the effect and the legacy of their narratives and the discourse they produced.

In what follows I examine a set of passages from different voyages in Hakluyt's text, and I aim to highlight the nature of the knowledge the English travelers produced through their physical encounters with other individuals and societies. The details of this knowledge, and the representation of foreign lands and peoples were vigorously tied to the English understanding of civilization, religion, national pride, and what they have perceived as the opposite of these terms and labels. These relations were established through showing or indicating that indigenous peoples are uncontrolled savages as Frobisher perceives the Inuit: "What knowledge they have of God, or what idol they adore, we have no perfect intelligence. I think them rather anthropophagi, or devourers of man's flesh than otherwise" (Hakluyt 194), or live randomly and chaotically, by virtue of identifying specific aspects of their identities, as Jenkinson describes the Tartars living "most idly," and "talking vainly" (82). These lenses were overwhelmingly portraying other people as uncivilized, unproductive, and Godless, and in specific cases served as a way to indicate that other nations were in need of the English hegemony. For example, in "The discovery of the large, rich, and beautiful Empire of Guiana," Raleigh proclaims that the Indians are unprotected from the Spaniards: "I am

¹² In fact, the history of the colonial relationship to others, and the whole concept of postcolonial studies, shows how the European encounter with otherness operated in a univocal system, in which the indigenous voices are either muted, or altered and utilized. See, Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" and Said's discussion of "containing the Orient," and "representing it or speaking on its behalf" (*Orientalism* 20).

assured now that they will all die even to the last man against the Spaniards in hope of our succor and return” (404), and therefore, Guiana must be conquered specifically by an English “Christian Prince,” and an “army of strength” (409). Whether it is to protect the Indians or to civilize them, it is still conquering—the effect is the same.

Through rhetorical analysis of these travelogues, we can see the xenophobic and ethnocentric discourses that make them historically relevant to the later foundation of imperial assumptions and justification of colonial expansion. This foundation is traceable through interpretations of concepts that became important to the colonial world in discussions of religion, nation, and the binary opposition of civilization/savagery. The question under discussion, then, is, how can we understand the beginnings of the growth, the nature, and the purpose of colonialism through the gaze that precedes and largely determines the discursive contours of the colonial encounter.

Discovery of East and West Communities:

Anthony Jenkinson (1529 – 1610/1611) was an Elizabethan merchant and ambassador who sailed to explore and establish a mercantile route with the East.¹³ Jack Beeching illustrates Jenkinson’s contribution to the establishment of early modern mercantilism in the East considering that he “opened up Russia and Persia for the merchant venturers and reached Bokhara.” Through the documentation of his travels, Beeching argues that Jenkinson “lists the many lands through which he has journeyed with a deliberate, resonant pride” (27). In his travels to Eastern regions, to Bukhara and Persia in particular, Jenkinson outlines the identities of the Tartars and the Persians to a degree that aligns with and supports the claim of English travelers seeing through a superior lens. Although Jenkinson and other English

¹³ For further information, see *Anthony Jenkinson’s Explorations on the Land Route to China, 1558-1560*. Edited by Lance Jenott (2001).

travelers observed Eastern territories primarily for the purpose of economic trade, their ideological lenses also reinforced a specific discourse of othering through narrative.

In retrospect, we can see how this lens influences the nature of the language and the typifying of the people in Jenkinson's travel reports. In the "Voyage of Anthony Jenkinson from Moscow to Bokhara," there is a cultural critique embodied in Jenkinson's careful anthropological examination of the Tartars and seen through the way his language is organized and structured.¹⁴ Jenkinson indicates the cultural gaps between the English and the Tartars by putting the descriptive language together in a specific detectable tone and diction. There is an outstanding formalized binary relationship between the corporeal and the intellectual in Jenkinson's narrative of the Tartars' habitual behavior. In a totalizing phrasing of his understanding of them, he states that the Tartars

... delight in no art nor science, except the wars, wherein they are experts, but for the most part they be pasturing people. They eat much flesh, and especially the horse [...] corn they saw not, neither do eat any bread, mocking the Christians for the same, saying we live by eating the top of a weed (Hakluyt 78).

Jenkinson's characterization of the Tartars is prefaced by the idea that they are unacquainted with civilized or sophisticated practices. It is the main claim he makes about the encountered culture, followed, however, by the exception of the Tartars being "war experts," which is not an exception that for him invalidates the initial general statement. Describing the Tartars' war expertise in this sequence is abstract and ambiguous. Although he credits them with one advanced quality, the estimation is diminished by the fact that his main conclusion is still "they delight in no art or science." For him, it is an exception to a rule that still otherwise stands. This enigmatic moment of appreciation is preceded by the assertion that the Tartars lack any intellectual or aesthetic understanding and followed directly by the implication that

¹⁴ The Tartars were a Muslim nomadic community who lived in the Russian territory.

they are subject to their appetites. The estimation is thus obscured even further by its position in this linguistic sequence. The term “experts” might suggest appreciation of the Tartars’ martial capacities; however, within the larger frame of Jenkinson’s narrative which draws distinctions between the cultivated civilized and the uncultivated “pasturing” nomadic, this articulation embodies a reductionist indication as well. There is a complicated discrepancy between the intellectual and the physical, the latter of which the Tartars ultimately belong to, by virtue of Jenkinson framing his observations mainly around the Tartars’ uncontrolled or unrestrained habits of consuming.

