

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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Date thesis is presented: May 12, 1964

Title: THE NORWEGIAN-SWEDISH CRISIS OF 1905.

Abstract Approved: _____

The Norwegian-Swedish Crisis of 1905 is unique because the two kingdoms, united in a dual monarchy, separated peaceably. The thesis raises three questions: why did Norway want independence at all, why was the secession peaceable, and can any of the factors which solved the Crisis of 1905 be injected or underscored in other crises so as to effect a peaceable solution.

In answering the first question the geography of the Scandinavian countries is compared, and differences in social and historical development are considered from the earliest times to the recent. The Kalmar Union (1397-1523) united the three Scandinavian kingdoms loosely under one monarch, but friction caused in large part by clumsy Danish administration of the area led to Sweden breaking away in 1523. Norway tried to revolt also, but the attempts at rebellion by violence failed, and Norway was placed in a subordinate status under Denmark until the Napoleonic Wars. During these wars the British control of the North Sea and the continental blockade threw the Norwegians onto their own resources. When Denmark allied with Napoleon was defeated by the Fourth Coalition, Norway was assigned to Sweden by the Treaty of Kiel (January 14, 1814). But Norway had caught the contagion of nationalism and chose instead to declare its independence, write a constitution, (proclaimed at Eidsvold on May 17, 1814) and call a

popular Danish prince to be king. When the Napoleonic struggle was over in the summer of 1814, Karl Johan Bernadotte, who had been adopted by the aging and heirless Swedish Karl XIII, quickly brought Norway to terms. Under the Act of Union the two kingdoms were united in the person of the king. The union went through ups and downs, but the crises seemed to separate the two monarchies more than any bonds which drew them together. By the end of the Nineteenth Century the strands of union had become badly frayed, and the final straw was the passage by the Norwegian Storting of a bill providing for a consular service separate from that theretofore existing under the Union under the control of the Swedes. When King Oscar II refused to sign the bill, the Norwegian section of the Joint Council resigned, and the king stated that he was unable to form a new government. The Storting took this literally and declared its independence on June 7, 1905.

In answering the second question, --why the secession was peaceable, --reference is made to the underlying attitudes and traditions, the events of the summer and autumn of 1905, and particularly to the Karlstad Conference at which the two nations negotiated their differences peaceably. Several times it seemed as though the conference must fail. But agreement was reached, and the Union was dissolved without any blood being shed. Prince Carl of Denmark was elected king of Norway and assumed power as Haakon VII.

The third question addresses itself to whether any of the factors which made the unique settlement of 1905 peaceful could also be injected or underscored in other crises so as to effect a peaceable solution. Since no two cases are alike, no iron-clad rule can be laid down. Nevertheless, some elements in the 1905 crisis seem to make a

peaceful solution more probable. Among these are the development of a tradition of negotiating conflicts instead of resorting to violence, a respect for authority and legal procedures, the granting of adequate powers to the negotiators, the avoidance of "Goldfish-bowl" negotiations, curbs on extreme expression of both criticism and wild enthusiasm, a vast amount of patience and respect for all the delegates, the shunning of humiliating terms, breaking deadlocks by shifting to less controversial items, the absence of meddling by the Great Powers, and, finally, tackling any controversy while it is still only a slow leak and not a blowout. In laying such a foundation, a heavy burden falls on education, both academic and adult to develop such political maturity. Sweden and Norway in 1905 showed that it could be done.

THE NORWEGIAN-SWEDISH CRISIS OF 1905

by

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A THESIS

submitted to


OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY


in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of


MASTER OF ARTS (GENERAL STUDIES)

June, 1964

APPROVED:


Professor of Education - In charge of
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Date thesis is presented: May 12, 1964

Typed by Minnette F. Walsh

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THE NORWEGIAN-SWEDISH CRISIS of 1905

Chapter I

THE PROBLEM

In 1905 the dual monarchy of Sweden-Norway under King Oscar II faced a crisis which resulted in the peaceful separation of the two kingdoms,--Sweden continuing under Oscar II, while Norway invited a Danish prince who ascended the throne as Haakon VII. Why was the separation peaceful? Whereas most nations, including the United States, have met attempts at secession with war, what factors made the Norwegian secession of 1905 singularly lacking in violence?

No historical problem is ever "on all fours" with any other. Yet, a corollary question for a further study is whether any factors which solved the Crisis of 1905 can be injected or underscored in other crises so as to effect a peaceable solution.

The solution found by Sweden and Norway is unique in the annals of history. Whereas many,¹ particularly in Scandinavia, have studied 1905 with the yardstick of justice or expediency or vindicated nationalism, no analysis has been found of the factors that made possible such a radical step peacefully instead of having the usual resort

1 Most of the sources are Norwegian. The Swedes have given almost no attention to 1905, while the jubilant Norwegians have made many analyses of the crisis. With mutual opening of archives in 1955, perhaps Swedish studies may soon appear.

to sanctions, even war.

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In the tradition of Hegel this paper proposes to look at the roots of the problem in which the thesis of Norwegian independence found expression, but only inadequate realization. Denmark, and in due course Sweden, early achieved national identities. But Norway took four hundred years longer. Hence, the long road of Norway must be examined more closely to solve the initial problem of why Norway should become aware of herself as a nation apart from the others.

The union with Sweden from 1814 to 1905 gave rise to the antithesis. Frustrated Norwegian nationalism clashed with the Swedish policy in a series of conflicts stretching over 91 years, culminating in the Crisis of 1905 when both countries stood on the brink of war. Other nations, and Norway, too, innumerable times had had recourse to "the field of honor" in similar circumstances, and there is no doubt that Sweden would have won such a "trial by battle". Yet neither side followed such a course.

The synthesis demonstrated a rare statesmanship in which Sweden and Norway each recognized the rights of the other and laid the foundations for an enduring cordial relationship based on mutual trust and respect. The bonds after divorce were stronger than they ever had been during marriage. The bitterness which had characterized nearly a century of union quickly gave way to a cordiality

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which has dominated the Scandinavian kingdoms during the Twentieth Century. This remains as a monument to the statesmanship of the synthesis.

When all the elements of the thesis and the anti-thesis have traditionally found a violent synthesis, why was a peaceful answer chosen in 1905? It is to this problem that this paper addresses itself.

To understand the roots of Norwegian independence adequately, a review of the geography and history of Scandinavia is necessary. (1,5,8,11,14,17,33)

THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

The events of 1905 leading to the independence of Norway had their origins in the early development of Scandinavia and centuries of domination of the peninsula first by the Danes and later by the Swedes. Geography, history, and the intellectual ferment of the continent laid the foundation for separation as well as union. But the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Period tipped the scales so that Norway grasped a brief moment of independence until she was forced once more into an unwelcome union with Sweden.

A. Physical Environment

Geography has many times shaped the political fortunes of a society. The broad fertile valleys of the Tigris-Euphrates brought forth a civilization which contrasted sharply with that of the tight little city-states of mountainous and maritime Greece. The geography of the Scandinavian peninsula produced two different societies although its people were ethnically similar.

The Scandinavian peninsula, about 500 miles at its widest, extends about 1200 miles from 55° N. to 71° N., resembling two large spoons side by side,--the western "spoon" is Norway, and the eastern "spoon" Sweden. Both were peopled largely by the same migration of Goths. But,

whereas Sweden except along its border with Norway is predominantly rolling or flat agricultural land dotted with lakes and streaked with rivers (much like Minnesota and Wisconsin), Norway is ruggedly mountainous. It has a rocky 1700 mile outer coastline carved deeply by recent glaciation, and an interior glacial plateau. Very little of Norway is suitable for farming. Travel in Sweden is easy, while in Norway difficult except in Gudbrandsdalen or in Østerdalen near the Swedish border.

Settlements in Norway tend to be along the coast, and communication up to modern times was almost entirely by sea,--as in ancient Greece. Small wonder, then, that communities like the Greek city-states should dot the coastline and that petty kings or jarls should claim dominion over each narrow fjord and in turn clash with each other. Independent and self-sufficient small units became a characteristic of Norway. By contrast, Sweden turned naturally to agriculture on its broad plains, and its easy communication predisposed the land to unity. Feudalism with modifications flourished in agricultural Sweden, while it failed to take deep root in Norway where the oar and the long-ship were tremendous levelers. Thus, although of the same ethnic stock the two countries developed differently.

The resources of the peninsula were also unevenly distributed. Apart from fish and timber, Norway had little

to offer until copper and iron were found in the Seventeenth Century, and the Twentieth Century saw the value of the hydroelectric power. Sweden early found iron ore in its northern parts, laying the basis for many fortunes made in exploiting this plentiful resource. Because forests covered much of the northern marshes both countries profited in exporting their surplus to the deforested countries of the south. England and the Lowlands needed timber for shipbuilding and for mining scaffolding and factory building especially during the Industrial Revolution. Sweden clearly had the advantage and grew rich, while Norway struggled in poverty. The sea was Norway's claim to greatness and her major source of income, either by supplying fish for the Hanseatic League or by a merchant marine traffic in later centuries.

With its inadequate farmland, 2.3% of its 124,566 square miles in meadow and .7% in cultivation, Norway sought its wealth elsewhere than on the land, and it is not surprising that many of the Viking raiders came from the rocky fjords. Sweden, on the other hand, had nearly 50% more land,--173,347 square miles,--of which about 9% was cultivable and 55% in forest. Sweden could sustain a population twice that of Norway.

The climate of the Scandinavian peninsula despite its latitude is similar to that of British Columbia, the west coast being warmed by the Gulf Stream, but Sweden

feels more of the Arctic blasts. The freezing of the Gulf of Bothnia in winter frequently stops traffic, but the Baltic Sea usually remains open, although it is colder than the North Sea and the Atlantic. Both halves of the peninsula enjoy almost continual daylight in summer, but the winter is dark and gloomy.

Denmark dominates the waterways leading to Norway and Sweden, and it is not without reason that the Danish coat-of-arms includes three wavy lines signifying the three major straits (Øresund, Storebelt, and Lillebelt) through which traffic must pass in order to reach the North Sea, and which Denmark has traditionally sought to control.

In sharp contrast with Norway and Sweden, Denmark, the third member of Scandinavia with 16,575 square miles, is about 60% cultivable (comparing with 66% for the Netherlands and 30% for the British Isles). Even the "Alps" of Fyn are about 430 feet high, and the rolling hills and dunes are intensively farmed. The thousands of low islands provided safe haven for the Viking ships. So far as was possible, Denmark was in an ideal position to dominate Sweden and Norway. With varying degree it did not until 1523 when Sweden forcibly broke loose.

In the Nineteenth Century the boundaries were fixed. Those between Denmark and the rest of the Scandinavian countries followed natural landmarks,--the Skagerrak and

Kattegat. Not so, however, the border between Sweden and Norway. This was generally without regard to watersheds, marketing areas or family ties. Historically this has often led nations more readily into conflict. However, no fighting seems to have been occasioned by this unusual border between Norway and Sweden. Although Norway had the military advantage of being able to attack downhill, she does not appear to have exploited it. Similarly, family ties and economic problems created by such a border never reached the proportion of a national crisis. It was at the southernmost border between Fredrikssten and Kongsvinger in a relatively flat landscape where no watershed was involved and no national boundaries were at issue that the two countries almost came to blows before parting in 1905.

B. The Early Development of the Scandinavian Kingdoms

The three Scandinavian kingdoms achieved national identities long before the coming of Christianity around the year 1000, but not simultaneously. The Swedes near present-day Stockholm and in the southern part of their peninsula were the first to found kingdoms of some strength and importance, and gradually the dominions were consolidated to include all of modern Sweden under the rule of one king with his religious and royal center at Uppsala. The Danes, occupying the southwestern part of the Swedish peninsula and the Danish islands,

subsequently founded their kingdom. But among the Norwegians there was no united kingdom, the country being ruled by many jarls, sometimes confederated, but never united.

During the Viking period King Harald Fairhair (860-933) welded Norway's petty kingdoms into a centralized monarchy after he defeated the jarls in the naval battle of Hafrsfjord (circa 872). But the introduction by Harald of the Frankish rule modified to recognize a condominium (10) of the kingdom among all the king's sons, legitimate and illegitimate, led to long periods of civil wars when sons supported by jarls tried to eliminate each other. And the Danes at times also exercised overlordship.

The development of the three Scandinavian kingdoms differed in other respects. First, whereas Sweden and Denmark under the German influence developed land armies and a feudal aristocracy with its caparisoned chargers, castles and moats, Norway tended to erase the distinction between noble and commoner. Second, the three kingdoms looked in different directions for their economic and cultural life, the Swedes toward the east and south, and the Danes toward England and Germany, the Norwegians toward Normandy, Ireland, Scotland, Iceland, Greenland, the Orkneys and Faroes. Lacking fertile land the

Norwegians stressed trade more than their kinsmen, and this factor became critical in the 91 years between 1814 and 1905. Third, Norway's population was not only the least of the three but also the slowest in growth and the weakest. Fourth, the monopolistic Hanseatic League by exploiting Norway contributed to its moral and social decline. Lacking an adequate aristocracy to assert local law and order the Norwegians could not resist the powerful German merchants who insisted on extraterritoriality. Fifth, unlike Sweden and Denmark, Norway failed to solve the problem of royal succession. And, finally, because the languages of the three were somewhat different, their saga heritage diverged markedly. By 1500 the languages were quite far apart. Within Norway only the rural areas preserved the ancient tongue, while Danish became the urban language. With such different influences it was only natural that the countries should drift asunder, regardless of their common origins and ties.

Notwithstanding such divisive tendencies, Norway and Sweden were united under dynasties for short periods of time,--under King Magnus Smek (1319-1355) and King Haakon VI (1355-1365), chosen by both countries as king. Not until 1905 would a king again be freely chosen by Norwegians, and significantly that young prince took the name Haakon VII.

1. The Kalmar Union (1397-1523)

The marriage of Haakon VI to Margaret of Denmark led to a union in 1397 of all three kingdoms, known as the Kalmar Union, (11, vol. 2, p. 30-127; 17, p. 208-240) from which Sweden broke away in 1523; but as between Norway and Denmark the union lasted for 417 years,--to 1814, when the Treaty of Kiel awarded Norway to Sweden as compensation for the latter's role in the Napoleonic Wars and as an offset for the loss of Finland. The vast territory of the Union extended from Finland through Sweden, Norway and Denmark to Iceland and Greenland, and included the Faroes and Orkneys. The Kalmar Union was not harmonious, as Margaret, a skillful diplomat, blundered as an administrator by placing Danes in key positions in Norway and Sweden. As friction and unrest grew, the Hanseatic Cities played on the rivalries by encouraging piracy by native Norwegian merchants who were then captured and beheaded. When the last of the pirates were executed in 1429, the Hanseatic League succeeded in destroying local competition to gain an exclusive control for a century to come. The Swedes protested first in 1434, but the Norwegians were afraid to join them in common cause. Clumsy Danish administration thus started the trend to Scandinavian disunity.

The remaining years of the Kalmar Union were marked by civil wars both within and between Sweden and Denmark.

The Danish administration and extortionate taxation prompted the Swedes under Gustav Ericsson Vasa in 1523 to break away. The Kalmar Union was finished, but Norway lacking leadership remained tied to the Danish apron-strings.

The decline of Norway was apparent in the power struggle within the Kalmar Union. Only Sweden and Denmark swung any weight, and the assumption in all deliberations was that Norway would accept any decision the other two made. She lacked a powerful nobility to protect her national interests.

2. Attempts at Independence

Several local uprisings did take place around 1500 in Norway. Some were an expression of protest at violations by the Danish king of the charters which had guaranteed that only natives should be appointed as rulers. Others were aimed at the exploitation by the Hanseatic League. And in a few instances the peasants and townsmen assassinated unjust or extortionate administrators. Two rival factions fought a small civil war, but not to obtain independence; the issue was whether to join up with Sweden or to adhere to Denmark. By 1504 the Danish crown prince (later to be crowned as Christian II) had suppressed the disturbances.

Lawmaking in Scandinavia from the earliest Viking days had been the domain of the ting³ (a popular assembly

³ The earlier spelling was "thing", pronounced "ting". The later spelling has been followed herein.

made up of all property owners) which made laws, protected local rights, demanded charters and privileges from the king (as the Norman barons had done at Runnymede in 1215), dispensed justice, at times refused to pay unjust taxes, and elected the king. With the establishment of a hereditary monarchy the ting declined in importance as the election became a mere formality and the king turned for support to the nobles and churchmen who were embodied in the Council of the Realm. But during the Fifteenth Century even the Council had retrogressed and became mostly a judicial body with little weight against the king. Therefore, in Norway there was hardly any constitutional progress between the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.

During the unrest in Scandinavia under Christian II when Sweden established its independence, Norway made an attempt at a greater degree of autonomy and perhaps independence. In 1524 Dr. Vincence Lunge and Archbishop Olav Engelbrektsson led a revolt (11, vol. 2, p. 120-131) to revive the political power of the Council, but the issue of Lutheranism split the two. Lunge saw the economic and political potential of espousing the new doctrine. When the Danes defeated the rebels, Norway was a conquered country.

In 1535, while Denmark was in the throes of a religious civil war, a new opportunity for independence developed. But there were two factions, one led by the Catholic Archbishop Olav Engelbrektsson and the other by the

Lutheran Vincence Lunge. Unfortunately they could not agree on either independence or any candidate. During the uprising Lunge was killed by a mob, leaving the Archbishop free to raise the banner of independence. He tried to secure the election of the Catholic Count Frederick of the Palatinate as king. But the Archbishop was no political leader, and the revolt lost momentum. Finally he had no choice but to accept the Lutheran Christian III of Denmark as king of Norway and to seek a pardon for himself.

In Denmark King Christian III by a coup d'etat destroyed the Danish Constitution. To replace it he summoned a diet to draft a new constitution (11, vol. 2, p. 131-132) placing the government in the hands of the King, the Council, and the nobility, and prescribing the Lutheran faith for the kingdom. In the king's charter to the nobles he stated in a secret paragraph ⁶ that Norway was to be treated as a conquered country, and that her autonomy would be ignored. Christian III was never legally elected king of the Norwegians, and he never visited their country. Norway's autonomy had vanished, but in practice the people did not notice any difference. The Norwegian Council of the Realm shriveled up unused, and the Danish Council proceeded to act for both countries. Curiously, Norway was still called a kingdom equal with Denmark, and it retained its old laws and its separate administration with little

6 Its secrecy was kept until the reign of Christian IV

interference from Denmark⁷. But the flag became the Danish "Dannebrog", a white cross in a red field. (23, p.21) The ordinary person continued his life much as before in Norway.

3. The Danish Period (1533-1814)

With the destruction of what was left of Norwegian leadership and the abrogation of autonomy, Norway reached the nadir of its national existence during the reign of Christian III (1536-1559). (17, p. 243-369) The Reformation, which required the importation of churchmen, added to the total collapse of any national spirit. The centuries that followed saw a gradual resurgence of Norway as a national entity, culminating with its independence in 1905. But the way was a hard one marked by many setbacks.

The Danes controlled most areas of Norwegian national life either directly from Copenhagen or indirectly by Danish administrators. Danish judges unfamiliar with Norse laws rendered judgments. Even enactments of the lagting (local assembly) were subject to review of the king and his Danish Council. Although there was occasionally some dissatisfaction, the Danes avoided outright

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some 70 years later because of the desire of Christian III and Frederick II to avoid an uprising. Christian III never set foot in Norway during the 26 years of his reign, but this was not indicative of neglect. Norway lacked leaders, and Christian avoided irritants and introduced reforms curbing the privileges of the Hanseatic merchants. (16, p. 830)

irritation of their subjects. Consequently most Norwegians remained peaceful and loyal.

