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Abstract approved:

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The Nobel Peace Prize is the most globally significant prize for peace, humanitarian and human rights activities; the only customary requirement when receiving the prize is to give a lecture discussing peace. Existing literature describes the history and politics of the Nobel Peace Prize, but the rhetoric of the Nobel lectures has not been heavily examined. This study is a rhetorical criticism using the method of genre description, in which the lectures of those laureates identified in the literature as "statesmen" -- primarily national leaders like Barack Obama -- are examined to find common forms, strategies and rhetorical substance. Two distinct sub-genres of statesmen-laureate rhetoric are identified: the first group uses the lecture to argue for strong international institutions, and the second group uses the lecture to enhance personal and national prestige.

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Peace In Our Times:
A Genre Criticism of the Nobel Lectures of the Statesmen-Laureates

by
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I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request.

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Peace In Our Times:
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Chapter One: Introduction

Barack Obama rose in Oslo's City Hall on December 10, 2009 to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. The Norwegian Nobel Committee had cited Obama for creating "a new climate in international politics" in which "diplomacy has regained a central position," and for "captur[ing] the world's attention and giv[ing] its people hope for a better future" (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2009). As he accepted the prize, however, Obama acknowledged that the Nobel Committee had provoked a storm of controversy when it chose him. Obama had been selected so early in his tenure that his accomplishments were questionable; but in the President's words "the most profound issue surrounding my receipt of this prize is the fact that I am the Commander-in-Chief of the military of a nation in the midst of two wars" (Obama, 2009).

What followed was a somber lecture during which Obama asserted that war had "appeared with the first man" and that "the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms" (Obama, 2009). Contrasting his position with that of more idealistic peace laureates, Obama said this:

> We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.

> I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King Jr. said in this same ceremony years ago: "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones." As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King's life work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there's nothing weak – nothing passive – nothing naïve – in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.
>
> But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason. (Obama, 2009)

Throughout his speech, Obama emphasized the unavoidable nature of war, and America's unique role in creating global stability -- "The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms" -- while challenging "the ambivalence of the broader public" who oppose the use of military force when it is used to further just causes (Obama, 2009). This was truly a different response to winning the Peace Prize than that offered by Dr. King or Mother Teresa; the latter used her lecture to discuss love for God and her fellow humans in a multitude of forms and to lead the audience in a recital of the Prayer of St. Francis.

The Nobel Peace Prize is the world's preeminent prize for peace -- in a sense, the only truly global prize for peace or service to humanity -- and carries

with it not only a large sum of cash but also a fundamentally unique status for its laureates (van den Dungen, 2001). In the contemporary media environment, from the announcement of the winner to the award ceremony and beyond, laureates gain international visibility equaled only by that available to major heads of state (and Hollywood celebrities), collectively constituting a "pantheon of contemporary heroes and heroines" (van den Dungen, 2005, p. 37). But since its earliest days, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has interpreted the concept of peace broadly, dividing its attention among pacifists, anti-war activists, humanitarians and leaders in nonviolent struggles for human rights, while also rewarding a different type of laureate, which Abrams (1984) labels "statesmen."

The statesmen-laureates are politicians, diplomats and generals, and include a number of sitting heads-of-state and others who have actively overseen forces even as they receive the Peace Prize. Generally, they are awarded for negotiating a treaty, helping to build international institutions or taking steps to resolve an active conflict, often one in which they were the leader of a belligerent party. Did the other statesmen-laureates deal with the Nobel Peace Prize in a manner similar to Obama? Did they also use the prize as a platform to justify their national policies -- including ongoing conflicts? Did they employ similar strategies to attempt to reconcile apparent contradictions between their and their nation's behavior and the ideals espoused in the Peace Prize? These are the general questions that inspire this study.

The significance of the Nobel Peace Prize in cultural terms seems clear from the enormous media coverage and controversy over laureates. The Peace Prize has also been explored in scholarly fields including politics and history. In Chapter Two, I review literature discussing the Nobel Peace Prize and the rhetoric of the Nobel lectures, and find that to date the vast majority of such material deals with the history of the Peace Prize and the decision-making process of the Norwegian Nobel Committee. Considering that when laureates accept their prize and deliver their lectures they become de facto public intellectuals and philosophers on a global stage (Salazar, 2009), there has been very limited study of the lectures themselves, of how the laureates philosophize about peace or employ the lecture as a platform. Two individual speeches have been subjected to the lens of rhetorical criticism and one content analysis discusses common values referenced in lectures, but nothing considers the various types of laureates -- e.g., humanitarians and statesmen -- as distinct classes with potentially different rhetorical goals, strategies and constraints.

Yet it stands to reason that the statesmen-laureates would face a fundamentally different situation in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, and in speaking on the topic of peace within the Nobel venue, than those who have dedicated their lives to nonviolence or the cause of human rights. For example, to condemn war entirely might appear hypocritical when the speaker commanded forces in a conflict; and a politician, even one inclined towards negotiated solutions, might need to consider the effect of their speech on domestic political

concerns such as placating hardliners to avoid losing power. Certainly these concerns may have played a role for Obama, as his speech included positive references to Republican U. S. Presidents -- he cites Nixon's visit to China and claims that Reagan's "efforts on arms control and embrace of perestroika not only improved relations with the Soviet Union, but empowered dissidents throughout Eastern Europe" -- while echoing, albeit more eloquently and thoughtfully, the Bush Administration's generally Manichean worldview and emphasis on the necessity of force in confronting "evil" (Obama, 2009). The statesmen-laureates might be presumed to have worldviews falling closer to the realist side of the idealist-realist spectrum; as global elites their view of solutions to world problems may be inclined more towards international institutions than the grassroots, more towards mechanisms of enforcement than towards the raising of people's consciousness and the cultivation of brotherly love. Of course, each laureate is unique, and moreover, the Nobel lecture places an expectation on the speaker to discuss peace. But as Obama highlighted in his speech when he contrasted himself with King, to be a statesmen-laureate is something qualitatively different than to be an activist- or humanitarian-laureate.

To treat the statesmen-laureates as a group and determine whether they employ common strategies or pursue similar goals suggests genre criticism as the most logical method to use. As I discuss further in Chapter Three, genres are similarities in form and style (Campbell and Jamieson, 1978), and genre criticism "is rooted in the assumption that certain types of situations provoke similar

needs and expectations among audiences and thus call for particular kinds of rhetoric" (Foss, 2004, p. 193). I begin the study with the supposition that the statesmen-laureates face a common situation in philosophizing about peace on a global stage while holding political and military power.

Chapter Four deals with the analysis of the lectures themselves, while in Chapter Five I discuss my conclusions and avenues for further research. This study applies the methods of rhetorical criticism to artifacts that are the outcome of political leaders faced with the need to philosophize about peace and conflict resolution in a complex rhetorical situation composed of multiple immediate, domestic and global audiences. It is my hope that it will shed light not only on the understudied Nobel lectures themselves, but also on how world leaders interpret and understand peace.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The Nobel Peace Prize can provoke discussion and controversy on a global scale -- as with Barack Obama's 2009 defense of just war and American foreign policy -- but relatively little attention has focused specifically on the rhetoric of the Nobel laureates at the moment of their apotheosis. By far the majority of material on the Peace Prize focuses on its historical development, and on the politics and decision-making process of the Norwegian Nobel Committee. I consider these subjects first, so as to understand the context and significance of the lectures and the nature of the common rhetorical situation they address, before turning to material discussing the lectures themselves.

Birth of the Nobel Peace Prize

Abrams (1984) describes how the roots of the Peace Prize lie in the organized peace movement, which arose in the latter half of the nineteenth-century. Although Alfred Nobel was not an active member of the movement, he became a financial contributor and sympathizer in his later years and the prize emerged from his desire to aid the movement. According to Feldman (2000), two conflicting trends shaped the concerns of the early peace movement: first, the unprecedented scale of the Napoleonic wars and the increasing brutality of smaller but increasingly industrialized wars as the century progressed; and second, the overall apparent stability and decline in the number of wars in post-Napoleonic Europe. In other words, war -- or at least war directly among

Europeans and their North American cousins -- seemed to be becoming more rare, but when wars did occur they were more horrific.

As artillery barrages replaced cavalry charges, and Sherman burned his way to the Atlantic, moralists became outraged. Moreover, as trade barriers fell among European states, profits and peace seemed to flow from stability and rationalists came to believe, as Kant had argued, that war was self-defeating in economic terms and that nations with close trade ties would not make war on one another (Feldman, 2000). Similar arguments can be heard today of course, but in the innocence of pre-World War I Europe it began to appear to a minority that war might be abolished, and that this might not only be a moral issue, but a matter of historical inevitability.

Feldman (2000) describes the socioeconomic dynamic within the peace movement's umbrella. At the fringe (and later, generally ignored by the Peace Prize) were those who saw peace as interwoven with issues of class and domestic power structures -- for them, peace would come only with justice and equality, and might require revolution to bring it; on the other extreme were those politicians and individuals with positions of influence within governments who tended to see peace as a matter of international institutions, such as laws requiring arbitration of conflicts; and finally, there were the middle- and upper-class idealists who could move among the politicians but who were relegated to lobbying and persuasive appeals. For the latter group, pacifism was a moral imperative, a matter of high-minded education that stood above mere politics,

and they clashed with and tended to sideline the revolutionarily inclined. They favored arbitration and also believed it would be possible to achieve general disarmament, goals which they saw as linked.

Nobel was a close friend of Baroness Bertha von Suttner, a woman very much of the pacifist-idealist school and one of the movement's celebrities after the publication of her novel *Lay Down Your Arms!* At her request, Nobel attended the Fourth International Peace Congress in Bern in 1892 and was impressed by the attendees but reserved about their prospects for success; equal parts cynic and idealist, he placed more hope in collective security arrangements than in disarmament, and as he commented later

> Perhaps my factories will put an end to war even sooner than your Congresses; on the day when two army corps may mutually annihilate each other in a second, probably all civilized nations will recoil with horror and disband their troops. (in Abrams, 1984, p. 2)

Nonetheless, he sent checks to support the movement and began discussing the idea of a prize to reward or foster peace activism. By 1895 he had completed a will that bequeathed his fortune for the establishment of a fund whose interest would be "annually distributed in the form of prizes to those who, during the preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind" ("Excerpt from the Will of Alfred Nobel").

Upon his death the following year, Nobel's will triggered a controversy. The great inventor and businessman had come to distrust lawyers and had drafted his will alone, naming institutions such as the Swedish Academy to award

his prizes but without informing them in advance nor specifying anyone to oversee the creation of the investment fund (Abrams, 1984). His will was contested and substantial legal maneuvering by his executors was necessary to maintain his vision.

The prizes for physics, chemistry, physiology and medicine, and literature, to be awarded by Swedish institutes, were not in themselves particularly controversial. But the prize for accomplishments in peace created a larger problem. Awarded to "the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses," it was inherently political in nature. It carried with it basic value judgments about the affairs of nation-states and human conduct which were definitely not shared by most kings and politicians. Moreover, Nobel had specified that the Peace Prize would be awarded "by a committee of five persons to be elected by the Norwegian Storting [Parliament]" ("Excerpt from the Will of Alfred Nobel").

Sverdrup (1984) considers the question of why Nobel choose Norway's Parliament to oversee the Peace Prize; he concludes that it must remain a matter of speculation, although it is possibly because the Storting was noted for being a strong advocate of international arbitration and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and because Norway has been historically more prone to neutrality than Sweden. Whatever Nobel's reasons, his vision ran afoul of contemporary political reality, because Norway was then part of the Kingdom of Sweden and there was a

growing independence movement. Swedish conservatives criticized Nobel's will on patriotic grounds and -- more significantly -- feared that the Peace Prize would be used politically by Norway's pro-independence faction to gain international recognition and support. The King of Sweden personally pressured Nobel's executors: Nobel had, the king claimed, "been influenced by 'peace fanatics and particularly by women,'" and for the good of Sweden his "'fantastic ideas'" should be ignored (Abrams, 1984, p. 4).

By 1900 however, after significant legal and political negotiation, King Oscar of Sweden approved statutes establishing the Nobel Foundation and setting down the rules by which the prizes were to be implemented. In certain notable ways the prizes were modified from Nobel's original intent as a result of compromises with the institutions selected to award them and with the Swedish government. Abrams (1984) notes the following substantive alterations: prizes could now be divided into up to three parts, and could be awarded to institutions and organizations; selection committees could elect to not award a prize if they concluded no deserving candidate was available; where Nobel had specified that prizes were to be awarded for work done in the "preceding year," the governing statutes interpreted this as referring to recent accomplishments, or accomplishments whose significance had recently become evident; and the statutes enabled posthumous awards and the passage of awards to heirs.

While some of these changes were simply practical necessities, others implied a shift in the prizes' intent and function. Abrams (1984) emphasizes that

Nobel had been partly influenced by von Suttner's argument that the peace movement did not need the honor or incentive of a prize but rather financial support, and that witnesses to Nobel's will testified that Nobel did not want to "'reward work that had been done,'" but rather to "'place those whose work showed promise in a position of such *complete independence* that they would in the future be able to devote their whole energies to their work'" (Abrams, 1984, p. 3). Dividing the prize and awarding it to institutions meant that the emphasis was no longer on the creation of what were essentially lifetime grants to "dreamers" (Abrams, 1984). And although the posthumous awards clause was later amended, in Abrams' words "the very presence of such a provision in the original statutes, however, is an indication of a disposition to treat the Nobel prize as rather an honor than a financial help for the laureate" (1984, p. 6).

Nonetheless, Nobel's prizes had survived their initial crisis and passed through the legal and political hoops that might have prevented their ever becoming a reality. The scientific and literary prizes went their own ways, while the Peace Prize began its own evolution as the most violent century in history unfolded. So far however, the literature dealing with the earliest history of the Peace Prize describes an ambitious but poorly planned or developed attempt on Nobel's part to advance humanity by enabling promising but underfunded dreamers to further their work. By leaving so much about the prizes unspecified, they quickly took on a different character as they were shaped by political concerns within the Kingdom of Sweden; and as the next section discusses, the

Peace Prize would soon begin to expand its conceptualization of peace beyond the organized peace movement, and to reflect Norway's foreign policy concerns.

Early Precedents (1901-1914)

The organized peace movement had celebrated the announcement of Nobel's will because it promised both greater prestige and -- perhaps more significantly -- serious financial support, with each prize amounting to about 25 times a full professor's annual salary (Abrams, 1984); Libak, et al. (2001) note that many veteran peace movement organizers openly yearned for the prize. There was thus a mixture of delight and dismay when the first Peace Prize was awarded in 1901 to Frederic Passy and Henri Dunant, and the reasons are worth discussing here because in its first decision the Nobel Committee established the direction for the prize's future evolution.

