

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Abstract approved:

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The frame of reference for understanding the rhetorical significance of cultural acts lies in the identification and explication of the diversity of theories which encompass sociological and anthropological definitions of culture. The paradigms presented in this thesis range from unilinear evolution, biological and environmental determinism, materialism, historical ethnology and reductionism, to psychological and cognitive phenomenology, linguistic analysis, and interpretive semiotics. Cultural theories represent thinking from sociology, economics, ethnology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, critical theory, and

linguistics; representing such writers as Spencer, Morgan, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Boas, Levi-Strauss, Chomsky, Habermass, and Foucault.

No single communication and cultural framework is universally agreed upon by members of the social science community. Ever since the pre-Socratics began to theorize about person-to-person communication and called it rhetoric, one framework does remain axiomatic--that humans use their capacities for speech to accomplish personal and social ends.

This thesis argues that rhetoric and culture share a common dynamic and paradigm, an engagement of common purpose; that they function in concert with one another as rhetoric transforms symbolic usages into acts of communal fusion.

Chapter II provides a review and analysis of cultural theories. Chapter III provides a definition of rhetoric in both modern and ancient usages and examines the ways in which people initiate and experience symbols in the rhetorical/cultural matrix. Chapter IV explores the rhetorical/cultural processes which define how people engage one another with symbols; Chapter V establishes the relationships of identification and division necessary to sustain shared meanings and interpretations rhetorically/culturally. Chapter VI provides a summary and the author's conclusions.

This thesis concludes that rhetorical acts and

cultural acts constitute a similar paradigmatic construct and calls for a synthesis of theories for purposes of rhetorical and cultural analysis.

The Rhetorical Dynamics of Culture:
An Interdisciplinary Approach to a Synthesis
Between Rhetoric and Culture

by

Toni K. Tobey

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Typed by researcher for Toni K. Tobey

To Christopher, Jami, and Joshua
my stars to steer by

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"...all our myriad cultures, and all yours,
are founded on love of illusion. It is not
that we both talk, but that we both talk
endlessly of persons, places, things, and
ideas that are not currently before us to
taste. It is not that we both build home-
caves, construct travel-guiders that stretch
for thousands of kilometers over the land,
lay out social grounds, or put together
musical compositions and complex combinations
of food...but that we both build, construct,
lay out, and put together these things
according to plans, visions, imaginative
schemes, that, until we have realized them,
have no real existence."

Samuel R. Delaney
"Stars In My Pocket
Like Grains of Sand"

Bantam Books, 1984

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THE RHETORICAL DYNAMICS OF CULTURE:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO A SYNTHESIS
BETWEEN RHETORIC AND CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an interdisciplinary approach to the study of rhetoric. It is a principle increasingly accepted that the manner of human communication is inseparable from the nature of human culture. As such, this thesis will argue that approaches to understanding the rhetorical essence of communication must include an understanding of the cognitive entity of Culture as delineated in sociological and anthropological theories about culture. The intention is to trace some interactions between rhetorical theory and cultural theory in an effort to make explicit the rhetorical aspects of human culture.

More importantly, this thesis is prepared as an effort to further the development of rhetorical theory in response to the growing trend in communication studies to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for the discipline. As argued by Kuhn, Price, Budd, and Ruben, the growing popularity of communication research has failed to bring us closer to a synthesis with other disciplines of the humanities, namely, sociology, anthropology, and linguistics. This omission needs

of redress, particularly as the failure has resulted in a lack of holistic integration in the communication sciences. This integration would augment theory building and expand possible avenues of exploration toward achieving a better understanding of the crucial connections between rhetoric and culture.

Communication-anthropologist Alfred G. Smith believes one of the basic shortcomings of the communication discipline is its failure to develop a synthesis with other disciplines:

Unless our view of communication is somehow systematic, our work in communication will be chaotic. Individual studies, courses, and operations can be adequate without a comprehensive framework; but the output of the whole field will be an unholy mess. Unless we view communication through some sturdy principles that are profound and sweeping, flexible and yet well ordered, the field will be just a grab bag of odds and ends. Work assignments will be at cross-purposes. Investments of resources will be non compos. A slapdash notion of the field can cripple our thinking about communication (Smith, 1977, p. 79).

That the field of communication and rhetorical studies lacks an integrated framework and theoretical reference point is reflected in a cursory review of research findings published in communication journals in the last six years. A journal search reveals a panorama of concepts such as self-disclosure, communication apprehension, empathy, persuasion, communication competence, attitudes, fear arousal, bonding, language, cognitive dissonance, source credibility, diffusion,

violence and aggression, self-esteem, perception, homophily-heterophily, dogmatism, meaning, deception, selective exposure, nonverbal communication, small groups, intimate relationships, etc. The net effect is a large volume of published research using quantitative methodology and covering increasingly narrowly defined aspects of communication behaviors. It is, specifically, research focused on those aspects of human communication which lend themselves to quantitative analysis through a methodological paradigm. "In many respects, quantitative methodology has functioned very much as a paradigm for the [communication] discipline over the past 15 or so years. It is almost as if communication scholars, unable to develop a conceptual framework for the field, have substituted a methodological paradigm in its stead" (Budd, Ruben, 1972, p. 3).

Reflecting upon such considerations, the task of this thesis is to present interdisciplinary alternatives and opportunities for the communication scholar by providing a qualitative overview and making explicit those connections between rhetorical theory and cultural theory.

Scope of the Study

In order to provide a frame of reference for understanding the rhetorical significance of cultural acts it is important to identify and recognize the significance and diversity of scholarly thought centering around the

development of a philosophy of culture. The complexity of ideas and exploration of a wide range of possible system explanations for culture have provided a rich variety of reasoning leading toward an understanding of the elusive disarray of human life as expressed and shared on this planet. The body of these theoretical works, ranging from unilineal evolution to interpretive semiotics, gives us a fundamental and basic foundation for asking those questions of concern, most notably, what culture may or may not be, and what the rhetorical connection may or may not be.

Chapter II will provide an overview of cultural theory as well as a definition of rhetoric in both modern and ancient usages. Subsequent chapters of the thesis will be devoted to: (1) the ways people initiate and experience symbols in the rhetorical/cultural context; (2) the rhetorical/cultural processes which define how people engage one another with symbols; (3) the relationships necessary to sustain shared meanings and interpretations rhetorically/culturally.

Cultural theory is as diverse as the human condition it attempts to address, analyze, and define. As such, as in the mirror darkly, theory reflects the problematic nature of exploring and comprehending the wide ranging phenomena of human behavior. If the multiforms of theory lead to any convergence at all, it is this: that culture, like human beings, is ever present and ultimately complex. Cultural theory is diverse because culture itself is

diverse. Looking for the right theory is not a particularly useful activity as culture is not a single unified act or endeavor, but a human occurrence and adaptive response to the need for social organization. These responses consist of innumerable clusters of behavior. The questions of discovery, of inquiry, and, indeed, of truth itself continue to be important because each new idea, each theory about the convolutions of culture represents a kind of reality. Every theorist has taken a stab at winding through a Daedalean Maze leaving a thread of thought that others may pick up and follow in finding their way to the heart of the matter.

While rhetorical theory brings to the modern era millenia of thought, including Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Quintilian, Campbell, Whately, Richards, Weaver, and Burke; cultural theory, at best, is in its toddlerhood of explication having survived an infancy nurtured by such writers and explorers as Spencer, Morgan, Tylor, Marx, Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Boas, Levi-Straus, Chomsky, Habermas and Foucault. These explorers represent thinking from sociology, economics, ethnology, anthropology and linguistics; all of whom have allowed our perceptions and attitudes to be amplified and enabled the social sciences to become increasingly integrated, adaptable, and flexible. Each theorist has looked at the cultural picture through a different lens, and each theory provides significant insights of its own contributing

to the realm of scientific inquiry for the human sciences in general. To borrow an analogy from Kuhn: "Looking at a contour map, the student sees lines on paper, the cartographer a picture of a terrain. Looking at a bubble-chamber photograph, the student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a record of familiar subnuclear events" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 111).

While it is still too early in the season of discovery and theory building to achieve a fully charted contour map of culture, each new construct, each new idea, and more importantly, each new synthesis between disciplinary ideas, adds to our knowledge and options of how things just might work. And just as human beings express themselves in a variety of cultural displays, so a multitheoretical array of ideas may lead to an eventual solution of the puzzle of ourselves.

Significance of the Study

With this background in mind, this thesis will examine culture from the perspective of rhetorical studies in the discipline of Speech Communication. While many of the cultural theories acknowledge language as an important dominion of culture, few, if any, rhetorical studies have explicitly placed culture at the center of rhetorical acts. An examination of card catalogs at the libraries of two major universities indicates that literary connections between

rhetoric and culture are basically null and void. Few rhetoricians have explicitly singled out communication or rhetorical acts as the primary means in which any given culture develops, shapes, describes itself and allows for continuation. While we have theories, particularly cognitive theories, provided by Levi-Strauss, Chomsky, and Sapir-Whorf, pointing to the correlations between thought, language, and culture; the immediacy of the issues of how thought and language combine rhetorically in order to communicate, or why the mode of rhetoric is culturally essential remains largely unexplored in the literature of cultural and rhetorical theory.

At this point in theoretical development, it has been suggested that the functioning of human societies may be founded on a set of innate, instinctive, and inherited abilities and skills (see: cognitive phenomenology, p. 26). Yet, individuals and societies are faced with the same issues of human survival, reproduction, and continuation even though the conventions vary from society to society and keep changing from generation to generation. Sooner or later, every member of every group must learn and understand the collective accumulation of technological data, social rules and regulations, and philosophical themes which underscore the collective; and every member of every group is further responsible in some fashion for the transmission of this collective data

base, whether objective or subjective. This collective legacy of group activity is referred to as culture and being introduced to a culture in the process of growth and maturation constitutes the process of enculturation.

This thesis will argue that the process of enculturation can be understood as a sequence or sequences of rhetorical acts. The process constitutes dynamic human interactions which are symbol-based and symbol-bound and coordinated through the agency of meaningful rhetorical acts for the purpose of social organization and coordination. Further, this thesis will argue that culture is the matrix for social interaction in all societies. As such, an understanding of the rhetorical functions of symbols, either linguistic or non-linguistic, for the purpose of engaging, shaping, defining, and continuing the parameters of communication/cultural exchange between individuals and groups is essential if we are to achieve any understanding of what culture may or may not be.

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THE SCOPE AND METHODS OF CULTURAL THEORY

CHAPTER II

The term Culture has been understood in a variety of ways, and the variety of these meanings reflects the vast array of human experience in different historical situations. A brief survey of the different theoretical applications of the word will provide an overview and framework for a discussion of the rhetorical nature of culture.

The word Culture derives from the Latin cultura and cultus, which mean care, and cultivation. These Latin words also carry an implication of "training", "fostering", and "worship". Both words designate the cultivation of something. Cicero speaks of cultura animi, or the cultivation of the mind, which he identifies primarily with philosophy and which changes the meaning from an attributive, functional one, to a general substantive term which implies an activity. From there we move to the word Culture as a concept, or an established condition or state of being. In this capacity, Culture refers to a specific condition of human beings.

Over the past hundred years or so since the word Culture was first used by anthropologist Edward Tylor [1832-1917] to demonstrate the "constant interreferences of man's body and his culture" (Bohannon and Glazer,

1973, p. 61), anthropologists and sociologists have attempted to develop a theoretical conceptualization and working definition of Culture. The definitions and hypothetical constructs of culture have run the intellectual gamut of thought from evolution, biological and ecological determinism, materialism, historical particularism, ethnology, and reductionism, to psychological and cognitive phenomenology, linguistic analysis, and interpretive semiotics.

This chapter will review the growth of anthropological and sociological ideas and theoretical orientations central to the emerging interests of cultural investigation and the growth of cultural studies as a domain of scientific inquiry. The legacy of attention to issues of human nature can be found in the development of historical, political, religious, and philosophical thought to (at the very least) the time of the early Greek philosophers in the Fourth and Fifth centuries, B.C. Speculations of our dim beginnings also appear in the early pentateuch of the Old Testament and the scriptures of the Koran. It would seem as long as people have wondered about the world and their place and purpose in it, they have been mystified by the enigma of their own nature.

In the past century, anthropology and sociology, as human sciences, have grown from random observations made by untrained amateur observers to laboriously

acquired accumulations of scientific data by thousands of social researchers with the intent of understanding how and why Culture in general and cultures in specific work. An increasing search for the application and integration of empirical methodologies of scientific investigation developed by the "hard sciences" of chemistry, physics and biology, are attested by the continuing changes of direction in theoretical and methodological approaches to the socio-cultural nature of human beings. While over 2000 cultures have been described to the present day (Human Relations Area File, 1982), the government of observation, organization of data, interpretation, and explanation of these cultures still must be grounded in a theoretical format. Like other disciplines in the social sciences, cultural investigations have undergone the constant reworkings of modification and change. These theories are the meditations and mediations of the historical setting of the writers and thinkers who produce them. As theory is developed, more choices are available to explain how people go about occupying this planet. And just as the saga of homo sapiens is only partial, the social sciences continue to advance and mature in the acquisition of knowledge, understanding and application.

Unilineal Evolution.

Edward Tylor defined culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man [woman] as a member of society" (Tylor, 1871). While this definition may seem cumbersome and vague a century later, Tylor, along with Herbert Spencer [1820-1903] and Lewis Henry Morgan [1818-1889], provided the first prudent route toward the mapping of a scientific perspective meant to address the complexity of questions attached to the the social realities of humankind.

Tylor, the most eminent thinker and foremost theorist of 19th century anthropologists, and his contemporaries, Spencer and Morgan, developed a unilineal evolutionary approach to cultural questions; maintaining that all human societies undergo changes over a period of time, with "primitive" stages replaced by more "advanced" stages. This evolutionary approach suggested cultures develop in a sequence of general stages from "savagery" to "barbarism", finally achieving "civilization" as they move through system stages marked by important technological inventions. They predicted that all cultures pass through these stages along a singular, categorical line of development; one which is traceable on a continuum of technological advancement and sophistication. Social customs were regarded by these early evolutionists as fixed and predictable human fabrications. While this theoretical base established

an important foundation for the emergence of later scientific theory building, it failed to account for cultural variables such as regression, extinction, and stage skipping. In addition, it was founded on an extremely ethnocentric vocabulary of social labeling. This labeling was formed by an entrenched belief in the supremacy of western civilization as the apex of cultural progression.

