Constructing Peace After Civil War:
Assessing the Role of Power-sharing on the Durability of Peace

by

Marisa L. Martín

MPP Essay

Submitted to

Oregon State University

In partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the

degree of

Master of Public Policy

Presented June 13, 2013
Commencement June 15, 2013

Master of Public Policy essay of Marisa L. Martín presented on June 13, 2013

APPROVED:

Sarah Henderson, representing Political Science

Alison Johnston, representing Political Science

Joseph Orosco, representing Philosophy and Peace Studies

Marisa Martín, Author

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my husband and my family for their endless encouragement and love. I would also like to thank my friends for their constant support. I extend my profound gratitude to my committee members, Dr. Sarah Henderson, Dr. Alison Johnston, and Dr. Joseph Orosco, for their support, guidance, and feedback regarding my essay. It was a great pleasure and an honor to work with such positive, intelligent, and dedicated individuals. I'd also like to thank Dr. Paul Kopperman for being an outstanding mentor during my years at Oregon State University. I offer my sincere appreciation to the MPP director, Dr. Brent Steel, and to all of the instructors and faculty in the MPP program for their contribution to my education.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Marisa L. Martín for the degree of Master of Public Policy presented on June 13, 2013

Title: Constructing Peace After Civil War: Assessing the Role of Power-sharing on the Durability of Peace

Abstract approved:

Sarah Henderson

A growing concern among the international community is that civil war has become the most common form of armed conflict worldwide. To prevent further bloodshed, more research is urgently needed to understand the causes of conflict and most successful strategies for peace. The bargaining theory of war proposes that former warring parties defect from peace processes as a means of self-preservation in the face of security threats and uncertainty. But which institutional arrangements are most effective in mitigating these conditions and facilitating peace? Increasingly, these theorists and conflict negotiators alike are proposing that power-sharing, arrangements within peace agreements that guarantee all factions a share of government power, is the answer. Indeed, power-sharing has become one of the most popular instruments for ending wars today. Nevertheless, its effectiveness is hotly debated. Consequently, one of the foremost questions within the civil war literature is: does power-sharing contribute to lasting peace and if so, under what conditions? To answer this question, this paper makes use of a new data set of 195 peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2008 that aimed to settle 53 civil conflicts in 44 countries. I find that political power-sharing largely decreases the risk of war relapse, military power-sharing mitigates conflict under certain conditions, and territorial power-sharing does not significantly affect peace outcomes. Thus, power-sharing is an important tool for ending war, however, other arrangements, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of soldiers, amnesty, elections, and comprehensive agreements are more critical to establishing long-term peace.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………...1

LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………………………2

DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS………………………………………………………26

RESULTS…………………………………………………………………………………..31

DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS……………………………………………..39

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………..43

REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………..45

LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES

Page

FIGURE A: Power-Sharing Agreements that Resulted in Durable Peace……………………….32

TABLE 1: Logistic Regression Results for Influence of Political Power-Sharing on Peace Outcomes…………………………………………………………………………...34

TABLE 2: Logistic Regression Results for Influence of Military Power-Sharing on Peace Outcomes…………………………..……………………………………………….36

TABLE 3: Logistic Regression Results for Influence of Territorial Power-Sharing on Peace Outcomes………………………..…………………………………………….….38

Introduction

The 21st century has presented a new set of challenges for the global community and has made policymakers, conflict mediators, and scholars increasingly concerned with how to end civil war. International changes, such as the spread of globalization and democratization, have contributed to significant interdependence between countries making interstate war far less likely, but it has also facilitated the rise of nonstate actors, such as terrorists and insurgents, who now pose a greater threat to international security (Nye, 2011). In fact, civil war has become the most common and most deadly form of armed conflict on the planet (Collier, 2007; Gates and Strom, 2007). From 2010 to 2011, the world experienced the greatest surge of intrastate conflicts since the 1990s peak of more than 50 civil conflicts (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012). Of particular concern is that civil wars tend to last much longer than interstate wars and have proven more difficult to resolve (Walter 2002). These trends have created a greater sense of urgency among conflict-resolution practitioners to improve their understanding of the mechanisms that create lasting peace (Gates and Strom, 2007).

The field of civil war research has grown substantially in the past two decades and scholars and negotiators have learned many important lessons in that time (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Yet, post-conflict situations continue to be ripe with unpredictable circumstances and efforts to establish peace frequently fail (Stedman, 2001). For example, during the 1990s, failed agreements led to sharp increases in violence in Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. Why did these peace processes fail? What makes the difference between renewed violence and enduring peace in nations emerging from conflict? Numerous theories explain that a return to war is the result of structural or cultural factors; however, the literature is increasingly recognizing the role that individual interests play. For example, the bargaining theory of war

advises that peace breaks down due to conditions of uncertainty and perceived threats among the actors during the peace process. Bargaining theorists and conflict management practitioners argue that a successful negotiation process requires institutional arrangements that address these individual concerns and that provide incentives for cooperation (Norris, 2008). Bargaining theorists propose that power-sharing is one such arrangement; a perspective that has been largely adopted by experts in the field. In fact, power-sharing has become one of the most popular instruments for ending wars today. However, the capacity of power-sharing to stimulate peace has been highly contested and it is therefore critical to continue exploring whether this widely used tool actually contributes to lasting peace following civil wars, and if so, under what conditions. Using quantitative analysis, I find that power-sharing can successfully diminish the risk of conflict, but that other institutional arrangements, such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of soldiers, amnesty, elections, and comprehensive agreements are more important predictors of long-term peace.

Literature Review

Despite great efforts by mediators to end civil conflict, countries that have experienced civil war are at exceptionally high risk of returning to war, a phenomenon that is often referred to as a 'conflict trap' (Collier, 2007). On average, civil wars last about 5 years; however, "only half of countries with a conflict that ends manage to make it through a decade without relapse" (Collier, 2007). Since 2000, ninety percent of all armed conflicts have transpired in nations that had previously experienced civil war (Walter, 2011). These patterns are disturbing because the financial and human consequences of intrastate conflict are dire. Economists who have quantified the average yearly costs of civil war estimate that domestic costs approach $64 billion and global cost reach $100 billion (Collier, 2007). Wars also result in death, disease, and

poverty, and are prime breeding grounds for terrorists and international criminal organizations. These costs not only devastate the afflicted country, but routinely spillover into other countries. Undoubtedly, the international community holds a stake in preventing and ending civil wars; however, achieving and keeping the peace has proven problematic.

Causes of Renewed War

Why do wars recur and how can negotiators stop this cycle? Myriad theories have emerged to explain the causes of renewed war and the conditions under which lasting peace is possible. Generally, the factors that cause a society to return to war are the same as those that cause initial outbreaks of conflict (Walter, 2011). While it is difficult to make definitive statements regarding causality, the most prominent theories explain renewed conflict as a consequence of structural factors, cultural factors, dynamics of the previous war, or characteristics of the peace process (including individual interests, the terms of the settlement, and third-party involvement) (Walter, 2011; Demmers, 2012).

Structuralist theories emphasize that conflict is path-dependent. This approach explains how initial country conditions that fail to meet human needs lead to grievances among the population and motivate rebellion (Demmers, 2012). For example, when political, geopolitical, and economic rules and structures break down, the opportunity for conflict rises. Thus, the systems of society, including the political economy, play a major role in igniting conflict.

There are several ways that political and judicial institutions contribute to conflict. For example, a history of colonialism, authoritarianism, and a corrupt criminal justice system is associated with greater conflict risk (Demmers, 2012). This is largely because illegitimate and oppressive regimes alienate populations and motivate insurgency (Stedman, 2001). However, strong authoritarian governments are often quite effective in blocking rebellions. Thus, the

opportunity for rebellion is strongest when political and judicial institutions are too weak to suppress an uprising (Stedman 2001; Walter, 2011). Additionally, even if the violence comes to a halt, peace is less likely to last when the regime is corrupt or weak because rebel groups are less likely to trust the government and because the parties have less experience addressing problems peacefully (Walter, 2011; Collier, 2007). That is, peace is more durable in democratic societies with high institutional capacity because actors with prior democratic experience are more likely to trust one another as well as the democratic characteristics of the peace process (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008).

The characteristics of neighboring states also affect peace outcomes because belligerents are more likely to return to war if neighboring states offer support (financial, military, or logistical) to one of the rival parties or if neighboring states express disapproval of the peace process (Stedman, 2001). The impact of neighboring states is particularly strong when the nation at war is institutionally weak. Given these political and geopolitical factors, it is commonly recommended that negotiators improve the nation's institutional capacity, strengthen government transparency and accountability, and ensure greater opportunities for public participation and representation.

Structuralist theories also stress that countries characterized by low per capita income and poor economic development are prone to cycles of violence (Collier, 2007; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Poverty and economic inequality are associated with myriad social problems, including high mortality, low life expectancy, and a lack of housing, education, healthcare, and job opportunities. Environments that offer civilians few opportunities often breed resentment against the government, making it far easier for rebel groups to recruit soldiers (Maiese, 2003; Walter, 2011). Similar problems occur in countries with a high dependence upon the production

and exportation of valuable natural resources such as oil, gas, diamonds, and rare minerals (Collier, 2007). Production of such resources brings wealth to political elites, which gives them no reason to change the economic system and incentivizes them to stop investing in human capital and other sectors of the economy (which in turn exacerbates grievances). Moreover, government elites and insurgent leaders are often able to use commodity wealth to finance their war (Stedman, 2001; Collier, 2007; Walter, 2011). Researchers who have focused on economic explanations of war typically recommend that mediators prioritize economic growth, and remedy harmful natural resource extraction and trade policies (Maiese, 2003).