Under Christian III the seeds of economic revival were planted in Norway. Mining was encouraged, and German specialists were imported. The Danish commandant of the Hanseatic city of Bergen took stern measures against the Hanseatic merchants. He trained his guns on their warehouses and ordered them to swear allegiance to the king or leave. Many left in 1559. To enforce this stiffening attitude the king revived the Norwegian navy and manned them with Norwegian personnel. The power of the Hanseatic League in Norway was permanently broken. (17, p. 258) With greater opportunity for trade the country grew stronger, particularly through the export of lumber for shipbuilding in Holland and England, and a Norwegian bourgeoisie was thereby created which was to play an important part in the eventual emancipation in 1814 and 1905. (11, vol. 2, p. 182-183)

Centralized administration came as a by-product of the Seven Years' War with Sweden (1563-1570), the duel between the Danish and Swedish kings in which the Danes sought to retake Sweden and the Swedes tried to seize Norway, Although the war ended in a draw, the need for a Norwegian army was apparent, so a statholder (viceroy) was established in 1572 to supervise the entire land and to command the army. But the army remained a paper organization

during the Kalmar War (1611-1613) when Denmark, seeking the leadership in the North, attacked Sweden and conscripted Norwegians to fight. The Norwegians refused to fight their Swedish neighbors and deserted, but Denmark nevertheless won with the help of foreign mercenaries and the fleet. The war merged with the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), in the course of which Norway emerged with its own army under the leadership of the Danish Statholder, Hannibal Sehested, who also organized a financial system and a postal service. The land was once more on the road to self-government, self-defense, and autonomy. (11, vol. 2, p. 213; 17, p. 283-286)

The growth of absolutism on the continent and the balance of power struggles had their effect on Denmark. The end of the Thirty Years' War coincided with the death of the Danish-Norwegian king, Christian IV. His successor, Frederik III, found himself compelled to yield extensive powers to the nobles in order to gain election by the four estates. The wars which Frederik III fought with Karl X Gustaf of Sweden to regain supremacy in the North went badly for Denmark-Norway,¹³ but Frederik was able to pin the blame

¹³ England, France and Holland threw their weight into the balance of power to preserve the three kingdoms and prevent Sweden from becoming too strong. In the two wars between 1657 and 1660 Sweden was confirmed in the territories of Jaemtland and Herjedal which she had taken from Norway in the Hannibal War of 1643-45; and Denmark lost all territory east of Kattegat. (11, vol. 2. p. 228)

on the nobles. In 1660, when he sought more money from the Danish estate, the first (clergy) and third (Townsmen) estates forces the nobles (second estate) to surrender their tax exemptions, and struck a further blow at the nobility by demanding that the monarchy be made hereditary, thereby depriving the nobility of their last great power, the power of election. Frederik in 1661 accordingly circulated a declaration which nearly all signed stating that they freely made the monarchy hereditary, but he trumped them by adding that the royal power should be absolute. Later in the same year the Norwegian estates concurred, and henceforth until 1814 the monarchy remained absolute. Denmark did not abandon absolutism until 1849.

The changes wrought by absolutism were not radical. The king chose "nobles of the robe" from among commoners to administer his territories. The King's Law, Lex Regis, was signed in 1665, but not published until 1709, and became the constitution for the Twin Kingdoms. Norway was granted equal rank with Denmark and freed of rule by Danish nobility. The king had absolute power by divine right, and he centralized authority by abolishing the Council and ruling through five administrative departments, called Colleges.¹⁴ In 1687 the King's Law was supplemented by the

¹⁴ The five were admiralty, war, treasury, commerce, and foreign affairs.

Code of Christian V which brought Norwegian law into closer harmony with Danish law. "In theory the Danish-Norwegian absolutism was the most logically developed and complete divine-right absolutism in all Europe. Even Hobbes could not have done better"¹⁵ (17,p. 289)

By contrast Sweden never adopted absolutism but preserved the old Scandinavian tradition of the election of the king by the ting and later by the estates in an Assembly of the Realm. During the Era of Liberty (1718-1772) political power was concentrated in the estates and the king was downgraded to the status of merely the president of the Riksrådet (National Council). The two coups d'etat of Gustav III in 1772 and 1789 to strengthen royal power still did not make him the equal of the king of Denmark-Norway. When Gustav IV was overthrown in 1809 following the disastrous war with Russia in which Sweden lost Finland, the estates drew up a new constitution and elected as king Charles XIII, who accepted the constitution as a condition of his election. The constitution of 1809 is the oldest written constitution still in force in Europe, and it was based on the principle of separation of powers derived from Montesquieu. The legislative power was vested in king and parliament, and both had to be in agreement. The judiciary was independent. When in 1814 Norway was united with Sweden, the bond was with a much more liberal system than had

¹⁵ This Code of Christian V has been amended but not replaced, and is law in Norway.

existed in theory with Denmark. (18, p. 93-95)

a. The Impact of the Intellectual Development on the Continent.

Scandinavia despite its geographical location on the fringe of Europe felt the effects of the social philosophies and intellectual developments which shaped the Continent. The Domesday Book as a tool for taxation was almost simultaneous in both England and Norway. King Sverre tangled with the Church over the investiture Controversy. King Sigurd Jorsalfar ("Jerusalem-farer") and others sailed off on the Crusades. The Ultima Thule which Pytheas visited around 330 B.C. was not impervious to the currents swirling in Central and Southern Europe.

(1) The Renaissance and Humanism.

While the Renaissance in Southern Europe took many forms, reviving the classics as well as the vernaculars, it tended in Scandinavia to arouse an interest in the heroic past in the countryside. The scholars all over Europe exchanged ideas, and the few books that were available were passed around, generally among churchmen and teachers, and sometimes among officials. The exuberance of the humanists knew no bounds in their search for knowledge. An unknown writer of the Fifteenth Century in the Hamar Chronicle described the life of that ancient town. Mapmakers drew painstakingly accurate maps of Scandinavia. Others brought

to light the nearly forgotten Heimskringla and other old manuscripts, written in Old Norse. But the full force of humanism was not felt until the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. (17,p. 272-276)

A new love of fatherland was characteristic of the Norwegian humanists. The Oslo group of scholars included Hallvard Gunnarsson who wrote a history of Norway in Latin, the first continuous account to be published. Other keen observers wrote of the society in which they lived, the nature of the geography. The Bergen group, still resentful toward the Hanseatic Germans, was strongly nationalistic, and from the pen of Absalon Pederssøn Beyer flowed a history, Om Norgis Rike (Concerning the Norwegian Kingdom), in which this scholar educated in Copenhagen and Wittenberg asserted the strength of the Norwegian nation. And Peder Claussøn Fries of Lista, near Fedde, in descriptions of his environment and in his excellent translations of the sagas awakened a slumbering Norwegian nationalism. (17,p. 272-276) The humanists sparked others to study things Norwegian and preserved for later generations a detailed knowledge of the national heritage. From these small beginnings grew a sense of separateness which was to lead to political separation in 1905.

(2) The Reformation and Education

Until the coming of Christianity, education in Norway had been a family affair,--the fathers teaching their

sons, and the mothers their daughters. The sagas, differing for each of the Scandinavian countries, were committed to memory (and still are, to some extent). Courage and loyalty were extolled; cowardice and dishonesty were scorned. But education was not formalized.

As Christianity spread in Norway following its introduction by Olav Tryggvason (995 A.D.) and more definitively by St. Olav (1030 A.D.), Latin schools to educate a priesthood were attached to the cathedrals. In Norway the first of these "classical schools" was established in 1152, one each in Oslo, Bergen and Trondhjem. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 required each bishop to maintain a school at his cathedral for all who took the first vows. But such education was not widespread and did not affect the average person. Very few books were to be found in Norway.

Beginning with the Kalmar Union the kings, ruling from Denmark, had naturally couched ordinances and decrees in Danish; and the Danish administrators with their headquarters in the cities had set the cultural standards in the urban communities. Danish became the language of the town, while in the countryside the people continued as before; but their quaint old language was looked down upon. The countryfolk kept up the old education through sagas, poems, country dances, and not until the Romantic Movement of the Nineteenth Century did they come into their own again.

The language of the Norwegian townsman and cultured person was Danish, or a modified Danish, and remained so until the Twentieth Century.

The Reformation, which reached Denmark-Norway in 1536, did not improve either the intellectual or cultural life of Norway. In fact, the first two centuries thereafter saw a change for the worse. People did not understand the sudden change in dogmas; they lost respect for the Church, and took to wild living without much restraint. According to the king's ordinance pastors were to own seven books, but few had that many. No Norwegian Bibles were available, and even Danish Bibles were so scarce that by about 1560 there were only 96 copies in the entire land. Education, such as it was, consisted of the oral instruction in the catechism which was repeated until memorized. The first hymnbook was introduced in 1569, but it contained no Norwegian,--only Danish and Latin hymns. All the literature of the Reformation was in Danish, and most of the clergy were Danes. Even when Norwegians entered the ministry, the books they read were Danish. In sum, the Reformation brought little intellectual stimulus or spiritual revival to Norway. (17, p. 243-272)

At the beginning of the Eighteenth Century only one in ten Norwegians was literate. By the end of the century the converse was true. No small measure of the credit goes

to the pietistic influence of Christian VI who in 1735 introduced the rite of confirmation by law for both Denmark and Norway, the prerequisite of which was that every young communicant had to prove that he understood the Lutheran doctrine. This made it necessary that every parish teach its children to read and write. An ordinance of 1739 made schooling compulsory for all children between seven and twelve years of age for six to seven hours a day for at least three months a year. The schoolbooks were to be Luther's Catechism, an explanation, the Bible, and the hymn-book. Met at first with resistance as well as a tremendous dearth of teachers, the law was declared optional; but then the clergy put teeth into the statute by refusing to confirm children who lacked the education. In 1749 the first teachers training college was established, but only as a private institution. The schoolbooks were all in Danish. Gradually Norway became literate. (17, p. 338-339)

For the higher education of her scholars, Norway had to send them to other lands, usually Denmark or Germany. Her pleas for a university and a commercial college went unheeded by Denmark until 1811, when a university was established at Christiania after the Napoleonic Wars had thrown Norway largely on her own. A combination of church and national ambition had thus by the end of the Danish Period raised the general level of literacy and education

to among the highest in Europe.

(3) The Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment with its emphasis on reason, natural law and progress blossomed among the intellectuals of Norway and Denmark during the Eighteenth Century. Despite the religious orientation of popular education, it was the clergy who liberalized the schools as they came under the influence of the rational thinkers of the Enlightenment. Chief among the philosophes was Ludvig Holberg (1684-1754), a Norwegian credited with "making Danish intellectual life European". (17, p. 339-341) With an Oxford education and a powerful satirical pen he created a Danish-Norwegian literature and counteracted the hitherto strong German element. He achieved his greatest fame in Denmark, particularly by reason of his plays (until pietism and blue laws closed the theaters), but his versatility swung him into social and economic history. He wrote in pure Danish and avoided foreign words and phrases, yet not in a spirit of nationalism,--rather with a warm affection for both Denmark and Norway. Other students of the Enlightenment claimed Holberg as a Norwegian, and emphasized more the unrecognized greatness of Norway. Many of these students banded together to form the Scientific Society of Trondhjem in 1760, and in 1767 this became the Royal Norwegian Scientific Society which filled an intellectual gap until the University

was founded in 1811. (17, p. 339-343) Toward the end of the century the movement which had its origins in reason and science fell under the spell of the French Revolution and patriotism.

(4). The French Revolution.

All aspects of European life and thought were felt in Denmark-Norway. The monarchy had gone through the stage of "divine right of kings" and absolutism. Pietism had left its permanent imprint. When the insane Christian VII ascended the throne in 1766, his physician, Struensee, won the confidence of the court; by 1771 Struensee's power was absolute, and in rapid succession he announced reforms in the manner of a benevolent despot. His liberal physiocrat policies were of tremendous benefit to Norway which suddenly found restrictions on its trade and economic development lifted. Whereas Norway gained, Denmark lost. Freedom of the press was also granted, and this was Struensee's undoing. Danish critics fearing Norwegian cultural and economic independence²³ swung the tide against Norway and Struensee capitulated. The Norwegians then became aggressive and weakened his position. In 1772 Struensee was arrested by the Danish nobles and horribly executed, thus

23 Norway had proposed (1) a university, (2) a commercial college, (3) a bank, (4) abolition of the 1762 tax, and (5) revocation of the mercantilist policy on grain imports.

ending a brief attempt at Enlightened Despotism which had made Norway more aware of itself as a nation. (17, p. 343-347; 8, p. 177)

The sixteen months of Enlightenment were followed by twelve years of reaction during which a Danish controlled mercantilism was restored. Freedom of trade was suspended, and Norway was compelled to import its grain from Denmark. Only the poll tax was lifted. In 1784 a coup d'etat in which Norway had no part brought back Enlightenment to the Twin Kingdoms. Trade became freer, and serfdom in Denmark was abolished at last. But in Norway where there existed no serfdom the Enlightenment was still despotic, as the Norwegian farmers learned when they protested the inequitable taxes in the Lofthus Rebellion of 1786-87.²⁵ Although the government in Copenhagen was in the hands of men steeped in Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau, they also believed in absolutism. Reforms were liberal, yet they did not include political freedom. (17, p. 348-352; 8, p. 117-119)

The last two decades of the Eighteenth Century saw an increasing tempo in commercial and intellectual activity. Trade grew, and with it a greater interest in the outside world. Trondhjem and Bergen on the west coast developed

²⁵ No violence was used by Lofthus,--only collecting signed protests against extortion. Nevertheless Lofthus was caught and imprisoned for five years.

strong business ties with France, while the south coast and Christiania found a golden opportunity in selling lumber to France's rival England. Political sympathies ran parallel to trade ties. Clubs were the avenues for ideas and discussions. Although the Lofthus Rebellion included a demand for native born administrators in Norway, and also showed that united action around a leader could bring results, the main interests of the people were still local,-- not national. After 1789, visitors reported hearing French revolutionary music in the clubs. Poets wrote patriotic drinking songs, and some wrote and talked the language of revolution. But there was no genuine spirit of revolution. Norway remained loyal to the king until the end. (17, p. 352-356; 8, p. 120-122)

Throughout the French Revolution and Napoleonic Period the foreign policy of Denmark-Norway was that of neutrality so that its merchantmen would be free to sail the seas to any port, even to France. Tense relations with England and Russia resulted, but open conflict was avoided until 1801, then when Denmark-Norway aligned themselves with the Second Coalition, England attacked Copenhagen, driving Denmark-Norway into the arms of France and Russia in 1807. But neither France nor Russia could prevent England from blockading the Norwegian coast. As a result people starved for lack of grain from Denmark. The political effect on

Norway was that when contact with the central government in Copenhagen was cut off, the interim government had to make independent decisions. This government established a supreme court, organized finances and in 1813 set up a national bank, and tackled the problem of defense. Denmark was helpless to assist. The Napoleonic Wars, more than any other immediate factor, gave Norwegian nationalism its stimulus to split the Twin Kingdoms. (8, p. 122-127)

4. The End of the Danish Period.

The turbulence of the revolutionary period and the example of the partition of Poland gave impetus to a Pan-scandinavian spirit; if the Scandinavian kingdoms did not stand together they might suffer the same fate. But the "togetherness" which Frederik VI of Denmark-Norway saw was to be won by his invasion of Sweden. The British fleet and a French army under Marshal Bernadotte prevented the landing in Sweden of Danish troops. So Norway was left alone, inviting Sweden to attack her. She repulsed the attacks because Sweden was preoccupied with the Russians in Finland. But the Norwegians refused to follow their advantage by invading Sweden. Instead they indicated that they had been forced into the war and were actually more fearful of the Russian threat to the entire Scandinavia. The Norwegian commander, the Danish prince Christian August, at one time promised the Swedish commander that he would not cross the

border unless he received *peremptory* orders, and even then he would give ten days' advance notice. So the army never crossed the border, despite repeated orders from Denmark to do so. Norway was slipping its ties with Denmark, and a Pan-Scandinavian sentiment was growing. (8, p. 127-128; 11, vol. 2, p. 391-396)

From the close of the Eighteenth Century, and particularly after Finland had been lost to Russia in 1808, Swedish policy had set as its main goal a union with Norway. Within Sweden there were two parties--(1) the "English party" which favored availing itself of Norwegian discontent with Denmark so that Norway would voluntarily unite with Sweden, and (2) the "French party" which saw the best course as that of getting France to force Denmark to yield Norway to Sweden in return for compensation in North Germany. Whatever the policy, the prize was Norway. (38, p. 5, 169)

Pan-Scandinavianism came within a heartbeat of realization after a coup d'etat placed the aged and childless Karl XIII (1809-1818) on the throne of Sweden, and the constitution was adopted which made Sweden a limited monarchy. (Supra, p. 19) A successor was imperative, and sentiment in both Norway and ³² Sweden swung to Frederik VI of Denmark-Norway. Unfortunately, Frederik was so stubborn an absolutist that he refused to accept the crown

³²- Count Wedel Jarlsberg, a leader in the Norwegian government, led the sentiment in Norway for union.

of a constitutional monarchy. The Swedes then elected in 1809 the conciliatory Danish Prince Christian August, who had refused to lead Norwegian troops across the Swedish border; but before he could ascend the throne he died of apoplexy in Sweden in 1810 while on maneuvers. Sweden under the leadership of the "French party" turned to the French Marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte in order to try to gain the favor of Napoleon for their union with Norway. He was made crown prince under the name of Karl Johan in 1810.

Although King Karl XIII did not die until 1818 at the age of 70, the active leadership of Swedish affairs passed quickly into the hands of the new crown prince. Because Karl Johan's policy was loyalty first to Sweden, he had no inclination to submit to Napoleon's dictation. Thus, when Napoleon ordered Sweden in 1810 to declare war on England, her old ally, the Swedes nominally complied after first agreeing with the English that it would be a sham war. Karl Johan's failure to follow Napoleon led to the alliance in 1812 between Sweden and Russia. Czar Alexander promised to help Sweden secure Norway as compensation for the loss of Finland. Alexander and Karl Johan laid plans to attack Norway and Denmark, but Napoleon's former marshal advised the czar to avoid battle and lure the French army deep into Russia. (11, vol. 2, p. 406-408)

The autumn of 1812 saw a sharp change in the European picture, as the Grand Army of Napoleon was annihilated by "king winter". Sweden made peace with England. Russia and England invited Frederik VI of Denmark to join in a concerted attack on France. The allies stipulated Denmark would yield Norway to Sweden in return for lands to the south, either in Germany or Holland. Frederik refused, and the Austrian Metternich, unwilling to destroy the legitimate monarchy of Norway, sided with Denmark. Even Russia tended to sympathize with Denmark. She even agreed to dopt the Norwegian transfer if Denmark would join the coalition against Napoleon. (38, p.88 et seq.) But Frederik would not budge unless Norway was guaranteed to him. Karl Johan, seeing that his chances of getting all of Norway were small, on April 10, 1813 changed tactics by demanding the bishopric of Trondhjem,--or else he would attack Denmark-Norway. The attack was stayed when news of Russia's friendly overture to Denmark reached him. But he carried on an intense propaganda campaign in Norway to win voluntary union as the "English party" wished. A few days later, April 15, 1813, when Napoleon once more began to march, the coalition turned their attention to him. However, Karl Johan gave minimal support to indicate his displeasure with the double-crossing by his own allies. Frederik VI thwarted Karl Johan's propaganda

effort by sending his son, Prince Christian Frederik, to Norway as his emissary to carry out reforms. Once more the Swedish prince was frustrated.

Karl Johan's next move had to wait for Napoleon's defeat. After the French defeat at Leipzig, October 16-19, 1813, Karl Johan (who had saved his troops for this) advanced against Denmark and soon threatened to overrun Schleswig and Jutland. Once more he demanded either the immediate cession of the bishopric of Trondhjem to be followed this time by the rest of Norway at the peace conference, or the surrender of all of Norway now. In the latter case Denmark would get Swedish Pomerania and a cash award as compensation. Frederik asked time to consider, during which interval he learned that Austria, Russia and England all backed Karl Johan. On January 4, 1814, when the negotiators met at Kiel, Karl Johan announced that if the treaty of peace was not signed within 48 hours, he would destroy the Danish monarchy. It was a bluff, because a week later they were still talking. On January 13, 1814, with still no peace signed, Karl Johan got from Castlereagh peremptory orders to march against Napoleon again, but he managed to keep this a dark secret while he forced an all-night session with the Danes. At last the Danes yielded. Had there been further delay, Karl Johan might have lost English backing.

5. The Treaty of Kiel

On January 14, 1814 Denmark signed the Treaty of Kiel and made peace with both Sweden and England. Karl Johan's plans had at last been realized. By its terms Frederik VI yielded Norway to Sweden, but Norway should remain a kingdom united with Sweden.³⁵ (2,p. 379-383; 38, p. 379-383) She was to retain local self-government, her own laws, and the rights already possessed. Sweden gave Denmark the Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen to its north, and promised to pay that part of the Danish-Norwegian state properly apportioned to Norway. Karl Johan, as a further bit of persuasion, agreed to use his influence at the Congress of Vienna to get greater compensation for Denmark.

In later years several interpretations were given as to the status of Norway. According to one of these, Sweden got possession of Norway with full ownership title. Even Karl Johan, writing the same day as the treaty was signed, expressed two inconsistent views: to his son he wrote, "Norway is united with Sweden, and forms a separate and independent kingdom." But to a Swedish nobleman

³⁵ Karl Johan apparently wished only a "union" of the two kingdoms, and in this he clashed with the "French party" which sought complete domination over Norway. The Swedish government favored a union by force, and this view prevailed in some degree during 1814 when Karl Johan was absent on the continent. That he yielded to these pressures

in Stockholm he wrote asking for an occupation force of 6,000 men, and said, "Norway is to be taken possession of, not as a province, but only to be united with Sweden in such a way as to form with it a single kingdom." (11, vol, 2, p. 415-418) These contradictions continued to have their adherents for the next 91 years and accounted for much of the ambivalence in Swedish policy.³⁷

Although the treaty was signed on January 14th, and Frederik VI four days later made the announcement, the news did not reach Norway until January 25th. As the terms of the treaty became known, joy over peace and the end of suffering gave way to bitterness at being the subject of barter in a balance of power struggle. The Danish king had in his farewell message released them from loyalty to him, but Norwegians refused to consider themselves chattels to be traded. During the isolation caused by the Napoleonic Wars Norway enjoyed autonomy and virtual independence resulting in a sense of nationalism. So because they had not been consulted, they felt themselves morally free to choose their own form of government and their own destiny.

and broke faith with his propaganda promises to Norway is indicated by his securing the help of the English to blockade the Norwegian coast.
37 Legal attitudes also accounted for some misunderstanding.

