Clashes of ideology are all around us, from our computer and television screens to our composition classrooms, and they merit attention within the composition classroom. This thesis examines the justifications and pedagogies that scholars in rhetoric and composition use to infuse issues of ideology and social ethics into writing instruction and the study of persuasion, and it analyzes the leading criticisms levelled against such pedagogies and their rationale. Using the 2014 Ferguson protests as a case study, this thesis illustrates how ideographic analysis can be a constructive method for introducing ideological inquiry into the composition classroom, and argues that its theoretical rationale is more cogent and compelling than other, popular, contemporary approaches. This thesis moves from theory to praxis as it applies the ideograph both in lower and upper-division composition classrooms, advocating for a rhetoric of inquiry and dialogue, rather than conversion and consensus.
Composing for Social Change: Clashes of Ideographs and Ideology in the Composition Classroom

by

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I understand that my thesis will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my thesis to any reader upon request.

Chris Gasser, Author
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**Introduction**

Clashes of ideology are all around us. Whether they are about Black lives, abortions, the responsibilities of firearm ownership, who should be the next President of the United States, or countless other significant clashes in our modern political climate, we simply cannot escape the fact that ideology is everywhere. What we do not see everywhere is an effective way to address and discuss those differences in ideologies. Rather than effective conversation, many within the public retreat to their internet sanctuaries, unfriending those with whom they disagree. Many watch their favorite late night host and nod in vigorous agreement, baffled at the idiocy of the other side. They even watch these clashes play out, not in reality, but in satirical television shows such as South Park, or Family Guy. In essence, they do everything shy of actually engaging in the clashes themselves. And they do this because they accept the idea that understanding cannot be reached. They accept the popular premise of ideology: I have my side, and you have yours, let’s agree to disagree.

Although many are reluctant to actually engage in clashes of ideology, this lack of engagement does not negate the fact that most of us participate in these clashes. Many of us protest in some form or another. We protest through the companies we support, we protest by sending letters, we protest by clicking “like” or “share,” we may even protest out on the street, marching for what we believe is right. Yet we cannot escape what we are really hoping to do: we are hoping to change the minds of our opposition, and if we cannot change the minds of the opposition, we are hoping that we can mobilize a critical mass to write a statute, or a law, that will force the other side to comply with the majority
who turned out to vote. In essence, this critical mass sanctions the state to enforce those views upon the other side, and we call it democracy.

Our country, and the Western World, has a long history of utilizing rhetoric to convert ideological opponents, and using the authority of the state when that rhetoric fails. This thesis is just a small step in proposing an alternative. Rather than proposing a rhetoric of conversion, where people position themselves and their ideologies against others who must be converted, this thesis proposes a rhetoric of empathy and of inquiry. Focusing primarily on education, specifically composition classrooms, this thesis proposes a new way of thinking about ideological inquiry in composition classrooms in the hopes that we can teach our students how to analyze, discuss, and reach understanding when it comes to clashes of ideology.

In Chapter One of this thesis we will examine the major movements and pedagogues that have attempted to incorporate ideological inquiry into the pedagogies of rhetoric and composition. Beginning with rhetoric’s 2,000 year-old history, the first part of Chapter One looks at the ways in which rhetorical education has shared close ties with politics and ideology. Moving past rhetoric’s ancient connections with the civic and with worldviews, the second half of the chapter looks at the latter part of the of the 20th century with the rise of the New Rhetoric Movement and the incorporation of rhetorical principles into the composition classroom. The remaining portion of the chapter looks at the ways in which pedagogues in the late 20th and early 21st centuries have attempted to incorporate clashes of ideology into the pedagogy of rhetoric and composition, and a few of the most prominent pitfalls that have plagued such a union.
Chapter Two begins by borrowing the concept of the ideograph, and ideographic analysis, from the theories of Speech Communication. Chapter Two advocates for using the ideograph, and ideographic analysis as a way to understand, navigate, and negotiate ideology within social clashes. Analyzing the events surrounding the Ferguson protests in 2014, I attempt to show how ideographic analysis can be used to understand and analyze different ideologies represented within Ferguson. Using ideographic analysis, I breakdown Ferguson, as a historical event, to <Ferguson>, the ideograph, to offer an effective and accessible way to discuss the clashing ideologies surrounding the death of Michael Brown. I then use this analysis to show competing views within <Ferguson>, in an attempt to create a rhetoric, not of conversion, but of understanding and empathy. This empathetic approach provided by ideographic analysis allows the viewing of different ideologies without needing to engage in whose version is *right* or whose is *wrong*. Following the analysis of Ferguson, I offer a theoretical, rhetorical framework for incorporating classroom praxis that looks at ways that ideology functions on the larger scale of mass consciousness, rather than simply on the individual level.

In Chapter Three, the theoretical becomes concrete as I discuss application of ideographic analysis, and how it can be used in both lower and upper-levels of composition pedagogy. Using the widely consumed genre of the image macro, or as I will describe in the chapter, genre of meme, I build off existing multimodal pedagogies to get students to consider ways in which ideographs influence their own views of clashes of ideology. I then offer a step by step pedagogy for dialoguing about those individual worldviews without the need to convert “the other.” Moving toward a more advanced approach to composition and the ideographic analysis, I suggest that current models for
teaching the rhetorical triangle limit the ways in which we can understand ideology, and I suggest that upper-level composition pedagogy can benefit from ideographic analysis of an ideological clash, similar to what I do earlier in Chapter Two.

Acknowledging my biases up front, this thesis is not value-neutral. It is very much a culmination of my own political and social philosophies and experiences with ideology as a student and as an instructor. I have been largely influenced by the works of Paulo Freire and other critical and liberatory pedagogues who have emphasized the possibility for education to be a potentially humanizing and ideologically liberating experience. Yet a noted difference in my own work, and what will be represented in the argument of this thesis, is a rejection of the stifling binaries that cannot accurately portray the nuanced and diverse statuses of our students, of people, and of prominent ideologies today. In the moments where I do resort to stifling binaries, it is to portray the issues as they are being portrayed within specific examples and works. I also cannot reconcile many of the Marxist views, which are so closely tied with critical pedagogy, with my own desires to one day rely less on state sanctioned violence and more towards an ideologically tolerant society. Instead I hope to propose just a small part of a rhetoric which will allow for students, to learn ways in which they can engage in ideological discussions with empathy and inquiry, rejecting the binaristic rhetoric of conversion. I fully recognize that this is perhaps a utopian dream, nonetheless, it is one that I believe is worth working toward, and one which we can work towards within the composition classroom.
Chapter 1: Ideology in Rhetoric and Composition: Modern-Ancient Connections.

“It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political…” – Aristotle (Rhet I.2,1356a, trans. Kennedy)

For composition instructors, discussing ideology is not necessarily avant-garde. Because our field values skills of analysis and explication, we often seek to develop those skills within our students, creating assignments that ask students to analyze artifacts for implicit meanings and subtle arguments being made in the world around them. Essentially, we ask our students to explicate these artifacts to reveal the different worldviews that such artifacts advocate for. We do this because we are aware of something that students may take for granted: argument is everywhere, and we are often caught in the middle of these arguments. Many times these conflicts are relatively low-stakes: McDonalds or Taco Bell? Nike or Addidas? Pepsi or Coke? Yet increasingly, with significant media being directed at social controversies, such conflicts transcend the mundane. These conflicts become something larger: clashes, where viewers of media become mobilized for different causes, defending different ideologies through Facebook, Twitter, online forums, university halls, and sometimes even directly yelling at the television, as if that will make a difference.

Although the stakes of the arguments are not always high, there is no mistake that those that are elevated have a profound impact on our students and their lives. Take for example the recent resignation of Tim Wolfe, the former president of the University of Missouri, who resigned amid protests over his perceived inaction surrounding various
acts of discrimination on campus, revealing a clash of ideology as student protestors felt that Wolfe’s response was “too little, too late” (Eligon). Or recently at my home institution, a large land grant state university, a recent meeting was held by minority students who felt that the university was not doing enough to address systemic inequality and implicit bias. For many of our students such conflicts are deeply personal events. For other students, such conflicts might seem intangible and unrelatable. All this to say that social clashes that demand action, and rebuttal, are affecting our student population, and if not our students on an individual level, certainly on an institutional one, as large institutions are being forced to respond to clashes of ideology both on local campuses and at the national level as the Academy undergoes constant change.

While these clashes certainly can be fueled by the media, such clashes are an indication of a larger trend: the competing interests and values that come with a heterogeneous population. According to the US Census Bureau, minority populations are rising at an increasing number while those who identify as Caucasian are rapidly losing their numerical dominance (Bureau 9). This is reflected in states like California, New Mexico, and, soon, Texas where Caucasians are the second largest ethnic population, behind Latinos (Panzar). The shifting demographics in our classrooms, although not represented to scale, do mirror the shifting demographics of the nation as a whole. The American Academy, as a whole, is becoming more ethnically diverse than it has ever been. In their most recent release of the “Freshman Survey,” UCLA’s Higher Education Research Institute noted that the newest freshman class entering the American Academy (including both private and public colleges and universities) is made up of roughly 68.2 percent White/Caucasian students with all other ethnic minorities equaling roughly 49.4
percent of students (with a total of over 100% allowing for multiple ethnicities to be represented within a single student) (Eagan et al. 47). These numbers show a clear difference from the 1990 survey, where the ethnicity split was 85.2/16.5 (Astin et al. 11) or, looking back even further, from 1970 where the split was 86.6/11.3 (National 37).

What the data show is a clear trend in academia where classes are becoming more ethnically diverse with the ratio of white to ethnic minority students shifting at a significantly increased rate in the last 20 years. Although these numbers are being used to show how diverse our students are, I use these numbers not to suggest that ideology is positively connected with any one ethnic identity, but to show that our students are coming to our classrooms as an increasingly heterogeneous population with increasingly diverse backgrounds and experiences, which ultimately translates to increasingly diverse worldviews and ideologies.¹

Our nation and universities are more diverse than they have ever been and we cannot afford to overlook the different experiences of each individual student. Because of this diversity, it is increasingly important to pay attention to how ideology functions within the classroom with its effects on the individual and the class as a whole. For this reason, the remainder of this chapter will explore how those in composition have justified and incorporated ideological inquiry into their pedagogies and the major criticisms levelled at those pedagogies.

¹ It should be noted that I use the terms ideology and worldview synonymously, following the Marxist tradition in which Marx connects ideology to the “production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness” (68). Or more plainly, Henry Giroux defines it as ideas that refer to “the production, interpretation, and effectivity of meaning” (66).
Ideology in the Composition Classroom: A Narrative’s Beginning

The justification for incorporating ideological analysis into rhetoric and composition pedagogies draws from a long history that connects rhetoric with civic participation. In the introduction to her book *Deliberate Conflict: Argument, Political Theory, and the Composition Class*, Patricia Robert Miller describes the connection between rhetoric and civic participation as one that is “as old as Aristotle,” which advocates for argumentation as being “necessary for the life of the polis” (3). She explains that this appeal is not only bolstered by the ethos of Aristotle, but also by the appeal to civic duty because “the skill of argumentation is important in a democracy” (3). Yet, rhetoric, as a tool of the civic, not only came with the teaching of argumentation, but was also steeped in teaching of morality, as important to the teaching of persuasion, which can be seen in the quote by Aristotle that begins this chapter. Thus the rhetorical tradition that claims rhetoric as important to the civic is not only about appeals in argumentations, but also tightly weaves together the teaching of rhetoric; the *polis*, or city state; the *demos*, or common people; issues of ethics and virtue; and civic participation for the purposes of democracy.

Although major differences exist between the Greek system of direct democracy, and our modern representative democracy, many contemporary scholars continue to appeal to the democracy of the Classical Greeks, with all that it entails, as a foundation for rhetorical instruction within the modern composition classroom. In the most recent edition of the textbook *Everything’s an Argument*, authors Andrea Lunsford and John Ruszkiewicz declare that they “have designed *Everything’s an Argument* to be itself a case for civil persuasion” (Lunsford IX). By appealing to the civil, from the Latin *cīvīlus*,...
meaning in relation to a citizenry, Lunsford and Ruszkiewicz make the connection between rhetoric and the civic, developing that connection to the Greek tradition of rhetorical instruction. In addition to the democratic appeals, it is not uncommon to see Greek terms at the heart of the composition course that is informed by rhetoric, such as the rhetorical triad espoused by Aristotle of *logos, ethos, and pathos*. There is also talk of the *kairotic* moment, a term borrowed from the Greek Sophists which relates to the most optimal time and circumstances for persuasion to occur. In essence, the field of rhetoric and composition claims citizenship education, and by extension ideological inquiry, as a legacy of classical rhetoric, and one that is necessary to teach in the modern classroom, not only for the betterment of the individual, but for the betterment of democracy and the nation.

