

A Dual-Objective-Based Tornado Design Philosophy¹

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ABSTRACT

Tornadoes represent a unique natural hazard because of the very low probability of occurrence, short warning times (on the order of only a few minutes), and the intense and destructive forces imposed on engineered and non-engineered buildings. The very low-probability very high-consequence nature of a tornado strike makes designing for survival and reducing damage under typical financial constraints a substantial challenge. On April 27, 2011 an EF4 tornado devastated a 0.8 km (1/2 mile) wide path almost 10 km (5.9 miles) long through the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama continuing on the ground for 130 km (80 miles). This paper presents the design concept that resulted following a week-long data reconnaissance deployment throughout the city of Tuscaloosa by the authors. The dual-objective philosophy proposed herein is intended to focus on both building damage and loss reduction in low to moderate tornado windspeeds and building occupant life safety in more damaging wind speed events such as EF4 and EF5 tornadoes. The philosophy articulates a design methodology that is the basis upon which

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20 structural engineering was formed, namely provide life safety and control damage, but
21 focused at separate tornado intensity levels.

22

23 **Key Words:** Tornado; residential building; natural hazard; design method

24

25 **INTRODUCTION**

26 Tornadoes, like all natural hazards, possess a full range of intensities from Enhanced
27 Fujita (EF) 0 that removes shingles from houses to EF5 that causes total destruction.

28 Currently in structural engineering light-frame design, tornado forces are not considered
29 because of their very low probability of occurrence. This is the case even though the

30 consequences of a tornado strike are severe, usually resulting in a range of damage and
31 often fatalities. Structural engineering research studies related to tornadoes over the last

32 four decades has consisted of studies on tornado dynamics (e.g. Davies-Jones, 1986; Lee
33 and Wurman, 2005), wind pressure distributions (e.g. Lewellen et al, 1980; Kosiba et al,

34 2008; Kosiba and Wurman, 2010; and Karstens et al, 2010), and missile risk analysis
35 (e.g. Dunn and Twisdale, 1979; Twisdale et al, 1979). Some early studies also focused

36 on Forensics and design of structures to tornadoes (e.g. Minor et al, 1972; 1976;
37 McDonald et al, 1974) as well as damage prediction for buildings in tornadoes (e.g.

38 Mehta et al, 1981; Minor et al, 1978). Studies that utilized damage to buildings in the
39 path of a tornado to develop wind speed maps and/or assessments have also been

40 performed (e.g. Coulbourne, 1999; 2008; Prevatt et al, 2011). A substantial amount of
41 tornado research has been done in the field of meteorology on the occurrence and

42 formation of tornadoes (e.g. Forbes, 2006) but is not expanded on here.

43

44 Recently, Haan et al (2010) used the tornado generator at Iowa State University to
45 compute pressure coefficients on a small-scale model of a one-story rectangular building.
46 They determined that the side (transverse) wind pressures on the building in simulated
47 tornadoes were 1.8 to 3.2 times those of a straight line wind, e.g. hurricane, with the same
48 wind velocity. Components and cladding tornado-induced pressures are between 1.4 and
49 2.4 times that of a straight line wind with the same velocity, mainly due to the vertical
50 suction imposed by low pressure within a tornado (these values will be used to compare
51 failure probabilities for a basic rectangular building later in this paper). These unique
52 characteristics, together with the localized extremely high wind speed over 200 mph,
53 have historically made the design of building structures against tornadoes difficult to
54 rationalize. In this study, it is proposed based on a recent damage survey of the 2011
55 Tuscaloosa Tornado that the design against tornado hazard should be based on dual level
56 limit states, namely damage control for low wind speeds and life safety for high wind
57 speeds.

58

59 **BACKGROUND**

60 April 27th, 2011 saw one of the largest outbreaks of severe weather in US history with 53
61 confirmed tornados in Alabama (NOAA, 2011). The supercell that spawned the
62 Tuscaloosa tornado traveled over 480 km (300 miles) through four states, while the
63 tornado itself was on the ground for approximately 130 km (80 miles), starting north of
64 Union, Alabama and traveling north-east to Fultondale, Alabama. The path cut across
65 Tuscaloosa County and the study area is as shown on the locator maps in Figure 1. The

66 City of Tuscaloosa was in the direct path and was bisected in a south-west to north-east
67 direction as shown in Figure 2. The 0.8 km (1/2 mile) wide by 10 km (5.9 mile) long
68 buffer around the center of the tornado path became the study area.