Historical Particularism.

As increasing amounts of ethnological data were collected by field workers in the early decades of the 20th century, the problems with a unilineal explanation of cultures became obvious. The vast amount of cultural diversity displayed globally was revealed through field investigation and led to the development of several new schools of thought.

Diffusionism was an approach developed by British and German/Austrian anthropologists, especially G. Elliot Smith, William J. Perry, and W.H.R. Rivers of the British school and Fritz Graebner and Wilhelm Schmidt of the German/Austrian school of thought (Ember and Ember, 1977, p. 39).

Diffusionism asserted that cultures rarely invent new technologies, but emerge through cultural borrowing. Information and technology is diffused by contact and parallel evolution is extremely rare. As an example,

these scholars maintained that most of the higher aspects of "civilization" were developed in Egypt and diffused to cultures of the Middle East.

However, the diffusionists provided very little credible documentation to support these suggested relationships (Ember and Ember, 1977; Howard and McKim, 1983) and no accounting was provided by this theory for spontaneous cultural development, variation, means of acceptance, rejection or modifications of an initial cultural trait, or the specific source of that trait.

The arrival of diffusionist theory led to the growth of historical particularism, a major school of thought founded by American anthropologist Franz Boas [1858-1942]. Boas' theoretical position was the investigation of individual cultures and a detailed ethnography rather than seeking to discover a set of universal laws which govern all cultural processes, as the evolutionists had done. Boas felt this inductive approach toward data gathering and compilation was critical in understanding how cultures are enacted.

Boas is credited with training a generation of anthropologists, including Margaret Mead, Alfred Kroeber, Robert Lowie and Ruth Benedict. It is generally agreed that he was the "founder of modern field work in America" (Bohannon and Glazer, 1973, p. 82). While the Boasian approach was not shrouded

in the ethnocentric theological roots of evolutionism, historical particularism failed to answer questions as to why the various diversities and manifestations of culture appear.

The Boasian focus remained two-fold, steeped as it was in the methodology of the inductive approach to scientific inquiry. "When studying the culture of any one tribe, more or less close analoga of single traits of such a culture may be found among a great diversity of peoples...scientific inquiry must answer two questions in regard to them: First, what is their origin? and second, how do they assert themselves in various cultures?" (Boas, 1896). While Boas and his colleagues were able to accumulate large amounts of ethnographic data, they "never had a clear picture of Kwakiutl or Inuit life, and had little appreciation for the ways the various customs and institutions of these peoples were interconnected" (Howard and McKim, 1983, p. 31).

Functionalism.

An attempt at a more unitary theoretical approach arrived with the functionalist perspective. Instead of being interested in collecting ethnographic information, these anthropologists and sociologists were chiefly concerned with how the bits and pieces of a culture function to fit the schematic of the socio-cultural paradigm. One of the first researchers to conduct

investigations from the functionalist point-of-view was Bronislaw Malinowski, [1884-1942] who defined culture as traits which serve the basic and derived needs of the individual in society. He saw in societies a basic human need for food, shelter, reproduction and sustenance, which lead to derived needs of comfort, safety, cooperation, and solidarity. Malinowski felt cultural manifestations function to fill these basic survival needs and meet human social requirements (Malinowski, 1939). His ideas, however, failed to answer the questions of why cultures do not meet needs in the same fashion, nor do they explain specific cultural patterns.

This shortcoming was addressed by several social scholars, Emile Durkheim [1850-1917], Max Weber [1864-1920] and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown [1884-1955]. Durkheim developed the idea of culture as an integrated system of interrelated parts which he called the "collective conscience" (Durkheim, 1938). Durkheim's work focused on the nature and power of social forces and the link between the individual and social reality; which Durkheim felt existed independently of the individual. Durkheim stressed that social knowledge comes not from the individual but from the collective and "the general characteristics of human nature participate in the work of elaboration from which social life results. But they are not the cause of it, nor do they give it special form; they only make it

possible" (Durkheim, 1938). Thus, according to Durkheim, culture is a community product which compels human beings to act and think in particular ways by shaping and educating the member of the group.

German sociologist Max Weber [1864-1920] saw the task of inquiry as the discovery of the meanings of how social life emerges and forms patterns, and how these configurations relate to one another. Weber was aware that human beings live in subjectively defined, and in a sense, "created" social worlds. "Action is social insofar as, by virtue of the subjective meanings attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals) it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its own course" (Weber, 1947, p. 88). Weber was concerned that the quest for scientific "laws" would result in trifling generalizations and obscure the researcher's understanding of unique cultural and social innovations.

Anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown argued that society has "a life of its own, obeying laws that transcend the individual" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952). These ideas, known as structural-functionalism focused on how the elements of the social order reinforce and maintain the structure in confirming and reaffirming the values of a society and promoting group unity. In the relationship between the individual and society, it is society that defines the parameters of individual performances.

While these studies were instrumental in establishing the concept of cultural integration, they failed in two ways: they treated societies as if they were not bounded by histories, and they ignored environmental influences which impact cultures. In short, structural-functionalism failed to answer the questions of why a certain culture chooses to meet social needs in a particular way.

Culture and Personality.

In the mid-1930s, a connection began to emerge between psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists which emphasized the relationships between the individual and culture. This new school was labeled culture and personality (Ember and Ember, 1973; Howard and McKim 1983; Smith, 1987). Anthropologists such as Kardiner (1949), Linton (1936) and Benedict (1934) thought people assumed certain personality characteristics in keeping with themes of their specific culture. These personalities were derived from the primary institutions of family composition and child rearing practices and gave rise to the secondary institutions of religion, ritual, and custom. These secondary institutions reconcile and satisfy needs and conflicts of the personality which are not met in the primary institutions. Linton claimed that "status" and "role" provide the individual with identities and competencies. These identities and competencies allow the individual to participate culturally, bestowing

specific privileges and requiring certain responsibilities in return. The various privileges and responsibilities and the manner in which they are performed delineate the overall social organization and pattern within any given cultural paradigm. Thus, status equals position and role equals what one does with that position. These are combined, according to Linton, in a completely integrated system.

Linton also acknowledged that it can be difficult to describe how dissimilar areas of cultural life can be ranked by members of a society. He argues that there are certain universal ways in which status can be ascribed, such as biological sex divisions, birth relationships, age, and marriage alliances. Ascribed status takes care of the problems of day-to-day living while other ranking and status may be earned. In this way, the individual may follow a course of action which will change social reality, by either enhancing or diminishing status.

Those aligned with the theoretical models of culture and personality promoted a diachronic and synchronic examination of any given culture, looking for causal patterns and relationships by searching for the present day and historical motivations of emotions and intellect. While these ideas represented a blending of contemporary Freudian psychology and historical particularism, the chief flaw was its reductionism or oversimplification, as if each culture lived in a bell jar of isolation from all others.

These theories failed to explain how psychological factors aid or impede the development of cultural practices. Serious questions as to methodology, "which was vague" (Howard and McKim, 1983, p. 33), were also raised at the time. Any methodology for successfully separating observers/analyzers from their own cultural indoctrination was not outlined and remains a critical problem which has yet to be successfully addressed.

Neo-evolutionism and Environmental Determinism.

In the 1950s Julian Steward (1955) focused his attention on specific evolution and the succession of changes which take place within a culture. He argued that environmental impact plays the significant role in determining the way in which cultures develop. He stressed the importance of the balance in the relationship between socio-culture and the environment. His theory allowed culture to be examined as a means of adjustments to circumstances proscribed by an environment.

Steward was part of the post World War II neo-evolutionary movement which included Leslie A. White (1949), E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1950), and Marshall D. Sahlins (1960); a group of anthropologists who advanced the theory of energy capture, allowing humans more control over their environment. As a result of more control and energy acquisition, cultures expand, change, and develop. Technological achievement

is the basic index of measurement for determining the level of any society's cultural sophistication. More advanced cultures are indicated by their increased levels of energy exploitation which allows them to grow and surpass societies employing a lesser consumption rate. Thus, energy capture, manifested by technological awareness, development, and implementation, is the methodological calculation for determining progress. This theoretical approach provided a needed impetus toward integration of such theories as evolutionism, ecological and biological determinism, and historical particularism; but it continued to foster the myths of ethnocentricity by using for its control model the western capitalistic empires. Further, neo-evolution offered no explanations of why general evolutionary trends occur in the first place, or why one culture moves through technological changes faster than another.

None of these theories to date was able to account for change within a culture or for the factors of conflict. Karl Marx [1818-1883] attempted to explain change and conflict in terms of production and economics rather than the progress of history and technology. Marx rejected biological and environmental determinism as the creators of social units and societies and focused instead on the economic techniques of interaction. For Marx, individual motivations, interests, abilities, and needs function as an expression of the economic structure

of a society. The divisions of labor which result from economic enterprise (production and consumption) reaches the acme of manifestation with the appearance of a class-bound system where wealth and power are condensed in the hands of the few. This creates inequities in the distribution of resources and leads to contention, opposition, and conflict between those attempting to maintain the system and those who are oppressed. This irreconcilable conflict between economic classes is the key to understanding a particular culture and the direction of change within its praxis.

The digression of Marx with other evolutionists is his view of the western capitalistic system; which Marx argues is only a stage of social development leading to a classless society. As such, he does not view the western world as the cultural model for all civilizations.

Cognition and Language.

A cognitive approach to culture has been developed by such writers and theorists as sociologist Levi-Strauss (1953, 1958) and linguist Naom Chomsky (1957, 1968, 1975). Levi-Strauss argued that interaction among human beings is a universal, systematized experience. As each postulated change in a language system must be evaluated in terms of its implications for the system as a whole, so the study of culture must be analyzed in terms of

integration. Instead of tracing the historical development of culture, the attempt is made to demonstrate how all the forms of meaning, both of language and culture are interconnected in a system, and systemically, the parts, once recognized and identified, could be used interchangeably. This allowed the formulation of a theory of universality; that the interpretive capacity of human beings has recognizable, universal components, with each component playing a part in the synchronic system. Thus, just as a structural description of a language tells us how the components fit together, a structural description of culture should tell us how it works, answering the question, "why are things as they are?"

Levi-Strauss' approach allows an examination of the inner form of any interactive structure as a rule-governed activity of the mind. To the extent that we recognize and specify these rules, we can order a satisfying account of the properties of culture. These rules are determined by the structure of the mind. Human beings learn the basic units of interaction and from these basic units, which can be isolated, human interaction can be manipulated into diverse combinations of expression [see: p. 73].

Chomsky's goal in the study of linguistics is to develop a complete understanding of language as a system which mirrors the mind (Chomsky, 1963). This focus on

cognitive patterns and structures would lead to an understanding of how the human mind works and bring us closer to a knowledge of the hidden mental operations, of which, language is but a reflection. Just as Levi-Strauss attempts to sort out the deep level meaning or deep structure of the mind, so does Chomsky's linguistic analysis attempt to define a set of base rules which "generates" the surface structure.

The important distinction between these structuralists and other theorists has been the concern with source rather than output or manifestation of cultural phenomena, whether it be language or some other descriptor of culture. And while deep structure analyses focuses on the systems of culture as expressed in ritual, myth, art, and living patterns as the surface representation of the mind (a sort of "rules of thought" underlying the cultural scene) the focus is on a "presumed" cognitive capacity and process. The shortcomings of this approach are two fold: there is little offered in the way of scientific methodology which allows for the collection of data; and, if "universals" of perception and classification do exist, they still fail to explain cultural diversity.

Two other anthropological writer's have made a significant impact on views of what this writer labels cognitive phenomenology, Edward Sapir [1884-1939] and Benjamin Lee Whorf [1897-1941]. Both had an effect on

the science of linguistics as well as cultural anthropology. Their ideas about language and culture have combined in what is traditionally referred to as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. The line of their reasoning is fairly simple: meaning is essential, categories of meaning change from culture to culture, and there is a very close connection between language and culture (Sapir, 1929, Whorf, 1941). The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis posits these connections between culture and language by asserting that language limits thought and thought shapes reality. They stress that symbols so heavily influence the experience of the person that they cannot be separated from experiential attitudes about existence and meaning. However, like Levi-Strauss and Chomsky, their premises are extremely generalized and the difficulty of detachment from the language experience in order to apprehend and analyze it poses a methodological problem in correlating language, experience, and meaning.

Chomsky and Levi-Strauss would lead us to believe that whether we call it language or symbol, these are innate universal human factors which appear in all members of the species and are ultimately not determined by cultural factors. Clearly the issues of language and meaning are domains central to the themes of culture, but any theory which deals with meaning will, by its nature, be controversial because

meaning is a symbolic abstraction and its categories do not appear before us as concrete objects, making these concepts extremely difficult to study.

Clifford Geertz and Dean and Juliet MacCannell have both been contributors to cultural theory in an area called interpretive semiotics. In an essay called "Thick Description" (1973), Geertz deals with the problematic nature of meaning and interpretation and the questions which surround the observer. That is, the problem of the Heisenberg principle: can you study something without changing it? Geertz believes that cultural phenomena such as myths, kinship, ritual, etc. can only be understood by analyzing their surrounding use in social life. He sees the activities of everyday life as symbols for cultural themes. Geertz recognizes the wide array of forms expressed culturally and, as such, does not view culture holistically. "As interworked systems of construable signs (what...I would call symbols), culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly...described" (Geertz, 1973, p. 14). Geertz goes on to say, "anthropological writings are themselves interpretations, and second and third order ones to boot...They are, thus, fictions, fictions in the sense that they are 'something made,'" (1973, p. 15). Geertz feels all civilizations, past and

present approach the same issues and problems. As stated by Geertz in a 1983 essay entitled "Common Sense as a Cultural System", those problems and issues consist of "Power, Change, Faith, Oppression, Work, Passion, Authority, Beauty, Violence, Love, Prestige" (p.21). In grappling with these common themes of survival and orientation (both biological and psychological), humans have created a wide array of forms, all designed to offset and balance the basic set of problems.