Passy's selection was the cause for delight. As the founder of several peace organizations in France and a leader of the international movement since its beginning, he was considered a don of the peace movement and it had been generally assumed he would win (Abrams, 1984; Feldman, 2000). Both Passy and Dunant were elderly, and thus the Nobel Committee had immediately established that as a practical matter it viewed the prize primarily as an honor or celebration of past work -- indeed, in these cases as a sort of lifetime achievement award -- rather than a grant to enable future careers; and it had immediately taken advantage of its option to divide the prize to, as it were, spread the honor around

(Libak, et al., 2001). Both decisions would set the tone for the future Peace Prize when dealing with activists.

Moreover, Dunant had long been living in a nursing home, heavily in debt, and it had been years since he had been active with the Red Cross. He was in effect rediscovered and a campaign was organized to lobby for him to receive the prize both as an honor of his past work and to relieve his debt. Norwegian military physician Hans Daae flooded the committee with documentation of Dunant's contributions and published a pamphlet arguing that

> When the Storting is to award the Nobelian prize . . . there should be no doubt about who should receive it. Dunant must be awarded the prize unanimously. That would bring honour to our country. Thereby the prize will not only be a prize of honour for the greatest friend of humanity of the century, but we can also rest assured that the monetary award will be used in the best, most appropriate way to promote better relations among peoples and to confirm peace. (in Libak, et al., 2001, p. 445)

In principle, Abrams notes, "the Nobel Committee frowns upon campaigns organized on behalf of candidates," and this is why nominees' names are no longer made public (2001, p. 536). In practice, however, campaigns sometimes work as well as they did with Dunant. Von Suttner became the first female laureate in 1905 only after a campaign by peace movement activists brought her key role in the creation of the Peace Prize to the forefront of the Committee's attention, and the only two other women to win the prize before 1975 were both supported by well-organized campaigns by the organization they had founded;

and Carl von Ossietzky (see discussion below) would have gone unrecognized without a major international campaign on his behalf (Abrams, 2001a).

The most significant aspect of Dunant's selection however, and the most controversial, was the nature of his work. As founder of the Red Cross, Dunant's efforts had not been to end or prevent war, but rather to minister to its victims. While laudable, for dedicated pacifists like von Suttner this did not constitute working for peace, and worse, might counteract peace efforts by mitigating the effects of war and thus making war more palatable (Abrams, 1984, Sverdrup, 1984).

The committee, in contrast, interpreted Nobel's charge to promote "fraternity between nations" broadly, and established that the "peace" for which Peace Prize was awarded would be a more expansive and flexible concept than abolition of war (Abrams, 1984). Many of the prizes in the first two decades did go to members of the peace movement; but Abrams (1984) observed that of the 83 laureates (at the time of his writing) at most 26 could be considered to be directly of the peace movements' lineage, with the bulk divided between humanitarian individuals and organizations, and statesmen. Although inspired by the peace movement, with the inclusion of wartime humanitarian work, the prize no longer belonged to it.

Another aspect of the Peace Prize frequently discussed in the literature became evident during the prize's first decade: the close relationship of the Peace Prize to Norwegian foreign policy and, more broadly, the general political outlook

of Norway's politicians. In Sverdrup's understated phrasing, "the members of the Nobel Committee have, in common with the rest of humanity, difficulty in liberating themselves from their physical and intellectual background" (1984, p. 32). Nobel had specified only that the Storting elect a committee to award the prize, and the Storting seems to have interpreted Nobel's wishes as something of an honor, but as its early name -- The Norwegian Storting's Nobel Committee -- implied, in the early years the Storting also felt a clear sense of ownership over the committee (Sverdrup, 1984).

For decades, the committee would be composed primarily of Storting members, including leading members of the Norwegian government -- for example, the committee chairman from 1901 to 1922, Jørgen Løvland, served as Prime Minister and Foreign Minster during his tenure (Sejersted, 2001). Membership typically reflected the balance of power among Norwegian political parties, with the Liberal Party dominating the early decades, and members tended to be connected to the Inter-Parliamentary Union and to the organized popular peace movement (Libak, et al., 2001). The committee thus tended to operate within a particular conceptualization of "peace." If it was broader than that of von Suttner, in terms of encompassing humanitarianism, it was also still in alignment with the more bourgeois elements of the peace movement that emphasized disarmament, international arbitration and international law, free trade and Inter-Parliamentary Union efforts (Libak, et al., 2001).

As the committee was made up of leading Norwegian politicians, the issue that had concerned the Swedish conservatives in the late 1890s soon manifested. Norway had gained independence in 1905 and it was seeking friends in the world, and Norwegian foreign policy concerns began to bear on the Peace Prize with the consideration of Theodore Roosevelt for the 1906 prize (Libak, et al., 2001). Roosevelt had mediated the Russo-Japanese War and was an advocate of international arbitration, but unlike the organized peace movement he saw no contradiction between arbitration and armament. The report prepared for the Nobel Committee as much as labeled him a warmonger for his expansion of the American Navy and his role in fracturing Panama from Colombia to gain influence over the Canal Zone. But these contradictions with the broader concept of peace -- not to mention Nobel's explicit desire to reward work done to reduce standing armies -- were ultimately ignored by the committee (Libak, et al., 2001). At his lecture, delivered in 1910, Roosevelt "sang the praises of the 'virile virtues'" and emphasized the necessity of strength (Abrams, 2001a, p. 531).

Roosevelt's prize illustrates the close connection between the early Nobel committee and the Storting's broader political concerns. Perhaps more significantly however, it established a precedent for the consideration and selection of leading politicians. In dealing with statesmen, unlike perhaps with lifelong peace activists, the committee tends to ignore their overall career in favor of focusing almost solely on the specifics of a recent accomplishment (Sverdrup, 1984). Moreover, the committee tends to set aside the motivations of

the statesman; Roosevelt was perhaps more influenced by a desire to counter Japanese expansion and establish a balance-of-power in the Pacific than by ideals of peace, and his successors among the statesmen-laureates are probably no less motivated by their nation's self-interest when they engage in activities for which they win the Peace Prize (Feldman, 2000).

The major themes that emerge from the literature focusing on the Peace Prize's early history are thus its immediate shift from an award to aid the peace movement's most promising members to an award for lifetimes of service in both peace activism and humanitarianism. The Nobel Committee, from the beginning, was also swayable by popular campaigns aimed at securing the prize for a favored individual. And within the first few years of Peace Prize, the committee used it in attempts to gain support and recognition for Norway by showering money and praise on a foreign statesman whose orientation towards peace was in question.

Interwar Years: The League of Nations and Carl von Ossietzky

The First World War entirely derailed the peace movement; activists either caught patriotic fever, becoming war-boosters, or if they held true to their ideals, they were often persecuted for perceived disloyalty (Feldman, 2000). The Nobel Committee had withheld the prize for most of the war, save for its 1917 award to the Red Cross. After the war had ended, however, many of the peace movement's proposals had become entirely mainstream -- the League of Nations,

in theory, institutionalized arbitration and international law, and created a framework for disarmament talks (Feldman, 2000). In addition, the idealism of the pre-war years had been greatly tempered. Where von Suttner and other activists had once seen war as a passing scourge promoted by elites against the will of the common people, the patriotic fervor of the war years left many, including the Nobel Committee, far less sanguine about humanity's supposedly natural desire for peace. Falnes observes that the Peace Prize presentation speeches given by representatives of the committee changed after World War I to emphasize that "peace endeavors have to combat first and foremost certain deep-lying tendencies in the very nature of man, together with the traditions of war associated with the cult of nationalism" (1938, p. 241).

Thus the trend for the Peace Prize between the world wars involved turning further away from the idealists of the peace movement and increasingly towards statesmen engaged in treaty negotiation and the construction of the League of Nations; a movement that paralleled Norway's engagement with the League. While Woodrow Wilson was an apparently controversial choice because he backed the punitive Treaty of Versailles, he was granted the 1919 award for his advocacy of the League (Abrams, 1984; Libak, et al., 2001). Overall, between 1919 and the Second World War, 21 laureates were awarded, of which ten are firmly categorized by Abrams (1984) as "statesmen;" and of the eight laureates that Abrams considers to be of the organized peace movement, half were

members of parliament and active in the Inter-Parliamentary Union or associated with the work of the League of Nations.

The close ties between the Norwegian government and the Nobel Committee finally became a liability during 1935-36 however, with the nomination of the German journalist Carl von Ossietzky. Von Ossietzky was a war veteran and pacifist writer who had exposed the Weimar Republic's rearmament, for which he was twice jailed. When Hitler came to power von Ossietzky was duly sent to a concentration camp. He became an international cause célèbre for opponents of the Nazi regime and a popular campaign was organized to support his nomination for the Peace Prize.

In 1936 von Ossietzky became the first laureate to be awarded while imprisoned, and his selection triggered strong opposition from the German government. Because the Nobel Committee, the Storting and the Norwegian government were so closely intertwined, the selection of von Ossietzky was viewed by Germany as an official condemnation of German policy originating from the Norwegian government, rather than as an unofficial decision from an independent prize committee. As a result, the Norwegian government quickly sought to distance itself from the committee; two committee members withdrew --including the Norwegian Foreign Minister -- and in a break with tradition the Norwegian Royal Family did not appear for the award ceremony (Abrams, 1984; Libak, et al., 2001). For tiny, ostensibly neutral Norway, the Peace Prize was a liability when facing a belligerent Germany, and in 1937 the Storting forbid

members of government from sitting on the committee to further emphasize the independence of the Peace Prize from the Norwegian nation-state (Sverdrup, 1984).

But just as awarding Roosevelt had established a precedent for giving the prize to politicians and statesmen whose overall career might be less than an ideal example of peace by focusing on a single accomplishment, when the committee chose von Ossietzky they laid the seed for a new direction in the Peace Prize's development. Formally, von Ossietzky won for his pacifist advocacy and for reporting on German rearmament, but the committee had not considered him a strong candidate for the prize until after the international campaign on his behalf built him into a symbol for peace and for resistance to oppression (Libak, et al., 2001). In popular consciousness, the Nobel Committee had given the award to a prisoner of conscience and stared down the Nazi regime. Informally then, von Ossietzky became the first laureate to expand the committee's conceptualization of "peace" to include human rights and dissent against repressive governments, and resulted in substantial strengthening of the committee's legitimacy as a body independent of Norwegian politics and willing to stand on principle against oppressive regimes (Libak, et al., 2001).

The Cold War and the Bomb

As it had during the First World War, the Nobel Committee withheld the prize from 1939-1943; it again awarded the Red Cross for its humanitarian work

in 1944. In 1945, they returned optimistically to a statesmen, choosing U. S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull as the most visible symbol of the newly formed United Nations (Feldman, 2000), and United Nations officials and organizations would collect many prizes in the following years. Despite the prohibition on government ministers holding positions on the Nobel Committee, a continuing theme in the literature discussing this period is the role of Norwegian foreign policy in influencing the prize.

Norway's traditional neutrality had been violated by the German invasion of 1940, and while still ostensibly detached from great power politics it became a member of NATO and firmly established itself as an Anglo-American ally state. This position was reflected in the Peace Prize, as no Eastern Bloc laureates appeared until the Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov in 1975, followed by Lech Walesa of Poland in 1983; both were dissidents, and the prize was derided behind the Iron Curtain as Western propaganda (Sverdrup, 1984).

Njølstad (2001) focuses on the shift in the committee's perception of atomic weapons through the decades of the Cold War. In the early years the mainstream perception of atomic weapons in much of the West was that they had helped end the Second World War and acted as a deterrent to otherwise unchecked Soviet aggression. The Norwegian popular consensus shared this view and the Peace Prize Committee does not seem to have considered nuclear weapons to be a novel or unprecedented problem (Njølstad, 2001). Gradually, however, this began to change as Norway discovered that its geographic position

made it the recipient of more nuclear weapon test fallout than any nation except the superpowers, and as atomic stockpiles increased concurrent with Cold War saber-rattling (Njølstad, 2001).

A split began to develop within the committee as a minority began agitating to select laureates who opposed nuclear weapons and were critical of Anglo-American Cold War policies. The anti-nuclear members managed to push through the selection of Linus Pauling, but only after the prize had been reserved for a year so that by the time he received it in late 1963 American policy had changed and Kennedy had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Njølstad, 2001). Thus the committee had not actually contradicted NATO policy, and only in the early 1980s did the committee begin to award laureates critical of Western nuclear policy, most notably the group International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Njølstad, 2001). By this time, opposition to NATO's nuclear policies was becoming more widely accepted among the general public, and the committee had also undergone a major shift in its membership as a result of a backlash against its decision to award the prize for 1973 to Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho (as discussed below), because the replacements for the two members who resigned in protest during 1973 were adamantly anti-nuclear and viewed non-proliferation as a moral issue (Njølstad, 2001). For the first half of the Cold War, however, the committee did not seem to recognize nuclear weapons as a particularly significant problem for global peace, and activists that

contradicted NATO policy were ignored despite the Peace Prize's mandate to recognize those who struggled for disarmament.

The Nobel Committee's single most controversial choice was also likely a product of its pro-American orientation during much of the Cold War. In 1973 it elected to honor Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho for their Vietnam War negotiations, but the decision backfired. Le Duc Tho became the only laureate to refuse the prize on the grounds that the Vietnam negotiations had produced no peace -- his name is listed on the Nobel website, but it lacks a picture or description -- and amid the firestorm of controversy Kissinger avoided Oslo (Sverdrup, 1984). A representative delivered his short letter of acceptance and he sought unsuccessfully to return the prize the following year (Abrams, 2001a).

Traditionally, whatever the decision, the committee's members have honored a principle of appearing unanimous in public. But in 1973 two members resigned in public protest and the Storting reopened the debate over its relationship to the Peace Prize that had lain dormant since the von Ossietzky affair in the 1930s (Sverdrup, 1984). The Socialist Party advocated a new committee composed of representatives of the five Scandinavian countries although the proposal soon died, as did formal attempts to prohibit Storting members from serving on the committee. But the Storting sought again to more clearly emphasize its distance from the committee and began to refrain from electing current Storting members (Abrams, 1984; Sverdrup, 1984).

The literature suggests that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho controversy impacted the committee's decisions in two notable ways. First, as mentioned above, the two replacement members were anti-nuclear and critical of Norway's involvement with NATO, and thus the committee began to tilt towards laureates who were critical of Western nuclear policy. More broadly however, Tønnesson (2001) notes that in the mid-1970s there was a fundamental shift in the general patterns of how the prize was awarded, likely as a result of the new members combined with a general attempt by the committee to reassess its decision making in the wake of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho embarrassment. First, there was a steady expansion in the Nobel Committee's conceptualization of peace; and second, there was a conscious reorientation of the prize away from white men and towards previously unrecognized regions of the world and -- to a lesser degree -- women.

