Most philosophical discussions of moral consideration for animals focus on animals as a single category, neglecting to differentiate them by type or role (such as wild, domestic, laboratory, or companion). Moreover, the importance of the individual animal in terms of relationship to humans is de-emphasised.

Animals should not be discussed as a monolithic group. In this thesis the dog is utilized as the paradigmatic animal to demonstrate that philosophical discourse on the ethics of consideration for animals must reflect the diversity present within the group labeled "animals". The major philosophical theories advocating moral consideration of animals are summarized, noting that all animals are discussed as one category.

Anthropological evidence is provided to demonstrate the historical nature of the human-dog bond. The ethics of care provides the foundation for the claim that dogs have relational value and thus persons have the moral obligation to care for them.
The Canine Connection: an anthropologically grounded philosophical perspective on caring for dogs

By
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Siobhan M. Baggot, Author
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I would like to thank those people who guided and assisted me in the writing of this thesis. To Dr Courtney Campbell I wish to express my sincere gratitude for the generous academic and emotional support he provided during the three years it has taken me to see the fruition of this endeavour. His scholarly guidance and discussion enabled me to broaden my philosophical horizon and consider new perspectives on the ways in which I interact with animals. His dedication to the practical application of ethics has inspired me to find ways in which I could utilize the knowledge I acquired in the course of my studies and inspired me to find ways in which I could combine philosophy with veterinary medicine. Dr Campbell's belief in my project gave me courage when times were rough and circumstances in my personal life were less than ideal.

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My parents, Desmond and Colette, provided patient support and encouragement to me during the writing of this thesis. My sister, Jennifer, helped me wade through the oftentimes muddy philosophical waters I found myself stumbling into at various times throughout this project. She also gave me buoyant and enthusiastic emotional support whenever I needed it. I would also like to thank my friend, Britt Conroy, who spent much time reading, writing and listening to me during the past year. I wish to thank Greg Black, who is not only the person whom I can call on at any hour to discuss philosophy, anthropology, and veterinary medicine, he is also my steadfast friend, and as such he has helped me immeasurably throughout this entire process. Lastly thanks to Deborah Orandon, without her embodied wisdom, empathy, and massage I might not have survived these past seven years! To all of these people, thank you for believing in me.
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my mother, Colette Baggot.

I began this project with the goal of showing my mom just what it is that motivates me, and what I am capable of doing. Unfortunately she died 6 months before my defense and did not get a chance to read this thesis.

Her life and beliefs have always inspired mine and have given to me the wisdom, energy, and optimism to pursue my dreams. Her spirit continues to give me hope and courage.

This thesis is also dedicated Barley, my constant companion for 13 years. She provides living evidence of the rich relationship possible between a person and a dog. Barley proves that dogs can care for us.

"To pet a dog is not such a bad way to practice theology [or philosophy]. It is to acknowledge wonder as the impulse that drives us out of ourselves, and it is to witness reverence -as well as a plea for love and understanding- in the eyes of another," (Webb, 1998, 121).
THE CANINE CONNECTION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICALLY GROUNDED
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CARING FOR DOGS

Siobhan M Baggot
INTRODUCTION

Dogs have been a very important part of my world for my entire life. I have had many and various relationships with all manner of them and find them so integral to my existence as to feel them inseparable from my sense of being. As a veterinarian my working hours are filled with dogs and when I return home my own dog greets me. I love dogs and care for them and feel I must somehow speak for them. I want others to know dogs, to recognize their importance, and to understand the human-dog bond. In this thesis I hope to show why we should care for dogs.

In order to provide perspective on the development of my passion for dogs I have briefly outlined the most relevant canine relationships through my life. Cindy, a longhaired dachshund was with my parents, living in Dublin with them, before I was born. She was part of the Baggot family before I was. Fairy, a feisty, smooth haired fox terrier was my first dog, in Columbus, Ohio. In primary school my first paying job was as a neighbourhood dog walker, and in this way I became acquainted with a great many dogs of all sizes from the parish priest’s cocker spaniel to our neighbor’s two Great Danes who used to tow me along the street! In Australia I didn’t have a dog, but instead my parents bought me a horse to fill the hollow I temporarily felt for lack of an animal companion. When we moved to California we brought Riah, a gorgeous Saluki with a penchant for long distance running, into our home. She and I spent countless hours of my adolescence together, at dog obedience lessons, playing Frisbee, swimming in Stonegate Lake, and skateboarding down the road. My dad included Riah, along with my mom, sister and me, in the dedication of his second book. We brought her to Ireland with us when we returned there and during the six months of her mandatory quarantine the whole family made weekly Sunday excursions to visit her in the boarding kennel over an hour’s drive away. A few years later I opened a dog grooming business in County Kildare and became, yet again, professionally involved with dogs.

Back in the States four years later I adopted Barley from the Woodland Humane Society, near Davis in California. She and I currently share the closest and most fulfilling human-canine relationship I can imagine. We have lived together for 13 years, through the toughest and most adventure-filled years of my life. We camped out in the desert
together, out of tents and from my truck, through several years of archaeological fieldwork. She tolerated my absences during the long days of vet school, and now enjoys the luxury of a settled, rather comfortable, retirement, spending her hours either napping at home or walking with me in the woods. The relationship I experience with her constantly amazes me in its richness, depth and continual evolution. She has taught me just how mutually involved a person and a dog can be, how intertwined two species’ lives can become. Without Barley it is unlikely that this thesis would have been written.

My love for dogs has shaped the form of my life in substantial ways. I became a veterinarian in order to help dogs and other animals. During my veterinary education I was faced with an ethical crisis of such magnitude that it become the guiding force of the subsequent four years. As a third year vet student in Pullman I learned that several dogs would be used in teaching exercises and then euthanised in order to provide me with “patients” on which to practice anesthesia and surgery skills. I found this situation sufficiently emotionally and ethically disturbing that my partner and I sought to take an “alternative track”, one that did not involve killing any dogs.

The decision to look for alternatives lead, in my senior year, to an opportunity to become involved with an educational committee, the Animal Care and Use in Education (ACUIE) Group. This diverse group of people included professors and students from the Department of philosophy and the College of Veterinary Medicine, as well as representatives of the university administration and the Vegetarian Resource Network. All of us had in common the goal to provide a forum for community discussions and education about animals, and the rights and obligations that define our relationship with them.

It was as a member of this group that I began to grasp how I might further my goal of speaking out more clearly for dogs. Courtney Campbell, of the philosophy department, was also involved with the ACUIE group and he and I discussed animal rights philosophies and my desire to educate people and help animals. He helped me to focus this resolution by suggesting that I combine a MAIS degree in Applied Ethics with my background in anthropology and the DVM degree. The path he described and I followed has lead me here, to considering and writing about our obligation to care for dogs as my thesis for the MAIS degree.
In most philosophical discourse on the moral consideration of animals, all animals are grouped together in a single category. All animals should not be considered interchangeable in terms of morality. I propose that animals have different relevance and roles and should be addressed in such a manner as to reflect this diversity. Dogs are used as the paradigmatic example of a category of animal with a value distinct from other animals. Dogs are our companions. I propose that humans have the moral obligation to care for dogs based on the mutual history and nature of our relationship with them.

Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two provides brief summaries of the main philosophies that advocate moral consideration of animals. The chapter is organized with a focus on how each philosophy regards animals, whether they are seen as having individual worth or value commensurate with the value of community and includes a discussion of the categories of moral value that animals may possess. Chapter three consists of the anthropological evidence for the longstanding bond between dogs and humans. This chapter covers both the archaeological and the cultural aspects relating to the domestication and enculturation of dogs into human society. Chapter four examines the ethics of care introduced in the first chapter, as this philosophy provides the foundation for my proposal that dogs have relational value. I provide further description and critique of Nel Noddings' ethic and conclude by developing an ethic of care suitable for use in guidance of human interactions with dogs. The epilogue presents my hopes for using this thesis to further my goal of advocating for dogs in our society.

I recognize there are several limitations to my ethic of care, expanded to include dogs, and I see these as areas on which to concentrate my next efforts. There is much room for improvement of my thesis. The first limitation addresses the boundaries of moral consideration of animals. I propose expanding the ethic of care to include dogs, as they dwell I argue, in our inner circle of care. While expansion of the moral community to include dogs is a step in the right direction, it is not enough. The argument of relationality addresses how humans should treat companion animals, but does nothing to enhance the lives of those animals for whom nobody cares. Adopting a biocentric orientation and incorporating that spirit into the ethic of care may assist in overcoming this limitation.
The second limitation is that I chose to focus on the anthropological evidence for the bond between humans and dogs. I did not include dog behavioural studies or data from human psychology or sociology because these are areas beyond the reach of this thesis. The selection of anthropological evidence was deliberate, as I wanted to highlight the longstanding historical nature of the bond. Limiting myself to inclusion of what is present on the following pages was even difficult as I have accumulated many more studies, but time and the limitations inherent in a Masters degree required me to select only a sample of my data. I look forward to revising this thesis and including ethological and psychological evidence on the nature and implications of the human-dog bond.

Thirdly I chose to focus on Nel Noddings’ theory of the ethic of care, despite the fact that I also referenced Karen J. Warren’s version of caring ethics. Noddings’ theory provides the necessary foundational ideas from which all other theories of care may be based.
CHAPTER TWO
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR MORAL CONSIDERATION OF ANIMALS

The question of moral consideration of animals has long been discussed among philosophers, from Aristotle to Immanuel Kant to Jeremy Bentham, Tom Regan, and Peter Singer. However the notion of moral consideration regarding animal rights was not formally debated until the 1970s when the animal rights movement emerged in the wake of the women's liberation movement and the campaign for equal racial rights. For the most part all animals are discussed as a single category, without consideration of their differing natures, roles, individuality, or value. In this chapter I first describe the four types of value attributed to animals. Then I outline the arguments of the major proponents for the ethical treatment of animals, beginning with utilitarianism, moving through environmental ethics, theological biocentrism, the feminist ethic of care, and concluding with two rights theories. I have ordered the philosophies in terms of degree of consideration of the value of the individual animal, as this is an important component in my assertion that dogs have relational value, an attribute that entails being valued both as an individual and as part of a larger community. I describe each philosophy and highlight the key points with emphasis as to how each contributes to my thesis.

Value

Those partaking in the animal rights debate generally discuss three types of value. These are instrumental, intrinsic and inherent value. Instrumental value is defined most basically as "the value an entity possesses in virtue of the value of the consequences it produces; an entity's value as means" (Dictionary of Philosophy, 1956). Extrinsic value is a synonymous term for instrumental value and is in opposition to intrinsic value. Traditionally and without much argument most people will ascribe instrumental value to domesticated animals. Domestic animals are valued for their usefulness to us. They pull ploughs and sleds, produce fiber and horns, leather and food. Some spend their lives in cages as the subjects of research or education. In many cases these animals sacrifice their lives for us. Implicit in the definition of instrumental value is the perception of valuelessness apart from utility, disposability once the use has been
fulfilled. The perception of domestic animals as possessing only instrumental value leads to actions of abuse and cruelty. The living conditions that "beef" cattle on "factory farms" endure, the lack of recognition of individuality suffered by dogs utilized for scientific experiments, the cramped cages and artificial daylight suffered by "battery" laying hens, and dairy cattle referred to as "production units" by their keepers, are but a very few examples of the treatment given to domestic animals relegated to having only instrumental value. When someone or something is valued only for what it can do for another it is treated as an object rather than a subject. An animal objectified has no more intrinsic value than a pencil. Like a pencil worn down to the nub, the animal is seen to be disposable once its usefulness is dispensed.

Intrinsic value is defined as the kind of value something has apart from its usefulness to others, "the value an entity would have if it were to have no consequences" (1956). It is the opposite of instrumental value. Something can however have both instrumental and intrinsic value.