Theories grounded in social psychology tend to explain war as the result of unresolved cultural disputes (Walter, 2011). For example, social identity theory explains that wars sparked by identity differences, including perceived ethnic, racial, and religious disparities, are particularly persistent (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Demmers, 2012). According to this theory, people construct their identities based around a shared set of socially meaningful characteristics in order to satisfy their need to belong (Demmers, 2012). In doing so, people create in-groups and out-groups and develop their identity in comparison to others. To protect and reinforce their sense of identity and self-worth, groups become motivated to improve their social position relative to other groups, which may embolden oppressive behavior against outsiders. Some studies indicate that it is easier to recruit and mobilize soldiers based on shared identity than on shared political or economic ideology because identity issues evoke a deeper emotional response and greater sense of personal threat (Mason, Brant, Gurses, and Quinn, 2011). It follows that the number of identity groups in a society affects post-war outcomes. For example, societies with a small number of sizable ethnic groups are at a higher risk of conflict than societies that are relatively homogenous or that are extremely fragmented, because large ethnic groups have

superior ability to dominate others (Mason, Brant, Gurses, Quinn, 2011; Walter, 2011). The prevailing wisdom is that resolving identity issues requires helping the groups meet their identity needs through alternative routes; although policy recommendations for achieving this are not well developed (Demmers, 2012). One strategy involves helping members of different groups develop a common identity by emphasizing their shared problems (such as natural disasters or threats from other nations) or by focusing on their common goals. However, these strategies may not be realistic in practice and could create other tensions, particularly if focusing on external threats increases fears. Thus, a more viable alternative may be to encourage members of different groups to join several new cultural, political, and social groups because "cross-cutting memberships make the individual less dependent upon one single in-group for the satisfaction of his or her psychological needs and less vulnerable to polarization" (Demmers, 2012).

Other theorists emphasize that conflict dynamics, or characteristics of the previous war, impact the odds of future conflict. For example, the length of war matters because parties that have been involved in conflict longer are more likely to recognize that they are unlikely to ever win and will therefore have greater incentive to remain at peace (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). Additionally, wars of high intensity, with high casualty rates, are associated with elevated risk of renewed conflict because this condition creates more distrust and resentment (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Lastly, higher numbers of warring groups and soldiers (e.g. over 50,000 soldiers) introduce greater uncertainty and therefore greater potential that at least some actors will defect from peace (Stedman, 2001). In short, war is highly path-dependent.

Bargaining Theory of War

While economic, political, or social identity grievances help explain motivations and opportunities for war, some argue that they are not sufficient to explain why war recurs in some

environments with these conditions but not others (Walter, 2011). The bargaining theory of war (or the rationalist approach) is a dominant theory that emphasizes the strategic nature of war and argues that individual factors drive conflict recurrence (Lake, 2010). Specifically, *asymmetric information* and *commitment problems* present during the peace process will cause actors to experience security threats that make them believe that a return to war will lead to better outcomes than peace (Walter, 2011; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Mattes and Savun, 2010; Demmers, 2012).

The theory assumes that warring parties consist of self-interested, utility-maximizing actors who make rational decisions given perfect information (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Bargaining theory's game-theoretic model assumes that when faced with the options of adhering to or defecting from peace, players will strategically choose the option with the greatest payoff (Demmers, 2012). A central idea is that because war is costly, groups with a clear understanding of the risks should recognize that peace offers the greatest chance for survival (Demmers, 2012). Following that logic, civil wars that end in a clear military victory should be more likely to result in long-term cooperation because they leave the defeated group(s) with few resources, little capacity to recommence conflict, and a clear understanding of the opposition's greater military capabilities (Mattes and Savun, 2010). In this case, the victor has no reason to keep fighting and the losing party has enough information to recognize that committing to peace is the safest option. Other civil wars end simply because the parties' resources have been exhausted. In this situation, both groups have had enough time in battle to learn that they are unlikely to defeat the other and therefore "both should prefer a bargained solution to destructive conflict" (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). In short, given the significant risks of fighting and a clear understanding of

the likely outcome of war, it would be in the rational interest of these parties to negotiate a similar outcome peacefully.

Bargaining theorists, however, recognize that warring groups may not always behave rationally (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Actors may let their emotions influence their decisions or may lack access to the information they need to accurately weigh the full costs and benefits of their decisions. For example, many conflicts come to a close without a clear outcome, such as those ended via negotiated agreement (either self-enforced or enforced by third parties) (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007). Under these circumstances, no decisive victor has been established, meaning that each party has *asymmetric information* regarding the relative military capabilities and intentions of adversaries (Gates and Strom, 2007; Wallensteen, 2001). This uncertainty decreases trust among the groups and contributes to communication problems. Groups often lie or hide information out of fear that it could be used against them (Fearon, 1995). For example, they may overstate their military capabilities in an attempt to appear less vulnerable or to try leverage this power to get a better deal during the peace process (Fearon, 1995; Mattes and Savun, 2010). Consequently, adversaries experience *commitment problems*; meaning parties cannot credibly promise to one another to uphold the peace (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

Under such conditions of uncertainty and distrust, groups experience security threats and become more likely to return to war preemptively as a means of self-preservation (Gates and Strom, 2007). Hence, rather than being advantageous, overstating one's military capabilities (or actually being more powerful) is dangerous because it increases fear among opponents and often compels them to behave preemptively. However, actors are only likely to succeed in returning to war if their resources, including weapons, leaders, financing, number of soldiers, and combat training, are enough to pose a threat to their adversary (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

Accordingly, actors who both oppose or distrust the peacemaking process *and* have the capacity to resume conflict are called *spoilers* (Stedman, 2001; Kieh, 2011). Generally, weaker parties are more likely to spoil the peace because they experience a greater sense of threat, have less ability to negotiate a peace deal in their favor, and have a lower opportunity cost of returning to war (Stedman, 2001; Walter, 2011). Therefore, because insurgents often have less power than the government and tend to be less satisfied with the status quo, they are more likely to renege on a peace deal (Gates and Strom, 2007; Mattes and Savun, 2010).

In sum, the rationalist approach explains renewed war as a failure of the bargaining process and "an inefficient outcome that all parties would avoid in the absence of bargaining imperfections" (David Lake). Certainly, a poorly designed agreement or one that is implemented at the wrong moment may make the parties want to return to war (Ouellet, 2004). Nevertheless, while a clear military victory may provide groups with complete information, much of the international community agrees that the price of sustained civil war is so high that it is preferable to initiate a peace process rather than hope that the war will resolve itself (Stedman, 2001). However, the argument for ending war through a negotiated peace process is not merely a normative one. Emerging empirical evidence casts doubt on the idea that peace is more durable following military victory. For example, a recent study by Mason, Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn (2011) specifies that while peace is often fragile immediately following the signing of a settlement, when settlements are designed right they are more likely to facilitate long-term peace than a military victory (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Stedman, 2001). Therefore, given the desire to avoid a long and devastating battle, the bulk of the literature states that resolving conflicts in the absence of a clear victory requires getting the terms of the agreement right.

Bargaining theorists argue that it is possible to end war in the face of asymmetric information and commitment problems by reducing security threats and providing parties with incentives to get them to support the peace process (Stedman, 2001). Without their commitment to stop fighting, the nation remains vulnerable to another conflict. To facilitate elite buy-in, bargaining theory makes two main recommendations. First, address the asymmetric information problem by equalizing groups' resources. Leveling the playing field should increase transparency regarding relative capabilities and reduce fear. Second, reduce commitment problems by rewarding groups for cooperating, while also requiring them to engage in costly concessions (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). The rationalist perspective's sub-theory of cost-signaling indicates that during the peace process, parties must be willing to take on 'costly concessions' or personal risks in order to credibly signal that they are serious about committing to peace. In other words, peace may be constructed by designing agreements that address individual concerns and that provide warring factions with incentives to commit to peace.

Constructing Peace Through Negotiated Settlements

Parties remain optimistic about their potential to win the war in the absence of a clear outcome, and therefore entering into an agreement is an important costly behavior that signals commitment to peace (Stedman, 2001). This process increases trust and encourages groups to stick to the terms of the settlement. Regrettably, no easy formulas exist for drafting a peace accord because settlements must provide solutions appropriate to the unique circumstances of each war. However, there are some broad procedural guidelines as numerous studies have provided insight into which policies are important to include.

A peace agreement may take the form of an official document or an informal verbal agreement, public statement, or letter (Yawanarajah and Ouellet, 2003). In some cases, it may be

possible to draft a single document. However, peace processes usually begin with the drafting of several partial agreements over the course of many months or years (which may stand-alone or be incorporated into a comprehensive agreement at a later date). For example, ceasefire agreements, in which all parties agree to stop the war for a specified time frame, are often the first partial agreements to be drafted. Once the fighting has stopped, there are three general stages to the negotiation process (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003).

The first stage is pre-negotiation, which outlines the procedural rules and institutions for negotiating peace, the parties that will be involved in the negotiations and their roles, and where negotiations will occur (Yawanarajah and Ouellet, 2003). This phase may also include interim or preliminary agreements wherein former combatants officially agree to negotiate a settlement. These partial agreements are important for initiating the peace process, but they are fragile as they typically exclude certain conflict actors and do not fully address the issues at stake (Yawanarajah and Ouellet, 2003). To enhance the legitimacy of the process, it is best to include all relevant parties in negotiations and tackle the full range of problems that led to the conflict (Jarstad, 2008; Brosché, 2005).