Positive Peace

Since 1901 the Peace Prize had been awarded to humanitarians, despite the criticism of those who believed Nobel had wished the prize to be a support mechanism for the peace movement exclusively. This expansion had long since become accepted, but the humanitarianism recognized by the Nobel Committee had always carried the connotation of war mitigation, as with the Red Cross or Fridtjof Nansen's work for prisoners of war and refugees. The 1952 award to Albert Schweitzer and Mother Teresa's award in 1979, however, reflected a

broader concept of "pure" humanitarianism; both dealt with the sick and poor, and both engaged in highly localized activities, suggesting that "it was obviously not the practical result of their contributions which was rewarded, but rather the charitable philosophy which formed their contribution" (Sverdrup, 1984, p. 34).

The prizes for 1960 and 1964 went, respectively, to Albert Lutuli, leader of the African National Congress in South Africa, and Martin Luther King. In Feldman's (2000) view, the laureates' nonviolent tactics were a point of leverage, an opening for the committee to reasonably make the case that they deserved the Peace Prize. In fact, however, the committee was making a fundamental shift in the Peace Prize's orientation towards what Feldman (2000) characterizes as interventionism. In previous decades, conflicts internal to a nation were generally off-limits for the prize. Moreover, they were prizes not for resolving a conflict but for dissidents struggling against a stable but unjust status quo -- they were prizes for human rights.

These laureates -- Schweitzer in 1952 and Lutuli and King in the early 1960s -- were the forerunners of a much more expansive notion of peace that would come to characterize the Peace Prize during the late 1970s and beyond. In the most recent decades, the Nobel Committee has come to embrace an open-ended definition of peace, retaining its traditional concept of "negative" peace -- prevention or resolution of conflicts -- while increasingly giving awards for efforts to create "positive" peace based on social justice (Stiehm, 2005), which often involved taking sides on a conflict internal to a nation-state. This has

become a key trend for the Peace Prize, as Krebs (2009) reports that more than one-fifth of the prizes since 1970 have been to dissidents or otherwise awarded to encourage change within a nation rather than being focused on efforts to stabilize international relations.

Positive peace and social justice have also broadened in recent years to include environmental concerns. Norman Borlaug won in 1970 for addressing famine, and in 2004 Wangari Maathai was honored for her leadership of the Green Belt Movement, which ties community development and women's issues to efforts to combat deforestation. Al Gore shared the 2007 prize with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. And so the definition of peace continues to expand to cover essentially whatever crisis is currently capturing the world's attention.

Krebs (2009) considers whether this shift towards the use of the prize to weigh in on matters of social justice has had positive effect, and finds that it sometimes produced notable backlashes and crackdowns by authoritarian regimes that fear the global spotlight given to those who criticize them. For example, in granting the prize to the Dalai Lama in 1989 the committee seemed to be sending an international message of censure to the Chinese government; the award was announced a few months after the Tiananmen Square massacre and it lent emotional support to the Tibetan people. But within a week after the award was announced, the Chinese government tightened its grip, with mass imprisonments and a strictly enforced ban on religious celebrations in Tibet

(Krebs, 2009). Likewise in the cases of Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma in 1991 and Shirin Ebadi of Iran in 2004: both regimes intensified repression following announcements that the respective dissident would win the prize (Krebs, 2009). In contrast, Abrams argues that, as with von Ossietzky and King before them, it is the prizes to the human rights activists that are best remembered and which "represent the glory of the Nobel Peace Prize" (2001a, p. 545).

Globalization and Gender

Concurrent with the expansion of the concept of peace over the last four to five decades, the literature indicates a clear reorientation by the Nobel Committee towards recognizing laureates from outside Western Europe and the United States (Tønnesson, 2001). From 1901 until 1973, when Le Duc Tho was selected, only two laureates had hailed from outside these regions, Carlos Saavedra Lamas of Argentina, who was selected for the 1936 prize after mediating a conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia, and Albert Lutuli in 1960. After Le Duc Tho declined the prize the Japanese prime minister, Eisaku Sato, was chosen for the next year.

Then the trend accelerated -- if one considers Poland and the Soviet Union to be outside the traditional Nobel geography, by 2009 there were 31 laureates (including institutions) from outside the traditional area, 29 of whom were chosen since 1973. The Nobel Committee, its vision previously so restricted, had finally become aware of the rest of the world, although perhaps no sooner or

later than the rest of world was experiencing the turmoil of globalization and unprecedented cultural mixing through trade, travel and media. But the Nobel Committee after the 1973 controversy was also consciously eager to broaden its view, expressing their "genuine concern to distribute the awards among the different regions of the world" (Abrams, in Tønnesson, 2001, p. 440). Of course, even with such a shift Europe and North America remain disproportionately represented; 21 laureates came from these areas since 1973, not counting the United Nations.

Women have seen a somewhat less dramatic expansion in their Peace Prize representation. Between Bertha von Suttner's prize in 1905 and the 1970s, only two other women won the prize, Jane Addams (1931) and Emily Greene Balch (1946), both Americans and both veteran peace movement organizers (Abrams, 1984). In total there have been only twelve female laureates. Stiehm (2005) observes that only one -- Swede Alva Myrdal -- came from an established political or institutional background that naturally led to prominence before winning the Peace Prize; that is, eleven of the twelve women started some variety of grassroots or dissident movement or organization.

The Peace Prize and Laureates in Summary

Abrams (1984; "Lists and Categories," 2001) categorized the laureates in six groups. The Organized Peace Movement captured a total of 31 prizes (all numbers for Abrams are as of 2000), the majority before the Second World War.

Humanitarians took 21 prizes, primarily between 1940 and 1987; the Human Rights category was essentially nonexistent until 1960, and Abrams places 15 laureates in this group; and Statesmen have a total of 34 prizes, concentrated in two blocks: the interwar years, and post-1960 -- they are the largest group during the most recent (1988-2000) period in Abrams' scheme. Abrams' final two categories, International Jurist and Religious have a scant five prizes between them, none after World War II; laureates such as the Dalai Lama or Reverend King are grouped functionally in Human Rights, rather than based on their backgrounds as religious leaders. The most recent laureates are not included in this list, and some such as Al Gore or Jimmy Carter might arguably be placed in the Statesmen or Humanitarian categories; conversely Gore and Maathai might warrant the creation of an Environmentalist category. Categorizing laureates, Abrams (2001a) notes, is often difficult because many of them have had multifaceted careers.

In general, however, the literature reviewed above indicates several trends about the Peace Prize as an institution. First, the Peace Prize has gradually evolved to incorporate an extremely broad understanding of "peace," with the Nobel Committee functioning as an "epistemic community" that explores and deliberates on the concept of peace in the process of its decision-making (Njølstad, 2001, p. 488). Second, it has grown to become a truly global prize, recognizing laureates from all regions of the world, although it continues to be disproportionately awarded to men from Western Europe and the United States.

And third, it continues to reflect Norwegian attitudes and foreign policy, and more broadly, "a common international peace agenda dominated by a western liberal line of thought" (Tønnesson, 2001, p. 441).

But the general trends in Abrams' categorization suggest that even as the Nobel Committee has continued to expand the definition of "peace," it remains the statesmen who capture a plurality of the prizes. During the interwar years they won primarily for negotiating treaties seeking to prevent war or for work with the League of Nations. There was a decline in statesmen-laureates after the Second World War, but by the 1970s they were once again the most common type of laureate. In the more recent decades they have been cited mostly for negotiations in ongoing conflicts or for disarmament work.

The literature notes that awards to statesmen tend to be the most controversial and least popular, in part because "they have, inevitably, long political careers behind them which, in the nature of things, will have left stains on their record sheets" (Sverdrup, 1984, p. 35), and the awards to statesmen often do not age well because they are typically cited for very recent actions that may not withstand the test of time (Abrams, 1984; Abrams, 2001).

As the Nobel Peace Prize has developed over the twentieth century from Nobel's original goal of supporting the peace movement, it has become a sort of international civic crown, uniquely prominent and controversial because "it is the only award that the world believes it has a stake in and claims as its own" (van den Dungen, 2001). But while laureates such as Dr. King, Mother Teresa, Aung

San Suu Kyi, Doctors Without Borders or the Dalai Lama may represent the popular understanding of what the Peace Prize should be, in practice it is often a prize for the world's political elite. In the following section, I turn from works that consider the Nobel Prize as an institution, to those that focus on the laureates' rhetoric in the lectures.

The Nobel Lectures

While the Nobel Peace Prize's history and trends have received considerable scholarly attention, the Nobel lectures have been less extensively examined. In total, three works discuss the lectures in broad, collective terms, while two others focus on individual lectures.

Abrams (2001b) gives a broad overview of lectures, which also serves to describe aspects of the rhetorical situation that the laureates face. He notes first that the only real requirement attached to a Nobel Prize is for laureates to, if possible, give a public lecture in Oslo within six months of receiving the award (Abrams, 2001b). In early years, these lectures usually took place months after the December award ceremony, typically in the spring or summer, and were often sparsely attended (Falnes, 1938; Abrams, 2001b). The trend in recent decades, however, has been to merge the laureate's lecture with their acceptance speech, so as to deliver it at the award ceremony amidst the peak of media coverage (Abrams, 2001b). Since 1990, award ceremonies and lectures are at the Oslo Town Hall, and are seen by an audience of over 1000 including the Royal

Family of Norway and representatives of the Storting, the Norwegian government and the diplomatic corps, with a substantial press and television presence (Abrams, 2001b; "The Award Ceremony").

In total, more than three-quarters of laureates have either spoken personally or had representatives read their lecture, with the record improving substantially after the Second World War; since 1945, only six laureates have not delivered a lecture personally, including Henry Kissinger, Soviet physicist Andrea Sakharov, Polish labor organizer Lech Walesa and Burmese dissident Aung Saan Suu Kyi (Abrams, 2001b). In the latter three cases, they were either under arrest or feared that they would be unable to return to their home nations if they left (Abrams, 2001b). Abrams describes the lectures collectively:

> [They] reflect not only a variety of approaches to peace but differences in form and style, and they are of uneven quality. They are the products, of course, of lives of activism rather than of scholarship. Some of the laureates were clearly too busy to do more than contributes reflections on current problems of peace. Others went to considerable effort to present thoughtful accounts of their own peace efforts or the particular approach to peace they advocated. Some laureates were obviously speaking to an unseen audience that extended far beyond Oslo; others spoke directly to their immediate auditors. There is high inspiration here and moving eloquence. Altogether the lectures represent an important documentation of the rich diversity of peacemaking and the high caliber of some of the best of the peacemakers. (Abrams, 2001b, p. 19).

Despite the lectures' diversity, both Kinnier, et al. (2007) and Salazar (2009) see fit to treat the Peace Prize lectures as collections with common themes and traits.

Kinnier, et al., (2007) posit that the Nobel speeches can be considered as a "source for ascertaining what could be universal values [in] the philosophies of the world's most admired leaders: Nobel Peace Prize laureates," and they perform a content analysis of 50 lectures to find common themes related to values. They find several common threads among the speeches: the laureates typically discuss their specific struggles or work but also transcend their specific struggles to deal with broader themes; they are generally hopeful and optimistic in tone, but place emphasis on work that remains to be done; and they often stress the interdependence of values, such as peace and justice, and the need for toleration of differences. In terms of universal values, "peace" and "hope" are extolled in over 90 percent of lectures; "security," "justice," "responsibility," and "liberty" in 80 percent or more of the lectures; and "tolerance" and "altruism" in over 70 percent. "God" and "truth" are less prominent, in less than 50 percent of the lectures analyzed, which Kinnier, et al., ascribe to the laureates' possible recognition that "too many wars have been fought over conflicting views of God and truth" (Kinnier, et al., 2007, p. 585).

Salazar (2009) also deals with the Peace Prize and Literature Prizes collectively, but his approach is entirely qualitative, focusing on the philosophical and cultural construction of the lectures. He describes the speeches as part of a larger Nobel rhetorical event, constructed by the media, which lasts from the announcement of the winners through the award ceremonies. Laureates, in his phrasing, become "global 'brands'" and objects of national prestige (Salazar,

2009, p. 374), and thus a Nobel Prize, in the context of the modern media environment, "inaugurates global publicness" (Salazar, 2009, p. 381). In the case of the Peace Prize "it lifts out of the flux of events made public by the media, events by and large agonistic and violent, exemplars that provide reasons to hope that humankind is capable of surmounting itself" (Salazar, 2009, p. 381). Salazar (2009) also compares the Nobel lectures to the inaugural lectures given by new professors when they are granted prestigious chairs at universities, because in such speeches the professors are expected to both discuss their biography and outline briefly the intellectual program they plan to pursue.

As the above descriptions indicate, the limited literature discussing the Nobel lectures collectively does not include any studies from the orientation of rhetorical criticism. It does serve to indicate, however, that scholars have treated the Nobel lectures as a distinctive group, and that there are commonalities among the lectures in terms of the themes and values expressed. There are two extant studies applying the techniques of rhetorical criticism to the Nobel Peace Prize lectures, and each focuses on a single lecture.

First, Kuseski (1988) analyzes Mother Teresa's 1979 Nobel Peace Prize lecture through the lens of Burkean rhetorical theory. She begins by noting that the speech presents difficulty for the critic because "its form is rambling and seemingly unfocused, disjointed, and apparently redundant. In short, the speech does not read well;" nonetheless, "more subtly, it leaves the audience or the reader with a sense of profound insight" (Kuseski, 1988, p. 323). Seeking to

resolve this apparent contradiction between rough style and meaningful substance, Kuseski (1988) turns to Kenneth Burke's "Five Dogs," five fundamentally different levels of meaning that a word might convey, from the sound pattern of the word devoid of meaning through a sort of Platonic ideal that the word points to, and including dictionary definitions, poetic connotations, and repressed memories of the first encounter with the object to which the word refers.

Kuseski argues that "the potency" of the speech relies on Mother Teresa's "subtle yet pervasive use of the key term, 'love'" (1988, p. 328). In the first section of the speech, which Kuseski terms "devotional," Mother Teresa begins by having the audience recite the Prayer of St. Francis with her, thus triggering identification of the audience with the theme and speaker. The remainder of the speech is a sermon that moves from discussing the perfect love of God, reflected through humans' actions toward one another, to a series of many examples of love drawn from the Bible and Mother Teresa's personal experiences. Over the course of 75 uses of the word "love," the speech functions as a "ladder, running from a smile, to family, to strangers, to other peoples, to God," and progresses toward identification of the audience with Mother Teresa's vision of the world (Kuseski, 1988, p. 331).