Jay McDaniel, in Of God and Pelicans, makes four further points about intrinsic value. 1) It is objective, by which he means that it is a value present in subjects-of-a-life regardless; it is real. He points out that intrinsic value is "not assigned or ascribed, it is recognized or discovered" (McDaniel, 1989, 65). 2) Intrinsic value is relational, meaning it depends on the individual living within an environment and having interactions with other beings. Existence is influenced by everything experienced. A subject without any circumstances does not exist. 3) Possession of intrinsic value does not preclude an individual having instrumental value as well. He gives the example of a deer, capably negotiating his life in the woods. He is valuable to himself. He will also be valuable instrumentally, when he dies and his body decomposes, providing nutrients to the earthworms and soil of the forest. 4) Intrinsic value can be gradated, whereas inherent value is an all or none quality (1989, 52).

The terms intrinsic value and inherent value are often used synonymously when discussing rights, as the outcome specified by possession of such value is the same, treatment with respect and care. To have either intrinsic or inherent value means to be treated as an end and not a means to an end. For many animal rights advocates, intrinsic value is said to be derived from an individual's possession of interests and experiences.
Animal rights philosopher Bernard Rollin provides evidence from five sources that animals have interests. Studies of neurophysiology show that animals have nervous systems that interpret and manipulate external stimuli. There is evidence from ethology of animal consciousness. Biochemistry studies prove that animals perceive pain and have awareness. Comparative anatomy studies demonstrate the presence of sensory systems very similar to ours which also suggests the presence of consciousness. The similarities, in all of the above categories, between human and non-human animals coupled with evolutionary theory points to the fact that as humans enjoy consciousness, so do animals (Rollin, 1981). If animals have interests and experiences then they have intrinsic value.

The last type of value is inherent value, which Tom Regan defines as the type of value commensurate with being a subject-of-a-life (Regan, 1983, 244). It will be defined in greater detail later in this chapter.

To the three aforementioned types of value I would add a fourth, that of relational value. This is not generally an attribute discussed in terms of animals, but it has been used to describe a quality present in those people we interact with and care about. Relational value can be found in those ethical systems with emphasis on community and interconnection, such as the ethic of care, biocentrism and process philosophy. It is this type of value, I will argue, that dogs, among other beings, possess.

**Utilitarianism**

Utilitarianism is the first philosophy I will describe, as it is the theory in which the value of the individual for him or herself is secondary to the value of the individual to the community. It is the principle for ethical guidance originated by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).

Utilitarian ethics seeks to achieve "The greatest good for the greatest number". This phrase is an oversimplification of a weighty principle but it does capture the essence of the proposal, as it is pithy and uncomplicated. Bentham defined the "good" in the principle of utility as actions that promote pleasure and minimize pain. The value of each pleasure or pain must be taken into consideration when determining which course of action to pursue. Bentham proposed seven criteria to assist in assessment of pleasure or pain. These include the intensity, duration, certainty of their occurrence, propinquity
(nearness), fecundity (the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind), the purity of the pleasure or pain, and the number of persons it involves as well as the radius of its extent. The factors must be summed up with the balance determining whether the outcome of the contemplated action will be good or bad.

The second utilitarian consideration is that of numbers of individuals benefiting from the action. Therefore a good action follows a sum in favour on the side of pleasure, with benefit for the greatest number, while a bad action will inflict disproportionate pain or will not benefit the majority. This is a community-based philosophy with the individual's needs subordinated to those of the majority; by default the welfare of some individuals will be compromised for the communal good.

Jeremy Bentham rejected the philosophical view that the individuals taken into consideration for the overall good must be human persons. He argued that animals too should be taken into consideration. He believed that causing an animal to suffer is an act as wrongful as the treatment of slaves. An individual's sentience, or capacity to suffer, is the criterion for moral consideration.

"The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"
(Bentham, 1789 in Pojman, 2000, 232).

In 1975 Australian philosopher Peter Singer published the groundbreaking book Animal Liberation in which he developed a theory of utilitarianism as it applies to animals. Singer rooted his argument in Bentham's philosophy, capitalising on the expansiveness of personhood status inherent in the original theory and he proposed that animals be included in the moral equation. Animals' suffering should count equally with human suffering when tallying up the factors determining the best action to take. Each individual (human or nonhuman animal) that can suffer should count as one. To do otherwise is to practice "speciesism", which Singer defines as "a prejudice or attitude of
bias toward the interests of members of one's own species and against those members of other species" (Singer, 1975, 7). Singer proposed that sentience become the criterion by which animals are deemed members of the moral community.

There are several problematic issues inherent in utilitarianism, and these have been well debated among philosophers. Feminists such as Carol Gilligan and Jean Grimshaw have argued very strongly against it and they delineate three main problems. The most basic is that utilitarianism tends to devalue the individual in favour of the whole. The second criticism is that it proposes to offer a universal principle upon which all actions can be based. Thirdly, it is grounded solely in rationality as the basis for choosing the best action to take and this leaves no place for emotional factors in choices, messy situations, or relationships (Wennberg, 2003).

Utilitarianism does tend to neglect those choices based on emotions or beliefs. We are not purely rational beings able to find satisfaction in the greatest good for the greatest number. Each one of us is an individual and each claims existence and satisfaction of our desires. Intuition, beliefs and diversity are part of our constitution and contribute to the richness of society. Moreover a rigid system such as utilitarianism cannot be flexible enough to encompass all possible situations and the nuances implicit in relationships. The egalitarianism of utilitarianism leaves no room for actions based on love, beauty, or freedom.

Although utilitarianism has been useful in expanding moral protection to animals by giving animals equal value to humans in terms of the balancing of goods, it does not, some argue, go far enough in protecting them against the incursions of human desires. Utilitarianism has been utilized to argue in favour of using animals for research whereby the benefits to humanity are said to outweigh the cost of animals' lives. As the best action is that which benefits the greatest number, those in the group not benefiting will suffer the consequences. It appears that the practice of utilitarianism does not value beings (of any species) as valuable unto themselves; all value appears to be instrumental, as that which is useful to the community good.

The Land Ethic
Conservationist and author of *A Sand County Almanac* (1949), Aldo Leopold is considered the father of environmental ethics. He developed a system of morality called the Land Ethic that is similar to utilitarianism in its community orientation. It differs however in that it does not present the greatest good as that which benefits the greatest number, but rather portrays the greatest good as that which benefits the ecological community. “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it does otherwise” (Leopold, 1949).

The fundamental and novel feature of Leopold’s land ethic is that he extends moral considerability from people to nonhuman natural entities. He entreats us to learn what we can from ecology to guide us in our morality and to focus us on relationships between and among living organisms. Ecologists teach a holistic view of the world and the land ethic draws from this paradigm to enable us to see our environment as a unified system of integrally related parts.

Previous to the development of this ecological paradigm, many scientists presented a worldview of atomistic and separate parts, so it made sense to understand moral issues in terms of competing and clashing rights between individuals. Ecology shows us that the ecological community is integrated and Leopold encourages us to extend that knowledge to morality, realising that the human community too works best when all parts are integrated. First, we are encouraged to recognize that we have responsibilities and duties toward each other in the human community. Next Leopold reminds us that the unity of the biotic environment also requires us to consider our duties to animals and the environment. If ethics in general imposes limitations on our individual freedoms of action towards others, then "An environmental ethic would impose limitations on human freedom of action in relationship to nonhuman entities and to nature as a whole," (Callicott, 1994,1).

As described by Leopold, morality is based on the beauty, integrity, and stability of the community. Individuals are valued in terms of what they contribute to the whole. Moral standing is extended not only to animals but also to inanimate objects such as trees, swamps, and mountains, with the criterion for value that of contribution of function as part of the ecosystem.
With its emphasis on contribution to the smooth functioning of the ecological community and the subsequent diminished concern for the individual, the land ethic is similar to utilitarianism and in like fashion it falters. The land ethic provides a holistic rather than an individualistic perspective on morality. Emphasis on the good as that which benefits the community means that the status of the individual is devalued and value becomes secondary to usefulness. Value appears to be instrumental and worth is considered in terms of how much an individual contributes to the ecological community.

Secondarily, within the land ethic a hierarchy of value is constructed. Not all animals are viewed as having equal worth. For example, wild animals are valued over tamed animals. Predators, who are fewer in number than preyed-upon species, are more highly valued individually than are prey species. Where this value structure becomes problematic for the individual is if the hierarchy is extended such that some animals are seen as having no value at all. This unfortunately does happen; wild animals are valued while domesticated animals are seen as pests or blights upon the land (Callicott, 1980). Many environmental ethicists shun domestication as something that has robbed animals of their natural wildness, beauty, and independence. Domestic animals are viewed as disrupters of natural ecosystems (as are most humans) and therefore are valueless within the land ethic. In this regard it must be stated that there are in existence no completely wild ecosystems, untouched by the hand of humans, so defining value based on wild versus domestic animals may be arbitrary. Since humankind’s harnessing of fire we have changed the land upon which we walk. Since we first tolerated wolves slinking near to that fire, we have changed the animals we met. This view of the world proposed by many environmental ethicists appears to be an ideal of wildness unfettered by reality. We must consider humans and animals in the environment as it is now and ethics should reflect this reality.

The importance of an ecocentric ethic is in its promotion of a worldview of environmental interdependence and connection. Morality can then be viewed in terms of relationship, a theme that will be revisited throughout this chapter.

Theological Biocentrism
Jay McDaniel and Sallie McFague, among others, propose a Christian based biocentric ethic. This is a life-centered position, not to be confused with ecocentrism, which is an environmentally grounded philosophy. Biocentrism emphasizes the value of animate beings (human and nonhuman animals and plants) while ecocentrism encompasses inanimate entities as well (plants, rocks, air, and environments for example). Biocentrists advocate a life-centered position in the world as an antidote to the human-centered position of anthropocentrism, which is the more usual stance among persons in our society. McDaniel states, "To be life-centered is to live out of a sense of kinship with all life, not human life alone. It is to empathize with other living beings too" (McDaniel, 1989,15). Adopting a biocentric perspective on our relationship with the world and the creatures that dwell on it requires a profound shifting in attitude and actions, but the results would prove revolutionary. Albert Schweitzer, father of the "reverence for life" perspective writes, "Until he extends the circle of compassion to all living things, man will not himself find peace" (Schweitzer in Webb, 1998,130). McDaniel speculates that nurturing a biocentric attitude may be the way to finding that peace.

McDaniel suggests three moral virtues to assist in developing a more biocentric lifestyle. These are, first, the adoption of an "inward disposition that is respectful of and caring for other animals, plants, and the earth and that refuses to draw a sharp dichotomy between human life and other forms of life" (McDaniel, 1989, 73). He terms this virtue "reverence for life". The second virtue is non-harm, ahimsa, towards others. The third virtue is active good will. It is not enough to do no harm; one should actually do good. He points out that the World Council of Churches in 1983 highlighted three further values necessary for modern Christians to incorporate into their lives. These are attention to peace, justice, and the integrity of creation. McFague fills out the meaning of the last phrase by explaining that "The value of all creatures in and for themselves, for one another, and for God, together constitute the integrity of creation" (McFague, 1993,165).

Recognition of the intrinsic value of all life is the foundation of a biocentric perspective. McDaniel espouses a Christian based biocentrism, in that he believes that God is the original source of value. God created life, he states, but once created this life has value in itself, as something independently valuable. In Genesis 1:21 God, after
creating animals on the fifth day, sees they are good. McDaniel calls this the "initial recognition of intrinsic value" (McDaniel, 1989, 68).

McDaniel proposes that not all life forms have equal intrinsic value. He criticizes the view held by other biocentric advocates that all life contains intrinsic value in equal proportions. Nor does he agree with biocentric Christians who believe that all life, because it comes from God and is an expression of God, is equal in intrinsic value, a view he terms "egalitarian monism". The example is provided of our own estimation of human value as higher than bacterial value when we do the simple act of washing our faces, thereby wiping out millions of bacterial lives. In practicality we are proving we believe ourselves to have higher intrinsic value than bacteria (1989, 75).