The approach by interpretive semiotics gives attention to the difficulties found in the analysis of meaning. While this area of study does not attempt to isolate a universal set of principles that lead to a particular state of living, it has begun to isolate a universal set of concerns (as expressed in the Geertz quotation) and advances the philosophy of toleration for the diversity with which these concerns are dealt with.

Alternative Approaches to Cultural Theory.

Two alternative approaches to cultural studies have occurred in the past quarter century and need review. These theories encompass the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas, and the philosophical and historical writings of Michel Foucault. Their work remains largely unexplored in the mainstream of communication literature at the present time and they do not treat Culture as an analytical, empirical paradigm. Yet, they have made a

distinctive contribution to contemporary thought about the premises concerning Culture. Presently some attention has been called to their discourses by those involved in rhetorical and communication studies, and certainly they offer an approach to communication behavior and human interaction which bears reflection and analysis.

Both writers are European in origin and bring a multi-disciplinary dimension to their philosophies. The primary orientation of their work appears to focus on the realms of language, knowledge, power, meaning, symbolism, and discourse.

Habermas [1929-] has emerged in recent decades as a major spokesperson for critical theory, an intellectual movement which began after the First World War as a philosophical discussion and critique of contemporary applications of philosophy. Critical theory became associated with the Institute of Social Research, a center in Frankfurt, Germany established originally to promote Marxist studies; hence, the appellation of "The Frankfurt School."

The works of Habermas include Theory and Practice (1963), an examination of the degeneration of political theory; Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), an attempt to develop an alternative perspective for the social sciences; Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics (1970), which constitutes essays reflecting his interest in the student movement and his

concerns with the ideological roles played by science and technology; and Legitimation Crisis (1973), in which he turns his attention to a philosophical and theoretical agenda--specifically, the social and cultural problems experienced by advanced capitalist societies. In addition, his works include, Communication and the Evolution of Society (1976), which looks at the problems of cultural evolution and the establishment of socio-political legitimacy, and The Theory of Communicative Action (1983), which examines theories of communication, particularly John R. Searle's speech act theory.

The problems of greatest concern to Habermas, according to his own account (Honneth, et al., 1981), has been in the area of developing a rational theory of communication, and relating this communication theory to socio-cultural conditions. As such, he expands on Searle's "speech acts" as the basic unit of communication analysis. He argues that speech acts convey information not only about the formal structure of language, but also about the patterns of culture that organize and underpin thought and social interaction. The purpose of his investigation into communication is to initiate discussion and an egalitarian approach to decision-making on social priorities.

There exists a very general similarity in the work of Habermas to the work of Levi-Strauss and Chomsky, inasmuch as Habermas concentrates on implicit sources of

cultural patterns and activity, rather than the explicit output or manifestations of culture. He appears to be less interested in the content of cultural acts than with the motives and implications of communication acts which generate the deeper levels of cultural patterns. He considers these patterns as rules influencing the nature of communication; hence, the overtones of relationship with Chomsky and Levi-Strauss who look for the deep structure rules of cultural and grammatical patterning. According to Habermas, "the domain of society itself is defined as patterns of symbolically structured events and expectations. Therefore, the study of culture no longer consists of relating culture to social structure, as traditionally conceived, but of relating specific symbolic acts to the broader symbolic environments in which they occur" (Wuthnow, et al., 1984, p. 209).

Habermas can also be described as a neo-evolutionist. He sees cultures exhibiting four major stages of development, (1979, p. 104, 106, 183-8) which he describes as social movements toward higher levels of sophistication and differentiation in an effort to utilize social capacities and adapt to increasingly complex circumstances. These stages refer primarily to his organization of theoretical principles which aid in delineating developmental stages rather than as fixed types of social progress. As such, cultural patterns may experience dynamic movement, remained fixed, or fall

into decline; the praxis of each cultural manifestation is thus arbitrary.

Habermas regards the most significant function and problem of modern culture as one of legitimation. "Legitimacy", he states, "means that there are good arguments for a political order's claim to be recognized as right and just" (1979, p. 178). Legitimacy refers to the type of claim that can be made by the state on its own behalf, socio-political statements by governments which essentially imply validity. He goes on to argue that legitimacy questions are permanent fixtures in the modern era due to the disintegration of collective cultural values. The state can no longer claim loyalty based on the convergence of religious, philosophical, or political values because the modern age no longer has a clear values system. Values have been institutionalized in favor of materialistic advantage and are subject to competition, grievance, and irrational argument. This creates, in turn, a cultural instability caused by the state taking on ever increasing contradictory roles. For example, the modern western state must, at any given time, protect free-enterprise systems and ensure the continuation of production, while providing social programs for the disenfranchised. This concept takes Habermas full-circle to the type of communication that affects the ability of groups and whole social orders to arrive at satisfactory agreements concerning common problems. "Because of the

importance of communication to the functioning of advanced capitalist societies, high levels of sophistication and self-awareness concerning communication are necessary" (Wuthnow, et al., 1984, p. 224).

In a critique of Habermas, Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzwill identify two problems with his approach to culture. One is in the relationship between social norms and speech acts. "To be useful in research, his theory needs to be more specific about the nature of social arrangements and the ways in which these are dramatized in symbolic-expressive acts" (1984, p. 237). Secondly, Habermas has not identified how the environmental resources of time, energy, technology and other social reserves (which may themselves become symbols) affect communication.

Michel Foucault [1926-1986] could be called a true interdisciplinary writer; the sweep of his work covers history, language, philosophy, knowledge, power structures, social order, crime, punishment, sexuality, and insanity. The word "culture" per se appears in the index of only one of his works, yet he seems ultimately to be offering a cultural analysis. Foucault's works include: Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1961), and Birth of a Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception (1963). These books are concerned with history and the role of language terminologies in shaping perceptions about medical practices and the insane. In

1966, he published The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences; a book prompted, by his own admission, from a passage in Borges relating to a "certain Chinese encyclopaedia" (1970, p. xv) describing the catagories of animals and which "in one great leap" brought him to realize the "stark impossibility of thinking that." In The Order of Things, Foucault discusses language, thought, speech, history, values, utility, wealth, and labor, to name a few of the topics covered. He next published The Archeology of Knowledge (1969) where he more explicitly delves into systems of knowledge and power in order to "impose the forms of structural analysis on history itself" (1972, p. 17). Since 1972 Foucault shifted increasingly into discussions of knowledge and power. I, Pierre Riviere (1973), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975), and The History of Sexuality (1976) address the application of knowledge and power to social institutions.

According to Foucault's translator, Alan Sheridan, his "essential concern has always been to understand the present, the present as a product of the past and as a seedbed of the new...Foucault's subject is all of history. History seen in terms of the shaping of modern culture, in terms of the dominant forces of power and knowledge" (1980, p. 82). What Foucault seems to be writing about is thought, and the institutionalization of language, which perpetuates and/or inhibits thinking. I say "seems", as

there is a chaos about Foucault's writing which makes access to his mind painful at times. He is difficult to pin to one or more particular genre of thought. Sheridan attributes the influences of Durkheim, Levi-Strauss, Saussure, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud to Foucault's philosophic development. But as Foucault states, "I prefer to utilize the writers I like, the only valid tribute to thought...is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest..." (1975, p. 33). Thus, Foucault's work can, at best, be called eclectic and eccentric. His writing suggests types of theory where he may be placed for critique and analysis, but he writes so broadly that a valid demonstration of those catalogues becomes impossible and inappropriate.

His ideas, however, are of use to those who would examine human communication and human culture. Like Durkheim, he believes social reality is a cognitive construction. Like Marx, he is concerned with false consciousness. Similar to Levi-Strauss he examines the connections of ideas to thought and language in order to understand the source of social impetus. As a writer his focus has been to examine changes which have occurred, what caused those changes, how lives in every strata were influenced by changes, and how particular individuals came to be either in or out of power. Foucault sees meaning "as emerging from the interplay of subjectivities in their relationships to institutions, technologies, and

changing social needs...how individuals' views of themselves reflect social changes; and how all these changes are linked to prevalent knowledges" (Cooper, 1981, p. 134).

Foucault's themes include repression, coercion, institutionalization, and the "culture of the confined." The one underlying observation about the modern era emerging from Foucault's pen is that the present western culture is one of confinement and isolation. This isolation is brought about by the interplay of language and scientific technology creating, in turn, a particular type of knowledge used increasingly to socialize individuals in particular ways for the purpose of control.

Foucault's approach to culture and social order is anti-empirical and anti-pragmatic. This, of course, makes his views on culture unapproachable in terms of any quantifiable methodology. At present, the validity of his arguments remains untestable if one is looking for hard scientific proofs. Perhaps the best way ultimately to approach Foucault's work is by qualitative, rhetorical analysis. This may, in fact, make his work more accessible and usable for the field of speech communication. Certainly his ideas on knowledge and power systems as integrated with language systems and manifested culturally, provide a wealth of resource options for the serious communications scholar and deserve to be included in any study of communication

and rhetoric.

Sociolinguistics.

The purpose of this thesis is to present the argument that rhetorical theory and cultural theory have a direct linkage which needs explication. Therefore this thesis will focus on "classical cultural theory", i.e., approaches to cultural theory which are explicit in nature and have as their major foci the analysis of human culture. With this purpose in mind mention only of sociolinguistic theory will be made.

During the past quarter century the systematic study of the relationships between social forms and language forms has become prominent. By the 1960's sociolinguistic concepts had established a secure foundation as research continually uncovered data showing the junctions of social behavior and linguistic description. Hymes (1964), Gumperz and Hymes (1964), Bright (1966), Lieberman (1966), Fishman (1968), Chapman (1967), Ervin-Tripp and Slobin (1966), and Slobin and Welsh (1967), are a few of the major contributors to the science of sociolinguistics. These researchers paved the way for further studies in the relationships between communicators, the communication situation, the development of linguistic performance, models of socialization, and the development of language competence.

One of the advantages of the sociolinguistic

perspective in communication research is the interdisciplinary integrations it provides with linguistics, anthropology and sociology. The term itself is a descriptor of the relevance between language and the speech community, indicates a necessary mediation among the social sciences, and offers opportunity for theoretical tie-ins.

Studies in sociolinguistics cover a wide range of topics, from Hyme's influential taxonomy, captured in his Speaking (1972) to Ervin-Tripp (1969) providing situational hierarchies with a view to formulating rules for social grammars. Giles and Powesland (1975) stressed the salience of the person addressed in communication exchanges and Brown and Fraser (1979) and Argyle, Furnham and Graham (1981) opted for purpose as the focus of analysis in communication interaction. The symbolic interactionists perspective has been stressed by O'Keefe and Delia (1982) who have borrowed heavily from Mead, Blummer, and Langer.

It should be evident from this albeit brief thumbnail sketch that sociolinguistics attaches great importance to situational influences on speech, interpretation, circumstances, and taxonomy. Communication science can gain both methodologically and theoretically from an examination of this perspective. For the purposes of this thesis, however, sociolinguistic data may serve as a supportive base

for argument's sake, but is not the focus of this discussion.

Summary.

This chapter has provided a general overview of theories of culture which have arisen in the past century. It should be apparent that theorists who have explored culture remain divided on how best to define culture and what aspects should be emphasized for analysis. It should also be apparent that the phenomena of culture are difficult to operationalize and measure. The examples included in this chapter indicate the variety of ways cultural factors have been analyzed, described, and accounted for and the philosophical systems generally associated with any study of culture. It is, of course, impossible to include every writer who has addressed the question of human culture. Any sorting and selection of theory begins with the constraints, limitations, and biases of the writer. In a work, such as this thesis, one cannot help but bend toward the previous convolutions of experience which have shaped the mind's focus; therefore, selection of theorists for examination and analysis, are a result of my own perceptual criteria. It is hoped that with this overview of cultural studies a more direct approach between the study of rhetorical theory and cultural theory will expand the vision of both paradigms, opening new avenues for theoretical and

practical investigation for scholars of either specialty.

The next chapter will provide an overview and frame-of-reference for rhetorical theory and will examine the ways people initiate and experience symbols in rhetorical/cultural contexts.

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RHETORIC AND CULTURE: THE SYMBOLIC EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER III

This chapter will provide a brief overview of rhetorical theory from its ancient roots to present day uses and describe the ways human beings experience symbols in the rhetorical/cultural matrix.

The rhetorical tradition.

Any review of rhetorical theory begins with an examination of ancient Greece, those fathers of classical western thought who were as interested in culture and the function and structure of human communication as we are today. A number of important Greek philosophers undertook a systematic analysis of communication in discourse, describing the principles necessary for successful public address.

In the Fifth century B.C. citizens on the island of Sicily deposed Thrasybulus, Tyrant of Syracuse, and established a democratic form of government. Courts were established to adjudicate various claims, but there were no professionally trained advocates. A free citizen was required to plead his own case in the hope of persuading judges that he possessed legal rights. Corax [465 B.C.] is generally given credit for beginning the systemic body of theory on rhetoric. He based his rhetorical theories and precepts on the process of reasoning by inferences

based on probability and outlined what he felt to be the proper partitioning and organization of thought for effective communication.

About 427 B.C., Gorgias, an ambassador from Sicily to Athens so impressed the Greeks with his mastery of oratory that he created a great interest in the art of oral communication and became a highly successful teacher of the principles of rhetoric. The Athenians provided fertile ground for the development of a theory of rhetoric as communication played a central role in their democratic social organization. The Greeks celebrated talk and assumed that it was the appropriate vehicle for the discovery and expression of philosophic truths. Greek literature in the forms of epics [see: Homer, The Iliad, The Odyssey] and drama were presented orally, and in the theatre various characters played prominent parts with the dramatic device of oratory. Greek political life was founded on the ability to speak effectively, and all citizens, with the exception of women and slaves, were encouraged to participate in the government of the city-state. Furthermore, the Greek culture manifested a strong, competitive sense of play and pleasure. Verbal skills in debate, storytelling, and public discourse were as highly praised as prowess on the battlefield or in athletic contests. Thus, rhetoric became an exalted art form, a political expediency for the management of public discussion and decision making, and the mechanism for

cultural maintenance in the forms of religious rites, myths, theatre, and story-telling.