In the second criticism of a Nobel Peace Prize lecture, Kirkscey (2007) applies narrative theory to Wangari Maathai's 2004 lecture and examines how she blends European narrative structure and African dilemma narratives.

Kirkscey describes how Maathai appears in Oslo in traditional African dress to emphasize "her credibility in the dual roles of African storyteller and Western scholar" (2007, p. 13), and spends the bulk of her lecture telling the story of the Green Belt Movement's origin and evolution; the protagonists are African women who "'are the primary caretakers, holding significant responsibility for tilling the land and feeding their families'" (Maathai, in Kirkscey, 2007, p. 13).

In Western terms, Kirkscey (2007) claims, Maathai's story functions as a *narratio*, relying on clear internal and external consistency, plausible and widely understandable motives, brevity, and unity of purpose through the avoidance of refutations or qualifications. Thus her narrative functions as evidence in a forensic sense. Yet Maathai leaves the story without resolution, except to note that the Green Belt Movement has been part of a shift in thinking about the relationship between women, community and the environment in Africa, a rhetorical strategy that "leaves her audience with an inverted enthymeme that implies the need for action outside Africa without *defining* the action" (Kirkscey, 2007, p. 15). Kirkscey argues that the omitted conclusion is also characteristic of Africa dilemma tales, in which a story is used to pose a difficult ethical puzzle which provokes discussion or debate among the audience, rather than providing a clear answer; thus Maathai leaves the audience with the problem of how to reconcile environmental realities with human desires for material wealth and power.

<u>The Nobel Lectures in Summary</u>

The literature on the Nobel lectures is indeed very slim, but it does suggest two key points. First, of course, is that Nobel lectures have been deemed sufficiently interesting to draw some scholarly attention. Second, there are suggestions of recurring -- though insufficiently described -- forms such as the use of autobiography (Salazar, 2009) and discussion of the individual laureates' struggles (Kinnier, et al., 2007). These patterns mesh with the more specific discussion of Wangari Maathai's speech, which is observed to rely on personal narrative as its key feature (Kirkscey, 2007). This suggests that there may be a fairly consistent form that revolves around personal autobiography as a central trope in a Nobel lecture genre.

However, none of the literature that examines a specific speech discusses statesmen such as Obama, so it cannot answer the questions that piqued my initial curiosity in the subject, such as whether Obama was abnormal in his defense of war and national policy within the Nobel Prize context. Literature discussing the lectures collectively does not delve into consideration of the various types of laureates, nor does it provide a detailed examination of common substance and strategies in their rhetoric, or of their understanding of peace.

<u>Conclusion</u>

Literature discussing the Nobel Peace Prize describes how it has developed from a Western cultural institution into a global one. Most scholarship

about the Peace Prize has focused on its historical development, and on the politics of the Nobel Committee. The committee is depicted as dedicated to its task of rewarding those who contribute to peace and humanity, and flexible and expansive in its definition of peace and fraternity between nations, but also as bound first-and-foremost to a liberal understanding of peace that tends to reward international institutions and stability.

As popular perception of peace has changed to include positive peace, social justice and human rights, the Nobel Prize has responded by incorporating these elements into the committee's understanding of peace; conversely, the prize may also function to expand popular understandings of peace by choosing to highlight activities (e.g., environmentalism) that were not traditionally considered peace work. In more recent decades, the committee has attempted to use the prize as a tool for social change by taking sides in conflicts internal to nations and giving international recognition to dissidents, although the efficacy of this is debatable (Krebs, 2009).

Since Roosevelt's prize in 1906, the committee has often opted to reward politicians and diplomats for their work building an international institution or resolving a conflict, often one in which they lead a belligerent party. Overall, such statesmen make up a plurality of the prizes awarded, but when making such awards the committee tends to adopt different criteria than when considering humanitarians or human rights activists, in that they focus on the recent action for peace rather than considering the statesman's career holistically. As a result,

the bulk of prizes have gone to leaders whose overall career may involve many warlike or otherwise questionable actions.

Yet despite the social significance of the prize, and the body of literature that examines its history, the one notable act of public communication that is common to most laureates -- the Nobel lecture -- has remained mostly unexamined. Only two rhetorical criticisms have been found, and they focus on laureates who are distinctly not typical -- one, a missionary nun, and the other, the founder of a grassroots environmental movement; both female when the vast majority of laureates (and all the statesmen) are male; neither involved in nation-state or international politics, or the resolution of active conflicts. Kinnier, et al., (2007) suggest that common values are present throughout the Nobel lectures, and Salazar (2009) indicates that the lectures are the central media event of the Peace Prize as an institution, yet almost nothing exists in the literature that investigates how the typical laureate uses the lecture rhetorically.

This foundation seems to justify a rhetorical criticism of a collection of Nobel lectures as a logical expansion of the existing scholarship on the Peace Prize. Given that the statesmen make up a plurality of laureates, and that their selection by the committee seems based on different criteria than other types of laureates, it also seems warranted to focus on them for this initial study. Also, understanding what is common among statesmen-laureates' lectures will shed light on Obama's lecture and help highlight how, if at all, he deviated from the norms of other statesmen. The critical method most suited to finding

commonalities in substance, style and strategy among collections of rhetorical artifacts is genre analysis, and in the next chapter I discuss the basic theory of genre criticism and the procedures a critic uses to set about describing a genre.

Chapter Three: Method and Artifacts

Since antiquity, scholars of rhetoric have understood that situations with similar characteristics -- such as common audiences or topics -- tend to trigger similar rhetorical responses including recurring strategies, forms and rhetorical styles (Campbell and Jamieson, 1978; Foss, 2004). My study is concerned with understanding the rhetorical responses created by laureates, and particularly by the statesmen-laureates, within the recurring situation of the Peace Prize lectures. I thus turn to generic criticism as a method for examining the lectures. As Foss describes

> Generic criticism is rooted in the assumption that certain types of situations provoke similar needs and expectations among audiences and thus call for particular kinds of rhetoric. Rather than seeking to discover how one situation affects one particular rhetorical act, the generic critic seeks to discover commonalities in rhetorical patterns across recurring situations. (Foss, 2004, p. 193)

In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of the concept of genre in relation to rhetoric, then focus on the procedures for a generic criticism, and finally discuss the selection of the artifacts in more detail.

Development of Genre Theory

The conceptual roots of genre stretch back to the classical era, and I begin this section by considering Aristotle's rhetorical taxonomy because it effectively illustrates the focus on the interrelationship of situations and strategy that characterizes the study of genre. For Aristotle,

> rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making -- speaker, subject, and person addressed -- it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. (*Rhetoric,* Book I, Chapter 3)

An Athenian citizen might find himself before a judge or jury in a trial (legal or *forensic* speech), debating policy before his fellow citizens in the *agora* (political or *deliberative* speech), or called upon to praise or censure someone (ceremonial or *epideictic* speech). Each of these situations tends to dictate a particular combination of style and substance in an orator's rhetoric.

For example, forensic rhetoric centers on questions of fact that, in temporal terms, are oriented towards the past -- "Did Adam steal Eve's apple, or not?" -- and with the overriding aim of persuading the judge to make what the rhetor considers to be a just decision. The major strategies in a legal setting are accusation and defense. Political deliberation, in contrast, is oriented primarily towards the future and towards questions of policy and expediency -- attempts to sway the audience to take an action that will bring about a good outcome or avoid a bad one; deliberative rhetoric thus centers on exhorting a desired course of action or dissuading the audience from following a harmful one. And when one speaks ceremonially, they are commenting on a question of honor in the present, that is, on whether the audience should place positive or negative value on the subject of the speech, in the moment of the speech; the key strategic forms in this case are the laying of praise or blame on the subject (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*; Foss, 2004). Of course, these elements flow into one another -- as when it is necessary

to establish the facts about a subject's past actions so as to justify praise or blame in the present moment -- but in Aristotle's schema the expectations and focus of the audience and overall situation demand particular types of responses by the rhetor.

Campbell and Jamieson's (1978) review notes that this basic division continued through the development of the modern field of rhetorical criticism. The tendency through the mid-twentieth century was for critics to focus on individual speeches, and to analyze them in terms of traditional concepts including "the canons and modes of proof, an emphasis on effects, and classification of speeches into deliberative, epideictic, and forensic genres," an approach known as neo-Aristotelianism (p. 402). Interest grew, however, in treating groups of speeches collectively, as with the study of the rhetoric of social movements that emerged during the 1950s (Campbell and Jamieson, 1978).

In 1965, Edwin Black noted that "the neo-Aristotelians ignore the impact of the discourse on rhetorical conventions, its capacity for disposing an audience to expect certain kinds of justification in later discourses that they encounter, even on different subjects" (Black, 1965, p.49). Black thus recognized that rhetorical conventions evolve in a dynamic process, with audiences and rhetors interacting in a feedback loop. In contrast to the relatively static division that had lasted since Aristotle, Black argued for a "generic perspective" based on the principle that there is a limited range of situations and strategies open to a rhetor, and thus "the recurrence of a given situational type through history will

provide the critic with information on the rhetorical responses available in that situation" (1965, in Campbell and Jamieson, p. 404).

Genre theory was further shaped by Bitzer's (1968) discussion of rhetorical situations. For Bitzer a rhetorical action is a response to an imperfection (exigence) in a given scene or situation, and its form and content are determined by conditions -- e.g., audience beliefs, external constraints such as history -- that are beyond the rhetor's intent and goals. Each situation is unique, but Bitzer also noted that

> from day to day, year to year, comparable situations occur, prompting comparable responses; hence rhetorical forms are born and a special vocabulary, grammar, and style are established. . .The situation recurs and, because we experience situations and the rhetorical responses to them, a form of discourse is not only established but comes to have a power of its own — the tradition itself tends to function as a constraint upon any new response in the form. (1968, p. 13)

Thus, over time conventions become constraints, as an audience's expectation that certain situations will be dealt with in expected ways limit the rhetor's freedom and channel the form of their rhetorical actions; also, similarities among situations lead to similarities among rhetorical acts that enable audiences and critics to group them into genres.

In 1976 the Speech Communication Association held a national conference centered on the concept of "significant form," or recurring patterns in rhetorical artifacts such as common imagery or structural arrangements (Foss, 2004). The result of this conference was the book *Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action*,

edited by Campbell and Jamieson. They offer an elegant definition of genre as a "constellation of recognizable forms bound together by an internal dynamic," and emphasize that the defining feature of a genre is the "fusion" of recurring forms and situations into a cohesive whole, rather than the mere recurrence of forms (1978, p. 409). This perspective moves away from static taxonomies and instead emphasizes how situation, convention, history and so forth function to shape rhetoric.

Building on the concept of genres as a fusion of forms and situation, Jamieson and Campbell (1982) discuss how complex situations can create what they call "rhetorical hybrids," rhetoric that responds to complex situations by tying together elements of previous genres to create what is in essence a new genre. In their study of public eulogies, for example, they note that gun control legislation is advanced as a means of honoring Robert Kennedy's memory, thus using deliberative rhetoric as a support for epideictic rhetoric. The concept of rhetorical hybrids highlights how a given artifact may blend together elements of multiple recognized genres.

Genre study has evolved to consider rhetoric in a wide variety of contexts. Many studies that deal with genre have focused on political oratory, especially nominating and acceptance speeches and various categories of campaign communication (Fisher, 1980; Benoit, 2000). Speeches of apology have attracted a great deal of study from genre critics, as have ceremonial addresses and eulogies (Fisher, 1980; Ware and Linkugel, 1973). Genre study has also

broadened to consider organizational communication, and such apparently mundane categories as letters of recommendation can be recognized as a genre, with distinct recurring forms and a clear recurring rhetorical situation (Foss, 2004). More recently, genre criticism has begun to address electronic and visual communication, as in studies that consider blogs and internet instruction manuals as genres with recurring norms (Miller and Shepard, 2004; Carlson, 2005). Benoit (2000) summarizes the range of genre rhetorical criticism and concludes that most criticisms can be grouped by the critic's focus on the "rhetors' *purpose,* the *situation,* the *rhetor,* and the rhetorical *means or agency*" (p. 181).

Over the twentieth century genre has evolved from a static concept based on taxonomy and categorization of rhetoric into a more flexible theory about how rhetors respond to similar situations by employing similar rhetorical substance and form. Genre criticism emphasizes identifying commonalities among artifacts and determining the underlying reason for their presence. Identifying a genre also lends predictive insight because conventions shape future rhetoric and lead audiences to expect certain types of strategies and substance from rhetors. Because genre criticism is often applied to find common features among artifacts grouped by type of speaker and situation, it is well suited as a framework for examining the Nobel lectures given by the statesmen-laureates.

Procedure

The methodology for this study is based on Foss's (2004) discussion of generic criticism in *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration & Practice*, a widely used rhetorical criticism textbook. Foss defines a genre as "a constellation, fusion, or clustering of three different kinds of elements so that a unique kind of artifact is created" (2004, p. 193). The first element is the situational requirements that evoke particular types of rhetorical responses, while the second is the substantive and stylistic characteristics of the rhetoric that makes up the genre -- the rhetoric's content and form. The third element is the genre's "organizing principle" which ties together situation, substance, and style into a cohesive whole -- the organizing principle is "the label for the internal dynamic of the constellation" (Foss, 2004, p. 194).

Foss describes three different procedural approaches for generic analysis. In what Foss (2004) calls *generic participation*, the critic judges whether a particular artifact should be considered to be part of a given genre based on how its characteristics conform (or do not) to the genre's characteristics. In *generic application*, the critic proceeds as above to analyze the artifact's characteristics in comparison to those of the genre, but takes the further step of evaluating whether the artifact is a good or poor example of the genre. The critic can use the genre's conventions as criteria to make judgments about the artifact's likely rhetorical effectiveness, particularly in terms of how it adheres to or violates the genre's conventions and characteristics. Both generic participation and generic

application center on comparisons of an artifact to a previously described genre, and involve reasoning deductively about the artifact by applying the genre's general characteristics to the specific case.

In this study, however, I employ the third option that Foss (2004) describes: *genre description*. This is the option to use when the critic suspects that a genre exists, and wishes to investigate it and determine its characteristics. The motivating research questions in a generic description are "Does a genre exist among a set of artifacts? If so, what are the characteristics of the genre?" (Foss, 2004, p. 201). While genre participation and genre application studies proceed deductively from the general characteristics of an established genre, genre description proceeds inductively; the critic builds up a picture of the typical or generic artifact by studying the common features of many artifacts. This approach involves four basic steps.