**Ideology in the Composition Classroom: A More Recent Beginning**

Although composition scholars who are informed by rhetoric claim a tradition that is over 2,000 years old, the history of composition as an academic field is significantly more recent, beginning with literary studies. In the late 19th century, Harvard required of its incoming freshman that “each candidate will be required to write a short English composition, correct in spelling, punctuation, grammar, and expression, the subject to be taken from such works of standard authors as shall be announced from time to time” (Bedford). This composition requirement, although relegating composition as a service to “such works of standard authors,” or literary studies, marked a beginning for composition curricula. In 1913, the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) formed to try to standardize the many lists of canonical authors that students should be able to write about (Bedford). Although composition as a semi-field underwent minor
changes in its approach to the content of writing, it would not break away from the current-traditional model set forth by Harvard until the latter half of the 20th century when the NCTE mandated the formation of the first Conference on College Communication and Composition, which began to lay the foundation for dramatic changes to be made in the field that was quickly becoming its own discipline (Beford).

As the latter half of the 20th century pushed forward, renewed interest in how classical theories of rhetoric could shape writing instruction began to slowly replace the current-traditional model of composition (Bedford). In his 1969 essay “The Rhetorical Stance,” Wayne Booth suggests a model of composition that hearkens back to the rhetorical triangle of the Greeks. Booth suggests that students focus on “a proper balance among the three elements that are…the available arguments about the subject itself [logos], the interests and peculiarities of the audience [pathos], and the voice… of the speaker [ethos]” (“Rhetorical Stance” 141). Breaking away from the current-traditional model, Booth advocates for the composition classroom to be a space that necessarily looks at the value of what is being said, who it is being said by, and what effect it is having on the audience. Yet, for this to occur, writers must necessarily begin to explicitly examine the commonly held values and worldviews of their target audience to ensure that their message is successful.

Following his essay on the rhetorical stance, Booth further outlines the role of the composition classroom, especially as it relates to argumentation. In his book Modern

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2 In his article “Process Pedagogy and Its Legacy,” Chris Anson offers a helpful definition of current-traditional rhetoric when he defines the “current-traditional paradigm” as: “traditional because it was based on a long history of product-focused instruction; current because that focus still persists among those who have ignored the field or deliberately resisted what it has said about the acquisition of writing ability” (215).
Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, Booth finds fault with scholars who advance the idea that facts and values are inherently separate, where one is objective while the other is subjective. Applying this critique to the composition classroom, Booth acknowledges that when he first began teaching argumentation, it “emulate[d] the purity of and objectivity and rigor of science,” and he came to the conclusion that, “whenever I touched on values, all I could do was indoctrinate, unless in some sense the pursuit of literary values is reasonable” (88). Booth then spends much of the rest of his text defending the value of teaching values, primarily as a way of winning assent and cooperation in argument. Thus splitting from the model put forth by Harvard, which emphasized correctness in writing, Booth’s composition classroom embraces rhetorical theory as a foundation, and it privileges issues of values and ideology as central to human decision making, and therefore critical to a class focused on argumentation and assent.

Extending this revival in the rhetoric of Classical Greece and emphasis on audience and values, Edwin Black “pioneered adding overt ideological judgement of public texts to the already established practices…” (Condit 2). In his essay, “The Second Persona,” Black explores ways in which moral criticism can be applied to public texts. Rejecting earlier notions of texts as value-neutral objects, Black argues that such objects contain “idiomatic tokens of...ideology” which instill ideological elements of the rhetor, or the rhetor’s persona, into willing auditors (115). By suggesting that rhetors are engaged in creating an ideal audience and sculpting willing auditors to become that audience, Black suggests that texts cannot be considered value-neutral. Instead, because they are engaged in moving willing auditors into adopting the ideology of the rhetor or his persona, Black posits that texts should undergo ideological analysis and “moral
This permission to engage in the ideological and moral aspects of a text marks an important turn for scholars of rhetoric and composition, as the act of applying moral criticism was now being sanctioned not only by other rhetoric professors, but by journals being willing to publish such material.

While perceptions of rhetoric were undergoing significant changes throughout the 1960s and 70s, so too were perceptions of composition. In her introduction to *Errors and Expectations*, Mina Shaughnessy explains how the radical demographic shift of higher education via the open-admission process affected the composition classroom. Shaughnessy writes that for universities that incorporated open-admission policies, such as the City University of New York, higher education was not only “opened to a larger population of students than it had ever had before, but to a wider range of students than any college had ever admitted…” (1). Because many of these new students were less prepared than the previous classes, of elite students, composition instructors struggled to adapt to such diverse needs within the classroom, with some faculty “announce[ing] to their supervisors (or their students) after only a week of class that everyone was probably going to fail” (3). What Shaughnessy describes is not only a situation of frustrated teachers, but the initial reaction to different viewpoints being incorporated into the classroom, different viewpoints of literacy and life experiences that instructors now had to navigate.

At the heart of the conflict that Shaughnessy describes is an ideological element that often comes with demographic shifts: language. Because many of the students under open-admission policies were attending without privileged education backgrounds, issues of language, especially whose dialect should be considered right or wrong became a
significant issue. Shaughnessy addresses this issue of literacy by suggesting that basic writers must learn to adapt to the dominant dialects largely due to the economic and hierarchical systems tied to those dialects. She goes on to write that, “all codes become codes by doing some things regularly (and not others) and… [what] makes them obligatory…logical or no, is that they have become habitual to those who communicate within that code” (12). Although she recognizes that the dominant code may not be completely logical, she goes on defend her position by stating that the “person who does not control the dominant code of literacy…is likely to be pitched against more obstacles than are apparent to those who have already mastered that code” (13). By writing about her experience with basic writers, Shaughnessy’s work reiterates that the composition classroom plays a major role in reinforcing dominant ideology, but it must also reconcile that ideological instruction with realistic barriers.

While some educators saw the conflict of dominant and non-dominant worldviews colliding as a practice in adapting, earlier educators argued that such hegemonic views of language constituted a political act, serving dominant ideologies and culture. In his landmark text *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Brazilian teacher Paulo Freire argues that language is a primary vehicle for either liberation or oppression (33). For Freire, the questions of who gets to speak, and how, are important because they directly correlate to liberatory or oppressive practices. By forcing others to exchange their authentic voices for the prescribed voices of the privileged dialect, Freire argues that, in doing so, students become dehumanized and oppressed by the rules of dominant society (55). Freire continues by writing that such oppression shapes how students see themselves in relation to the world, literally determining their worldview. For Freire,
liberation occurs when an individual is free to utilize his own voice and dialect to name the world. Freire writes, that “to exist humanly is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming” (Freire 76).

The explication of language as a vehicle of oppression or liberation leads to Freire’s much larger critique of formal education: the dehumanization of students for social control. Calling formal education the “banking-model of education,” Freire argues that students are dehumanized and trained to become “receptacles to be filled… [where] the more completely students accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view deposited to them” (58-59). Freire chides formal education as being an “exercise of domination…with the ideological intent (often not perceived by educators) of indoctrinating [students] to adapt to the world of oppression” (Freire 65). For Freire, the recognition that education serves to promote certain worldviews (such as submission to authority, conformity, and lack of critical analysis upon institutions promoting the status quo) makes the classroom the penultimate expression of ideology, and he suggests that instructors recognize it as either a place for social control or a space for student liberation.

In only a few short years, the views on language and oppression within the composition classroom began to move away from language as a value neutral concept toward an understanding that with control of language comes significant social power. In 1972, the Committee on the CCCC Language Statement issued its statement that was formally adopted in 1974. This statement claimed that students have a right “to their own patterns and varieties of language” and that “the claim that any one dialect is
unacceptable amounts to an attempt of one social group to exert its dominance over
another…. Such a claim leads to false advice for speakers and writers, and immoral
advice for humans” (Committee 2-3). In formally endorsing the committee’s statement,
the NCTE, as the overarching organization for the CCCC and its committee, affirmed the
rights of students with dialects different than what they called Edited American English,
or the standard, academic dialect. This declaration then formally sanctioned the inquiry of
how dialects, which effect social understanding, are closely tied to issues of hegemony
within the composition classroom and sanctioned explicit discussions of language as
ideology within the composition classroom.

Following the NCTE’s declaration, many composition scholars began looking at
how the expectations of language and composition revealed dominant worldviews while
suppressing minoritarian views and behavior. Dubbed “the hidden curriculum” by
educational scholars like Michael Apple (14) and Henry Giroux (42), this curriculum, and
the desire to expose it, became a significant focus for many critical pedagogues,
including compositionist Ira Shor. In his book *Critical Teaching and Every Day Life*,
Shor continues the work of Paulo Freire, but this time looking at the American Education
System as a system of oppression and one of potential liberation, writing that “the spread
of school endangers learning” (3). Shor goes on to write that “the teacher who changes to
liberatory modes accepts responsibility for a process which converts students from
manipulated objects into active, critical subjects” (97). Thus what can be seen in these
liberatory classrooms is not necessarily an emphasis upon writing as course content, but
rather using writing to critically analyze ideological content so that the student recognizes
how dominant ideology oppresses others. In essence, Shor writes that the purpose of such
a liberatory classroom is not only to teach the students, but also to change the students’ consciousness and the ways in which they view the world.

To accomplish this change in consciousness, Shor advocates for Freire’s problem-posing pedagogies which blur the lines between teacher and student, emphasizing the dialogic processes, creating a less-authoritarian and more democratic classroom. To do this, Shor advocates for the teacher to take on the role of the “teacher-student,” while students take on the role of “student-teachers” (Freire 66). Again borrowing from Freire, Shor writes of his classroom pedagogies that:

I came to class prepared to pose a number of problems.... At any moment I had to... abandon my plans and move in the direction of the dialogic process.... You have to listen carefully all the time. The teacher does not routinely lecture.... This milieu demands that the teacher surrenders her or his authoritarian supports. (Critical XXV)

Not only does Shor incorporate Freire’s view of education as being a political act, but he also incorporates many of Freire’s pedagogies into the disciplines of composition.

To achieve this anti-authoritarian environment, Shor advocates for a series of other pedagogies to be brought into the composition classroom. He advocates for activities such as “introductory sign-ins” where, rather than being lectured to, students talk about themselves, their interests and desires for the class, which can then be incorporated into the course content. Additionally, Shor advocates for utilizing free writes as a way to set a “non-authoritarian tone [for] the sessions” (Critical 129). He also advocates for what he calls “dictation sequences” where students pair up and work with each other, describing a vivid picture while the partner records it. The purpose of this exercise then is to:
make a connection between their speaking language and the act of writing language on the paper—which is now disassociated from them, because they have been required in authoritarian classrooms to encode a language in which they do not speak – Standard English. By transcribing the language of a peer, they validate their own native speech, which once it is put on paper with respectful care, turns out to be a far richer resource than they had imagined. (Critical 131)

Much like Shaughnessy and Freire, Shor is clearly concerned with issues of whose voice is being heard and what kind of reception it is gaining. Though unlike Shaughnessy, Shor argues not for cultural capital in learning dominant dialects, but rather using students’ experiences and worldviews as significant sources to enrich education (what he calls a generative theme) (Empowering 3). What can be seen in Shor’s pedagogies are not necessarily what one would normally expect, which he describes as “students waiting for the teacher to arrive and do education to them” and the teacher being “a talking head who would shellack them with grammar and knowledge” (italics added, Empowering 3). Instead, Shor opts for a pedagogy that places students’ voices in a position of authority while seeking to help those students develop a critical consciousness toward literacy and society as a whole.