McDaniel utilizes ideas from process philosophy to advance his biocentric theology. Process philosophy or theology is a radical new perspective on the nature of reality, combining concepts from quantum physics, evolutionary theory, and ecology with religion. The foundational idea of this philosophy is that organisms are never completely independent of other organisms or their environment. "An organism of any sort is a highly integrated and dynamic pattern of interdependent events. Its parts are modified by the unified activity of the whole. Every event occurs in a context that affects it," (Barbour, 2000, 116). Process philosophy can be instrumental in assisting us with the task of grading intrinsic value. McDaniel states that it does this by helping to define the reality, nature, and range of subjectivity. Process theology teaches that the subject does not have experiences, but rather is composed of experiences. Life consists of momentary pulses of subjective experiences and these can be had by both living cells and those things made up of, at the submicroscopic level, pulsations of energy. "The entire cosmos is alive with subjectivity, with aims and interests, and hence with intrinsic value" (McDaniel, 1989, 76).

Process theology divides all forms of life into two categories, monarchically organized organisms and democratically organized organisms. A dog is a monarchically organized organism whereas the ringworm fungus, *Trichophyton*, growing on the dog is a democratically organized organism. A monarchy is composed of both a body and a psyche. The psyche is the stream of experiences lived by the organism, the unifying principle of a being, what some call the spirit, self, or soul. This type of organism is a
subject-of-a-life. Not all monarchical organisms contain the same amount of soul. Depth of soul depends on how well the organism learns from experiences and develops an identity over time (interestingly, a concept similar to philosopher Tom Regan's criteria for possession of inherent value) and how richly this entity experiences events. A democratically organized organism does not have a "presiding psyche" (1989, 78). It is a collection of energy events without a unifying core of being.

McDaniel uses process theology to assist in ranking degree of intrinsic value in individuals. Both monarchical and democratically organized organisms contain some amount of intrinsic value, as creatures made by God, but not all possess it equally. Intrinsic value is composed of experiential richness and self-concern. Richness is made up of events of harmony and intensity. Harmony is defined as "a general feeling of attunement, balance, accord and affinity" (1989, 80). It may be found in relation to ourselves, other beings, with ideas, or in God. McDaniel proposes compassion as the highest form of harmony. Intensity is defined as "energetic vitality in relation to other beings" (1989, 81). Organisms that have the capacity for greater degrees of harmony and intensity have greater intrinsic value. We can rank degree of intrinsic value when aided by two assumptions: monarchies can enjoy greater experiential richness than democracies and increasingly complex nervous systems lead to increased intensity of experiences. Thus the dog has greater intrinsic value than the fungus on the dog. These assumptions however must be tempered by the reminder that all creatures have some degree of intrinsic value and the reminder that every creature regards its own life and interests as central. The fungus on the dog, if it can view itself, believes it is more valuable than the dog and it is interested in promoting its own survival.

Whether or not process philosophy settles the debate as to the origin and degree of intrinsic value, this theory provides, in common with environmental ethics and care ethics, further recognition of the importance of the interconnections between all organisms. It emphasizes that relationships are crucial and are indeed a critical aspect of all living beings.

Sally McFague works within the Christian biocentric perspective as well. Her views are similar to McDaniel in that she advocates a lessening of anthropocentrism with a
consequential deepening relationship and reconciliation with the natural world. In The Body of God (1993) she proposes that God can be appreciated in animals and nature, which are God's embodied reflections. Moreover, because of this every creature and every body has intrinsic value. McFague writes that Jesus must be welcomed back into the picture, as his teachings can lead us to this deeper relationship with all of creation. The life and stories of Jesus show us that God's love is all encompassing. Jesus lived and advocated for the poor, the oppressed, and the outcasts. His parables highlight the radical philosophy of compassion and caring. The teachings of Jesus suggest liberation from the dualities seen in our society, those of male/female, rich/poor, humanity/nature, to name just a few.

McFague suggests that there is a new poor, and that is nature. Nature (including all animals) has been chained to work for us; we see nature in terms of instrumental value, rather than intrinsic value. McFague contends that humanity must take responsibility for the oppression and destruction of the natural world. She states that selfishness is the greatest sin, and salvation comes from remembrance of our proper place in the world. Part of our duty then lies in healing what we have damaged. We need to stop destroying the earth and take responsibility for its well-being. McFague writes, "the land and its creatures have rights and are intrinsically valuable" (1993, 187). She exhorts us to recognize this and welcome all beings, including animals, to our table.

The theology described by McFague, with its emphases on the ecological community, on Jesus as exemplar of compassion, and on the quest for healing, offers much wisdom for our modern world. Although her focus is on the banishment of hierarchical dualities she does touch on how that would affect human relationships with animals. She suggests that we should represent the interests of "the truly voiceless ones on the planet, namely, small children, all species of plants, and all animals except human beings," (1993, 12). Her persuasive argument resonates with my feelings about God as not only transcendent, but also very much alive and truly present in all creatures. McFague weaves a feminist perspective into an ecological theology and presents a very palatable philosophy along with a call to action. She challenges us to change our perspective and then act on that new found knowledge. She does not address the animal issue per se, but includes animals
among the voiceless ones, those in need of advocates, and in that way encourages us to change the way we both view and treat them.

**Feminist Ethics**

Proponents of feminist ethics begin with a critique of patriarchy, with its emphasis on rationality, duality, and hierarchy, as being the cause of many problems in society, from sexism, to environmental destruction, to war, to animal abuse. Feminists have strongly identified with the Other, those not in power (non-white and non-male, non-human) and from this identification have formed a philosophy radically different from traditional Western ethics. In 1982 Carol Gilligan responded to Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral development. Kohlberg concluded that men are more advanced morally than women, therefore women suffer from arrested moral development. Gilligan proposed instead that men and women develop different moral perspectives; they speak with "different voices". There is a female moral voice and a male moral voice, and these voices are not necessarily restricted to the sex they are named for. That is, a male can morally speak in the female voice. Those speakers with a male voice tend to develop a "justice perspective" based on abstract principles and individual rights, while those with a female voice develop a "care perspective" with the emphasis on relationships comprised of compassion, care, and cooperation (Tong, 1998).

Feminist theorists emphasize relationships as primary and stress that there should be less focus on universalizable moral principles to guide our behavior and more focus on context and emotion than is usually allowed for in Western philosophy. Concrete situations and real life experiences matter and should be considered when we are making decisions as to how we should act (Wennberg, 2003).

Although there is a diversity of feminist moral philosophies, Jean Grimshaw (Grimshaw, 1986 in Tong 1998) suggests these three features provide a common core:

1. A critique of abstraction, which is flawed by its tendency to look for universalizable rules. Instead, feminist ethics give priority to an "ethic of particularity" that focuses on individuals with their specific needs.
2. The contextualization of ethical thought: concrete situations and real life experiences count and should be considered when making moral decisions. This is accomplished with close, attentive scrutiny, and then analysis, of each situation faced.

3. An emphasis on caring and compassion in moral relationships.

**The Ethic of Care**

Feminist philosopher Nel Noddings pioneered the field of Care-Ethics, with the book *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (first published in 1984) in which she argues that morality arises out of the desire "to be and remain related," (Noddings, 2003, 83). Relationships are formed because the person we care about makes a difference to our life. We will treat that person with care because we want to be connected. The longing for ongoing connections influences our behaviour toward that person; thus we will tend to act morally. "The desire to be good is a natural derivative of the desire to be related" (2003, 151).

Natural caring is sparked by memories of being cared for. Noddings suggests that humans naturally care for certain beings; she provides the example of a mother who naturally cares for her child. As Noddings reasons, natural caring alone does not provide solid ground for a basis of morality. Natural caring, she argues, is not enough. Ethical caring is needed to transfer feelings into right actions. Moreover, Noddings states, our inclination to behave morally is born of natural caring and in this caring we seek reciprocity. This reciprocity is not the same type as described by contractarians, whereby reciprocity is characterized by mutuality, but it is rather characterized by what she terms completion.

Noddings refutes the utilitarian view that animals are interchangeable, and that together they make a class. She acknowledges that each individual animal is different and the situations leading to encounters with different animals influence whether or not we develop a caring relationship with that particular animal. She does not, however, believe humans can develop ethical relationships with animals by transitioning from the state of natural caring to ethical caring, as we do in human relationships. Noddings argues that ethical relationships require reciprocity with completion, which she believes is beyond the scope of an animal's range of responses, "We can see clearly that animals are not
capable of entering a mutually or doubly caring relation with human beings..." (2003,159). She does not argue for the extension of natural caring towards one animal outward to include all animals.

While I endorse many of Noddings' notions about care and an ethic based in relationships her theory seems inadequate in many respects. While I agree that obligations arise out of a desire to conform to an ideal moral version of self and that attainment of that goal leads a person from natural to ethical caring, I disagree with the limitation on caring that Noddings prescribes. I propose a more generous caring response whereby the inclination to care is nurtured and the caring attitude expanded, so that the caring response is practiced within many types of relationships without losing its force.

Noddings focuses her ethics of care on relationships with inherent power differences. When she discusses relationships she is referring to those in which one party is a caregiver and the other is the care receiver, or one is the teacher and the other is the student. These relationships are important to discuss in terms of morality but in focusing on them she loses sight of those relationships based in equality rather than imbalance.

Likewise, although I heartily agree with Noddings that every animal is an individual and that the circumstances of encounter influence our actions toward each one, I disagree that we cannot be in moral relationships with them. I think many persons are already involved in ethically sound relationships with animals. Noddings' definition and requirement of reciprocity characterized by completion as required for ethical relationships seems artificial and puts constraints on what many of us feel to be wonderfully rewarding and ethically sound relationships, those we have with our pets and those we feel, by extension, with other animals.

The ethic of caring, as described by Nel Noddings, does provide a new perspective on the basis of morality. Rather than placing the onus of our behaviour on the principles of utility or justice she grounds morality in relations and the character of caring. The value of this paradigm shift is that it provides a new way of thinking about and interacting with others.

Ecofeminist Karen J. Warren proposes her own version of the ethics of caring. She suggests that moral relationships be based on an ethic founded on care, but her building blocks are slightly different than those in Noddings. I find value in Warren's alternative
view of a caring relationship and the implications arising from it. Where Noddings began with “caring for” Warren starts with “caring about”. What differentiates the second from the first is that “Caring about another is the expression of a cognitive capacity, an attitude toward the cared-about as deserving respectful treatment, whether or not one has any particular positive feelings for the cared-about” (Warren, 2000, 110). She is describing the caring attitude of a moral person, a vision akin to Noddings' ideal version of self.

Warren proposes that the caring person does not need reciprocity from the cared-about in order to be in a relationship. In fact, the cared about does not even have to be alive. Warren describes an experience in which she learned to care about the mountain she was climbing and in this way, developed a relationship with it. She tells of listening to the voices of the birds, the water trickling on the rock. She feels the rock under her hands, the lichen, and the crannies. She begins to speak to the rock, as if it were her friend. She feels gratitude to the rock for giving her the opportunity to know herself in this new way, and describes a sense of being in a relationship with the natural environment. “It felt as if the rock and I were silent conversational partners in a longstanding friendship” (2000, 103). She came to care about the rock. A reciprocal relation, so important to Noddings’ ethic of care, is not so easily defined in this case, and according to Warren is not necessary.