Jenkinson is invested in describing the Tartars’ bodily traditions of consumption as the primary marker of their collective identity. Later in his account with the king, Jenkinson writes that the king offered him food, “commanding [him] to be well feasted with flesh and mare’s milk: for bread they use none, nor other drink except water” (80). Two pages after, Jenkinson duplicates the same description mentioned above, while forcing a stronger link between the Tartars’ eating habits and what might be called in a modern sense—their national identity:

[The Tartars] be great devourers of flesh, which they cut in small pieces, and eat it by handfuls most greedily, and especially the horseflesh. Their cheiefest drink is mare’s milk soured, as I have said before. They eat their meat upon the ground, sitting with their legs double around them, and so also when they pray. Art or science have they none, but live most idly, sitting round in great companies in the fields, devising, and talking most vainly (Hakluyt 82).

Apparently, Jenkinson is focused on the Tartars being not artful and scientific, and ostensibly unsophisticated—and therefore not civilized. Even though he acknowledged the exception of war expertise earlier, the generalizing reduction not only remains, but also intensifies: “art or science have they none,” and they live “most idly,” putting forward a further explicit

indication that the Tartars have no life-purpose, motive, or foundation. His phrasing contextualizes the way he perceives the Tartars community and raises the difficulty of reading the framing of war expertise as a sincere gesture of respect or appreciation. Moreover, the content of this attribution places emphasis on the Tartars' lack of civilized disciplines. Even though Jenkinson suggests that war is a substantial thing, in the context of the body/mind binary he sets up, war takes a condescending register: the one thing that might be counted as art or science among the Tartars, is bodies destroying other bodies. They are not strategic thinkers nor artists—they are fighters and “great devourers of flesh.”

In the frame of reference to the binary between the corporeal and the intellectual, Jenkinson's fixation on the Tartars eating “flesh” has strong rhetorical indications. He uses a loaded bodily language to portray a “greedy” animallike obsessed pleasure underlying a human act. Even though his focus on flesh may not have explicit connotations of savagery, it still operates in a strong distinction to mind and conversation. Jenkinson emphasizes this distinction even further by implying a contrast between the Tartars' food and the English less “fleshly” diet. Of the specific English eating habits, Anne Suranyi writes that “one of the most important staples of the early modern European diet was bread,” (Suranyi 95). Thus, by focusing on the Tartars' unfamiliarity with wheat and bread and their “greedy” consumption of flesh, Jenkinson indicates that bread is a more noble and sophisticated food.

Jenkinson's visualization of the Tartars consuming practices, which are compared relatively to the English diet, is an index of both familiarizing and de-familiarizing the different encountered culture through travel-writing. There are instances in the English narrative that engage with the potential possibility of seeing through the eyes of the other, but these instances are minimal and simplistic. By virtue of the fact that we only have the traveler's individual narrative formalization, it can be debated whether these moments are sincere or not. There is a shortened moment in Jenkinson's narrative where the gaze is turned

around towards the English when he writes that the Tartars are “mocking the Christians for [eating bread], saying we live by eating the top of a weed” (Hakluyt 78). Jenkinson claims to represent the Tartars view of the English food, which could be interpreted as a moment of de-familiarizing English practices as seen through the eyes of the encountered society. Yet, it can be read as way to further de-familiarize the Tartars by framing wheat as weed. In other words, Jenkinson could be ironic and suggesting that the Tartars are primitive because they characterize wheat as a weed, which makes them even stranger.

Jenkinson reduces the potential of any human action to insubstantiality. When he describes the practices that might be considered intellectual or spiritual, he presents them as lacking any sense or meaning perhaps especially relevant to English practices. He frames prayer as just another habit the Tartars are doing while sitting down: “they eat their meat upon the ground, sitting with their legs double around them, and so also when they pray” (84). He takes a very profound activity and frames it as the same way the Tartars eat. We might expect the practice of prayer to appear in the sentence about art or science, but it is not — it is in the same sentence about eating. He criticizes the rhythms and habits of their normal life making them look only like creatures of habit, who make no distinctions between eating. In addition, when he says that the Tartars are “sitting round in great companies in the fields, devising, and talking most vainly,” he inserts a linguistic judgment that situates them as being self-absorbed, and their speech is trivial without sense, value, or linguistic force.

Even though Hakluyt’s text is pre-colonial, it manifest strong aspects of colonial rhetoric through a particular framing of both the physical and the lingual identities of the new encountered peoples. In *The Rhetoric of Empire*, David Spurr writes about the English demonstrating the general idea of others’ inability to talk well and to interact with the English, and therefore they repress the possibility of encounter— with the specific idea of using linguistic incapacity to show that others’ talking is pointless and uncivilized. Through

“the negation of civilized language as a faculty of the Other”, people’s speech and behavior were linked to the “incapacity to master the instincts and passions of the body” (Spurr 102-3). According to Spurr, this is a common discourse used to show that other people are not civilized—which is to suggest that they are bodily focused—while the English are the rational enlightened ones. The English want to show that they value rationality, that their speech is thus the crown of civilized purposes, rather than merely an activity done in vain.