Although some rhetoricians had been writing on the relationship between the rhetorical situation and language, this connection became much more profound with James Berlin’s Rhetoric and Reality. In his book, Berlin accounts for the different approaches to rhetoric within the 20th century, beginning with what he calls objective theories of rhetoric, which locate the real within the material world. Objective theories of rhetoric, like current-traditional rhetoric, view rhetoric and writing as a symbolic act that “at worst, is regarded as a distorting medium that alters the original perception, and at best as a transparent device that captures the original experience so that it might be
reproduced in the faculties of one’s audience” (8). He then moves to subjective theories of rhetoric, which “locate truth within the individual or within a realm that is only accessible only through the individual’s apprehension, apart from the empirically verifiable sensory world” (12). Finally, Berlin accounts for what he calls transactional theories of rhetoric that “sees truth as arising out of the interaction of the elements of the rhetorical situation” (15). He then breaks transactional theories down even further into what he calls classical, cognitive and epistemic, spending significant time on both classical and epistemic rhetoric.

Of classical rhetoric, Berlin writes that “truth is here located in a social construct involving the interlocutor and audience (or discourse community)” (15). Berlin suggests that classical rhetoric largely disregards logic and science, because they rarely lead to disagreement, and it is far more concerned with the human experience, the emotional, the aesthetic, and the ethical (15). Yet Berlin also notes that because rhetoric is so intimately tied to the political and the social spheres, logic does have a small place in classical rhetoric as it can be used to help make decisions through public discourse or as Berlin puts it “individuals working together within a community of discourse trying to decide what will be in the best interest of the group and the individual” (15). What Berlin describes here is the classical rhetorical situation as espoused by Booth, and much earlier by Aristotle and the classical Greeks. He talks about the role of logic (logos), the human experience and the audience’s response to it (ethos) and the emotional and aesthetic (pathos).

Although Berlin acknowledges that classical and epistemic rhetoric can be similar in that they both “posit a transaction of elements of the rhetorical situation” (16) the
significant difference between the two stems from the role of language. For classical notions of rhetoric, language is not significant in the realms of science or logic, as it is something separate from the social realm. Yet Berlin writes that under epistemic rhetoric all experiences, even the scientific and logical are grounded in language, and language determines their content as structure ... and language structures our response to the material world. Rhetoric thus becomes implicated in all human behavior. All truths arise out of the dialectic, out of the interaction of individuals within the discourse communities. (16-17)

The difference then largely becomes that under epistemic rhetoric, there is no way to view the world without the influence of language. The study of how language is being used to represent the world, even what we consider to be scientific or logical, is inherently one that is open to scrutiny for the epistemic rhetorician.

Building off epistemic rhetoric, Berlin goes on to champion an approach to teaching rhetoric, which he calls social-epistemic rhetoric. Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric not only shares ground with classical versions of rhetorical inquiry, but also shares much of the same interest in language, as a political act, that the critical pedagogues were interested in. Sharing ground with the classical rhetorical triangle, Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric involves three parts: “the dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse community in which the observer is functioning and the material conditions of existence” (“Ideology” 482). While the classic rhetorical triangle is made up of speaker, audience, and message, Berlin’s rhetorical triangle seems to have close correlations with one important deviation: In both triangles there is a speaker, or observer correlating with the concept of ethos. In both triangles there is an audience, correlating with pathos. But when it comes to the logos portion of the triangle, “the message” is swapped out for “the material conditions.” This marks and important shift in the
rhetorical approach as it acknowledges a constructivist worldview where the inherent value of logic is rejected for emphasizing how the logic is situated in context via language (the material conditions). Essentially, Berlin rejects the idea that there is an inherent objectivity to logic and instead logic is something that is socially constructed through the conditions of a particular group. This turn becomes especially important as it marks a move toward the collective, or social, in acknowledging that even the most entrenched values or logic, what can be considered scientific or objective, are socially constructed, rather than embodied, and are therefore subject to change.

This turn away from the objective nature of the logos in social-epistemic rhetoric is important because it complements the pedagogies of other critical pedagogues. Because social-epistemic rhetoric is overtly aware of the ideological, it “views knowledge as an arena of ideological conflict [where there are] no arguments from transcendent truth, since all arguments arise in ideology” (679). The understanding and constant unveiling of these conflicting ideologies “supports economic, social, political, and cultural democracy” where “what is good, what is possible, and how power is to be distributed… [is] continually decided by all and for all in a way that is appropriate to our own historical moment” (679). Thus the ultimate purpose of social-epistemic rhetoric is to fulfill Shor’s dream of students becoming their “own agents of for social change, creators for democratic culture” (Shor qtd. in Berlin 680). With an emphasis upon the dialectic, student authority, and ultimately democratic ideology, Berlin situates many of the critical pedagogies firmly within the realm of rhetoric, again validating the study of ideology, and its conflicts, in the composition classroom.
Although social epistemic rhetoric enjoyed the backing of a few noted compositionists, other prominent pedagogues sought to raise student consciousness in the composition classroom via different pedagogies, such as service learning. Stemming from the traditions of John Dewey, with an emphasis upon democratic education, pedagogues, such as Bruce Herzberg, argue for using writing and service learning to tackle issues of ideology in the composition classroom. Herzberg writes that the purpose of service learning in the composition class is not simply to write about the experience but to “study literacy and schooling and to write about that” (309-310). Although he advocates for service learning, Herzberg simultaneously critiques the experience as one that tends “to be personal” and “if our students regard social problems as chiefly or only personal, then they will not search beyond the person for a systemic explanation” (309). To help raise student consciousness about systemic oppression and how dominant ideologies reinforce oppressive practice, Herzberg pairs his service learning requirement with in-class discussions of Mike Roses’ Lives on the Boundary, so students can both read about and witness how implicit, dominant ideologies harm certain populations (310). For Herzberg, the composition class is not only a place to raise a democratic consciousness, but also one where students can read about and witness dangerous dominant ideologies with the hopes of garnering sympathies for social change.

What can be seen since the creation of composition as a discipline is an attempt to incorporate conflicts of ideology into the classroom in order to liberate students and enact social change. What began as a shift away from disassociating writing from thought, in the span of just a few decades, became a discipline of challenging dominant dialects and their harmful ideologies for anyone who was not of the dominant culture. What can thus
be seen is that in a few decades, the discipline of rhetoric and composition has continually sought to incorporate ideology into its curriculum to create a critical consciousness, within the student population, under the guise of developing better and more empathetic citizens, a tradition that such scholars claim as directly descending from the Greeks.

**Ideology in the Composition Classroom: Some Limitations**

Although many composition scholars have sought to develop critically-conscious citizens by calling attention to ideology within the classroom, such pedagogies have not been without significant criticism. As composition, as a discipline, turned away from current-traditional rhetoric, and its emphasis upon writing conventions, the field became the target of significant public outrage. In their 1975 article, “Why Johnny Can’t Write,” Newsweek decries the passage of NCTE’s affirmation of a student’s right to their own language and laments expansions in the composition curriculum to allow students to work with contemporary media of communication such as film, videotape and photography” (Shiels 60). They go on to write that the first step to “fixing” literacy within the United States is to “teach the English teachers themselves how to write. "If they don't know," the article asks, "how on earth are they supposed to teach the children? (Shiels 62).

Although Newsweek published their article over 40 years ago, this criticism still continues today. In his column for the New York Times, Stanley Fish echoes the criticism of Newsweek when he writes:

Although the other 100 sections fulfilled the composition requirement, instruction in composition was not their focus. Instead, the students spent much of
their time discussing novels, movies, TV shows and essays on a variety of hot-button issues — racism, sexism, immigration, globalization. (Fish)

Fish then comes to the conclusion that “unless writing courses focus exclusively on writing, they are a sham...all courses listed as courses in composition [should] teach grammar and rhetoric and nothing else” (Fish). What can be seen in Fish’s criticism of his own university’s writing program is a major objection to favoring other types of rhetoric above current-traditional. This objection argues that the sole purpose of the composition classroom is to teach the mechanics of writing, and to focus on anything other than writing mechanics is doing a disservice to students.

And while some suggest that teaching ideology distracts from teaching rhetoric and composition, others posit that it is just too complex and lofty. Sharon Crowley writes, “I think, that the aim of empowering students, however worthy, is so encompassing that it can never be reached...can we impart literacy in a quarter? A semester? A year?” (234). Expressing similar sentiments about time and efficacy, Maxine Hairston writes, “Multicultural issues are too complex and diverse to be dealt with fully and responsibly in an English course, much less a course that in which the focus should be on writing, not reading” (487). Even when literacy education is right in front of her students, Linda Adler Kassner writes that the purpose of service learning should not be to raise critical consciousness, as Herzberg suggests, because just “helping students articulate whatever consciousness they had in a way that was acceptable in the academy” was a much larger and worthy challenge (Kassner 555). What can be seen through these many objections is one of pragmatism: critical consciousness is too lofty to achieve in such little time,
especially when students are struggling to simply articulate their own immediate consciousness in an academic way.

Other criticisms of bringing ideology into the liberatory classroom stem from personal experience. In her reflection on her critical classroom, Karen Keaton Jackson writes:

In my early service-learning courses, I used texts that focused on race. Students seemed to feel the issue of race was forced on them, and they remained circumspect, afraid to engage in critical discussion. Despite my intentions, students may have felt their experiences and beliefs weren’t validated, and my status as an African-American may have exacerbated these concerns. (Ray et al 166)

What Jackson describes is an issue of exclusion within the critical classroom. If students feel like what they believe is antithetical to the message that the instructor is preaching, they will refuse to speak. In his analysis of critical studies, Richard Fulkerson notes an even more troubling trend which can occur: “In addition, a student who knows his or her own teacher’s political views will probably not choose to oppose them with a grade at stake” (Fulkerson 28). Not only are students often not comfortable with disagreeing with an instructor’s political position, but the classroom structure encourages these students who disagree to passively pay lip-service to critical ideologies to simply get the grade.

Along with the fear of chilling student speech in favor for ideological discussion, other composition scholars have suggested that attempting to teach critical pedagogies should be equated with liberal indoctrination, especially given the close connections of critical pedagogies to Marxist and Neo-Marxist ideas (Inman 4, Giroux 99, Apple 1). Yet compositionists, without explicitly charging critical pedagogues with advancing Marxist ideals, have explicitly asserted charges of indoctrination. In his prominent book *Save the
Stanley Fish argues that “if a university or professor pressures students to accept [alternative principles] as theirs, it is using the power it has to impose a moral vision on those who do not share it” (46).

A final criticism that I wish to offer of prominent pedagogies that seek to incorporate issues of ideology is the implied connection between liberatory pedagogies that illuminate ideology and a problematic, monolithic appeal to democracy. In a refreshingly-meta review of the discourse surrounding the notions of democracy and citizenship, Patricia Roberts-Miller urges composition teachers to examine the connections between pedagogy and political theory as she asserts that, “much of our disagreement about pedagogical practices is disagreement about what it means (or should mean) to participate in a democratic public sphere” (4). In her article, she taxonomizes six different definitions of democracy that are represented in composition pedagogies: “liberal, technocratic, interest-based, agonistic, communitarian, and deliberative.” She then suggests that while the liberal model of democracy “theorizes a public space where people rely on rational discourse in order to determine what is in the universal best interest… [it is] explicitly utopian, as both advocates and critics… describe it as a vision that has never existed” (4).

Although Roberts Miller asserts that there are problems with idolizing the liberal model, without paying significant attention to the other types of democratic public spheres, she highlights a fundamental ideological issue that arises from labeling critical pedagogy as democratic. If we consider the widely espoused rhetorical tradition of the Greek polis, we inherently see two types of democratic spheres at play. On one hand, there is the classical model, where theoretically, Athenians would gather to practice
democracy, debating with one another to determine the direction of the country and the public good. On the other hand, rhetoricians also espouse a history of rhetoric that stems from a sophist tradition, in which an individual must be adept in rhetorical practices as lawyers were scarce and ancient courts would require individuals to represent their own interests, thus professing the interest-based, self-interested approach. Even in our own view of rhetoric and democracy, from the outset of our espoused history there is a conflict about what public sphere is being implied when democracy is invoked. Is democracy a tool for the public good or for the protection and welfare of the individual? Can it be both, or at what point does it switch between the spheres?