First, in a genre description the critic typically starts with the observation that there are apparent similarities among rhetorical acts. Foss emphasizes that the "suspicion of the presence of a genre is not to be confused with a preconceived framework that predicts or limits the defining characteristics of the genre. Rather, your hunch simply serves as a prod to being an investigation" (2004, p. 197).

With regard to this study, Barack Obama's lecture served as that prod, because his defense of American military policy and the dualistic (good vs. evil) worldview that are notable characteristics of the speech did not fit with my

expectations of how a Peace Prize laureate would discuss issues of war and peace. My feeling that the speech was incongruous with the situation led to my wondering if there were, in reality, consistent patterns and practices in the Nobel Peace Prize laureates' rhetoric from which Obama was deviating.

The second step in generic description is to collect artifacts that may represent the speculated genre. Foss instructs the critic to "identify rhetorical acts in which the perceived rhetorical situation appears similar or search out contexts that seem to be characterized by similar constraints of situation" (2004, p. 197). James Measell, for example, recognized that Abraham Lincoln and William Pitt both faced similar situations when they sought to restrict the right of habeas corpus (in Foss, 2004), while Ware and Linkugel's study of apologia begins with the observation Richard Nixon, Adlai Stevenson, Harry Truman and Edward Kennedy all "stood trial before the bar of public opinion," leading to their choice to make speeches of self-defense (1973, p. 417). In my case, it is the annual Nobel award ceremony and the historical-cultural context of the Peace Prize that seem to create similar rhetorical situations for the laureates, and it is from that body of works that I draw artifacts.

The third step is analysis of the artifacts. The critic is looking for common elements, and must proceed in an open-ended and open-minded way; in Foss's terms,

> ideally, you allow the artifacts being studied to suggest the important similarities and differences, focusing on those elements that stand out as critical. These might be metaphors, images,

> sentence structure, failure to enact arguments, or an infinite variety of other elements. (2004, p. 198)

The critic is also free to draw from other methods and theories, such as focusing on similarities in emotional appeals or evaluation of narrative elements (e.g., characters, scenic elements) in the artifacts through the lens of fantasy-theme analysis (Foss, 2004).

If sufficient similarities are found, the last step is to "formulate the organizing principle that captures the essence of the strategies common to the sample collected" (Foss, 2004, p. 198). As an example, Foss refers to Laura Hahn's study of *Seinfeld, Beavis and Butt-head,* and *The Howard Stern Show*; these shows are tied together into a genre of "humorous incivility" by an "active resistance to diverse perspectives" (Foss, 2004, p. 198). Likewise, eulogies often share a need to "reknit" a community that has been torn by a member's death, and ease the surviving community members' confrontation with their own mortality (Campbell and Jamieson, 1978, p. 409). The organizing principle, therefore, is what separates a distinct genre from a collection of works that merely share some common characteristics; it is the theorized reason for the presence of the recurring characteristics.

The basic process of genre description, then, involves studying "a variety of artifacts that seem to be generated in similar situations to discover if they have in common substantive and stylistic strategies and an organizing principle that fuses those strategies" (Foss, 2004, p. 200). If the artifacts do share similarities,

and a cohesive principle can be identified, then the critic has developed a theory of a distinct genre. The emphasis, however, should always be on how the genre develops insight into the artifacts, the situation, and rhetoric in general, rather than on neat classification or taxonomy (Campbell and Jamieson, 1978; Foss, 2004). In the final section of this chapter I briefly describe the selection of lectures and provide a list of those examined in this study, before turning in Chapter Four to analysis of the artifacts.

Description of Artifacts

The updated table presented in *Peace & Change* ("Lists and Categories," 2001), based on Abrams (1984) categorization of the Nobel Peace Prize laureates places 34 winners in the statesmen category through the year 2000, and I use this categorization as the basis for selection of the artifacts. After 2000, there are two laureates whom Abrams would certainly have added to the statesmen category: Kofi Annan and Barack Obama; and two laureates whose work in international mediation might place them as statesmen, but would more likely result in a "humanitarian" designation in Abrams' scheme (Jimmy Carter and Martti Ahtisaari).

Of the 36 statesmen including Annan and Obama, 25 delivered lectures or had someone read a lecture on their behalf (e.g., Anwar al-Sadat), or sent the text of a lecture to the Nobel Committee because they were unable to attend (e.g., Hjalmar Branting); others sent acceptance letters or telegrams, but I do not

include them because little of substance is communicated beyond appreciation for the prize. In the course of my analysis, I reviewed all the lectures by those Abrams categorized as statesmen, though not all lectures are extensively cited in Chapter Four because the focus is on representation of the most common elements.

The descriptions of the laureates given below, as well as the texts of the lectures, come from the Nobel Prize website (<http://nobelprize.org/ nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/>); the specific web address for each lecture is given in the bibliography. All citations of the lectures in Chapter Four are references to the texts available at this site, and are given by referencing the name of the laureate, regardless of year delivered or whether a representative delivered the lecture. Unless otherwise noted below, the lectures were each delivered on December 10 or 11 of the year in which the prize was awarded.

Pre-World War I

Year	Laureate	Description
1906	Theodore Roosevelt	United States: President [lecture: May 5, 1910]
1912	Elihu Root	United States: ex-Secretary of State [lecture scheduled for Sept. 1914 but not delivered]

The only two statesmen-laureates from before World War I are both Americans, Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. Roosevelt delivered his speech almost four years after winning the prize; Root did not deliver the lecture because World War I erupted and prevented his travel to Oslo, but he had prepared a lecture which was later published with his other writings.

Post-World War I (1919-1939)

1920	Léon Bourgeois	France: ex-Secretary of State; President, French Parliament; President, League of Nations [communication to the Nobel Committee: Dec. 1922]
1921	Hjalmar Branting	Sweden: Prime Minister; Swedish Delegate, League of Nations [lecture: June 19, 1922]
1926	Gustav Stresemann	Germany: ex-Lord High Chancellor; Foreign Minister; Part-originator of Locarno Pact [lecture: June 29, 1927]
1929	Frank B. Kellogg	United States: ex-Secretary of State; Part-originator of Briand-Kellogg Pact [acceptance speech/banquet speech: Dec. 10, 1929]
1934	Arthur Henderson	United Kingdom: ex-Foreign Secretary; President, Disarmament Conference in 1932 [lecture: December 11, 1934]

There was only one prize awarded from 1914-1919, to the International Red Cross. Woodrow Wilson was given the prize for 1919, but he was unable to give a lecture, sending a telegraph of thanks instead. The five statesmen-laureates listed above were the only ones to give lectures or send written communications that effectively took the place of a lecture, although there were three other statesmen-laureates during this period.

Post-World War II

1950	Ralph Bunche	United States: Professor, Harvard University; Director, division of Trusteeship, U.N.; Acting Mediator in Palestine, 1948
1953	George C. Marshall	United States: General President, American Red Cross; ex-Secretary of State and of Defense; Delegate, U.N.; Originator of "Marshall Plan"
1957	Lester Pearson	Canada: ex-Secretary of State for External Affairs; ex-President of the 7th Session of the UN General Assembly

No prizes were awarded from 1939-1943; the International Red Cross won for 1944, and Cordell Hull, the U. S. Secretary of State won in 1945 for his

work establishing the United Nations. He did not give a lecture. During the 1950s, there were three statesmen-laureates, all from either the U. S. or Canada. Between 1957 and 1971 there was only one statesmen-laureate, Dag Hammarsköld, who was awarded posthumously. Thus, for a thirteen year period there is a gap -- there are no statesmen-laureate lectures. During this period, "pure" humanitarians and human rights activists begin to be more frequently selected as laureates.

Post-1970

1971	Willy Brandt	West Germany: Chancellor
1974	Eisaku Sato	Japan: Prime Minister
1978	Anwar al-Sadat	Egypt: President
1978	Menachem Begin	Israel: Prime Minister
1982	Alfonso Robles	Mexico: Delegate, UN General Assembly on Disarmament; ex-Secretary for Foreign Affairs
1987	Oscar Arias Sanchez	Costa Rica: President
1990	Mikhail Gorbachev	USSR: President [lecture: June 5, 1991]
1994	Yasser Arafat	Palestine: Chairman, PLO; President, Palestinian National Authority
1994	Shimon Peres	Israel: Prime Minister
1994	Yitzhak Rabin	Israel: Prime Minister
1998	John Hume	United Kingdom: MP, Leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party
1998	David Trimble	United Kingdom: MP, Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party
2000	Kim Dae-jung	South Korea: President
2001	Kofi Annan	Ghana: United Nations Secretary-General
2009	Barack Obama	United States: President

After 1970, statesmen-laureates become common again. In the 38 years from Willy Brandt (1971) to Barack Obama (2009), a statesman is named for thirteen years, or more than one-third of the time. But this actually understates their prominence, as multiple statesmen are selected in a number of years. One-

third of the lectures, and nearly one-third of these prizes, go to leaders involved in Middle East peace negotiations on behalf of their nations. After 1974 there are only three statesmen from nations that traditionally tended to win the prize, and two of them are cited for negotiations in a domestic conflict (Hume and Trimble for Northern Ireland) -- Barack Obama is the first statesmen since 1974 to lead a traditionally-awarded Western nation. In this era, only Kofi Annan holds a notable position with an international institution.

Conclusion

Genre has a long history as a concept within the study of rhetoric, dating to ancient Greece. For Aristotle, there were only three basic types of speeches, distinguished by their different strategies, situations and audiences. In the modern world however, genre has become a more flexible concept, emphasizing how strategies, forms and substance fuse with recurring situations to create conventions that dictate how a rhetor can typically be expected to respond to situations of a given type. These conventions, in turn, have predictive value by indicating how a future rhetor in a similar situation will be likely to employ rhetoric; and they have evaluative value, by allowing a specific artifact to be compared to the norms of a previously identified genre to determine whether that artifact is likely to be rhetorically successful or not.

To study the Nobel lectures of the statesmen-laureates, I adopt the critical method of genre description, in which the critic examines a collection of artifacts

inductively, seeking to find common characteristics of form and substance. For this study, I examine 25 Nobel lectures, which appear to have a common rhetorical situation and common type of speaker, the statesmen-laureate; I base this selection on Abrams' (1984) categorization of types of laureates. To my knowledge, this will be the first rhetorical criticism that attempts to find common characteristics among multiple Nobel lectures. In the next chapter, I analyze the lectures and discuss the common themes that emerge.

Chapter Four: Analysis

The Nobel statesmen-laureates span eleven decades and hail from many countries and their careers are varied. They include career diplomats, heads of state, and in cases such as Yasser Arafat, leaders of paramilitary non-state forces. It is thus to be expected -- and in fact, is the case -- that their lectures include a diversity of stylistic and substantive elements. Yet there are several notable patterns in theme and structure that emerge from reading the lectures. In this chapter I draw on the lectures to illustrate these recurring elements, then turn to formulate organizing principles that tie them together.

There are also some recurring elements that, while common to most of the lectures studied, are not examined in detail in this chapter. I justify this decision on the grounds that they do not seem distinctive to a genre of statesmen-laureate lectures. This includes statements that thank the Nobel Committee or the people of Norway for the prize, which extol the honor of the prize itself, note the laureate's humility in accepting the prize, or which extol the people of Norway for their peace-loving character. Laureates also often phrase their acceptance of the prize as an act taken on behalf of a larger people or cause. Japanese Prime Minister Sato, in 1974, serves as a typical example:

> Excellencies, Ladies and Gentleman,
>
> Having the exceptional honor to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, rich in tradition and honored throughout the world, before such a distinguished assembly, was, indeed, the most memorable occasion of my life.

> [. . .]
>
> It is therefore on behalf of the Japanese people as well that I respectfully express my profound gratitude to the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament for their decision to award this prize to us. It is with great pride as a Japanese and with deep humility as an individual that I accept this prize.

I do not examine these statements in detail because it is a common -- indeed, expected -- feature of speeches in general to thank and compliment the audience; and of acceptance speeches to amplify the significance of the award and indicate the recipients' appreciation for the prize. Such statements can be seen to serve rhetorical purpose -- for example, by creating a tone of *gravitas* on the part of the speaker and gaining the audience's favor by complimenting them -- and they are conventions of broader genres such as the acceptence speech, but they are not unique to the statesmen-laureates.

This chapter instead focuses on the following major elements, each of which is present in a large number of lectures: peace as law and order guaranteed by international institutions; peace as linked to social justice and human rights; emphasis on the laureate's nation's virtues and experience of suffering in war; and narratives about the peacemaking process.

Peace as Law and Order

A major conceptualization of peace running through the lectures of the statesmen-laureates is that of peace requiring the establishment of international law and enforcement mechanisms. This definition and understanding of peace

appears with the first statesmen-laureate, Theodore Roosevelt, and is the most characteristic element of lectures through the 1950s; it then becomes secondary or does not appear notably in lectures during the 1970s – 1990s, only to reappear as a major element of Barack Obama's lecture in 2009. Of course, this is also the typical liberal-internationalist framework which, as discussed in Chapter Two, has been noted by scholars to shape much of the Nobel Committee's decision-making process. As I discuss further below, the era in which this theme becomes less observable is also the era in which statesmen-laureates were being selected from outside Western Europe or Anglicized North America, and it is central to Obama, the first head of state from the Western regions traditionally recognized by the Nobel Committee.

Roosevelt argued that "all really civilized communities should have effective arbitration treaties among themselves," and suggested that the United States Constitution and Supreme Court might be used as models for establishing more permanent rules for international relations and permanent courts of arbitration. Roosevelt then goes further to propose a League of Peace made up of major powers that desire peace, which would enforce arbitration decisions "by force if necessary," because

> the supreme difficulty in connection with developing the peace work of The Hague arises from the lack of any executive power, of any police power to enforce the decrees of the court. In any community of any size the authority of the courts rests upon actual or potential force.

Roosevelt contends that until such an enforcement mechanism exists, peace among nations will be fleeting and nation-states will not give up their large militaries, just as in

> new and wild communities where there is violence, an honest man must protect himself; and until other means of securing his safety are devised, it is both foolish and wicked to persuade him to surrender his arms while the men who are dangerous to the community retain theirs. . .So it is with nations."

Roosevelt's speech bears similarity to the non-statesmen Nobel winners in the pre-World War I era, in that it focuses on international arbitration. But he does not extol the popular peace movement, or peace as both a virtue and inevitability as do most of the non-statesmen -- for example, note the tone exuded by Charles Albert Gobat, winner for 1902, in describing the Hague Convention:

> To keep the peace! What a noble and magnificent idea! How many hopes are stirred by the thought that this greatest of all ideals - the maintenance of peace - should be the objective of an international convention bearing the signatures of most of the nations of the world!