The remarkable emphasis on the corporeality of the encountered other, is a common thread in early modern travel writing observable through the writers’ discussion of consuming practices. Suranyi suggests that “the representation of foreign foodways found in early modern travel literature were ideological constructions as much as verifiable descriptions” (87). There is a strong connection between others’ food and the visualizing of their identities and cultures through the English lens.¹⁵ While early modern travel was wrapped in an exploratory overlay, it makes a great sense for English explorers to focus on food habits; however, this focus was a significant part of a larger cultural biased context. Flesh and fleshly being and terminology as presented in English travel writing was to a great extent associated with reductionist and myopic connotations, especially when the exotic unfamiliar other was introduced. It becomes contingent of the way the English discourse functions through early modern travel accounts because the writers are invested in setting up the binary between the intellectual-spiritual and the corporeal-savage other.

Cannibalism is a complex act manifested in the culmination of this binary relationship. As one of the disturbing socio-cultural phenomena that receives an intense descriptive energy in the travelers’ rhetoric, cannibalism registers how the English encounter with others

¹⁵ Suranyi writes extensively about the depiction of different European and non-European nationalities, such as French, German, Italians, Irish, and also Turks, based largely on their specific foods and drinks as portrayed in English travel narratives.

circulate around the great anxiety of bodies being consumed— and consumption in general. In early modern travel accounts, claims of cannibalism were targeted mostly against the Western natives of the New World. Martin Frobisher (1535–1594) was an English explorer and navigator who traveled to the New World in an attempt to find the Northwest Passage.¹⁶ In “The Second Voyage of Martin Frobisher into the Northwest,” the traveler writes about his confrontation with the Inuit, in which he perceives them as Godless and cannibals based primarily on their exotic eating habits:

What knowledge they have of God, or what idol they adore, we have no perfect intelligence. I think them rather anthropophagi, or devourers of man's flesh than otherwise: for that there is no flesh or fish which they find dead (smell it never so filthily) but they will eat it, as they find it without any other dressing (194).

Frobisher uses the Inuit’s meat-eating in a forced violent medium through which he identifies them as cannibals. He writes forcefully and unambiguously, and his tone is condemning. The critique is bounded up by the idea that the Inuit do not just eat human flesh, but any, and all flesh. There is an implication that there is a specific food that civilized people would not eat, beyond just human flesh. David B. Goldstein suggests that “to think about eating was to engage in a complex set of discussions about ethical behaviors, and ultimately about the nature of the self in its relationships,” and within this emphasis on eating, alongside the recognition of self-identity as well as others’ identities, he argues, “eating provided a central means of understanding the relationship between ethics and community-formation in early modern Britain.” (3). In this context, Goldstein’s argument helps to show how otherness was perceived specifically through the early modern exploratory lens. The English overseas travels in Hakluyt’s text constructed and framed the collective identities of the explored

¹⁶ See, Best, George. *The Three Voyages of Martin Frobisher in Search of a Passage to Cathay and India by the North-West, 1576-78*. Ed. Vilhjalmur Stefansson. London: Argonaut, 1938.

communities, to a great extent, through the peoples' consumption habits and their overall corporeality. Within the specific context of the contrast between civility and barbarity, flesh had central anthropological meanings which were cultivated through both religious and superstitious connotations, as Frobisher directly assumes the Inuit non-religious groundless being and cannibalistic practices.

It is not an unusual act for the exotic indigenous to eat meat yet being intensely invested in portraying that as unusual or anthropophagi, says more about the Frobisher's own understanding of the inferiority of other bodies and minds, than it says about the natives. What these writers ultimately describe is essentially normal and mundane for the people themselves; it is about traditions, repetitions, rhythms and habits of their lives; however, those things are described in the English writing through self-distancing narratives, and as a sign of others' barbarity and cannibalism. There is a specific English articulation and understanding of the relationship between language, creed, and bodies being imposed on different cultural climates. The English writers attempt to show that they are more intellectually focused, while others are immersed in their corporeal appetites. These exploratory narratives produce an implicit splitting between transcendence/knowledge, and the body— which is most frequently expressed as metonymic descriptions of fighting, eating, and infidelity.

This rhetoric and its sustainability was co-opted to a larger history of racialized power structures and ultimately fed into the colonial mentality. The split between transcendental and physical realms was used broadly in the colonial world to subordinate and “other” people. In this specific context, Edward Said argues that the European discourse developed “the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient— its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness—into a separate and unchallenged coherence” (205). Along these lines, Said further argues that “the Orient

existed as a place isolated from the mainstream of European progress in the *sciences, art, and commerce*” (206; italics mine). Even though Said’s language refers to the Orient, we can see the same particular dynamics sustained in the encounter between Europeans and non-Europeans overall. In the transit between the pre-colonial era and the explicitly recognized colonial world or thought, this discourse of de-familiarizing and subordinating was operating on a larger scale and was applied also on Western indigenous peoples. The same binary opposition is traceable in Jenkinson’s account of the Eastern Tartars, and also in Frobisher’s perception of the Western Inuit. Both encountered communities are being positioned in distinction to thinking, art, science, and adequate or valid religious values. English travelers want to establish the idea of themselves as the civilized nation because they know how to speak, act, eat, and practice their religion. The newly-encountered foreign societies were considered and imagined to be closer to the physical world, and thus cannibal and bestial.