In the more recent history of ideology in composition, especially as it espouses democracy, this dilemma is only complicated further. In discussing democracy, Ira Shor mentions things such as, “Professorial resistance to \textit{democratic access}” (19), \textit{democratic discourse}…critically questioning each other, as well as orthodoxy, for mutually evolving awareness, or ‘conscientization’ in Freirean terms” (30), and “teachers…may simply choose not to cooperate with \textit{democratic pedagogy}. Many will not be able to respond to an egalitarian mode in class” (34). In roughly 15 pages, these passages invoke different taxonomies of democracy. In the first of the Shor examples, democracy is being discussed in terms of egalitarian-access, correlating closely with Roberts-Miller’s “communitarian democracy” model since, as Shor advocates for opening admission to non-elite students, he is rejecting a fundamental belief in the “privileging of the autonomous individual” (Roberts Miller 5). In his second, democratic mention, Shor invokes Freire’s conscientization, or critical thinking, which then utilizes dialogue and “the conviction of the oppressed that they may fight for their liberation” (Freire 54). In
other words, consciousness allows the oppressed to engage in dialogue with their oppressors. This has close ties to Roberts Miller’s agonistic definition which she describes as having the ability to “make any single ideology temporary through forcing it to engage with whatever voices, perspectives, or persons the ideology excludes” (Roberts-Miller 127). Finally, Shor’s third portrayal of democracy, although communitarian, is closely connected to Roberts Miller’s taxonomy of deliberative. By elevating the student’s experience above the teacher’s content knowledge, opts to privilege “narrative, attention to the particular, sensibility,…[and] emotion” as worthy forms of knowledge and argument (7).

While Shor seems to dance between the different taxonomies, other pedagogues fall firmly within a specific taxonomy. For Berlin, democracy is communitarianism, as social-epistemic rhetoric meets the criteria of showing dependence upon homogeneity (Roberts-Miller 143). Although Berlin’s social epistemic rhetoric allows for the different viewpoints contained within the social, it still clearly relies upon a homogenous society as can be seen in the earlier quote: “what is good, what is possible, and how power is to be distributed… [is] continually decided by all and for all in a way that is appropriate to our own historical moment” (italics added, Ideology 679). In Berlin’s view of democracy, all competing ideologies within the social will come to a single consensus about how to distribute power, and will have such agreement that this moment will be defined by a singular historical moment. For such a thing to occur, an entire society would have to be in complete agreement without significant ideological conflict. When conflict is introduced, a singular moment is fractured into as many viewpoints as there are parties that can interpret the moment through their own ideological lens. Thus homogeneity is
the only way for such consensus to be gained. Alternatively, if implemented in a heterogeneous society, what occurs is the formation of the dominant majority, a critical mass, who then enforces their will and worldview upon the minority, or simply discounts them altogether to form the illusion of a single historical moment that has been “decided by all.” Such a critical mass runs directly counter to the aims of liberatory pedagogy which seeks to dismantle authoritarian structures, even if those structures are a more inclusive majority.

Without further belaboring the point for every pedagogue who has discussed ideology in the classroom, what I hope to make clear is that while the titles liberatory, critical, and democratic have all been used as justifications for incorporating ideology into the composition classroom, despite that they have been used concurrently, if not synonymously, they should not be considered so. Given that some spheres of democracy line up clearly with liberatory practices, while others can potentially hinder them, the monolithic appeal to democracy in discussions of liberation and ideology in the classroom is not adequate.

Although this review is not exhaustive of all the pedagogies that seek to introduce ideology into composition via classroom pedagogy, we can clearly see how it has remained a challenge in composition to incorporate ideology. Some scholars continue to try to strike a balance between illuminating worldviews, teaching composition, considering mental and temporal constraints, and avoiding indoctrination. Aligning myself with these scholars, I propose, in the following chapter, a pedagogical approach, not a perfect solution, that may allow for enriching discussions of ideology while avoiding the major criticisms that have been presented in the literature.
Chapter 2: Ideographic Analysis of Ferguson as Social Clash: a Case Study

“the deconstructive phase of critical thought...has lost its effectiveness. It is now a closed parenthesis and leaves us faced with a new task: constructing” - Hardt and Negri qtd. in Mahoney

As a field, composition has a long history of valuing studies in ideology (c.f. Aristotle; Booth, 1969; Black, 1970; Shor 1979; Berlin 1990; Herzberg, 1994; Ray et al. 2011) but these studies have also been met with significant resistance for multiple reasons (c.f. Hairston, 1992; Crowley 1994; Fish, 2008; Bauerlein & Bellow, 2015). Discussions of ideology are largely acknowledged to be valuable discussions that illuminate implicit worldviews behind cultural practices and beliefs, but they also have the potential to alienate our students. Thus the question continues to haunt us: how can we talk about clashes of ideology, within the composition classroom, while still focusing on student writing, promoting humanization, avoiding charges of indoctrination, and refusing to appeal to the ethereal and at times contradicting ideals of democracy? In a move that is all too familiar within our field, I wish to situate this question further.

In her Atlantic article about Ferguson, Dr. Marcia Chatelain appeals to educators, asking them to “commit to talking about Ferguson on the first day of classes” (Chatelain). To help educators “talk about Ferguson”, Chatelain offers the use of the hashtag #Fergusonsyllabus for Twitter users to compile their suggestions for talking about Ferguson with their students. For some, this seems to be a natural subject. In their response to #Fergusonsyllabus, the organization Sociologists for Justice compiled a
statement on Ferguson regarding structures of oppression and posted a specific syllabus to their website, also labeling it with the #Fergusonsyllabus tag (Sociologists). Unlike the field of sociology, which has a very clear area of interest in the study of Ferguson, composition does not have that obvious, immediate connection. How are we, as rhetoric and composition scholars, supposed to “talk about Ferguson?” Any direct mention of Ferguson, either in support of the protests or against, opens us to the same charges of radical indoctrination that have plagued our field for the last thirty years. We could fall back to the tried and true methods of the expressivists, asking our students to journal or free write about their response to the clash. Yet, discussions of personal feelings are difficult to have a relevant discussion about, without entrenching students in their own affect or circling us back to instructor indoctrination. As of now, very few pedagogical approaches in rhetoric and composition offer us a way to break away from charges of indoctrination or personal affect.

In this chapter, I wish to propose a pedagogical approach that will allow scholars of rhetoric and composition to incorporate clashes of ideology into the composition classroom while also avoiding the charges levelled against earlier pedagogies that attempted the same thing. I propose that rhetorical theory, specifically ideographic analysis, can incorporate clashes of ideology into the composition classroom in a meaningful way without indoctrinating students while still emphasizing writing in the composition classroom. By looking at ways in which Ferguson, as a historical event, can be approached as <Ferguson>, the ideograph³, I wish to propose that Ferguson can act as a case study which, as a clash of ideology, can be broken down and understood in such a

³ Using the carrots: <ideograph> is a standard way to denote an ideograph
way that will allow our students to engage in ideological discussion. It is the purpose of
the rest of this chapter to provide a model for analyzing clashes of ideology and using the
ideograph, so that clashes can enter the composition classroom in a meaningful way.

**Enter the Ideograph**

In his 1980 essay “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology”
Michael McGee argues that there is an inseparable link between ideology and discourse,
arguing that “humans beings are ‘conditioned,’ not directly to belief and behavior but to a
vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior
and belief” (6). For McGee, ideology is not only an issue of consciousness and
worldview, but also of rhetorical constructs, which act as “the building blocks of
ideology” (7). McGee calls these “building blocks” ideographs, and defines them as a
“one term sum of an orientation… that will be used to symbolize [a] line of argument”
(7). The power of these ideographs, McGee argues, is that no one “is permitted to
question the fundamental logic of ideographs: everyone is conditioned… [ideographs]
exist in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political
consciousness” (7). Drawing a connection to Burke’s terministic screens, McGee
suggests that ideographs simultaneously reflect and deflect different worldviews that
shape reality (12).

Breaking down the ideograph, McGee suggests that ideographs are made of two
pieces that work concurrently: the diachronic and the synchronic. For McGee, the
diachronic element of the ideograph pertains largely to time, noting that this element is
one that is relationally vertical, explaining that “the way an ideograph can have meaning
now is controlled in large part by what it meant then” (italics in original, 11). The
synchronic acts as the horizontal axis, to the vertical diachronic, as it is largely concerned with the way “that people make use of [ideographs] presently” and the ways in which they “clash with other ideographs” (italics in original, 12). Further developing the notion of the synchronic, McGee posits that the synchronic is related to other ideographs, not only through the clashes, but they also work in groups that are meant “to be taken together, as a working unit.” McGee offers examples such as <rule of law> as meant to be described using other ideographs such as <public trust>, <freedom of speech>, and <trial by jury> (13). And in this way, ideographs are “always understood in relation to one another” (14).

Building upon McGee’s conceptualization of the ideograph, Kevin Michael DeLuca contributes to McGee’s definition of the synchronic element by situating it within the political theory of agonism, earlier referred to as agonistic by Patricia Roberts-Miller, which is concerned with the places that worldviews conflict and studying that specific site of conflict. Expanding the synchronic element to be less static than it appeared in McGee’s original work, Deluca argues that synchronic elements “are specific, not foundational” as “they are the recognition of difference as the socially constructed” (41). Because they are constructed, DeLuca argues that they can be studied not only as a whole cluster, but also by the links that bind synchronic clusters together. The purpose of examining these links extends beyond simply “attempting to move the meanings of key ideographs” but instead to “disarticulate and rearticulate the links between the ideographs, and the synchronic” to show how different interpretations and definitions can arise out of a single ideograph (45).
Much like DeLuca, I too wish to use McGee’s ideograph in an agonistic spirit. Rather than using it to supplement political theory, I propose that McGee’s ideograph can be a beneficial tool within the composition classroom. It can highlight the fringes of ideologies that our students hold, rearticulate links between different ideographs, and offer new and diverse interpretations of those ideographs and ideologies to our students. What I am suggesting is that the ideograph and its agonistic nature can ask students to examine their own understandings of ideological clashes, and by extension, their own ideologies, to promote dialogue rather than situations in which students attempt to persuade by prostheletizing to their fellow students. Using the ideograph in this manner can expose students to different viewpoints that may utilize similar terminology for vastly different meanings, which can become a point of ideological tension.

Up to this point, I have suggested that composition currently has few pedagogical approaches for discussing clashes of ideology, such as the Ferguson protests. I have suggested the use of the ideograph as conceptualized by Michael McGee and have borrowed its theoretical application as a tool for encouraging agonism, yet all of my suggestions, up to this point, have largely been theoretical. Using the protests in Ferguson as a case study, I will show how the ideograph can be used to analyze clashes of ideology and offer pedagogues a framework for using ideographic analysis to incorporate clashes of ideology into the classroom as an extension of rhetorical theory.

**Ferguson and the Ideograph**

On August 9th 2014, 18 year old Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police officer, and his body was left in the streets for roughly 4 hours before it was transported to the city morgue (Bosman). Airing disgust about the way that the predominantly white
police force handled the shooting of Brown, a black man, members in the Ferguson community took to social media, including Twitter, to air their frustrations using the hashtag #Ferguson. As protests ramped up in the following days, members of the Ferguson community, along with media outlets began using #Ferguson to not only send updates about the protests, but also to offer pictures of police response to the rest of the nation. Pictures and reports spread through social media helped to elevate this killing of an unarmed man, by police, to the national stage, which was continually stoked by a series of dramatic actions, such as issuing curfews, calling in the National Guard to help quell protests, and a grand jury verdict refusing to indict the officer.

During the height of the unrest in Ferguson, Chatelain’s article came out advocating educators to use the hashtag #Fergusonsyllabus, a hashtag created by an educator, for educators, with educators from a myriad of disciplines responding. The new hashtag emerged as a force which attempted to merge the worlds of academia and protest, as protestors physically and ideologically clashed with establishment protestors, police, and military forces. As Chatelain issued her request for educators to talk about Ferguson, the thriving hashtag began to develop. It was not just a few responses from sociology or other social sciences, but as Chatelain called upon the Twittersphere for “a book, an article, a film, a song, a piece of artwork, or an assignment that speaks to some aspect of Ferguson,” a new issue began to arise: What exactly was Ferguson? As responses from educators poured in, the examples spanned not only mediums and disciplines, but also issues. Within the article itself Chatelain offers the following, limited categories: Teaching about race and Ferguson; African American History/Civil Rights in the United States; children’s books; community organizing, leadership, activism; educational issues;
media studies and journalism; music; other relevant hashtags; poetry; policing; and race and violence (Chatelain). Before she can finish her article, Chatelain’s request to talk about Ferguson evolves into talking about at least 10 major social issues.

What we can clearly see is that a commitment to talking about Ferguson is not simply committing to talking about a suburb of St. Louis. Rather, Ferguson, what appears to be a concrete set of historical events, is clearly many different things to many different people. When we treat Ferguson as a single historical event, the mass undertaking that is “talking about Ferguson” is more than overwhelming to anyone trying to dedicate only one or few class periods to this social issue.