For a year King Frederik VI had had Prince Christian Frederik, the 26-year old heir to the Danish-Norwegian³⁸ throne, serve in Norway as his emissary and statholder in an effort to retain the loyalty of the Norwegians and thwart the Swedish undermining. He also administered the land while the English privateers made commerce and communications difficult. The people became very fond of this jovial prince. When the news of the Treaty of Kiel reached him on January 24th privately, a message also came from the king that he should surrender Norway to the Swedes and then return to Copenhagen. He refused to obey, and instead journeyed through Gudbrandsdal to Trondhjem where crowds urged him to call an Assembly of Estates and to ascend the throne of Norway.

Reared in absolutism, Christian Frederik believed that inasmuch as Frederik VI had abdicated and spoken only for himself, the prince could proclaim himself king. As King of Norway and as heir to the Danish throne, he could eventually restore the union. Furthermore, Karl Johan had so many detractors in Sweden and among the legitimate monarchs that perhaps his days were numbered. Possibly in Christian Frederik the dream of Scandinavian union would be realized. But the young prince wisely hesitated to

³⁸ Christian Frederik later became King of Denmark, 1839-1848.

act alone. Instead he called 21 leading men to meet February 16, 1814 at Eidsvold, a town about 35 miles north of Christiania,³⁹ to advise him.

The prince was not prepared for the overwhelming opposition these leaders showed when he announced the plan to proclaim himself the absolute king. An absolute monarchy, they explained, was no longer a sound theory. From time immemorial in Norway the king had been chosen by the people assembled in ting. The philosophy of Enlightenment and of the French Revolution had reaffirmed the principle of the sovereignty of the people. It remained for Professor Georg Sverdrup, one of the last to arrive, to argue that when Frederik VI resigned, the sovereignty reverted to the people to be conferred by a free election. The people had the right to choose their own form of government. The prince graciously yielded and agreed to serve as regent and to call a Constituent Assembly. With enthusiasm from all he issued a Declaration of Independence. (17, p. 376-378)

6. The Independent Norway of 1814

The independence of Norway was of short duration, lasting a scant six months. Its leaders recognized that there was little time to act before Sweden would assert her rights under the Treaty of Kiel. On the other hand,

³⁹ After the destruction of Oslo by fire in 1624 and its rebuilding by Christian IV, the city was called

the treaty had obligated Sweden to recognize the local self-government and laws of Norway. Consequently the framework which the Constituent Assembly shaped could have far-reaching effects. Although independence was soon snatched from her, the Constitution which was drafted and even more significantly the memory of those months kept alive a spirit of independence and constancy which finally bore fruit in 1905.

The call for the Constituent Assembly announced that the delegates should be chosen on Friday, February 25, which was designated a national day of prayer. There was to be a church service in which the people should call upon God for blessing. Then the question was to be put to every congregation, "Do you swear to maintain Norway's independence and to risk life and blood for the beloved fatherland?" This took place in every parish throughout the land, and the oath was taken unanimously. Thereupon two men were elected from each parish, one of whom should be a farmer, and these met in each county to choose three delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Again, one of these had to be a farmer. However, even then the Assembly was

Christiania until 1924 when the Old Norse name of Oslo was restored. Throughout the remainder of this paper the name Christiania is used.

not truly representative, since neither workers nor small farmers had the franchise. In this manner 112 men were chosen to meet April 10, 1814, at Eidsvold.

Meanwhile, believing that Norway was theirs, the Swedes sent their armies against Napoleon again. On the advice of his cabinet, the regent Christian Frederik sent an emissary to England to plead the cause of an independent Norway. He realized that Norway could never survive without the support of the great powers, particularly England. The British prime minister, Lord Liverpool, indicated his support of Sweden, but the adamant position was somewhat softened when the emissary proved to him that the Norwegian movement was a native uprising and not inspired by Denmark or the regent. However, when Britain and the other powers also refused to help Norway, her cause seemed almost hopeless.

The negotiations with Sweden bore the most fruit. Like the English, the Swedes believed that Denmark held the key to the surrender of Norway. Eventually Norwegian representatives persuaded them that Denmark had nothing to do with it. Instead the Swedes were dealing with a genuine mass movement. Sweden then put pressure on Christian Frederik to get Norway to yield. Norwegian stubbornness increased although the regent did admit that if it would help Norway, he would abdicate; but he would not lead

the people into a union with Sweden. Such a union was for the people alone to decide through their representatives. If they were to join Sweden, it could only be as a union of two equal nations. (17, p. 380-381)

The Swedes faced a series of dilemmas. The insistence of the powers that Bernadotte and his Swedish army go after Napoleon had given the Norwegians an opportunity. The Count von Essen, who had been sent by Karl XIII to take over Norway as governor, was advised to return because his mission was hopeless. On March 31, 1814 the armies of the coalition entered Paris, and Karl Johan could again turn his attention to Norway. But how should he proceed? His advisors showed that the gentle approach was not succeeding; but could a union by force work any better?

a. The Constitution of Eidsvold, (May 17, 1814)

The Norwegian course was clear. A constitution was imperative. So on Easter Sunday, April 10, the delegates set a Christian keynote by joining in the church services at Eidsvold. The following day the formal sessions began which in the course of a month drafted a document setting up for Norway a limited hereditary monarchy with the law-making power being exercised by the people through their elected representatives. A first draft using much of the terminology of the French Revolution and Constitution of 1791 was discarded. Instead the delegation adopted a less liberal document.

A clash occurred early in the sessions. Although all were agreed on a constitutional monarchy and autonomy, there was a large minority, the Union Party, which preferred union with Sweden, and reasoned that Norway's limited resources would not be able to support a viable government. Also they knew that by choosing Christian Frederik as king they would eventually re-unite with Denmark when he became king there. The majority who favored independence and Christian Frederik prevailed.

The constitution providing for a Storting (Great Assembly) of 123 representatives elected by qualified voters for three years. These representatives were to select from their number one-fourth to be the Lagting (Upper Assembly), while the remaining three-fourths were to be the Odelsting (Lower Assembly) in which all bills had to originate. It was a modified unicameral system, because in the event of disagreement they were to sit as one body, with passage of any law assured by a two-thirds vote. The king had only a suspensive veto. If he vetoed any measure it would nevertheless become law if it was passed in the same form by three separately elected Stor-tings. This suspensive veto later was frequently attacked by the Swedes, with it becoming a critical issue in 1905.

The Constitution broadened the franchise, but it was still limited to males of the official class, townsmen

who owned a house or three hundred specie dollars, and farmers who owned their own land or had rented a farm for at least five years. (17, p. 384-385) Workers and other tenant farmers could not vote. Because two-thirds of the representatives should be from country districts, the power of the farmers was obvious.

The Constitution was signed and proclaimed on May 17, 1814 as the law of the land. This date was to become the greatest Norwegian national holiday even after the inevitable union with Sweden. On the same date the Assembly elected the young Christian Frederik king of Norway.⁴³ (11, vol. 2, p. 423-432)

The new king, however, was no match for the crisis that faced Norway. England, Russia and Prussia notified him that they would never recognize Norway as an independent kingdom, and that they would side with Sweden in upholding the Kiel settlement and legitimacy. But he continued to hope that some accident⁴⁴ would avert battle. At that moment while Karl Johan was on the Continent, Norway could muster about 20,000 men, but Sweden had only 16,000 at home. (11, vol. 2, p. 434) The return of her

⁴³ He was never crowned.

⁴⁴ Karl Johan hoped to be King of France on the fall of Napoleon, and Christian Frederik hoped then to be chosen crown prince of Sweden.

armies from the Continent, not to mention the promised mercenaries from Russia and Prussia and the naval blockade by England, would give Sweden an overwhelming force. Christian Frederik's only hope lay in diplomacy.

Pressure from the foreign powers was heavy. England agreed only to use its influence to retain for Norway its constitutional liberties provided that Norway consented to the union with Sweden. Norway refused, and the English began their blockade on May 31, 1814. On June 30 the emissaries of the coalition reached Christiania, demanding that Christian Frederik surrender the forts and the kingdom to the Swedes. In return they promised to lift the blockade partially. The terms of the Treaty of Kiel were irrevocable, they said. The king was willing to yield in order to spare his country further misery. But the cabinet, seeing this as a violation of the new Constitution and also a possible cause for unrest, refused to allow a surrender. A bid by Christian Frederik for further negotiations was met with impatience by Karl Johan, who held the diplomatic whip over Norway. Only Russia suggested further consideration.

The military showdown began with the Swedish invasion of Norway on July 29. Karl XIII issued a proclamation urging surrender and arguing that the Eidsvold Constitution was illegal and basically harmful to the rights

of the Norwegian people. Norway chose to fight. Although the Norwegians won some of the skirmishes in the north, the Swedes proved victorious in the strategic south. Fearing costly guerrilla warfare, Karl Johan did not charge deeply into Norway.

Time was working in Norway's favor.⁴⁶ The emissaries of the powers began favoring recognition of Norway's right to be treated as a de jure state. Karl Johan also recognized in the Constitution many of the points for which he as a Gascon and Jacobin had fought in the Constitution of 1791. Sincerely seeking to respect Norwegian demands for national integrity and freedom, he turned once more to diplomacy. He offered an armistice accepting the Eidsvold Constitution with only such modifications as might be required to effect a union of the two kingdoms. To accomplish this he demanded that Christian Frederik call a Storting special session and abdicate.⁴⁷ (34,p.7) When the Norwegian cabinet advised the king that the military supplies would not last over a week, Christian Frederik had no alternative except to begin negotiations.

46 The debate in the English Parliament had shown great sympathy for Norway. However, by a vote of 115 to 34 the House of Lords sustained the British policy of supporting Sweden.

47 Revisionists are painting a much more sympathetic picture of Karl Johan now.

b. The Armistice of Moss (August 14, 1814)

Christian Frederik in his desire to avoid a decisive defeat which might handicap negotiations agreed to an armistice. According to its terms the Eidsvold Constitution was to be kept intact except for minimal changes necessitated by the union. Even these changes were subject to the approval of the Storting. The fortress of Fredrikssten,⁴⁸ which the Swedes could not take was to be yielded to them; but the other forts were to remain in Norwegian hands. Swedish troops were to occupy a district east of Christiania, but neither Norwegian nor Swedish troops were to come within 21 miles of the capital. Only Norwegian regulars were to remain under arms; volunteers had to be discharged immediately. No person or group were to suffer reprisals for their conduct in the war against Sweden. Christian Frederik was to turn his power over to the cabinet until the Storting could make permanent provisions. By a secret agreement he was to take no further active part in the government. He was also to leave the country within two days after the convening of the Storting. The Norwegian cabinet, instead of the Swedish representative as Karl Johan had planned, was to carry on the government. The Treaty of Kiel was not mentioned, and this

⁴⁸ Here it was that Karl XII in 1718 had been shot while trying to take Norway in the Great Northern War (1700-1719).

led lawyers later to the conclusion that the Treaty constituted no part of the law of Norway. Norway never recognized the Treaty. (11, vol. 2, p. 437-443; 17, p. 391; 19, p. 13-14)

The armistice was signed by the Norwegian cabinet at Moss, Norway, on August 14, 1814, incorporating the foregoing terms. In a separate agreement hostilities were to be suspended and the blockade lifted for a period of fourteen days after the opening of the Storting. When this time limit expired some Norwegians suggested a delay until the following spring while they gathered munitions for resuming the war as soon as the April thaw made fighting feasible again. On August 30 Karl XIII ratified the terms stating that " the kingdom of Norway, without being regarded as a conquered country, in the future shall be an independent state united with Sweden; and its present constitution shall be properly protected, after the changes necessitated by the union of the two countries shall have been made." (11, vol. 2, p. 443) Christian Frederik did not take direct part in the negotiations, and the Swedes avoided affront by failing to nominate explicitly Karl XIII as king of Norway.

Christian Frederik summoned the Storting for October 7. The cabinet ruled the country but was meticulous in not recognizing the union until after the Storting should have decided in favor of the union.

The composition of the Storting was not outstanding. Only 18 of the 123 men of Eidsvold were elected, and only one member of the Union Party. In the weeks preceding the election Sweden had carried on a propaganda campaign in favor of union. As an answer the people had elected a body which was overwhelmingly for independence. But independence was no longer the issue. On October 10 Christian Frederik submitted his abdication, and that night he sailed for Denmark where the Danes greeted him warmly.⁵¹ On November 3 the Storting accepted the abdication. The changes to be made in the Constitution were accomplished. The Swedes had proposed that the king be empowered to naturalize foreigners by royal decree, but the Storting balked, fearing an influx of naturalized Swedish officials. They were correct in this fear because such really had been Karl Johan's plan. A compromise was effected in return for greater military support for the union whereby no Swedes could enter Norwegian official posts. On November 4 the Storting with only five dissenters voted for the union and the election of Karl XIII as king of Norway. Thus ended the brief period of independence of Norway. (17, p. 382-395; 19, p. 14-17)

C. The Union of Sweden and Norway (1814-1905)

The Swedes entered upon the union with pomp and circumstance, and there was a whirl of social functions to

⁵¹ He became Christian VIII of Denmark (1839-1848)

celebrate the occasion. In Norway Karl Johan with proper ceremony gave the oath of Karl XIII, but the crowds were silent. The people were suspicious and unprepared for the unwelcome union.

1. The Act of Union (1815)

During the winter of 1814-1815 the Norwegian Storting and the Swedish Riksdag (parliament) drafted the Act of Union (Riksakt). In 1815 when it was formally adopted the king was crowned in Norway, thereby formalizing the Union which had begun on November 4, 1814.

The Act of Union, which became the basis of the two monarchies until 1905, stated that the two countries were equal, with the same king, and that the constitutions of each country should be respected. Theoretically, each country was autonomous, but the king initially had broad powers which were whittled away as the Nineteenth Century progressed. All ministers were responsible to the king. Parliaments were summoned by the king, who opened each session of the Storting in Christiania and that of the Riksdag in Stockholm. Because he resided only part of each year in Norway, a statholder(until 1856) carried out royal duties. He signed all laws, but on the question of the veto his position was ambiguous as he tried to rule with an absolute veto which the Swedish constitution gave him and with a suspensive veto under the Eidsvold constitution.

In both countries the king had full power over war and foreign affairs, except that no Norwegian forces could (or were ever asked to) serve beyond the borders of Norway. In foreign affairs the only restriction the Norwegians could assert was through the budget. Under the Swedish constitution the king was likewise free in foreign affairs. However, because the king always chose a Swedish foreign minister, the Norwegians felt their interests were not always considered. In sum, the Act of Union provided that the union existed in the king, so that Oscar II in 1905 could truthfully state to the Norwegian commissioners, "I am as Norwegian as you are!" In Norway he spoke Norwegian (and kings were popular according to their ability to speak without a Swedish accent); and in Sweden he was Swedish and spoke Swedish. The union was in the person of the king.

Neither parliament nor cabinet exercised any authority over the king in the other kingdom, but while in Norway he was accompanied by Swedish commissioners and while in Sweden by Norwegian commissioners. In theory, under the Act of Union each country was independent and equal, but united under the king.

a. Comparison with other Dual Monarchies.

There was precedent for such a union in the dual monarchy of Spain and Portugal which under the Thomar

compact of 1581 provided that Philip II of Spain and his successors should also be crowned in Portugal. Portugal was not to be regarded as a conquered or annexed province, but as a separate kingdom joined to Spain solely by a personal union in the king. It was similar to the union between Castile and Aragon under Ferdinand and Isabella. Philip II promised to maintain the rights and privileges granted by his Portuguese predecessors, to summon the Cortes at frequent intervals, and to create the Portuguese privy council which should accompany the king everywhere for consultations. He also agreed not to allow any alien in public office. The similarity to the union of Sweden and Norway was strong. But neither Philip II nor his successors kept the Thomar compact in their eagerness to acquire the Iberian Peninsula. Consequently, in 1640, after a fight, Portugal once more won its independence, frustrating the Spanish policy of union and amalgamation. (6, vol. 5, p. 389) The Iberian dual monarchy showed one of the inherent weaknesses of such governmental structure, --the overweening probability that the stronger would gobble the weaker.

The dual monarchy of Scotland and England presented another pattern. After many years of fluctuation Scotland and England were united under James Stuart (James VI of Scotland) in 1603 by virtue of the Act of Succession which

made him next in line for the throne of England when Elizabeth died childless. Scottish desires to remain independent were mainly economic, but arose also from the resentment at always being subordinate to the English political, ecclesiastical and even colonial policies. As in Spain-Portugal, so in England-Scotland, the person of the monarch was the uniting factor. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought a greater degree of Scottish independence,-- a free Parliament and a Church of Scotland; but the dominant policy of William (1689-1702) and of Anne (1702-1714) was to unite the two kingdoms. In the Act of Union of 1707 the two merged into one kingdom. To be sure, the Scots were guaranteed their church and seats in Parliament, but Scotland lost its independence. The union, however, was built on a basic common identity of interests, in which both benefitted by merger and found a greater identity as Great Britain. (20, p. 359, 363, 523-526)

With these examples before them in 1814, would the dual monarchy of Sweden-Norway enhance the realization of Norway's dream of status, or would the stronger try to engulf the weaker? Would Norway, like Portugal, have to fight to save itself? Certainly with the future in the hands of the king, much would depend on the course he followed. It would depend on whether, as Anne had with the Scots, he could convince the Norwegians that union

was really serving their greater interests. In this, Oscar I (1844-1859) nearly succeeded.

2. Swedish and Norwegian Viewpoints on the Union.

Although the official Swedish position was that Norway was an equal kingdom united with Sweden in the king through the Riksakt, wide circles were dissatisfied with the form of the union. They regarded Norway as a substitute for the lost Finland with which she had had much closer ties. They hoped that soon the two governments would merge into one nation, as England and Scotland had done a century earlier. Others, members of the "French party", regarded Norway as a possession acquired by force by virtue of the Treaty of Kiel, and therefore rightly dominated. These attitudes did have their effect in retarding the achievement by Norway of a status of actual equality.

The official Norwegian position agreed substantially with the official Swedish attitude, but maintained that the union was by virtue of the consent of the Norwegians acting through their Storting. Most Norwegians accepted the Union, because there was no other politically realistic course possible. Some, seeing the tie as having a beneficial economic potential, were therefore more co-operative. A few nursed the grudge that Norway had been assigned to Sweden like a chattel. Although the Union of

1814 was not exactly a "shotgun marriage", it was a "marriage of reason" rather than of "love". There was no enthusiasm for the union, and much apprehension. At least Norway had achieved the right to control her internal affairs, and absolute monarchy had been replaced by constitutional monarchy. On one thing the people were united, --the Constitution of Eidsvold. It was this that had given them a de-jure status, and any tampering at the suggestion of the Swedes met with almost unanimous resistance.⁵⁵ (4, vol. 2, p. 748-750; 17, p. 395, 404-407)

In the years that followed, the Norwegians consistently showed their attitude toward the union by ignoring the Union Day, November 4. Instead they celebrated enthusiastically the anniversary of May 17, 1814 when the Constitution had been proclaimed and Christian Frederik had been chosen king. All efforts by Karl Johan to call attention to the "error" failed.⁵⁶ The Constitution became almost a fixation for the thwarted Norwegians.

55 According to Professor Steen of Oslo University, had Norway gained independence in 1814 the Concert of Europe would undoubtedly have forced her to give up or radically change the Constitution. But the Union with Sweden was the salvation of the Constitution.

56 No doubt the snowy weather of the dark autumn contrasted unhappily with the almost continual sunshine and bright new foliage of the leafing birches on May 17. A wintry anniversary could never be popular. As the Nineteenth Century drew to a close even the Swedes joined the Norwegians in celebrating the spring anniversary.