This recognition of the role of communication as a means of cultural coordination served an important role in the development of a theory of rhetoric. Isocrates [436-338 B.C.] recognized the important role of speaking in deploying social organization. In a famous passage from the Antidosis, Isocrates states the social-coordinative role of rhetoric:

"We ought to think of the art of discourse [rhetoric] as we think of the other arts, nor show ourselves intolerant toward that power which, of all the faculties which belong to the nature of man, is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess, we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honourable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul. With this faculty we both contend against others on matters which are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our thoughts...And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well

as in our our thoughts speech is our guide" (trans. Donald L. Clark, 1959, pp. 53-54).

Theorizing, then, about communication and its role in social formulation and organization and in cultural cohesion captivated the attention of the Greeks. Aristotle developed a rhetorical model, identifying the various aspects of public discourse. A model of communication emerged which included concepts of dialectic and rhetoric, having sub-forms of the deliberative, the forensic, the epideictic; and the poetic with sub-forms of dramatic, epic, and lyric. Aristotle defined rhetoric as all the available means of persuasion, a definition which has consistently withstood the test of time, and continues to prove useful in sorting out communication efforts.

A fuller accounting of the history and development of Greek rhetorical theory will not be attempted. Ample sources on the topic are available if the reader desires to pursue an investigation of classical rhetoric. Certainly the ancient Greeks had differing views on the subject. Some, like Plato, saw rhetoric as deceitful and manipulative; some, like Aristotle, approved it as a useful art form; some defined rhetoric narrowly while others defined it to include all communication, including writing. In passing, it is noted that scholars such as Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates undertook investigations and discussions of rhetorical principles and practices; and in his Rhetoric, Aristotle attempted a fairly complete

directory on the subject which is still the most widely used and influential treatise on the principles of oral communication.

Following the decline of Greek civilization the interest in rhetoric continued and remained strong among the Romans. Cicero and Quintilian wrote extensively on rhetorical theory and fully elaborated the so-called canons of rhetoric for purposes of public communication and analysis. Cicero designated these canons as: inventio (invention), dispositio (organization), elocutio (style of language), pronuntiatio (delivery), and memoria (memory). While conditions of the Roman rule prized efficiency more than democratic procedure, and the elocutionary style of the speaker more than the content of the message, Cicero and Quintilian were still concerned with meaningful public and legal discussion and proscribed rhetorical models for leadership success and as a means of political organization and change.

The tradition of Roman rhetoric and declamation continued in the medieval period. St. Augustine wrote the most important work of rhetorical theory during this period. The thrust of Augustine's rhetoric was to (1) instruct in righteousness, (2) to conciliate to righteousness, (3) to stir to righteousness. By the Middle Ages, for which Augustine wrote, rhetoric was no longer seen as a means to discover truth or even to argue or persuade, it was seen as the means of disseminating

truth for the expansion of Christian dogma. The increased use of written communication diluted the oral tradition and interest in speech acts; letter writing became the mechanism for state and church business and rhetoric was relegated to the role of declamatory skill.

By the Age of Enlightenment three approaches to rhetorical practice may be recognized: (1) the traditional classical approach, still based on the writing of Aristotle, Cicero and others, encompassing the divisions and categories of speech acts from invention, or discovery of arguments and appeals, to delivery; (2) the stylistic approach which concentrated on the use of various linguistic devices such as schemes and tropes (to the exclusion of all else); and (3) the Ramistic approach, established by the Frenchman, Peter Ramus, who conceived of rhetoric only as style and delivery.

In 1776, George Campbell published his Philosophy of Rhetoric, reopening an examination of the classical questions regarding rhetoric. According to Golden, Berquist and Coleman (1982), Campbell's treatise is the greatest book on communication theory written in the modern era (p. 148). The significance of Campbell's work on rhetoric is his combination of ancient theory with current scientific trends of investigation and a merger between rhetorical theory and psychological theories of the times. He placed logic firmly in the scope of rhetoric and stated that rhetoric was concerned with informing,

delighting, and persuading. Underlying his philosophy was the assertion that rhetoric was a dynamic, developing process.

Other writers of the 18th and 19th centuries promoted a resurgence of interest in rhetoric. Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres appeared in 1783, and prompted a new interest in culture and human nature and the restoration of rhetoric to its ancient status. Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric was published in 1828. While Whately concentrated on argumentation, composition, and emphasized the role of logical principles in rhetoric, he also subscribed to Campbell's notion that rhetoric is less concerned with investigation and discovery than with management (p. xxviii).

Since 1920, studies have examined the classical tradition and have attempted to explain the meanings of Aristotle, Cicero, and others in the context of contemporary issues and questions. Such men as James Winans and Charles H. Woolbert incorporated new developments in psychology into their writings on public speaking. Methods were developed for the controlled study of human behavior, and communication theory gradually developed a quantitative methodology dealing with speech acts. In recent years the social sciences have produced a great quantity of research relevant to the study of human communication [see: pp. 2-3].

In many cases there appears to be little resemblance

between modern rhetorical theory, communication research, and the ancient, traditional study of rhetoric. There has been a temptation among some scholars to say rhetoric is a dinosaur, irrelevant in today's modern world other than as a museum exhibit. As Edwin Newman lamented in Strictly Speaking: Will America Be the Death of English?:

Still worse is the destruction of rhetoric. Rhetoric does not mean fustian, exaggeration, or grand and empty phrases. It means--it meant--the effective use of language, and the study of that use. Suddenly beloved of politicians and journalists, rhetoric is now used to mean something doubtful and not quite honest, instead of something desirable (Tompkins, 1982, p. 28).

A more accurate assessment is that modern times are able to use empirical methodologies to test old principles, and as a result, alterations, refinements, rejections, and expansions of previous formulations are underway. It is a necessary pruning to enhance theoretical growth. As a result, the study of rhetorical principles and practices has taken on new mutations in response to historical demands.

Aristotle noted that speakers seek to change the minds and hearts of others. Aristotle saw in language a functional use, and began to construct a set of principles where language is used by purposeful design. While it may be argued that Aristotle only approached the study of communication in the context of public speaking, today, rhetorical studies have expanded the parameters of investigation to include all forms of communication

exchange, whether interpersonal, intra-cultural, or inter-cultural. No single framework is universally agreed upon by all members of the communication profession. Ever since the pre-Socratics began to theorize about person-to-person communication and called it rhetoric, one rhetorical framework does remain axiomatic--that humans use their capacities for speech to accomplish personal and social ends. This fact alone motivated those very first ancient inquiries into the nature of communication and is a query which continues to prompt the "who", "where", "what", "when", "how", and "why" questions revolving around speech acts in the present day.

This thesis argues that rhetoric and culture share a common dynamic, an engagement of common purpose, that they "function" in concert with one another. In moving toward an understanding of how rhetorical acts function as cultural acts and how cultural acts are fundamentally rhetorical in nature we may come to know how the elements of social order reinforce and maintain the "structure" of cultural enactments in confirming, reaffirming and disconfirming the values of a society and in promoting group unity. As such, the scope of rhetoric and culture comprise both the perspective of the source of messages and the perception of the receiver who encounters and processes any given message. Rhetoric, then, becomes a cognitive processing of symbols; a definition borrowed directly from Arnold and Bowers (1982). While "rhetoric"

and "communication" can be used interchangeably and may be defined so as to make them synonymous with one another, it will be useful for discussion purposes to make the definition somewhat narrower and more specific. Following the tradition of other writers, namely, Arnold and Bowers (1982), Benson and Pearce (1977), Miller, Prosser and Benson (1973), Golden and Corbett (1968), Cronkhite (1974), Pearce and Cronen (1980), Langer (1942), Gregg (1984) and Burke (1967, 1945), I will initially define rhetoric as the study of the meaning of symbols. This definition will be elaborated and expanded in subsequent chapters of this thesis, and it will be shown that Culture is, likewise, a cognitive processing of symbols.

The symbolic experience.

The notion of Culture (with a capital "C") or culture and cultures (with a small "c") is in and of itself a fascinating exploration into symbolic constructs. Other lexical choices could be asserted, such as, society, collective, group, civilization, and even communication. My own acquaintance with theories of culture leads me to an approach similar to other writers (Tylor, Morgan, Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Habermas); viewing culture as a supraorganic integer impacting the individual with the symbol-systems of belief, value, norm, and behavioral choice; all of which must be communicated in some fashion. Culture may be thought of, using a metaphorical

personification, as the "earth mother"--a vast emulation of collective communication shaping existence, nurturing reality, and explaining experience, that individuals may add to or rearrange accordingly as events transpire.

For this reason I have come to believe culture is best understood as a symbolic process. In fact, I would go so far as to label it both a macro-process and a micro-process, in as much as culture(s) are built from the communication events of individual lives as well as group (local, regional, national, global) activities and events. Culture, like rhetoric is never static, but consists of motion, of the movements of individual and group interactions which occur within its contextual praxis. Because of this dynamism, culture is continually reshaping, folding, and unfolding itself, much as a communication exchange may be understood to occur.

Everywhere we turn it is, apparently, easy to see that civilizations rise, age, and die with a basic tendency toward recurring themes of survival, adaptation, technological innovation, group cohesion. As yet a successful accounting of a universal law which ultimately and accurately summarizes the reasons behind this process, or allows prediction of the outcome of a particular cultural sequence or system has not been proven; the cycle, as a cycle, is apparent. And if explanations are absent as to why the cycles occur in the first place, at the very least a recognition of how they occur in the

continual sweeping movement of human activity is possible.

The dynamic nature of the process of culture arises out of individual and group interaction. The dynamic nature of rhetoric arises out of the same interactions. People continually engage in some sort of social exchange. This exchange is facilitated by the use of symbols. Symbols may be thought of as speech, or the use of language, as well as nonverbal expressions communicating experience and ideas and influencing thought. Thus, language and nonverbal modes of symbol use, such as music, dance, art, and film, bring forth and express the emotional, spiritual, and rational content of the human mind.

Suzanne Langer (1942) defines symbols as "vehicles for the conception of objects" (p. 61). Symbols allow people to think about something apart from its immediate presence. Langer, therefore, calls the symbol "an instrument of thought" (p. 63). The anthropologist, Leslie A. White, declared, "the symbol is the basic unit of all human behavior and civilization" (Bohannon and Glazer, 1973, p. 335). Symbols, then, may be thought of as the matrix, or the instrumentation of human interaction; a definition which applies equally to rhetoric. Further, the symbolic mode, or use of symbols, requires that people maintain shared meanings and interpretations of the symbols.

Kenneth Burke, a rhetorical theorist, has suggested that we are only able to coordinate social life at all

because our social realities are constructed through symbols. Burke's first premise in his definition of "man" [sic.] is: "Man is the symbol-using [symbol-making, symbol-misusing] animal" (p. 16). Burke then continues with his definition by describing how our use of symbols constructs reality: Man is the inventor of the negative, separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy, and rotten with perfection" (1970, p.16).

Any study of culture, then, must be concerned with the way in which human beings experience symbols in order to construct reality both rhetorically and culturally.

Today, many writers define rhetoric as the use of symbols for social management. Pearce and Cronen (1980) suggest that rhetoric can best be defined as a form of social action that can be studied as a process of creating and managing symbols in the context of social reality (p. 61). And while we primarily focus on the most pervasive and complex symbol system--language--music, dance, art, mathematics, and film are also representative of symbolic occurrences which influence our perceptions, shape our meanings, and persuade our attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. For example, though it is now 1988, recent films, including PLATOON, HAMBURGER HILL and FULL METAL JACKET, have re-focused collective attention on the Viet Nam war and the historic social conflict that invasion

engendered in our nation. These movies are only a recent example of the way in which a particular medium, such as film, can influence and concentrate our individual and collective attention on social issues. We can see, therefore, that a visual/linguistic form, such as film, contains a rhetorical element in that symbols are manipulated with a purposeful intent to create meaning and influence a social perception.

Languages are the clearest illustration of symbol use. A language is an abstracted, structured, rule-governed system of cognition and not a physical object. This rule-governed system is an abstraction of cognitive and organizational patterns which indicate relationships and procedures. Without the relationships and procedures, language would be meaningless.

The phonemic rules of language specify how the basic meaningful symbols (morphemes) are to be constructed out of meaningless sound elements formed physiologically by the vocal mechanism. Syntactic rules tell us how these basic morphemes or symbol units are to be united into larger constructions of sentences or phrases. The semantic and pragmatic aspects of symbol manipulation focus on the attachment of meaning to symbols and the meaning created when symbols are used. Rhetoric, then, offers a pragmatic approach in evaluating and analyzing the meaning created when symbols are used; specifically to elicit and manipulate a social response, organize or reorganize

social structure, and influence problem solving procedures and change. Cultural analysis shares a similar paradigm by investigating the social constructions which are created by the use of symbol manipulation.

It is important to keep in mind that symbols are not only used individually, but are incorporated into a symbol-system or language-system in which relationships are agreed upon within the shared speech-cultural community. As the ancient Greeks discovered, and as contemporary trends in rhetorical theory indicate, when people exchange symbols, it is for the purpose of accomplishing some task or goal. Whether that goal is the establishment of families, the exchange of goods and services, the contracting of governments and religions for social organization, or for the manipulation of power based on knowledge and belief systems, it is the same. These activities remain symbol-bound and task-oriented. They are used rhetorically to produce the social process we know as culture. Conversely, culture(s) produce symbol-specific modes of cognition which are understood by individuals and groups as norms, mores, and behavioral options. These consist of collectively adopted and adapted beliefs, values, and attitudes which are manipulated rhetorically through communication acts to reproduce or modify the cultural praxis. Let us look at an example of how this works.