The intersection between their inabilities or unwillingness to communicate, and their biases and beliefs, produced the gap between others’ actuality and the English voices as mediated in their narratives. The travelers were noticeably terrified by difference. After a violent interaction Between Frobisher and the Inuit, two native men were killed and two women were taken into captivity. Frobisher describes one woman as:

...the old wretch, whom diverse of our sailors supposed to be either a devil, or a witch [...] and for her ugly hue and deformity we let her go: the young woman and the child we brought away. We named the place where they were slain, Bloody Point (Hakluyt 192).

The language and the discourse are intensely charged with determined stigmatism surfaced through hegemonic masculinity. There is no textual manifestation of attraction to difference in Frobisher’s account; in fact, different bodies were identified and defined to be beastly obnoxious, and those that were not rejected were “brought away” without comment. The

travelers did not see the unknown in its nature, rather according to their own fears and biases, and they eventually diffused what they perceived as chaos, in order to legitimize their hegemonic interventions. Norris Brock Johnson analyzes this initial momentum of confrontation, arguing that “Renaissance Europeans for the most part chose neither to directly confront, clearly see and recognize, nor to accept the darkened alter images staring back at them as they peered across the seas” (153). The genre of travel narrative claims to emerge from the noble desire to explore the world and to establish an understanding of others, whereas major influential English travelers continually de-familiarized, dehumanized, and demonized the different and the exotic they were exploring.

The perception of the natives and also the newly-encountered place was filtered through the English suspicions and assumptions about different bodies. The dynamic of calling the place and vilifying the inhabitants is eventually used to claim geographical property. Frobisher reinforces this dynamic in his account of the Inuit when the English kill the people and immediately name the place. They established their power and law by calling the place the “Bloody Point,” and making it a proper name. They declared it as the identity of the place to which they have just arrived at, and thus violence was used to define and reinforce their territorial aspirations. Robert M. Ehrenreich argues that “for the Frobisher voyages, the perceived threat engendered by the interaction during the first voyage caused them to accelerate their adoption of the militaristic and societal characteristics of colonial outposts” (118). By reason of feeling threatened, the English self-justified and formally textualized their colonial purposes. There is an overstated suspicion and fear of otherness circulating and being justified through a highly charged bodily narrative. Steve Clark argues that the historical foundation and advent of European colonialism “gives some credence to the positing of a destructive impulse within the interstices of narrative grammar, a genetic preprogramming to destroy.” Clark employs the metaphor of linguistic genetics in order to

emphasize the overall quintessence of the colonial cruel impulse, as it was manifested through textuality, in which “there is always a potential violence in the bringing of language: of reduction, of instrumentality, of intrinsic abuse” (15). It seems that those intense early moments of othering, then, by all sorts of forces, were laying the foundation for a much more explicit and absolute colonial violence.

In his groundbreaking essay, “Of Cannibals,” (1580), Michel de Montaigne offers a different Renaissance attitude to the societies encountered by English travel writers from the ones we read in Hakluyt’s collection. Montaigne writes about a European encounter of a Brazilian tribe and the tribe’s cannibalistic practices. In so doing, he re-theorizes the comparison between European and non-European peoples to a more sophisticated and hybrid conceit:

...every man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to; it is indeed the case that we have no other criterion of truth or right reason than the example and form of the opinions and customs of our own country. There we always find the perfect religion, the perfect polity, the most developed and perfect way of doing anything! (231).

Montaigne’s figure and writing are an interesting contrast to pre-colonial travel writing specifically because he was not a travel writer, and he was able to write conceptually about the encountered different cultures. His perception of difference is more interesting by virtue of the fact that he comprehends it conceptually more than those who physically and closely encountered it. On some level, this demonstrates how short-sighted and judgmental travel writers were because they did not perceive difference as difference rather as inferiority and threat, and on the other level, it might also suggest that the physical encounter itself brought with it threat and thus defense and denigration in the writers’ descriptions and perceptions of others.

Montaigne discusses the European gaze and the ways it scrutinized what was alien to it. He accuses Europeans of being unable to see the actuality and the novelty of others. He redefines wildness, barbarity, and cannibalism and other terms that came to be core value terms in European travel accounts. He theorizes the relationship between wild, nature, and civilized interventions, showing that European travel writers observe others only as distinguishably inferior in nature:

Those ‘savages’ are only wild in the sense that we call fruits wild when they are produced by Nature in her ordinary course: whereas it is fruit which we have artificially perverted and misled from the common order which we ought to call savage (ibid).

Montaigne presents the experience of an animated disorientation through his articulation of the difference between nature and wildness. He disorients from the sense of turning the unknown wild into a substance that counteracts the cultivated urbane. Both Montaigne and travel-writers are marking the same things— the cosmos of different bodies— but he values the difference he perceives. He does not frame a relational comparative reading of others’ existence, he imagines them and perceives them seriously as their own people, while considering why they might be what they are. He provides another explanation and reading for the English understanding of wildness, or “devilishness” and “deformity,” as we read it in Frobisher’s voyage for example. The real wild is not “the primitive” who is close to nature, but the people who have been influenced by the English barbaric violent behaviors.