Instead, I suggest we view social clashes, and in this case Ferguson, not as a set (or multiple sets, since we know that there are many views not represented within History) of historical facts, but rather treat it as an ideograph, as <Ferguson>, a political term worthy of analysis. Yet, by now we know that there are two elements to the ideograph: the diachronic and the synchronic. When scanning through some of the proposed texts, the diachronic element is revealed. Blog posts detailing the history of Missouri and the city of Ferguson, a message from then Attorney General Eric Holder, Information on the Ferguson-Florissant School District, and many more all serve to offer a specific image of Ferguson as it has been throughout the past, influencing how it should be seen now. Even within the categories included in Chatelain’s article, ideographic clusters emerge within <Ferguson> such as <race>, <African American History>, <Civil Rights>, <Activism>, <Education>, <Community>, <Policing> all of these surrounding issues of <Justice>. What can be seen from the response to Dr. Chatelain’s call is not just a response to talk about Ferguson, but a response begging to talk about <Ferguson> and
everything included in such an endeavor. This presents a new challenge for pedagogues: how can we commit to talking about these issues that each have a unique and complex history that shapes the way that we perceive them now?

First and foremost, as educators, we must accept that something as large as <Ferguson> is simply too large for students to handle in a single course, much less a single week or day. As noted above, <Ferguson> tackles more than just the killing of Michael Brown, but spans an entire section of U.S. History and beyond. Additionally, as Christopher Beer Todd says in his article on rapid response teaching, “We cannot assume that students know what we mean by Ferguson,” and when we consider what is being associated with <Ferguson>, we cannot readily assume that even the most knowledgeable instructors can know what there is to know about <Ferguson>. This is where ideographic analysis can help: once we recognize a clash as an ideograph, we can begin to locate the diachronic and synchronic elements. From there the analysis can be further narrowed by picking an ideograph within <Ferguson>. For this purpose, I want to narrow my emphasis upon one prominent ideograph, <policing>, to continue my analysis. I will then show how such ideographs can be used to analyze the arguments and discourse being made around the clash. Once elements of argument and discourse are identified, the study of clashes of ideology quickly falls under the domain of composition and rhetoric, and can be incorporated into classroom praxis, which we will visit in more depth in Chapter 3.

<Policing> as a part of <Ferguson>

During the Ferguson protests, policing became one central theme. With the death of Eric Garner, in New York, at the hands of police officers fresh in their minds, the American public was already primed for action when reports of Michael Brown’s death
came in. Immediately following the death of Michael Brown, protestors on both sides of the debate began to appear. On one hand, protestors decried a subversive war on young black men, and the over-militarization of police oppressors, while on the other, counter protestors took to the streets and to the media to defend the police and denounce the initial protests. What ensued then was over a month of back and forth arguing that resulted in neither side converting the other. Although the debates were spread out over weeks, a good synopsis of both sides can be found in one of Bill O’Reilly’s specials in which he and the Fox news team represent the pro-police standpoint of Ferguson, while Michelle Bernard and other news media outlets represented the anti-police view. In using broad strokes to distill a month’s worth of arguments and news coverage, the argument largely boils down to these two points of view:

_O’Reilly_: So let me restate – 12 million arrests a year, 400 fatal shootings, many of them justified. And Al Sharpton has the nerve to insult the American police community, men and women risking their lives to protect us. This Charlatan has the gall to do that…

_Bernard_: There is a war on black boys in this country. In my opinion there is a war on African- American men. It is an absolutely deplorable situation that the United States, which is supposed to be the greatest nation on earth, sits back and allows black boys to be murdered [by police]. (qtd. in O’Reilly)

What can be seen in the two pundits’ views is a fundamental clash of ideology surrounding the notion of <policing>. In the pro-police argument, police are “justified” because they “protect us” while “risking their lives.” In the anti-police camp, police are extensions of an oppressive state, which has declared “war on African-American men.” Because of this executive oppression, the narrative that the United States is the “greatest nation on earth” is disrupted because that executive entity is not associated with justice, but with “murder.” What we see then is an argument in which both sides are claiming
that their own ideology is superior to the other, causing the clash of ideologies. In moments of opposition, where ideologies are clashing, ideographic analysis can be used to apply an agonistic lens, which can highlight the conflict and move beyond the argument of who is right or wrong in favor of examining the worldview and experiences that are informing others’ ideologies.

Looking to McGee and ideographic analysis, it is important to begin the discussion of <policing> by first understanding that specific ways to understand ideographs are not typically something we choose, but are representative of a “mass conscious” (5) to which we are “conditioned” (6). McGee likens this conditioning to that of “a conditioned dog… obliged to salivate or socialized children… required to speak English” (6). Essentially, we must first remember that ideographic analysis begins with the understanding that these viewpoints are often ingrained in the ideologies and in the people, such viewpoints are not chosen or considered at the critical level. We can then begin ideographic analysis by examining the diachronic, or what the ideograph “meant then” to shape how it should be interpreted now (McGee 11). When looking at Ferguson, the most widely shared image, surrounding #Ferguson shows a comparison of two images, each with a line of black protestors contrasted against a police line (Stricker):

![Figure 2.1- <Policing> in Ferguson Protests](image-url)
Despite the age of the photo on the left in contrast to the age of the photo on the right, neither image necessarily suggests to audiences how they should view police, or <policing> when talking about Ferguson. At most, anyone viewing this image might suggest that perhaps not much has changed from then to now. But when a different image is introduced to prime the first image, the narrative begins to shift. Consider the following two images, and their contexts, and the way they can shape the narrative of the original image:

![Figure 2.2 Diachronic Views Informing <Policing>](image_url)

In the picture on the left, the beloved sheriff of Maybury, Andy Griffith, is shown. Griffith, known for using his position as Sheriff to help the people of Maybury and foil the attempts of any injustice, helps to prime the interpretation of the first photo. If a person comes to the first photo, equating policing to what is portrayed by Andy Griffith, where police officers act as upstanding agents of justice, that person may be inclined to initially understand the situation based on a positive historical view of the police, and <policing>. The second photo is of a civil rights protest in Birmingham, Alabama where police officers used police dogs and fire hoses to break up civil rights protestors, acting as oppressors to those fighting for justice. This image can prime an individual to have the opposite opinion. With the proper priming, there is an inclination to side with whatever
diachronic view is there. The diachronic elements, especially when reinforced for years, become the lens through which we interpret clashes, with different diachronic elements contributing to different interpretations of the same events, sparking ideological clashes.

Returning to the O’Reilly dialogue, the synchronic elements can also be teased out. In the pro-police view of <policing>, as espoused by O’Reilly, police are described as “justified,” connecting them to <justice>. Similarly in arguing that police “protect us,” a whole slew of ideographs are introduced when we begin to push on this idea of protection: What is it that police are protecting? <private property>, <human life>, and even <protection> itself comes in as an ideograph as they fulfill McGee’s criteria of being politically loaded words that are appealed to as if there is consensus to its meaning, but quickly deteriorate under further scrutiny. Similarly, we can also question, who is the us? <citizens> and <Americans>. Finally “risking their lives” associates police offers with the ideographs <sacrifice> and <martyr>. Thus the synchronic clusters of the pro-police view of <policing> create an extremely positive view of police officers and their practices. Similarly, the same analysis can be done of the converse argument. Here, police officers are associated with <soldiers> and are again associated with <Americans> but this time, as something that is acting as a threat, since it is aligned with <murder>. That alignment creates a vastly different painting as it calls into question a lack of <freedom> and acts as antithesis to <American exceptionalism>, painting a vastly different view of police and <policing> than the pro-police standpoint.

Further representing the expression of these worldviews, we can also look at different events that unfolded during the protests. After the shooting, an initial witness recounted that as Brown was shot, Brown was raising his hands and mouthing the words
“don’t shoot” (Dept. of Justice 6). The slogan “hands up don’t shoot” then became synonymous with the Ferguson protests to highlight police brutality perpetrated against minority populations. Pictures of protestors wearing “hands up don’t shoot” shirts with their hands up became the symbol for Ferguson sympathizers. Representatives Hakeem Jefferies, Yvette Clark, Sheila Jackson Lee, and Al-Green, while speaking at the House of Representatives all put their hands up in solidarity with the Ferguson protestors in the “hands up don’t shoot” movement (McCalmont).

The only caveat to the “hands up don’t shoot” narrative is that its inspiration likely did not happen, as the “statement is contradicted by the physical and forensic evidence” (Dept. of Justice 83). Although proving a negative is nearly impossible, the Department of Justice report of the events of Ferguson could not give credibility to the witnesses who testified that these were the final actions of Brown due to inconsistencies between testimony and forensic evidence (8). Regardless of the physical and forensic evidence, the “hands up don’t shoot” narrative continues to be powerful. It remains powerful not because Michael Brown was executed while attempting to surrender, but because it fits the specific worldview of those who hold this ideology. It remains powerful because, for those people who are inclined to buy into it, such a narrative is perpetuated by the ideology that police violence is brutality perpetrated by an oppressive institution toward members of minority populations.

Similarly, the effects of the ideographic worldview can also be seen on the pro-police side in the aftermath of Ferguson. After Officer Darren Wilson was not indicted by the grand jury in Ferguson, protestors once again took to the streets. In response to these
actions, Fox News host Bill O’Reilly published a segment, offering three interesting statistics:

1) “In the past 50 years, the rate of Black Americans killed by police has dropped 70%.”

2) “In 2012, 123 African-Americans were shot dead by police [in contrast to the] 326 whites killed by police bullets.”

3) “In 2013, Blacks committed 5,375 murders in America; Whites committed 4,396. Whites comprise 63 percent of the population; Blacks 13 percent. So, anyone thinking clearly can see that the homicide rate among Blacks [sic] way out of proportion” (O’Reilly).

Here we can see the influence of <policing> for the pro-police viewpoint: The first statistic is meant to challenge the narrative of police violence – although not explicitly saying it, viewers are meant to treat the narrative of black man killed by white police with suspect because this statistic is improving. The second offers a prima facie defense in which O’Reilly argues the numbers– 326 whites killed versus 123 African-Americans clearly more whites are killed. Finally, his third statistic contrasts how 13% of the population committed more murders in 2013 than a group that makes up 63%. When strung together, the narrative that O’Reilly creates is “police killings of African-Americans are on the decline, with more Whites than Blacks being killed. And it is really the Black community who is committing violence toward Black individuals.” This new narrative allows the previous narrative of the pro-police stance, of police being protectors and martyrs for justice, to remain intact. It is important here to note that although there
are many issues with the statistics as presented by O’Reilly, and with the “hands up don’t shoot movement,” the issue is not necessarily one of fact, but it is one of worldview, where those in the neither camp can break out of the established diachronic and synchronic elements of ideographs that comprise their worldviews.

In his article, “Michael Brown and the Clash of Civilizations: Activating Racialized History, Normalizing Racialized Violence” Scott Gage identifies this type of justification represented within O’Reilly’s statements as being the product of ideographic influences, primarily as shaped by the ideograph of <black brute> which has historically shown African American men to be “monstrous beast[s], crazed with lust” whose “ferocity [was] almost demoniacal” (Winston qtd. in Gage). He then goes on to point out that this portrayal of African American men is used to justify violence against African Americans (as can be seen in the O’Reilly argument) on the grounds that it is not the white population who is violent, but it is the white population who is forced to react violently against the already violent black population. At the end of his article, Gage suggests the use of ideographs to “disrupt and dissent [from]” normalized views of sanctioned state violence by “[undermining] the normalcy of racialized State punishment by describing it with ideographs such as <imperialism> and <terrorism>” (Gage). Clearly ideographic analysis can be an effective tool for interpreting and disrupting worldviews, but to introduce such disruptions into classroom pedagogy requires significant tact, and an alternative way of approaching rhetoric.
Post Script: A Theoretical Framework of Rhetoric for Ideographic Application

In this chapter, I have introduced the ideograph as a method for analyzing clashes of ideology. I have shown how Ferguson, as a historical event, is too massive to handle in the classroom, and have shown the value of considering Ferguson as an ideograph that can be broken down into more manageable pieces. I analyzed how the ideograph<policing> has primed the ways in which different viewpoints reacted to the situations in<br>Ferguson> and how, even when the logic of the position fails, the ideology remains intact, perpetually combatting any narrative that is not compatible with its own worldview. I then ended the chapter with the voices of other scholars who are also advocating for using the ideograph to interpret and discuss worldviews. Yet, for such worldviews to be disrupted, we must first re-envision a modern purpose for rhetoric, a purpose that extends beyond the binary persuasion for which it is currently employed.