Roosevelt's overall tone and style are more reserved and his optimism is restrained; he considers it unlikely that war will become obsolete soon, his emphasis is on "practical methods" and small steps, and he reminds us that "words count only when they give expression to deeds, or are to be translated into them."

The basic model of peace that runs throughout many of the statesmen-laureate lectures thus begins with Roosevelt and differs from the early non-statesmen in its emphasis on the need for enforcement over the celebration of

human virtue or the potential for peace. For there to be peace, nations must be willing to bind themselves into some sort of structure of rules that places limits on their behavior, gives guidance to the resolution of disputes, and is backed by force sufficient to overwhelm opposition to the decisions of international courts.

In the interwar years, the generally abstract discussion of international law and enforcement becomes increasingly concretized as arguments in favor of supporting the League of Nations as the best available means of implementing such policies. Hjalmar Branting argues for the League because

> the whole collective force of the League is to be turned against the aggressor, with more or less pressure according to the need. Without envisaging any supranational organization, for which the time is not ripe, the present approach is as analogous as circumstances permit to that of an earlier age when the state first exercised authority over individual leaders unaccustomed to recognizing any curbs on their own wills.

As Branting demonstrates, the earlier statesmen-laureates view international stability as a gradual evolution building on the internal domestic legal structures of Western nation-states. Many laureates exhibit an understanding of law as being desirable, neutral and devoid of ideological baggage; Leon Bourgeois' lecture is perhaps the most explicitly worshipful of law when he compares law to precisely calibrated scientific instruments which eliminate error:

> devoid of individual or national bias and immune to the fluctuations of opinion . . .the unprejudiced registrar of claims and counterclaims. By its absolute impartiality and its authoritative evidence, the law will appease passions, disarm ill will, discourage

> illusory ambitions, and create that climate of confidence and calm in which the delicate flower of peace can live and grow.

Through the 1920s and 1930s, the statesmen-laureates continue this general theme of law and the development of frameworks to limit conflict: Frank Kellogg places his hopes with the Washington Naval Conference and the limitation of armaments as a means of limiting war; Arthur Henderson claims that the nations of the world have become so bound into treaties renouncing aggression that war has become impossible without violating sworn agreements, although he next notes that "no one would be bold enough to suggest that this is enough to ensure peace," because in practice the League's members fail to enforce sanctions on treaty violators. The tension between the dream of international law and the practical reality that the League was failing because its members did not act runs throughout this period; the response offered by laureates is further exhortation and encouragement to live up to treaty obligations, and further proposed treaties. Henderson argues that the solution must be for nations to subordinate "in some measure national sovereignty to worldwide institutions and obligations;" he later develops this theme into a call for a League police force and World Commonwealth.

After World War II the theme of international institutions and law remains active as the central message in Bunche's and Pearson's lectures, which focus on the United Nations. As the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, proved to be less effective at maintaining peace then its supporters hoped,

Pearson brings back essentially the same argument that characterized the pre-World War II years, asking "can we not put some force begin the United Nations which - under the authorization of the Assembly - might be useful at least for dealing with some small conflicts and preventing them from becoming great ones?"

After Pearson, there is a gap of 15 years before the next lecture falls within the statesmen category, and at that point the focus on international law and enforcement subsides as a major theme in the lectures. Brandt emphasizes that cooperation among nations, inviolacy of borders in Europe and negotiations for arms control are all essential for peace, but as the Cold War progressed and balance between the superpowers came to trump the letter of international law the enforcement theme is no longer trumpeted. As Brandt points out with regards to the Berlin Wall crisis, rhetoric about the legal status of the city was irrelevant so long as the West was unwilling to start World War III over East Germany's building of the Wall -- he describes such rhetoric as "impotence disguised by verbalism. . .the verbalists had nothing to offer." Robles in 1982 gives perhaps the driest and most technical lecture of any of the statesmen, focusing on the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty and this of course falls firmly within the peace-as-law theme. But at the risk of sounding dismissive, it can barely be considered as rhetoric -- indeed, Robles does not appear to be attempting to persuade so much as inform -- as the following selection indicates:

> The transitional article specifies that "denunciation of the declaration referred to in Article 28, paragraph 2, shall be subject to the same procedures as the denunciation" of the treaty, except that it will take effect on the date of delivery of the respective notification and not three months later as provided in Article 30, paragraph 2, for denunciation of the treaty.

Moreover, as I discuss further below, with the shift by the Nobel Committee towards recognizing previously unrepresented geographical areas and ethnic groups also comes a shift in the type of rhetoric that characterizes statesmen's lectures. Law and enforcement regimes are replaced as the major substantive element, and exhortation as the major strategy, by national self-praise and emotional appeals, coupled with more extensive paeans to human rights. The legal-enforcement theme returns in full force, however, with Barack Obama in 2009.

Where previous laureates who emphasized law and enforcement tended to focus exclusively on the problem of checking aggressor nations, Obama reflects an expanded notion of enforcement that includes taking military action to intervene in humanitarian issues. Obama also amplifies the lament, prevalent especially during the League of Nations years, that the primary cause of failure in international law is the unwillingness of nations to contribute to enforcement efforts, stating "those who claim to respect international law cannot avert their eyes when those laws are flouted."

The law-institutions-enforcement paradigm is typically promoted in the lectures through deliberative exhortation aimed at getting the audience to

believe that it is possible to achieve peace and stability if sufficient support is given to existing and proposed institutions. Peace is *possible*, although laureates vary significantly over whether they believe it will come soon, if only the system were sufficiently supported. It is thus not surprising to note that most of the laureates from before World War II, and Bunche and Pearson after World War II, are themselves actively working in the institutions they extol so much; sometimes this is the reason they have received the prize -- Bourgeois was president of the League of Nations, for example. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the Nobel Committee, especially in the early decades, was made up of supporters of international arbitration and institutions such as the League, and Norway in general tends towards the internationalist ethic that values such institutions. There is a strong hint, therefore, of "preaching to the choir" throughout most of the early statesmen's speeches. Rhetorically, the bulk of this material seems intended to serve the function of encouraging greater and more intensive support for a position which the audience already accepts.

There is a counterpart to this line of rhetoric, however, and that is laureates' analysis of why peace has proven so fragile and difficult to create. Many laureates from before World War II, and especially Obama in more recent years, who focus on this theme tend to divide the world into civilized/responsible nations and uncivilized/irresponsible actors which include, for example, trans-national or breakaway ethnic groups. Bourgeois names as one of the challenges to peace "artificial movements. . . such as the Pan-Germanic, Pan-Islamic, or Pan-

Negro. . . [Which] lack the essential and real unity of background or community of purpose" and thus pose "a grave danger to the general peace;" he also chastises "certain powers that were defeated in the Great War [that] have not been wholehearted in their acceptance of the moral disarmament which is the primary condition for any peace." As I discuss further in the National Virtue and Suffering section below, all of the pre-World War II statesmen-laureates except for Stresemann were from neutral or victorious nations in World War I; they are the nations with the power to dictate the terms of international law, and thus their enthusiasm for the subject can also be understood as a reflection and advocacy of national interests and the stabilization of the status quo world order that they wish to solidify.

Moreover, laureates also focus on enforcement mechanisms -- and work with institutions that seek to enact them -- because they perceive humans as essentially warlike, with tendencies that must be held in check by responsible leaders. A common corollary element in lectures that emphasize law-and-enforcement is historical/anthropological discussion and demonstration explaining the roots of war as an inherent aspect of human nature. Elihu Root's lectures provides the most explicit early version of this element:

> To deal with the true causes of war one must begin by recognizing as of prime relevancy to the solution of the problem the familiar fact that civilization is a partial, incomplete, and, to a great extent, superficial modification of barbarism. The point of departure of the process to which we wish to contribute is the fact that war is the natural reaction of human nature in the savage state, while peace is the result of acquired characteristics. War was forced upon

> mankind in his original civil and social condition. The law of the survival of the fittest led inevitably to the survival and predominance of the men who were effective in war and who loved it because they were effective. War was the avenue to all that mankind desired. Food, wives, a place in the sun, freedom from restraint and oppression, wealth of comfort, wealth of luxury, respect, honor, power, control over others, were sought and attained by fighting. Nobody knows through how many thousands of years fighting men have made a place for themselves while the weak and peaceable have gone to the wall. Love of fighting was bred in the blood of the race because those who did not love fighting were not suited to their environment and perished.

Likewise, Bourgeois claims that

> human passions, like the forces of nature, are eternal; it is not a matter of denying their existence, but of assessing them and understanding them. Like the forces of nature, they can be subjected to man's deliberate act of will and be made to work in harmony with reason.

Thus the heavy emphasis on sanctions and the dream of the global police force -- these mechanisms would limit conflict in a way that the peace movement and internationalism as an ethic are unable to. Even when this element is not a significant part of a lecture, it is present implicitly where the theme of progress towards a stable global legal structure is emphasized, because the world is progressing *towards* stability and law, *away* from barbarism and international anarchy.

The common form and substance noted here, that of applying a broad generalization of history to explain conflict as an essential, but manageable, element of human nature, generally disappears by the 1970s and 80s, but it reemerges with Obama, who claims that "war, in one form or another, appeared

with the first man. At the dawn of history, its morality was not questioned; it was simply a fact, like drought or disease." This somewhat pessimistic view of human nature functions rhetorically to justify the need for strong international institutions by providing a explanation for war that locates its roots outside of social structures or the intentions and errors of statesmen (i.e., it is part of human nature and ancient), but also manageable (i.e., war is comparable to interpersonal conflict, and can be limited and channeled in the same way that murder or theft are, through deterrence and punishment).

Social Justice and Economic Prosperity

Statesmen-laureates dating to Roosevelt have made at least passing reference to social or economic justice. Before the 1970s and 80s however, these issues remain primarily in the background, and are referenced in two basic ways.

First, laureates such as Root note trends away from cruelty among "civilized" humans: "cruelty to men and to the lower animals as well, which would have passed unnoticed a century ago, now shocks the sensibilities and is regarded as wicked and degrading." Such references are cast as evidence of a gradual trend towards more humane treatment of fellow human beings that might indicate that the *potential* for widespread peace is coming.

Somewhat more common among the first half of the twentieth century and beyond World War II is discussion of economic and labor justice. In Roosevelt's case this consists of dedicating the Nobel Prize money to start a

foundation for "industrial peace," "for in our complex industrial civilization of today the peace of righteousness and justice, the only kind of peace worth having, is at least as necessary in the industrial world as it is among nations;" he describes elements of both labor and capital as greedy, violent and arrogant. Branting suggests that internationalist trade unions have been one of the most important factors in movement towards peace because they cross national lines and propagandize against war; Henderson cites the International Labor Organization as saying that "universal peace can be established only on the basis of social justice."

The importance of economic justice becomes more central in the lectures after World War II. The three statesmen-laureates in the 1950s all warn that the West must wake up to the fact that "the far away, little known and little understood peoples of Asia and Africa, who constitute the majority of the world's population, are no longer passive and no longer to be ignored" (Bunche). Bunche, Marshall and Pearson all note that non-Western people are now beginning to seek freedom and economic prosperity, and that if the West does not respond effectively, they will turn towards communism and the "false promises of dictators because they are hopeless and anything promises something better than the miserable existence that they endure" (Marshall). Pearson warns that income inequality must be checked lest it give rise to political instability.

While all three laureates speak in terms that suggest their genuine concern for human rights and equality, it is significant to note that they are

engaging less in exhortation of social justice than in linking it to political stability and the bipolarism of the Cold War world; social justice issues are cast as a matter of concern primarily because failure to consider them will increase problems or create imbalance between East and West, rather than as goals for their own sake. Of course, this may be a conscious rhetorical choice on the laureates' part: by casting issues of justice in realpolitik terms, they make a still primarily Western (i.e., stable and wealthy) audience more likely to take the plight of the developing world seriously.

After the mid-1970s general exhortation of justice and condemnation of injustice became an essential feature of all the statesmen's lectures except for Robles. Sadat and Begin, during the thirtieth anniversary year of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, both pledge their nations' commitment to justice. Begin says, "free women and men everywhere must wage an incessant campaign so that these human values become a generally recognized and practiced reality."

These issues are sometimes discussed in the "negative" sense -- that if there is not justice, there will be no chance of peace -- and sometimes in the "positive" sense, desirable as ends to themselves. For Arias Sanchez, "liberty performs miracles. To free men, everything is possible." Gorbachev sees as one of the major barriers to peace

> The growing gap in the level and quality of socio-economic development between "rich" and "poor" countries; dire consequences of the poverty of hundreds of millions of people, to whom informational transparency makes it possible to see how people live in developed countries. Hence, the unprecedented

> passions and brutality and even fanaticism of mass protests. Poverty is also the breeding for the spread of terrorism and the emergence and persistence of dictatorial regimes with their unpredictable behavior in relations among States.

F. W. de Klerk and Obama use almost the same language to describe the relationship between justice and peace: "Peace does not simply mean the absence of conflict. . .there can thus be no real peace without justice or consent" (de Klerk) and "for peace is not merely the absence of visible conflict. Only a just peace based on the inherent rights and dignity of every individual can truly be lasting" (Obama).

This element seems to function in several different ways. First, it functions analytically as a means of explaining why peace has been elusive, like the more straightforwardly pessimistic discussion of conflict as a part of human nature discussed in the previous section. The gap between rich and poor, or injustices and lack of human rights, are rarely attributed to an agent or cause, or if they are it is to abstractions such as oppression; instead, they simply *are*, they exist and create a barrier to peace. Actions such as investment in development are necessary to create greater justice (e.g., with Obama), but pre-existing injustice is taken as a given scenic element of human life.

Second, discussion of human rights and related concepts functions to buttress the laureate's credibility and image as a humanitarian and their appeal to the international audience. Politicians who are awarded for a narrow accomplishment such as negotiating a treaty (which may not stand the test of

time) or for aspirations, and who have careers that incorporate war-making, seem to use humanitarian rhetoric as part of the construction of their image as statesmen. They show their broader concern for humanity by discussing widespread problems of poverty and oppression in general terms, but tend not to turn this focus on themselves or their actions.

Finally, the literature on the historical development of the Peace Prize shows that humanitarians and human rights activists have come to make up a much larger proportion of laureates in recent decades, and suggests that awards given to humanitarians tend to be more popular and less controversial. It is likely that statesmen-laureates are employing rhetoric that parallels their activist counterparts not only because it casts them as more high-minded individuals but also because such rhetoric has become an expected norm in Peace Prize lectures. Simply put, the audience likely expects a Peace Prize laureate, whatever their background, to make references to justice as well as to peace.

National Virtue and Suffering

Statesmen-laureates receive the Nobel Peace Prize as individuals, but they are necessarily also seen as representatives of nations. Although it plays a relatively small role in most of the early twentieth century lectures, with the shift to laureates who are not typically involved in international institution building, over time the laureates increasingly take advantage of the lecture to highlight the particular experience of their respective peoples.