3. Comparison of Norway and Sweden in 1815.

But the two countries were not equal; they differed in many ways. Norway had a population of 885,000; Sweden had 2,300,000. Because Norway had poor soil she turned to fishing, logging and merchant carrying trade. In contrast Sweden was agricultural and industrial.⁵⁷ While Sweden had a landed nobility with most farms being over 100 acres operated by landless farmers, Norway's farms averaged less than 15 acres. Norway had not possessed a true nobility or serfs since the emigration to Iceland, except for two nobles who were shorn of any hereditary status by 1814. Having been ruled from Denmark for four centuries, Norway had no experience in civil service, while Sweden had had much experience in governing. The Swedish Constitution (1809) was aristocratic with a Riksdag of four estates, (clergy, nobility, townsmen, and bönder or farmers), with ultimate authority resting in the crown in the areas of military, finance, justice and foreign affairs. The Norwegian Constitution (1814) was liberal with a modified unicameral Storting and limited royal power. The social swirl in Sweden included a colorful court with an aristocratic society and parties; Norway had no social life

⁵⁷ It should be noted that the union of Belgium with Holland joined two different economies, one industrial and manufacturing and the other agricultural and commercial. The union did not last long after the Napoleonic Era.

except private debating clubs, drama clubs, newspapers and rustic gatherings.⁵⁸ Swedish gentlemen wore lace; Norsemen wore plain clothes or native costumes with bright colors. In language, although each understood the other without the need of interpreter, there were noticeable differences. Many identical words with robust and warm connotations in Norwegian carried coarse and depreciating overtones when used in Swedish speech. Norway had just founded its first university at Christiania in 1811, while Sweden had a long academic tradition dating back to Uppsala in 1477 and Lund in 1660. The standard of living in Norway was decidedly inferior to that of Sweden.

Yet, for all their differences, there were many points of similarity. Ethnically they were the same. There were no foreign elements, except Finns and Lapps; all immigrants (Germans, Huguenots and Scots) had been assimilated. The majority in both countries were devout but superstitious, frugal, narrow-minded, and hard-drinking. Most of them were literate by 1815, but since the education was mostly in the hands of the parish pastor before whom every child had to come for confirmation, the

⁵⁸ Until the repeal in 1842 of the Conventicle Act of 1741 freedom did not include freedom of assembly.

reading was heavily weighted toward the Bible and Luther's Catechism. All of the people were Lutheran, and each country had its Lutheran state church. But this did not lead to ecumenicity or any sharing of experiences. The similarities did not unite the people.

Thus, although occupying the same peninsula and having many points in common, the two countries had acquired through the centuries different characteristics and interests which often clashed. Their heroes, sagas and traditions differed. The Swedes had successfully broken out of the Kalmar Union in 1523, while the Norwegians despite uprisings continued for three centuries longer to get a Danish imprint on government, literature and society. The intellectual movements of Europe affected each country uniquely and at differing times. Economically, Sweden and Norway had semantic difficulties. Even constitutional development varied and took differing forms which could, and did clash. Whereas Sweden had had a fling at empire⁵⁹ and "great power" status, Norway lacked diplomatic recognition, her only period of empire had ended centuries ago with the Vikings. Sweden had enjoyed independence since the Reformation; the Norwegians, on the other hand, were late arrivals. While the Norwegians still were divided

⁵⁹ Delaware until 1655, Finland until 1808, and Pomerania until 1814.

and lacked both powerful friends and resources, Sweden, despite her declining power in the face of Russia and Prussian expansion, was a power to be courted. Norway was the tail of Sweden's kite, and apart from Sweden lacked status.

With this inauspicious beginning the dual monarchy of Sweden-Norway faced the many issues of the Nineteenth Century, found solutions too little or too late, and then inevitably the two kingdoms were on the road to crisis.

Chapter III

THE ROAD TO CRISIS

The union of Sweden-Norway began with suspicion and apprehension, and the first few decades witnessed crises which did not strengthen the ties. No outside enemy threatened these two remote kingdoms to drive them into each other's arms. In their self-contemplation they could indulge in flyspecking and criticism of the other over wrongs, real or concocted. At the mid-century mark the reign of Oscar I (1844-1859) ushered in a Pan-Scandinavianism which died when Sweden-Norway refused aid to Denmark in its struggle with Prussia in 1864. Thereafter Norway joined the chorus in singing the glories of nationalism, and tensions with Sweden heightened. Although solutions were found, each side nursed a grievance,-- Norway because she felt that it was outrageous that there should have been any question about it, and Sweden because the Norwegians were not grateful. Instead of welding a closer marriage, the nations drifted apart. It was the person of the king who held the union together and rode out the storms until the Crisis of 1905.

A. Education for Nationalism

Education, particularly in the broad sense, shaped the destiny of Norway. It was not the only factor;

history is too complex for one-word solutions. But the pietistic and devout pastors and lay preachers shaped generations of Norwegian leaders. These went on to write an opinionated nationalistic poetry and prose, self-righteous, uncompromising and anti-Swedish. Others became merchants and shipping magnates who pushed Norway's merchant fleet to third place among world powers, thereby winning friends and giving the country an orientation greatly at variance with Sweden's. Pietistic laymen preached the Gospel and improved farming methods. Scholars revived the ancient language and culture, and in so doing gave the rural population a self-confidence and stature they had never known before. The establishment of state teachers' training colleges in 1826 set in motion a secularization and standardization of schools, and teachers went into all parts of the country imbuing their pupils and communities with the mystical greatness of Norway. Ideas of democracy and parliamentarianism and socialism led Norway away from Sweden, and in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century Norwegians became quarrelsome in asserting their rights and claims within the Union. It was not unexpected, then, that a growing majority came to the conclusion that Norway, like Portugal, could not get equality with a stronger partner.

The emphasis in the education of children remained

religious until 1860 when some secular subjects were introduced.¹ The pastors had shared their wider knowledge with their pupils, but it was not adequate. Compulsory education for the primary grades, which had gone into effect for the towns in 1848, became obligatory for all in 1860. At the same time secular subjects, such as history, geography and natural sciences, were added to the basically religious curriculum.²

In 1905 the Swedish Riksdag debates cast aspersions at the stereotypes and attitudes fostered by Norwegian school books which, it was alleged, described the Swedes as their national enemy. (21, p.228) Although this was false, nevertheless the primary school readers gave an unflattering caricature of the Swedes. Thus, the story of Torgny lagmann (29, p. 320-322) at the ting at Uppsala in 1018 as told in verse by the Norwegian nationalist

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- 1 Even today all education in Norway is still under the Department of Church and Education.
 - 2 Secondary schools, which remained voluntary, had been mostly Latin Schools in the Early Nineteenth Century, but with a few "modern schools" (realskoler). By an act of 1869 secondary education was reorganized so that a child after three years of primary school would take six years of "middle school" (middelskole) to be followed by three years of "gymnasium", a 3-6-3 arrangement. In 1896 this was revised to a 5-4-3 plan. After 1896 the gymnasium provided three lines, --a Latin line, a science line, and an English line. From the gymnasium the student could enter the university of Christiania.

Per Sivle (1857-1904) described the manner in which the Swedish king's greed for more Norwegian land was bluntly blocked by Torgny, and every Norwegian schoolboy remembered the lines:

"Hats off for the honored hero
Who,--yes, he was Swedish, and not a Norwegian!"

The implication was that here and there one could find a hero in Sweden, but not often. Thus, also, since so many times the two Scandinavian nations had fought each other, it was only natural in a century when war heroes were extolled that the adventures of the doughty Norwegians should put the fleeing Swedes in a dim light. But in Jacob B. Bull's Brødre (30, p. 76-79) (Brothers) a Pan-Scandinavian note was struck by a farmer who scolded a victorious Norwegian colonel who in 1808 was feeding his own regiment first and letting the defeated Swedish prisoners go hungry:

"For, guest is guest, whether invited or not,
And war is not war when the battle is over.
We Norwegians are wont to wait, boy,
Until Strangers have gotten themselves food and
drink!"

To a Swede such accounts of heroism and condescension must have been irritable, but they hardly made "national enemies" of the Swedes. Nor did they differ much from the caricature which the Swedes learned about their neighbor to the west.

It was the university students, however, who first thought of celebrating May 17 in order to draw attention

to the Constitution. Almost immediately after the establishment of the union, several crises ⁶ had strained relations with Sweden, and to the students the Constitution became a symbol of national status and identity. In the year 1824 they organized a celebration, and for the next several years the day was observed by private parties. When the Swedish statholder asked the king about the matter, the king seemed tolerant and well-disposed. In 1827 the festivities became more public and widespread, and toasts were drunk to the king. Karl XIV Johan (1818-1844), with his characteristic French explosiveness, reacted with rage, and the students responded by booing a Swedish play in Christiania. The king replied by dismissing the statholder, Sandels, and appointing von Platen, whose policy became one of amalgamation and consolidation of the two kingdoms. Von Platen tried to show that the wrong day was being celebrated,--it should be either August 14 (when the Armistice of Moss was signed), or November 4 (when the Union was established). But the Norwegians paid no attention to the Swedish statholder. Then the king called a special session of the Storting in which he called the celebration of May 17 an insult to the Union and the Act of Union of November 4, 1814.

6 These were the Danish-Norwegian national debt, the Bodø affair, and the veto.

The Storting yielded, and in 1828 there was no general celebration of the anniversary.

Once more the students took the initiative. In 1829 the Students Union decided to make it one of their private festivals, and the affair was quiet. But unfortunately a new-fangled invention, a steamboat (disquietingly named "Constitution"), arrived in Christiania harbor, and on the beautiful spring day hundreds met it with shouts and national songs. The crowd (numbering about 500) continued outdoors enjoying the weather, but the statholder got nervous and the police chief was frightened into reading the riot act. The crowd did not disperse, so the cavalry and infantry were ordered to scatter them. No shots were fired and no one was killed, but the public furor⁷ over the Torgslaget ("Battle of the Market Place") was whipped up by students. In a popular lithograph Henrik Wergeland (1808-1845) showed "Swedish" cavalry riding over bloody corpses, although there were no Swedish soldiers in Norway, nor were they allowed there. The furor led to an investigation which showed that the use of troops was unwarranted. But now the people could not be stopped, and the Storting told the king that the anniversary was a right of the people. The king agreed and dismissed the Swedish statholder, leaving the office

⁷ A sabre slashed the coat of Wergeland, a student.

vacant.⁸ Thereafter the holiday was celebrated by all in Norway, and has remained its greatest holiday even after Independence Day (June 7, 1905) dawned in the following century. (11, vol. 2, p. 460 et seq.; 17, p. 405-406) But it was the students, and particularly Henrik Wergeland, who had established the day.

Education also had its reactionary,--Hans Nielsen Hauge (1772-1824), a young farmer with little formal education, who in April, 1796 experienced a personal conversion and spent the remaining years of his life until 1824 in lay evangelism, particularly among rural folks. Being called to a religious revival, the farmers turned a deaf ear to the French Revolution and followed Hauge in stressing the importance of personal salvation. The ordained clergy and the state church persecuted this lay preacher, and in 1804 he was imprisoned for violation of the Conventicle Act. While waging war on the tendency to a broader cultural education, he sought to rescue his followers from the snares of the world by setting up self-sufficient farming communities on remote undeveloped land, organizing co-operative and wholesale enterprises and industries, and preaching both salvation and better farming methods. His

⁸ When the office was filled once more, in 1835, a Norwegian was appointed, and this remained the practice until the post was left unfilled in 1856.

imprint on the state church has been permanent,¹⁰ while his influence on the farmers has been profound. Hauge, more than any other individual, was instrumental in rousing the rural people to a new sense of their own value and providing them with the rudimentary means of political expression. (17, p. 360) Toward the end of the Nineteenth Century it was the farmers who formed a stubborn bloc for independence and the dissolution of the Union with Sweden. (35, p. 161-181)

The nationalism which Wergeland had sparked was kindled into a strong flame by others. Peter Andreas Munch (1810-1863), a professor of history, reflected the romantic movement on the Continent by showing in many volumes that Norway had the richest cultural tradition of all the Scandinavian countries, and that the Danish Period was a "mere soldering between Norway's past and present". (17, p. 438) Peter Christen Asbjørnsen (1812-1885) and Jørgen Moe (1813-1882) showed their countrymen the rich heritage of folklore and legends. Ivar Aasen (1813-1896) pointed to the rural dialects as the true Norwegian

10 ¹⁰ The conservative spirit of Hauge led to the establishment of a separate theological faculty (Menighets-fakultetet) stressing evangelism and home mission work, while the theological faculty of the University of Christiania continued to supply pastors for the State Church.

language, thereby giving the farmers a tremendous sense of pride and self-confidence. M. B. Landstad (1802-1880) wrote down folk ballads, and Ludvig Lindeman (1812-1887) recorded folk tunes. Jacob Aall (1773-1844) tried to (35,p. 122-131) popularize more words from the dialects, and Landstad argued that the cultural gulf between pastor and rural congregation could only be bridged by pastors learning to preach in the local dialects. The nationalism thus kindled initially by Wergeland had grown in the 1840's into a rift between the urban Danish and the rural folk cultures which later generations intensified.

Many townspeople and officials regarded the wave of rural nationalism as provincialism. In the words of the impulsive Karl XV (1859-1872), while still viceroy for Oscar I, the farmers "desire to make of every province a little kingdom". While the countryside turned to a fostering of national feelings, some townsmen became Union-minded because of the political protection the Dual Monarchy afforded. Others with wider horizons sought a Scandinavian federation in which Norway as the weakest could tip the scales to her own advantage.

B. Pan-Scandinavianism.

The movement toward a Scandinavian federation had its strongest support in academic circles in the middle of the Nineteenth Century. But it lacked political

leadership and economic advantages, and remained only an idea.

Thoughts of reviving the Kalmar Union arose when Christian VIII Frederik (1839-1848) began his rule in Denmark, and it was clear that his childless son, later Frederik VII (1848-1863), would be the last of the dynasty. Students and professors meeting in Scandinavian academic congresses argued that Sweden and Norway were already united, and the intellectual barriers to a union with Denmark were few. There was so much in common.

When the German population of Schleswig-Holstein revolted in 1848, the threat of Prussia saw Norwegians and Swedes fighting on the side of the Danes, but with the proviso that they would defend only Jutland and not the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. It was the czar who saved Denmark and the duchies, for he was loath to see a Scandinavian federation which might menace his northern flank and possible acquisition of polar access to the Atlantic, where the boundary had never been clearly defined.

The Crimean War (1854-1856) caused the Swedes to abandon a pro-Russian policy which they had maintained in gratitude for Alexander I's support of their claim on Norway in 1813-1814. During the war Sweden was shown the czar's plans to seize Finnmark, and Sweden announced

her neutrality but refused to close her ports to foreign warships. In return an Anglo-French guarantee was given that no Scandinavian territory would be ceded to Russia. At the peace conference Oscar induced the allies to force the Russians to demilitarize the Aaland Islands in the Baltic.

The fear of Russia strengthened Pan-Scandinavianism and a unified defense. Napoleon III urged that "the North must become one unit, one strong power, a counterweight both to Russia and to Germany. And this must happen soon".¹⁵ (8, p.155) Further impetus was given by the cordial relations existing between Oscar and Frederik, and in 1857 Oscar offered Denmark a military alliance to defend Denmark including Schleswig. Frederik's anti-Scandinavian foreign minister countered by demanding the inclusion of Holstein, which was predominantly German, and the alliance plan withered. Suddenly Oscar became ill, and while he lingered his son Karl, a Pan-Scandinavian, acted as regent. Impulsive and anxious to win the support of the Norwegians, Karl promised them a "morning gift" of the abolition of the position of statholder, which since 1835 had been filled always by

¹⁵ In 1854 the Norwegians even celebrated Union Day, November 4, with enthusiasm as a first step to a Nordic union of states.

a Norwegian but which was vacant in 1859. The Storting was enthusiastic, since the existence of a statholder who presided over the meetings of the king's ministers in Christiania precluded the establishment of the office of prime minister. But Karl had not reckoned with the Swedish Riksdag, which claimed that this changed the character of the Union and therefore had to have their sanction. Karl yielded to Swedish pressures, and Norway saw that though he was charming he did not have deep convictions. The Pan-Scandinavian movement suffered a set-back.

As Prussian demands on Denmark increased in 1863, Karl XV, who had become king (1859-1872), offered Frederik again a military alliance to defend Denmark and Schleswig. If successful, he figured that he would have as much right to rule the North as Victor Emmanuel had to reign over the newly united Italy. But neither the Swedish nor Norwegian ministries would support him unless one of the great powers helped to make the move safe and victorious. In November 1863 Frederik died, and the Glücksburg dynasty ascended the throne of Denmark. While Denmark thus stood alone, Prussia invaded and in a short war took Schleswig and Holstein.

Although many Norwegians expressed sympathy for the Danes, no deeds were forthcoming. Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) in his great drama, Peer Gynt, lashed out at the

weakness and vacillation of the Norwegian character. But the Scandinavian idealists were outnumbered by the realists who counted the probable commercial losses if they participated. The farmers, also, with their provincial outlooks, resented anything foreign,--even a Danish alliance. Pan-Scandinavianism as a political force was dead. (8, p. 155-158; 17, p. 426)

As the vision of a united North faded, its place was taken by a growing desire for Norwegian national independence. The remaining years of the century brought a resumption of a series of conflicts with Sweden as Norway within the Dual Monarchy pressed for an actualization of the theoretical equality. Finally in 1905 the pendulum swung her entirely out of the Union.

C. Development of Democracy.

The last decades of the century were a period of increasing popular interest in politics and of tremendous economic growth. The lack of private capital made it imperative for the state to cooperate with industry. A department of the interior under the ministry of Fredrik Stang (1808-1884) beginning with the 1840's guided the country in the establishment of a state postal system, a telegraph, a network of excellent roads, a state railway, and government owned coastal packets. Businessmen founded industries, and the government moved

to eradicate the slums and shacks by building apartment houses for laborers. As the rural isolation disappeared, farmers began to take a more active part in wresting control of government from the "official class" and putting it in the hands of the people. (17, p. 427-436; 35, p. 182-210)

Government in the mid-century was in the hands of an "official class", an aristocracy of professional people. There were no political parties to vie with each other for reforms. On the contrary, there was a surprising dedication of the officials to serve the people as a whole and to remedy evils where apparent. Not content to wait for problems to explode, the Storting and the officials initiated studies of social conditions and enacted reforms. Political apathy left the reins of government largely in the hands of lawyers.

The farmers took the initiative in hastening reforms. With the self-assurance gained during the previous decades that their culture was the true Norwegian way of life, and stimulated by the "American letters" of their relatives who were experiencing democracy on the Wisconsin and Minnesota frontiers, they pressed for economy in government and universal suffrage including women. A labor movement, led by Marcus Thrane, a Utopian socialist, was nipped in the bud in 1851 by a government

still frightened by the Revolutions of 1848 on the Continent. Yet the poorer farmers and the workers were welded together into a class party with a liberal program,--the first true political party in Norwegian history; and it succeeded in electing Johan Sverdrup (1816-1892) in 1840 to the Storting. Led by Søren Jaabæk (1814-1894), Farmers' Clubs were organized and agitated for reforms. In 1869 Jaabæk and Sverdrup joined forces and formed the Liberal Party, more commonly known as the "Lefte" or "Venstre". Not until 1884 did the conservatives organize to form any opposition. In part this was due to the tradition against parties, since all officials were regarded as servants of the people as a whole. In part, also, the head of government from 1861 to 1880 was Fredrik Stang, a liberal thoroughly respected on all sides, yet above party politics. The opposition to the Left came from the landlords who followed Jaabæk's pattern of mass meetings to shape public opinion on the course of reforms. (17,p. 455) In the usual parliamentary tradition they came to be known as the "Right" or Høire.

Progress toward democracy included annual sessions of the Storting(1871), supplanting royal ministers with ministers seated in the Storting and responsible to that body (1884), and universal manhood suffrage (1898). With each step the power of the king was curtailed and the

Union ties were correspondingly weakened.

Yet it would be misleading to say that the people generally took part in government. The educated had little interest in politics, preferring to throw their energies into cultural and religious work. (17, p. 436) Through missionary societies, temperance leagues, sports clubs, professional groups, savings associations and co-operatives,--all voluntary,--Norwegians helped develop their country, and simultaneously learned the democratic art of give and take and compromise. Thus, the non-political organizations, including also labor groups and Farmers' Clubs, trained a people to abide by group decisions and to effect changes by elections. These voluntary associations made a lasting contribution to the political structure of Norway, and were an important factor in the orderly and peaceful settlement of the Crisis of 1905. (35, p.143)

Whereas on the Continent nationalism and liberalism tended to part company after 1850, in Norway they went hand in hand. Almost all organizations, even the religious, became strongly national minded. Conservatives tended to be Union-oriented. While those favoring more democracy and parliamentarianism tended toward the independence of Norway. (35, p. 144)

Thus, as Norway became politically conscious, the

ties with the Union king were weakened, and there was little left to justify the Dual Monarchy.

D. Rifts in the Union.

The fabric of the Union of Sweden-Norway weathered several storms in its early years. Fortunately Karl Johan (1818-1844), who ruled until he was 80 years old, was really well liked,²² and the Union survived its first trials.

1. Danish-Norwegian National Debt.

Hardly had the ink dried on the Act of Union (Riksakt) when Norway refused to recognize the Swedish agreement under the Treaty of Kiel that Norway would pay a proportionate part of the Danish-Norwegian national debt. With some justice, and as if echoing 1775 in America, Norway argued that she had not been represented in making the debt, and that the union with Sweden did not rest on the Treaty of Kiel but rather on the Act of Union. Denmark turned in 1818 to the Concert of Europe requesting that it suppress such radical ideas. The Quadruple Alliance solved the crisis by threatening Sweden,--not Norway. Although Sweden resented this interference, Karl Johan put pressure on Norway, and the Storting yielded in 1821.