If "labor" is a symbolic concept used by a particular

culture there is nothing innate in the concept that dictates whether labor is to be performed by women or men or children, on Wednesdays, Saturdays, or Sundays, in the day or in the night, in blue jeans or evening gowns, for a profit or for sustenance, for the state or for the individual. The initial concept of "labor" (which is in and of itself a symbolic construct which is used to specify "work"), is further managed symbolically by the addition or deletion of symbols which dictate the distinctions or categories of "work" or "labor". These descriptive inclusions define the specifics of labor such as gender, race, place, time, and so on; characterizing who is to do the labor, when it is to be done, and how it is to be done. In addition, cultural ideological symbols are used to supplement the concept of labor and provide the "why" or the reason it should be done in the first place. These ideological tenets are expressed with symbols such as "capitalism", "communism", "socialism", "protestant work ethic", "free enterprise", "collective", "proletariat", "bourgeois", and so forth. Thus, the initial symbolic concept of "labor" is elaborated and expressed under the aegis of cultural symbols which process the rules and sequences of an activity called "labor".

Elaborating on the earlier definition of both rhetoric and culture as a process, we may now add to the definition that rhetoric and culture are both a human activity of shared meanings and interpretations through the use of

symbols. This exchange of shared meanings through the vehicle of symbols for the purpose of accomplishing a goal may be defined as cultural rhetoric. Both rhetoric and culture are concerned with the dynamics that occur within the boundaries of social messages and the options which are available to individuals for managing these dynamics in desired ways. Another way of stating this is that rhetoric and culture are both coordinative. They involve human thinking on interests, values, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, subjective and objective interpretations and reasoning, forming a complex pattern of communication for the purpose of discovering and influencing choices.

The purposes then, of rhetoric and culture are to influence human choices on matters which require our attention. Rhetoric is symbol-system management with the goal of organizing action and coordinating human intentions. Therefore, culture may be defined as dynamic human interactions which are symbol-bound and coordinated through the medium of meaningful rhetorical acts for the purpose of social organization.

Summary.

It has already been noted that humans are distinctive in their ability to use symbols and this symbolic ability is commonly manifested in that arbitrary human invention-- language. Symbols are the means used to describe reality. Every utterance unavoidably conveys an attitude--

unavoidably, because the symbols of language are discretionary and refer to reality selectively, subjectively, and only partially. Unavoidably because language is ultimately influential, and this ability to influence may also be understood as the rhetorical ability to engage and persuade. Because meaning is shared through language, these symbols allow us to act with and through the conveyance of words to effect social purposes. In other words, to use speech capacities to negotiate and accomplish personal and social ends.

The focus of classical rhetoric was persuasion as it occurred in public address. But language and other symbols have the power to influence in more ways than just formal statements. Whenever we exchange attitudes, we function rhetorically. This broader scope for defining the rhetorical process allows us to look at rhetoric as cultural and culture as a cluster of rhetorical acts. An approach toward a rhetorical understanding of culture allows us to "see" culture as a structure prompting a sequence of cognitions invoked by symbol users, the impact caused by these uses, and the chain of events which occur when symbols are exchanged.

A contemporary example of this sequence of cognition, impact, and event is illustrated by the discussion of the "War on Drugs" (a metaphorical symbol for a social issue and concern). The current debate over urine-analysis (voluntary and involuntary), military policing of borders,

and cross-cultural intervention is creating a new social awareness which is impacting lives in the courtroom, the work place, and in international relationships. The controversy this exchange of symbols is evoking in contemporary American culture is evident, even though, as yet, the result is inconclusive. Still, we can see that inquiry, argumentation, appeal, and persuasive symbol manipulation of cultural values are being used and point to a need for social action. Culturally and rhetorically the process engages some opinions and refutes others in order to reach a consensus on social judgement. Culture reflects these judgments, making modifications and realignments mirroring the collective value system, and, in some cases, creating new ones. These directions and indirections produce rhetorical culture and are a result of the process known as symbolic interaction. Symbolic interaction, its' rhetorical and cultural paradigm, will be discussed in Chapter IV.

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RHETORIC AND CULTURE: SYMBOLIC INTERACTION

CHAPTER IV

This chapter discusses symbolic interactionism, providing an overview of the scope of its premises and its application to rhetoric and culture. In addition, the chapter reviews Kenneth Burke's analytical methodology of the pentad as one means of applying a method of rhetorical analysis to cultural paradigms.

Symbolic interaction.

Symbolic interaction is perhaps the broadest theoretical perspective of the role of communication. Developed primarily by the field of sociology, it is less a theory, as noted by Littlejohn (1983), than an umbrella of thought under which a number of theories find application. The primary originator behind the basic ideas of symbolic interaction was sociologist George H. Mead, though the term was actually coined by Herbert Blummer. Rhetorical contributors to this theoretical canopy include Manford Kuhn, Kenneth Burke, John Searle, Suzanne Langer, and Richard Gregg. This section will review the scope of symbolic interaction and its major premises.

Littlejohn identifies seven basic propositions encompassing the central themes of symbolic interactionism:

1. The meaning component in human conduct:

distinctly human behavior and interaction are carried on through the medium of symbols and their meanings.

2. The social sources of humanness: The individual becomes humanized through interaction with other persons.

3. Society as process: Human society is most usefully conceived as consisting of people in interaction.

4. The voluntaristic component in human conduct: Human beings are active in shaping their own behavior.

5. A dialectical conception of the mind: Consciousness, or thinking, involves interaction with oneself.

6. The constructive, emergent nature of human conduct: Human beings construct their behavior in the course of its execution.

7. The necessity of sympathetic introspection: An understanding of human conduct requires study of the actors' covert behavior (Littlejohn, 1983, p. 45).

This school of thought maintains that humans act with symbols, a fact anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski noted in his observation that humans engage in acts of communal joining when they speak. Thus, the rhetorical function of an utterance is more important than its actual content. Mead viewed society and individuals as inseparable and interactive. The self and society are not frozen, but are part of a dynamic system. Burke tells us that "rhetoric is an essential function of language itself" (Burke, 1969, p. 43). As such, the rhetorical nature of symbolic communication is inseparable from the process of communication. Society requires communication to promote social order. It is an interactive process using symbols as the medium of translation and transformation. The essence

of human life is the cultural coming together, through the use of symbols, to promote shared meaning and explanation. The use of symbols is itself a rule-governed activity leading to the formulation of cultural guardianship. An understanding of the rhetorical and cultural dynamics of symbolic interaction that produces this guardianship allows us to approach culture as a process which manages and engages human beings in symbolic usages. This management shapes collective cognition and shows us how those uses function to promote and enhance social coordination, producing rhetorical culture.

The symbolic nature of language.

In order to understand how people interact rhetorically and culturally with symbols, we must first evaluate and define the nature of symbolic use. According to George A. Miller (1981) we could give three different answers to the question "What is language" (1) we might answer in a way that emphasizes the structure of language; (2) we could answer in terms of the process of uttering sounds associated with spoken languages; or (3) we might also respond in terms of the social conventions associated with using language; that is, in terms of the relationships between language and the world. Winifred P. Lehman (1983) identified these three definitions respectively as, the "syntactic," "phonological," and "semantic" components of language. Howard R. Pollion (1974) provided a useful

definition of language. He said language is a system of symbols, governed by rules describing what combinations of symbols are acceptable for use in communicating. These symbols, along with the governing rules, are abstract; symbols are separate from tangible objects and the experiences they are meant to describe.

Several important characteristics of language are suggested by these definitions. First, language is composed of symbols--that is, words. Second, the symbols we use have no necessary relationship with the objects, events, persons, and feelings they represent. Third, the use of language is rule-governed. The rules for governing symbol use come, for the most part, from culture, and other rules represent individual agreements made in particular relationships.

The use of symbols is the principal means of conveying human experience. Gregg (1984) argues that symbolic interaction, or what he labels inducement, is a direct consequence of the neurophysiological processes of the mind. He states that the brain is innately adapted to create and respond to symbols; and that all behavior is symbolic behavior (pp.131-149). He further argues that all cognitive processing occurs from the structure or patterning of symbolic experiences.

While language is the primary symbol system, we must not overlook non-language symbol-sets such as painting, sculpture, dance, and music. Any interpretation of symbol-

sets, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, derives its primary meaning from cultural agreement. Thus, people may dance, paint, sculpt, use words, phrases, and sentences to stand for meanings they are trying to represent and communicate. People talk about yesterday, today, and tomorrow, an activity which would be impossible if language were not symbolic and abstract.

Symbols are structured arbitrarily. To say that language is arbitrary is not to say that it is accidental but rather it is to acknowledge the fact that words used in language are symbolic. For instance, there is nothing in the word "table" that makes it a better word to use to refer to a son or daughter than a word like "child." That "child" refers to a daughter or son is arbitrary. Consequently, to know the meaning of the word "child" the listener must have heard the word, learned the word from his/her culture, understand the cultural concept of "child" and realize that the word is used to talk about this concept. The symbol is simply a convention for talking about the concept. Thus, while symbol use may be a structuring/patterning activity of the mind, it always operates on a level of conceptual and cultural abstraction.

This brings us to a second observation about symbolic interaction and language. The use of symbols is selective and subjective. We not only use symbols to communicate our perceptions and experiences to others, but we also use symbols to perceive and interpret the messages of others.

Because of neurological and cultural limitations we cannot perceive all there is to be perceived. We also choose not to perceive all we can. Symbol use is an abstractive process involving selection, choice, and purpose. This intentional use of symbol-sets is arbitrated by the guardianship of culture. We choose from the stimuli available to us, catalog those stimuli according to a learned cultural dictionary of meaning and interpretation, and structure our individual and collective realities from the symbol-sets of cultural directives and alternatives. All human experience is, therefore, symbolic experience. Reality is symbolic reality. Culture represents an amalgam of arbitrary symbol-sets compiled and aligned toward agreement and consensus for the purpose of group oneness.

Human comprehension about how the world works, and how we should function in relation to that world is dependent on how our minds have classified the available stimuli into functional symbol-sets. All human comprehension and activity is, therefore, symbol-bound in that we can neither escape the use of symbols or the learned cultural meanings and judgments attached to them. Symbols are the tool for manipulating knowledge and meaning, filtering messages as they are received, sorted, and interpreted. As we cannot transfer our thoughts directly one to another, we translate them into a medium that we have in common with others, the medium of symbols, or language.

Mead, Burke, and others have been concerned with the question of how communication determines the nature of society or culture. Mead believed human beings learn about themselves through interaction with cultural (social) symbol-sets. The words we use take their meaning from interpretations experienced in cultural interactions. For example, if one is raised in a white community where the members of other races and ethnic groups are regarded as inferior, chances are the belief that non-whites are inferior will become a cognitive attitude. The meaning for the symbol "blacks" or "hispanic" is developed through cultural symbolic interaction with members of the white community.

The range of available symbols, and their primary interpretations are determined and limited by culture and the culture-specific rules of relationship. Cognition, then, is a symbolic cataloging of experience which is culture-bound. The particular set of symbols available to people for use in conveying ideas seems to reflect those things which are important to that culture. J. Dan Rothwell (1982) noted several striking differences among languages of different cultures. For example, Eskimos have at least nine different words for snow, the Masai language uses seventeen different terms for cow, in Arabic there are six thousand words that relate directly to camels, and the Chinese have no word for romantic love, as western Occidentals would describe the experience of sexual

attraction. The point is, each language carries with it a particular cultural frame-of-reference, with culture representing the major contributor to values, attitudes, and beliefs. Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, and George Austin summarized this idea when they wrote:

The speakers of a language are partners to an agreement to see and think of the world in a certain way--not the only possible way. The world can be structured in many ways, and the language we learn as children directs the formation of our particular structure (Bruner, et. al., 1956, p. 143).

The question then becomes: if the structure of human activity is symbolic, how do those symbols function in the creation of human performances? Further, how are those performances mandated and sanctioned by culture? Any communicator needs a set of values that are applicable to the speech act to help choose ideas, select supporting symbols, and decide on appropriate strategies and basic themes. Such a consideration of values requires a rooting in a cultural custom. Culture supplies the directives and supporting network of beliefs, values, and attitudes. Values and beliefs are transformed rhetorically into individual and/or group action or performance. It is the capacity of humans to use symbols and the capacity to be influenced by the use of symbols that brings us to an examination of rhetoric as the transformational medium between cultural values and beliefs and the enactment of attitudes in communication events.

Rhetorical transformation.

Burke argues that human relationships are best understood as being symbolic and best analyzed rhetorically. It has already been noted that symbols encourage us to share attitudes. This sharing can only be brought about by the transformational qualities of rhetoric. Rhetoric is the means whereby we are empowered and enabled to transform symbol use into action for the purpose of social coordination. One of its features is that rhetoric makes appeals. It provides reasons to believe, feel, and act in a particular way. Cooperation requires agreement among individuals concerning their common interests and usually, some expression of those interests in terms of norms. To be a member of a group in good standing requires a knowledge of the cultural lore of the group. Rhetoric provides appeals that advise us about belief and conduct in each social situation. Rhetoric is dependent upon opinion. Through symbolic interaction rhetoric intersects ideas with experience, it attempts to evoke moral, emotional, and rational commitments to belief and action.

Language exhibits our motives and encourages opinion or sharing of these motives--what Burke calls a rhetoric of motives. When communication takes place symbols are rhetorically transformed from the realm of individual and cultural significance to the realm of social action. In this realm attitudes are attached to opinions

or interpretations of stimuli and cognition and consensus is sought within the cultural paradigm. During a communication exchange symbols move to other levels of abstraction; from what it is or describes, to how we interpret it, and how we act with symbols available in the cultural cognitive repertoire. Rhetoric is concerned with the dynamics that occur within the boundaries of the repertory and the options available to performers for managing these dynamics in culturally desired ways.

It is valuable at this point to argue that there is no such thing as neutral language or symbols. This proposition requires some analysis, for currently we labor under the notion that some language is loaded, i.e., "communist," "queer," "feminist," etc.; whereas some language is objective, fair, or neutral. A common example would be the belief that mathematical language is not loaded, that it is impartial, objective and carries no emotional overtones. Is the simple equation $E=MC^2$ not perhaps one of the most portentous utterances of our age? In short, symbols are not neutral, nor is it desirable that they should be.