To re-envision rhetoric’s purpose, we must first understand its purpose as it is often used now. Although such an endeavor could easily fill volumes, Bruce McComsky in his text Dialectical Rhetoric offers significant insight into rhetoric as it is now, and could be. In his text, McComskey borrows the ideas of “dimensionality” and “orientations” from Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man. Using this idea of dimensions, McComskey argues that there are currently two main approaches to rhetoric, but we are quickly approaching a need for a third orientation that is more suitable for the modern social climate. McComskey defines the first orientation of rhetoric as one that is largely concerned with the rational. One-dimensional rhetoric’s role is to distinguish what

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4 I have situated this post script as a transition between the case study and the application chapters, as it fulfills the role of neither, yet it is important to understand both as a caution to the incorporation and use of ideological analysis in the classroom, and to its practical application which will be discussed in chapter three.
is rational, and defend such ideas. Akin to a positivistic worldview, one-dimensional rhetoric only allows for one worldview to exist, the rational, while all other worldviews, and by extension people who hold those views, are irrational and simply dismissed (90). Two-dimensional rhetoric, according to McComskey, is a rhetoric of opposition, where there are two established worldviews vying for power (94). We see this view of rhetoric in public assumptions about argumentation. We ask those with whom we disagree to see the other side, as if only one other side exists. Thus two-dimensional rhetoric often lacks the nuance that exists in the world, forcing audiences into an either/or situation (95).

Looking back to our earlier pedagogues, we see this binary in the oppressor/oppressed, dominant/minoritarian, even the right/wrong worldviews that are espoused in <Ferguson>. The ultimate goal of this second orientation of rhetoric is conversion, to convert the opponent or to persuade those who have not yet joined a side.

Yet McComskey argues for a third approach, an approach that is more suitable to today’s needs of empathy and understanding in a heterogeneous world. This third approach is what he calls dialectical rhetoric, or a rhetoric built around dialogue and understanding, rather than consensus (100). Building off of Linda Flower’s work on community literacy (2008), McComskey argues that “three-dimensional dialectical deconstruction has a positive, affirmative (not just negative, critical) inflection: its task is not to reverse binary structures, but to construct new orientations no longer founded on old oppositions” (italics added, 117). By refusing to reverse binary structures, and instead opting to construct new structures and understandings, McComskey’s dialectical rhetoric seeks to move beyond right/wrong and understand what is for many different orientations in negotiation and mediation with each other. This is the type of rhetorical
framework that I suggest must accompany ideographic analysis. Ideographic analysis, and extended to rhetoric in general, cannot always be about determining who is right or wrong, or condemning the other side as being ignorant, bigoted, immoral. It must allow individuals to share their own understanding and experience in an exercise in empathy and understanding, rather than condemnation or conversion.

In addition to McComskey’s dialectical rhetoric, another prominent scholar’s approach offers a powerful way to discuss ideology within the classroom. In her article “Pathologia,” Jenny Rice concludes, that dialogue is piercing, [and] wounding” (38). But what makes these wounds so unique is that although they can exist, to an extent, within the individual, they transcend beyond individuality into the public sphere of affect, into the “mass consciousness” as McGee puts it, or “sensorium,” as she labels it. She then connects the sensorium to Raymond Williams’ “structures of feeling” or “social experiences in solution, as distinct from social semantic formations which have been precipitated and are more evidently and immediately available” more plainly said, affecting the common values and perceptions of a specific group at a specific moment (qtd. in Rice 39). What makes Rice’s theory on wounds and the sensorium so profound is her suggestion that we “theorize the wound itself as the beginning of dialogue… [reclaiming] the wound… moving away from the descriptive is…into the realm of ought” (italics in original 40).

What makes this such a powerful notion is that a common approach to persuasion has largely treated clashes of ideology as descriptive matters, as is matters, where the
primary function of these debates centers on logic, persuasion, and Truth. Even to the point of persuading from the front of the class, while wielding the gradebook against students. When we look at clashes of ideology that mobilize protestors and counter protestors, who call upon government officials for action and garner attention from multiple media outlets, rarely do we see these clashes stemming from the descriptive world of logic. We saw this earlier in the cases of “hands up don’t shoot” and of O’Reilly’s faulty statistics, both which have been easily rebutted logically, yet are still in circulation among the faithful in each camp.

What we see then is that clashes such as Ferguson largely stem from the sensorium where those who mobilize do so, not because they themselves have a stake in the outcome of the clash, but because they identify with a specific structure of feeling that is being targeted within the clash. Evidence for this type of mobilization can be seen in Ferguson in the police reports where, out of 51 people arrested for protesting in Ferguson, only 1 protestor was actually from Ferguson itself and “the rest were from surrounding towns and faraway cities such as Des Moines, Iowa, Chicago and New York” (Rosenbaum). Although certainly there are some who may have come for the spectacle and to engage in deviant behavior under the guise of legitimate protest, when we consider that many were arrested “for simply not dispersing when police ordered them to” it becomes much easier to accept that there must be something other than immediacy and logic driving these people to engage in a protest outside of their community, some sort of

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5 I emphasize Truth here, with a capital T, in reference to a belief in a constant, objective, Platonic type of truth. Such a reference can be seen in *The Phaedrus*’s depiction of the winged horses of the soul, while one yearns for the earthy, the other pulls towards the heavenly, constant Truth.
affiliation, some sort of feeling, and our approach to rhetoric must necessarily take such feeling into account.

What McComskey and Rice offer is a theoretical framework that guides an approach to working with clashes of ideology in the classroom, a framework that extends beyond the descriptive is and into the prescriptive ought, and it centers on dialogue and affect, rather than logic. Such an approach allows for a disengagement from a singular, comprehensive truth, in favor of engaging in perspective-sharing among students. And on a larger level, it is not only sharing among students, but among different perspectives represented within the sensorium, allowing students to use the wounds in the sensorium as the catalyst for discussion, rather than their own individual wounds, and personal feelings, which may or may not be a productive place for dialogue to stem form.

But it also must be recognized that this theoretical framework is not simply a place for students to share their worldviews, but a way in which to engage clashes of ideology in the classroom without making many of the same missteps that have been committed before in our discipline’s history. With dialogue being the center of the theoretical framework for discussing clashes of ideology, and the ideograph being the vehicle from which such analysis can begin, there is no shortage of writing that can be done. Students can analyze the genesis of their own viewpoints and learn to communicate such a position in a way that they can have a respectable conversation about it. They can also learn to listen to others and respond to others’ experience, rather than simply to disagree with the argument. This provides a significant opportunity for writing about oneself, articulating ideas, and to another for clarification and inquiry.
Additionally, because it is through dialogue and inquiry that understanding is worked toward, rather than an emphasis upon illumination, much of the pressure is removed from the instructor. There is no longer a pedagogical aim for students to be “sufficiently illuminated.” The purpose is not to reveal to students all of the injustices in the world and how ideology plays a significant role in perpetuating injustice, but rather to ask students to move beyond their single worldview, and practice empathy while also learning how to respond to lines of inquiry that may contradict their own. This type of inquiry is also aligned with Linda-Adler Kassner’s own goal of “helping students articulate whatever consciousness they had in a way that was acceptable in the academy” where students are asked to consider what structures they may belong to within the sensorium and begin to articulate such a position in a way that is productive toward inquiry. (Adler-Kassner 555). The reduced dependence upon illumination also reduces the chance for a chilling-effect as students realize that it is not valuable, in such a framework, to parrot back the ideology of the instructor, if those students know it at all. Because the dialogue is not a one-way street where students are rewarded for showing that they have become sufficiently illuminated, students are encouraged to present their own ideologies, as lines of inquiry, rather than trying to hide their ideologies.

The final criticism that this framework responds to is the fact that ideographic analysis informed by McComskye and Rice is in no uncertain terms a democratic pedagogy, but it is also one that actively resists the appeal to democracy as monolith. Looking back to Roberts-Miller’s definition of the agonistic and DeLuca’s connection with the ideograph to agonism, what we see is a pedagogy that is fundamentally concerned with discourse on the fringes. This pedagogy seeks to find the places where
worldviews become troubled as different worldviews are invited to speak within the public sphere. In essence, this pedagogical framework is entirely about negotiating democracy, but negotiating in a way that students learn to engage, and empathize with difference, while still allowing instructors of composition to focus on things like composition and rhetoric.

In this chapter I have shown how ideographic analysis can allow for understanding different viewpoints within a clash of ideology and how those viewpoints can be discussed using ideographic analysis. Paired with the framework from *Dialectical Rhetoric* and Jenny Rice’s work on the sensorium, I have laid out a theoretical framework from which the ideograph can be introduced into the classroom. In the next chapter, I will explore specific pedagogical moves that will enable students to enter into discussion about the sensorium, and ways in which ideographic analysis can be worked into already existing classroom structures.
Chapter 3: Rhetorical Theory to Classroom Praxis: The Ideograph in Action

“The smallest minority on earth is the individual. Those who deny individual rights cannot claim to be defenders of minorities.” - Ayn Rand in *Capitalism*

Incorporating ideological inquiry into the composition classroom is not as easy as “committing to talk about” specific clashes. To suggest that, the statement oversimplifies the amazing complexities that occur in “talking about” an ideology. It seems that within the statement to “talk about” ideology, there seem to be a number of premises that are taken for granted. First, to suggest that we need to “talk about” something treats discussion as if it is this monolithic illuminating practice. Part of the problem in clashes of ideology, with Ferguson, is that we, as a society, are talking about Ferguson. Bill O’Reilly is talking about Ferguson, Al Sharpton is talking about Ferguson, Michelle Bernard is talking about Ferguson, and the list goes on and on, but the problem remains that simply talking about an issue does equate to resolution or understanding. And this is only compounded by the fact, as we saw with Ferguson, that often times despite differing sides sharing language about a problem, their interpretations of that problem are vastly different. What we need then are strategies for creating productive dialogue that accomplishes the task of building understanding and empathy, rather than consensus.

In Chapter One we looked at the ways that compositions pedagogies have tried to justify ideological inquiry using rhetorical principles. We also looked at some of the major critiques of attempting to incorporate illuminating practices into the composition classroom. In Chapter Two we looked at the ideograph, and ideographic analysis, as a
possible way to analyze the Ferguson protests, which offers a way to effectively analyze clashes of ideology. At the end of Chapter Two there was also a short framework for handling clashes of ideology, identifying that wounds within the sensorium (or mass consciousness to return to McGee) can be productive places for discussion. This emphasis upon dialogue found in Linda Flower’s Intercultural Inquiry, ultimately, led us to Bruce McComskkey’s dialectical rhetoric. These approaches then act as a framework for discussing clashes, rather than trying to debate them, and they provide an approach for incorporating clashes into the composition classroom.

It is then the purpose of this chapter to show how ideographic analysis could be used as a pedagogical tool in analyzing ideological arguments, especially where clashes of ideology could exist. Keeping in mind the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Two, this chapter will look at ways in which ideographic analysis could be applied both within lower-level, such as first-year, composition as well as more advanced composition courses. The former, I suggest, can be done by allowing our students to analyze and create in a medium that many of them are already familiar with consuming, if not also with creating: the image macro. The latter, I posit, can be accomplished with a more in-depth approach to ideographic analysis, such as was modeled in Chapter Two.

The Meme as the Image Macro

One way that students are already analyzing and creating ideological and political arguments is in using the image macro. These endeavors can be seen all over social media, as evidenced by the “Bernie Sanders’ Dank Meme Stash” which can be found on Facebook, or the Internet Meme Database, which analyzes and tracks meme usages, offering information on a specific meme’s history, current usages, and analytics on its
popularity over time. I suggest that certain image macros, or memes, are ripe for ideographic analysis, and can be analyzed as a mode of current argumentation as well as created by students of lower-level composition courses.