69

70 The City of Tuscaloosa has a population of approximately 93,000. This southeastern
71 university town is primarily made up of single-story, single-family homes and light
72 commercial structures. The tornado's path cut through neighborhoods consisting of off-
73 campus student housing, single-family homes, two- and three-story wood-frame
74 apartment buildings, and light commercial buildings. The majority of neighborhoods that
75 were in the path of the tornado were post-World War II construction dating from the
76 1950s to the 1970s. Intermingled in these neighborhoods are newer homes and some
77 newer multi-story, wood-frame apartment buildings.

78

79 Over 7,000 homes in Tuscaloosa County received some level of damage as a result of the
80 tornado. Of those 7,000 homes, approximately 4,700 homes were destroyed or received
81 major damage. Ninety-five percent of the destroyed or damaged housing units were
82 single-family homes (Morton, 2011).

83

84 **FIELD INVESTIGATION**

85 In the days following the Tuscaloosa tornado, a team of researchers from academia and
86 industry assembled in Tuscaloosa to collect perishable data associated primarily with
87 wood-framed structures. Field data collection activities were conducted from May 2
88 through May 5, 2011. Approximately 0.8 km (1/2 mile) long transects across the path of

89 the tornado, spaced approximately 0.8 km (1/2 mile) apart, were studied and building
90 damage ranging from no-damage to total destruction was recorded in the form of geo-
91 referenced photographs and detailed case studies.

92
93 Data collection activities began each day by synchronizing cameras and video equipment
94 with Global Positioning System (GPS) units. Transects across the tornado path were then
95 investigated throughout the day. Each evening the photos and GPS tracks were
96 downloaded from field equipment and processed to create a nightly progress map. A
97 custom software program developed at The University of Alabama automatically created
98 a Geographic Information System (GIS) ready file of photo locations from the daily GPS
99 tracks and photo times. The photo locations were then displayed as points and overlaid
100 on a basemap of Tuscaloosa and the photos were hyperlinked to their locations.
101 Individual building damage was rated on an EF scale based on photo evidence and
102 specific buildings were identified for detailed case study investigations.

103
104 A map showing EF categories for buildings is shown in Figure 3 and available on the
105 web at http://esridev.caps.ua.edu/tuscaloosa_tornado/. The degree of damage observed
106 and documented in Tuscaloosa ranged from no building damage to damage associated
107 with EF4 level wind speeds. As expected, it can be seen from Figure 3 that higher EF
108 wind speeds (reds) tend to be located along the center line of the tornado, while lower EF
109 wind speeds (greens) tend to be along the edges of the tornado path. A contour map of
110 the EF wind speeds developed from observed building damage is shown in Figure 4. As
111 expected, the contours in Figure 4 show that the majority of buildings in Tuscaloosa

112 received no building damage. The area of each EF wind speed (in acres) is shown in the
113 legend in Figure 4. It was observed that the vast majority (86%) of the affected area was
114 at the EF2 category or lower (wind speeds below 135 mph).

115

116 **DUAL DESIGN PHILOSOPHY**

117 In this paper, a dual objective-based tornado engineering design philosophy is explained
118 that has the simultaneous objectives of (1) reducing monetary losses due to damage (D);
119 and (2) reducing loss of human life (L). While these objectives may seem an obvious
120 goal for any design code related to natural hazards, an acceptable solution for light-frame
121 buildings has not been put into practice by the design community. Consider that at the
122 center of a tornado swath for a large EF4 or EF5 tornado there is substantial damage,
123 potentially slabs swept clean of the residential building that once stood there,
124 corresponding to a degree of damage (DOD) of level 10. Moving out perpendicular to
125 the direction of travel of the tornado the DOD reduces at some gradient to a DOD of level
126 1, which is the threshold of visible damage (WSEC, 2006). It should be noted that the
127 DOD's are not intended to be mutually exclusive nor absolute, i.e. they can overlap
128 significantly.