Warren outlines three aspects of care: 1. Caring about may or may not involve caring for the other 2. Reciprocity is not a condition for caring about 3. Care and caring are processes, not events (Warren, 2000, 141). The process of caring can be divided into phases, and I will relate these (as Warren does) in terms of our relations with animals. The first is “caring about” something or someone. This is also described as “loving perception”. The moral person can learn about animals, becoming considerate of their needs and welfare. The second phase is “taking care of” another, and this step involves recognition of our responsibilities towards the other being. Warren writes that these responsibilities are not necessarily duties nor do they stem from rights, but nonetheless they are important to consider. This step correlates fairly well to Noddings’ suggestion to look towards the ethical ideal and move into ethical caring. “Care giving” is the third phase and it necessitates putting into practice the caring process by doing what we can to enhance the well being of animals. This correlates to "caring for" others. The last phase is
“care receiving” which means the animal should receive the care it needs on its own terms, that is care stemming from an understanding of the animal as a being enmeshed in complex relationships (2000, 142). The last phase includes the stipulation that the animal be capable of responding to human care practices. This step is close to Noddings' definition of the cared-for, but differs in the lack of requirement for completion in the cared-for's response.

Unlike Noddings', Warren's version of relationship is not defined by a power difference, that of one party caring for the other. Rather it seems to suggest that there can be relationships based on altruism or interest, with an acceptance of differences in reciprocity far greater than is seen in Noddings' ethic of care. Warren's alternative definition of relationship holds promise for expanding the ethics of care beyond the human realm.

In the passage below Warren sums up what I believe is the most important idea encompassed by her version of the ethic of care. In these few sentences she emphasizes what differentiates care ethics from all the other philosophies advocating moral consideration of animals, the recognition that caring for animals matters morally. Warren writes of this embodied understanding, and the epiphany experienced as she swam in the ocean with dolphins.

_I also came to see things differently during that swim. At one point I turned to a calf swimming by my side and began voicing what was for me a profound realization. Looking directly in each other's eyes, I said to the calf, "Even if you are sentient, capable of language and communication, rational, a rights-holder, deserving of respect and protection—even if all this is true, which I believe it is—that's not what is morally basic. What is morally basic is that we care about you_ (2000, 121).

**Animal Rights**

The last section in this chapter focuses on the most individualistic philosophical system, rights theory. Tom Regan's philosophy of animal rights based on inherent value is outlined and contrasted with Andrew Linzey's theologically based animal rights philosophy.
Invocation of rights language presupposes an adversarial relationship between those with more power and those with less or none. It has been successfully used to argue for attainment of equal legal rights for African Americans, women, and homosexuals in our society and is now being used to argue for the respectful treatment of all animals. The theory of rights addresses a major problem inherent in utilitarianism, that of the happiness of the many overriding the legitimate interests of the few. Individuals do matter in rights theory. Unfortunately, animals have enforceable rights only if they are granted these rights by humans. As philosopher Stephen Webb states "Animals do not have a sense of their own moral claims on each other or on us. Even if the rights of animals are inscribed by law and enforced by the state, animals will still be dependent on us to voluntarily limit and alter our power over them and to go out of our way to protect and nurture them" (Webb, 1998, 42).

Tom Regan uses the term inherent value to make his case for animal rights. In The Case for Animal Rights (1983) Regan proposes that animals should be included within the moral community as possessors of moral rights. He argues that not only humans but also nonhuman animals possess inherent value, which entitles the bearer the right to be treated with respect, and not merely as means to an end. He argues that the ways in which we use animals, e.g. for food, fiber, and research, violates this right, is morally wrong, and should cease. Regan writes, "These animals are our psychological kin. Like us, they bring to their life the mystery of a unified psychological presence. Like us, they are somebodies, not somethings. In these fundamental ways, they resemble us. In this fundamental sense, all subjects-of-a-life are equal because all equally share the same moral status" (Cohen and Regan, 2001, 210).

Regan explains the difference between inherent value and intrinsic value in this way, "To say that inherent value is not reducible to the intrinsic values of an individual's experiences means that we cannot determine the inherent value of individual moral agents by totaling the intrinsic values of their experiences" (Regan, 1983, 235). This means that individuals with inherent value are more than just compilations of their qualities or experiences, they are valuable beyond that, valuable in their own right. Traditionally inherent value has been applied only to moral agents (i.e., humans with subject-of-a-life capacities) and not to moral patients (such as humans in persistent
vegetative states, embryos, or animals). Moral agents are those individuals who have the ability to “bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as they conceive it, requires” (1983,151). In contrast moral patients do not have the abilities that enable them to conceive of moral principles or to act in ways that reflect morality.

Regan’s argument is revolutionary in that that he expands the discussion of inherent value to include not only moral agents (rational human beings) but also moral patients (in which group he includes animals). He proposes that since moral agents possess inherent value then they cannot be treated as mere collections of intrinsically valuable experiences or qualities. Each individual with inherent value possesses this quality equally; therefore all must be treated equally if justice is to be provided for. If inherent value is not composed of the sum of intrinsic values then an individual cannot have more or less inherent value than another individual.

He proposes that the possession of the capacity for rationalism or morality should not be the criterion for determining inherent value. Inherent value is derived, he states, from being a subject-of-a-life and he lists nine qualities possessed by such individuals:
1. Beliefs and desires
2. Perception
3. Memory
4. A sense of one's own future
5. An emotional life
6. The ability to experience pain and pleasure
7. Preference and welfare interests
8. The ability to initiate action in pursuit of desires and goals
9. A psycho-physical identity over time

Regan applies these characteristics to animals and argues that these capacities indicate that animals are "subjects-of-a-life". As subjects-of-a-life they have inherent value. As possessors of such, animals are beings with moral status (1983, 243).

Next Regan argues that the restriction of inherent value to moral agents alone is arbitrary. All beings fulfilling subject-of-a-life criteria possess inherent value equally. Put
another way, moral agents do not possess more inherent value than moral patients do. Human animals are not more inherently valuable than nonhuman animals. In Regan's words "All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be moral agents or moral patients" (1983, 240). In other words, inherent value is an all or none quality, either a being has it or the being doesn't and it is unethical and unjust to suggest that rights be granted only to those who are moral agents. A hamster therefore has as much inherent value as a dog or a human has. Put simply, all beings with inherent value possess it equally and all "have an equal moral right to treatment respectful of their value," (1983, 266). In consideration of animals this translates to mean that all organisms fulfilling subject-of-a-life criteria have inherent value and therefore have moral rights.

**Theos-Rights**

While Tom Regan argues that animals possess moral rights based on inherent value because they are subjects-of-a-life, Andrew Linzey, a pioneering animal theologian, claims that animals have theos-rights based on their God granted intrinsic value. "Animal creation should be the subject of honour and respect because it is created by God" (Linzey, 1995,3).

Linzey believes that even if there were a fundamental theological distinction between human and nonhuman animals it would be irrelevant when considering whether or not animals should be treated respectfully. He states that God does not prefer one part of creation above another; God is not anthropocentric. Linzey advises us to "abandon our sharp, sometimes arrogant, separation of humankind from nature" (1995,10).

Linzey proposes that humans do have responsibilities toward animals. This is in contrast to more traditional Christian teachings, going back to Thomas Aquinas, whereby animals are seen in terms of their usefulness to humans and our duties to animals are indirect. Linzey argues that not only do humans have responsibilities to animals but moreover those animals have the right to our responsibility and reverence. He considers and dismisses in turn rationality, personhood status, and sentience as criteria for the possession of rights, arguing that a purely secular basis for rights is problematic in itself: "it is only God who can properly and absolutely claim them" (1995, 22). By this he means that no rational, secular criterion can be the foundational basis of a right; rights
must come from somewhere, they must be granted by someone. Linzey states that God is the germinal source of rights. Rights arise from being valued and as God is the ultimate judge of value, God is also the ultimate source of rights.

At the heart of Linzey's theory that animals are deserving of rights is his belief that a theocentric orientation to all creation is necessary. An orientation such as he describes requires the understanding of several proposals. The first is that "Creation exists for God" (1995, 24). The world was made by God for God. By this Linzey means that the world was not made solely for humans and that animals were not put on the earth merely to serve us. Next Linzey writes, "God is for creation" (1995, 24) which means simply that God is not indifferent to creation, but loves and values it. As part of creation we are valuable and God is on our side. Likewise as God created the animals, God values them and is on their side too. Combining these components leads to Linzey's conclusion that if humans are to respect God then we must also respect all that has been created, as God respects and loves all creation.

Linzey proposes that animals possess rights derived from God, which he calls "theos-rights". His argument has been summarized into three main points. The first is that God is the basis for all rights. God created everything in the world and has the right to have these creations respected. Secondly, those creatures that are Spirit-filled, breathing, and made of flesh and blood are inherently valuable to God. Finally, these creatures can make a claim on us that is no less than God's claim upon us (Wennberg, 2003).

Key to Linzey's philosophy is the underlying recognition of an ongoing and dynamic relationship between God and all creation. "God's affirmation of creation is not a once-and-for-all event but a continual affirmation, otherwise it would simply cease to be," (1995, 25). This is similar to the quality of God's immanence as described by Sally McFague and the dynamic God portrayed in McDaniel's process philosophy.

At first reading it may seem that there is a bewildering gulf between Regan's secular and Linzey's theological accounts of value. The basis for rights is different; Regan's focuses on the value of the subject's inner life, while Linzey's appeals to God's assignment of value to the subject. Further investigation however reveals that these theories have a stunning commonality, which is that animals fulfilling inherent value criteria and theos-rights holders are one and the same. Although the foundation for the
rights differs, both theories hold that animals are valuable in and for themselves and are thus worthy of our respect.

McDaniel's and McFague's biocentric theologies and Linzey's theos-rights philosophy share a spiritual outlook on creation. They advocate a radical paradigm shift away from anthropocentrism and towards a more balanced and less selfish consideration of the world, in which humans interact with respect or reverence with all.

A striking feature of this overview of the various philosophies and theologies addressing the moral consideration of animals is that all treat animals as a monolithic category. The diversity of animals is absent from the conversation. There is virtually no acknowledgement of the myriad of animal categories, wild, domestic, companion, mammal, bird, or reptile. The range of these philosophies is too broad, while the focus is too limited in scope. The theories do not describe how we should interact positively with animals, but instead narrow in on prohibitions on actions and interactions. For example, Stephen Webb argues that rights language limits too narrowly the relationships we form with our pets. "Rights cannot do justice to our relationships with pets, which are governed by acts of love and not the protection of mutually recognized self-interests. Rights provide minimal warrants for protection from each other; they do not encourage attentive gestures of affection and attachment " (Webb,1998, 40).
CHAPTER THREE
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL GROUNDING OF THE HUMAN-DOG BOND

This chapter addresses the anthropological evidence for the human-dog bond and attempts to show that this relationship is the result of a long history of favourable interactions between both species. I explain briefly the process of domestication and then follow this with an examination of the process of dog domestication. As the domestication of dogs is inherently connected to their evolution, this I also describe both in terms of physical and cultural development. I propose that dogs have value that is in addition to the intrinsic value that should be granted to all animals; dogs have relational value and evidence for this value is provided in this chapter. The chapter closes by emphasizing the relevance of the human-dog bond as a principle for guiding our interactions with dogs, a species with which we share our history and for which we have the obligation to care for.

Canines and humans have interacted for a very long time. Wolves and humans lived side by side for aeons before evidence of domestication appears in the archaeological record. The human-canine bond may have its beginnings in a loose association between wolves and people, with both species benefiting from the relationship. This is not hard to understand as wolves and humans both live communally within hierarchical groups where sharing and cooperative behaviours are vital for survival. Both species are medium sized omnivorous hunters and scavengers so their ecological niches overlapped and the two species most likely encountered each other at nearly every type of site where food was found. As wolves follow ravens to kill sites, so they may have followed humans, and humans may have followed wolves, competing for and benefiting from each other’s skill.

Domestication

It is the long history of interwoven relationships arising from domestication that gives dogs part of their relational value. Domestication was the second step, after association, taken towards initiating a deeper and more complex relationship between
dogs and humans. The concept of domestication is somewhat contentious and there are two main contrasting perspectives on the nature of the domestic relationship.