Aristotle defined rhetoric as discovering the best possible means of persuasion on any subject whatever. This definition of rhetoric is standard and influential; therefore, we tend to think of persuasion in terms of forceful arguments or powerful advertising campaigns or propaganda. But suppose we strip language of its overt

appeal to do something or accept an idea. Is it then nonpersuasive? Words must always convey an impression. Let us examine the following common series of remarks:

"Hello, how are you?"
 "I'm fine. And how are you?"

The first question--"How are you?"--was not intended to elicit information. Or at least that particular question seldom is intended to bring any answer but the standard, "Fine". The common "how are you?--I'm fine. How are you?" series does not try to say so many things in an almost equal number of words. It is a rhetorical communication of quite a different class from a question such as "How do I get to the corner of Monroe and 16th?" One way in which we can characterize the "how are you?" formula is to say that it is an unmediated attempt at persuasion. It is one way in which human beings establish rapport with one another. In this sense, it is hardly neutral, nor is it talk for the sake of talk. In rhetorical theory, especially that of Kenneth Burke, it is purposive talk designed to overcome estrangement. The intention is not to literally mean "Fine." The intent is to persuade toward unity, and this intention toward sharing and cohesiveness is experienced through the rhetorical transformation of symbols into intent and purposeful action. Further, this exchange is mediated by the cultural directives or forms for associational discourse. It may be specific only to English speaking

Americans, but it is a cultural rhetorical appeal for association, recognition, and acknowledgement universally understood by members sharing this symbol-set. It is a manifestation not only of individual rhetoric but of cultural rhetoric as well. People can use this strategy of identification and association to create oneness only because it is culturally shared and understood.

Rhetoricians hold that people manage social situations through their use of symbolic acts. While most contemporary rhetoricians discuss the subject in functional terms, the most influential account in terms of transforming symbols into action is provided by Kenneth Burke. Burke regards communication as a rhetorical presentation of symbolic reality. What Burke implied, but did not fully explicate, is that symbols are a presentation of cultural reality. When we use expressive symbolic forms we create meaning in others, and culture is maintained or changed, i.e., common ground is established and understanding leading to unity is realized. Rhetorical communication presents an image of reality that requires response or action. In other words, as speakers and listeners we work together to transform symbolic meanings into unity, or what Burke calls consubstantiality, in order to accomplish our objectives.

Communication also represents and structures reality through the organization and projection of symbols. We are all possessed of a past, for example, but the meaning of

the past is dependent on the individual and cultural relationships which give it color and context. Symbols take our past experiences and organize them in ways permitting the sharing of projections and predictions into the future. Communication, then, is not only representational of cognitive organization but is presentational; meaning symbolic forms embody images of reality inviting specific action. It presents reality, or our image of it, that is responded to as it is presented. Our cultural image of the world is introduced and exhibited to others as it is perceived, experienced, and as it might be.

The presentational nature of communication derives from the situational context in which communication occurs. Why we act is not necessarily an internal mechanism, but an external movement toward others based on how we understand the situations we are in. The situational context is usually defined by the cultural guardianship of symbols. In other words, the presentational nature of communication allows a speaker to present a scene to a listener, assuming the scene presented is understood in the cultural context. The scene must have a specific purpose, intent, or motivation, and requires a response. As speakers and listeners, we work together to form the cooperative means necessary for our social goals to be met.

In 1945, Kenneth Burke developed the theory for which he is probably most famous--"dramatism." Burke emphasizes

that humans act. The metaphor of dramatic human action is not new. Shakespeare had this to say in As You Like It:

All the worlds a stage,
and all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts.
[Act 2, scene 7, lines 139-42]

The difference, however, is that Burke does not use the application of the dramatic as a metaphor. He means that people literally do act. As such, Burke developed a model or conceptual structure that shows the interrelationships among communication behavior, and offers us a mode of analysis for symbolic behavior as it is transformed rhetorically into meaningful, purposeful, acts. This model serves as a way to understand what happens when people exchange symbols. The dramatistic model formalizes the elements of dramatic presentation with five terms, called the dramatic pentad. Burke depicts the elements this way:

ACT: what was done, what communal moments were depicted.

SCENE: where the act occurred; the context of interaction in time and place and including the conditions for interaction.

AGENT: who performed the act; the individual or group engaged in some social function through the management of symbols.

AGENCY: the means of acting; how the deed was done, including the medium of enactment.

PURPOSE: the end or goal of the act; the communal values that were certified by engaging in an act. (Burke, 1945).

Burke's point provides a statement about human behavior with symbols--that is, that symbolic action will

occur and action will contain some kind of answer to each of the five questions presented in the pentad. More significant to the purpose of this discussion is that action integrates social values and results in communal (cultural) joining. The pentad provides a motivational model for analysis that explains why a person did what he/she did. It is designed to discover the facts in relationship to each element in a manner providing a plausible explanation for what happened, how it happened, and the motivational urges that account for why it happened. Burke maintains that we act out of motive. More than that, we impute motives to other actors. This is necessary if we hope to understand why they are acting as they are. Significant to this and implied is the fact that without culture our motives would be confusion. Culture provides alignment for the interpretations which justify motivation.

Each element of the pentad contributes to the analysis of symbolic action. It allows us to make inferences about a person's attitude. Burke maintains that every attitude incites to action and that every symbolic act conveys an attitude of disposition toward its referent (1945, p. 332). He further maintains that attitudes are our projections into the future of events in the present based on our experience with the past. And attitudes, as has been argued in this thesis, stem directly from cultural values.

The relationships between the five elements of the

pentad are called the ratios. Burke states that there must be consistency between the act and the scene, for example, and that it is situationally dependent. Further, there must be consistency in the agency-act, or the means or methods of the action. There are ten possible ratios among the terms of the pentad. They can be used as a kind of checklist for determining how motivations are assigned in descriptions of symbolic interaction. [see: appendix 1].

Before moving on, an illustration may be helpful to explain how the ratios can aid in illuminating the motivations suggested in a description of human action. Senator Edward Kennedy explained his behavior at Chappaquiddick in a famous speech to the voters of Massachusetts. David A. Ling has shown that a scene-act ratio figures prominently in Kennedy's explanation: poor lighting, a sharp turn, the absence of a guard rail. These situational elements produced the tragic automobile accident, not any fault of the agent [Kennedy] (Ling, 1969, pp. 327-335).

In review, the vocabulary necessary to implement Burke's model of the process engaging human beings in symbolic acts runs more or less as follows:

ACTOR: People are usefully considered actors in several senses of the word. (1) People "act" rather than move; that is, human beings are assumed to be purposive beings who both reflect cultural standards of action fostered by collective interaction and follow prescribed

forms or rituals when seeking to express particular ideas or motives. (2) People, often and perhaps always, play out pre-given scripts in their interactions with others. Those who avoid appropriate cultural scripting risk misunderstanding or social ostracism. (3) Persons are aware of their roles as actors. There is inherent to people in collectives intrapersonal separations of their "me's" from their "I's" or their selves from their roles. As Mead defined it, variously, the "me" is seen as the mediator between the "I" and society or significant others.

The notion of an "actor" logically requires the notion of a "spectator". SPECTATORS: The relationships between the actor and spectator(s) are much the same as those between a performer and an audience, with one persona performing properly for the audience. Spectators in these relationships are not deaf, dumb, and blind. Both actor and spectator enact culturally determined roles with actors offering culturally acceptable behaviors (if they weren't, they would be misunderstood) and spectators offering appropriate cultural approval or disapproval of the actor's performance.

AGENCY: Agency may be thought of as the script or message encoded and decoded during a communication exchange. Any number of interpretations for "agency" could be useful. A sociodramatist such as Duncan views scripts as ritualistically enacted, prescribed forms of symbols. Garfinkel, an ethnomethodologist,

sees them as mutually constructed modes of action and problem-solving. A sociolinguist such as Hymes seeks out linguistic markers or interpretive codes.

Nonetheless, people shift from group to group, situation to situation, purpose to purpose, channel to channel, tone to tone. The term "message" is normally used by scholars to examine microscopic linguistic matters and the term "script" is a word which is used to analyze the macroscopic cultural rituals and themes of enactment.

SCENE: This has a Meadian tradition of examining the here and now construction of mutual meaning as well as the environmental factors ranging from one-to-one interactions through full-blown, society-wide, political arenas. The scene may be traced through contexts of institutional and cultural standards for verbal and nonverbal behaviors. In any event, meaning is inextricably bound up with cultural contexts and social expectations of the situation or scene.

PURPOSE: Regardless of viewpoint, most rhetorical scholars believe that standards of meaning are culturally determined and that purpose takes on significance only as interpreted by culture or sub-cultures. Individual meanings and idiosyncratic actions, while expressive, are not necessarily communicative, as purpose may only be shared if the intended meaning is understood in some context of interaction. The competently performed purpose of the actor must be both correct culturally

as well as strategic in the deployment of symbols.

The dramatic model of interpretation and analysis is not exclusively Kenneth Burke's. Other dramatistic models have been developed by Goffman, Garfinkel, Duncan, and Geertz. This review of dramatism has attempted to point out the general constructs and methods of analysis available for rhetorical and cultural scholars. This approach allows us to see the process that involves people in the exchange of symbols or symbolic interaction; and how that process functions in social or cultural usages. Dramatism emphasizes the symbolic human act or action. In terms of the pentad, an act must have a purpose. This has implications for the study of rhetoric and culture when we begin to take into account the purposiveness of human communication. In the words of Burke, "things move, persons act" (1972, p. 28). But they must act within the cultural praxis. [see: appendix 2].

Summary.

Kenneth Burke tells us that rhetoric is not rooted in some ancient mystique but is "an essential function of language itself,...the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols" (Burke, 1969, p. 43). Let us consider this statement as a means of summarizing this discussion and for reiterating the transformational role of rhetoric in its application to symbolic use.

The argument of this chapter is that humans use language which is symbolic in nature and content. We use language to shape our view of the world, and this view is augmented to a large degree by the government of cultural expectations for values, attitudes, and beliefs.

Rhetoric's domain in the cultural-symbolic exchange is to transform symbols into communication presentations that encourages the exchange of attitudes. By expanding the boundaries of rhetoric to include the transformation of all symbolic activity into action we can begin to explain human symbolic behavior within the cultural frame-of-reference.

At the heart of rhetoric is the intentional use of created symbolic meanings. This paradigm of action allows us to examine symbolic transformations and explain what symbols people are using and how they are using them in order to understand why they behave as they do.

Rhetoric is an essential function of language. Language is operationalized and understood within the cultural mold. Because culture shapes symbol use all language contains an attitude or bias. The role of rhetoric is to transform symbols into human action. Any study of rhetoric, then, concerns itself with the way symbols function, with what people do with them. The use of symbols forms cohesive bondings between individuals or groups through shared actions or motives. Rhetoric then is the transformation of cultural information into symbolic behavior for the

purpose of inducing cooperation and meeting goals. Consequently, rhetoric must take into account not only individual and group symbol use and motives, but the cultural directives which supply interpretation and meaning as the model for appropriate communal fusion. Finally, rhetoric is transformationally directive in that humans respond by nature to symbols and can, therefore, be moved to action by symbols. We use them, reflect on them, embellish them, change them, and always act with them; transforming them rhetorically into cultural interpretations of reality.

The next chapter addresses the rhetorical transformation of symbols into cultural fusion and the relationships necessary for sustaining cultural meaning between individuals and groups.

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RHETORICAL TRANSFORMATION AND CULTURAL FUSION

CHAPTER V

To this point we have discussed theories about culture and rhetoric, the ways human beings experience symbols, and the interactive process engaging people and collectives in symbolic usages. This chapter is devoted to the rhetorical transformation of symbols and how they function to produce cultural fusion, or the relationships and purposes necessary for sustaining shared meaning between individuals and groups.

Culture and rhetoric.

Chapter II explicated and reviewed a number of theoretical constructs attempting to define culture. These constructs range in scope from evolution, determinism, materialism, ethnology, and reductionism, to psychological and cognitive phenomenology, personality, linguistics, and semiotics. Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, in their Culture--A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (1976) identified over 164 definitions of culture. Regardless of whether a structural-functionalist or phenomenological point of view is held about culture, and regardless of the difficulty in forming a consensus about what culture is or is not, a definition of the term must be elaborated in order for us to begin to understand rhetorical culture and how rhetoric serves as the

transformational device between cultural symbology and cultural enactments by individuals and groups, leading to cultural fusion.

Borrowing a device utilized in linguistics between Language (with a capital L) and language (with a small l), Culture and culture will be distinguished accordingly for our purposes. Culture will be defined as the knowledge of appropriate and inappropriate thought and behavior patterns of a group. A culture may be defined as a learned symbol-set of attitudes and behaviors held in common by a number of people. These attitudes and behaviors define them as members of the same group and likewise stipulates others as nonmembers of a group. By distinguishing between Culture and culture in this manner, we may differentiate between the knowledge about attitudes and behavior held in common and the actual performance or enactments of these attitudes and behaviors by individuals and members of a collective. Put differently, we all have knowledge about our cultural norms, but we enact that knowledge with differing levels of commitment, variation, and interpretation.

The characteristics of making this distinction between Culture and culture may now be considered. First, both Culture and culture refer to learned and acquired knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors. Geertz defined culture as:

"an historically transmitted pattern of meanings

embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [women] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (1973, p. 89).

It is this cultural pattern of symbolic interactions into which individuals are born and socialized and acquire the ability to function with other members of the same groupings. For example, patterns of behavior that we now enact and which we recognize as natural to our society were learned when we were infants and children. Persons born in other cultures with other language symbol-sets would have learned different sets of attitudes and behaviors as being the significant criteria for human performances. Thus, in this culture, we have specific symbol-sets which provide the base of cultural and individual enactments. We refer to these symbol-sets as cultural attitudes; or beliefs, opinions, values, and norms which shape our thinking and tell us what is appropriate and what is not. For example, we have attitudes about politics, religion, education, and families. We share similar values about magic, myth, ritual, marriage, sex, productivity, industry, competition, and cooperation. These constitute our cultural symbol-system. Similarly, when we speak with someone, when we belch, go to the bathroom, attend the theatre, go to class, engage in courtship and sex, or attend funerals, we attempt to perform according to Cultural knowledges. We have acquired these attitudes and behavior patterns from those around us who in turn learned

them from past generations and which we, in turn, will transmit to the next generation.