129

130 There are two considerations or design objectives for a new tornado design philosophy:
131 damage (D) and life safety (L). This dual design approach can be achieved using three
132 philosophies, as shown in Table 1 and explained here: (1) Damage can be controlled at
133 lower levels of the Enhanced Fujita scale wind speeds, i.e. EF0 and EF1, through the use
134 of engineered connectors, design ensuring continuous vertical uplift load paths,

135 horizontal load distribution and load paths, as well as better shingles and reinforced
136 garage doors. This is handled typically at the component (C) design level, i.e.
137 connectors, single load paths. (2) For wind speeds currently corresponding to EF2 and
138 EF3, both component and system-level loading must be considered to enable better
139 performance. System level (S) performance is related to load sharing amongst wall lines
140 and distribution of the lateral load path as a whole throughout the building as a structure
141 is racked by wind and amplified further by windborne debris. (3) In tornadoes with wind
142 speeds currently corresponding to EF4 and EF5, the major issue becomes system effects
143 and other alternatives (A) to provide life safety to the building occupants. These
144 alternatives are safe rooms, underground shelters, and often basements, most of which
145 assumes total devastation of the main structure. Table 1 presents the concept of design
146 objectives and the philosophy aligning with each of the two objectives. It is important to
147 note that the dual objectives must be used simultaneously in building design, and
148 therefore so should the three philosophies that drive the design toward the objectives.
149 This will ensure minimization of financial losses when possible and protection of life
150 safety for building occupants in the worst case. No effort was made in this paper to
151 identify what wind speeds can be reasonably (i.e. financially viable) designed for in
152 practice beyond conceptual discussion.

153

154 **DESIGN OBJECTIVES**

155 Consider the first of the dual objectives described above, namely reducing monetary
156 losses from tornadoes. Engineering design can reduce and in many instances eliminate
157 the damage as described in Table 2. Each of the examples in Table 2 is linked to one of

158 the two proposed design objectives and best addressed using either: 1) a component level
159 (C) design philosophy, 2) a system level (S) design philosophy, or 3) an alternative (A)
160 philosophy. Specifically, an engineering solution typically focuses at either the
161 component level such as a connection or single wall, or at the system such as the lateral
162 force resistance for a building. Additionally, as one can see from inspection of Table 2,
163 an alternative approach for life safety must be considered at the high EF3 to EF5 wind
164 speeds. Since there is obviously no way of knowing where in the swath of a large
165 tornado the design building will be located, the three philosophies are applied at the same
166 time to achieve the dual objectives.

167

168 A survey on the performance of existing residential structures in the 2011 Tuscaloosa
169 tornado indicated a lack of continuous load path consistent with older construction
170 practices and conventional construction. It is envisioned that by employing the dual-
171 objective design philosophy, a portion of the damage that occurred due to EF2 and below
172 wind speeds will be reduced thus resulting in a “shift” of building performance from
173 current observation. There is a wind speed limit for which engineers rationally conclude
174 the alternative philosophy will be a more practical solution and monetary losses are
175 unavoidable for economically viable housing. A reduction in damage can be realized for
176 many buildings that have historically suffered significant damage at the outer edges of
177 large tornadoes or in smaller tornadoes. Consequently, the implementation of this dual-
178 objective approach will result in a reduction of the width of extensive damage along the
179 tornado path. Although the center of large tornados will still experience EF4 or EF5 level
180 damage, there would be a steeper gradient in damage reduction to EF1 or below after

181 moving outside the high wind speed region. In other words, an explicitly articulated
182 dual-objective design philosophy will reduce the losses for wind speeds below some
183 threshold while providing life safety at wind speeds exceeding that threshold. Figure 5
184 shows on the left a hypothetical tornado damage swath path and the performance of
185 current residential buildings and on the right the improved swath due to the
186 implementation of the dual-objective design achieved by applying all three philosophies,
187 namely component, system, and alternative.

188

189 In the following section, selected photos from the Tuscaloosa tornado damage assessment
190 are presented to illustrate several critical damage states outlined in Table 2. As illustrative
191 examples, design and construction features that may help to shift the damage to a lower
192 degree are discussed for each case and linked to the three design philosophies described
193 earlier, as well as the potential level of difficulty in addressing these problems with
194 engineering design. The potential level of difficulty in implementation is provided
195 because one of the most significant challenges in residential construction is altering
196 convention even when it may provide a performance improvement.

197 DOD2: Loss of roof covering: Loss of roof covering may be due to aging of roofing
198 material or improper fastener schedule. With high wind-rated roof shingles and correct
199 installation details, damage shown in Figure 6a could be reduced or eliminated. The
200 potential difficulty of implementing this component level change is low.