The travelers’ egocentric tendencies and inability to understand others had a persuasive effect in infusing the persona of the grotesque, colonized other vis-à-vis propagandizing the fantasized image of cannibalism—and ultimately reinforcing it through narrative. The travelers were not discovering cannibalism, rather they shaped the figure of cannibal through a specific manifestation of the relationship between language and bodies. In her argument, Rebecca Weaver-Hightower examines the development of this disturbing

orientation with a dynamic analysis of the colonial mentality, suggesting that “employing cannibalism as a signifier of savagery entailed a certain amount of denial and projection on the part of the European imperialists, for European disciplinary practices themselves involved a great deal of violence to the body” (114-5). The intense physical language and representation became a means for English men to convince themselves that they needed to civilize the world — the primitive, violent, and bodily focused world — while they showed through language that they did not hesitate to violate others in their difference, or to justify violence against them.

We see the criticism and the focus on difference in moments that look proximate and perhaps caring but are ultimately also distancing and othering. These are moments of almost “encountering,” where travelers almost interact with someone as human, but they still do not approach a possibility of treating the encountered other as equal, as Jenkinson writes about the Tartars:

At my being [in Bokhara] I could have bought many goodly Tartars’ children, of their own fathers and mothers, a boy or a *wench* for a loaf of bread worth six pence in England, but we had more need of victuals at that time than of any such *merchandise* (Hakluyt 79; italics mine).

Jenkinson writes about the possibility of buying Tartarian children from their parents and this reveals how he sees human life as an economic investment. His narrative comes across not only as insulting, but provocatively dehumanizing. “A boy or a wench” are functionally equal to a “loaf of bread,” which is in sequence functionally identical to “six pence in England.” This is human transaction represented and symbolized through the pre-colonial rhetoric, not only as a mercantile potential, but also as an egocentric drive and craving for ownership.

While Jenkinson's perception of the Tartars distinguishes the English as the more civilized and valuable nation, his description of the Russians aims to make the English look like better Christians. Instead of focusing on their mistreatment of the Tartars, he uses the Russians' practice of authority to say good things about the English:

Many of [Tartars] were sold by the Russians, and the rest were banished from the island. At that time it had been an easy thing to have converted that wicked nation to the Christian faith, if the Russians themselves had been good Christians: but how could they show compassion unto other nations, when they are not merciful unto their own? (Hakluyt 79).

The main reason for observing the Russian matters is to make a point of comparison to the English. There is no description of the Tartars or the Russians as just other different peoples. Jenkinson emphasizes instead their national and religious identities as distinct from the English religious identity. Moreover, it is not just English Christians in comparison to the Russians or Tartars, but within the three groups there are levels. Both groups are less veracious than the English: The Tartars are a "wicked nation," while the Russians are not "good Christians." Even though there is hierarchy within this otherness, it is still consistently inferior to Englishness. Jenkinson wants to highlight the English self-esteem and their presupposition to bring order to the chaos and shape to the unshaped structures of societies.

During his journey in Bukhara, and on his way to meet the king, Jenkinson and his crew were attacked by a group of "men well armed and appointed, who boarded us, and began to enter into our Barke," and the English were saved by a Tartar who "was reputed a holy man, because he came from Mecca." Jenkinson writes that they were rescued by "our holy Tartar," (Hakluyt 79), and "through the fidelity of that Tartar" (Hakluyt 80). Here, one figure from that "wicked nation" becomes "their" holy man. He becomes appropriative. There is an abstraction in this phrasing: there is indeed an appreciation of the holiness, but it is an

appreciation because he saved them. It might be argued that the possessive “our” in this paragraph refers to affiliation and not ownership, and that it actually connotes a sense of gratitude. However, I suggest that within the larger pre-colonial context of expansion and ownership, and the specific reductionist approach of Jenkinson’s narrative, the “our” does not imply reciprocity, rather a unidirectional sense of utility. The Tartar is worthy of mentioning and consideration within the narrative because of his utility in light of Jenkinson's needs. Moreover, what would holiness really mean to Jenkinson considering his already decided conception of the Tartars as "that wicked nation" that should be converted to Christianity?

Even though the Tartars’ king offers a generous reception to the English company when they meet, Jenkinson still thinks that “[the king] showed himself a very Tartar” when he “went to the wars owing [Jenkinson] money” (Hakluyt 86). Describing the king as a true Tartar in this articulation is degrading— as though his identity embodies the meaning of dishonesty. Even after they were rescued by one Tartar, and hosted by the king, Jenkinson decidedly still sees the identity of the culture in an overly simplified, and thus insulting view. He does not see the act only as an individual act, rather as an opportunity to activate his criticism and to stereotype the Tartars overall. This is a further evidence to the idea that Jenkinson was observing Eastern cultures through ethnocentric lenses. His awareness of the king’s good hospitality and of his company’s survival at the hands of the “holy man”, does not prevent him from seeing the entire nation as inferior as such.

Even when he is supposedly praising the king, Jenkinson still constructs a reductionist narrative: “but yet I must needs praise and commend this barbarous king [...] and of such goods as were gotten again, I had part restored me, and this good justice I found at his hands” (ibid). This sentence is presented as a spur of the moment; however, it shows that there is only conditional admiration for the king as he is. There is only a certain kind of admiration that has limitations to it. It is for what the king does or does not do for English men. Both

instances of relating to the “holy man,” and the king, are being subject to observing individuals only as part of an entire nation, in which the good deeds still do not invalidate the overall simplistic categorization. They are a means to an end, a device to English utility.