Therefore, during the second phase of the peace process, mediators often aim to establish a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) (Yawanarajah and Ouellet, 2003). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2013) and the Peace Accords Matrix (2012) define a CPA as a written document created through the course of negotiation signed by all actors involved in the conflict. CPAs identify the full range of substantive issues of concern and outline how resources will be distributed as well as how future disputes will be addressed, including any political, social, legal, military, or economic structural or procedural changes required (Yawanarajah and Ouellet, 2003).

The third phase designates how the settlement will be implemented (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). This may involve a separate implementation agreement that specifies actors' responsibilities, the consequences for not fulfilling their roles, and whether a third party will oversee the implementation (e.g. the United Nations, the African Union, or an external government). While settlements facilitate peace, there is a significant margin for error. Consequently, a pressing objective is to determine which provisions yield the greatest prospects for long-term conflict termination (Mattes and Savun, 2010).

Given the multitude of theoretical perspectives regarding the main causes of civil conflict, however, it is understandable that there remains substantial disagreement regarding which policies to prioritize (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Despite this disagreement, the international community generally recognizes disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of soldiers (DDR), amnesty, reconciliation, elections, and security guarantees such as power-sharing, and third party involvement as the most important terms to include in a settlement (Kieh Jr., 2011; Stedman, 2001; Mattes and Savun, 2009). For instance, most scholars agree that because disarmament and demobilization of soldiers make groups vulnerable, these processes help them signal to one another that they can be trusted to uphold the peace (Stedman, 2001). Additionally, a failure to help former combatants reintegrate into civilian life, particularly in a fragile society, makes them more prone to reengage in violence. DDR is presently considered one of the best predictors of enduring peace and is critical to the initial stages of a peace process (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Stedman, 2001).

Once soldiers have laid down their arms, it is widely recommended that the nation address past injustices that contributed to the conflict, including denial of rights, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (including genocide, torture, forced disappearance, and slavery)

(Maiese, 2003). To do so, mediators may include provisions to establish institutions for war crimes tribunals, war reparations, and criminal justice system reform. A common way to address past injustices is to create truth and reconciliation commissions, which may take on a variety of forms. Quite often, nongovernmental organizations, governments, and conflict management practitioners set up reconciliation commissions (Malek, 2013). For example, South Africa's government was instrumental in forming South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission that aimed to address the injustices of apartheid, and nongovernmental organizations spearheaded successful reconciliation commissions in Rwanda following the genocide. Reconciliation may be more successful, however, when community members and local leaders initiate these processes. These commissions may resemble formal courts in charge of investigating and prosecuting war crimes or may be informal without the authority to prosecute. Generally, commissions are tasked with healing communities by uncovering and publicly acknowledging the realities of the conflict. Reconciliation can last months or even years as they call for individuals to come forward one by one to share personal testimony of the war. Perpetrators are asked to acknowledge their actions and victims are encouraged to forgive them. Predictably, these processes are long and painful, but because reconciliation opens a dialogue to address core issues, adversaries that have participated in such processes are more likely to uphold the terms of the settlement. Many argue that truth and reconciliation commissions are "the best—or only—way to achieve a full accounting of crimes committed against fellow citizens and to prevent future conflict" (Rotberg and Thompson, 2010).

It is imperative to note, however, that pursuing justice may be incompatible with the objective of peace (Stedman, 2001). One of the central difficulties with resolving conflicts is that warring groups may refuse to put down their arms if it means revealing their role in the war and

facing prosecution. Moreover, it may not be feasible to prosecute every perpetrator because during the course of war, "the line between offenders and victims can become blurred" (Yawanarajah and Ouellet, 2003). Given these difficulties, settlements may stipulate that parties acknowledge past injustices (e.g. through reconciliation commissions), but grant parties amnesty to appease their fears (Yawanarajah and Ouellet, 2003; Rotberg and Thompson, 2010).

Amnesty involves legally exempting perpetrators of crimes from punishment, often with the condition that parties publically acknowledge guilt during reconciliation processes (Melander, 2009). Bargaining theory argues that amnesty is supportive of peace because people have a strong desire for justice and so agreeing to allow one's enemies to go unpunished is a costly concession and therefore signals commitment to cessation of conflict. However, there is debate regarding how effective amnesty is in securing peace. Melander's (2009) study found that amnesty might support peace in authoritarian regimes, but not in democracies or in nations transitioning between regime types. This may be because authoritarian regimes offer a more stable national environment and because people within authoritarian regimes may be more accepting of impunity for guilty parties. In contrast, other studies indicate that amnesty may promote peace in democracies, but only when the most egregious human rights violators and leaders of the conflict are brought to justice (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003). The relationship between amnesty and peace is thorny to say the least; critics argue that while amnesty may support peace it does so by sacrificing justice and human rights, and encourages a climate of impunity for criminal behavior (Melander, 2009). To balance the desire for both peace and justice, many third parties grant amnesty to the majority of soldiers, but not to the leaders of the war. Put simply, amnesty allows many guilty parties to avoid legal prosecution and denies justice to many victims, but may be one of the only ways to get warring elites to agree to stop fighting.

Because democratization is associated with peace, many negotiators include elections as a major provision within settlements in an attempt to help the nation become a stable democracy (Stedman, 2001). However, democracy requires that elections be free and competitive, involving candidates who hold legitimacy among constituents. Yet, in post-conflict societies where political parties are often weak and corrupt, democratic elections may not be feasible. Consequently, negotiators and scholars are increasingly recognizing that elections, which help establish how power will be distributed, may be viewed more realistically as an instrument for ending war than for democratization.

A common recommendation for incentivizing groups to adhere to peace is to convert warring groups into political parties (Stedman, 2001). These parties may not be perceived as legitimate, but granting warring elites the chance to compete for political power through the electoral system is often effective in getting core actors to stop fighting. For example, although Charles Taylor was considered corrupt and guilty of war crimes, "most international observers believed that the election of Charles Taylor in 1998 [although undemocratic] was necessary to bring [Liberia's] civil war to a close" because he threatened to return to war if he was not elected (Stedman, 2001). Nevertheless, elections are not always successful in ending war; losing groups may decide that war will bring more favorable outcomes and there is also significant danger to putting extremists in power. For example, while Liberia was experiencing short-term peace, Taylor was actively fueling the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone by providing assistance to the rebels who were committing egregious human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Furthermore, international observers argue that his oppressive regime led to the outbreak of the Second Liberian Civil War that occurred about a decade later. Clearly, post-conflict elections are unlikely to resemble those in fully institutionalized democracies and pose their own set of risks.

Nevertheless, several studies have provided evidence that holding elections is successful in teaching former adversaries how to compete for power through peaceful means and often sets the stage for consolidating democracy in the country (Stedman, 2001; Jarstad, 2009).

The rationalist approach argues that the key to reducing the risk of war and incentivizing groups to stick to peace is to provide them with two main security guarantees, power-sharing and third party involvement (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Norris, 2008). The modern concept of power-sharing grew out of Arend Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy, an institutionalized form of managing conflict in societies divided along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, in which leaders of warring groups are guaranteed a share of political power (Lijphart, 1969; Norris, 2008). Lijphart argued that holding elections or converting warring groups into political parties is not enough. He contended that majoritarian democracies (winner-take-all systems) would prove unstable in societies plagued by conflict because groups that lose the election will lack a voice in the new government and may be tempted to return to war (Lijphart, 1999). He contended that the only way to mitigate the potential for conflict is to guarantee all political elites a share of political power (with or without elections). By his definition, political power-sharing involves four major components: (1) grand coalitions, in which elites from each rival group are integrated into the executive (often established through the electoral system); (2) a system of mutual veto power, in which decision-making requires a super-majority or consensus among all parties in the executive; (3) proportional representation for all groups in civil service appointments and elections; and (4) self-governing autonomy, in which groups are granted power to govern over local issues (e.g. through federalism) (Lijphart, 1993; Norris, 2008).

Consociationalism was first developed into a theory during the late 1960s (Norris, 2008). Over the years, the concept has been widely studied and broadly expanded (Hartzell and Hoddie,

2003). Other scholars have coined the terms 'consensus democracy', 'proportional democracy', 'negotiation democracy', and most commonly 'power-sharing' to refer to strategies similar to consociational democracy (Norris, 2008; Jarstad, 2009). Some scholars make a distinction between dividing resources and sharing resources. For instance, if resources are not shared but are allocated to groups to control independently, or if certain groups are prohibited from participating in various government institutions or decision-making processes, many scholars would label this power dividing rather than power-sharing (Brosché, 2005; Gates and Strom, 2007). Yet a fair number of scholars make no such distinction, and rather stick to a broader definition of power-sharing.

Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) were principal developers of the broader and most widely recognized concept of power-sharing. They define contemporary power-sharing to be "those rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power" (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). A major contribution of theirs was defining four distinct forms of power-sharing: political, military, territorial, and economic power-sharing. They believed that in post-conflict societies, where the concerns of former belligerents are multidimensional, it is beneficial for political elites to share not only political power, but other power as well. For example, groups that have been economically marginalized may not agree to a peace deal unless they are granted economic power. Therefore, the modern definition of power-sharing incorporates elements of Lijphart's consociationalism, but it has evolved.

Political power-sharing involves sharing government power, via mechanisms such as Lijphart's grand coalitions, mutual veto power, and proportional representation in government or civil service (either through elections or appointments) (Walter, 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie,

2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009). Territorial power-sharing is where the state continues to have central control, but local groups are granted greater autonomy over local issues (which can be especially effective when the crux of the conflict involves geographic disputes) (Mattes and Savun, 2009; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). Federalism is a chief example of territorial power-sharing. Military power-sharing involves sharing coercive resources, integrating rebels into the state security forces, or creating a new national army that guarantees positions to all former combatants (Mattes and Savun, 2009). Economic power-sharing provides groups mutual control over state economic resources, and often involves redistributing resources toward historically marginalized groups (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mattes and Savun, 2009). In short, power-sharing involves a compromise that guarantees all factions a role in government and a share of at least some political, economic, territorial and/or military power in return for adhering to the peace (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Brosché, 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Norris, 2008). While their definition is relatively new, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) find evidence that these types of arrangements were implemented in negotiated settlements as early as the mid 1940s in Colombia, India, and Malaysia.