201 DOD2: Loss of vinyl/metal siding: Siding materials are often torn off by strong wind due
202 to geometry and improper installation details. An example of observed siding damage is
203 shown in Figure 6b. The space between the siding and sheathing behind it often makes

204 siding one of the first components to be damaged in strong wind, particularly siding on
205 roof gables. Hurricane rated siding installed with fastener penetration into studs and
206 sheathing material, can significantly increase the capacity of siding. The potential
207 difficulty of implementing this component level change is medium.

208 DOD3: Broken glass in doors and windows: The damage to door glass and windows,
209 examples of which are shown in Figure 7, is difficult to design against due to the high
210 debris content within a tornado. There is no economical way to strengthen the glass
211 components of a building envelope to prevent missile intrusion, however, the use of
212 storm shutters may reduce windborne debris penetration for lower wind speeds, but likely
213 not for wind speeds in excess of 140 mph. The potential difficulty of implementing this
214 component level change is high.

215 DOD4: Uplift of roof deck and loss of significant roof covering material: Roof coverings
216 are typically not designed for significant internal pressure. High internal building
217 pressure is common in high wind due to breaches in a windward wall as a result of
218 window breakage, and the same phenomenon is assumed to occur in a tornado.
219 Significant roof damage can occur as shown in Figure 8a. Specifying a design limit state
220 in which internal pressure is considered, and ensuring a continuous vertical load path, are
221 mitigation strategies. The potential difficulty of implementing this component/system
222 level change is medium.

223 DOD4: Garage door blown inward: Garage doors are a very commonly observed weak
224 link in residential building envelopes, as shown in Figure 8b. Once a garage door fails,
225 further breaching of the main portion of the house can occur because attached garages are
226 often frame back into the main house. With proper detail in bracing design and use of

227 wind-rated garage door systems, garage door failure can be mitigated. The potential
228 difficulty of implementing this component level change is low.

229 DOD4: Failure of porch or carport: A porch or carport is often an under designed
230 extension of the roof system that creates a weak link at the interface with the main
231 structure, i.e. where the porch or carport frames back into the main roof system. Poles
232 supporting porches and carports are often inadequately connected to the foundation
233 allowing for uplift and failure as seen in Figure 8c. Once these weak interfaces are
234 designed properly, extended roofs for porches and carports will withstand wind speeds
235 beyond 90 mph, perhaps even as high as 140 to 150 mph. The potential difficulty of
236 implementing this component level change is low.

237 DOD4: Collapse of chimney: With proper lateral load design, the performance of
238 chimneys in tornadoes can be significantly improved. Brick chimneys in old construction
239 are typically stacked bricks or unreinforced masonry and are susceptible to collapse in
240 tornado force winds as shown in Figure 8d. Designing for lateral loads on chimneys can
241 be addressed relatively easily in new construction. Making chimneys part of a strong
242 “core” for an entire wood frame building is also suggested. The potential difficulty of
243 implementing this component level change is medium.

244 DOD5: House shifts off foundation: Significant wind speeds are required to shift an
245 entire building off a foundation, even if the building is poorly anchored to the foundation.
246 An observed example of a building shifting off a foundation is shown in Figure 9.
247 Although engineering design can address the foundation slippage relatively easily, the
248 level of lateral force may just damage the other structural components if the foundation
249 holds. The design of the foundation and anchors must be done in coordination with

250 structural lateral force resisting systems similar to earthquake systems. The potential
251 difficulty of implementing this system level change is medium.

252 DOD6: Large sections of roof structure removed: Failure of the majority of the roof
253 structure, examples of which are shown in Figure 10, may be mitigated through the use of
254 connection hardware and non-conventional member sizes for roof trusses. This may be a
255 good practice for custom designed or specific buildings. The potential difficulty of
256 implementing this system level change is medium.

257 DOD7: Exterior walls collapsed: A safe room or shelter is the best means of protecting
258 the lives of the occupants in the event of wind speeds in excess of 160 mph (e.g. DOD7-
259 DOD10). The majority of exterior walls of a wood framed structure will collapse in wind
260 with speeds in excess of 160 mph. An observed example of a building where the exterior
261 walls collapsed is shown in Figure 11. The potential difficulty of implementing this
262 system level and alternative method change is high.

263 DOD8: Most walls collapsed: An observed example of a building where most of the
264 walls collapsed is shown in Figure 12.

265 DOD10: Slab swept clean: An example of an entire building blown away, leaving only the
266 slab, is shown in Figure 13. The building in Figure 13 was a newly constructed
267 apartment complex built in 2010. Note that even the linoleum on the floor was peeled up
268 from the tornado.