There is a similar settled way of reflecting on the Persian culture in Jenkinson’s “Voyage into Persia.” The traveler’s close encounter with the Persian king contains further elements of the English othering rhetoric. Jenkinson labels the Sophy and his people through a totalizing narration: “this Sophy that now reigneth is nothing valiant, although his power is great, and his people martial” (Hakluyt 101). The Sophy is not a valiant ruler or a figure worthy to be respected. There is a spectrum to the way Jenkinson observes other identities where the distinctions between others are reflected through a complex rhetoric of othering. The appreciation is conditional, in which other peoples can get only conditional virtues:

These persons are comely and of good complexion, proud and of good courage, esteeming themselves to be best of all nations, both for their religion and holiness, which is most erroneous, and also for all other their fashions. They be martial, delighting in fair horses and good harness, soon angry, crafty, and hard people (Hakluyt 101).

At first glance, this phrasing looks like praise, but a closer look shows that the judgment and the comparison is smuggled in between. Although Jenkinson admits the possibility of the Persians being good people, there are still limits to that. There are layers in this description: first, he describes their good qualities, then he talks about how they perceive themselves, and when he gets to “which is erroneous,” the appreciation collapses. They have a high self-esteem, and he judges this self-esteem based on their religion and nationality. He categorizes them not as people but as abstractions of people— as a representation of a religion or a nationality. There is an intersection between abstraction and concreteness; he describes what they do in concrete and bodily terms, but he describes who they are in purely abstract terms.

He is not just judging them, rather he judges how they judge themselves. By criticizing the Persians for having an inflated self-esteem, Jenkinson is suggesting or implying that the English self-esteem corresponds with and matches what they are, and their level of holiness and courage— whereas the Persians think they are holy, but they are not. He characterizes them for not having a legitimate religious belief or practice and that they are immensely and unjustifiably proud of themselves. Jenkinson's view and critique of both the Persians and the Tartars shows that he lays great emphasis on the English homogeneous supremacy as a religious-political entity. What he ultimately cares about is Englishness. It is a project about promoting Englishness.

Pre-Colonial Efforts in the West:

In early modern period, the investment in spreading English ideology and economic exploitations— which eventually gives rise to colonialism—had diverse, but affiliated courses of action. In the East, the English efforts were leaning towards imperial mercantilism as opposed to colonization in the West. Early imperialism was thought about through the attempts to implement economic power systems for the English advantage in the East, whereas their attempts to establish colonial settlements in the Americas had a more defined and traceable trajectory.

In 1595, the English traveler Sir Walter Raleigh made his first journey to “Guiana,” a region in South America. After his Journey, he published “The Discovery of the large, rich, and beautiful empire of Guiana,” in which he enthusiastically writes about the unique riches of Guiana. During his encounter with the Indians, Raleigh offers a rich rhetorical representation not only of the land, but also its people. One of the main things emphasized in Raleigh's rhetoric, with a specific reference to Guiana “that for the greatness, for the riches, and for the excellent seat, it far exceedeth any of the world,” (389) which the English “were

very desirous to find” (394), is that Guiana was never conquered, and Raleigh desperately wants the English to do so:

Guiana is country that hath yet her maidenhead, never sacked, turned, nor wrought, the face of the earth hath not been torn, nor the virtue and salt of the soil spent by manurance, the graves have not been opened for gold, the mines not broken with sledges, nor their images pulled down out of their temples. It hath never been entered by any army of strength, and never conquered by any Christian prince (Hakluyt 408-9).

The passage is circulating and recurring patterns— it is many ways of saying the same thing: this land is beautiful, uncorrupted, unspoiled, and the English need to do something about that. He describes the country towards its untouched potential and what it exclusively contains to satisfy the English colonizing appetites. This passage shows the tension between Raleigh’s enthusiasm about a place that has never been touched, and his inability to resist the impulse to do the exact same thing that ruins it: consuming its resources. He suggests that the mission of conquering Guiana must be done by an “army of strength” and a “Christian prince,” or else it will not count. The mission of discovering the land and bringing back its riches is a holy mission that can be done only by an English Christian.

Raleigh also promotes the English as the more appropriate, effective, and legitimate colonizing power compared to the Spaniards, who were the regnant European power in Guiana at the time. He is distancing the English from the Spaniard’s cruelty towards the Indians, to highlight the English honorable conduct and merit especially so as to deserve capturing the land:

... as yet our desire of gold, or our purpose of invasion is not known to the [Indians]: and it is likely that if her Majesty undertake the enterprise, they will rather submit themselves to her obedience than to the Spaniards, of whose cruelty both themselves and the borderers have already tasted: and therefore till I had known her Majesty’s pleasure, I

would rather have lost the sack of one or two towns (although they might have been very profitable) than to have defaced or endangered the future hope of so many millions, and the great good, and rich trade which England may be possessed of thereby. I am assured now that they will all die even to the last man against the Spaniards in hope of our succor and return (Hakluyt 404).