22 But Karl Johan never learned to speak any language except French.

Norway paid. (11, vol.2, p.455-456; 19, p. 45-46)

2. Bodø Affair.

While the debt question was still in dispute, an English trader, John Everth, had opened a trading post in the newly established frontier town of Bodø, a harbor about 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle. He turned into a large scale smuggler, and in 1818 the Norwegian government arrested him and confiscated his goods. Everth had the ear of Castlereagh, who was at that moment mediating the Danish-Norwegian debt. Perjured witnesses and forged documents persuaded Castlereagh that the Norwegians had been highhanded, and pressure was put on Sweden to force his release. On gaining his freedom, Everth and his friends lured some harbor guards onto their ships, and hijacked the confiscated goods and sailed away. Once safe at sea, Everth set the guards loose in a frail boat, and they eventually made their way to shore. The matter did not end there, for Everth claimed he was innocent and demanded a huge indemnity. The British government presented a near-ultimatum to the Swedish Foreign Minister who awarded payment out of the Norwegian treasury without making any effort to represent the Norwegian position. The Swedish decision in part was based on the mistaken belief that abuse by Norwegian frontier officials was quite in character. Although the facts did not come to

light until 1827, the incident added fuel to the nationalistic fires and convinced Norway that she was being treated as a Swedish possession. (11, vol. 2, p. 454; 8, p. 145-146)

3. Suspensive Veto versus Absolute Veto.

While Karl XIII was still living, Karl Johan embarked on a plan of amalgamating Norway with Sweden under one law. But the Norwegian Constitution with its suspensive veto (25) was irreconcilable with the Swedish Constitution with its absolute veto. Issue was joined on the 1815 bill in the Storting to abolish Norwegian hereditary nobility, which the king vetoed. Again in 1818 it was passed, and Karl Johan, who had become king, blustered that the Great Powers sworn to support legitimacy would not tolerate such a curtailment of royal power. He even threatened war and prosecution of the Storting as traitors; but they passed the bill a second time. In 1821 it was passed a third time and became law without royal sanction.

Although momentarily frustrated, Karl Johan a few months later assembled the Swedish and Norwegian troops for maneuvers near Christiania. Then it was discovered that the Swedes had been issued battle ammunition. Simultaneously the king wrote to the Great Powers an attack on Norway's spirit of insurrection, but the response lacked enthusiasm, and Karl Johan subsided by proposing

constitutional changes for the 1824 Storting, including the abolition of the suspensive veto and a right to re-introduce nobility. The maneuvers ended with parades, balls and dinners, camouflaging the suspicion of the people for the king.

The 1824 elections were held on the constitutional issue, and a resounding majority was elected in favor of retaining the Constitution intact. Despite more blustering from the king, the proposals for change were unanimously voted down. Again in 1827 the issue was raised unsuccessfully by the king. He resolved to resurrect it in 1830, but the "Battle of the Market Place" on May 17, 1829 made it impolitic. The Constitution became a sacred symbol which not even the king could attack after the July 1830 revolution in France made a constitutional monarchy safe from despotic intervention. The veto question was never resolved.

4. Norway's Voice in Foreign Relations.

The question of Norway's equality with Sweden seemed to defy solution. In 1834 the Storting proposed that the Norwegian minister of state in Stockholm should be present in the Swedish Ministerial Council when diplomatic issues involving Norway were to be discussed. Up to that time the Swedes had determined Norway's diplomatic posture. On April 11, 1835 a royal resolution was adopted

meeting Norwegian demands and setting up a Joint Council composed of four Swedes and three Norwegians when sitting in Stockholm, or four Swedes and the entire Norwegian Council when sitting in Christiania. This Joint Council thenceforth appointed consuls, and all consuls took an oath of loyalty to both kingdoms.²⁷ The Swedes even appointed some Norwegian diplomatic officials, but refused to regard this as a matter for the Norwegians.

Still Norway regarded the Joint Council as an index of inferiority, because, although the Swedes had to be present when Norwegian foreign interests were discussed, no Norwegian was allowed to be present when Swedish foreign concerns were on the agenda. (11, vol. 2, p. 479-480)

5. The "clean" Norwegian Flag.

For a brief period in 1814 the Norwegians had flown their own "red, white and blue cross", no doubt strongly influenced by the French tricolor. But the Union introduced a Union flag which was a Swedish "yellow and blue cross", with a corner emblem of a diagonal white cross in a red field,²⁹ which the Norwegians regarded as

27 Up to this point the Swedish Council had appointed all consuls, even those handling purely Norwegian affairs.

29 This was a modification of the old Danish flag, Dannebrog, a reminder of pre-1814.

a symbol of subordination. Nationalistic agitation resulted in 1838 in granting the Norwegian merchantmen the right to fly the "clean" flag but "at their own risk". This meant that south of Cape Finisterre the Norwegian ships risked pirate attacks unless they flew the Swedish flag. Nevertheless the people were jubilant. (11. vol. 2, p. 448-481; 19, p. 47)

There was no man-of-war flag for Norway, and this remained to irk the people until 1898 when the Union emblem was removed. (19, p.71) Again, it was too late to restore good relations!

6. Statholder Controversy.

Pursuant to the Act of Union (Riksakt) in the absence of the king a statholder (viceroy) acted for him, but the office was unpopular and efforts were early made to abolish it. A bill was introduced in 1818 but got nowhere. Again in 1848 and 1854 bills were introduced, and in 1854 the Storting passed the measure, but the king vetoed it.

The first two statholders had been Swedes, but the later appointees had been leading Norwegians, and it appeared that in his later years Karl Johan had sought to win the voluntary support of the Norse for a policy of amalgamation. He became immensely popular in Norway, and Pan-Scandinavianism blossomed. On his death in 1844

at the age of eighty he was succeeded by his sickly son, Oscar I, (1844-1859) who pursued a gentle policy toward Norway. The revolutions of 1848 frightened most elements in Scandinavia, and conservatism and Pan-Scandinavianism led the two kingdoms toward a closer union. The Norwegians and Swedes even sent military units to assist Denmark in 1848-50 in her first war with Prussia. Amalgamation even went so far as to see Swedish and Norwegian conscripts training together. When in 1855 the last statholder (Løvenskiold) resigned, the vacancy was not even filled; the institution was withering on the vine. Amalgamation was not far off. Birch-Reichenwald who became the leading minister in 1858 favored such a policy, and the new king, Karl XV (1859-1872), indicated he would make a "morning gift" of abolition of the statholder if the next Storting passed the bill. The Storting passed the bill.

But neither the king nor Norway had reckoned with Swedish sentiment which was violently incensed at the Storting's bill, and under the leadership of Anckarsvård the Riksdag took the position that Norway had been poor compensation indeed for the loss of Finland in 1814 and that the statholder was a basic part of the Act of Union so that no alteration could be made without the consent of Sweden. The conservative Anckarsvård successfully

intimidated the king, and the king yielded to Swedish pressures and vetoed the Storting bill. The Swedes pressed their victory by urging a revision of the Act of Union to provide that Sweden would be regarded as primus inter pares in all matters in which equality could not be maintained.

The next few years saw a struggle on the question of revision of the Act of Union, during which the Norwegians compromised in order to win approval of the jury system, and annual sessions of the Storting. In 1864 Prussia attacked Denmark on the Schleswig annexation; but Norway was reluctant to rush to her aid despite Ibsen's polemics, with the result that Pan-Scandinavianism was shattered. The Norwegian conservatives led by Ole Gabriel Ueland (1799-1870) came forward with a proposal to establish a federal union in which Sweden would have predominance. But with Ueland's death in 1870 the liberals, more accurately called the Left, under John Sverdrup (1816-1892), who favored dissolution of the Union, gained the ascendancy. Sverdrup urged the adoption of the parliamentary system with a cabinet responsible to the majority in the Storting, and after heated debate such a proposal was passed. However, on the advice of the Statsminister Stang the king vetoed it, and tension between the Storting and the ministry mounted.

In 1873 a measure to abolish the statholder was again passed, and creating in its stead a minister of state for Norway who would be regarded as a prime minister. The king, Oscar II, (1872-1909) signed the measure and appointed Stang as Minister of State, and thereby the statholder controversy came to an end. (11, vol. 2, p. 535)

7. The Veto Question again.

Although the overriding of the statholder veto by the third passage was additional proof that whatever absolute veto the king had in Sweden, in Norway he had only a suspensive veto on legislation, yet the question of his veto of a constitutional amendment was moot. Sverdrup, the leader of the Left, was anxious to move the country toward a ministerial type of government in which the ministers would be members of the Storting and participate in its deliberations as in Great Britain. In 1874 the Left majority secured passage of such a bill to amend the constitution; it was vetoed. Again in 1877 it was passed,--and promptly vetoed. The election of 1880 returned an even larger Left majority, and the bill was passed for the third time; but Statsminister Stang advised the king to veto it. Thereupon Sverdrup, who had been chosen president of the Storting, secured passage of a resolution that the constitutional amendment should

be entered by the ministry as law despite the three vetoes. The ministry refused on legal grounds, and Stang resigned.

The king persisted in appointing a conservative, more accurately Right, ministry, led by Christian Selmer, (1816-1889), who continued Stang's policies. The election of 1882 returned 83 Left against 31 Right, and the Storting impeached Selmer and his ministry. The king yielded by dismissing him but reappointed Frederick Stang whose prestige had suffered in the proceedings. Once more impeachment was threatened, and the king finally appointed the Left leader John Sverdrup who promptly entered the constitutional amendment in 1884. Norway thereby had effected a constitutional change to parliamentary government over the king's veto.

A year later, 1885, Sweden moved toward parliamentarianism by adopting a constitutional amendment making the Swedish ministers responsive to the Riksdag, among them the foreign minister who continued control of foreign affairs for both kingdoms even though he had been made accountable to the controlling party of the Riksdag and not to the Union king as theretofore. This meant that Norwegian foreign policy was in the hands of the majority of the Swedish Riksdag. Inevitably where it clashed with Norway's interests, a Swedish policy would prevail. Yet

this step toward parliamentarianism fell short of the progress Norway had made, for the king continued to exercise much greater power in Sweden than he could under the Constitution of Norway.

8. Revision of the Rigsakten (Act of Union).

The unilateral action of Sweden whereby she gained virtually complete control over foreign affairs of the Union aroused a storm in Norway which dominated her politics for the ensuing twenty years, bringing her nearly to the brink of war in 1896 when she ignominiously retreated in the face of Swedish military threats, but finally resulted in a complete break in 1905 when it was apparent that negotiations were fruitless. The fact that the Riksdag had successfully placed Norwegian international relations under a Swedish minister of foreign affairs responsible only to the Swedish Riksdag, and without the consent of the Norwegian Storting, produced bitter debates in Norway. Efforts to soften the maneuver by increasing the Norwegian minority in the Joint Council for Foreign Affairs could not disguise the control which the Swedes held, and the Norwegians countered with a proposal that the Joint Council be fixed at six, three for each kingdom, to which the Swedes agreed provided the Swedish minister of foreign affairs should report to it all joint diplomatic matters. The Norwegian ministers inadvisedly

agreed, although it left Norway without a foreign minister. In 1886 the Swedish members of the Joint Council demanded that the Swedish foreign minister should serve as joint foreign minister, but the Norwegians balked, and Norway continued in effect until 1905 without a foreign minister.

The Act of Union had not mentioned consuls. They had never been considered of great importance, and the special session of the Storting in November 1814 had reasoned that economy dictated no separate consular service. For that matter, the Swedish Chamber of Commerce handled most commercial matters adequately. After 1836 consular appointments were approved by the joint council of Ministers, and after 1858 the Norwegian Interior Ministry had an office for commercial and consular affairs; but the Swedish minister of foreign affairs exercised absolute control. (8, p. 196)

While Sweden had turned to agriculture and manufacturing with an export trade twice that of Norway, Norway in the Nineteenth Century had nurtured a carrying trade so that her merchant marine was the third largest in the world. Some Norwegian merchants nursed the grievance that their exports had failed to keep pace with the Swedish because they did not have their own consuls to represent them. There was an inherent conflict in interest as a Swedish consul, anxious to make

a favorable sale, found himself asked to help a Norwegian seaman in the toils of the police; and this assumed that the Swedish aristocrat sitting as consul could fully understand the sailor with his local dialect. Sweden's commerce led her increasingly toward a protective tariff, and in 1888 she adopted a high tariff with higher internal prices which forced Norway to seek cheaper markets. The Swedish consuls could not serve both interests adequately.

Norway made plans to set up a separate consular service. The basic assumption was that because the Act of Union was silent on the consular corps, it did not concern the Dual Monarchy and could be legislated as an internal Norwegian matter. As might have been expected, the king vetoed the bill after passage by the Storting.

The Swedish position was inconsistent. While denying Norway the right to legislate a consular service on the ground that the Act of Union (Rikssakten) was superior and required the consent of both kingdoms for a constitutional change, she had rejected Norway's protest that the 1885 parliamentary change violated the Act of Union and necessitated ratification by the Storting. However, it is doubtful that the Norwegians any longer wanted consistency so much as independence.

Norway still was not united in finding a way to

freedom. The Right was split, many favoring the Union; and the Left, besides being divided, hesitated making any drastic moves. While the government vacillated through the years, Norway's interests overseas were all too often handled by unsympathetic Swedish consuls. About 42% of the expenses of the joint diplomatic consular service was paid by Norway, and the service was poor as far as she was concerned.³⁴ It was therefore their economic interest which led the people to want to be united, and freedom came via the consular question after a series of crises in which dissident voices eventually yielded in 1905.

In 1891 the Emil Stang (1834-1912) Right ministry in Norway opened negotiations with Sweden on the status of the foreign minister by proposing that the nationality of the foreign minister be unspecified but that he should be responsible to the Joint Council made up of three ministers from each country. Although approved in Joint Council, the Left in the Storting raised much opposition, and Stang's ministry had to resign because of its failure to safeguard Norwegian interests in the joint control of foreign affairs.

Johannes Steen and a Left Ministry took over as the crisis deepened. The Swedish prime minister, Gustaf

³⁴ Sweden appointed many salaried consuls where Norway had no interests, and in many places where Norway had a heavy traffic there were no consuls.

Åkerhielm, blustered and threatened while the Norwegian Storting added fuel to the fire by passing a separate consular service law and refusing to pay certain foreign service expenses.³⁵ In 1892 the king refused to sanction the consular law, and as the year passed without any change of heart on the part of the king, Steen resigned in 1893 despite the offer of an olive branch by the new Swedish prime minister, Boström, conceding equality of both kingdoms in the Joint Council and the possibility that the joint foreign minister might be unable to form any cabinet in Norway, thereby creating a crisis around which the Norwegians could secede.

But the Norwegians were still divided in their loyalty to the Union, and Emil Stang, a Right, rallied enough of his party to form a ministry "in order to avert the danger of leaving the king without advisers, and the country without a government." So bitter was the division in Norway that any hope of solution was stillborn, and the Union by default continued to be a thorn to both kingdoms.

In Sweden there was talk of presenting a new Act of Union to the Riksdag, and after adoption to submit it to the Storting; if no agreement could be reached, then the Swedish army was to seize Christiania and Trondhjem and to dictate terms. (11, vol. 2, p. 566-567; 19, p. 67-70) The external threat served to heal party wounds in

³⁵ The expenses of the consul and legation in Vienna.

Norway, and leading figures of all parties urged negotiations. Sweden opened the door by an overwhelming adoption of a Riksdag resolution looking toward giving Norway a greater voice in foreign affairs, but a veiled threat remained in approval of a large unlimited credit of Kr. 7,500,000 which the Norwegians took to be for military action if they did not yield to the Riksdag.³⁷ A month later, on June 7, 1895, the Storting, by a vote of 90 to 24, passed a resolution to negotiate and to pay up the Norwegian share of the budget for the consular service on the old basis. It had no alternative and no defenses.³⁸ Norway was humiliated.

The lesson of 1895 had been learned, and the Storting promptly appropriated Kr. 8,000,000 to buy naval vessels and an additional Kr. 12,000,000 to ready coastal forts. The Left reversed its traditional pacifist attitude and for the next decade set as its goals strong defenses and a united nation.

Outwardly both governments were officially embarked on a discussion of a revision of the Act of Union, but

37 On June 1, 1895, Count Ludwig Douglas, a disciple of Bismarck's "Blut und Eisen Politik" and a half-Prussian by birth, was appointed Swedish foreign minister.

38 The pacifist policy of the Left in prior years had left the border with Sweden defenseless. It would have been an easy matter for Swedish troops to occupy Christiania and Trondhjem within a day.

the Swedish government still sought foreign aid and support for an attack on Norway. Kaiser Wilhelm in the summer of 1895 even offered to assist,³⁹ but Oscar II turned down the offer. The Scandinavian peninsula continued tense on the verge of war.

The Union revision committee⁴⁰ began its task of seeking equality in November 1895 and continued until 1898 with apparent good will among participants. But the final report showed the hopeless deadlock when the Norwegians and Swedish delegations each came up with two mutually exclusive proposals,--four different plans, none of which had a chance of adoption. The report was tabled by the king.⁴¹ The Swedish cabinet unnecessarily added that the status quo would continue until the consular question could be negotiated,--which the Norwegians deemed stubbornness and the Swedes regarded as putting the matter

39 Germany let it be known that no separate consuls which Norway might appoint by unilateral action would be recognized.

40 This was the third committee to attempt to revise the Act of Union, the first in 1839-1844 being received coldly by both countries. The second (1865-1867) came up with a draft giving Sweden predominance, and its report was rejected in 1871.

41 The factory legislation and the extension of the franchise which even Right in Norway supported were too liberal for even Swedish Liberals. Each country saw closer ties as threatening its way of life.

to rest. Like its two predecessors the third Union revision committee ended in failure.

The two countries found more and more grounds for incompatibility. In May, 1895, the preferential commercial relations had ended between the two, as Norway continued with free trade and Sweden erected the same tariff barriers against her as against any other foreign power. In 1898 a bill to remove the Union symbol from the merchant marine flag was passed for the third time and became law despite any veto by the king, according to Art. 79 of the Constitution. A crisis was averted by the king's refusal to veto. But the anti-Norwegian foreign minister of the dual monarchy, Count Ludvig Douglas (1849-1916), refused to announce the change to the world and was forced to resign; his conciliatory successor, Alfred Lagerheim (1843-1924), gave the notice to the foreign powers. Steadily Norway increased her defenses and Oscar did not dare to veto the appropriations for fear of further ministry crises. Socialists, who had been pacifists, became partisans, and international congresses became heated. In both countries there was increasing talk of dissolving the Union.

The election of 1900 brought the Left again into office, and the new Steen cabinet saw among its members Wollert Konow who had favored a "tough line" in the 1895

negotiations with Sweden, and also Lt. Col. Georg Stang who, as defense minister, eloquently urged the building of a chain of forts along the Swedish border. Stang unwisely went so far as to argue openly that these forts, stretching from Fredrikssten to Kongsvinger, could be used as bases for an invasion of Sweden,--a remark which the Swedes five years later would use to raze them.

While incompatibility was increasing, the Swedes were showing more signs of withdrawing from the threatening posture of 1895. Certainly, with the passage of time the Norwegians were getting stronger. But on the other hand the Swedes were adopting a policy of conciliation. It was not simply exhaustion; there was a growing appreciation of the neighbor to the West. Norwegian officials in increasing numbers got responsible positions in the foreign service, and by 1902 Norwegian consuls outnumbered the Swedish. In the new (1899) department of foreign affairs in the Norwegian ministry of the interior Sigurd Ibsen (1859-1930), son of the playwright, was made director, and he proposed a plan for a consular service which met the approval of the Swedish foreign minister. But the Swedish spirit of conciliation was not reciprocated in Norway where the talk shifted from a separate consular service to complete independence. Whereas in

42 See map in Appendix B.

Sweden the Social Democrats and Liberals swung toward pacifism and self-determination of peoples, and therefore played a significant role in promoting good will for Norway, in Norway the Left did not reciprocate but bolstered military defenses and sought common ground with the Right. The Left was not going to be caught again with a split country as in 1895. Nationalism had become a stronger force than Liberalism.

In 1902 the Ibsen consular service proposal was taken up by Erik G. Boström (1842-1907), the conservative Swedish prime minister, and a committee began work on a draft with the assurance from Boström that its advice would be carried out. Norway responded warmly to renewed negotiations, but on the premise that she should have a separate consular service over which the Swedes should have no authority. The Swedes agreed; and so the fourth Union committee began its deliberations in 1902.