269

270 From the discussion on DOD levels observed during the Tuscaloosa investigation it is
271 clear that there are design measures one can take to reduce or eliminate certain levels of
272 tornado damage on the outside edge of a tornado path. It is believed by the authors that a

273 residential building at the center of a strong tornado cannot be designed economically to
274 withstand tornado loads. The authors strongly believe that this does not justify ignoring
275 the engineering measures that can be taken to reduce tornado damage for regions under
276 certain threshold level, e.g. 135 mph, which is the vast majority of the tornado affected
277 region, according to the survey results from the Tuscaloosa tornado.

278

279 **ILLUSTRATIVE FRAGILITIES**

280 In order to illustrate the potential effectiveness of one retrofit or mitigation technique that
281 is commonly used in hurricane prone regions of the U.S., fragilities for two simple
282 scenarios are developed. The first compares two different roof nail patterns where one is
283 representative of standard coastal construction and one represents poor construction in
284 which some field nails were missed underscoring the need for quality. The second
285 compares the failure probability of a single and dual hurricane clip in both a hurricane
286 and a tornado to typical toe-nailing. The house used in this example is intended solely
287 for illustration and included four basic rooms. The plan and dimensions of the house are
288 shown in Figure 14. The house roof is sheathed with 1.22m x 2.44m (4ft×8ft) oriented
289 strand board (OSB) with a thickness of 12mm (15/32 inches). The roof-sheathing panels
290 are attached to two truss members by 8d-box nails (6cm [2.375 in] long, 0.287cm [0.113
291 in] in diameter). Two roof-sheathing nail patterns were investigated in this example
292 within the context of tornado and hurricane winds: 15cm/30cm (6"/12") (6 inches
293 between edge nails and 12 inches between field nails) and 15cm/61cm (6"/24"). The
294 latter of these is used here to represent poorer construction where not all roof sheathing

295 nails hit the truss. Roof trusses are placed at 60 cm (24 inches) on center and connected
296 to the walls by H2.5 hurricane clips.

297 In order to compare the probability of failure for roof-sheathing panels or roof-to-wall
298 connections (hurricane clip) between a hurricane and a tornado, a fragility analysis was
299 conducted in this example. In general, the failure probability can be defined through the
300 expression of the following limit state function:

$$301 \quad P[G(X) < 0] = \sum_y P[G(X) < 0 | D = y] P[D = y] \quad (1)$$

302 where D is the random variable representing the demand on the system (e.g., 3-sec gust
303 wind speed) and $P[D = y]$ is the natural hazard probability, $P[G(X) < 0 | D = y]$ is the
304 conditional limit state probability, and denotes the so-called fragility (Ellingwood et al,
305 2004).

306 The limit state describing roof panel uplift failure involves wind load and dead load and
307 is expressed as (Ellingwood et al., 2004):

$$308 \quad G(R, W, D) = R - (W - D) \quad (2)$$

309 where R is the resistance of the roof panel or hurricane clip to uplift (Table 3), W is the
310 uplift wind load and D is the dead load on the panel. The wind load applied on low-rise
311 building components and cladding can be computed as:

$$312 \quad W = q_h [GC_p - GC_{pi}] \quad (3)$$

313 where q_h is velocity pressure evaluated at mean roof height, G is gust factor, C_p is
314 external pressure coefficient and C_{pi} is internal pressure coefficient. Equation (3) is used
315 to calculate the wind load induced by hurricane wind. In order to approximate tornado
316 wind, the total pressure coefficient is scaled by a factor H to account for the increase in
317 vertical wind velocity pressure:

$$318 \quad W = q_h H [GC_p - GC_{pi}] \quad (4)$$

319 In this example, the factor H is treated as a random variable and its density function is
320 assumed to be uniformly distributed over a range [1.4, 2.4] for components and cladding
321 and [1.8, 3.2] for the main uplift wind resisting system based on the work by Haan et al,
322 (2010). It should be noted that the pressure coefficient on the components and cladding
323 is still larger than the main wind force resisting system even when the factor H is applied.
324 The velocity pressure is calculated following ASCE-7 (2010) as:

$$325 \quad q_h = 0.00256 K_h \cdot K_{zt} \cdot K_d \cdot V^2 \quad (5)$$

326 where K_h is the exposure factor, K_{zt} is the topographic factor (taken equal to unity so as
327 not to make the results dependent on local topography surrounding the building); and K_d
328 is the directional factor (it is assumed that the wind direction is known and K_d is set to
329 unity); and V is basic wind speed. R , D , GC_p , GC_{pi} , and K_h are taken as random variables
330 in reliability analysis. The mean value of GC_p was evaluated by wind tunnel tests (Datin
331 and Prevatt 2009). Statistics of random variables for wind load and dead load are
332 presented in Table 4. It is observed from the wind tunnel test data that the largest wind
333 pressure coefficient occurs on the roof at panel B (Figure 15) with wind direction