Of course, we recognize that individual variations of performance will occur within the value system, and that changes and modifications of Cultural knowledge systems will occur over time. Nonetheless, culture provides the reference for interpretation from which individuals make sense of their environment and interactions. Each individual performance attempts to address the specific demands of a cultural situation. These performances do not exist in isolation or occur at random. They are patterned according to hierarchical arrangements which are infused with cultural ideals for performance. According to Duncan, communication occurs through the cultural hierarchy and is accomplished through:

"the staging of a progression of steps from lower to higher, in which each step is determined by a higher step, until finally the hierarchy ends in the final step, a transcendent ultimate which is the principle or order on which each step rests. These ultimate meanings infuse the beginning as well as the end of a hierarchy, and their glory and mystery is felt in each step.

A hierarchy is therefore a progression, a way up and down in which each class of being strives toward the kind above, until the striving of all ends in some great perfection, such as God, country, wisdom, ideology, or love, which is beyond struggle and is the end of all desire" (1968, p. 165).

At the center of the "great perfection" for a culture are the abstract symbolic principles or ideologies which direct every phase of cultural enactment. These present symbolic images of conduct which, to borrow rhetorician

Weaver's phrase, "draws everything toward itself and is the ideal of its excellence" (1964, pp. 11-12). These cultural forms express a great variety but "examine them as we will", continues Weaver, "we find this inward facing toward some high representation. This is the sacred well of the culture from which inspiring waters like magnetic lines of force flow out and hold the various activities in subservience of acknowledgement. Not to feel this magnetic pull toward identification is to be outside the culture" (1964, pp. 11-12). These ideals serve as culture's essential principles of the whole, providing the source for symbol-sets which lead to the unity which makes community possible. As a metaphor we may turn to one of the mechanical theorems of physics--that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. The whole of culture, or its holistic spirit, is equal to the sum of its parts, or its various ideologies, and the degree of perfection with which those ideologies are understood and converted into action by members of the cultural collective.

Kenneth Burke wrote in Language as Symbolic Action (1966) that a series of abstractions occur from symbolic interaction until one arrives at an ultimate representation that can be considered a "god-term." His argument supports Duncan, in that culture presents a standard of perfection or excellence and human behavior moves logically toward the symbolic ideal represented by the hierarchies of culture. Another way of stating this

is that human beings move through various levels of abstractive symbolic intercourse beginning with cognition, conceptualization, knowledge of and understanding, and concluding with performances that attempt to manifest the cultural ideals of perfection. Culture, then, is an abstract vision, or that large controlling image supplying a philosophical underpinning to the motivations and actions taking place in daily life. As such, culture forms the ultimate pattern for attributing meaning to human experience by providing a road map for communicative action.

In spite of the inconsistencies within a culture, and there are many incompatible ideologies, these dogmas inform behavior. Each ideology absorbs more and more meanings and interpretations and the most powerful ideology will absorb the rest into an all-explaining image. Let us look at an example of incompatible ideology and the all-explaining image with which it is finally resolved.

If one accepts that the American culture is primarily Christian in terms of religious ideology, then, for argument's sake, we may infer that there is a value placed on the Christian rule of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." We may explain this rule in terms of a directive toward brotherhood and equality. However, we are also given a cultural directive concerning economic ideals, which is the ideology of acquisition, free-market enterprise, initiative and entrepreneurialism. This can

be translated as the god-term "Capitalism." Colloquially speaking, we may say that "he/she who has the most, wins." How are the contradictions between the religious ideals of brotherhood and equality resolved with the economic ideals of acquisition and success and which cultural directive is to be behaviorally followed? In this culture we arrive at a relatively peaceful solution by integrating the god-terms of Capitalism with the religious god-terms of Christianity.

Some individuals fuse the values of Christianity and Capitalism. How often do we hear God's name and will involved at ground-breaking ceremonies and the launching of battleships? Since the resurgence of imperialism in the latter part of the last century, we have culturally linked "thy will be done" with American progress. We call the phenomena and fusion of ideologies "Manifest Destiny." Hence, when some citizens on the left of the social debate are perceived by right-wing factions to be working toward socialism (or some other "ism") and against a "strong America" and "America's rightful, progressive world leadership", they are often labeled "Godless communists." In the smallest economic transactions of daily life, this ideological fusion of contradictory ideals appears. Does not the motto "In God We Trust" emblazon our currency? Are we not "one Nation, under God", and the land of promise and sanctification? Clearly there is evidence that God and Capitalistic principles are entwined and deeply entrenched in the highest ideals of this culture.

We can discover the pairing at every turn.

An understanding of these hierarchies of excellence and performance constitutes an understanding of the essence of culture itself. We take for granted the resolution of cultural themes in which behavior is rhetorically justified and explained. An understanding of the culture can only be acquired through direct experience with life in that culture. It is through this experience that individuals gain insight into the true meaning of cultural values and acquires identification with those norms.

This background allows us to more fully exploit our understanding of communication as a process of rhetorical culture. Communication is a presentation of culturally appropriate actions and is aimed at achieving the ideal or standard of excellence manifest in the ultimate god-terms of a culture. Culture, itself, is a social construction continually undergoing the process of negotiation and resolution through rhetorical transformations.

Too often the emphasis is on some structural feature of culture such as families, churches, and economic systems, without sufficient consideration given to how those features manifest themselves in everyday interaction by members of the group. If culture consists of "webs of significance that man [woman]...has spun" (Geertz, 1973, p. 5), then spun webs imply the act of spinning. As a result, we need to concern ourselves not only with the structures of spun cultural webs, but with the process of

their spinning as well. We need to ask ourselves, at this point, how these specific symbols with their particular cultural significance and displays come to be and how they are rearranged.

As has been discussed in Chapter IV, central to culture are rhetorical acts which lead to communal joining (p. 71). Rhetoric is an essential function of language (Burke, 1969, p. 43), and language is an essential structure of culture. Our cultural thinking is influenced by the language we use and rhetoric shapes our cultural thinking. We may, at this point, ask ourselves, "does language make culture possible, or does culture create language, making it possible?" This is essentially a chicken and egg question, much like asking "which came first, the universe, or language to describe it?" Yet, it deserves commentary. Both language and culture, as we recognize, involve such passive things as our world view and our attitudes toward others. The language use of others affects us. Language also involves the active art of rhetoric or symbol manipulation for the purpose of cohesion and unity. For example, if a government can change economic behavior by tampering with the religious and monetary system, it can also implant thoughts and influence actions by tampering with language--and this evokes the rhetorical questions of truth, reform, and propaganda. Every statement is an argument, an attempt to influence thinking by use of language. We can see

governmental tampering of language by its refusal to call the Vietnam war a "war" and instead referring to it as a "police action" or "friendly intervention." By the creation of these rhetorical symbols the government shapes and reinforces our ideological or value attitudes and changes our perception and definition of what war is and is not. In a nutshell, then, it is impossible to attempt to separate language, culture, rhetoric into a neat linear model. They are highly interactive, and, as in the old song about love and marriage, "you can't have one without the other." Culture would be impossible without the underlying linguistic structure. Language would cease to develop and expand and change without the underlying cultural structure. And neither could function at all if it were not for the nature of rhetorical transformations which change symbols from cognition and understanding into human motivation and action. Likewise, you could not have a rhetorical motivation occurring if it were not structured by the attitudes and beliefs shaped by culture and language.

Culture deals with knowledge and information concerning appropriateness of conduct, what is thought to be proper and improper within a given social group. This consensus on appropriateness and inappropriateness is arrived at rhetorically by the presentation of communication acts which provide arguments for and against consensus. In this fashion, culture is in a continual

state of restructuring. Culture also defines certain people as members of a particular group and as nonmembers of other groups. Our specific culture defines us as Americans, but at the same time it also defines us as nonmembers of the Brazilian, Canadian, and South African cultures. Our values, beliefs, opinions, attitudes and behaviors define us and are enacted as members of one particular culture, not of another. Consequently, while culture uses rhetoric to function, maintain, and manipulate its intentions and meanings, culture also produces an invisible persuasion or rhetoric with values, beliefs, and attitudes. Culture persuades people to behave in very specific ways and respond to and interpret their environment and interactions according to cultural symbol-sets which are highly influential in the processes of cognition and behavior. Cultural rhetoric is selective and subjective, enabling us to establish common-ground with one another and exchange our perceptions and experiences. Likewise, cultural symbols also limit message responses and provide filters telling us how to direct information selection, choice, and purpose. The highly influential nature of culture is thus persuasive, pervasive and rhetorical within the deep structure of the unconscious, shaping our motivations into an alignment with others. There are hundreds of acts we perform daily without reflecting on them. They are routine, dominated by the cultural will and we remain largely unaware we have been

persuaded by generations of formulated consensus to do what we are doing.

Rhetorical culture: identification and division:

The primary function then of culture is to produce identification with the group. The primary function of rhetoric is to produce identification by the manipulation of symbols for inducing cooperation. This does not mean the identification of, as in descriptive acts, but identification with, as in group solidarity, whereby we discover and reinforce that our ways are the same. At the basic level, identification occurs when we show that our attitudes or actions are like those of the other. "I once had to write a thesis myself," produces an identification or unity between a graduate committee chairperson and a graduate student. "I am so disgruntled with the lack of information provided by the graduate office," moans one student, "I agree, it's terrible," responds another, and, in that rhetorical act, agreement is asked, received, and identification with one another occurs.

Any mode or choice of symbolic activity can draw people together and produce identification. This is the major function of rhetoric and of culture. At its most complex, rhetoric fuses an audience together in the cultural ideologies or god-terms which mark us as distinct, unique groups of people--nationally, religiously, economically, politically, philosophically.

Regardless of depth or sophistication of the speech-act the basic principle of rhetoric is the act of producing identification. When examined drastically, the goal of culture is to produce identification between people. People use rhetoric, Burke argues, to persuade others and themselves through address [speech-acts] to identify (1969). This is not to be confused with being or becoming identical, but it means, rather, that human interests are joined. What Malinowski calls communal joining. This can be exhibited in any number of ways, from using the same language, to wearing the same clothing, espousing the same cause, or playing by the same ideological rules. Any mode of symbolic action can be understood rhetorically as the source of identification whether it be identification with the cultural matrix, or the identification with individuals or groups within the culture.

Identification is a dialectical term which implies an opposite. So, when it is stated that rhetoric allows human beings to function with symbol-sets in order to produce identification, it is implied that the use of such symbol-sets rhetorically manipulated will also produce division. And this leads us back to Aristotle whose rhetorical ethic was persuasion involving choice. To be attracted to one view, one interpretation, one perception, is to make a choice to dismiss other views, interpretations, perceptions. It is the choice to identify with one symbol-set in favor of another. Thus,

in both culture and rhetoric (which is why I use the label rhetorical culture) there is a movement of motives leading toward identifying or dividing; a movement toward, or a movement away from, in hierarchal terms. A movement toward the cultural ideals of excellence and perfection, or a movement away from those dogmas and tenets. It is these cultural relationships which are necessary to sustain or change meanings.

Rhetoric, then, transforms the cultural structure of symbol-sets into direct action which produces either identification with, or division from commonly held attitudes, values, and beliefs. More than this, culture functions rhetorically in attempting to overcome division, by persuading toward unity, or compensating for division by providing rhetorical arguments concerning justification and legitimization [see Habermas, pp. 30-34]. We need the rhetorical aspects of culture precisely because we are not one with each other. Rhetoric shows us the ways we are united or provides a dialogue showing how we may become united. Thus, the principle of rhetorical/cultural identification is an ongoing cycle of joining and dividing, creating need for a new effort to join that also divides us, at the same moment, from something else.

Such identification and division produces cultural fusion. Regardless of intention, rhetoric and culture lead us to change our perceptions as we identify with something new and divide from something old. For example, the

characterization of a military action as an "exercise" or "police action" rather than as an invasion may go unnoticed by many, but there is a clear difference in perception that encourages a common identification of meaning and response. Further, cultural rhetoric is always present whenever we use symbolic means to induce cooperation because all symbols express a cultural attitude or directive leading to either identification or division.

Rhetorical culture provides us with a common framework in which to conceptualize and share our experiences. It provides a common rationale or argument for the meaning of these experiences, our expectations of future outcomes, and gives us confidence that we are bonded in a fashion that sees reality in ways which are essentially the same. Culture provides the conceptual patterns for interpreting reality, and rhetorically we shape our responses to this reality. When we identify, we become one in terms of a shared principle or ideal. Burke (1969) states we cannot distinguish ourselves from one another in terms of that principle because we all adhere to it as essential to our orientation toward reality. This oneness in principle is called consubstantiality, meaning that there is an essential nature that is shared in common. For example, if we think of profits as the index of success, we are likely to adopt a materialistic orientation toward life, and act accordingly. We are likely to identify with whatever embodies positive attitudes towards the means

that will further our economic ends and allow us to achieve success. We are likely to define value in terms of personal gain, a value which is upheld by the culture. We are not likely to identify with matters presented as worthy because they have intrinsic merit. We may experience unhappiness and isolation if we don't advance economically because we will have failed to achieve success.

For example, if "work ethic" is a cultural, rhetorical term--which it is--then we find enthymematic appeals to that cultural rhetoric at every turn. For instance: "I am majoring in Liberal Arts," student A says. "What can you do with that?" student B says. In the question "What can you do with that?" is a powerful cultural appeal toward the standards or god-terms of success which define success in economic terms as the acquisition of wealth. The implied bias is that Liberal Arts majors will not achieve a satisfactory hoard of wealth identifying him/her as successful in cultural terms. The rhetorical response, then, in this capitalistic culture may be analyzed syllogistically:

All good capitalists work to make money.
Johnny is a good capitalist.
Therefore, Johnny works to make money.