Theodore Roosevelt offers the United States Supreme Court as a possible model for a permanent international court, suggesting that "the methods adopted in the American Constitution to prevent hostilities between the states, and to secure the supremacy of the Federal Court in certain classes of cases, are well worth the study of those who seek at The Hague to obtain the same results on a world scale." Nearly all the other statesmen-laureates until the Second World War and immediately beyond make little mention of their home nation however, preferring to focus on broader issues.

The exception to this rule is Gustav Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, whose 1927 lecture aimed to "answer the questions so often raised about Germany's frame of mind." Stresemann contrasts the old, militaristic Germany with the New Germany that desires peace and justice. The bulk of his lecture is a meditation on the economic and political changes that occurred in Germany as a result of the war, particularly the humiliation and impoverishment of the middle class, and the beginning of a new sense of national identity and optimism. The following passage is typical in that Stresemann seeks to explain why Germans engage in a behavior that has been criticized internationally:

> Germany is often reproached with the fact that hundreds of thousands assemble in organizations which keep alive the memory of the war, the spirit of military life at the front, and the like. But I would like to put a question to everyone: Psychologically, could it be otherwise? I was not at the front during the war; but if I had been, it would have been for me the greatest and most moving experience of my life. The devotion of the individual ego to the idea of the state, the risking of one's life, the straining of all one's powers - is there any country in the world where those who have

> shared such experiences do not talk about them with one another? We have no waters of Lethe which can wash away man's memories or erase the pictures engraved in the mind's eye.

Stresemann, of course, differs from the other statesmen-laureates in the first half of the twentieth century because he hails from the losing side in the First World War. Thus, where other laureates from victorious or neutral nations tend to spend their time discussing the legal framework of the League of Nations, Stresemann employs his lecture to propagate a more sympathetic and contextualized view of Germany's people and their mood.

George Marshall's 1953 lecture also emphasizes his nation's experience, but in quite a different way. Marshall notes that "despite the amazing conquest of the air and its reduction of distances to a matter of hours and not days, or minutes instead of hours, the United States is remote in a general sense from the present turbulent areas of the world." This remoteness, coupled with the United States' diverse immigrant population and its resulting diversity of perspectives, and the lack of damage to America caused by war, led Marshall to conclude the United States had a unique role to play in producing global stability both through NATO deterrent forces and as a relatively impartial actor in international disputes.

From the 1970s onward, however, laureates place far greater emphasis on discussion of their nation or culture, and in many cases the lecture focuses nearly exclusively on the laureate's national experience, either in general terms or through discussion of their personal experience. Willy Brandt begins this trend;

much of his lecture deals with the division of Germany and particularly with Berlin. He describes how "the most striking aspect of the Berlin Wall was the absurd division of what had remained intact of the whole organism of a metropolis, with all the lamentable consequences for the people." In another long section, he discusses previous German Peace Prize winners, including Stresemann and Carl von Ossietzky, before turning to discuss the unique role the Federal Republic of Germany plays in European peace and stability, as both a part of NATO and friendly neighbor to the Warsaw Pact.

Eisaku Sato, the next statesman-laureate to give a lecture, talks about Japan's unique history; in his terms, "Japan managed to live in tranquility in a state of isolation, neither threatening other nations nor threatened by them" until the nineteenth century, after which,

> the Japanese people experienced a variety of vicissitudes and were involved in international disputes, eventually, for the first time in their history, experiencing the horrors of modern warfare on their own soil during World War II. Japan is the only country in the world to have suffered the ravages of atomic bombing. That experience left an indelible mark on the hearts of our people, making them passionately determined to renounce all wars.

Later in his lecture, Sato speaks of Japan's advanced scientific and technological capabilities, and suggests that his nation will contribute to the peaceful development of fusion power. Moreover, he extols Japanese culture and potential, suggesting that, "had the Nobel Prize been established a thousand years ago, the first recipient of the Prize for Literature might well have been a Japanese woman. Also, had Japan taken part in the life of the international community

several centuries earlier," many more Nobel Prizes in the sciences might have been won by Japanese people. Japan's unusual history, Sato claims, has led to "social awkwardness" that resulted in Japan being "unable to contribute actively to world civilization in a measure commensurate with our potential."

These two lectures, in 1971 and 1974, illustrate the beginning of the shift that occurs in the rhetoric of statesmen-laureates. It is perhaps not merely a coincidence that this shift occurs with Brandt and Sato, because they are the heads-of-government of former Axis powers whose nations launched wars of aggression in their respective continents and were then reduced to occupied territories after the war, but which by the 1970s had become major economic powers again. Both speeches focus heavily on their nations as critical actors for peace and regional stability in Europe and Asia respectively; both involve repeated assertion of how they govern according to principles of renunciation of force and aggression. In Brandt's case Hitler is briefly mentioned, but only when Brandt pays "respect to those men and women who joined the resistance against Hitler;" as cited above, Sato's only significant reference to World War II focuses on Japan's uniqueness as a victim of atomic bombing.

This is not to say that either laureate, three decades after the war, *ought* to have been apologetic or even necessarily to have raised World War II as an issue. Rather, both choose to incorporate some references to the war but cast those references in a way that emphasized the pain it caused their nation. These lectures therefore suggest an attempt to break with the past and establish new

identities for their nations in global consciousness (or perhaps more accurately, cement already developing post-war identities); they represent themselves as victims of the war.

Most statesmen-laureates after Brandt and Sato focus heavily on their nations' virtues or on their nations' experience of suffering in warfare. In 1978, Anwar Sadat's lecture states that

> the road to peace is one which, throughout its history which coincides with the dawn of human civilization, the people of Egypt have considered as befitting their genius, and their vocation. No people on earth have been more steadfastly faithful to the cause of peace, and none more attached to the principles of justice which constitute the cornerstone of any real and lasting peace.

Sadat goes on to cite the treaty between Ramses the Great and the Hittites, and Jesus' use of Egypt as a sanctuary. His counterpart, Menachem Begin, also lauds his people: "the ancient Jewish people gave the world the vision of eternal peace, of universal disarmament, of abolishing the teaching and learning of war;" he then turns to the other side of the virtue-suffering coin:

> But in my generation, Ladies and Gentleman, there was a time indescribable. Six million Jews - men, women and children - a number larger than many a nation in Europe - were dragged to a wanton death and slaughtered methodically in the heart of the civilized continent.

Oscar Arias Sanchez speaks of oppression throughout Central and Latin America, a world "which cannot wait for the guerrilla and the soldier to hold their fire," then celebrates Costa Rica as "a symbol of peace," "a country of teachers. . .a country of peace. We discuss our successes and failures in complete freedom. . .

We believe in dialogue, in agreement, in reaching a consensus." Gorbachev's lecture is primarily a policy discussion of the implementation and effects of *perestroika*, but as part of this he speaks often of the uniqueness of Soviet society and its struggles: "our democracy is being born in pain," he says, but

> a country like ours, with its uniquely close-knit ethnic composition, cultural diversity and tragic past, the greatness of its historic endeavors and the exploits of its people - such a country will find its own path to the civilization of the twenty-first century and its own place in it.

Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres focus heavily on the costs of war. Rabin speaks of his career as a military officer who issued orders to send soldiers to kill and die: "There is a moment you grasp that as a result of the decision just made, people will be going to their deaths. People from my nation, people from other nations. And they still don't know it." Concluding "there has been no pity in the Middle East for generations," he then turns to extol the Israeli Defense Forces for establishing a code of conduct for its soldiers centered around the Sanctity of Life, which Israel has always viewed as "a supreme value. We have gone to war only when a fearful sword was poised to cut us down."

Peres recounts his lost youth, emigrating from Russia to Israel, where his village was surrounded by barbed wire; "in the morning, we would go out to fields with scythes on our backs to harvest the crop. In the evening, we went out with rifles on our shoulders to defend our village." Where before "war was fought for lack of choice," however, "today it is peace that is the 'no-choice' option." Wealth, Peres argues, comes now comes from technology and intellect rather

than territory, and so technologically and economically advanced Israel must take on a role in the Middle East as a leader in education and industry, and aide its neighbors in "a great, sustained regional revival."

As the preceding paragraphs illustrate, one of the major themes of the lectures from the 1970s through the 1990s has been for laureates to extol the virtues and contributions of their nation while emphasizing the destruction and suffering they have endured with dignity and pride. In such discussion, war is never a choice made by the laureate's nation, but rather something that happens *to* them.

There are several reasons that seem apparent for this shift among the statesmen-laureates' lectures. First, there are the changes in the Nobel Committee's selection criteria and its new orientation towards selecting non-Western laureates for the Peace Prize. The result of the committee's reorientation is that most statesmen-laureates after 1970 are more likely than not to be from a region embroiled in active conflict or economic and social turmoil; Arab and Israeli leaders make up a full one-third of the statesmen-laureates between 1970 and 2000, for example. For laureates that fit this profile, the emphasis is thus on the local problems they face and on the dream of peace, rather than on global-scale institutions.

Second, the media environment likely plays a significant role. The growth of the Nobel Prize as a media event, as discussed by Salazar (2009), makes the Nobel Prize an object of great national prestige as well as a personal honor. The

global reach of television coverage also means that the laureates' home nations can become immediate audiences to the lectures, making lectures in the latter decades much more akin to domestic political speeches in their emphasis on patriotic themes, as compared to the largely Norwegian/North European primary audience in previous decades. Likewise, expansion of media coverage makes the lecture an opportunity to shape the nation's image in the mind of foreign audiences. The laureates can be seen to be appealing to their home nation by extolling its virtues or telling the story of its suffering, while also producing a more sympathetic image in global consciousness.

Moreover, television as a medium tends to emphasize the emotional over the discursive. Common imagery is of families disrupted, childhoods and innocence lost. Those laureates who oversaw active conflict rarely focus on their actual decisions and instead on the necessity of defense -- this is most prominent with the Israeli laureates. Conversely, laureates also speak of the promise of peace in terms of their land flourishing and the nation contributing to humanity, and of children reaching their potential, as with Mandela who says "the children must, at last, play in the open veldt, no longer tortured by the pangs of hunger or ravaged by disease or threatened with the scourge of ignorance, molestation and abuse and no longer required to engage in deeds whose gravity exceeds the demands of their tender years."

Whatever the underlying reasons for the shift, the overall effect is a transition from earlier lectures consisting of primarily deliberative rhetoric

seeking to bolster support for international institutions towards primarily epideictic rhetoric aimed at communicating a sympathetic and identifiable image of the laureates' nation. The lectures shift from exhorting institutional means of developing global stability, relying on arguments about human nature and the effectiveness of legal-enforcement oriented solutions; towards praising the virtues of the nation and of peace as a means to a better future, condemning the conflict in which the laureate was involved while presenting their side as acting out of necessity, and relying primarily on *pathos* and emotional imagery for rhetorical effect.

Peacemaking Process

The final major recurring element that I discuss in this chapter, also notable primarily in the lectures after 1970, is narrative that describes negotiations or other peacemaking work for which the laureate is being rewarded, or of which they are proud. Kirkscey (2007) focused on Wangari Maathai's use of narrative, as I discussed in Chapter Two, and described it as straightforward and clearly developed; in most cases the statesmen-laureates do not develop as clear a narrative as Maathai does. The narrative may be broken up by digressions or given in an incomplete form, but nonetheless many laureates emphasize their role in peacemaking. In some cases, as with Kim, this is done in a restrained manner, though with others such as Sadat it is done extravagantly, possibly due to variations in cultural norms regarding self-promotion. In this

section I build a composite picture of the basic narrative that is conveyed, in whole or in part, in many statesmen-laureates' lectures.

Typically, the primary character is the laureate himself, narrating in first person singular; otherwise, the laureate narrates in first-person plural, speaking on behalf of their nation's citizens. The common plot or sequence of actions is that the laureate is called to action by a crisis or by existing undesirable conditions, which in their role as a responsible leader they must ameliorate. Eisaku Sato talks about how "upon assuming the reins of government, I adopted, always conscious of the importance of the role of the United Nations, a policy of following a formula of collective security;" he realized that "to leave Okinawa in such an anomalous state [under U.S. control] would create greater tension in Asia." For Anwar Sadat, Egypt's long history as a land "cherished by God almighty" led to his peace initiative in which "through me it was the eternal Egypt that was expressing itself: Let us put an end to wars, let us reshape life on the solid basis of equity and truth." Mikhail Gorbachev recollected that when "I agreed to assume the office of the General Secretary of the Communist Party. . .I realized that we could no longer live as before. . .Those who were then governing the country knew what was really happening to it and what we later called '*zastoi*', roughly translated as 'stagnation.'" Kim Dae-Jung went to North Korea "with a heavy heart not knowing what to expect, but convinced that I must go for the reconciliation of my people and peace on the Korean Peninsula."

The laureate takes a decisive action -- opening dialogue with a rival nation of long-standing enmity in the case of Sadat or Kim, for example. When Menachem Begin received Sadat's message, he "without delay or hesitation, extended to President Sadat on behalf of Israel, an invitation to visit our country." Oscar Arias Sanchez states that "faced with the nearness of Central America's violence" and "as the people's servant, I proposed a peace plan for Central America." To counter the decline of Soviet society, Gorbachev considered it "a great temptation to leave things as they were, to make only cosmetic changes," but in the end "the realization that we faced inevitable disaster, both domestically and internationally, gave us the strength to make a historic choice, which I have never since regretted," to adopt *perestroika* as a new governing philosophy. F. W. de Klerk's account of South African politics claims that, driven by economic changes and introspection leading to "a fundamental change of heart," the National Party he led came "to the point of making a clean break with apartheid and separate development - a clear break with all forms of discrimination - for ever."

Having made an historic, courageous decision to work towards peace and betterment, the statesmen engage in a long and arduous struggle. Their work is inevitably, in Willy Brandt's words, "a sober task," composed of small steps. Brandt's attempts at rapprochement with East Germany involve achievements such as Christmas passes for Germans to visit family members across the Berlin Wall. For Sato, negotiations to transfer control of Okinawa to Japan "did indeed

present a challenge." Begin notes that the Camp David negotiations only reached fruition due to Jimmy Carter's "unsparing effort, untiring energy and great devotion in the peace-making process," and that after Camp David began "the natural arduous negotiations to elaborate and conclude a peace treaty." *Perestroika* is a "stormy and contradictory process" that requires resolution and resolve to see it through (Gorbachev).