Norway still nursed resentment over the humiliation of 1895. Hampered by this lag the friendliness of Alfred Lagerheim (1843- 1924), the Swedish foreign minister, was met unfortunately with increasing coolness in Norway, particularly by the Left which sought to maneuver the negotiations into a deadlock and crisis whereby the king would be left abruptly without a government,--the so-called "crisis line". The growing nationalism of Norway had so aroused emotions and feelings that

the consular issue was being pushed into the background by an extreme demand for independence. The election of 1903 could well be decisive if the Left should prevail. Yet Lagerheim was even willing to concede greater autonomy, if only the Union could be kept intact. The Swedes could hardly have been more reasonable.

On January 23, 1903, the Storting, crowded by the Left, adopted a resolution that confused the consular question by injecting the demand that the authority of the foreign minister could only be established with Norwegian consent. Clearly the Left was playing for votes in the forthcoming fall elections in order to get a mandate of the people. The consular question, so nearly solved, was no longer the real issue. The Left wanted a greater irritant. The Swedes reacted, and the negotiations nearly disintegrated. While the Left sought every opportunity to scuttle the deliberations, the Right and Moderates⁴³ tried to keep the discussion going on the establishment of a consular service divorced from the control of the joint foreign minister,--an anomaly in government structures.

⁴³ The Moderate Left, usually called Moderates, were a small party of 10 or 15 members of the Storting with a short life. They generally lined up with the Right, and in 1903 they vanished from the political scene as the Left gained seats and the Moderates formed a coalition with the Right. (35,p. 199-200)

As the election campaign of 1903 proceeded, the Left came more and more to be identified as the "War Party", while the Right were labeled as appeasers who would yield to Swedish demands. The Right reply voiced by a mellowed Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson,⁴⁴ the famous author, was that so long as the Swedes were reasonable, the Norwegians could not refuse to negotiate. That the nation was still divided was shown in the election results: 49 Right, 9 Moderates, and 6 Left faced 48 Pure Left (a split within the Left) and 5 Social Democrats (a new party on the scene, predominantly Labor). And so the negotiations continued with Francis Hagerup (1853-1921), a Right, as prime minister. The Storting still favored negotiating.

In January, 1904, the Union revision committee had reached substantial agreement, and a consular law was proposed and adopted in the Storting which met the major criticisms of the Swedes. In May it was handed to the Swedish prime minister Boström with the expectation that he would approve and that the Riksdag would pass an identical law. The law made the consuls independent of administrative supervision by the foreign minister, but

⁴⁴ In December, 1903, the Swedish Nobel Prize Committee awarded the Literature Prize to Bjørnson, much to his embarrassment, and the Left referred to the "thirty pieces of silver". (28, vol. 1, p. 357 and note)

left the diplomatic functions of the consuls under the joint foreign minister. This was as far as Norway could go, and the next move was up to Sweden.

The last annual celebration of Union Day, November 4, 1904, gave occasion for expressions of good will on both sides. Unfortunately, a few days earlier a cabinet crisis in Stockholm had brought about a collision between Boström and Lagerheim, and Boström had threatened to resign unless Lagerheim was ditched. On October 25 Lagerheim tendered his resignation, and the Conservative Boström⁴⁵ took over negotiations. Since he had clashed with Lagerheim, he felt bound to take an opposite course from the conciliatory Lagerheim in order to preserve Swedish honor. At the very moment that a solution had been within grasp of both nations, the Swedes became intransigent. Abruptly the climate changed, and much of the blame can be laid to Boström, who guided the nation onto a collision course.

When Boström returned to Christiania the clock was turned back; he brought no Swedish draft of a law, but only the outlines of a new law which the Storting must approve in advance incorporating conditions which everyone knew the Norwegians could not accept. The outline provided

⁴⁵ Boström had changed from his reasonableness of 1893 to a bull-headedness in 1904-1905. He probably calculated that the attention of the great powers was directed at the Russo-Japanese War and that they would not intervene in a little Scandinavian dispute.

not only for foreign ministry authority directly over the consul but also in diplomatic affairs. The futility of further negotiations appeared as Boström spelled out six conditions or "dependency clauses", one of which demanded that the joint consular system should continue to exist in certain foreign countries. Although the Norwegians could not accept, neither could Boström command a majority in the Riksdag for anything less.

Compromise was hopeless. As 1905 opened it was clear that the fourth Union revision committee had failed and pessimism settled over both kingdoms. In Norway the Left waited for even the Right to admit that negotiations were useless.

E. The Intellectuals.

Two things are essential before any revolution becomes a possibility,--a political program showing a solution and redress of grievances, and grass roots support. The Left demonstrated the first condition. In Norway it became the mission of its artists and scientists to rally popular opinion to the course of political independence and thereby to convince even the Right that there was no honorable alternative. Without exception they were nationalists.

Norway's intellectuals strongly influenced public opinion during the last years of the Union. Ole Bull

(1810-1880) although gone, still stirred everyone with his wistful folk melodies. Edvard Grieg (1848-1907) translated the rushing cataracts and the snow-capped mountains into music, while painters, such as Gerhard Munthe (1849-1929) and Edvard Munch (1863-1944), put on canvas the wild spirit of the native landscapes. Yet it was the poet Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (1832- 1910) who did most direct damage to the Union. In his Memoirs, Oscar II wrote more bitterly about him than any other person. He accused him of publishing "false rumors, stories of Swedish great power dreams and aggressive political plans". (28, vol. 1, p. 329-330) Because of his prolific pen, Sweden had to shoulder a heavier military budget. "His wicked and damaging genius can scarcely be described", wrote the king. "His hateful soul frustrated any reconciliation between the brother nations as the Union revision committee began its work in 1896." True, Bjørnson was stung by the humiliation of 1895, and in his efforts to win foreign support to end Norway's isolation he incited the Balkan Pan-Slavic press to suspect Sweden's conciliatory approach.⁴⁷ (Ibid.) Although Oscar and Bjørnson were reconciled in 1903 when he accepted from the king the Nobel Prize for literature, the Norwegian

⁴⁷ He was probably seeking to undermine the world image of Sweden.

people had been inspired by the poem, "Ja, vi elsker dette landet" (Yes, we love this land), so that it became the Norwegian national anthem and a rallying point for the masses seeking a symbol of independence.

No one is so aggressive as one conscious of an inferiority complex. Thus, even in the realms of medicine and exploration the discovery of the leprosy bacillus by Armauer Hansen (1841-1912) and the Arctic venture of Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), such feats were exploited in the cause of nationalism. The fact that the renowned scientist Nansen was articulately in favor of total independence from Sweden further served to unify the people and to loosen the ties with the partner country.

F. Summary of Nineteenth Century.

As the two Scandinavian monarchies approached the crisis, there were centrifugal forces tearing the Union asunder; but there were at the same time centripetal lines which placed limitations on the impending explosion.

Among the centrifugal forces, the most powerful was the Nineteenth Century nationalism which was particularly virulent in the groups which had not achieved a satisfying status. Norway had a bad case, Sweden slightly. The frustration of Norway in attaining adequate recognition within the Union and the disappointment of Sweden in not regaining her former great power position,--both were

disruptive to the Dual Monarchy. The divergence extended even to such basic concepts as "justice", "right" and "equality", and the interpretation of the Act of Union. Then, too, there were stereotypes or images which each, rightly or wrongly, had of the other,--the condescending and arrogant Swede with all the pompous nobles, and the hill-billy Norwegian with his coarse folk culture and smelling of fish or the barn. The improved military posture of Norway threatened to shift the emphasis from logic to logistics. But most important of all the centrifugal forces was the difference in economic development, which in turn affected the purse and was readily translated into juridical rights, particularly the right to a separate consular corps which most Norwegians believed would protect the extensive merchant marine. Norway saw the absolute need to maintain her economic life; Sweden saw a menace to the Union. Here was something each could feel; and in Norway, where life depended so much on the sea, the deepest emotions were aroused.

On the other hand, the centripetal pulls acted as restraints on what might otherwise have been a violent revolution. There was a social preponderance in favor of even an uncomfortable stability and a status quo, especially among businessmen and government officials, when faced with the uncertainty of change. Although there might be disagreement, the monarchical tradition and

respect for the crown was strong,--so strong that Norway as late as 1902 had been willing to discuss outstanding differences through a fourth Union revision committee. This indicated that each nation believed in the basic system and the integrity of the other side. Furthermore, from a common Lutheran background the two nations shrank from an appeal to arms. No doubt a further factor was the fear of Great Power pressure, as well as the growing respect for the International Court at the Hague, and the Victorian morality which Ibsen in Hedda Gabler summed up in the curtain lines," But people don't do such things any more!" From the Norwegian point of view, the greater military power of Sweden gave cause for second thought before acting hastily. Last, but not least, was the tenacity of Boström who insisted on legalistic obedience despite the opposition he aroused.

Finally, there were non-centric forces, such as the Swedish Social Democrats who as a matter of socialist principle believed in self-determination along nationalist lines and were willing to let the Norwegians go as they wished, and also the growing number of Swedes who coldly calculated that the Union was no longer worth the financial and emotional struggle. Crisis after crisis had weakened the ties. The "Marriage of Reason" had never grown into "love", and it remained only to make a

few futile gestures in the direction of negotiation and reconciliation, and then to prepare a decree of divorce satisfactory to the parties and the court of world opinion.

Chapter IV

STILL MORE NEGOTIATIONS

A. The Special Committee of the Storting.

As long as the Right segment in Norway shrank from unilateral action, no choice remained except to probe for other answers. Popular sentiment in Norway was tired of further negotiation, but the Storting on February 13, 1905 voted to set up a Special Committee with members from all parties to inquire into the various documents in the consular problem. This committee unfortunately kept no stenographic records but minuted its conclusions each day. After two weeks of meetings it was clear that no progress had been made. In the meeting on February 23 Francis Hagerup explained that foundering of the consular negotiations was due to two factors, (1) difficulty in setting up the consular corps in a satisfactory manner, and (2) difference between the Norwegian and Swedish conceptions of the character of the Union and Norway's rights as a sovereign state. He also pointed out the financial, political, economic and military impossibilities of acting on the consular matter unilaterally. Although the Special Committee continued to meet it was making no progress.

In letters from Oscar II to Hagerup the king urged

him to continue negotiations and indicated that Boström was willing to resign if he and his actions were an obstacle to peace between the two countries. While Hagerup responded, he remained a factor in hindering the Storting from taking any hasty steps during the crisis. (12, p. 20-23)

Meanwhile, as the Special Committee discussed and the Storting hesitated, public sentiment was rising, and Fridtjof Nansen, the Arctic explorer (1861-1930) in an article summed up popular sentiment by saying that the nation had at last had enough of the endless preaching and failure in negotiations. The people were demanding an appeal to moral courage, of which there had been little evidence since 1814. Popular meetings took place all over the country. Hagerup appeared in the position of hindering the Storting in taking any hasty step in the face of rising chauvinistic public opinion. Only a small part of the Right held to this viewpoint, and the longer it held sway the more irritated the public became. Petitions from all parts of the country were sent to the Storting advocating decisive measures and assuring the government that the people would make any sacrifice necessary to defend their liberty and independence.

Within the Storting four viewpoints had developed. (1) The Right, most sympathetic toward continuing the Union with Sweden, felt themselves forced to retreat, and

Hagerup slowly led the way. They still preferred to defend the Union as long as humanly possible and then to negotiate a dissolution, possibly along the lines of the "long law line",³ that is, enacting the consular bill in each of three successive Stortings, thus exhausting the king's suspensive veto, and then negotiating a dissolution of the Union. (2) The Left favored the precipitation of a crisis; they had nothing to lose and a great deal to win.⁴ (3) The moderates vacillated. (4) The Social Democrats, who held only five seats, favored an immediate dissolution either by resolution or by crisis. Hagerup's mild approach and lack of decision cost him the support of many of his own Right, and his resignation and that of his Cabinet were only a matter of time.

Public opinion in both countries, as expressed in the press, created an atmosphere of stubbornness on both sides. The Swedish press blamed the Norwegians for the breakdown of negotiations, while Norwegian newspapers attacked both Boström and Swedish motives. Fortunately, the Svenska Dagbladet asked for a truce in the vituperation and some of the Norwegian press, the liberal press, applauded. Lending weight to its plea, the Svenska Dagbladet published a series of articles by Professor Harald

3 This process would take at least three years to reach a crisis, hence "long law line".

4 Because this procedure could lead to an immediate crisis it became known as the "short law line".

Hjärne (1848-1922), of Uppsala, which assumed that the Union was rapidly approaching dissolution and proposed a series of minimal conditions which the Swedes could accept. Hjärne urged an election by the Storting of a Bernadotte as King of Norway, a razing of the frontier forts, the creation of a neutral zone along the border, an agreement of a free and reciprocal commerce between the states, and a treaty protecting the Lapps. Prophetically, many of these suggestions were in the course of a year adopted as a basis for the eventual dissolution of the Union. It was peculiarly significant that Hjärne was himself a Swedish Nationalist in the Riksdag and had the support of many Swedes. His articles had considerable influence in Norway. But the explosiveness of the press was illustrated by the space given by the Norwegian press to a slur on Norway made in Berlin by a Swedish Union minister, and which the Norwegians used to prove the impossibility of representation by Swedish personnel in the foreign office. (19, p. 98-99)

The Swedish press also played on the growing tension between Russia and Japan and increasing Russian naval activity in the Baltic and North Seas which culminated in the sinking of two British fishing vessels on October 21, 1904 on the Dogger Bank as evidence of Russian intentions toward Scandinavia.⁶ The editor of Stockholm's

⁶ Later investigation showed that the incident had been

Dagbladet wrote that Sweden should assume a "cold blooded" attitude and a "defensive position" until clearer light was obtained on the "force" and "plans for dissolution of the Union". By mingling Russian and Norwegian foreign policies the Norwegians saw an instance of Swedish saber rattling. Tension was clearly mounting. (19.p. 101)

The Special Committee of the Storting held a session to consider Norway's defense posture, in the course of which Defense Minister O.S.J. Strugstad argued that although outnumbered three to one (80,000 against 25,000) the Norwegians had advantages in supplies, equipment and morale which offset the Swedish position. He did not, however, mention the fact that Norwegian munition factories could not even supply the small arms with adequate ammunition and that artillery shells would have to be bought abroad. He felt that a foreign loan was necessary but that any attempt to borrow might possibly cause a panic among Norwegian bondholders abroad. The naval report was optimistic and indicated that Norway could defend its coastline. The net defense picture was substantially better than in the crisis of 1895. Ibsen,

a mistake in identity when the Russian naval captain while drunk believed he had encountered a Japanese fleet which was thought to have rounded the Horn for a sneak attack by way of the Baltic.

a member of the Joint Council, predicted that the Swedes would not attack Norway, both for foreign as well as domestic reasons. The results of this hearing in the Special Committee of the Storting were to have considerable effect on the policies of the Norwegian government for the remainder of the year. (19,p. 105-106)

As the Special Committee continued its hearings and deliberations the leadership swung from the Right to the Left. The hope was even expressed that the crown prince or Oscar II might sanction the consular law in order to avoid conflict. The Swedish Foreign Minister, Lagerheim, who was present in Christiania with the crown prince, urged Boström to take this line as a step toward conciliation.

Norway, lacking official relations with other nations was bound to be misunderstood. Without a diplomatic corps to act as an information service, Norway had to use unconventional methods to win friends among the great powers. She turned to her scholars and scientists. Under the leadership of Fridtjof Nansen many published articles abroad in Great Britain, Denmark, France and Germany, as well as in the United States, in an effort to create a favorable world opinion. In these articles they presented Norway's point of view effectively.

Meanwhile Swedish leaders in Liberal and Social

Democratic circles were becoming sympathetic to the Norwegian position. Karl Staaff (1860-1915), a Liberal lawyer and later Prime Minister, visited Christiania with a Liberal delegation during these times and reported back to his party that Norway was unanimous in its determination to secure passage of the consular law. The annual meeting of the Social Democratic Party in Stockholm heard Norwegian speakers plead for help in achieving Norwegian independence, and the party passed a resolution supporting the Norwegians either in negotiations for the law or in achieving separation.

Hagerup was still indecisive and stalling for time when he appeared again before the Special Committee. During these weeks the crown prince had been virtually ignored, but he had gotten a clearer picture of the political and moral weight of the Norwegian position. Gustaf maintained that the royal power had never sought to hinder Norway's desire for its own consular corps; the only condition was that such a step be done in a manner quieting to the Union within the framework of the laws, particularly those that affected both nations. He, therefore, proposed new negotiations with Sweden on a broader basis. Both Hagerup and Ibsen urged the crown prince not to make the statement, but he directed it to the chairman of the Special Committee who advised him that all documents in its possession or received by it

were confidential. Thereupon the crown prince, Gustaf, published the statement through the news bureau.

The reaction to the statement came through the columns of a leading Christiania newspaper, Verdens Gang, on February 26, asking for the resignation of the government, and forthwith two cabinet members, Christian Michelsen (1857-1925), and Schønning, tendered their resignations on February 28. Hagerup had no choice but to follow suit, although in doing so he once more declared that if the Norwegians would follow his plan "in closed phalanx" it would be possible to arrive at a peaceable and honorable withdrawal from the Union. The crown prince accepted the resignations calmly, although he claimed that there was no crisis that precipitated them. But the reason was clear to the public which saw that Hagerup's cabinet and government had become untenable and that the two cabinet ministers, Michelsen and Schønning, had "burst out" in disagreement.

The Special Committee continued to meet, while the Right Party and the Left sought to achieve enough unity to get a substantial majority to form a coalition government. On March 4 the Right agreed to the demands of the Left to support a program for immediate action, and the Special Committee thereupon voted to adopt either the resolution or "short law line". The vote was so close

that the Committee approved on March 6 a compromise motion tabling the entire problem until a new ministry could be formed. A draft of the consular law was adopted, together with a timetable to propose a crisis sometime after the Riksdag might have adjourned in 1905. The Storting passed this proposition with about 100 members favoring an immediate crisis by way of a consular law to go into effect no later than April 1, 1906. Despite a few timid voices, no one favored a continuation of the Union in its present form.

The public reaction was unanimous. No sooner had the report of the Special Committee been publicized than scores of meetings up and down the land sounded forth the cry, "Now or never!" It seemed as though all parties, both on the Right and on the Left, and all groups, workers' unions, prohibition societies, and youth organizations were united. The Swedish papers also sensed this and Dagbladet reported that the enemies of the Union had grown in tremendous numbers, but its correspondent assured the readers that the consular proposal would be vetoed in the Joint Council meeting in Stockholm. The editor of Stockholm's Tidningen, who was then in Christiania, reported that public meetings had a fanatic note like a religious revival of a Salvation Army meeting, and that no one any longer dared oppose. "Although the

last act of the Union tragedy has not been written, it is best to prepare oneself for the worst", he wrote. The emergence of such national unanimity among all parties and sections of the Norwegian people was one of the remarkable results of the slow maneuvering of the Hagerup government and the Special Committee of the Storting.

B. Preparation for a Showdown.

Although many candidates were considered for the position of Prime Minister, Christian Michelsen appeared to be the best choice, and on March 11, 1905 the crown prince asked him to form a government, which he did with tremendous good humor. Michelsen, a member of the Left, had not been tied very strongly to any party, and he had served in the conservative Hagerup ministry. By education a lawyer, he had made a tidy fortune as a Bergen ship owner, and both the Storting and the Norwegian people had been captivated by his cheerful personality. One of his major problems was to form a cabinet which would bring together all factions, and on March 15 he succeeded. The major platform of the cabinet was to establish Norway's own consular corps and to obtain independence as a sovereign state.¹⁰ To this announcement the Storting responded by rising in standing ovation, and Michelsen knew he had not only all the parties of the Storting but also the entire Norwegian people behind him. Although the crown prince

¹⁰ In choosing Michelsen the crown prince was in a dilemma. The cabinet was charting a course to unseat

had asked whether the consular law would be ready before the Riksdag adjourned in May, the Special Committee of the Storting and the cabinet decided to delay the submission until after the adjournment of the Riksdag in order to gain an advantage.

With the appointment of Michelsen as prime minister to reflect the views of the Special Committee a clear decision had been made to dissolve the union between Norway and Sweden.

The preparations for the showdown moved ahead. Because Norway had no official foreign representation except through the Swedes, more vigorous efforts were made to acquaint the world with what was transpiring in Norway. Representatives were sent abroad unofficially to talk with government officials, notably Professor Fridtjof Nansen, who ostensibly went to England for a series of scientific lectures but seized the opportunity to write an article which was reprinted in the London Times, Le Temps, and the Kölnische Zeitung, in which he pointed out that the consular problem as viewed by Sweden was not constitutionally justified. He argued that from 1814 to 1858 the consular corps had been under the Chamber of

the Swedish royal house, while on the other hand the Swedish government was making no efforts to preserve the Union. To buy peace for the time being he had to choose Michelsen.