Domestication may be viewed as subjugation: a relationship based on a power differential, with a more powerful party dominating a relatively powerless party. The inequality inherent in this type of domestic relationship can lead to abuse, such as that seen on factory farms, or can lead to the more appealing but also problematic type of relationship seen in stewardship or paternalistic models of interaction. This view of domestication calls for the need to use rights language in the advocacy of moral consideration of animals.

The alternative perspective of domestication is to see it as a partnership between two parties, as in a good marriage, wherein both parties consent to the relationship and derive satisfaction from it. There may be a power difference but it is the backdrop rather than the focus of the interactions and what matters most is that both parties benefit. It is this paradigm of domestication that I am exploring in the context of the human-dog relationship. This view of domestication calls for use of the language of relationality, as used in the ethic of care.

Prehistorians have divided the human cultural past into categories based on tool types and subsistence patterns. The Paleolithic began around 2.6 million years ago (although this date is a subject of much controversy currently as new finds arise) in East Africa and is thought to have lasted until approximately 14,000 years ago. This period covers the majority of human existence. Stone provided the main survival material, although plant and animal products were also used. People were foragers who hunted and gathered for food (Conroy 1997, Hall 2003). The Mesolithic is a period of transition at the end of the last glaciation and it is during this time that the bow and arrow appeared and regional differences in resource use occurred. Generally it has been accepted that this is when human and dog interdependence began, although this idea is under scrutiny. The Neolithic translates as the "new stone age" because this period is defined by the appearance of grinding stones used for grain processing, but the actual social and subsistence definition of the Neolithic is the dawning of agriculture, with small farming villages and more controlled use of resources. The Neolithic period may have emerged as long as 11,000 years ago in some areas, the Middle East in particular (Hall, 2003).
The domestication of animals coincides with the Neolithic revolution. As humans became increasingly more sedentary and began to use agriculture to support a burgeoning population, our relationships with animals (and indeed the natural environment as a whole) changed. The world was divided into those parts we can use, control, and own versus those parts we consider wild and untamable. For the most part the domesticated animals and plants were valued for their usefulness as property while the wilderness was appreciated for qualities apart from utility. I suggest that with the advent of domestication humans began to see animals as possessing value in terms of their usefulness and lost sight of their value apart from utility.

Historically domestication was viewed as a static event. However, more recently domestication is described as a dynamic interaction between groups mutually affecting each other. We owe this new perception to Frederick Zeuner, a zoologist and palaeontologist writing in the 1960s, who first defined domestication as a "biologically defined symbiotic relationship" (Zeuner 1963, Harris 1996). Evolutionist David Rindos defines domestication as a co-evolutionary process by which both groups enhance their reproductive fitness (Harris 1996). Domestication may also be described in more anthropocentric terms as a process whereby succeeding generations of tamed animals gradually become absorbed into human societies, eventually becoming estranged from their original wild ancestors. This process may be seen as one in which a symbiotic relationship develops, that is, both groups “choose” to associate with each other as a survival strategy (Clutton-Brock, 1999).

The Stages of Domestication

Zeuner outlined five stages of intensity of animal domestication. These stages included:

1. Loose contact between humans and animals, with free breeding between the animals
2. Confinement of animals to the human environment, with captive breeding
3. Selective breeding of animals, organized by humans to obtain specific desired qualities
4. Planned development of breeds of animals for purposes of human economic consideration
5. Extermination or persecution of wild animal ancestors (1963).

As noted in Zeuner's classification system, domestication involves aspects of both animal husbandry and utilization. Feminist anthropologist Jacqueline Milliet argues that it is a synchronic phenomenon requiring constant interactions and modifications. Domestication involves not only economic consideration, but also fulfills emotional, ritual and symbolic functions. She reminds us that there are three factors that humans control for domestic animals and these are feeding, protection, and reproduction (conditions that wild animals control for themselves) (Milliet 2002).

It is important to note that domestication always involves two species. My claim is that neither one can remain unchanged by the relationship. As in mathematics, when one element in an equation changes so must the other elements change. Similarly, we cannot transform a species without being somehow altered ourselves.

**Physical and Cultural Aspects of Domestication**

Domestication is wrought by both physical and cultural processes. The physical process of evolution begins when animals are removed from their original wild companions and are modified biologically, first genotypically then phenotypically. These starter animals are termed the founder group and are either selectively bred for certain traits or physically altered through natural selection (which is shaped by their new environment and their interactions with the human community within which they live) (Clutton-Brock, 1999). Culturally, domestication begins with ownership of an animal. The animal must be claimed by an individual or group of individuals in order to be incorporated into the human society; following this claim of ownership the animal may be used in negotiations of barter, exchange, or inheritance (Clutton-Brock, 1999). As domestication is connected with economics and domestic animals are valued as property, and ownership is conceived as a relation between persons (subjects) and things (objects), then domestication can be construed as appropriation of part of nature (Ingold, 1994). Humans became separated from the natural world by their claim upon it as property.

**Dog Evolution and Domestication**
Two recent reports in *Science* indicate that the domestication of dogs occurred first in the Old World. Peter Savolainen and his colleagues compared mitochondrial DNA samples from 654 domestic dogs, representing all extant breeds, with the mtDNA from 38 Eurasian wolves. With cladographic analysis they hypothesize that the first dogs were domesticated from wolves in East Asia between 15,000-40,000 years ago (Savolainen et al, 2002).

Ancestral humans began to utilize and profoundly alter nature for their own purposes. Humans started to shape their futures rather than just exist within them. As humans exerted an increasingly higher level of control over the environment we altered our culture, and as our culture changed it evolved to include and to depend on domestic animals. Dog domestication enabled early modern humans to hunt more successfully; with dogs men could fell larger animals and in greater numbers. Families and herd animals could be protected and the home areas could be kept free of refuse (garbage dispersal becomes a new problem seen with increased sedentism). Moreover, with the advent of agriculture, it has been argued, humans began to see themselves more in the role of protector of property and less in the role of aggressive hunter (Reed, 1984). Humans allowed animals into our villages, then into our homes, and into our families. We began to have dogs as friends. The human-dog bond developed with domestication and what began as a loose association between species became an important relationship bringing the two communities much closer together.

Dog evolution is inextricably tied to human cultural evolution, with association between the two species possibly preceding domestication by over one hundred thousand years. It has generally been accepted that the relationship between dogs and humans began in the Mesolithic, when men hunted alongside wolves. Recent genetic data suggests that the relationship may have arisen during the Paleolithic, as some wolves were exploring the new niche provided by their interactions with humans (Vila et al, 1997).

Coyotes, red wolves, foxes, jackals, and grey wolves have all been suggested as likely candidates for being the wild ancestor of the domestic dog, either solely or in some combination. The European Grey Wolf was thought to be the most obvious progenitor and a study of genetic data confirming that dogs evolved from the grey wolf was
published in *Science* in 1997. Vila et al analyzed mitochondrial DNA from 162 wolves from sites all over the world and 140 dogs representing 67 breeds. They found much similarity between gene sequences of dogs and wolves, much more so than between dogs and coyotes, or dogs and jackals (the other postulated ancestors of dogs). There was so much similarity that the authors of the study came to the conclusion that wolves are the ancestors of domestic dogs. More significant to this chapter is that the authors found the gene sequence divergence between dogs and wolves to be such as to imply that dogs became genotypically distinguishable from wolves approximately 135,000 years ago. This supports the theory that wolves were on their way to becoming dogs genetically before they became physically distinguishable domestic dogs. This date of 135,000 B.P. needs further verification, however, as it suggests a much earlier date than other DNA studies provide. The genetic evidence is corroborated somewhat by one site in the archaeological record. Bones of wolves have been found in association with humans dating to at least 125,000 years ago at La Grotte du Lazaret in France, where wolf skulls were apparently placed at the entrance of Paleolithic shelters (Thurston, 1996). Thus the ancient, long-standing association between wolf-dogs and humans is supported, but by no means confirmed, both by molecular biology and archaeology.

A second study published in the same journal, *Science*, provides further evidence that supports an Old World origin of domestic dogs and documents the importance of dogs in human society. Mitochondrial (Mt) DNA was extracted from the remains of 37 canines from archaeological sites across Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia (pre-Columbus era). These samples were compared with mtDNA from 140 modern dogs representing a diverse selection of breeds and mtDNA from 259 wolves. A phylogenetic tree was constructed with the results indicating that all domestic dogs originated from Old World grey wolves. The authors surmise that those early peoples represented at the dig sites in migrating to the New World brought with them dogs arising from multiple, previously established lineages. This suggests a very long relationship between humans and their dogs (Leonard et al, 2002). For example, the ancestors of today's Native Americans, crossing the Bering land bridge or traveling along a coastal route about 12,000 years ago, may have brought with them their already domesticated dogs to the American continent.
Evidence for the physical changes brought about by domestication of dogs is found in many archaeological sites. The task of proving that domestication has occurred (i.e. physical changes have been made to the domesticate by the domesticator) has been made relatively straightforward with the provision of a checklist of characteristics indicating morphologic distinctiveness between domestic dogs and their wild ancestors. There are several criteria for differentiating early-domesticated dogs from their wild ancestors. These can be summed up as; smaller body stature; a foreshortened skull with reduced cranial vault and associated brain volume, and large teeth in relation to the jaw so that the teeth appear compact, crowded, and rotated (Musil, 2000). Thus dogs have been physically altered by domestication and as they entered a new niche their bodies adapted to their new environment and roles.

Many archaeological excavations of habitation sites where dog remains are found provide evidence of the physical changes brought about by domestication. Some such sites, Kniegrotte Cave, Teufsbruke Cave, and Oelknitz in East Germany for example, represent temporary dwelling areas of Magdalenian hunters. These caves provide the earliest evidence of canine domestication in Europe but evidence is scanty. For example, Canis was represented by one individual in Kniegrotte cave. The maxilla fragment found in Kniegrotte cave contained adult teeth with crowding noted between premolar2 and premolar3. Tooth crowding is a trait seen with domestication of dogs. The maxilla is at the small end of the size range spectrum for adult wolves found in the area. The toe bones found at Teufsbrucke cave were also small in size. A distal humerus fragment, distal tibia fragment, phalanges and metatarsal bones were recovered from Oelknitz cave, and these were smaller and more gracile than typical wolf bones. Rudolf Musil's hypothesis that these bones represent early-domesticated wolves, or Canis familiaris, is based on the list of traits characteristic of domesticated dogs. He states that it is not mere coincidence that the sites where "small wolves" or early domestic dogs were found are the same sites where the most hunted animals were horses. The author concluded that domestication of wolves appears to be correlated with the hunting of horses for food, as the sites that yielded domestic dogs also yielded the greatest concentration of Equus bones (Musil, 2000).
A recent report of archaeological evidence for dog domestication appears in *Current Anthropology*. Sablin and Klopachev describe a site in central Russia, dating from 13,000-17,000 years BP. Two canine skulls were found in association with the remains of a dwelling made up of mammoth bones and a hearth. Also found were mammoth ivory ornaments, female figurines made of limestone and bones carved with geometrical designs characteristic of “Evolved Gravettian” culture. The canid skulls were from adult animals, most closely resembling in size and shape Siberian huskies, differing from them in being longer craniodorsally and having flatter and broader frontal bones. The premolars are compacted, one of the criteria of domestication. Sablin and Klopachev argue that these Ice Age dogs were different enough from wolves and similar enough to domestic large breed guard -type dogs to infer domestication. They postulate that the canids were domesticated (physically and culturally altered) *in situ* from wolves. Furthermore, they advocate the theory of coevolution, “The early dogs from Eliseevichi may have played an important role in the development of human hunting technology and strategy. In an environment in which wolves and humans were competing for food, it is not difficult to surmise how an alliance could have been formed between them. Social structures and behavior patterns are closely similar because both species evolved in response to the needs of communal hunting” (Sablin and Klopachev, 2002).