Sometimes no clear reason is given for the difficulty; but when the difficulties are discussed in greater detail, the most common reason is lack of trust on the part of other parties. Developing trust is depicted as critical to success. "At first," Kim Dae-Jung relates,

> North Korea resisted, suspecting that the sunshine policy was a deceitful plot to bring it down. But our genuine intent and consistency, together with the broad support for the sunshine policy from around the world, including its moral leaders such as Norway, convinced North Korea that it should respond in kind.

Willy Brandt states that "when we proposed a treaty on the renunciation of force and called upon our Eastern neighbors to take us at our word, we were able to build on what other West German governments before us had said." The narrative is generally open-ended; the results of the peacemaking process are an important first step towards peace or improved relations, but rarely described as a final solution. Begin, for example, speaks of the draft treaty that emerged after the Camp David Accords as "the first indispensable step along the road towards a comprehensive peace in our region."

There are rarely any non-elite actors present in this narrative. Instead, peacemaking is carried out almost solely by high-level officials. For the most part, the only definitively identifiable individuals are the laureates themselves and their counterparts in other nations. When non-elites are mentioned, they are spear-carriers such as "the delegations of both countries" who "worked hard" (Begin), or they are "the people" in a collective sense who require leaders to take action on their behalf, as with Gorbachev's "misinformed society under the spell of propaganda [that] was hardly aware of what was going on and what the immediate future had in store for it" or the separated families of the Korean Peninsula and the divided Germany that Kim and Brandt sought to unite. Moreover, the use of first-person perspective makes the laureate the center of activity, initiating and responding to events. To be fair, the laureates are telling stories about their experience, but the effect is to reinforce an image of statecraft and governance as the domain of a select few. Though not presented as part of a peacemaking narrative, Rabin's phrasing is suggestive of the general vision of the statesmen-laureate lectures:

> Our peoples have chosen us to give them life. Terrible as it is to say, their lives are in our hands. Tonight, their eyes are upon us and their hearts are asking: How is the authority vested in these men and women being used? What will they decide? What kind of morning will we rise to tomorrow? A day of peace? Of war? Of laughter or of tears?

The laureates' narratives function, therefore, to create an image of the statesmen-laureate as a thoughtful, pragmatic, visionary leader. Peacemaking,

within the narrative, is not something anyone can do, nor is it the product of a grassroots; and it is not something that produces quick results or clean solutions. It is a matter of cultivation of trusting relationships between elites, the results of which impact the lives of the people in the background. The narrative functions to justify both the laureate's actions and their winning of the Peace Prize by presenting themselves as a stabilizing influence in international affairs. In the next section, I discuss how the elements described above fit together into two distinct sub-genres and formulate the organizing principles.

Summary and Organizing Principles

The major recurring elements discussed above are those that, in my judgment, seem most prevalent and most heavily emphasized throughout the lectures reviewed. I began my analysis with a collection of speeches determined by Abrams' categorization of "statesmen," but I found that, in fact, there appear to be at least two distinct groups of statesmen in terms of their rhetoric. First are those statesmen who primarily emphasize international institutions and law-and-order; second are those that emphasize their national experience, and narratives about their role in a peacemaking process. Social and economic justice, and human rights issues play a larger role in the latter group's rhetoric as well, though the former also addresses them.

These rhetorical differences also correspond roughly to different regional backgrounds, with statesmen from developed, stable regions tending to adopt the

first type of rhetoric, and statesmen from underdeveloped or unstable regions tending to adopt the second; and perhaps more significantly, the division corresponds to whether or not the laureate is heavily involved in international institution building. Additionally, the shift corresponds to the general trend of increased global media penetration over the 1970s and beyond; and to representation of humanitarians and human rights activists among Peace Prize laureates generally. As the Peace Prize gradually becomes the premier prize for contributions to humanity, and global media becomes more pervasive, the audience for the lecture -- and thus the rhetorical situation -- is changing as much as the type of laureate.

In formulating organizing principles then, it seems reasonable to treat these two groups differently. In the first case, the lectures share a common depiction of peace as stability and absence of conflict, coupled with trade and social justice, with particular emphasis placed on international law and strong enforcement mechanisms to guarantee compliance. In general, these lectures deal with international relations in broad strokes and on a global level, except for occasional detailed discussion of the specifics of treaties or the structure of international institutions. A common theme is the analysis of the roots of human conflict which is depicted as an inherent part of the human condition, and which therefore needs to be managed through legal and institutional means. Social and economic justice issues are mentioned secondarily, typically in the recognition that injustice and inequality tend to breed instability and violence. The specific

topic focused on by the laureate changes with the passing decades, but this overall worldview orientation remains stable. The key organizing principle here seems to be *exhortation of stable institutions*.

In the second group, the primary emphasis of the lecture is on the virtues of the laureate's nation, the suffering experienced due to war by the laureate and his nation, and the dream of prosperity that might come with peace, and on exhortation of human rights generally. These lectures also tend to feature strong elements of narrative in which the laureate describes their actions in establishing peace, such as by initiating talks with a long-standing enemy. The focus is on presenting the nation and the laureate positively; often there is implicit justification of acts of defense in the conflict that is (hopefully) being resolved. The organizing principle seems to be *justification of the laureate and the nation through identification and sympathy*.

In both cases, laureates generally depict peace as a necessary and desirable end, and maintain guardedly optimistic tones about progress. Whether dealing with international institutions or their respective nations, laureates are focused on positive portrayals, and mix deliberative and epideictic speech, leaning towards the former in the first group and towards the latter in the second group. In the next chapter, I develop final conclusions about this study, discuss avenues for further research, and return to focus on Obama's speech to determine whether my initial judgment of it as unusual was warranted.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

In the previous chapter, I discussed the major themes that emerged from my reading of the statesmen-laureates' lectures. These indicate that statesmen-laureates have tended to use the lecture either as an opportunity to encourage support for international institutions, or as an opportunity to paint a compelling, sympathetic picture of their nations, and moreover, of themselves as lovers of peace and as visionary statesmen. In this chapter I first consider the study's implications and limitations, then possible future lines for research, and finally return to consider Obama's speech in light of my findings.

Implications

Foss states that the basic research questions motivating a genre criticism are "Does a genre exist among a set of artifacts? If so, what are the characteristics of the genre?" (Foss, 2004, p. 201). The first -- and most obvious -- implication of the study is that the statesmen-laureates' lectures do appear to constitute a genre, with two distinct sub-genres (alternatively, it might be said that there are two genres present). The recurring situation of the Nobel lecture elicits recurring substantive themes and forms (e.g., the peacemaking narrative), which can be explained through underlying rationales of exhortation of stable institutions and justification of the laureate and the nation. The nature of these recurring elements has evolved over time, but within the two sub-genres they have been relatively consistent.

I began this study by asking whether statesmen-laureates other than Obama have also used the prize as a platform to justify their national policies. While the earlier statesmen-laureates did not tend to emphasize their nation, they did use the lecture to exhort the international institutions, sanctions, and treaty frameworks that they were involved in building. Later laureates, of course, very much used the lecture as a platform for defense and justification of their nation and its policies.

Because the statesmen-laureates operate within a set of genre norms regarding the content and form of their speech, future Peace Prize lectures by laureates of this type are to some degree predictable. As the audience has evolved to expect these constraints, statesmen tend to fit their rhetoric to these expectations, and to make use of the opportunities the established norms provide them for self-justification. Future statesmen-laureates will likely continue to use the lecture largely as a means of justifying their nation and themselves on the world stage.

Moreover, this study indicates that statesmen-laureates are able to use the lecture itself as a means of depicting themselves as worthy of the peace prize, particularly through the process narrative and through exhortation of human rights. These elements are essentially expected as part of the genre, making it an expectation that the laureate will use the lecture to legitimize themselves as a visionary, pragmatic leader regardless of their previous career. There is a feedback loop or reinforcement mechanism at work here, wherein winning the

Peace Prize enables the laureate to use the prize and lecture to enhance their legitimacy as a statesmen, thus justifying the fact that they have won the Peace Prize.

Limitations

There are several notable limitations to this study that stem from the choice of genre criticism as a method. First, most theory surrounding genre rhetorical criticism emphasizes that common, recurring *situations* tend to dictate common forms, style and substance. In this study, I proceeded on the assumption that the Nobel lectures constitute a common situation for the statesmen. However, in this case I found that the two sub-genres roughly correspond to two distinct types of statesmen-laureates, based on national background. This suggests that *speaker*, as well as speaker's *purpose*, are as significant an element in the constitution of a genre as *situation*. Benoit (2000) raised a similar point, arguing that critics should adopt a more expansive and flexible understanding of what factors drive the formation of a genre, and this study serves as evidence in support of his critique.

Second, genre criticism focuses on study of the texts of the lectures themselves, without extensive investigation into, e.g., their historical and cultural background. For example, I make assumptions based on commonly understood social patterns -- such as the general expansion of global media over time, leading to the likelihood that laureates are increasingly speaking to domestic and global

audiences beyond the Nobel lecture hall -- when attempting to understand why laureates adopt certain strategies. Other methodologies, however, might cast more light on these conclusions by studying how the Nobel lectures have actually been conveyed in the media, and how this has changed over the decades.

Third, the approach to genre description that I use, based on Foss's (2004) description of the procedure, did not involve searching for larger genres of which the statesmen's Nobel lectures may be a part. It may be that all Nobel lectures share many of the same characteristics, or that the elements described in this study may be common to statesmen's discussions of peace in settings other than the Nobel lecture. This last point leads, naturally, to consideration of future research.

Suggestions for Future Research

This study describes common elements among the lectures of statesmen-laureates. The most obvious suggestion for future research would be to describe the conventions in the lectures of other types of laureates. Genre description of lectures by humanitarians, human rights activists, and the organized peace and anti-war movement -- or all lectures collectively -- would serve to determine whether the conventions discussed in this work are unique to the statesmen or common to Nobel Peace Prize rhetoric generally. Furthermore, comparison of the statesmen-laureates with other types may indicate, for example, whether the later statesmen-laureates adopt human rights and social justice rhetoric because

they are driven to do so in response to a general Nobel lecture norm created by the increasing presence of human rights activists among the laureates; or perhaps whether they do so to co-opt the human rights rhetoric as part of the process of legitimization that the peacemaking process narrative seems to serve.

Beyond genre criticism, a second interesting line of future research would be a content analysis or similar approach, to evaluate themes of law-and-enforcement, peacemaking narrative or national virtue and suffering quantitatively. While one content analysis has been performed on the lectures (Kinnier, et al, 2007), it searches for references to values in a very general way -- notably, it concludes that over ninety percent of lectures reference "peace." Of course, the Nobel lectures, particularly the lectures of the statesmen-laureates, are also ripe for more focused rhetorical criticism of individual speeches, as only two have been so analyzed to date.

Obama in the Context of the Statesmen-Laureate Genre

At this point, I return to focus on Obama's lecture and apply the understanding of the statesmen-laureate's lectures that were developed through genre description. In light of my findings, does Obama's lecture still appear unusual and not typical of a Nobel Peace Prize lecture? Essentially, no and yes. On the one hand, Obama's lecture deals with similar themes to other lectures, and engages in justification of the laureate's nation as its primary motivating principle. On the other hand, it differs in tone from most lectures and combines

elements of both sub-genres, producing a hybrid, as the following discussion indicates.

Obama is the only laureate to directly raise the controversy surrounding his prize. Certainly, other statesmen-laureates who delivered lectures have hailed from nations whose policies are unpopular internationally (e.g., Israel), or were themselves considered unworthy of the prize. But Obama is unique in that he explicitly addresses the controversy surrounding him and the major reason for it (i.e., the wars). This immediately sets a different *tone* for the speech, one in which Obama confronts the expectations of his international audience, even if much of the substance of the speech is similar to other laureates and fits within the genre expectations.

Second, Obama resurrects the law-and-enforcement theme, and the corollary theme that justifies sanctions and enforcement through historical description that paints war as a problem with which humanity has always struggled. In this respect, he is like most statesmen-laureates from wealthy, stable Western nations, and particularly echoes previous American statesmen-laureates such as Roosevelt and Elihu Root. Yet Obama develops a new line of argument, not notably present in previous lectures (although not unknown outside the Nobel lectures), by tying human rights and social justice to enforcement and military force. Previous laureates who had strong elements of international law and the need for enforcement in their lectures were focused on to the need to check aggression among nations, but Obama

> believe[s] that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That's why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.

Thus human rights become a justification for military action in general, and American military action in particular.

Moreover Obama, like other latter-day laureates, emphasizes his nation's virtues; but where the genre norm has been to highlight suffering due to war, and as a result condemn it, Obama instead highlights American national *sacrifice* for the good of other nations. Though he emphasizes international standards and laws, he tells the world that it has been America that has largely maintained global stability:

> the service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest – because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.

America's primary national virtue, in this interpretation, is that it has been willing and able to stand as protector to the world. In Obama's lecture, therefore, the two sub-genres are hybridized, with the need for law and enforcement functioning as support for the justification of the United States. Maintenance of a stable world order through force is necessary because of the inherent tendency toward conflict throughout human history, and American behavior is justified

because American military policy is *identified* with the maintenance of a stable world order. As when he directly raised the issue of controversy in his Nobel selection on a personal level, Obama maintains a challenging tone that implicitly criticizes the rest of the world for criticizing American policy.

By developing these elements within the larger context of a meditation on just war doctrine, Obama casts himself as a serious leader who never employs force arbitrarily, but who is willing to use force when necessary not only in defense of the nation but also for the good of humanity. Obama's implicit challenge to critics of himself or of American policy is that they are unwilling to take on the same burden of deciding when to use force in a world full of threats, a burden that Obama and America shoulder, although he also calls on other nations to join -- or perhaps to follow -- the United States in maintaining global stability.

Conclusion

This study builds on existing scholarship about the Nobel Peace Prize and expands the understanding of the Nobel lectures by describing the recurring rhetorical strategies and substance that characterizes the lectures of the most common type of peace laureate, the "statesmen." Existing literature indicates that there is scholarly interest in the Nobel Peace Prize, and that its history and politics have been investigated, but considering its international prominence and significance, and the fame and importance that attend so many laureates, little study of the rhetoric of the Peace Prize has occurred.

Using the rhetorical critical method of genre description, I found that there are two major types of statesmen-laureate lecture, each with consistent recurring themes and basic forms tied together by organizing principles that constitute distinct sub-genres. Laureates from before the 1970s, who tend to hail from Western Europe or the United States exhort the international institutions they seek to build and emphasize the need for civilized nations to stand together to check aggressor states; while laureates from after the 1970s, who are often from less stable regions use the lecture as an opportunity to justify themselves and their nations on the global stage. Obama's lecture combines elements of both sub-genres, and results in a justification of national policy by implicitly casting it as the backbone of enforcement mechanisms against aggressors and thus the lynchpin of global stability.

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