This is a similar rhetoric to Jenkinson's manifestation of the Russians' mistreatment of the Tartars, not out of an absolute concern for the Tartars, but to carve out the prospect of the English superior power. Whether it is to protect the Indians from the Spaniards or to conquer them, Raleigh's discourse was operating through one impulse: to control and colonize as a Western imperative. His rhetorical strategies are an embodiment of colonial self-justification. It manifests an obsessive desire to take away the nature and the riches of Guiana— it is a microcosm through which a clear paradigm of the colonial growth demonstrates itself. It projects the aspiration to take over everything—not only the land and its riches, but also the people themselves, by the agency of the queen's name, and presumably English humanity.

In a similar model, Said describes the “spaces of weaker or underdeveloped regions like the orient,” which were simply viewed as an invitation for European “interest, penetration, insemination— in short colonization” (*Orientalism* 219). The pre-colonial discourse as it was operating in travel writing, likewise explored and used “weak” territories as a justification for the intervention of English hegemony and colonial power. Whether it is framed as conquering the land to protect the people, or to take over the place because the people are uncivilized— it is still the same animating impulse used towards the same end. In other words, the colonial enterprise is based on the notion that the colonizers can prove other peoples are in need for command, by themselves being in need for it.

Louis Montrose writes about the specific details through which Raleigh's writing surfaces his strong yearning for control. He suggests that Raleigh's perception of Guiana and

the Indians operates “in the distance, yet at the center” (4). Raleigh’s orientation pretends that the other is in the center and that it is the thing the English are focusing on, while his language reveals that Englishness is in the center. Montrose describe this rhetoric as a desperate desire to look unbiased and self-controlled:

Through this heavily mediated pattern of assertion and denial, Raleigh’s text voices the Englishmen's own consuming desire to consume the Indians' land and goods; it registers a fleeting intimation that the "man-eaters, and Canibals" of the New World are actually a projection-and, by this means, a legitimization-of the Europeans' own predatory intentions toward their hosts (20).

Raleigh complains about the Spaniards deception for they have “persuaded all the nations, that we were cannibals (Hakluyt 396). Ironically, he shows the absurdity of the English proto-colonial discourse of describing others as cannibals and barbarians, when he suggests how ridiculous it is for others to think that the English are going to eat them, and how terrible it is to be called cannibal by people who did not know them. The embodiment of this rhetorical practice within travel narratives had a grand role in the schema of facilitating further growth to the idea of cannibalism, in which there seems to be a decision over time that other peoples are primitive, cannibals, or non-human, even before the English encounter them or interact with them.

In addition to the explicit colonial intentions and declarations, there is what looks like a very sophisticated aesthetic perception of other bodies in Raleigh’s fixated language: “there was one as well favoured, and as well shaped as ever I saw any in England, and afterwards I saw many of them, which but for their tawny colour may be compared to any Europe” (Hakluyt 391). This textual moment provides conflicting signals: Raleigh is taken by the Indians’ beauty and shape, but he still compares them to Europeans’ bodily shape and figuration. His description suggests a moment of admiration; however, he is still unable to

fully express this admiration without qualifications. On the one hand, Raleigh perceives the beauty from the context of white beauty, and on the other hand, he suggests that the Indians are comparable to the English and the only difference is their skin tone. The same equivocal language is used to describe an Indian woman later in the text:

A stranger had his wife staying at the port where we anchored, and in all my life I have seldom seen a better favoured woman: she was of good stature, with black eyes, fat of body of an excellent countenance [...] I have seen a lady in England so like to her, as but the difference of colour, I would have sworn might have been the same.

In this portrayal, there is a great moment of similarity and proximity, nevertheless projected through a larger complex narrative of difference. This striking woman is almost the same as a particular woman in England except for her skin color. A possible reading of Raleigh's articulation suggests that the only way Raleigh can understand the foreign beauty is to compare it to white English beauty, diminishing the possibility of an equal encounter. Another possible reading might be that he can see the woman as equal to a woman in England while the only difference is the skin tone, suggesting a more proximate encounter. Either way, the white beauty is the only lens through which he can perceive the different beauty. Whether it is similarity or difference it is still ultimately spinning in the orbit of whiteness. In both readings I still see a potential of a simplistic non-encounter frame. The simplistic frame of binaries that keeps the English from having a real encounter, which is "us/them," "nation/nation," "religion/religion," and "skin color/skin color." Seeing someone as their gender, nation, or religion, —if they see them as that—there will still be barriers to the encounter. They are encountering others as an example of what they might represent, and they flip back and forth between those categories.

Additionally, the way Raleigh articulates his admiration is an example of the tension explicit in English travel writing between the way the genre of travel-narrative positions itself

as exploratory, and the way it is confined and enclosed. Raleigh's textual formation conflicts with the ideation of travel writing as a way to discover and perceive the different in its alterity. This is not a critique of Raleigh and his proto-colonial intent, rather the overall discourse and the tensions that it manifests. Because the aim of this travel writing is not precisely to enrich English knowledge about different cultures, but to justify colonial expansion, Raleigh's narrative reconfigures and presents otherness only in relation to Englishness.