**The Stages of Dog Domestication**

Zeuner's outline of the stages of domestication is useful for describing the stages of dog domestication. During the Paleolithic period, when humans were hunting, scavenging and gathering, they shared an environmental niche with wolves. The two species had much in common: both lived in socially cohesive small family groups, both utilized open savanna and mixed forested terrain, and both hunted in packs as one alone was not strong enough to bring down the large prey they favoured (Hall and Sharp, 1978). This was the period of Stage One, loose contact with free breeding, which I call the Association stage. The study by Vila *et al* shows that even though wolves were still wolves during this stage they were beginning to become genetically differentiable from their wild kin. The wolves that associated with humans were evolving into the new niche opened up by this relationship; perhaps the wolves hunting alongside men found different
food sources available. Perhaps they were the wolves more tolerant of humans and thus exhibited less stress when around us. Perhaps their modes of interaction with others of their own species changed as they associated with us.

Dogs became not only genetically, but also physically, differentiable from wolves, and this almost certainly arose as the animals were incorporated into the human environment. Thus Stage Two probably began during the Neolithic Revolution as dogs moved from merely associating with humans to playing a significant role in village life. Certainly this move towards domestication benefited the dogs, as they are now found dwelling within every human society, whereas wolves have been nearly exterminated worldwide. The first domesticated dog remains were found in the Old World (Germany, Israel, Iraq and Siberia) dating from 12 000-14 000 years BP (Leonard, 2002; Savolainen, 2002; Sablin, 2002).

Certain behavioral traits of dogs have been emphasized with domestication. This is the category of Stage Three in Zeuner’s system of domestication. Whether or not this selection was done with intentionality by humans or is a product of the new niche dogs occupied is subject to debate (Morey, 1994). However, characteristics such as tractability, submission to the hierarchy, and sociability have enabled dogs to live within our culture. Traits such as aggressiveness towards strangers, speed, strength, and protectiveness over stock animals have been selected for when dogs are expected to guard sheep or homes or to hunt with their owners. More recently in the history of dog domestication dogs have been bred for specialized traits such as “going to ground”, pointing, or lap sitting. Within the past 120 years the species of dog has become subdivided into breeds, or lineages and these breeds have been managed for economic and social gains (Stage Four). Dog shows and dog breeding have become big business. The first kennel club was founded in the 1870s for the registry of purebred dogs. Today there are over 400 hundred recognized breeds (Budiansky, 2000). Stage Five is the extermination of wild ancestors and this act has been committed against the dog’s closest ancestors, the wolves, in nearly every place where wild wolves were once found.

The fact that dogs became dogs, and were no longer wolves, is evidence that humans altered the evolution of the canid lineage. Humans have been agents of canine physical and cultural change. In fact, domestic dogs are physically and culturally
differentiable from their wild ancestors. The close association with dogs has also changed humans. Evolutionarily dogs were agents of human cultural change, enabling humans to interact in new ways with their environment and with other humans. The adoption of dogs into human communities brings about changes to the culture, allowing people to hunt bigger and faster game, protect themselves and their domestic stock against wild animals, develop competitive sports involving dogs, travel farther afield, and interact with animals and thus nature in a new way.

In a similar manner, humans have changed the culture of dogs with the process of domestication. The term culture is not used often in terms of animal societies, but if we define culture from a nonanthropocentric perspective, paring it down to its basic components it appears logical to use it to describe certain aspects of canine communities. Anthropologists Sharp and Hall defined two crucial components of culture. These are 1) the presence of learned and flexible social patterns and 2) learned communication interactions among members of the group. Moreover, they state that the essence of culture is that the individual is embedded within the system. That is, the culture exists before and after the individual’s life and it is culture that shapes the worldview of its members (Hall and Sharp, 1978). Zooarchaeologist Clutton-Brock defines culture in terms of domestication "as a way of life imposed over successive generations on a society of humans or animals by its elders. Where the society includes both humans and animals then the humans act as the elders” (Clutton-Brock, 1999). Dogs have adapted so integrally into our societies that we see evidence of them all over the world in virtually every human community. They have learned how to fit in seamlessly in a multitude of human cultures, so much so that they no longer fit into wild canid society. The dog has been so thoroughly enculturated into human society that we now contemplate their having moral rights, being granted “personhood status” and discuss the possibility of legal rights.

The Human - Dog Bond

Dogs are emphatically good at interacting with humans and this skill helps perpetuate the strong bond between their species and ours. The November 2002 issue of Science contains an article elucidating the unique ability of dogs, among nonhuman
animals, to read human visual cues. Eleven dogs, seven wolves, and eleven chimpanzees were tested for the ability to find hidden sources of food. The food was hidden in such a way that olfactory cues and memory could play no part in its detection. Human social cues such as pointing, gazing, and tapping the bowl underneath which the food was hidden, were used to locate the food. The results showed that the domesticated dogs performed better than the chimps or the wolves in interpreting the human communication cues. Dogs of all ages were good at the task and this did not vary with their history of interactions with humans. The authors concluded that dogs did not inherit this skill from wolves; neither did they learn it through intense socialization with humans at an early age. This study provides evidence that dogs developed social and communication skills with humans somewhere along their history of domestication. “Our conclusion is that as a result of the process of domestication, some aspects of the social-cognitive abilities of dogs have converged, with the phylogenetic constraints of the species, with those of humans through a phylogenetic process of enculturation…” (Hare et al, 2002).

Several archaeological sites provide evidence of the close relationships between dogs and humans. One such site is a Natufian tomb at Ein Mallaha in northern Israel, where the remains of a puppy were found placed under an elderly person’s left hand. The burial was dated at 9750-9350 BC. The close association between the human and dog bones indicates “an affectionate rather than gastronomic relationship” (Davis, 1987).

The skeletal remains of three canids were excavated from Koster, an archaeological site situated in the Illinois River Valley, Illinois. The site is located on an alluvial and colluvial river fan and is composed of 25 prehistoric components, representing continuous Holocene occupation by humans. The dog skeletons were found in shallow, basin-shaped pits, which were well demarcated and only large enough to hold the bones. Koster canid F 2256 had a mano (handstone) and a metate (grinding tablet) situated near its skull. The skeletons were complete and in correct anatomical position. The bones showed no evidence of human modification; that is there were no scratch or scrape marks, nor evidence of burning which implies that these dogs were not butchered nor eaten. Radiocarbon dating was done on charcoal found in the burial pit associated with canid F2256 and it was found to be 8 470 +/- 110 years BP in age. The authors state that, based on the completeness of the remains and their location within pits, these canids
were deliberately buried (Morey and Wiant, 1992). The fact that one dog was buried with a handstone and grinding tablet which were tools used by women for grinding grain may provide evidence that the animals were regarded as part of the household. There is speculation that while it was the men who used dogs for hunting, it may have been women who instigated the more domestic relationship with dogs. A woman may have found and fostered an orphaned pup and raised him within her home, thus initiating the first companionable relationship between early humans and dogs.

Utilization of the model of domestication of dogs shapes our understanding of humans’ role within the environment. Viewing domestication as a mutually beneficial process, inferring a symbiotic relationship between humans and dogs rather than a unilateral and teleological one, places humans firmly within the environment rather than outside of it. Humans may be understood as both agents of change and elements changed. Likewise, wolves and dogs have actively participated in shaping our history. Our interaction with wolves and our shaping of them into domestic partners changed the place of humans in the world, and likewise irreparably changed the nature and world of domesticated canines. The dog became a new type of creature, no longer wild and self-reliant, but domesticated and now dependent on humans, with a history so intertwined with ours as to be inseparable.

Animals have given up or lost their autonomy in the process of domestication. Humans have taken control of their most basic aspects of life: reproduction, nutrition, and protection. Domestic animals are dependent on their human owners for their survival. As caretakers of our charges, and in response to their dependency, we should be responsive to their needs and should engage in reciprocity equal to the gifts they have presented to us.

The evidence provided by anthropological studies emphasizes the notion of relationality. Humans and dogs have been interacting closely for thousands of years and have mutually influenced each other’s evolution during that time. Moreover, humans and dogs have a history of close relationships. As the ethic of care is based on morality as grounded in relationships this philosophy is the most appropriate for prescribing human moral consideration of dogs.
CHAPTER FOUR
CARING FOR DOGS

This chapter begins with a story about a man, his dog Elvis, and a third dog, a stranger. The man and his dog enjoy many activities together; sometimes they hike, they might backpack, and some days they just play ball. Elvis sleeps in the man’s house at night, protecting him from the dark. The man feeds his dog and keeps him healthy. They are companions and have a mutually caring relationship.

When he meets a dog he has never met before, the man greets her with a friendly gesture and an attitude of respect. If he saw a stray dog lying in the street, injured by a car, he would try as best he could to help her. If he came upon someone abusing her he would endeavor to stop the torment. He would feel an obligation to act on behalf of the dog, even though he does not know her.

Why would this man feel obliged to stop and help the stray dog? He might answer in this way; 1) He believes in the inherent worth of all animals and 2) He has learned from the companionship he shares with his own dog that dogs are creatures who are good at being in relationships. Moreover, he believes that relationships with dogs are worthwhile and he recognizes that caring is an essential component of relationships 3) thus he has extended the care he feels for his dog to a general attitude of caring for all dogs, because he recognizes in them not only their inherent worth but also the potential for relationship. 4) If he does not stop to help the stray dog he would be compromising his character, his integrity as a caring individual.

It appears there are actually two sources of the obligation this man feels for the stray dog. The first source arises from the relationship that he has with dogs, which originated from a relationship with one specific dog and developed into a predisposition towards developing relationships with dogs in general. The first source is the obligation the man feels to care for dogs. The second source arises from the desire to live an authentic life, true to an ideal image of self. The second obligation therefore is to himself.

This story illustrates how a caring attitude towards others, even those who are strangers, arises from caring for those we know and love (those in our inner circle of relationships), is nurtured by striving to attain the ethical ideal version of the self, and
then is put into practice via ethical caring. It provides evidence that natural caring can lead to the practical ethical action of caring for another.

By definition, dogs are connected to human society and they exist in and from relationship to us. Our relationship with dogs is one of transcendence of self-interest or utility; it is based on care and mutual giving. Care ethics focuses on connections and a morality based on the desire to remain related. I have elaborated the ethic of care in order to develop an ethic of moral consideration of animals using our relations with dogs as the paradigmatic example.

Do we have an obligation to care about or for dogs? If so, why? Nel Noddings proposes that moral persons have the obligation to care for those with whom they are in relationship with. Karen J. Warren suggests that moral persons ought to care about and then, perhaps, care for those entities with which they are in relationship. The foundation for these two versions of care ethics is equivalent. Both are based on relationship, but in certain definitions and details, such as the nature of relationship and how we might care, they differ. I have formed my own response to the above questions using key elements drawn from both versions in order to devise an ethic of care suitable for guiding a moral person's interactions with dogs, our closest animal companion.

The Ethic of Care - Noddings

Noddings' ethic of care provides the framework upon which care ethics is built, so in this section I outline this philosophy as it relates to my thesis, moving from the general theory to more specific ideas regarding human obligations to animals. As the care ethic is grounded upon the nature of relationships that is where I begin.