Commerce of Sweden, and therefore not under the foreign ministry as the Swedes now maintained was the character of the Union. He pointed out how the Norwegian shipping had increased during the 1890's and how the consular problem had developed between 1891 and 1903, ending with negative results. But there was lacking a desire on the part of the Swedes to recognize the existing agreement. "We have tried always to have our right respected, and we now rely on the victory of justice", he concluded. This article aroused considerable interest in England because of her shipping and commercial interests. The Times, in an editorial, pointed out that Sweden had herself to thank for the trouble when she changed her concept of the Union in 1885. Despite newspaper support, the British government officially took the position that it would maintain neutrality in the forthcoming crisis.

The Swedish press roared in anger and demanded that the diplomatic corps set things straight, forgetting that the diplomatic corps represented Norway also. However, their best weapon was to use Nansen's opposite number, the Polar explorer Sven Hedin, who wrote that it was the Norwegians who had broken off negotiations with virtually an ultimatum at a moment when the Swedish government had proposed to renew negotiations on lines different from Boström's. "It is Norway who wants to

break away from the Union, and Norway must be responsible for the results", argued Hedin with keen insight.

The result of the public opinion duel showed the foreign public how far apart the two nations were, and how little the rest of the world had been aware of the drift of affairs in the Scandinavian peninsula.

Efforts to interest American support were disappointing. Senator Knut Nelson, himself of Norwegian background and a United States Senator from Minnesota, disapproved of the Norwegian position and urged her to continue to solve the issues by negotiation with the Swedes. Throughout 1905 he maintained neutrality toward the question.

Sweden convened Secreta Utskottet (a secret committee, composed of six representatives from each house of the Riksdag), which had not been in session since the crisis of 1895 when Norway acted unilaterally. Some Swedish newspapers called it the Swedish "Zemski Sobor", which meets only when the empire is in need or the government does not know what to do. This aroused fears in Norway that Sweden was planning war. (19,p.114) Actually, the Secreta Utskottet had discussed the advisability of Boström's resignation in order to clear the air. The committee members made it clear to Boström that he was the object of attack from many sides within Sweden. This marked the beginning of a series of Swedish cabinet crises

during the year 1905, a year which saw four different prime ministers and cabinets. (40) Nevertheless, the secret nature of the committee aroused much uneasiness in Norway as well as criticism by the Liberal press in Sweden. Neither did the Royal House enhance its position as ruler of both nations when the crown prince assumed the chairmanship and presided over the meetings of this Secreta Utskottet.

The plan of the crown prince was revealed to the Conservative Bishop Gottfrid Billing (1841-1925), upon his return to Stockholm about April 1 from Christiania. It was his idea that Sweden should not leave initiative up to Norway for unilateral solution; that discussions should be resumed to set up a foreign ministry under either a Norwegian or a Swede as a common ministry; and that each nation should have its own consular corps, except that special consuls in so far as their work touched on relations with foreign powers should be under the leadership and control of the foreign ministry. However, the discussions could not modify the common foreign ministry which now existed and which was an absolute guarantee of the continuance of the Union. The Swedish-Norwegian ambassadors were directed to publicize this proposal, despite the fact that they represented Norway also. The memorandum to all ambassadors concluded with the comment, "That Sweden should deliverately uphold the

Union with force of arms,--all thought of that is precluded". The memorandum had a salutary effect on the London Times, which swung about and urged the Norwegians to heed this proposal, particularly because geography placed the two nations on the same peninsula. (40, p. 5)

The proposal of the crown prince undid all for which Boström had stood and it was basically the Swedish program from the 1890's modified by a divided consular corps, although Boström announced that he was in complete accord with the crown prince. Because Boström regarded himself as a hindrance to further negotiations with Norway, he suddenly and without warning, not even to his friends, submitted his resignation on April 7, 1905. Perhaps the crown prince's proposal had made this move necessary. Basically, however, nothing had changed, and Johan O. Ramstedt (1852-1935), whose rise to the post of minister had come through a legal career and the Supreme Court, took the place of Boström. He was regarded, however, as being less unfriendly to Norway and its position.¹⁴ (40, p.8-9)

The Easter season in the middle of April saw many members of the Storting traveling to Stockholm where they

¹⁴ In a letter to Herslow on April 7, 1905, Boström wrote that since he now saw himself as an obstacle to further negotiations, by his resignation he wished to tear this weapon away from the Norwegians. His move must be regarded as a patriotic gesture in the interest of clearing the air.

met their opposite numbers and were handsomely entertained. Discussion, of course, swung around to politics, and the Norwegians gained the impression that there was a growing appreciation in Sweden of Norway's demands, particularly in leading circles. The Swedish minister of defense, as well as the chief of staff, assured the Norwegians that "not a single soldier would be sent against Norway, except if Norway should begin war by an attack on Swedenor, if the king or crown prince were involved in personal attacks in Norway". The change in Swedish opinion was apparent even to those members of the Norwegian Left, who most feared invasion.

With the breakdown of negotiations via Boström, the crown prince had assumed a major role as mediator. Whereas heretofore attacks had been made on the Swedish ministers and their proposals, it was significant that now the attacks would be directed against the Royal House itself. Since it was the crown prince who offered to conduct further negotiations, and if these failed to meet the minimum demands, it was the crown prince and the Royal House who must needs take the blow. After having been wined, dined and toasted, the Norwegian members of the Storting returned to Christiania where they quickly became aware that the Norwegian press and public were solid in expectation of royal sanction for the proposed consular law to go into effect April 1, 1906.

The king and the crown prince were in a most difficult situation. (23,p. 279-284) To escape the dilemma the king proposed a broad new basis for negotiations on all joint problems of the Union, this being presented to the Joint Council. This was the last session of the Joint Council under the Union king. The Norwegian councillors answered the crown prince's proposal as being inadequate to meet the needs and demands of the Norwegian people, and recited that the people demanded their own consular corps apart from the joint laws and constitution and that this would be established by the Norwegian authorities on their own; that the Storting had created a special committee which was coming in with a report including a schedule for the establishment of the consular corps; that the new proposal for negotiations seemed to offer no new light, and reminded the crown prince of the fact that the third Union revision committee had broken off negotiations due to the series of demands of the Swedish section which had attacked the sovereign right of the Norwegians; therefore, it was useless to talk of further negotiations until the consular question was out of the way, and then only other Union questions could be discussed. The joint councillors argued that even such discussions must be on the free basis that if they should founder neither side should be required to return to the status quo but should be free

to go its own way of national existence. The Swedish government and the Swedish section of the Joint Council answered that Norway had no right under the Constitution and laws to this position and cited them to the government statement of January 30 and six dependency clauses of Boström. Both sections of the Joint Council thus were agreed that there should not be any further discussions, but the advisory council noted that Norway was not seeking a dissolution of the Union. The crown prince gave the impression that the proposals should be dropped.

However, the Swedish press and both houses of the Swedish Riksdag supported the crown prince and spoke bitterly of Norway's attitude, some threateningly. On April 6, 1905 the crown prince published his five-point program which the Norwegian cabinet ignored until it could no longer avoid it, and then it refused unanimously to embark on any new negotiations.

The visit of the crown prince on April 27 to Christiania was the last of any Bernadotte under the Union, and he proposed that his plan should be considered, together with a postponement of the consular law. Crown Prince Gustaf was met with hostility on all sides. As a mediator he had failed and had reaped the personal hatred of the Norwegian people and the press. The Norwegian press pushed the idea that the king would not

in the last analysis refuse to sanction the consular law; "The king will do his duty as King of Norway".

Prior to the recess of the Norwegian Storting for the Easter vacation it had approved a Kr. 40,000,000 foreign loan to be placed with a French bank. When this application was placed before the crown prince on April 18 in Stockholm, Gustaf, serving as regent, asked the purpose of the loan and received evasive answers. He suggested military maneuvers might be afoot, to which Michelsen replied that such maneuvers were perfectly normal in May. Thereupon the Crown Prince Regent gave his approval, relying on the belief that he could persuade the French government to block the loan. Unfortunately for the crown prince, the French Foreign Minister Delcasse told the Swedish ambassador that the bank and the government were at odds and he had no control over the lending policy. Ironically, the French loan subsequently was in part subscribed by a Swedish bank, and the Swedes thereby strengthened the Norwegian defenses and financial posture. Reference was made in both Swedish and Norwegian papers to the "war fund". (19, p. 121-122)

During May in Norway things moved apace. The Special Committee approved the consular law, and it passed the Storting early in the month. The cabinet drafted its strategy and directed the three members of

the Joint Council to go to Stockholm on May 19, with instructions to return in a leisurely manner a few days after the king might give his refusal of sanction. Although the public had been led to expect approval, neither the Storting nor the cabinet really expected anything other than a veto.

The 17th of May celebration in Norway saw a tremendous outburst of patriotism and nationalism. Nansen stated that Norway would not yield, not even "over our dead bodies". Everyone expected that this was the last celebration of Constitution Day under the joint monarchy. Although Professor Hagerup cautiously had urged a delay for a year or more, it is significant that not a single newspaper in Norway agreed with him. The Swedish press, however, annoyed over the May 17th celebrations which they regarded as a hysterical phenomenon, hailed Hagerup's speech as a gem of political wisdom and pinned their hopes on his leadership despite the fact that his Right following had dwindled from a minority of 17 to a very small minority of 6. The Storting passed the consular law by a vote of 82 to 6. Hagerup no longer spoke for Norway.

C. The Showdown.

The next step was for the law to be presented to the king for sanction. Although King Oscar II, now 76 years old, had been ill for many years and had turned affairs of state over to the 47 year old Crown Prince

Gustaf, this was deemed to be such an important matter that the Norwegian councillors arranged to have the matter handled directly by the king. The newspapers on both sides showed unusual restraint. The meeting with the king was attended by three Norwegian councillors, the crown prince, Oscar II, and secretaries. No Swedish ministers were present, neither had they been consulted by the king prior to this time; and so on May 27, 1905 the Norwegian councillors in a brief statement, particularly brief because of the age of the king, pointed out that the Norwegian people, the Storting, the government, and all parties were united on the consular law and that all expected the king to do his duty as King of Norway by giving his sanction to the law. The king responded that in keeping with the Act of Union he could not approve until the law had been approved by the constitutional method of joint action, and he refused to give his sanction. The councillors thereupon quietly presented their resignations prepared in anticipation of such a veto. The king then asked for the signature of the councillors to the protocol, but they responded by saying that a Justice Department opinion of 1847 made this unnecessary, and for them to countersign the denial of sanction would leave them without a fatherland. When the king then asked that the secretary of the delegation

sign, Jørgen Løvland (1848-1922), blocked the secretary, and Harald Bothner (1850-1924), sparked the session by defending the Norwegian action on grounds of patriotism. Oscar exploded, "I am as good a Norwegian as thee", (using the familiar "Du"). Gustaf sought to mediate and urged that his father accept the resignation, saying, "Yes, Father, that you must do". The king yielded, but not until a brief statement had been written stating that the king needed time to form a government "since it is clear to me that no other government can be formed now, so I do not agree to accept the resignations of the council members". Thus ended the last official session between King Oscar II and his Norwegian councillors.

D. The Declaration of Independence, June 7, 1905.

In Norway many people saw the end of the Union in sight; nevertheless both the ministers as well as the press in both Sweden and Norway knew that the next legal step was for some action to be taken by the Storting or the Norwegian government. On Monday, May 29, the ministers left Stockholm quietly for Norway, after having asked and received the permission of the king to leave.

The press of Sweden split, the Conservatives expressing themselves in violent tones and warning the Norwegians of what might follow. The Liberal press predicted the dissolution of the Union.

In Norway the press was unusually reserved and disciplined and resorted to straight reporting of events. A Danish newspaper reported that if one did not know Norwegians, one might not know that the Union was about to be dissolved, so reserved were both the people and the press.

When the news of the refusal of sanction and resignations reached Norway, the members of Storting were surrounded by jubilant throngs and shouts. Impromptu parades were formed, and the national anthem was sung again and again. Knots of people discussed the situation in legalistic terms of the press, constitution, law and royal power, sanction and parliamentary right. But the people were jubilant as they discussed the probable outcome of the crisis.

After the denial of sanction no one in the Norwegian government seemed to know the effect of the action. President Carl Berner (1841-1918) of the Storting proposed another message to the king, but no agreement could be found on such action. Fortunately, it was never delivered, for it might well have led to further delays and hindrances. In the following days the cabinet held strategy sessions, and some fear was voiced for what might happen if the king or the crown prince should make a hurried visit to Christiania. Fortunately, neither made

the attempt, and thereby the crisis and possible hostilities were avoided. The cabinet finally came up with a resolution which would result in a quick crisis, the "short law line". However, Professor Francis Hagerup and Prime Minister Michelsen on June 2 sought to soften the blow on the aged king by proposing that Oscar be invited to nominate a Bernadotte son for the Norwegian throne. This would have the effect of pointing out that the objection was not to the king but to the manner in which the Union had evolved. It would have the further advantage of stealing a march on the Norwegian party of the Left which was known to favor a republic. These proposals were submitted to the Special Committee which rejected all. Although this normally would have called for resignations, everyone was agreed that the government should close ranks in the face of such a crisis. New plans were proposed in haste, partly out of fear that the crown prince, who was then in Germany, might return to Christiania on June 10. Fortunately, none of these proposals included calling up the military reserves, and Michelsen relied heavily on the previously expressed attitudes of the king, the crown prince, the Swedish Liberals, and on his own countrymen that there should be no resort to war.

Once more the cabinet struggled with the crisis and proposed the invitation to a Bernadotte to accept

the crown. And once more the Special Committee split vehemently on the issue. Much was made of the fact that in addition to Norwegian respect for the Bernadottes, it would prevent foreign powers from pressing their own nominations. To be sure, the invitation would bind Norway to following the way of monarchy. But, it was argued, Norway needed foreign support and republics were bad for business as well as foreign relations; then, too, the invitation should impress foreign countries of the Norwegian love for the Bernadottes and monarchy and thereby lead them to the conclusion that this was "no revolution". Michelsen, with his sense of humor, commented that the "Guild of Princes" would highly approve the invitation.

When the proposals were brought to the floor of the Storting the debate continued without subsiding, and Dr. Alfred Eriksen, a Social Democrat and opposed to monarchy, argued that the dissolution of the Union required the drafting of a new constitution, and he urged that the matter be referred to the people. The debate continued until after midnight of June 6.

On June 7 the Storting met once more, but the objectors had withdrawn most of their protest, and Eriksen agreed to limit his opposition solely to the Bernadotte invitation. Michelsen read a prepared address to the king which ended with the following resolution:

"Whereas the members of the cabinet have resigned their functions, and His Majesty, the King, has declared himself unable to form a new government for the country, and whereas the constitutional royal powers have thus ceased to function, the Storting empowers the members of the resigned cabinet to continue until further temporarily as the Norwegian Government and to exercise the authority granted to the king in accordance with the Royal Norwegian constitution and applicable laws, subject to the changes that are necessary by reason of the fact that the Union with Sweden under one king is dissolved in consequence of¹⁹ the king ceasing to function as King of Norway."

This proposal was unanimously adopted. The second proposal was with reference to the Bernadotte invitation, and only five Social Democrats dissented. One hundred and twelve voted yes. The short session of the Storting ended on June 7, 1905 with the words "God preserve our Fatherland!"

The decision was made calmly and ended with hand shaking all around and with the crowded galleries and people on the street. It was a calm but jubilant decision. Norway at last was free and over 500 years of domination by Denmark and Sweden was ended. There was some dancing and singing, and the appearance of any government member was sufficient to start the crowds singing "Ja, vi elsker dette landet", the national anthem, which the nationalist poet Bjørnson had composed. But the noise of jubilation soon subsided as people quietly asked

¹⁹ Author's translation.

each other, "Is this the way it feels to stand at an historic moment?" The members of the Storting passed out the word: "Quiet and dignity! No expression of feelings! The moment is too serious to be dragged down to the level of public demonstrations". When, a few evenings later, crowds brought ovations to the cabinet members, they were firmly encouraged to disperse; and the entire country soon saw the need for self-discipline and tact.

The tensions had polarized around the Left "War Party" in Norway and around the unyielding Boström in Sweden. The two were irreconcilable, but not to the point of war. An earthquake during the autumn of 1904 and a series of powerful revival meetings under the leadership of a Pastor Lund had convinced multitudes in southern Norway that God in His way would solve the crisis. A calm self-restraint ruled the countryside.

For the next few weeks the government maintained a censorship on all telephone and telegraph messages, and controlled all editorial expressions; but these restrictions were relaxed when it sensed that there was strong support of the government and its policy to preserve calm lest the tense scene be disturbed by lack of objectivity.

The break came after a series of crises and

patient discussions. Except for the "Battle of the Market Place in 1829, there had been no violence.

Chapter V

THE MOUNTING CRISIS

A. Norwegian Popular Reaction.

The excitement which gripped Norway on the days immediately after that fateful 7th of June, 1905 was subdued; the people sensed that a very serious step had been taken and that this was no time for popular outbursts. A spirit of self-discipline ruled the masses. There were no parades, no processions, no public demonstrations except the changing of colors throughout the land on Friday, June 9. The Union flag was respectfully and tearfully hauled down to the salute of 21 guns, and the tri-colored cross of the Kingdom of Norway was hoisted to the top amid the thundering of cannon and the music of the national anthem and the shouts of the crowd. But everyone knew that independence could not be gained that easily and that there was a storm yet to come. The question on everyone's mind was, "How will Sweden react?"

B. Swedish Popular Reaction.

The first reactions in Sweden were those of shock. The news media had not kept the Swedes particularly aware of the growing crisis and therefore when the news suddenly broke the vast majority of the people seemed surprised that the Norwegians had actually taken such a rash step; they could not grasp that Norway had deposed

the king and dissolved the Union. The first popular outburst was a mass procession in Stockholm to the palace of the king to express to him their loyalty.

While Norway was united, Sweden was seriously split. The Social Democrats, led by Hjalmar Branting, hoped for an immediate recognition of the the independence of Norway and the negotiation of favorable terms. For once the Social Democrats were united with the crown prince and applauded the king at the conclusion of the Throne Speech on June 21. Branting carried his program into the streets by leading 20,000 workers in a peace demonstration on June 15 which carried placards proclaiming, "Workers for Peace", "Down with War", and "Norway Independent". During the summer he continued to urge a general strike if war came. Although this was not a majority view, it seriously affected the government's bargaining position and encouraged the Norwegians. To the Swedish Conservatives the attitude of the workers seemed an indication of the decadence of the times, and not a few were arrested. The Swedes never achieved during the summer the unity of spirit which prevailed in Norway.

C. The Official Discussion.

Meanwhile the diplomatic channels between Norway and Sweden were busy. The first official reaction came on June 9, when Prime Minister Ramstedt announced the summons to the Swedish Riksdag for the 20th of June and

in the following words set the official position of the Swedish government which was to prevail through the remainder of the negotiations:

"By its revolutionary resolution the Storting has unilaterally and without the consent of the King and with no reference whatever to Sweden decided to dissolve the Union which has existed upon the foundations of lawful and fixed terms between the two countries, and which cannot be burst asunder without bilateral agreement. Inasmuch as the resolution of the Storting thereby in high degree violates the rights of Sweden it has become absolutely necessary immediately to summon a special session of the Riksdag to consider what steps must be taken by Sweden in consequence of these circumstances. I therefore must submit to Your Majesty that at the same time that Your Majesty announces that you can not recognize the new government named by the Storting that Your Majesty also will resolve to summon a special session of the Riksdag."

The king gave his sanction as requested, and on the following day sent a letter, simultaneously published in the Swedish official Gazette, to the President of the Storting which set forth at length the constitutional and statutory grounds on which the king maintained he could not recognize the action of the Norwegian government and further maintained that the Norwegian action of May 27 and June 7 were a strained interpretation in no wise constituting an abdication. He characterized the Norwegian action as "revolutionary conduct", and concluded, "It remains for Sweden and myself as Union King to determine whether Norway's aggression against the existing Union shall lead to the lawful dissolution of the Union. Present and future judgment must decide between me and Norway's

people."

The exchange of letters continued as the Storting replied a few days later reminding the king that when he explained in the State Council of May 27 that he could not sanction the unanimous proposal of the Storting to set up a separate Norwegian consular service, and the king himself stated that he could no longer constitute a Norwegian government, it was clear that the Union could not be maintained further. The Storting was therefore placed in the position of necessarily finding a government for the country. Every way was blocked, especially since "Your Majesty's Swedish government" already on the 25th of April had rejected new negotiations with the alternative of dissolving the Union if unanimity could not be found on new forms for the Union. The Storting went on to say that the Norwegian people felt no bitterness or ill will toward His Majesty or the people of Sweden. Occasional expressions to the contrary had their origin in dissatisfaction with Norway's position within the Union, and inasmuch as this ground for bitterness and ill will would vanish with the dissolution of the Union, the consequences thereof were dissolved. The Storting expressed its sincere friendship and sympathy for the Swedish people and offered to enter upon negotiations necessary for the final dissolution in a spirit of meeting every reasonable wish for the protection of the independence and

integrity of the two kingdoms. If the negotiations could take place without prejudice and bitterness it was the conviction of the Storting that that which had happened would remain to the lasting good fortune of the Scandinavian people. For the sake of the North the Storting therefore made its appeal to the people which with graciousness and courtliness had captured a leading place among the nations and with which the Norwegian people from the bottom of their hearts wished to maintain good relations.