This articulation and half-way admiration feeds in more directly to the identities the English want to claim for themselves because it tells us about which identity they value more. Englishness—or at this specific context, Whiteness, was employed to enhance the details of the difference through adhering to skin-color contrasts: “the English/European division of beauty into ‘white’ or ‘black’ not only served aesthetic purposes but supported an ideology that still continues to serve the interests of white supremacy and male hegemony” (Hall 4). And to go further with this point in regard to Raleigh's narrative, women from other cultures were reduced to being sexualized significantly through the colonial internalized attitude and externalized gaze. This gaze had a functional agency in determining a very strict modern reality of sexual racism, by the very fact that “race was then (as it is now) a social construct that is fundamentally more about power and culture than about biological difference” (6). The multi-dimensional validity and gravity of race as a concept that involves different aspects and layers of constructions, is present within Raleigh's rhetoric of otherness in which there is an interrelationship between ethnicity, gender, and skin color.

In Raleigh's observations, there is a constant fixation on national and racial distinctions manifested through frequent hints on gender and sexuality. He articulates his relationship to the place and the peoples—and ultimately to England—with a remarkable sensual intensity:

I made them understand that I was the servant of the Queen, who was the great cacique of the north, and a virgin: that she was an enemy to the [Spaniards] in respect of their tyranny and oppression, and that she delivered all such nations about her, as were by them oppressed (Hakluyt 388).

The way Raleigh uses the virginity of the queen as a central focus in his purposeful discovery is related to the way gender and sexuality circulate in his overall enterprise. On the basis of their analogical virginity and worthiness, a sense of natural mutual belonging is invoked between the “large, beautiful, rich Guiana,” the “land that hath never been sacked,” (391), and the virgin queen. There is a similar set of observations in Raleigh’s indication of the temptation to take the women of the land, while insisting on English innocence. Through an appealing flow of language, he attempts to demonstrate the English virtue as eloquently as possible:

Any of our company, by violence or otherwise, ever knew any of the [Indians’] women, and yet we saw many hundreds, and had many in our power, and of these very young, very excellently favoured, which came among us without deceit, stark naked (Hakluyt 396).

This is an unusual, energetic, and forceful way of establishing virtue. He wants to seem lacking intent while he is revealing more than he thinks he is revealing. In his discussion of “Black Bodies, White Bodies: Toward an Iconography of Female Sexuality in Late Nineteenth-Century Art, Medicine, and Literature,” Sander L. Gilman surveys the synthesis of the black female image through both aesthetic and scientific perceptions, which were interestingly unified in the way they portray the black female “as more primitive, and therefore more sexually intensive” (212). He links eighteenth and nineteenth century documentations and perceptions of sexuality on the basis of race, to an earlier history of examining the black female body, in which “the roots of this image of the sexualized female

are to be found in male observers, the progenitors of the vocabulary of images through which they believed themselves able to capture the essence of the Other” (237). The way Raleigh fuses together the image of the black woman, the naked women, the virgin queen, and ultimately the untouched Guiana, all in a persistent and articulate mode, is a vital representation of the way white European scrutiny mapped and shaped the structure of the explored-colonized world.

The tension at stake is between the idea of the theoretical exploratory nature of the genre of travel writing, and its practicable ideological and rhetorical force of othering. There is a significant connotative distinction between difference and otherness. Difference is the *thing* that travel writing claims to pursue, encounter, and sustain, whereas otherness depends more on positioning the Self and the Other in a distancing binaristic relationship. The textual manifestation of difference in early modern English travel-writing signals the travelers’ failure to maintain the concept of the genre and its claim to embrace cultural diversity. The English phrasing and narration and the ethnocentric content of that narration normalizes others into discourses of distancing and subordinating.

What are the consequences of reading travel writing in this way as a proto-colonial encounter? Of looking at people as categories and stereotypes? Or going out to the world to find the different exotic others, only to ultimately show that they are non-English others? We see English travel writers almost admiring or noticing similarities but representing a xenophobic encounter as well through their narratives, images, and sentences. We can see the legacy of early modern travel accounts taking a very specific ideological form through the textual construction and reproduction of non-English cultures and peoples. In multiple linguistic representation, these texts show how the other was regulated to a racial inferior other. The writers’ specific reductionist rhetoric ignores a true sense of humanity and culture

in order to project the English sense of being culturally superior, which ultimately serves their economic-political desires.

There are different geographical spaces introduced in early modern travel writing as for instance Raleigh and Frobisher sail West, while Jenkinson sails East. The specific usage in their writing indeed differentiate between ‘barbarians’ in the east and ‘savages’ of the New World, but it is still ultimately part of the same apparatus of othering through textuality. The binary between West and non-West is a fundamental instrument in the larger colonial narrative because it shows how the pre-colonial perception has constructed different non-English identities and regions.

English colonialism and imperialism is a process of defining English superiority by the way in which they perceive different cultures. In the larger colonial-imperial context of ownership, colonialism and settler colonialism is immersed in setting up the colonized other in lesser terms, and “thus the whole question of imperialism, as it was debated in the late nineteenth century by pro-imperialists and anti-imperialists alike, carried forward the binary typology of advance and backward (or subject) races, cultures, and societies” (Said 206). Bearing in mind that the English empire was ultimately global, it is actually relevant and important to look at the representations of both the Orient and the Western indigenous in compatibility. By showing how the same dynamics of representing the Orient also operate in a Western context, the function of the overall colonial discourse in its different stages becomes effectively more explicit. In the pre-colonial world, othering was the genesis of the colonial appetite for ownership.

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