Further, cultural rhetoric works at an implied (invisible) level of cognition for the purpose of producing cultural cohesion. Syllogistically it manifests itself with this type of rhetorical argument.

All good capitalists want to work to make money.

Johnny wants to be a good capitalist.
Therefore, Johnny wants to work to make money.

Conversely, we may change the conceptual patterns arising out of personal and social conflict and rhetorically adjust our interpretations of reality and the responses now called for. If our culture were to change the standard of evaluation for success from money (materialism) to the aesthetic and include in the cultural hierarchy a vision of success based on making beautiful objects, this change would be addressed rhetorically and new behaviors would be found to be appropriate in order to identify with the common norms of the community. Beauty might be found in a task well done, in valuing neighborliness, empathy and compassion, in caring for people rather than things and the final criterion for success may be found by the number of people attending a funeral rather than the number of objects remaining to be sorted and taken care of. The transformation of one set of values or standards (materialism) would be accomplished by rhetorically manipulating the symbol-set to include and enhance the new values (aesthetisism).

Each act of identification, then, implies an underlying cultural principle that brings cohesion and unity to our conceptions of reality. It must not be forgotten that cultural attitudes and how they are performed serve as the subjective filter allowing us to emphasize some aspects of living while ignoring or

dismissing others. This use of communication to take action provides the rhetorical base for acts to continue from event to event, with people identifying or dividing. Each rhetorical act refutes aspects of our previous identifications, making way for the creation of new modes for describing and enacting reality.

Summary.

The creative transformation of culture and its subsequent fusion comes about through the operation of rhetoric which brings about mutual identification. When further symbolism is created in some way, this creation is only added to the culture by the rhetorical transformation of symbolic understanding and knowledges into human communication and behavioral performances. Further, it is only enacted when it is understood by others, and it is the function of rhetoric to unite these symbolic constructs into cultural unity and purpose.

Cultural fusion and identification does not mean approval of all an individual thinks, feels and does. One cannot, however, disapprove anything until after an understanding of what there is to disapprove becomes apparent. Therefore, identification is the necessary a priori condition which must occur before division may occur. Identification ends in mutual influence. When we examine what human beings do with language, we discover they cannot use any symbolic form without communicating a

cultural attitude. All attitudes are incipient acts. They provide organization for our images from the past and project them into a future. Thus, identification ends in mutual influence. Through this mutuality of identification and influence the purposes of each individual may be brought about, though they may be very different. To bring human purposes to fruition requires modification in the purposes and desires of all, but it does not require that we be identical or the same. Rhetoric mediates these differences in order to discover the most profitable means of fulfilling human goals.

So, when we examine cultural rhetoric we are examining the persuasive uses of culture and language and how they are transformed by rhetorical acts into the dynamics of human interactions with symbols in order to construct interpretations of experience and form social norms that define the world.

Rhetoric then, is assigned the task of creating speaking conditions favorable to the expansion of symbolic expression and identification to promote cultural understanding and influence. Cultural rhetoric becomes the discovery of the means of symbolism which lead to the greatest mutual understanding and mutual influence. This rhetorical transformation leads to cultural fusion, or the incorporation of cultural symbol-sets into speech-acts and human behavior.

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SUMMARY

CHAPTER VI

Sticks and stones may break my bones
But words will never hurt me.

"In the course of life it happens again and again--in the family, the workplace, the street, the international arena--that a crisis arises in which we are faced with the possibility of establishing or losing community. Rhetoric--the art of 'persuasion' in its broadest sense--is the art by which we address these possibilities" (White, 1984, p. 4). In our daily lives we are faced with choices concerning the possibilities about our existence. How do we become? What are the rewards which are possible for us? What are the risks that must be undertaken in order to fulfill and magnify our potential as human beings? As people, it is our nature to be concerned with possibilities.

We "see" our world through the symbolic veil. Symbols shape us, direct us, misguide us, align us, and blind us. They enable us to think, feel, experience and articulate our unique expressions and perceptions of what is going on around us. We use symbols to create and destroy our relationships. We come together in efforts of mutuality and identification, or we make choices leading us away from each other--in the home and family, in our churches and synagogues, on the job and at play, in the

governments of nations encircling this globe--we use symbols to create brotherhood and unity or to destroy its possibilities.

Everything humans attempt is the creation of symbols, just as the symbol "labor" creates additional symbols, i.e., "capitalism", "communism", "socialism", "blue-collar", "white-collar", "proletariat", "bourgeois", and so forth. These symbols are balanced, changed, modified, nullified according to our collective sense of "the possibilities" which lie before us. We build from the past toward the present and attempt to predict the future with symbols. Symbols are the cognitive structures that give us a collective sense of proportion, or a reality we share and in which we organize ourselves, identify ourselves and relate to one another. Symbols serve as mediators, moderators, arbitrators and as masters of ceremony for the human experience. They introduce us, and enable us to say good-bye. They become a sequence of rules and regulations requiring responses we don't necessarily have to think about, or which we can change when they no longer suit our needs. We create and rearrange symbols in order to cope with the world, guide behavior, predict the environment, control ourselves and others. And because we, as a species, have this ability to abstract and codify ourselves, we create rhetorically the guardian of culture which binds our symbols into attitudes and procedures and defines who and what we are, telling us who and where and

what we ought to be, shaping how we are to become possibilities. In our daily conversations culture is our teacher and guides our answers to the universal questions of "who am I and why am I here?"

In the created hierarchies of order comprising cultural directives, we always address the possibilities. Culture is rhetorical, providing the communicative format and implications which manifest our thinking about a particular matter. Rhetoric is that "art by which culture and community and character are constituted and transformed" (White, 1984, p. xi). If we are symbol users, we are likewise users of rhetoric. The fact that we act with symbols and upon symbols makes us so. At this point, we may ask, "what does all of this mean?"

For the rhetorician the goal is to understand the strategies, appeals, and linguistic devices with which cognition is transformed into action taking place within the cultural womb and to ask the questions of why people are doing what they are doing and what are they hoping to accomplish? What possibilities are being addressed? What aspects of behavior are being defined, reinforced or changed? Rhetoric is not simply concerned with speech-acts and group movements or to be confined to one specific area of expertise and knowledge. Rhetoric is the manifestation of culture and its collective knowledge. It is the transformation of culture into behavior. There are many procedures and rules and methods of analysis available to

the rhetorician. But an explicit understanding of culture, and the theories about culture are necessary if rhetorical analysis is to sharpen its pencil and proceed into the future. Theories about culture, provided by anthropology and sociology, linguistics, sociolinguistics, semiotics, and cognitive phenomenology, should give the rhetorician pause, food for thought, and produce questions of how these theories can be brought to shed light on the rhetorical nature of humans. The goal is to arrive at a more fully developed comprehension of human behavior; making what was formerly invisible, visible; discovering what works and what does not work rhetorically; discovering the possibilities. The rhetorical scholar is identified by the questions she or he raises about human conduct and what are the actual or potential consequences of such conduct. To accomplish this, the rhetorician must have a firm footing in cultural theories so choices can be made and possibilities discovered. This will enable rhetorical analysis to go forward so that "Rhetorical criticism may be applied to any human act, process, product or artifact which, in the critic's view, may formulate, sustain, or modify attention, perceptions, attitudes, or behavior" (Bitzer and Black, 1971, p. 221).

The analysis and criticism of rhetorical culture is not without its difficulties. It has been said that fish will be the last to discover the existence of water. It is the same for humans. Culture is the most powerful

rhetoric because of its invisible nature. Rhetorical culture controls, guards, and persuades us with symbols we often deny. In analyzing culture, we are trying to get fish to perceive water. As scholars of rhetoric, we are attempting to perceive water ourselves.

Kahlil Gibran wrote that language was not a garment that could be taken off or put on at will. Its very removal was a literal tearing of flesh from the bone. To remove ones self from the language, symbols and culture encapsulating our being is as painful and as mutilating as tearing flesh from bone, for we have no way to Be. Pain is the price, the economics of freedom in a linguistically/culturally constructed world. This is so because symbol use and our resultant culture are an immersion, a complete and collective baptism from birth to death into a proscribed way of thinking; a rigid road map for living, an attitude of Being. Culture is an individualistic and collective tool often invisible by its very nature, yet it defines us as individuals and as groups, enslaving both with equal ferocity. Yes, words do have the power to hurt us. And words compounded into cultural ideologies have the ultimate power of freedom or incarceration.

We are entering an era where the opportunity for an expanded planetary awareness is possible. We are living in an age when our marvelous technology is latent with possibilities. The rhetorical choices we make as

individuals, groups and nations will shape those possibilities for good or evil. The unfortunate reality of culture is that we usually choose to remain enslaved. The more aware the rhetorician can help us become of the actualities of its terms of contract, the better we will be enabled to make fruitful choices concerning the possibilities. If we remain unwise and uninformed about the rhetorical nature of our culture, and how it shapes us the more we will tend to cling to the false security of the status quo and the reinforcing certainty and assurance that our cultural structure is the right way, the only way. For we are afraid to risk the complete unknown and embark on new territories, or new ways of thinking which would allow us to map our own destinies and chart our own responses for ourselves. In some ways, culture is a more awesome weapon than the nuclear bomb; producing automated robots guaranteed to perform in a pre-programmed and predictable stimuli/response fashion.

Culture is an abstraction that attempts to produce and reproduce a specific reality. What we do with our culture(s) in the course of social evolution becomes the problem, for we have no idea of what we are creating until it has been forged and the chains of thought are in place. Those chains limit our possibilities by preventing us from seeing the world on terms other than our own.

In attempting to define and reconcile culture, language, and symbols, we must be aware of the catch-22.

In the very attempt to change we will establish the mechanism whereby we create more symbols, stretch our language, and further cultural directives. It is inevitable, because we are symbolic, rhetorical, cultural beings. Everything we attempt is actually the creation of more symbols, definitions, and more cognitive structures that, literally, give us a collective reality in which we organize ourselves. We plug ourselves into culture and respond with a kind of knee-jerk reflex. We create language in order to cope and control, and too often, we do this unaware of the effects we are creating, and which must be causally justified after the fact. Language and symbols are the deepest of our cultural rivers, giving us roles to help us navigate its waters. Language, symbols, and culture tell us the terms of life's contract. Rhetorically we act out those terms--actors on the cultural stage, with the cultural script in hand, making our chalk marks on the theatre floor so we may take our places when the curtain goes up on our performance. The set and lighting design are provided by our symbols, the dialogue by our culture.

Yet, we need culture. We need it precisely because we all share the paradox of being individually different yet similar and because we are so rarely at one with ourselves and each other. Culture overcomes division and creates a cycle and sequence of joining and bonding. Culture, functioning rhetorically, can be thought of as shared meaning through symbols which result in this process of

identification, of group solidarity and cohesion. The process is generative, ongoing, cyclical, shaping and reshaping, structuring and restructuring reality, providing consensus on our interpretations of reality, forming a continual interlocking mechanism of social relationships, creating awareness as well as choices for the people who exist and attempt to co-exist within its complex forms of expression.

The paradox can be found in the freeing nature and enslaving nature of culture. The rules and government of culture foster cohesion. The rules and government of culture foster dissent. The rules and government of culture prevent us from seeing other ways. It is the function of rhetoric to show us the possibilities, so that when we are weary of the burden of the myths we have fostered, when they no longer work for us, when we have examined what we are doing and find it wanting, when we long for a new order, a new place, when we are willing to take the quantum leap and find the freedom to redefine ourselves, rhetoric will show us the choices.

As Gibran implies, to tear away language is to tear away culture, the mysterious container of being, the predictor of role. It is to tear away the flesh from our bones; to wrench ourselves into the bloodiness of rebirth and rediscovery. The task is before us now, in our global enterprises. For if we are rhetorically unable to change our frame of reference, our view of the world and become

more inclusive of others, if we are unable to identify on a more empathetic basis with others who share this lovely planet, we risk death, our bones bleaching in the sun of the cultural status quo. Or, as we tear ourselves away from the past, will those tatters of flesh become a banner, an ensign, a guidepost for a world that does not yet exist? We are, after all, only possibilities waiting to happen.

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1




The pentad model of symbolic interaction

Ten possible ratios are available for analytic purposes: act-scene, scene-agent, agent-agency, agency-purpose, purpose-act, scene-agency, agent-purpose, agency-act, purpose-scene, and act-agent.

Note: the model is not linear, showing the interactional flow as multi-directional and dependent on each variable of the pentad. The shaded area suggests one possible ratio.

APPENDIX 2



Rhetorical transformation of cultural symbols.

When the actor encodes symbols according to the cultural rules, they are rhetorically transformed for the purpose of understanding and alignment. Likewise, the audience (listener) must decode messages, which have been rhetorically transformed, and approve or disapprove, according to the cultural rules, the actor's performance.

Rhetorical transformation also converts symbols into socially agreed upon rules and behavioral norms, thus affecting the cultural meaning. This is significant as a process, not as activities of stasis.

APPENDIX 3

Rhetorical culture

Is Supraorganic:	Culture is an amalgam of cognitions carrying norms, values, beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors.
Is Dynamic:	Culture is non-static. Culture is always in motion. The motion of culture may be thought of as <u>process</u> .
Is Symbol-Based/Symbol-Bound:	Symbols are language. Symbols are nonverbals. Human beings use symbols to communicate experience, express ideas, or influence thought. Symbolic meanings must be shared.
Involves Human Interaction:	Symbols are the instrumentation of interaction. People exchange symbols to accomplish social and individual goals.
Is Goal Oriented:	The structure of culture secures group unity.
Is Rhetorical:	The function of rhetoric is the management of symbols for the purpose of coordinating human activities and securing behavior. Rhetorical culture produces indentification through symbol manipulation.

Rhetorical culture is: dynamic human interactions which are symbol-based and symbol bound and coordinated through the agency of meaningful rhetorical acts for the purpose of social organization and identification.

Any study of culture must be concerned with: (1) the ways people experience symbols, (2) the processes that define how people engage one another with symbols, (3) the cultural and rhetorical relationships necessary to sustain shared meanings and interpretations.