Effectiveness of Power-sharing

While there are numerous theories regarding the causes and solutions of civil war, there are important reasons to focus on power-sharing. In recent decades, power-sharing has become one of the most widely accepted tools for ending civil conflict (particularly among the Western states). It is one of the most frequently used mechanisms for terminating conflicts, particularly those in Africa (Mehler 2009; Gates and Strom, 2007). For example, of the 38 civil wars terminated via negotiated settlement between 1945 and 1999, all but one included power-sharing provisions (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). From 1989 to 2004, 70 of 83 peace agreements

contained power-sharing (Brosché, 2005). Since the turn of the 21st century, most negotiated settlements have included power-sharing provisions. While power-sharing has been extensively studied and has contributed to peace in several countries, it warrants further examination because the effectiveness of this widely used tool is highly debated within the literature (Brosché, 2005; Norris, 2008).

Numerous studies have found evidence that power-sharing provides important benefits. Among the most frequently cited success stories in which power-sharing has prevented a return to war for at least a few years are South Africa (1994), Liberia (2003), and Angola (2002) (Norris, 2008; Jarstad, 2009; Mattes and Savun, 2009). The rationalist approach argues that power-sharing is effective at reducing the risk of conflict because it equalizes resources and requires players to make costly concessions (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Norris, 2008). Providing a share of power to all belligerents makes the competing sides more evenly matched and allows them to have a clearer understanding of one another's relative capabilities and intentions. In turn, security threats and the risk of preemptive war are reduced. Power-sharing is costly because it restricts the potential power of each party. In other words, all groups must concede the prospect of gaining full control of the country. Additionally, agreeing to share power with a former enemy may be perceived as "selling out their interests" and may cause them to lose supporters (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009). Hence, in taking on these risks, parties are able to credibly signal to one another their intention to commit to peace (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Gates and Strom, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Walter, 2002). Power-sharing is therefore purported to reduce commitment problems, fear, and uncertainty, as well as encourage cooperation, moderate behavior, and trust (Mattes and Savun, 2010; Brosché, 2005; Norris, 2008; Walter, 2002; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007).

While power-sharing is a costly concession, it also provides each party with a guaranteed reward—all parties retain at least some power (Walter, 2002). This is important because warring groups are hesitant to commit to peace if it means surrendering power. Indeed, Walter (2002) finds that "parties are 38% more likely to sign an accord if it includes a guarantee to be part of the future government." According to Gates and Strom (2007), "the temptation to fight is low as long as the value of power-sharing is greater than the share a spoiler could earn through fighting." Thus, by providing a benefit to all warring groups, each group has greater incentive to remain at peace.

Much of the support for power-sharing comes from large-N studies (Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 2002; Gates and Strom, 2007). Many of these studies have examined the aggregate effect of power-sharing dimensions. For example, Hartzell and Hoddie's (2003) quantitative study of 38 civil wars between 1945 and 1998 provided evidence that including more dimensions of power-sharing has a cumulative and positive association with peace. For example, including all four forms of power-sharing (political, economic, territorial, and military) facilitates peace better than including only one form of power-sharing. In all of these ways, power-sharing is considered to support the chances for conflict resolution (Stedman, 1997; Mattes and Savun, 2010; Gates and Strom, 2007).

In contrast, recent studies that have examined power-sharing dimensions independently raise questions about their effectiveness. For instance, political power-sharing is the most common form included in peace accords and has been most widely studied (Mehler, 2009; Walter, 2002). Mattes and Savun (2009) find that "each additional dimension of political power-sharing reduces the risk of settlement failure by about 29 percent" and they argue that because it is the only type of power-sharing that they find to be statistically significant it should be given

priority in negotiated settlements. Stedman (2001) also finds evidence that political power-sharing significantly raises the probability of peace. Binningsbø's (2005) study of power-sharing in 118 post-conflict societies between 1985 and 2002 lends support for political power-sharing as a valuable instrument for peace, although this study provides for a more nuanced result: proportional representation may support peace, while grand coalitions do not. To confuse matters, however, some studies find that political power-sharing undermines peace (although this has not proven to be statistically significant) or has no effect (Derouen, Lea, and Wallensteen, 2009; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mukherjee, 2006).

Territorial power-sharing is less commonly included in settlements (Mehler, 2009). However, some research indicates that territorial arrangements reduce the risk of relapse (Binningsbø, 2005; Stedman, 2001). A few studies have implied that military and territorial pacts are more effective in promoting peace than political or economic pacts because military and territorial provisions require costlier concessions, thereby signaling greater commitment (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). Yet other studies provide conflicting results. Negotiators have been least likely to include economic power-sharing in negotiated settlements and therefore few studies have examined its role on conflict termination. It could be that political power-sharing includes economic power-sharing, because groups with control over state decisions will also make decisions regarding economic resources.

Qualitative studies have sparked concern not only over the effectiveness of power-sharing, but also its potential dangers. For example, Jarstad (1994) states that a disagreement over a power-sharing arrangement led to an escalation of violence during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Also worrisome is that power-sharing may actually incentivize groups to initiate war as a means of obtaining at least some future power (Tull and Mehler, 2004; Sisk, 2003). Power-

sharing pacts failed to prevent the outbreak of recommenced war in Lebanon (1975), Northern Ireland (1974), Somalia (1992), Angola (1992 and 1994), Sierra Leone (1999), and Czechoslovakia (1993) (Gates and Strom, 2007; Sisk, 2003). The Dayton Agreement following the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict is another well-known failure (Norris, 2008).

A major debate over power-sharing is whether it is supportive of democracy (a common long-term goal among conflict negotiators) and whether it needs to be democratic at all (Gates and Strom, 2007). Many argue that power-sharing supports democracy because it teaches rivals basic democratic forms of governance (Lijphart, 1969; Norris, 2008; Gates and Strom, 2007; Jarstad, 2009; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Walter, 2002). However, researchers are increasingly concerned that it may conflict with the goal of democracy because it is a rigid system that is inherently elite-centered (Jarstad, 2009). Rather than holding free and competitive elections, power-sharing guarantees power to groups typically in the absence of elections. If elections are held, the outcomes are essentially rigged. Therefore, power-sharing may lead to *adverse selection* in which it rewards and includes violent extremists who lack popular support while excluding parties that were not part of the war (Jarstad, 2009; Gates and Strom, 2007; Brosché, 2005). Consequently, power-sharing may reinforce divisions between former belligerents (Sisk, 2003; Tull and Mehler, 2005). Power-sharing may also create a *moral hazard* by empowering political elites who may not represent the public's interests and who have little accountability to the public (Gates and Strom, 2007). Though elites may be satisfied with power-sharing arrangements, citizens often are not (Mehler, 2009; Horowitz, 2009). Power-sharing also involves *transaction costs* or political stalemates because of its emphasis on inclusion, mutual veto-power, and consensus-based decision-making in a pluralistic environment (Gates and Strom, 2007). Notwithstanding, others argue that the very logic of power-sharing relies on the

assumption that a majoritarian, winner-take-all, election system following civil war would prove less stable, and therefore it is necessary to sacrifice democracy and good governance in the short-term to ensure immediate security (Gates and Strom, 2007).

In practice, power-sharing has been defined in countless ways, had different goals, and been implemented differently, which has contributed to momentous debate regarding how to measure, study, and draw conclusions about it (Brosché, 2005; Jarstad, 2009). Unfortunately, the inconsistencies within the literature are due to differences in methodology, operationalization, coding, case selection, and interpretation of provisions within peace deals (Mattes and Savun, 2009; Mehler, 2009). This uncertainty has made it more difficult for conflict management practitioners to design the most effective power-sharing arrangements. Nevertheless, proponents and critics alike agree that there are few alternatives for ending war, which explains why it is widely used despite remaining questions (Jarstad, 2009; Brosché, 2005; Mehler, 2009). Certainly, power-sharing is not perfect, but because it is one of only a handful of tools available to mediators, it is essential that researchers continue to examine the circumstances under which power-sharing is effective. Researchers have identified several of these conditions for success.

Conditions for Success

There is disagreement about whether it is acceptable to forgo democracy for peace through power-sharing in the short-term, but most scholars agree that long-term peace requires a transition to a more flexible democratic system that allows new coalitions to form that move beyond the cleavages of war and include previously excluded groups (Jarstad, 2009; Ouellet, 2004; Sisk, 2003). For example, many argue that power-sharing was only successful in the case of South Africa because the terms of the settlement required the government to transition from power-sharing institutions towards a democracy within a period of five years (Gates and Strom,

2007). It is therefore widely recommended that settlements identify deadlines for phasing out power-sharing and transitioning toward more permanent systems of democratic elections and governance (Krienbuehl, 2010).

Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) have found that combatants are often able to reduce their distrust if substantial costly signals are in place, such as power-sharing and amnesty. However, even with these provisions, parties may continue to experience informational asymmetries and commitment problems (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Hence, most civil war scholars argue that consolidating peace requires other security guarantees, such as a credible and neutral third party to monitor and enforce the terms of the settlement (Brosché, 2005; Walter, 2002; Gates and Strom, 2007; Stedman, 2001, Mattes and Savun, 2009). Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) find that third parties decrease the risk of a failed agreement by 83%. As a monitor, third parties may collect, verify, and pass information between the groups, as well as report attempts to violate the peace deal (Walter, 2002; Mattes and Savun, 2010). For example, former UN Secretary Kofi Annan and his negotiation team were instrumental in maintaining post-election peace in Kenya following its civil war. As monitors, the team assisted the groups by identifying the substantive issues of concern, resolving disputes throughout the peace process, and engendering trust (Horowitz, 2009).