334 $\alpha_{wind} = 45^\circ$ ($C_p = 2.3$). For wind direction $\alpha_{wind} = 0^\circ$, the largest wind pressure coefficient
335 is at the panel A ($C_p = 1.47$).

336 Figure 15 shows the fragility curves of the two panels with different nail patterns under
337 the wind load induced by hurricane wind and the approximate tornado wind loading. It
338 can be seen from Figure 15 that the lowest risk of failure is for panel A, nail pattern
339 15cm/30cm (6"/12") under the hurricane wind (the far-end curve on the right). If this
340 panel is subjected to the approximated tornado wind, the fragility shifts to the left and is
341 indicated by the large bold curve. Comparing these two curves, one can see that panel A
342 with nail pattern 15cm/30cm (6"/12") almost has zero probability of failure at hurricane
343 wind $V = 224$ kph (140 mph), but this panel has a probability of failure of 30% if it is
344 under a tornado wind with the same wind velocity. The worst case is panel B with a nail
345 pattern of 15cm/61cm (6"/24") under tornado wind, whose fragility curve is represented
346 by the curve on the far-left end. One can see that this panel has less than 10% failure
347 probability under hurricane wind velocity 150 kph (93 mph), but 63% probability of
348 failure if the house is subjected to a tornado with the same wind velocity (approximately
349 an EF1 tornado wind speed).

350 A fragility analysis was also used to illustrate the failure of the roof-to-wall connection.
351 This roof-to-wall connection is close to the location where the largest wind pressure
352 occurs and is shown in the inset images in Figure 16a and 16b. The wind direction used
353 in the calculation is 45° , which is the same as the wind direction that induces the
354 maximum wind pressure on the roof. Again, the fragility curves for a single hurricane
355 clip, double clip, and toe nailing under the wind load from a hurricane is shown in Figure

356 16a. Note that toe nails have a 67% probability of failing at 160 kph (100 mph) but that
357 simply replacing them with a single H2.5 hurricane clip virtually eliminates the
358 likelihood of failure. In a tornado, recall from the earlier discussion that the uplift and
359 other pressures are higher than a straight line wind and thus the amplification factor was
360 modeled as a uniformly distributed random variable based on the range given by Haan et
361 al (2010). Although this is approximate and clearly additional work is needed, it is
362 applied here to help introduce the additional uncertainty associated with tornado wind
363 loading into the resulting fragilities. It can be seen that if the roof truss is connected to
364 the wall with a H2.5 hurricane clip, the probability of failure for the hurricane clip is
365 about 49% to 89% if loaded by an EF2 tornado (expected wind speed range of 111 – 135
366 mph). If two H2.5 hurricane clips are used, and assuming the wood truss can develop the
367 full force in the connectors, there is only approximately a 2% to 18% failure probability
368 in an EF2 tornado. This illustrates the damage reduction possibility for a single damage
369 mechanism through the use of hardware. Finally, it should be noted that in the tornado
370 pressure calculations the building was assumed to have been breached whereas the
371 envelope was assumed to remain intact in the hurricane pressure analysis.

372 **FUTURE STEPS FOR RESIDENTIAL LIGHT-FRAME CONSTRUCTION**

373 The low probability of tornado occurrence combined with the high consequences of a
374 tornado strike make for a very challenging load scenario to consider in structural design.
375 Unlike straight line winds, it is difficult to attach a specific probability to tornado wind
376 speed at a specific building site because of the low occurrence rate. There are also studies
377 (e.g. Haan et al, 2010) that show tornado loading has a significantly stronger vertical
378 component than straight line winds, even when the horizontal wind speeds are the same,

379 as illustrated in the fragility assessment presented earlier. Several critical issues need to
380 be addressed before the structural engineering community can develop and implement a
381 dual-objective design philosophy for tornado hazard mitigation of residential buildings.

