International Commercial Fishing Management Regime Safety Study: Review of International Case Studies

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The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by NIOSH.

Photo: Homer, Alaska

Ted Teske (NIOSH)

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#### International Commercial Fishing Management Regime Safety Study

- Sponsors:
  - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
  - United States National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
- Purposes:
  - to document (globally) the relationship between safety at sea and fisheries management practices and
  - to provide practical guidelines for fisheries managers on how they can help to make commercial fishing safer





#### Timeline

- February 2008- Literature Review
- Spring 2008- FAO sponsored 16 case studies from around the world
- August 2008- Review of case studies
- November 2008- Expert Consultation





#### **Review of Case Studies**

- Conceptual Framework
- Hypotheses
- Findings from Case Studies
- Preliminary Recommendations



Photo courtesy Harold Mason





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


Photo courtesy Harold Mason





**Government Policies Which May Affect Fishing Safety** 





#### Hypotheses

- 1. Fisheries management policies may have wideranging indirect effects on fishing safety.
- 2. Quota-based fishery management systems are safer than competitive fishery management systems.
- 3. Ineffective fisheries management policies may also affect safety.
- 4. Fisheries management can affect fishing safety directly by integrating safety policies with fishery management policies.





#### Hypotheses #1

# Fisheries management policies may have wide-ranging indirect effects on fishing

safety.









- Spain: Engine Power Limits
- The report suggests that engine power limits might limit the opportunity to participate in some fisheries safely
- "... the State determines a maximum power for the engines of vessels, which is too low for shell-fishing out at sea, inshore fishing and the harvesting of goose barnacles in Galicia, as a higher power engine is necessary to escape from storms and maneuver better among rocks, etc." [page 18]







- France and EU: Maximum Tonnage
  - reduced freeboard,
  - reduced enclosed volumes in the upper parts,
  - reduced living and working space, detrimental to living and working conditions, [Page 7]





- Thailand: Race for fish.
- The report suggests that race for fish conditions are created by seasonal closures, aggravating risks:
- "... especially after the closing season periods, with the open access condition, fisheries will be in high competition in order to get to and from the fishing ground as fast as possible and carrying home with the largest possible catch." [pages 6-7]





#### Hypotheses #1 Summary

	Country/ Region	Type of Evidence
*	Chile	Empirical
	EU	Hypothesized
₽	Iceland	Empirical
	Japan	Implicit
	Malawi	Hypothesized
***	New Zealand	Empirical & Anecdotal
	Philippines	Hypothesized
·燕:	Spain	Hypothesized
	Sri Lanka	Empirical & Hypothesized
	Thailand	Implicit



#### Hypotheses #2

#### **Quota-based** fishery management systems may be safer than competitive fishery management systems.







• France

	Total accidents 2000-2005	Accidents yearly average	Yearly exposure time	Frequency rates
Brittany: Bay of St Brieuc (Race)	80	13.3	108 900	122
Normandy: Bay of Seine (Quota)	227	37.8	638 600	59
Normandy:Off Bay of Seine (Quota)	313	52.2	2 860 000	18





## Hypotheses #2 Summary

	Country	Type of Evidence
•	Argentina	Empirical and anecdotal
*	Chile	Empirical
	France	Empirical
	Iceland	Empirical





# Estimated Annual Fatality Rates in Alaska Halibut and Sablefish Fisheries

Year	# Fatalities	FTE	Rate per 100,000 FTEs
1991	6	2663	225
1992	7	3167	221
1993	1	2220	45
1994	1	2394	42
1995*	0	1266	0
1996	0	1214	0
1997	0	1229	0
1998	1	1104	91
1999	1	1096	91
2000	0	1124	0



#### Estimated Search and Rescue (SAR) Case Rate in Alaska Halibut and Sablefish Fisheries

			Rate per 100,000
Year	<b># SARs</b>	Vessels	Vessels
1992	23	4618	498
1993	26	4362	596
1994	33	4641	711
1995	15	2673	561
1996	7	2527	277
1997	7**	2455	285
1998	7**	2078	337
1999	6	2076	289
2000	3	2018	149





#### Hypotheses #3

# Ineffective fisheries management policies may affect safety.









- Ghana
- "Our fishing grounds have dramatically changed due to the operations of other fishers. We are now fishing in higher seas. . . Now we spend between four and five days at sea for each trip."
- "I am the captain of an inshore boat and started fishing since 1983. Due to declining fish catch, we have moved from our fishing grounds in Ada Foah in the Greater Accra Region, Keta in the Volta Region, Elmina in the Central Region and Sekondi in the Western Region, to deeper waters."







- Malawi
- "Resource decline due to lack of proper institutional arrangements (open access and common property) and weak enforcement capacity results in overfishing of stocks in shallower water and hence forces fishers to venture into risky offshore deep water fishing." [Page 40]





### Hypothesis #3 Summary

	Country/Region	Type of Evidence
*	Ghana	Anecdotal
	Malawi	Hypothesized
	Pacific Islands	Anecdotal
	Thailand	Implicit



#### Hypotheses #4

#### **Fisheries**

management can affect fishing safety directly by integrating safety policies with fishery management policies.









- Iceland
- "...the system can also contribute to increased safety through placing requirements on equipment and training, resulting in a lower accident rate." (pg. 2)
- "We conclude that there is most likely a link between increased safety training, equipment and awareness and the steady decline in accidents from the inception of the Marine Safety and Survival Training Center in 1985." (pg. 11)





- Pacific Islands
- "... In developing countries where the state of management is rudimentary, rather than improving safety by changing the type of management measure, it may be more relevant to alter the process so as to include safety as specific fisheries management objective." (Pacific Islands, pg. 27)
- In effect, this equates to the concept of "safety at sea as an integral part of fisheries management". Presently, this concept is not a prominent feature of fisheries management in the Pacific Islands region. Where management is intended to improve sea safety, it is by way of a peripheral requirement, not as an explicit objective of management.





### Hypotheses #4 Summary

	Country/Region	Type of Evidence
*	Ghana	Implicit
	Iceland	Empirical
•	Japan	Implicit
	Malawi	Hypothesized
	Pacific Islands	Hypothesized
	Peru	Hypothesized
······································	Spain	Hypothesized
	Sri Lanka	Hypothesized



## Recommendations for Fishery Managers #1

Fisheries managers must be aware that the way fisheries are managed can affect safety.






# Questions?





#### **Fisheries Management: A Traditional Perspective**







#### **Fisheries Management: An Expanded Perspective**