Third parties are said to be most effective when they have the power to enforce the settlement by promising to intervene if either party attempts to spoil the peace (Mattes and Savun, 2010; Kieh Jr., 2011). Multiple reports point to competent third party enforcers as a major predictor of post-conflict peace (Stedman, 2001; Walter, 2002). Third parties may enforce the peace through sanctions (e.g. trade sanctions or freezing of assets) or by intervening in a peacekeeping capacity. The presence of peacekeepers with the mandate to use force is

significantly associated with greater chances for long-term peace (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Mason, Brandt, Gurses, and Quinn, 2011).

Third parties often facilitate conflict resolution; however, some studies have found that third party intervention has no effect on peace (Fortna, 2004). More worrisome is that third party intervention, including peacekeeping, has in some cases increased commitment problems and aggravated violence. A major reason for this failure is that many third parties are willing to become involved as monitors, but not as enforcers (Stedman, 2001). Being an effective enforcer requires substantial military capacity and a willingness to endure costs, commit resources, and risk troops. These are costs that international nongovernmental organizations and external governments are often unwilling or unable to take on. When third parties merely monitor the peace process, the warring groups quickly recognize that the monitor lacks the power to protect them or to punish them for spoiling the peace. When third parties lack the capacity to enforce the peace, the competing groups have less incentive to stop fighting and may even attack third party monitors (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Quite understandably then, many scholars argue that third parties with a personal stake in ending the conflict will be more effective because they have greater political will to intervene (Mukherjee, 2006). However, while third parties with a strategic interest in ending the war may be more effective under some circumstances, they also run the risk of losing legitimacy among the warring groups. For instance, they may be more inclined to give preferential treatment to the actors that better serve their interests, or may fail to properly report or respond to violations of the terms of the agreement. For example, third parties in Angola did not report certain violations because they were afraid that doing so would make them seem less neutral, and they falsely reported that the rebel group had demobilized because they wanted the mission to appear successful (Stedman, 2001). However, other scholars explain

that the positive association between intervention and renewed war may simply reflect a spurious correlation. That is, third parties and peacekeepers are more likely to intervene in the most high profile and most violent wars that already have the greatest risk of failure. In fact, since the Cold War, peacekeepers have been more commonly deployed in those situations in which the resolution of armed conflict was particularly difficult (Fortna, 2004).

Many civil war scholars are beginning to argue that power-sharing is most successful in creating peace when it is used as a short-term solution, efforts are made to transition toward a more democratic form of governance, and a third party enforcer oversees the peace process. Yet questions remain as to why power-sharing has failed to prevent war in many countries, suggesting that further research is needed to better understand the conditions that make power-sharing more or less successful. As Gates and Strom (2007) argue, there are "many reasons to think that the effects of power-sharing are worth further scrutiny - and that the field could benefit from new theoretical ideas as well as from improvements in data and methods."

Data and Research Methods

This paper advances our understanding of the effect of power-sharing on long-term peace following civil wars. Specifically, this paper tests the hypothesis that political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions decrease the probability of renewed violence among the same parties within five years of signing the peace agreement, when controlling for other factors that affect post-conflict outcomes including other agreement provisions, conflict dynamics, and initial conditions of the country (e.g. structural and cultural factors).

To explore the conditions necessary for constructing peace, I utilize the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0, 1975-2011 that includes data on peace settlements signed between two warring groups that engaged in armed conflict between 1975-

2011 (Högbladh, 2011). Similar studies have been conducted, but no other study has used this same dataset to extensively scrutinize the relationship between power-sharing and other agreement provisions, including amnesty, reconciliation, elections, DDR, third party presence, and peacekeeping. Krienbuehl (2010) uses an earlier version of the dataset, although there are key differences between our models. First, Krienbuehl examines power-sharing following interstate and intrastate wars, whereas my analysis looks specifically at the role of power-sharing following civil wars because these wars are characteristically different than interstate wars. Second, Krienbuehl bases his research on Lijphart's original definition of power-sharing, whereas my research utilizes the more broadly-defined and commonly used definition shaped by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003). Finally, his research is qualitative in nature, in which he uses a case-study approach to examine eight peace agreements that occurred from 1989 to 2005; whereas my study is quantitative in nature. Melander (2009) also uses an earlier version of the dataset, but his study focuses on the role of amnesty and political gender inequality in preventing violence, not power-sharing. In short, no other study has used this version of the dataset or this model.

In this dataset, the peace agreement is the unit of analysis, meaning that there may be multiple agreements for one conflict and therefore each agreement is analyzed separately. Moreover, while a civil war may involve a complex set of actors, including a government and two or more rebel groups, the dataset treats each agreement as if it were signed by a dyad which includes only the "primary warring party on side A" and the "primary warring party on side B" (Högbladh, 2011). These differentiations allow us to ascertain which accords contributed to a cessation of fighting between which groups. This dataset also includes information on the name of the warring parties, the name of the accord, the date the deal was signed, information on provisions, and whether conflict reconvened after a period of time.

Earlier studies have only researched agreements signed by parties involved in large civil wars with at least 1000 battle deaths per year, while this dataset includes wars with at least 25 battle deaths per year between a government and a rebel group. There are several justifications for using a lower threshold. First, low intensity conflicts are common and they entail significant human and financial consequences (domestically and globally) (Melander, 2009). Second, smaller wars have the potential to turn into more destructive large-scale wars. Hence, understanding how to end lower intensity wars is arguably just as critical to security as ending larger conflicts. Moreover, excluding smaller-scale wars could mean that I would risk underestimating the extent to which power-sharing fosters peace if "power-sharing provisions are more likely to be included in peace agreements that are negotiated in very large wars" and if "peace agreements in very large wars are generally more likely to fail" (Melander, 2009).

A peace deal may be considered a failure if civil war reignites at any point following the signing of the agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). However, research studies must necessarily define the durability of peace more narrowly due to data limitations as well as the desire to include more recent wars to examine modern trends. Moreover, many argue that if an agreement brings peace for at least a few years, then it was more or less successful in bringing conflict to an end. Thus, most researchers today opt to operationalize durability as a period of short-term peace between signatories. Binningsbø (2005) operationalizes durability as a one-year period of peace. Melander (2009) uses a two-year period because some evidence suggests that peace is most fragile during the first two years after a peace signing. However, the emerging consensus within the literature is that a five-year period of peace provides the most accurate account of peace durability, because once nations have remained at peace for five years, they are highly unlikely to return to war (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Walter, 2002; Jarstad and Nilsson,

2008; Krienbuehl, 2012). Hence, to assess whether the agreement led to durable peace between the dyad, this paper uses a binary dummy that assesses whether "violence with the same parties restarted within 5 years" following the signing of the peace deal as its dependent variable (coded by UCDP as *DyVi05*) (Högbladh, 2012).

While examining the agreement itself is beneficial for assessing the effects of the agreement, a clear limitation of this method is that the number of observations is limited. Additionally, I excluded twenty peace accords signed during wars involving interstate violence. I also excluded two civil wars that occurred after 2008, in order to use the 5 year threshold for peace durability. Therefore, I've included a total of only 195 accords signed between parties involved in one of 53 civil wars.

UCDP variables that most closely resembled the contemporary definitions of power-sharing are used to operationalize these provisions. The independent variables of interest are a political power-sharing dummy variable indicating whether "the agreement provided for the integration of rebels into the government or civil service (*intgov*), a military power-sharing dummy that reflects whether "the agreement provided for the creation of a new national army or the integration of rebels into the army" (*intarmy*), and a territorial power-sharing dummy to define whether "the agreement granted the disputed region power-sharing in the local government" (*shaloc*) (Högbladh, 2012). Due to limited data and access to information, I was unable to obtain data regarding economic power-sharing.

The dataset includes detailed information regarding other provisions of the settlement, allowing me to assess their impact on peace in relation to power-sharing. For example, the UCDP amnesty dummy indicates whether "the agreement provided for an amnesty" (*amn*), the reconciliation dummy defines whether "the agreement included the concept of National

Reconciliation" (*recon*), and the election dummy is operationalized as "the agreement provided for elections or stipulated electoral reforms" (*elections*). Another dummy expresses whether "the agreement included provisions for the disarmament of the warring parties" that is "coded as yes even if the disarmament only concerns one of the warring parties" (*ddr*) (Högbladh, 2011). I used the UCDP third party and peacekeeping dummies to create two new variables. *Third_pko* is a dummy that indicates whether the agreement stipulated for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation *and* whether a third party monitored the peace process." *Third_nopko* is a dummy that expresses whether a third party participated in the peace process without a peacekeeping operation (the baseline category is that a third party was not involved in the peace process). This dataset identifies whether an agreement includes both parties of the dyad or whether one of the parties to the conflict is excluded (*inclusive).* The dataset also identifies the type of peace agreement. Full (or comprehensive) agreements are those in which the dyad agrees to address the entire range of issues underlying the conflict (coded as 1), partial agreements are those in which at least one of the parties agrees to address some of the underlying conflict issues (coded as 2), and a peace process agreement coded as 3 in which "one or more dyad agrees to initiate a process that aims to settle" all or part of the dispute at a later point (*pa_type)*.