382 Some of the most important issues include:

383

384 Issue 1: Identify realistic threshold wind speeds that a light-frame wood building can
385 resist. A systematic study needs to be conducted that focuses on the optimal threshold
386 tornado wind speed for which engineers should be designing a system. This requires a
387 thorough survey of possible improvements and design options that are practical and the
388 corresponding wind speed at which these measures will be valid. A study should also be
389 conducted on the cost-benefit ratio of these design options at various wind speeds to
390 inform the calibration of the new dual-objective tornado design philosophy. This
391 threshold is highly dependent on the structure type and acceptable probability of failure.
392 For economically viable residential buildings it is likely to be in the 120~150 mph range.

393

394 Issue 2: Develop a better understanding of the spatial characteristics of tornado loading.
395 The current understanding of tornado loading on structures is not comprehensive or even
396 comparable to that for straight winds because of the high level of turbulence and debris in
397 a tornado. This is partially due to the lack of experimental procedures to accurately
398 represent tornado loading. Unlike widely adopted scaled wind tunnel testing for wind
399 loading on structures and components, the spatial characteristics of the loading on
400 buildings within a tornado path are very difficult to experimentally investigate. In
401 addition, how the lateral wind pressure combined with suction acts on different

402 components of a structure is unknown, although some work has been performed in this
403 area. Applying design methods from straight wind cases will likely improve the
404 resistance of buildings against tornadoes; designing using realistic and quantifiable
405 tornado loading is most desirable. Studies on tornado loadings should be focused on
406 scaled experimental work, numerical simulation, and continued in-situ tornado data
407 collection.

408

409 Issue 3: Acceptable and implementable approaches in design and construction of
410 residential buildings to reduce tornado damage. A suite of design and retrofit measures
411 should be developed to reduce structural and component damage up to the threshold wind
412 speed. The measures for design and retrofit can be very different and may take many
413 forms including adjustment factors for loading, prescriptive requirements, innovative
414 analysis procedures, and additional load cases (such as the breached garage door case for
415 attached garage wall and roof design). Available products on the market for residential
416 construction must back measures that can be implemented by the current residential
417 construction industry, possibly with minimal training. Implementing hurricane region
418 construction practices and products in tornado prone regions is a good starting point, but
419 not necessarily an end solution.

420

421 Issue 4: Shelters or safe rooms for extreme wind speeds. For wind speeds exceeding the
422 design threshold, the alternative of a shelter or safe room can provide life safety to
423 building occupants. The shelter must be designed to handle both wind pressure and
424 debris impact as in the current guidelines (FEMA 320 and FEMA 361) to build safe

425 rooms and shelters. These can be built per FEMA recommendation and their increased
426 use should be further enabled in more for tornado prone regions. Shelters should be
427 included at the same time as the component and system philosophies are implemented as
428 discussed above.

429

430 **Summary and Recommendations**

431 TORNADOS are very low-probability but very high-consequence natural hazard events
432 which makes designing for survival and mitigating damage under typical financial
433 constraints a substantial challenge. However, a dual objective-based design philosophy
434 for residential buildings can reduce damage and save lives by focusing on separate
435 tornado intensity levels. The performance of buildings: (1) at EF0 and EF1 wind speeds
436 can be improved at the component level (i.e., connections), (2) at the EF2 and EF3 wind
437 speed design can be improved at the system level (e.g., shear walls, load paths), and (3) at
438 EF4 and EF5 wind speed life safety can be provided using alternate means (e.g., safe
439 rooms). The Tuscaloosa, Alabama tornado of 2011 was used as an example throughout
440 this paper to systematically explain the concept. However, several critical issues have to
441 be addressed before this dual-objective design philosophy for tornado hazard mitigation
442 can be realized, e.g., identification of realistic threshold wind speeds, better
443 understanding of the spatial characteristics of tornado loading, acceptable and
444 implementable approaches in design and construction to reduce tornado damage, and
445 implementation of shelters or safe rooms for extreme wind speeds.