Appropriating the name *meme*, from the term *gene*, Richard Dawkins originally posited the meme as a way to apply concepts from evolutionary biology to social phenomena, writing that “cultural transmission is analogous to genetic transmission in that, although basically conservative, it can give rise to a form of evolution” (Dawkins 189). This form of social evolution, similar to the biological gene, is what he calls “mimeme” but ultimately shortens to “meme,” which he explains as:

> tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves into the gene pool…via sperm and egg, so memes propagate themselves by in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in a broad sense, can be called imitation. (192)

In this explanation of memes, a definition is uncovered. Memes, for Dawkins, are both physical and immaterial units of culture that are replicated and transmitted widely.

Although Dawkins’ definition of the meme still holds true, and is largely still the foundation of mimetics (the study of memes), for the purposes of this chapter, I wish to use a more narrow definition of the meme found in Heidi Huntington’s “Pepper Spray Cop and the American Dream: Using Synecdoche and Metaphor to Unlock Internet Memes’ Visual Political Rhetoric” which defines the meme as “a variety of ‘‘catchy’ and widely propagated ideas or phenomena on the Internet” (Huntington 78). Drawing off of earlier scholarship done by Knobel and Lankshear (2007), Huntington uses the meme as a medium for discussing and analyzing visual, political rhetoric. To do this, she looks at different memes that incorporate the image of the “pepper spray cop”, Lt. Pike, of the UC
Davis Police Department, who pepper sprayed students at the height of the Occupy Wall Street protests in 2011. Huntington’s article proves valuable to the study of ideological memes as it shows that, despite the often whimsical nature of memes, they can be, and are, used to create complex visual arguments. Huntington’s article also shows that sometimes, these memes are not just complex arguments, but also ideological in nature, as many of the “pepper spray cop” memes are used to argue for individual liberty and freedom (80).

It is ultimately the narrow application of the term *meme* that Huntington uses, that I am concerned with here, which is called the image macro. Unlike the expansive definition of meme offered by Dawkins which includes “ideas, fashion, tradition, and culturally shared knowledge” the image macro is a much more specific type of meme (Dawkins 192). One can think of the relationship between the meme and the image macro as being similar to that of the rectangle and the square. Although all image macros are memes, not all memes are image macros. Typically the image macro is an image with white font at the top or the bottom of the image. Sometimes the text is misspelled as in the case of the widely popular “lolcats” memes, which is meant to offer humorous effect. Although Wikipedia traces the image macro to originating on the Something Awful Forums, it is hard to know for sure since one defining aspect of the meme/image macro, is quick replication (“Image Macro”).

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6 Although I try to tease out the distinction between the terms meme and image macro, much of this chapter uses them synonymously to align with the vernacular that the general internet users may use as can be seen in the earlier example of the Internet Meme Database and Bernie Sanders’ Dank Meme Stash.
It is also important to note that the image macro often functions off of shared cultural knowledge, which simultaneously transmits and evolves. In the case of the “lolcats” (a name derived from the acronym “lol,” or laugh out loud, and cat, the animal), the cheezburger macro is perhaps the most widely known, but the meme began to evolve. Evolution can be seen then in the following macros: note that although the cat has changed, and the text has changed, similar aesthetic features (the parts of the image macro: picture with superimposed text) exist as do features of the meme of “lolcats” (picture of cats, incorrect grammar and spelling, humorous message) also exists.

Thus, just as the meme is transmitting, and more people are becoming exposed to the humorous cat memes, so too are the image macros evolving. Take special note of the third meme and its bent toward the political. The cat has a black patch over its mouth.
akin to Hitler’s moustache with the text “I can has Poland?” Although I do not wish to suggest that the political is the absolute *telos* of the image macro, politics can play an important role in the image macro and can easily come to represent clashes of ideology, despite the whimsical nature of the medium. This ideologically-loaded type of image macro will be explored in more detail further in this chapter.

**Enter the Ideograph (Again)**

When he originally contributed the ideograph to rhetorical theory, McGee offered the ideograph in its primitive state. He writes that it is “through words only (and not claims), such terms as ‘property,’ ‘religion,’ ‘right of privacy,’ ‘freedom of speech,’ ‘rule of law,’ and ‘liberty’ are more pregnant than propositions ever could be. They are the basic structural elements, the building blocks of ideology” (McGee 6-7). Essentially for McGee, the ideograph is meant to be understood as a unit of speech, something firmly within the realm of communication and discourse studies that acts as a verbal “object” to shape the worldviews of those who it influences. Although McGee largely imagined the ideograph to be a verbal unit, more recent ideographic research has expanded the ideograph into areas beyond speech communication.

In her 2004 article, Dana Cloud suggests that “that photographs and other images can enact ideographs visually and index, or point to, the verbal slogans capturing society’s guiding abstractions” (Cloud 288). Arguing that images of Afghani women supported the ideograph <clash of civilizations> in mobilizing the West to war in Afghanistan, to help the Afghani women, Cloud suggests that such images point explicitly toward <clash of civilization> but also toward <liberty> and <freedom from oppression>. Cloud’s emphasis upon the visual as pointing toward other ideographs
marks a significant shift away from the ideograph as posited by McGee: no longer is the ideograph simply a verbal unit, but now the world of visual rhetoric could be interpreted through ideographic analysis as well, allowing images to be scrutinized for their ideographs and ideological arguments.⁷

The realm of the ideograph was again expanded in 2007 by Davi Johnson, who opened the world of mimetics to ideographic analysis. In her article, “Mapping the Meme” Johnson argues that “the meme is both a supplement and an alternative to McGee’s Ideograph” (28). Parting from both the definition of the ideograph “which is limited to words—or representational forms (as in Cloud),” Johnson looks back to Dawkins’ original definition of the meme as unit of cultural discourse which can include any type of expansive cultural artifact. In making this broader connection, Johnson suggests that the “meme and the ideograph both function to persuade” (42) with “the [ideograph] acting like a ‘rider,’ capitalizing on the speed and mobility of the meme (44).

Although Johnson uses meme in its broadest sense, and expands the ideograph into mimetics, she ends her article with advice offered by Deleuze and Guattari who suggest that “readers take concepts and ideas, and use them without strictly limiting themselves to the (perceived intentions) of the authors” (qtd in Johnson 45). It is in the spirit of this advice that I wish to expand on the notion of ideograph as “rider” to the meme and merge this idea with Cloud’s interpretation of the ideograph as both written and visual medium.

⁷ It is important to note here, that although she expands the realm of the ideograph, Cloud’s definition of the ideograph continues the notion of the ideograph as “pregnant” or something that contains and conceals ideology. Although this does not change the nature of opening up visual rhetoric to the ideograph, such a viewpoint of the meme is different than other interpretations of the ideograph and marks a relevant area of disagreement in ideographic analysis from that of Davi Johnson.
to suggest that the ideograph does, in fact, have a place in both analyzing and creating (narrowly defined) memes and image macros.

**Image Macros and Ideographs: A Pedagogy for Composition**

Although the “Lolcats” are a significant contributor to our understanding of the image macro, just as the “Poland Kitty” in Figure 3.3 pointed toward the political, so too can we see that turn in other image macros. This political turn offers ripe ground for ideographic analysis within a lower-level composition classroom, allowing students to compose in a medium that many of them are already familiar with. The following portion of this section will then be devoted to describing a pedagogy surrounding the analysis and creation of image macros as a way to incorporate clashes of ideology into the composition classroom.

Within current composition pedagogy, there is a precedent for using memes to teach argumentation. In her lesson plan posted online, Regina Mills from the University of Texas Austin advocates for using memes to help students breakdown and understand enthymemes. She does this by asking students to identify and analyze “the stated and unstated premises and come to a conclusion about the meme’s argument” (Mills). The following steps for incorporating memes into the classroom stem from Mills’ lesson plan, but have adapted them for a teacherly audience and added explanations for clarity:

1) Locate relevant image macros: Although image macros can be found nearly anywhere on the internet (and some places you may not want to visit) one safer source for image macros is using the meme database at knowyourmeme.com. This site logs nearly every significant image macro and theme, and offers detailed
analysis and background on each of the macros, including where the macro originally stemmed from and its current uses.

2) Select an image macro: Although some might be hit or miss, two prominent memes right now are “Condescending Wonka” and “Everyone Loses their Minds.”

![Condescending Wonka and Everyone Loses their Minds](knowyourmeme.com)

Figures 3.4 & 3.5- “Condescending Wonka” and “Everyone Loses their Minds” from knowyourmeme.com

3) Ask students to identify visual cues that are meant to instruct them about how to approach the meme. In figure 3.4, Wonka seems to have a face of apathy or condescension, while The Joker in 3.5 seem to be suggesting that the content is somehow worthy of freaking out over.

4) Ask students to identify the argument or premises: Using what they know about how they should approach the meme, ask students to begin making premises or interpret the argument being made. For example, in Figures 3.4 an argument seems to be made that the U.S. government is a waste of resources. We can see the first premise in the text of the meme, which suggests that the speaker cannot
see the work that the federal government does. A second, hidden premise, is also represented as the image prompts us to respond with condescension toward the subject of the meme, connecting to the socially constructed reputation for government inefficiency.  

5) Create a meme of your own: Student can then use meme generators such as memegenerator.com and select from popular meme’s and the website will superimpose the text over the meme to create the image macro:

![Meme Image]

Figure 3.6- “Condescending Wonka” for First-Year Composition made on knowyourmeme.com

Although such a pedagogy can be an effective way to teach the enthymeme, premises, and analyze arguments, there is a completely different set of image macros that such analysis gives us little advice what to do with. These types of macros, rather than utilizing major memes, such as “Condescending Wonka” or “Everyone Loses Their

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8 For those who remember the movie Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, it is worth mentioning that memes do not have to give fidelity to the original meaning of the image being used. Although Figure 3.5’s representation of the Joker freaking out (or pretending to freak out) is accurate, the condescending Wonka meme is not. In this section of the movie, Wonka is genuinely amused, not condescending, but similar to the ideograph, the meme is not concerned with what is inherently true or right, but is concerned with how it is being used and understood in the world abroad.
Mind”, utilizes a different type of meme that does not necessarily tell the audience how it should approach the content. Consider a popular Bernie Sanders meme:

![Figure 3.7- “Bernie Sanders Sign” from knowyourmeme.com]

Notice here the represented meme does not necessarily tell audience members how to respond to socialism in the same way the earlier Wonka or Joker memes did for their content. It seems to be making an argument against socialism, but there are too many unstated premises to draw conclusions based on enthymemes alone. It is for memes such as this that I suggest ideographic analysis as a useful way to analyze the argument presented.

Looking back to McGee, we can remember that the ideograph is made up of two distinct elements: the diachronic and the synchronic. The diachronic acts as a historical anchor for the chosen ideograph, suggesting to audience members how they are to interpret it, while the synchronic is associated with other ideographs to help shape its meaning now. I thus propose a version of the earlier steps to analyzing memes, but this time for memes that do not offer the initial theme to tell audiences how to approach it:
1) Locate relevant image macros: Similar to the above step, knowyourmeme.com is a good place to find these types of memes as well. Select a meme such as:

![Figure 3.8 - “Baltimore Riot” from knowyourmeme.com](image)

2) Locate the diachronic: Realistically, diachronic and synchronic are not student-friendly terms. Instead, asking students to locate the historical elements of the photo would serve the same purpose in easier-to-comprehend terms. Notice in Figure 3.8 that the meme is suggesting that the key to understanding the difference can be found in the juxtaposition between Martin Luther King and the riots in Baltimore.

3) Locate the synchronic: Ask students to try to find an ideograph to begin their connections. Figure 3.8 uses `<protest>` which when aligned with Martin
Luther King invokes other ideographs such as "peaceful protest", "civil disobedience", "unity", and "civility". Figure 3.8 also uses "riot" in association with "destruction of private property", "violence", "aggression", and "brutishness".

4) Combine the diachronic and synchronic elements to form an argument: Much like Figure 3.8 does by associating Martin Luther King with "protest" and Baltimore with "Riot" to create an implicit criticism of the Baltimore riots, students can combine the diachronic and synchronic elements of their memes to understand the arguments being made.

5) Create a meme in response: Ask students to use a meme generating website to create a meme of their own, either supporting or offering a new interpretation of the ideograph in question. Students can be encouraged to use the same diachronic elements and change the synchronic clusters, or change both the elements to shape a new narrative around the ideograph in question.