To examine the impact of conflict dynamics, or characteristics of the previous war, I include a dummy from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2012 that denotes the cumulative intensity of the conflict coded as 1 if the "conflict since the onset has exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths," 0 if otherwise (*cumint*) (Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen, 2012). By taking the difference between the date the conflict started (*d_1_arm*) from the UCDP Database on Categorical Variables and the date that the agreement was signed (*pa_date*), I created a continuous variable that gives the duration of the conflict in years (*dur_yr*) (Högbladh, 2011).

To account for a nation's initial conditions, I've included Fearon, Kasara and Laitin's (2007) index for ethnic fractionalization that ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is highly fragmented, 0.5 is generally "bipolar" or divided between two major ethnic groups, and 1 represents a sizeable ethnic majority and fairly homogenous population (*ethfrac*). I've included Polity IV (p4v2010) scores that express *regime* type based on the regime's "qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition." Polity scores range from -10 to -6 (fully institutionalized autocracies), -5 to +5 (anocracies or mixed regimes), and +6 to +10 (fully institutionalized democracies) (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2011). Using data from the United Nations (2013), I added a continuous variable for GDP per capita (*GDPpc*). To capture dependence upon natural resources, I've created dummies that indicate whether a nation is a diamond exporter (*diamond*) or an oil or gas exporter (*oilgas*) based on data from the Center for the Study of Civil War's International Peace Research Institute Oslo (Gilmore et. al., 2007; Thieme et. al., 2007). I analyze the data using logistic regression analysis with robust standard errors.

Results

I run three different logit models summarized in three tables in which I regress the existence of political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions to assess their impact on the durability of peace, while controlling for other peace agreement provisions (Model 2, all tables), conflict dynamics (Model 3, all tables), initial country conditions (Model 4, all tables), and the fully specified model (Model 5, all tables). First, Figure A gives the total number of agreements in the dataset that include political, military, or territorial power-sharing and gives the number and percent of those agreements that resulted in either renewed war or durable peace. As shown below, 75% of the political power-sharing agreements, 64% of the military power-

sharing agreements, and 78% of the territorial power-sharing agreements resulted in at least five years of peace. Yet, logistic regression reveals more nuanced results, in which it becomes clear that a number of other factors are also responsible for whether peace endured.

FIGURE A: *Power-Sharing Agreements that Led to Durable Peace* (Data source: UCDP Dataset - Högbladh, 2011)				
Type of Power-Sharing	*Renewed War*	*Durable Peace*	*Total*	*Percent that resulted in peace*
Political Power-Sharing	8	24	32	75%
Military Power-Sharing	24	43	67	64%
Territorial Power-Sharing	2	7	9	78%

As indicated in Table 1 (Model 1), logistic regression reveals that political power-sharing provisions significantly reduce the probability that violence will restart among the dyad within five years of signing a peace agreement. In fact, the chance for further violence decreases by a factor of 0.44. When controlling for provisions commonly included in agreements, the overall model remains significant (Prob > chi2 =0.0016), but interesting results arise (Model 2, Table 1). Specifically, the influence of political power-sharing on war outcomes becomes insignificant. This finding indicates that Model 1 suffered from omitted variable bias and overestimated the peace-promoting impact of political power-sharing. Of all the provisions, only elections significantly decrease the probability of renewed war (by a factor of 0.467). Contrary to several prominent studies, agreements that were overseen by third parties (with and without a peacekeeping operation) have a significantly higher probability of breaking down compared to settlements without a third party. Finally, peace process agreements and partial agreements that failed to address the full range of key underlying issues of the conflict were more likely to lead to renewed war compared to comprehensive agreements (significant at the 95% confidence level).

When controlling for conflict dynamics, the overall model remains significant and political power-sharing significantly reduces the odds of further violence (Model 3, Table 1). Yet conflict duration and intensity do not significantly predict peace outcomes. Model 4 (Table 1) controls for initial country conditions including structural and cultural factors and is significant at the 95% level (Prob > chi2 value = 0.02). Model 4 reveals that low ethnic fractionalization and fully institutionalized democracies significantly cut the chances for further warfare (at the 90 and 99 percent confidence level respectively). In contrast, GDP per capita and exportation of diamonds, oil or gas do not considerably impact peace breakdown. However, when accounting for a nation's initial conditions, political power-sharing reduces the chances that the groups will revert back into war (95% confidence level). Intriguingly, in the fully specified model (Model 5), which includes agreement provisions, political power-sharing becomes significant again. I cautiously interpret these results to mean that other arrangements within settlements are partially predicting the impact of political power-sharing, which would explain why power-sharing is insignificant when controlling for these variables. Moreover, the fact that the fully specified model includes fewer observations than the peace agreement model (Model 2) may help explain why political power-sharing is suddenly significant in the fully specified model even with the inclusion of other agreement variables. The fully specified model also reveals that the presence of a third party, the presence of a third party combined with a peacekeeping operation, and diamond exportation each significantly increase the probability of renewed war. Finally, peace process and partial agreements are more likely to collapse compared to comprehensive agreements.

TABLE 1. *Logistic Regression Results for Influence of Political Power-Sharing on Peace Durability*

Variable Category	*Independent Variable*	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Power-Sharing	Political Power-Sharing	-0.840*	-0.574	-1.324***	-1.176**	-1.052*
		(-0.056)	(-0.268)	(-0.008)	(0.013)	(0.094)
Peace Agreement	Amnesty		-0.496			-0.721
			(0.231)			(0.19)
	Reconciliation		-0.136			-0.215
			(0.73)			(0.677)
	Elections		-0.761*			-1.002
			(0.06)			(0.113)
	DDR		-0.543			-0.217
			(0.14)			(0.706)
	Third Party *and* Peacekeeping		2.416***			2.733**
			(0)			(0.011)
	Third Party (No Peacekeeping)		1.336***			1.107*
			(0.006)			(0.094)
	Inclusiveness		0.346			-0.361
			(0.335)			(0.475)
	Type of Peace Agreement		0.647**			1.300***
			(0.016)			(0.005)
Conflict Dynamics	Conflict Duration (Years)			-0.011		-0.002
				(0.377)		(0.891)
	Cumulative Intensity			0.546		0.088
				(0.302)		(0.92)
Initial Conditions	Ethnic Fractionalization				-1.122*	-0.104
					(0.083)	(0.901)
	GDP Per Capita				0	0
					(0.645)	(0.644)
	POLITY Score				-0.102***	-0.061
					(0.002)	(0.238)
	Diamond Exporter				0.21	1.511*
					(0.617)	(0.067)
	Oil or Gas Exporter				0.221	-0.227
					(0.505)	(0.629)
	_constant	-0.259	-2.724***	-0.14	0.457	-2.289
		(-0.102)	(-0.008)	(-0.777)	(-0.295)	(0.237)
	chi2	3.659	26.875	7.567	14.033	35.624
	Observations	195	194	129	188	125

Notes: Dependent variable is a binary dummy that assesses whether violence with the same parties restarted within 5 years following the signing of a peace agreement that contained political power-sharing. P-values are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.

Table 2 assesses the impact of military power-sharing. Without controlling for other factors, military power-sharing is not a significant predictor of relapse (Model 1, Table 2). It continues to be insignificant when controlling for other provisions (Model 2, Table 2). Rather, the terms that significantly decrease the odds of relapse are amnesty, elections, and DDR. On the other hand, third party oversight, with and without a peacekeeping operation, significantly raise the odds of renewed war. Additionally, partial agreements are associated with a higher risk of conflict compared to comprehensive agreements. Model 3 (Table 2) indicates that conflict duration and intensity are not significant predictors of peace outcomes, but when controlling for these conflict dynamics, I find that military power-sharing significantly decreases the probability of conflict relapse. However, it is important to note that Model 3 is insignificant as a whole indicating the presence of omitted variables. When controlling for country conditions, military power-sharing again significantly reduces the risk of future war (Model 4, Table 2). Yet this may be attributed to the reduced number of observations in this model. The only initial condition that significantly predicts peace outcomes is regime type; democracies are less likely to resume war than authoritarian or mixed regimes. Lastly, in the fully specified model, military power-sharing is insignificant (Model 5, Table 2). Instead, third parties paired with a peacekeeping operation, diamond exportation, and partial agreements significantly increase the probability of war.

Table 3 provides some striking results. In particular, territorial power-sharing is insignificant across all five models, indicating that providing rebels with the opportunity to share power in local governments is insufficient for ending conflict. Rather, when controlling for the terms of the settlement in Model 2, only elections significantly reduce chances for war whereas third parties, with and without peacekeepers, and partial agreements increase the odds of conflict.

TABLE 2. *Logistic Regression Results for Influence of Military Power-Sharing on Peace Durability*

Variable Category	*Independent Variable*	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Power-Sharing	Military Power-Sharing	-0.3	0.491	-0.803**	-0.633*	-0.907
		(0.336)	(0.247)	(0.031)	(0.074)	(0.174)
Peace Agreement	Amnesty		-0.685*			-0.769
			(0.098)			(0.153)
	Reconciliation		-0.31			-0.438
			(0.425)			(0.389)
	Elections		-0.836**			-1.021
			(0.035)			(0.13)
	DDR		-0.633*			0.106
			(0.092)			(0.863)
	Third Party and Peacekeeping		2.375***			2.467**
			(0)			(0.014)
	Third Party (No Peacekeeping)		1.314***			1.069
			(0.009)			(0.112)
	Inclusiveness		0.097			-0.342
			(0.794)			(0.496)
	Type of Peace Agreement		0.713***			1.367***
			(0.01)			(0.002)
Conflict Dynamics	Conflict Duration (Years)			-0.002		0.006
				(0.844)		(0.687)
	Cumulative Intensity			0.595		0.165
				(0.227)		(0.833)
Initial Conditions	Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.751	0.162
					(0.24)	(0.844)
	GDP Per Capita				0	0
					(0.522)	(0.703)
	POLITY Score				-0.105***	-0.092
					(0.002)	(0.117)
	Diamond Exporter				0.185	1.598**
					(0.648)	(0.031)
	Oil or Gas Exporter				0.216	-0.229
					(0.51)	(0.638)
	_constant	-0.283	-2.576**	-0.236	0.269	-2.59
		(0.114)	(0.011)	(0.611)	(0.532)	(0.185)
	chi2	0.925	27.876	5.598	10.595	37.883
	Observations	195	194	129	188	125

Notes: Dependent variable is a binary dummy that assesses whether violence with the same parties restarted within 5 years following the signing of a peace agreement that contained military power-sharing. P-values are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.