Human relationships are many and various in type. Factors such as family ties, intimacy level and commitment, proximity, shared interests, and circumstances all play roles in our making decisions as to the types of relationships we form. If relationships can be diagrammed, as Noddings proposes, as a series of concentric circles with oneself in the center and ever-expanding circles around the center, then those with whom we form the closest bonds are situated in the smallest circle, closest to the center. This is the inner circle, in which "we care because we love" (Noddings 2003, 46). In this scheme the inner circle usually includes our blood-related family and our closest friends. The next circle
encompasses our acquaintances, our colleagues at work or school, and the members of our religious or residential community, "those for whom we have personal regard" (2003, 49). The next circle is comprised of those we know less well, such as the receptionist at the dentist's office, the man who holds the flag at the road construction site; people we may see every now and then, who aren't quite strangers but whom we might never get to know any better than as just passing by. The people within these circles are termed the "proximate others" (2003, 47). We treat persons in each circle differently, depending on how closely we interact and how well we know them. We value those in our inner circle more highly than those we hardly know or strangers whom we will never meet. Noddings uses the metaphor of "chains" to describe our connections to those people not yet encountered or to those outside the concentric circles of the known entity. The chains extend from the proximate others within our circles to those people we may encounter, such as a potential son-in-law or a future student. We are "prepared to care" (2003, 47) for those people connected to us by these chains.

Within these relationships Noddings differentiates two types of caring, natural and ethical. Neither type of caring is elevated above the other. Natural caring is born of memories of being cared for. Noddings suggests that we naturally care for certain beings; her primary example is of a mother who naturally cares for her child. From natural caring arises the impulse to care for the other. Ethical caring then arises out of natural caring. It is the "I must" that follows the original feeling of "I want" to care. We can channel this natural inclination to care into an ethical response by accepting the challenge provided by situations where the feeling is not so easily evoked. A father may naturally care for his daughter, but he may not care naturally for his sister's son when the boy is throwing a temper tantrum. Regardless of how the man feels at that moment he is obliged to care for the boy, as he and the boy are in a close relationship, thus ethical caring must be invoked so the man can calm the boy down.

Discipline is required to respond as one who cares when the impulse to care is absent. According to Noddings when natural caring is impossible a person must rely on self-discipline for commitment to the caring action and this is what transforms natural caring into ethical caring. In recognition of the relationship and the obligations involved the moral person must choose to care for the other. Referring back to the previous
example, the man must choose to behave in a caring manner towards his angry nephew, even if he does not feel loving towards him at the moment. Because the man recognizes the importance of their relationship he chooses to care. "[E]thical caring is anchored in the feeling and recognition of relations that are integral to natural caring, but we shall see the role of choice and commitment emphasized" (2003, 149). Natural caring arises out of love for the other. The desire to be ethically caring is guided by a person's sense of his or her ideal self.

The Ethical Ideal

Noddings proposes that the moral person is obliged to their ideal version of self. It is that self who propels the moral person into caring for another when the feelings of natural caring do not arise. Behaving in an authentic manner, being true to the ideal self, makes the moral person bridge the divide between natural and ethical caring. It provides the commitment and discipline necessary to care for another.

Noddings states that the ethical ideal arises both from memories of being cared for, which lead to the capacity for natural caring, and from the desire for continuing caring relationships. She writes that when we recognize and accept our desire to be and remain related to others we are able to be receptive to them. Receptivity often leads, she suggests, to natural caring (2003, 100). Natural caring requires less effort than ethical caring, so if the moral person cares more often naturally, then her decisions to care for another will become easier to make. Being a caring person makes caring for others less difficult. To be caring, therefore, the caring attitude (encompassed in the ideal version of the self) should be cultivated and this in turn will nourish the caring person and help her attain the discipline required by ethical caring.

Is the moral person obliged to act on the imperative "I must"? Am I obliged to care? Noddings replies that the answer depends on the circumstances, on the nature of the relationship, the claim being made, and the picture of the ideal self that the person holds. She states that the demand for care can be ignored, it can be acted upon, or it can be abstained from if the demand is beyond our capacity to fulfil. The first choice, ignoring the demand, betrays the person who does not care. The last two choices, inaction or action, are made after consideration of the demand and thus these are actions of care.
"Caring requires me to respond to the initial impulse with an act of commitment: I commit myself either to overt action on behalf of the cared-for or I commit myself to thinking about what I might do" (2003, 81).

We must return to the issue of choice. Noddings writes that it is the consideration of the demand that follows the feeling of "I must" that is characteristic of the caring individual. If the "I must" is equal to "I want" then the choice to act is easily made; it is based on natural caring. When impulse and demand differ or conflict then the decision becomes more difficult. It is under those circumstances of conflict that ethical caring occurs and the ethical person responds by choosing the action that most closely conforms to her picture of the ideal self.

Noddings asserts that the moral person values the caring relationship over any other form of relatedness, so in order to be good we should be caring. It follows then that a moral person sees herself as a caring person because she values the quality of caring. Her ethical ideal self will care. Noddings writes, "I feel the moral ‘I must’ when I recognize that my response will either enhance or diminish my ethical ideal" (2003, 83). The ultimate source of obligation is, in Noddings' words, "The value I place on the relatedness of caring" (2003, 84).

Caring Obligations

How then does a moral person know whom to care for? Can a person care for everyone? Noddings reminds the reader that it is the nature of the relationship that determines whom we must care for. The circles of relationship provide guidance and limitations for care. She writes that a moral person is obliged to care if there is the possibility of reciprocity with "completion" in the cared-for. Without the possibility of completion there is no obligation to care. "I am not obliged to care for starving children in Africa, because there is no way for this caring to be completed in the other unless I abandon the caring to which I am obligated," (2003, 86).

The cared-for must be able to reciprocate to the one-caring in order, not necessarily in kind, but by "receiving the efforts of the one-caring, and this receiving may be accomplished by a disclosure of his own subjective experience in direct response to the one-caring or by happy and vigorous pursuit of his own projects" (2003, 151) for an
ethical relation to be completed. Reciprocity, in terms of ethical relationships, is thus demonstrated by the ability of the cared-for to provide completion “The freedom, creativity, and spontaneous disclosure of the cared-for that manifest themselves under the nurture of the one-caring complete the relation... What the cared-for gives to the relation either in direct response to the one-caring or in personal delight or in happy growth before her eyes is genuine reciprocity,” (2003, 74). Completion, it appears, is the reward for caring. As stated above, a moral person ought to care for those he or she is in reciprocal relationships with; these are usually found within or close to our inner circles of connection.

When does a moral person become obliged to care? Noddings answers this question with two criteria for obligation. The first tells us when we must care and the second aids in prioritizing our obligations: 1) If there is a potential for a reciprocal relationship, "if our caring can be completed in the other" (2003, 86) then we must care. If there is the potential for a reciprocal relationship with completion then the moral person must care. If the moral person does not feel motivated by love (natural caring) then she or he must employ discipline to act morally (ethical caring); 2) The dynamic potential for growth and reciprocity embedded in the relationship provides guidance for prioritizing the obligations to care. The greater the potential for evolution in the relationship the greater is the obligation to care. For example, the obligation to care for one's own child is greater than the obligation to care for the neighbor's child as the first relationship is ongoing and has a great potential for development.

Caring for Animals - Noddings

Are moral persons required to care for animals? Should all animals be grouped as a class and are we required to treat all animals with the same ethic? Are we obliged to care for dogs? These are questions I brought to my reading of Noddings' care ethic and presented next are my interpretations of her answers.

First, Noddings reminds the reader that obligation is bounded by the possibility of reciprocity in the cared-for. She states that animals will always be the cared-for, they are not able to be the ones-caring. So can animals, as the ones that are cared for, respond in a manner that is sufficient to fulfill the requirement of reciprocity?
Before answering this self-posed question Noddings makes three points:

1) Affection for animals varies considerably between persons

2) There is a need for a nonjudgmental ethic based on the differences in affection felt for animals and the rejection of universalizability

3) We do not view animals as subjects in the same way that we view humans as subjects. Moreover she states that our primary obligation is to humans because "ethicality is defined in the human domain...It is not 'speciesism' to respond differently to different species if the very form of response is species specific" (2003, 152).

She then asks whether we truly view all animals in a similar manner and argues that lumping all animals together as a class of "interchangeable receptacles" is mistaken and suggests that animals should be viewed as individuals if we are to "meet the other morally" (2003, 154). Noddings provides the example of her pet cat Puffy, whom Noddings admits she sees as an individual and with whom she has a relationship. This relationship seems to have arisen from natural caring, and encouraged by Puffy's responsiveness (the cat greets Noddings in the morning and "speaks" to her in a squeaky voice when she desires milk) developed into one with an ethical dimension. Noddings writes, "I have incurred an obligation and, as we shall see, this obligation rests on the establishment of a relation" (2003, 156). Noddings emphasizes again the path from natural to ethical caring and the importance of choice leading to action. "What we see clearly here is how completely our ethical caring depends upon both our past experience in natural caring and our conscious choice. We have made pets of cats. In doing so we have established the possibility of appreciative and reciprocal relation," (2003, 157). She notes, however that the relationship and thus the obligation is limited by the limited nature of Puffy's reciprocity.

A deciding factor for prioritizing obligations to animals, as with obligations to any other, is dependent upon the dynamic potential of the relationship. Noddings differentiates animals by their relationships with us. She states that we have obligations only to those animals that we have actual relationships with, such as our pets. Beyond those, she writes, "the feeling that arises is more nearly pure sentiment and I risk talking nonsense as I act upon it" (2003, 159).
Does Noddings believe moral persons are obliged to care for dogs? I believe she would answer that yes, the people involved in relationships with dogs are obliged to care for them. It seems to me, however, based on her discussion of animals as limited in their responsiveness, that the feeling of care arising from the relationship is that of natural caring or love, not ethical caring. Her ethic of care is confusing in regards to animals.

**Critique of Noddings' Ethics of Care**

There are two main problems I have with the ethic of care as proposed by Nel Noddings. First, she places limitations on whom or what the caring person should commit to caring for. Noddings is afraid, it appears, of caring too much, or for too many. It almost seems that Noddings advocates moral stinginess. The second problem is that of the limits she places on the definition of caring relationships.

The parochialism implied by Noddings' version of care ethics is problematic. It advocates ignoring the claims of persons or beings one does not know. Although in theory Noddings advocates invocation of the ideal self in order to guide our behavior, in reality she advises conservation of our moral energy in order to protect the one-caring. I believe that the lessons learned by caring for specific, known individuals within the inner circle of our moral community can and should be extended out to those individuals inhabiting the less familiar reaches of our world. The experience of being in a relationship with a specific animal, such as a pet, can be transferred to other situations, other animals, and with that our obligations, if we are to behave true to our moral ideal, expand. An excerpt from the essay "Freedom and Wilderness, Wilderness and Freedom" by author Edward Abbey may help flesh these ideas out.

"I was walking along Aravaipa Creek one afternoon when I noticed fresh mountain lion tracks leading ahead of me. Big tracks, the biggest lion tracks I’ve seen anywhere....and then I saw him: I felt a kind of affection and the crazy desire to communicate, to make some kind of emotional, even physical contact with the animal. After we’d stared at each other for maybe five seconds- it seemed at the time like five minutes- I held out one hand and took a step toward the big cat and said something ridiculous like, "Here, kitty, kitty." The cat paused there on three legs; one paw up as if he wanted to shake hands. But he didn’t respond to my advance..."
I turned and walked homeward again, pausing every few steps to look back over my shoulder. The cat had lowered his front paw but did not follow me. The last I saw of him from the next bend in the canyon, he was still in the same place, watching me go. I hurried on through the evening, stopping every now and then to look and listen, but if that cat followed me any further I could detect no sight or sound of it.

I haven't seen a mountain lion since that evening, but the experience remains shining in my memory. I want my children to have the opportunity for that kind of experience. I want my friends to have it. I want even our enemies to have it—they need it most. And someday, possibly, one of our children's children will discover how to get close enough to that mountain lion to shake paws with it, to embrace and caress it, maybe even to teach it something, and to learn what the lion has to teach us."

This piece demonstrates how the desire for connection can lead to an attitude of caring about others, which extends our connections outwards beyond our inner circle to those inhabitants of the very far-removed circles. It shows how a person can move from caring for one's children to caring about a stranger, even an animal, wild and unknowable. It provides evidence, contrary to Noddings' concern, that caring can be expansive and need not be limited solely to those that we are in reciprocal relationships with, characterized by completion.