Notice that in this type of macro, no orientation is given to the audience, yet with ideographic analysis, an orientation can be discovered and the argument unpacked. An additional benefit is that this analysis does not only reveal that the maker is not sympathetic to Baltimore rioters, but also reveals the maker’s ideology about what a protest is and is not. Ideographic analysis, when paired with memes, become not only a way to understand arguments that our students are encountering, but also the type of worldview and values that are being espoused within that line of argument.
By teaching students to analyze the arguments behind these seemingly innocuous pieces of culture, students get the opportunity to dialogue about such clashes, but in a way that extends beyond their own feelings of Ferguson, or of Baltimore, or of any other clash of ideology with which they might want to take up. Instead, they are asked to identify the elements of the argument and respond in the same medium, to express their own views. They could be assigned a paper or a presentation in which they explain why they made the diachronic or synchronic choices that they did in their own response. This could allow the student to examine his or her own ideologies in conversation with others’ views, or it could allow them to share their own understanding without proselytizing to the rest of the class.

**Ideographic Analysis and Upper-Level Composition**

As students progress through levels of composition and argumentation, it is not uncommon to ask students to pick and defend a side of a controversial debate. This practice of creating and defending a thesis about a controversial subject dates back to the Roman Progymnasmata (Murphy 45) and is a common assignment within composition classrooms, though now we call it “teaching the controversy,” a term coined by Gerald Graff in the early 90s (Graff). Regardless from whence it came, this pedagogy of controversy is one that has been used not only to get students excited about argumentation, but it has also been used to ask students to take on different ideological viewpoints surrounding topics that the professor deems important. One typical method for “teaching the controversy” is to do so through the lens of the three appeals, or logos, ethos, and pathos. Although this approach has, and continues to work, I would like to suggest that it is also vastly limited, especially when it comes to arguments of ideology. I
would like to take the remainder of this chapter to propose how ideographic analysis can act as an alternative pedagogy that asks students to approach clashes of ideology in a way that is similar to the moves that I make in Chapter 2.

In her analysis of Edwin Black’s response to James Welch’s *Blue Book*, and expounding of the communism as cancer metaphor, Celeste Condit simultaneously reveals the strengths and limitations of using the rhetorical appeals when approaching ideological arguments. After analyzing the texts of both of authors, Condit concludes that Welch’s:

> conspiracy rhetoric, though it might fail the test of logos, might effectively build affiliations among those whom it successfully enrages. The potential impediments to the effectiveness of these appeals lie less in ideology-as-logos, and more in the possibilities they offer for relationships among specific bodies (14).

Condit then goes on to discuss the pathos of both arguments in what she calls “affiliative emotions” which exist even after “the test of logos (on the ideology) has failed” but the emotion of that specific group remains, uniting the group beyond the point of logos (c.f. structures of feeling in Chapter Two).

Although Condit’s article points out the power of affiliative emotion and the pathos that remains when the ideology is shown to fail, I argue that this creates an unnatural split between logos and pathos. For Condit, ideology is confined to the realm of logos and cannot span beyond that realm. On one hand this position makes sense: ideology has to fit somewhere, and since it dictates the logic of a person’s worldview, it certainly makes sense to classify it as logos. On the other hand, in containing ideology within the realm of logos, Condit forces an unnatural split where the logic of an ideology becomes split from the very emotions that compel an individual to hold that ideology in
the first place. I argue that her split, using the rhetorical appeals, creates an incomplete view of ideology and forces the analysis into binaries in which it does not fit.

Applying this approach to our case study of <Ferguson> and even more narrowly <policing> the problem with this confinement of ideology to only logos becomes more clear. Using Condit’s approach our <policing> case study could break down into this chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideology of Logos</th>
<th>Ideology failing the test of Logos</th>
<th>Affiliative Affect (Remaining Pathos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-Police View</strong></td>
<td>Policing as an act of justice, violence is therefore justified</td>
<td>Some police act unjustly- Tamir Rice, Eric Gardner, etc…</td>
<td>Affiliative Emotion with police and other pro-police supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Police View</strong></td>
<td>Policing as an act of brutality, violence is an act of oppression</td>
<td>Some/many police actively work to help their communities.</td>
<td>Affiliative Emotion with police protestors and other anti-police supporters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.9 “Logos/Affect Chart”

Although the compartmentalized analysis offers an easy to comprehend chart, and offers a potential explanation for why such diametrically opposed groups cannot collectively come to consensus (largely because the logos of both sides is flawed, but all that is left for either side is the affiliative emotion), it does not adequately explain the ideologies. In this view, ideology is linear and has little effect on the pathos. Ideology (logos) breaks down, but affiliative affect (pathos) remains. It does not account for the fact that such affect also serves to reinforce the logos, acting cyclically (consider McGee’s emphasis on ideology as something we are conditioned to in Chapter 2). This is how someone who has never experienced police violence can so strongly resonate with the anti-police ideological view. Simultaneously the same can be said for the pro-police side. What is
not accounted for is the way in which the feeling that that police must be justified as public servants reinforces the flawed logos. The point here is that to create a separation between the logos and the pathos does not capture the full effect of the ideologies represented. Instead, what if the affiliative affect is not only a by-product but also a fundamental part of the ideology itself? Logos, Ethos, and Pathos as a methodology, deployed in the way that Condit did, cannot account for such an amalgam because it is too simplistic. It does not allow for the nuance that actually exists within the real world.

The benefit of ideographic analysis is then revealed: students are not locked into one position to identify with when they realize the logos of the “other” ideology “fails to pass.” In fact, by definition of ideology, the logos of ideology will always fail the test of logos so long as multiple worldviews exist. Ideographic analysis allows for such worldviews to exist as it is not an issue of whose logos fails the other’s test. At the end of her article, Condit writes:

> the goal cannot be to eliminate our affiliative networks, but to broaden them. A familiarity with our own proclivities toward affective narrowing may help us to choose our enemies more strategically and to frame moral judgements in ways that invite more of our fellow travelers on the planet to share our judgements, rather than to feel condemned by them. (20)

Echoing this goal, I suggest that when we frame ideology in terms of logos, it is significantly more difficult to get past whose ideology fails harder, increasing the difficulty of expanding our affiliative networks. Instead, by analyzing the ideograph, students do not have to emphasize the fact that an ideology may have failed the test of logos; rather, they encounter alternative views of history, new views of the diachronic, that they may not share, but feel no need to defend their own view of the diachronic against. Such expression can allow affiliative networks to broaden as students are
exposed to different views and experiences, without needing to force one another to agree. Inquiry, rather than assent, becomes the purpose of ideographic analysis.

Thus the pedagogy for more complex analysis that mirrors my own in Chapter 2:

1) Identify a clash of ideology: In essence, identify a controversy. There is certainly no lack of them in our modern political climate: immigration, firearms, abortion, policing, climate change, etc… if you need inspiration, see what is on the news, they always manage to find some sort of controversy.

2) Let students identify the ideographs: It is never enough to simply commit to talking about a clash of ideology, as simply talking about it opens the instructor up to the very same charges of indoctrination that we are hoping to avoid. Because these clashes are so complex, allow students to focus on the pertinent issues that they see within the clash.

3) Ask students to pick one ideograph represented within the clash: for more in-depth coverage of the clash, identify many different ideographs and allow students to pick one that they feel that they could talk about. As a white male, living on the West Coast, I am at a disadvantage when talking about the effects of discrimination towards the African American Community in Ferguson, but I, as an individual, am certainly able to talk about my own view of policing.

4) Ask students to offer an alternative interpretation of that same ideograph in light of the events: This is the quintessential view of seeing another side’s argument. The best part of ideographic analysis is that nobody is trying to win assent.

Whether the student agrees with an alternative diachronic element or synchronic
clusters is wholly irrelevant to ideographic analysis. The fundamental aspect is empathy for alternative viewpoints, not negotiating who is more or less right or wrong.

5) Allow students to voice the views: originally typing this, I wrote “their views” but deleted it. Whether their presentation is their view or not, what they are presenting is not necessarily their view, but a view, a diachronic and synchronic element of a specific ideograph of a specific clash of ideology. Although it might be folly to suggest that a student could wholly separate themselves from their ideological viewpoint, they are presenting as a third party analyst, not as a representative of their ideology.

6) Facilitate the discussion: Although students may want to disagree, because the objective is not to win assent, there is nothing to disagree with. It then becomes important to distinguish between offering an alternative viewpoint or experience and disagreement. This facilitation becomes the primary role of the instructor.

This chapter set out to offer two ways in which ideographic analysis could be used within the composition classroom: through the use of the image macro, and as an alternative to the three main rhetorical appeals. By teaching students to analyze and create image macros, students are able to incorporate, analyze, and create ideological arguments via a medium that many of them already consume in one form or another. The image macro also allows many other valuable rhetorical principles such as genre, visual rhetoric, the enthymeme, and many more to also be incorporated into a unit that utilizes such a pedagogy. For more advanced students, ideographic analysis offers an alternative
approach to clashes of ideology. Allowing students to look beyond logos and begin
dialogues about clashes of ideology, ideographic analysis asks students to think beyond
what they perceive to be right or wrong with the goal of broadening their affiliative
networks. It is then the purpose of this chapter to have applied the many different abstract
concepts of the ideograph and ideographic analysis in a clear and concrete way.
**Conclusion**

At the beginning of this thesis, we examined the state of ideology within composition studies. Despite a clear interest in incorporating ideology into composition classrooms over the last 40 years, such a feat has remained largely controversial due to the specific pedagogies used to force ideology upon students, chilling students’ ideological expression where students would exchange their own ideologies for that of the professor, in fear that their grade would suffer. Additionally, others questioned how much could effectively be done to discuss ideology within a course or how much writing would have to be sacrificed for an ideological agenda, raising doubts that such discussions could be reasonably had within the composition classroom.

In Chapter Two we looked at the ideograph as a way to analyze clashes of ideology and applied it to the Ferguson protests that resulted after Michael Brown was killed. We looked at the ways in which historical events that lead to clashes of ideology could be interpreted as ideographs in their own right, as they seem to contain a common definition that fractures under further scrutiny, reflecting an individual’s worldview. We then broke the clash of ideology down into further ideographs that, even if students could not capably speak to the clash, students could speak to one of the ideographs that comprised the clash. Using <policing> as the example, we looked at the ways in which the diachronic and synchronic elements of <policing> shaped the discourse and interpretations of <Ferguson>. Finally, Chapter Two ended with an embedded caution that such clashes, as a representation of mass consciousness, also reflect disagreements within that consciousness, “wounds,” if you will, that simultaneously offer a place to begin the conversation, but must also be approached with significant care and respect.
We then identified intercultural inquiry, and the spirit of empathy, as frameworks for approaching such wounds and utilizing the pedagogies laid out in Chapter Three.

In Chapter Three, I laid out two separate pedagogies that could be used to incorporate ideographic analysis as a way to discuss clashes of ideology within the classroom at both the lower and upper levels of composition. By using the image macro, students could take a genre that many of them have already been exposed to and analyze the genre for the implicit and explicit arguments. Furthermore, they could use the image macro as a way to begin ideographic analysis as they identify diachronic and synchronic elements to unpack the ways that macros can reflect clashes of ideology. Additionally, I argued that for upper-level students, moving beyond logos, ethos, and pathos to incorporate ideographic analysis of clashes of ideology can be a new way to ask students to think about and analyze the arguments around them. I laid out some potential constraints of using logos, ethos, and pathos and how those constraints could be avoided via ideographic analysis to foster empathy and broaden affiliative networks among students by foregoing assent and fostering dialogue. The suggested pedagogies also avoid any charges of indoctrination as students are the ones identifying the clashes and the ideographs and reporting on the different views of the ideographs as a rhetorical exercise in analysis, rather than attempting to defend their own ideological positions and win the assent of their peers. This model enables students to focus on their own writing and rhetorical analysis, devoting their time to crafting and analyzing arguments rather than listening to the instructor illuminate all the ways in which dominant culture keeps control via hegemonic practices.
Ultimately this thesis is just an initial suggestion of ways in which ideographic analysis could play a role in the field of rhetoric and composition. Although there are few scholars discussing the ideograph, those scholars largely stem from the speech communication side of the rhetorical rift, and to the detriment of composition, there is very little in current scholarship as to how the ideograph could be better integrated into composition studies. This is then an area where more research could, and should, be done, as we in composition find alternative ways to address clashes of ideology within our classrooms, as we consider that the student makeup of our classes is becoming increasingly diverse, and as we consider the need for navigating clashes of ideology becomes even more prevalent with so many different worldviews being represented in our classes.
Works Cited