Model 3 (Table 3) indicates that conflict dynamics are not strong predictors of falling back into war. Interestingly, as Model 4 (Table 3) indicates, higher democracy scores are the only initial condition that significantly decreases the chances of future violence (significant at the 99% confidence level). Finally, in the fully specified model (Model 5, Table 3), amnesty decreases the odds of renewed war ($p<0.1$) whereas third parties paired with peacekeeping forces, partial agreements, and diamond exportation significantly increase the odds of war.

Logistic regression provides important insight into the impact of power-sharing agreements; however, there are several caveats. First, a word of caution must be stated when interpreting these results because most accords in the sample did not include political, military, or territorial power-sharing; hence settlements without these provisions were overrepresented. Second, the fully specified model and model 3 in all three tables included fewer observations (125 and 129 observations respectively). Third, not all of the assumptions of logit are fulfilled because the observations were not randomly sampled. However, as a limited number of civil wars have ended via a peace settlement, it was necessary for UCDP to hand select the cases. Moreover, significant imperfect multi-collinearity, which would dampen the significance of results, did not manifest in simple pair-wise correlations tests[1]. Another limitation is that power-sharing arrangements were defined quite broadly, and it may be important to examine terms of power-sharing arrangements more narrowly. For example, to examine the impact of grand coalitions, proportional representation, and mutual veto power separately to discover which political arrangements are most critical to peace. Finally, some models were not highly significant, indicating the presence of omitted variables that better predict peace outcomes. Nevertheless, these problems are common in studies that examine peace agreements.

---

[1] Pairwise correlation matrices indicate that the independent variables are not highly correlated and variance inflation factors (VIF scores) conducted on the fully specified models indicate that there is no significant multi-collinearity within the models.

TABLE 3: *Logistic Regression Results for Influence of Territorial Power-Sharing on Peace Durability*

Variable Category	*Independent Variable*	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Power-Sharing	Territorial Power-Sharing	-0.905	-0.117	-1.445	-0.962	-0.572
		(0.268)	(0.903)	(0.201)	(0.244)	(0.734)
Peace Agreement	Amnesty		-0.595			-1.006*
			(0.143)			(0.051)
	Reconciliation		-0.262			-0.406
			(0.501)			(0.443)
	Elections		-0.783*			-0.968
			(0.052)			(0.131)
	DDR		-0.527			-0.159
			(0.149)			(0.777)
	Third Party and Peacekeeping		2.337***			2.360**
			(0)			(0.022)
	Third Party (No Peacekeeping)		1.284***			0.996
			(0.009)			(0.148)
	Inclusiveness		0.248			-0.544
			(0.464)			(0.257)
	Type of Peace Agreement		0.658**			1.379***
			(0.014)			(0.003)
Conflict Dynamics	Conflict Duration (Years)			-0.004		0.003
				(0.705)		(0.859)
	Cumulative Intensity			0.466		0.029
				(0.355)		(0.971)
Initial Conditions	Ethnic Fractionalization				-0.843	0.099
					(0.177)	(0.907)
	GDP Per Capita				0	0
					(0.504)	(0.709)
	POLITY Score				-0.087***	-0.064
					(0.008)	(0.206)
	Diamond Exporter				0.219	1.520*
					(0.589)	(0.064)
	Oil or Gas Exporter				0.3	-0.18
					(0.359)	(0.702)
	_constant	-0.348**	-2.582**	-0.366	0.069	-2.306
		(0.02)	(0.011)	(0.436)	(0.866)	(0.247)
	chi2	1.226	26.066	2.433	8.738	37.312
	Observations	195	194	129	188	125

Notes: Dependent variable is a binary dummy that assesses whether violence with the same parties restarted within 5 years following the signing of a peace agreement that contained territorial power-sharing. P-values are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.

Discussion and Policy Implications

Several findings may be gleaned from this research that have important policy implications. Intensity and duration of the conflict were not significant predictors of peace outcomes in the 53 civil wars included in this dataset. However, this is not to say that these variables are unimportant, as several other studies have found evidence that these characteristics significantly impact the probability of renewed war. Likewise, many of the initial conditions of the country did not significantly impact the probability of peace, although the results demonstrate that conflict negotiators are bound to experience greater difficulty establishing peace in nations that export diamonds, score low on democracy, and that have higher ethnic fractionalization. Yet as several other researchers have found, the structural and cultural characteristics of the country prior to the war often influence whether war recurs in one way or another (Collier, 2007). Despite the difficulty of establishing peace, this research indicates that peace is something that can be facilitated through the institutional arrangements included in negotiated settlements. Additionally, this research provides further evidence that comprehensive agreements (that include multiple arrangements to address a greater range of the parties' concerns) are more likely to lead to durable peace than partial agreements or merely initiating a peace process. In other words, instituting multiple provisions will provide greater chances for lasting peace.

A central discovery of this research is that power-sharing decreases the probability that war will restart among the same parties within five years of signing a peace accord. Yet, some forms of power-sharing promote peace better than others. For example, political power-sharing, or integrating rebels into the government or civil service, proved to be more effective for ending war compared to military and territorial power-sharing. In other words, when former adversaries share government power via mechanisms such as grand coalitions, proportional representation,

and a system of mutual veto-power, they are less likely to initiate further warfare. However, when controlling for other factors it becomes clear that the significance of shared political power is contingent upon model specification. Specifically, political power-sharing is successful at diminishing the risk of conflict without controlling for other factors and when accounting for conflict intensity, conflict duration, GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization, regime type, and natural resources exportation. Thus, political power-sharing is significant across all of the models except Model 2, which controls for other agreement provisions. Military power-sharing also significantly reduces the probability of conflict relapse, but it is not as effective as political power-sharing. In particular, integrating rebels into the national army only mitigates conflict when accounting for initial conditions of the nation and the dynamics of the previous war. Perhaps when state soldiers and rebel soldiers are integrated into the same army, they are better able to develop a common identity and move beyond their differences. It is critical to note that territorial arrangements, which grant rebels political representation in the local government, appear to be ineffectual in reducing the risk of conflict. Perhaps rebels are discontented when they merely gain more control over local issues rather than matters of the state. Certainly an important area for future research is to examine the nature of the relationships between power-sharing and the independent variables in this study, such as the conflict dynamics and initial characteristics of the nation. For example, is it that political power-sharing is most beneficial for reducing conflict risk in small scale wars or large scale wars? Qualitative case studies may be more beneficial for uncovering these issues in greater detail. While further research is needed to assess why the literature provides such conflicting results, my research adds to the body of literature that finds that political and military power-sharing increase the chances for peace.

Thus, a practical implication of my research is that when mediators are designing settlements, they should prioritize political and military power-sharing over territorial power-sharing.

Remarkably, another principal finding is that when taking into account the other terms included in the peace settlement across all three tables, all forms of power-sharing (political, military, and territorial) are insignificant predictors of peace. This suggests that something else within the peace agreement is driving peace outcomes and therefore negotiators should prioritize these provisions over power-sharing. The provisions most effective for diminishing the probability of war are DDR, elections, and amnesty.

As discussed in the literature, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of soldiers into civil society is a critical first step to signal commitment to peace (Stedman, 2001). It is necessary to note, however, that it is often only the rebels who give up their arms after a civil war because the state is typically not expected to give up its military resources. Rebels commonly experience greater security threats during this period and it is therefore recommended that a third party oversee demobilization and disarmament, as well as promise to intervene should either party take advantage of the vulnerability of their opponent.

Additionally, amnesty proved to facilitate war termination in several cases. Likely because reducing fears of prosecution encourages groups to disarm and demobilize (Melander, 2009). There are valid human rights concerns and disadvantages to granting amnesty to combatants and/or leaders of the war, however, the reality may be that it is an effective and important tool for bringing conflict to a close. Fewer studies have examined the conditions under which amnesty facilitates peace in relation to power-sharing, and given its controversial nature it also warrants further scrutiny.

Two other key findings are that democracies are less likely to return to war compared to mixed or authoritarian regimes and that holding elections decreases the chance of relapse. Again, power-sharing was not a predictor of peace when controlling for other settlement terms, such as elections, indicating that elections are more important for establishing long-term peace. This finding lends support to the idea that if power-sharing is to be used, it should be used only as a short-term solution. Instead, long-term peace requires that efforts be made to help the country transition toward a more democratic form of governance via elections.

Nevertheless, elections are not a panacea. It still holds true that holding elections too early threatens the security of the nation if it lacks the institutional capacity to run elections smoothly or if losing groups decide to return to war. Several studies provide evidence that ensuring democratic and peaceful elections requires substantial political, judicial, and electoral system reforms to occur first (Norris, 2008; Sisk, 2003). For example, reforms that sufficiently check the power of the president (such as strict term limits) are important for ensuring that the nation will be able to hold regular elections, which helps losing groups believe that they have a chance to compete fairly in the next election. In other words, it is unlikely that the nation will be ready to hold elections immediately after the war. Therefore, negotiators may need to use political or military power-sharing or some other transitional government to get the groups to stop fighting and then assist the parties in holding democratic elections once the nation has undergone significant reform and is stable enough to support such a system.