446

447

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558

559 Table 1: Design Objectives and Philosophy Considered as a Function of Wind Speed
 560

	Enhanced Fujita Scale Winds (3-sec gust)					
Methodology Proposed	EF0 (65-85)	EF1 (86-110)	EF2 (111-135)	EF3 (136-165)	EF4 (166-200)	EF5 (>200)
<u>Design Objective</u> Damage (D)/Life Safety (L)	D	D	D/LS	D/LS	LS	LS
<u>Philosophy Considered</u> Component (C)/System (S)/Alternative (A)	C	C	C/S	S	S/A	A

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564 Table 2: Dual design objectives, philosophy, and examples of Engineering/ Construction
 565 Improvements
 566

Proposed Design Objective	Philosophy	DOD ¹	Damage Description	Example Engineering and/or Construction Improvements
Damage Mitigation	Component	1	Threshold of visible damage	N/A
		2	Loss of roof covering	Use manufacturer recommended number and placement of fasteners for high wind shingles.
		2	Loss of vinyl/metal siding	Use high wind-rated siding and ensure fastener penetration into studs (not board of any kind).
		3	Broken glass in doors and windows	Use hurricane rated windows and doors. This is not necessarily effective against windborne debris impact, but minimizes loss of building envelope.
		4	Uplift of roof deck and loss of significant roof covering material	Use hurricane clips on both sides of truss, 2x6 trusses, heavier nail schedule on roof sheathing, add blocking for short edge nailing of roof sheathing.
		4	Collapse of chimney	Better connection to the structure.
		4	Garage door blown inward	High wind-rated garage door and track system.
	Component / System	4	Failure of porch or carport	Ensure continuous vertical load path through engineered metal connectors from roof into foundation.
		5	House shifts off foundation	Ensure adequate number and placement of anchor bolts, use steel hold downs, 2x6 sill plates with washers.
	System	6	Large sections of roof structure removed	Ensure connection between trusses/rafters to wall top plates. Space trusses at 16" oc and line them up with vertical wall studs.
Life Safety	Alternative	7	Exterior walls collapsed	Closer nail schedule for shear capacity, provide full anchorage for all walls; safe room or shelter.
		8	Most walls collapsed	Safe room or shelter.
		9	All walls collapsed	Safe room or shelter.
	10	Slab swept clean	Safe room or shelter.	

567 ¹A recommendation for an Enhanced Fujita Scale (2006), Wind Science and Engineering Center, Texas
 568 Tech University, Lubbock, Texas.
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Table 3: Capacity statistics

Variables	Mean	(COV)	Distribution
Roof sheathing panel (15cm/30cm or 6"/12")	69 lbs/ft ²	0.22	Lognormal
Roof sheathing panel (15cm/61cm or 6"/24")	34 lbs/ft ²	0.29	Lognormal
Hurricane clip H2.5	1312 lbs	0.12	Normal
2-16d Toe Nails	350 lbs	0.16	Normal

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Table 4: Wind load and dead load statistics

Variables	Mean	Coefficient of variation (COV)	Distribution
Dead Load D	1.6 psf (0.077 kPa)	0.10	Normal
K_h (exposure B)	1	0.21	Normal
GC_p (C&C)	Wind tunnel tests	0.12	Normal
GC_{pi}	0.15	0.05	Normal

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
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
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
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
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Area of Study










Current Performance

Dual-Objective Design Target































List of Figures – STENG 1767

Figure 1, Locator map of Tuscaloosa County and the Study Area showing the path of the April 27th Tuscaloosa tornado.

Figure 2, Downtown Tuscaloosa showing the tornado path and study area in relation to major roads, water, and The University of Alabama.

Figure 3 Map showing EF rated photos along the tornado path in Tuscaloosa.

Figure 4 Contour map of EF wind speeds based on observed building damage

Figure 5: Conceptual tornado damage swath based on current performance (left) and after the implementation of the dual-objective design that reduces lower wind speed damage (right).

Figure 6: Examples of observed Level 2 Degree of Damage (a) loss of shingles, (b) loss of siding.

Figure 7: Example of observed Level 3 Degree of Damage, broken windows.

Figure 8: Examples of observed Level 4 Degree of Damage, (a) significant roof damage, (b) garage door blown in, (c) porch damage, and (d) chimney collapse.

Figure 9: Example of observed Level 5 Degree of Damage, building shifted off of the foundation.

Figure 10: Example of observed Level 6 Degree of Damage, large sections of roof removed.

Figure 11: Example of observed Level 7 Degree of Damage, exterior walls collapsed.

Figure 12: Example of observed Level 8 Degree of Damage, most walls collapsed.

Figure 13: Example of observed Level 10 Degree of Damage, newly constructed (2010) apartment complex with slab swept clean.

Figure 14: Plan of the house used in the example

Figure 15: Fragilities for loss of roof sheathing panels

Figure 16: Fragilities for roof to wall connection failure in a (a) hurricane and (b) tornado