In order to live out the ideal version of self, a person must be willing to extend care to strangers. The person whom I learn to become is shaped by my interactions with others in the world. I learn to care about and for others by practicing a caring attitude first towards those I know best and then by extension to others less known.

The specifics for moral behaviour must be transferable to other concrete situations and claims should not be neglected just because the one in need is a stranger, someone we would rather pass on by. Care ethics is grounded in concrete situations but this should not be a restriction, rather one situation should prepare us for the next. A story from my life may clarify this point. As I was driving to an event that I was involved in on campus I saw a car stopped. As I slowed down, a big black lump became evident in the road. The lump was a dog, hit by the driver of the now-stopped car. My thoughts were conflicted; should I stop, say I am a vet and take care of the dog? Or should I continue to
the lecture that I was supposed to attend? If I stopped I would be late to the lecture, if I made it at all, and moreover would arrive wet (it was a typical rainy Oregon winter night), disheveled, and possibly bloody.

I stopped. I had to. All my previous encounters with dogs had taught me that they are creatures worthy of moral treatment and this one, in her helplessness, had made her claim on me, a claim I could not ignore. She needed my care and I was obliged to help her. I did not choose to encounter this dog in that situation, but based on past experiences with dogs I felt I had no choice but to provide care for her.

Noddings' proposal that we confine our obligations to those we choose to enter into relationships with becomes irrelevant when the practice of ethical caring meets needy animals in real situations. It seems almost hypocritical to the essence of a caring ethic to limit that caring only to those we know best and to those we choose to enter into such relationships with. I think Noddings fails to recognize one of the most important aspects of her ethic of care: the moral person is obliged to act in a caring manner in many circumstances where the relationship is unacknowledged or even not apparent. I accept that the obligation to self is real but propose that the connection to the stranger is also real and signifies a relationship also worthy of the obligation to care.

The second problematic issue is twofold and based on the limits placed on the definition of relationship. Noddings' definition of relationship is too narrow in focus and fails to capture what I see as the essential spirit of relationships, that of connection. Firstly, Noddings focuses on relationships that are composed of parties with inherent power differences, as evidenced by the terms she uses in describing the two parties involved: the "cared-for" and the "one-caring". She neglects the type of relationship that is not based on one party taking care of the other, who receives the care of the first and thus, in turn, provides completion, which is the impetus for further care giving by the first. This cycle of events does not describe many of the relationships I am familiar with, those that are based on sharing of common goals, interests, or histories, those connections that we choose to develop that are not based on power imbalances but rather on equality. Relationships of this sort with animals are also de-emphasised and to some extent almost dismissed. Many human-animal relationships are very important to the parties involved and neglecting this aspect of care ethics seems an oversight at best and negligent if put in
more critical terms. Relationships based on equality can also be moral, exhibiting the required characteristics of reciprocity, dynamism and potential for growth, and they need to be brought back into the discussion.

Secondly, the requirement for reciprocity with completion puts too narrow a constraint on what we may term a caring relationship. Noddings' theory is confusing when she describes the nature of our obligations to animals. We are obliged to behave morally towards those with whom we are involved in reciprocal relationships. She states that a baby can reciprocate a mother's care by smiling and burbling in response to her loving touch, but that an animal's responsive calls and gestures to our presence are not necessarily demonstrations of reciprocity, or if they are it is a reciprocity somehow limited by their animal nature. She writes, "In connection with animals, however, we may find it possible to refuse relation itself on the grounds of a species-specific impossibility of any form of reciprocity in caring," (2003, 86). An animal, she states, cannot provide for completion in relationships. "The potential for response in animals, for example, is nearly static; they cannot respond in mutuality, nor can the nature of their response change substantially," (2003, 87). This is very confusing, as it seems to me that Noddings has conflicting beliefs. First she states that animals cannot provide the reciprocity necessary for an ethical relationship. Yet, Noddings admits to being involved in such a relationship with her cat.

To clear up the ambiguity enmeshed in Noddings' definition of reciprocity I propose an alternative definition, one that acknowledges a wider range of relationships such as those felt between parties both with and without power differences, and those relationships we share with our pets. Reciprocity can be defined as "A mutual action; principle or practice of give and take" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1982). To be reciprocal means "1. Mutual (reciprocal love, protection, injuries), complementary, expressing mutual action or relation. 2. (Math) function or expression so related to another that their function is unity," (1982). Thus reciprocity in relationships does not require completion, but rather mutuality, an exchange in kind.

Many of our relationships with animals do not provide reciprocity with completion. Edward Abbey's close encounter with the mountain lion evidenced a type of relationship, albeit brief, in which there was an exchange of experiences (reciprocity).
was an encounter that shaped or influenced each party's life to some extent. My encounter with the injured dog on the road was also an exchange and we had a short-term relationship that mattered morally.

While many human-animal relationships do not provide reciprocity with completion, I do believe that dogs, in their relationships as companions to humans, are capable of providing reciprocity with completion. I can support this proposal with many examples of this sort of reciprocal relationship.

Relations with Dogs

To begin, we need to recognize how much dogs give us in return for the care we afford them. Pet keeping can be seen as having educational value. It has been shown that children raised in families that have pets behave differently towards others than children raised in petless homes. Animal ethicist, James Serpell, cites a claim made by Boris Levinson, a pediatric psychiatrist, that pets have a beneficial role to play in human development. He states that "[T]he experience of caring for a pet during childhood could make a person more sensitive to the feelings and attitudes of others, inculcate tolerance, self-acceptance and self-control" (Serpell, 1996:89).

People let down their guard to animals. As a vet I have seen this many times. A few months ago a seemingly taciturn elderly man brought his dog in for treatment of a superficial wound. At first the man was reluctant to talk to his pet in front of me, but after I began to chat to the animal, he too joined in the conversation and soon we three were involved in a positive and open interaction. I learned that his dog was his closest companion and without her he would have no one at home to talk to or love. Dogs are a constant source of affection in our lives and they let us know that whatever we look like in the morning, how hard our day has been, or how late we get home, they will still greet us with an exuberant welcome. They give us nonjudgmental companionship.

Pets can help us expand our boundaries. They allow us to dote on them, to pet them, to love without fear of rejection. They ask us to romp, to roll in the grass with them, to run. They encourage us to feel freedom from the usual constraints for a little while when they grin and ask us to throw a Frisbee across the lawn, or when they bow down in solicitation of a game of chase. We almost can't help responding with a smile of
our own and sometimes even the most serious adult will consent to take off her shoes and dance barefoot with her dog.

In a reversal of the usual roles of human as care provider and dog as cared-for some dogs take care of their people. Not only do many women rely on their dogs for protection but service dogs, such as those trained as guide dogs for the blind, wonder dogs who can predict and warn their owners of oncoming epileptic seizures, dogs that visit residents in managed-care facilities, provide care for their human companions. When I visited the Guide Dogs for the Blind facility in Boring, Oregon, I was astounded to see a young Labrador dog lead his blind human companion through a maze of obstacles and even steer her away from a low hanging branch. My dog guards and provides protection for me on my solo hikes in the wilderness. She has even gone to seek help for me when I was injured and alone on the trail.

Dogs also help us by giving us opportunities to learn and practice compassionate caring within a safe environment. Stephen Webb writes, "The human dog relationship can engender a kind of valuing that is appropriate in various ways to our relationship with other animals as well " (Webb, 1998, 7). Thus the relationship of mutual giving, as evident in our interactions with our pet dogs, can enable us to reform our treatment of all beings, extending our circle of compassion to include many others. It gives us practice in natural caring, thereby helping the ethical person to become closer to his or her ideal self.

It is their quiet acceptance, their expressions of loyalty, and their firm resolve to keep us in the center of their universe that makes us reciprocate their feelings and love them back with an affection that transcends the species barrier and allows us to call them our companions. I believe this sketch provides evidence of a few of the myriad ways in which dogs amply demonstrate they are creatures very capable and willing to care, reciprocate and enter fully into relationships with humans.

Obligation to Dogs

Dogs are "beings in relationship" with humans. The existence of Canis familiaris as a species is due to that fact; dogs would not be dogs if a few intrepid wolves had not deigned to domestication. In this way, dogs are unique, owing their identity to a relationship with another species, as no other animal does. Cats hold a special place in
our society as well but cats, wild and tame, have not become as dependent on us for their beingness as dogs have. House cats are in essence miniature wild cats, retaining their independence and ancestral nature.

Dogs are defined by their relationship to humans. As humans are necessarily part of dogs’ identities and as we have encouraged them to integrate into human society, we owe them morally sound treatment. Dogs should be cared for and treated ethically because ours (dogs and humans) is a long history of intertwined lives; it is a tale in which both species have interacted so intimately and for so long that the species barrier has been, in a sense, transcended. Dogs hold a special place in human society; they inhabit the realm of those in close relationship to us, along with our families and our friends.

Dogs and humans shared first the hearth, now the home. Many of us count them among those dwelling in our inner circle of relationships.

Some of us will care about dogs; some of us will care for dogs. Our obligations to dogs are based, as are our obligations to humans, upon the nature of our relationships with them and the vision we each hold of our ideal moral self.
CHAPTER FIVE
EPILOGUE

Dogs may be viewed as a bridge species, a connection between humans and the world of nonhuman animals and nature. As the most domesticated of animals they are both familiar to us and yet remain in some ways, alien. They will always be, no matter how well adapted to human society, nonhuman animals. As our companions dogs provide more than just a glimpse into the ways of animals; they provide hands-on, direct and daily contact with nonhuman animals. As the familiar animal in the midst of human society, dogs can be the catalyst for a new way of thinking about animals. They can steer us towards a paradigm shift, one that moves us away from anthropomorphism and towards a biocentric perspective.

I would like to see the opportunity provided for students to encounter this new paradigm by way of the classes I teach. Currently the veterinary medical program is lacking, I believe, in discussion about the nature and depth of human-animal relationships. The emphasis of the curriculum is on the science of veterinary medicine and more spiritual and emotional aspects of the art of healing and the virtue of compassion may be neglected. The majority of veterinary students decide to become vets not for the economic rewards, nor social status, but rather because they feel compelled to help animals. Unfortunately this vocational desire can be nearly forgotten, or at best is reduced to a vague memory, in the very hard work and stresses of the professional curriculum. I would like to help repair this situation by teaching a class that focuses both on the ethics of animal relations and the human-animal bond. The class might be interactive and discussion-based, providing time for vet students to remember why they decided to become veterinarians and a place for nurturing the compassion that their initial impulse sowed.

I would like to teach this class to a broader audience as well, perhaps to undergraduates or to the general public. I believe the same format of readings and facilitated discussions would be valuable to anyone interested in the ethics of human and animal interactions. I am certain that I too would benefit and learn much from leading a
class such as this. Moreover, I would like to share with others what I have learned in the writing of this thesis.

The reading I have done in order to write this thesis, followed by numerous discussions and hours of mental processing of the material, have brought focus and clarity to my initial general interest in the subject of animal ethics. I have realised the importance of recognizing that by caring for dogs one expands one's circle of interactions to include nonhuman animals. When a person cares for her companion dog, and is cognizant of the dog's individuality, granting other dogs individuality is a natural progression. The initial extension of caring only for human persons, to that of caring for a dog, can therefore lead to caring for other dogs, and perhaps to caring about and for other species of animals.

A crucial first step for transcendence of the species barrier may be development of a concrete caring relationship with a companion animal. The caring person who extends the boundaries of the moral community to include dogs among the members of her inner circle may as a consequence consider caring for other nonhuman entities, such as wild animals, trees, deserts and mountains. The caring person stands firmly rooted in a world that provides many rich opportunities for caring. I believe that the ethic of caring for dogs can facilitate the ethic of caring for all.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