Lastly, all three tables demonstrate that the presence of a third party intervention both with and without a peacekeeping operation significantly increases the chances that the conflict dyad will revert back into war. Yet, it is important to be cautious when interpreting these results as they contradict many previous studies which indicate that competent and engaged third party

enforcers are largely successful at keeping the peace (Mattes and Savun, 2010; Kieh Jr., 2011). It is entirely plausible, however, that several of the third parties involved in these 53 civil wars undermined peace due to a lack of capacity or bias. Third parties are often willing to observe the negotiating process and verify information, but far fewer are willing to take on the risks of enforcing the peace. Additionally, third parties may show favoritism or may fail to report attempts to spoil the peace out of fear of appearing biased and experiencing retaliation (Stedman, 2001). However, the deployment of third party interventions is not random and therefore the relationship could be spurious. As discussed in the literature, peacekeepers are often sent to nations "where they are most needed, when peace would otherwise be difficult to keep" which would cause us to "underestimate the effectiveness of peacekeeping" and third party involvement (Fortna, 2004). Hence, an important area for further research is to uncover why third party intervention is associated with higher risk of war within this dataset.

Conclusion

Civil conflicts are raging in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, Mali, and in many other regions of the world. These wars are costly and the problems associated with these wars are spilling over into other nations each day. Certainly, one of the most pressing global needs is to develop more refined policies for ending civil war and unrest. Yet there are many challenges to developing and implementing such policies. Internal armed conflict is particularly persistent and getting warring parties to agree to a bargained solution in the face of fear and uncertainty is arduous. However, this research demonstrates that institutional arrangements matter and that political and military power-sharing help end war when taking into account the structural and cultural conditions of the nation as well as the characteristics of the previous war. These arrangements facilitate elite support of the peace process by leveling the playing field and

helping parties credibly signal their commitment to peace. However, it is important to keep in mind that power-sharing, as some of the literature suggests, may aggravate conflict or have no impact on peace.

Additionally, this research indicates that other settlement provisions play a greater role in bringing conflict to an end than power-sharing and therefore negotiators should prioritize comprehensive agreements that provide for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of soldiers, amnesty and elections. Peace is more likely to endure when nations transition away from power-sharing and toward a more democratic form of governance via free and fair elections. There are no simple solutions for ending civil war as every country poses a unique set of circumstances that impact the prospects of war termination. Thus, when crafting military and/or political power-sharing agreements, it is necessary to consider the conditions of the country and of the conflict to decide which power-sharing provisions are most appropriate and whether such arrangements are necessary.

References

Binningsbø, Helga Malmin. (2006). "Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War?*" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA.* Retrieved from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p98892_index.html

Blattman, Chris and Edward Miguel. (2010). Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature*, *48*(2): 3-57. doi: 10.1257/jel.48.1.3

Brosché, Johan. (2009). *Sharing Power – Enabling peace?: Evaluating Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005.* Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala, Sweden.

Collier, Paul. (2007). *The Bottom Billion.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Demmers, Jolle. (2012). *Theories of Violent Conflict: An Introduction.* Taylor and Francis.

Derouen, Karl, Jr., Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen. (2009). The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26*(4): 367-387. doi: 10.1177/0738894209106481

Fearon, James D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization, 49*(3): 379-414. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903

Fearon, James D. (2003). Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country. *Journal of Economic Growth, 8*(2): 195-222. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40215943

Fearon, James D., Kimuli Kasara and David Laitin (2007). *Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset Replication Data* [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/.

Gates, Scott and Kaare Strom. (2007). *Power-sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict.* Center for the Study of Civil War, Oslo.

Gilmore, Elisabeth, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Jan Ketil Rød. (2005). *The Diamond Dataset Codebook.* Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO.

Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie (2003), Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science, 47*(2): 318-332. doi: 10.1111/1540-5907.00022

Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie (2007). *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars.* University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Retrieved from http://muse.jhu.edu/

Högbladh, Stina. (2011). *Peace agreements 1975-2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset* [Data file]. Pettersson Therése & Lotta Themnér (eds.), 2012, States in Armed Conflict 2011, Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report 99 Retrieved from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_peace_agreement_dataset/

Högbladh, Stina. (2012). *UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook, version 2.0.* Uppsala: Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Horowitz, Jeremy. (2009). "Power-Sharing in Kenya". *Prepared for the Workshop on Political Inclusion in Africa, American University on April 24-25, 2009.* University of California, San Diego.

Human Rights Watch. (2012). The Special Court for Sierra Leone's Landmark Judgment in the Trial of Charles Taylor. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice/charles-taylor

Jarstad, Anna K. (2009). The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace. *Africa Spectrum. 44*(3): 41-62. Retrieved from http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/191

Jarstad, Anna K., and Desireé Nilsson. (2008). From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25*(3): 206-223. doi: 10.1080/07388940802218945

Kieh Jr., George Klay. (2011). Peace Agreements and the Termination of Civil Wars: Lessons from Liberia. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 11*(3)

Krienbuehl, Lukas. (2010). *Peace with Power-Sharing: Under Which Conditions?* Swiss Peace Foundation, Working Paper. Available at: http://www.swisspeace.ch/countries/sudan/research.html

Lake, David A. (2010). Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War. *International Security, 35*(3): 7-52. The MIT Press. Retrieved from http://muse.jhu.edu/

Lijphart, Arend. (1969). Consociational Democracy. *World Politics. 21*(2): 207-225.

Lijphart, Arend. (1993). *Consociational Democracy, in*: Joel Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Maiese, Michelle. (2003). *Addressing Injustice. Beyond Intractability.* Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/address-injustice

Malek, Cate. (2013). Reconciliation. Beyond Intractability. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/coreknowledge/reconciliation

Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers, & Ted Robert Gurr. (2011). *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. Dataset User's Manual.* University of Maryland: Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Program (INSCR) Program and Center for International Development and Conflict management (CIDCM). Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf

Mason, David, T., Gurses, M., Brandt, P. T. and Michael Quinn, J. (2011), When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars. *International Studies Perspectives, 12*: 171–189. doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00426.x

Mattes, M. and Savun, B. (2009), Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design. *International Studies Quarterly. 53:* 737–759. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00554.x

Mattes, M. and Savun, B. (2010), Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements. *American Journal of Political Science. 54*(2): 511–524. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25652220

Mehler, A. (2009). Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa. *Africa Spectrum, 44*(3): 2-10. Retrieved from http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/189

Melander, Erik. 2009. *Justice or Peace? A Statistical Study of the Relationship between Amnesties and Durable Peace.* Lund University, JAD-PbP Working Paper Series (4).

Mukherjee, B. (2006), Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?. *International Studies Quarterly. 50*: 479–504. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00410.x

Norris, Pippa. (2008). *Driving Democracy: Do Power-sharing Institutions Work?* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011). *The Future of Power.* New York: Public Affairs.

Ouellet, Julian. (2004). Structural Components of Peace Agreements. Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/substantive-provisions

Peace Accords Matrix. (2012). Frequently Asked Questions. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame, IN. Retrieved from https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/faq

Polity IV Project. (2011). *Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets (Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2011 [Excel Time series data file]*. Center for Systemic Peace. Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm

Rotberg, Robert I.; Thompson, Dennis (2010). *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions.* Retrieved from http://osu.eblib.com.ezproxy.proxy.library.oregonstate.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=483525

Sisk, Timothy D. (2003). Power Sharing. Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/power-sharing

Snyder, Jack, and Leslie Vinjamuri (2003). Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice. *International Security, 28* (3):5-44.

Stedman, Stephen John. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Process. *International Security, 22*(2): 5-53.

Stedman, Stephen John. (2001). *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers.* International Peace Academy and Center for International Security and Cooperation. New York. Retrieved from http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/Pdf_Report_Implementing.pdf

Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen. (2012). Armed Conflict, 1946-2011. *Journal of Peace Research, 49*(4): 565-575.

Thieme, Nadja; Päivi Lujala & Jan Ketil Rød. (2007). *The Petroleum Dataset: Country Profiles* [Data File]. Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO. Retrieved from http://www.prio.no/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/Geographical/Country%20Profiles%202007.pdf

Tull, D. M. and Mehler, A. (2005). The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa. *African Affairs, 104*(416):. 375-398. doi: 10.1093/afraf/adi034

United Nations. (2013). *National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (GDP and its breakdown at current prices in US Dollars – All countries for all years – sorted alphabetically* [Data file]. United Nations Statistics Division. Retrieved from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). (2013). *UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia* [Data file]. Retrieved from www.ucdp.uu.se/database

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) . (2013). *UCDP Database Categorical Variables 1989-2008* [Data file]. Uppsala University. Retrieved from www.ucdp.uu.se

VanderZee, Lenore, Laura Taylor, Alex Dukalskis, Alma Gottlieb-McHale, and Chris Sullivan. (2010). Comprehensive Peace Agreement: How is it Defined and Why Does It Matter? Peace Accords Matrix. Retrieved from www.peaceaccords.org

Wallensteen, Peter. (2001). *The Growing Peace Research Agenda. Occasional Paper No. 21.* Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, San Diego, CA.

Walter, Barbara F. (2002). *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.* Princeton: Princeton: University Press.

Walter, Barbara F. (2011). *Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace.* Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9069

Werner, Suzanne and Amy Yuen (2005). Making and Keeping Peace. *International Organization, 59*(2): 261-292. doi:10.1017/S0020818305050095.

Yawanarajah, Nita and Julian Ouellet. (2003). Peace Agreements. Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/structuring-peace-agree