D. Official Swedish Views.

In the Swedish state council on June 19, the day before the meeting of the special session of the Riksdag, Prime Minister Ramstedt stated at length the historical geopolitical position of the Swedish government. He stood on the legal ground that the Union was based upon an agreement of two kingdoms which could not be dissolved by unilateral declaration, and that it remained for Sweden to determine what position it should take on the question of the dissolution of the Union. In conformity with the existing constitutional principles Sweden would undoubtedly be justified, if necessary, to resort to weapons. In the embittered circumstances of present public opinion, Occasioned by Norway's method of action, it was only natural that one's thoughts should turn to such stronger media. However, cool and impartial consideration showed that a

policy based on force could not be to the true interests of Sweden. It was clear that if the kingdom should maintain the Union with force, this would react upon the inhabitants of the other kingdom. Maintenance of the Union in this way would cause more damage than good. Such action would remain a source of weakness instead of strength. Although Sweden would not have any resort to force to maintain the Union, the dissolution of the Union could not be lawful and valid without the consent of Sweden. Before Sweden could formulate the resolutions of dissolution, she insisted on negotiations between the two kingdoms. The geographical position made it most desirable that in the case of conflict between them there should be an understanding to refer their differences to arbitration so as to guarantee that the two kingdoms might live as neighbors in peace and friendship. In any event the dissolution of the Union made it necessary to change many of the existing relations between the two countries. It was therefore desirable that the Riksdag should consent to His Majesty undertaking negotiations with the Norwegian Storting through representatives from both countries. Any formula upon which they agree should be placed before the Riksdag for its approval. Not until then would the Union be considered as terminated. The cabinet unanimously approved this expression of its position. The king thereupon declared that although it was a painful step which

his ministry had advised him to take, he would proceed in the full belief that a Union without mutual sympathy would be of no true value for Sweden. (21,p. 201-226)

On June 21 the king, in his Throne Speech² officially set the stage by showing remarkable restraint, maintaining that he had pursued a course in conformity to his understanding of the Act of Union and had sought conscientiously the welfare of the two nations. His final draft deleted all remarks which could be offensive to Norway. The proposals which he laid before the Riksdag did not aim at meeting wrong with force. The Union, he said, was not worth the sacrifice which military force would demand. A Union forced upon Norway after such manner would be of little value for Sweden.

The debate opened in the Riksdag on June 27, and it was soon apparent that the moderate tone of the royal proposal met much criticism, and some of the speakers used very sharp and violent words. It was a shame and a dishonor for Sweden, some said, to recognize and consent to what had taken place in Norway. They spoke of the treasonable and faithless manner in which the Norwegians had

2 See Appendix A, wherein the possibly offensive original remarks appear. Their deletion showed a painstaking sensitivity on the part of Oscar, a fact which cannot be overestimated in setting the spirit for the ensuing months of negotiations. Here was truly a great king. The author is indebted to Dr. Ivar Beskow, Chief of Archives, for opening the Foreign Office archives and furnishing a photostatic copy of the original manuscript which the king used.

treated their king and they had not stopped at threatening the king. However, remarkably, not a single voice expressed any desire for war with Norway. Baron J. T. Kennedy, of the Upper Chamber, stated, "The Swedish people are the best and bravest, but they would also be the most patient if they approved what the royal proposal contained. Has not the king already lost his one crown and also suffered damage to the other?" Another member declared that he had met a friend on the street who was glad that he was unmarried and had no children from whom to hide his shame. Lars Berg, in the Upper Chamber, said, "My aged blood boils within me from anger over such insults against the Swedish people and at the thought that I am a Swede. The Norsemen, just like a snake, have pierced our throat with their fangs. We must get rid of these people. If we therefore enter upon discussions with such faithless people as the Norwegians, we must support our work with might."

Professor Trygger stated that the breach in the Union was due to a falsehood directly from the beginning; The Act of Union was wrong when it stated that the Union had been established on the basis of the free will and agreement of two peoples rather than on the basis of conquest.

In the Lower Chamber there were also bitter and

violent speakers, among them Hjalmar Hammarskjöld (1862-1953), who later became a delegate to the Karlstad Conference. To him it appeared that approval of the royal proposal would be to kiss the hand that had hit them as a tight fist. Although he was no friend of force, and least of all war, he still preferred the strongest means rather than be trampled under the foot of Norway. Another speaker, Peter Waldenström (1838-1917), stated that the Norwegians had shown the Swedes a friendly mien while they made preparations for that which had happened. In their school books the Norwegians described the Swedes as their national enemy. To him it was a most detestable irony that the Storting should have proposed that a prince of the House of Bernadotte should ascend the Norwegian throne. An alliance with Norway as a substitute for the Union assumed a nation worthy of trust. Any discussion of dissolution must be based upon a lawfully constituted government with which the Swedish government could negotiate.

There were moderate voices in both chambers, not the least of which was Baron Fredrik von Rosen (1849-1917), in the Upper Chamber, who pointed out that it was important to act quickly lest some other country should recognize the new position of Norway and thereby humiliate Sweden to her disadvantage. Others pointed out that it was worthy of Sweden to solve the problem nobly and in

a conciliatory spirit lest it lead to an international question which could readily lead to Sweden's further humiliation.

A moderate position was taken by Prime Minister Ramstedt in the Upper Chamber and by the Justice Minister Ossian Berger (1849-1914), in the Lower Chamber, both of whom pointed out that it was a sign of strength to adopt the conciliatory spirit of His Majesty without imposing further conditions. They resisted the suggestion that the resolution of the Storting should be confirmed through a referendum of the people. If the Union could not be dissolved by act of the Storting, neither could it be dissolved by any referendum, they claimed. These moderate positions were not generally acceptable to the Riksdag, and on June 27 a Special Secret Committee was constituted with 12 members from each chamber to draft a proposal. Because of the many diverse and wide disagreements among the members of the two chambers as well as among the Swedish people, their task was very difficult indeed. Carl A. Lindhagen (1860-), the Mayor of Stockholm, and a member of the Lower Chamber of the Riksdag argued that it would be very advantageous to Sweden to get rid of Norway which had always been a hindrance to good relations on the Scandinavian peninsula. Because of the unpreparedness of the Swedish politicians they had reached no unanimous

opinion on how to proceed. Among the socialist and worker classes, a strong segment of Sweden, there was great sympathy for Norway and her rights, and they indicated that if resort was made to force they would invoke a general strike. The leader of this segment was the Social Democratic leader, Hjalmar Branting (1860-1925), and the experienced politician Adolf Hedin (1834-1905).

As the debates in the press and in the Riksdag continued bitterness was enhanced by the return of Gustaf Adolf³ (1882-19), the oldest son of the crown prince, with his bride from their wedding in England. The Norwegians, wishing to honor this prince who was very popular in Norway, planned to decorate the Norwegian government department building in Stockholm on the day of the arrival of the prince and princess. As the decoration of the building began, some of Stockholm's newspapers editorially stated that they hoped that Sweden would be spared the sight of the Norwegian revolutionary flag on the ministerial building, and thereupon the Mayor of Stockholm, as ex officio the chief of Police, asked the Norwegian authorities to be courteous enough not to decorate their building, inasmuch as he could not guarantee the consequences in the event the Norwegian flag was displayed. Because the Norwegian government did not wish to give any

³ He became Gustaf VI Adolf, the present King of Sweden in 1950 when the crown prince (later Gustaf V) died.

occasion for any outburst it telegraphed the Norwegian representative in Stockholm to stop the decoration. However, the day after the royal arrival the Stockholm newspapers editorially stated that the only dark spot in the festivities had been the Norwegian ministerial building without any decorations and with a bare flagstaff; this they regarded as an insult to Sweden and explained that it was in consequence of orders from the government in Norway. When the Norwegians immediately and officially explained that this was a misrepresentation and that the failure to decorate the building had been at the instance of the Swedish officials, the newspapers refused to publish the explanation and stated only that the Norwegian government had confirmed that the building had been left bare by reason of orders from Norway. The incident did not serve to improve relations between the two countries.

While incidents of this sort served to irritate both sides, there were many Swedes who publically advised their compatriots against irresponsible conduct and war.

E. Report of Special Secret Committee.

On July 25 the Special Secret Committee made its report to the Riksdag and postulated its proposals on the premise that the Union had not yet been dissolved and could not be dissolved without the approval of the Swedish king and the Riksdag. Accordingly, in order to gain greater assurance that the resolution of the Storting of

June 7, 1905 was the will of the Norwegian people,

1. (a) There should be a new election to the Storting, or
(b) A popular referendum.

The choice could rest with the Norwegian government.

2. In the event that such election or referendum indicated that the resolution of June 7 was the desire of the Norwegian people, then Sweden should be prepared to dissolve the Union upon certain conditions, among them:

- (a) The fortifications near the border must be destroyed.
- (b) The right of the Lapplanders to move across the border must be respected.
- (c) No hindrances or unreasonable conditions should be placed on transit traffic to or from either country or to the inhabitants to use the waterways which criss-crossed the borders of the countries.

3. The extent to which Sweden and Norway should submit disputes to arbitration should be explored.
4. In view of the special significance of the problem to the entire country, the Special Secret Committee did not advise giving the government any full power to dissolve the Union.
5. Although the government already had adequate funds at its disposal, nevertheless the proposal to place one hundred million kroner at the further disposition of the government authority should be given, plus the power to make such a loan if necessary, depending upon circumstances.

This report was unanimously adopted without debate in the Upper Chamber on July 27. The Lower Chamber also approved, but Otto Hedin and Hjalmar Branting, the Social Democrat

leader, protested the authorization for a loan of one hundred million kroner for war purposes, because, he said, Norway could not regard it as anything else than a threat, and negotiations might be damaged.

The following day, July 28, the Norwegian Storting accepted the proposal of the Swedish Riksdag and set Sunday, August 13 as the day on which the people, through a referendum, should vote either "yes" or "no" on whether or not they favored the dissolution of the Union.

The failure to accept the softer proposal of the Ramstedt ministry led to its downfall, and on August 2, a new coalition ministry was formed under the chief representative of the Right wing in the Upper Chamber, the iron master, Christian Lundeberg (1842-1911), Whereas previously a change of ministry generally retained some of the previous ministers, this time there was a completely new government with the express function of implementing the program of the Riksdag. In this respect the Lundeberg ministry became the first ministry in Sweden to be politically responsible to the Riksdag, and it was also the first coalition government formed to meet a crisis.

F. The Foreign Reaction.

While the Norwegians maintained a calm self-discipline and the people of Sweden seethed and boiled in restrained anger at both the brashness of Norway and the

apparent meekness of the Swedish government, the reaction of the foreign press and the foreign offices was varied. This was a turbulent year in European diplomatic affairs; the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 had ended tragically for Russia, social unrest in Russia had led to mutinies on board the battleships as well as general strikes, Kaiser William II (1859-1941), was intervening actively in North African colonial affairs to the discomfort of France and Great Britain, and a nationalist uprising in Persia threatened the Peacock Throne of the Shah. Revolution, war and nationalism were in the air. With mounting anxiety the foreign capitals received news that the border guards on both the Swedish and Norwegian sides had been strengthened. The martial spirit, hitherto limited to warmer waters, now seemed ready to invade even the sub-Arctic. The diplomatic barometer warned of storm.

Throughout 1905 Russia was not opposed to Norwegian independence, and even saw a commercial advantage; but officially her attitude was to follow the moves of France, Great Britain and Germany, and to wait and see what those countries might do. Russian archives give no indication of any plan to recognize Norway before Sweden had first given recognition. (27)

Great Britain's ambassador in Stockholm, Sir Rennell Rodd (1858-), cautioned the Swedish government to be conciliatory. Simultaneously, Sweden lost her

best friend when Delcasse' left the Quai d' Orsay. Even the kaiser openly urged moderation upon Sweden. However, the kaiser is reported, in a private meeting at Gefle on August 13, 1905, to have advised King Oscar to use a mailed fist to compel Norway. Fortunately the king did not follow the kaiser's advice, and their conversation was not revealed until many years later. (40, p. 389; 23, p. 408-409; 19, p. 159-160)

Norway had always regarded the kaiser as one of its best friends. For many years it had been his custom to visit the West coast of Norway every summer. Even after the events of May 27 and the proclamation of June 7 there had been no change in his plans. However, after the royal wedding in Berlin Crown Prince Gustaf of Sweden had an opportunity of talking with the kaiser. The news soon was published that he had given up his Norwegian coastal trip for the year 1905. His decision was interpreted by Norwegians as an attempt to remain neutral. Even though the kaiser during July did sail along the Swedish coast, it is to be noted that he did not set foot on Swedish soil. However, he did receive a visit from King Oscar II on board the "Hohenzollern". The visit aroused considerable speculation in Norway and Sweden. A rumor flew that King Oscar had been advised to use force. Another rumor declared that if the Union could not be maintained, that then a Swedish Bernadotte should ascend

the throne. Otherwise serious consideration would have to be given to a Danish candidate. While King Oscar, and Crown Prince Gustaf who accompanied him, urged William II to withhold recognition of Norway until the dissolution of the Union on Swedish terms, the kaiser urged speed lest the Scandinavian peninsula be Balkanized. Although he preferred a Bernadotte prince, he favored as an alternative the Danish Prince Waldemar, whose wife was not British, in contrast to Prince Carl, whose wife was the daughter of King Edward VII of England.

Because of the secrecy surrounding the meeting at Gefle, some sources characterized the event as a "new Tangier", quite the opposite of what the Swedish king had sought.

Following Gefle, Germany with renewed effort pushed the candidacy of Prince Waldemar and sent instructions to the various German envoys on July 16 to support him. King Christian IX of Denmark, however, preferred Carl to Waldemar, and Frederik Wedel-Jarlsberg (1855-), speaking for the Norwegian government, found Waldemar and his Catholic wife unacceptable. As the kaiser continued his cruise and visited Copenhagen in August, the Danish royal family convinced him that both the Danish and Norwegian governments stubbornly insisted on Prince Carl.

As the summer proceeded and the Swedish king had made no public decision on the Norwegian offer of the

throne to a Bernadotte, it became apparent that continued silence was a trump card which could block any other candidacy and could even compel the Norwegians to accept indigestible terms as a price for Swedish concurrence in the dissolution of the Union. Most important of these was the Swedish recognition of the existence of the new state. So long as this recognition was not withheld too long, no other state would recognize Norway. Even King Christian I X refused to permit his grandson to assume the Norwegian throne until Sweden recognized the new state.

While the kaiser electioneered, Wedel Jarlsberg, a former Norwegian member of the Union foreign service, assisted by the Danish Foreign Minister Raben, allowed rumors to be spread that there was strong sentiment in Norway for a republic. But the Norwegian government did not know that Crown Prince Gustaf during his visits to Germany and England in June had broached a plan whereby the throne would be offered first to a Bernadotte and secondly to Prince Carl of Denmark. Also, no decision would be forthcoming on the Bernadotte invitation or the election of Prince Carl until after a satisfactory solution of the crisis. No matter how strenuous the efforts of the Norwegian diplomats, official and otherwise, no foreign capital would recognize the Norwegian government until the Swedish had first recognized it. Privately

Crown Prince Gustaf had persuaded his father, King Oscar II, and the Swedish cabinet that the Bernadotte invitation should be declined. But of course the Norwegian government knew nothing of this and was kept in the dark. Sweden played its trump card well and slowed down Norway.

It had been the plan of Prime Minister Christian Michelsen that the choice of a king should be quickly made so that the new king could head the Norwegian delegation in the forthcoming conference with Sweden. Unfortunately, this was not to be, and the Norwegian government, lacking recognition, had to wait until the conclusion of the Karlstad Conference and until mid-October before finally the Swedish king declined the invitation. In forcing the Norwegians to follow this course the Swedes showed an amazing skill in diplomacy, and were able to call the tunes most of the summer.

The Norwegian representatives abroad, while failing to gain recognition of their independence and of immediate acceptance of Prince Carl for the royal throne, were able to win considerable good will and support. Fridtjof Nansen, while giving technical lectures on the Arctic, used his free moments to gain the ear of the British foreign office. Wedel Jarlsberg was successful in getting a promise from Denmark that Prince Carl could assume leadership of the Norwegian negotiations with Sweden if he was elected by a plebiscite. Such an election

assumed that the Bernadotte candidate would decline the throne. When Wedel Jarlsberg got the British minister in Stockholm, Sir Rennell Rodd, to seek the consent of Crown Prince Gustaf, the crown prince tacked on the shrewd provision that Carl could not proceed to Norway until after a Norwegian-Swedish settlement had been reached. Although Wedel Jarlsberg rejected this provision it had to stand. Consequently it frustrated the plans of Michelsen to have Carl head the Norwegian delegation. Norway could do nothing without the recognition of the great powers and of Sweden. Count Raben, of Denmark, began to complain to the Swedish representative of the delays.

By August 2 the Swedish cabinet had become more than irritated over the secret diplomacy waged by the Norwegians in the foreign capitals. Accordingly it sent the crown prince to Copenhagen to straighten out matters. The crown prince concurred with the Norwegian plan, but on his return to Stockholm found that the cabinet was strongly opposed. (39, p. 60-65, 157-163, 386-390) The new Lundeberg coalition ministry had assumed office on August 2nd and was plotting a course to gain the approval of the vast majority of Swedes.

Michelsen persisted in his plan to obtain British and Danish help for the immediate election of Prince Carl. He went so far as to state that if Sweden vetoed the plan he would propose to the Storting that it elect Prince Carl.

Such an election depended upon the willingness of the prince and the approval and recognition of Denmark and England. Inasmuch as the approval of Germany was equally important, Wedel Jarlsberg approached Ambassador Schoen, the German minister to Copenhagen, who wrote to his home office that England would recognize Prince Carl whether Sweden consented or not.

After the new Swedish ministers had taken the oath of office and the king had given them his thoughts on the Norwegian throne candidacy, Crown Prince Gustaf went into detail on the attitude of the Bernadotte family to the Norwegian offer. He pointed out that the Swedish line of succession was by no means secure. For various reasons there was not a single prince available; one was too close in the line of Swedish royal succession, another was impractical, Prince Eugene was an artist and a free thinker, and Prince Carl of Sweden was absolutely unwilling. The Norwegians had, in an insulting manner, carried on secret negotiations with the Danes. Therefore he proposed to go to Copenhagen that night in an attempt to bring the Danes into line.

Once more Wedel Jarlsberg tried to get the support of Edward VII, and on August 16 the crown prince laid before the Swedish cabinet King Edward's plea that the Swedes approve the election of Prince Carl of Denmark.

The following day, August 17, the cabinet revised Crown Prince Gustaf's reply to King Edward so as to state most positively that the Norwegian throne was not vacant until the Swedes had agreed to the dissolution of the Union; no Swedish prince was available for the Norwegian throne, but the Swedish royal house looked with favor on Prince Carl of Denmark ascending the throne eventually.

Meanwhile Nansen optimistically notified the Norwegian cabinet that England would recognize Norway and Prince Carl, if he was elected, even though Sweden had not vetoed or turned down the Bernadotte invitation. The government then renewed its effort to gain the cooperation of the Danish royal house and particularly Prince Carl. The Danish cabinet opened discussion, thereby leading the Swedish minister to Copenhagen to threaten war if Denmark meddled in the affairs of the Union. This sufficed to make the Danish cabinet pause. When Edward received the reply penned by Crown Prince Gustaf, as modified by the Swedish cabinet, the British beat a retreat. Thereupon the Danes dropped the matter so that Nansen and Wedel Jarlsberg had to confess failure for the time being.

By mid-summer, 1905, then, the Norwegian attempts to present the Swedes with a fait accompli of a king and recognition of its national independence by one or more foreign powers had been thwarted. Britain would recognize the Norwegian government under Prince Carl only if

Denmark also did so. Denmark refused to let Prince Carl put foot on Norwegian soil until Sweden's terms had been met,--the satisfactory conclusion of negotiations, the rejection of the Bernadotte invitation, and the final proclamation of King Oscar II that the Union had been dissolved. The utter seriousness with which the Norwegian representatives had sought a prince had dispelled any fears abroad that Norway might become a republic. Norway was thoroughly enmeshed in negotiations to get Prince Carl and was morally bound to continue as a monarchy. Sweden had forced Norway to enter into the forthcoming negotiations without a leader and without recognition. Through her masterful diplomacy Sweden had won this round.

On the other hand, Norway's dealings had won the respect of the great powers and of Denmark. Although Germany had sent a large naval squadron into the Baltic and close to the Swedish and Danish shores, this was not deemed an unfriendly act but rather a gesture showing that Germany had taken over the mastery of the Baltic Sea after the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904. The British, not to be outdone, during August likewise sent a large squadron into the Baltic, but gave signs that it was not to be regarded as an unfriendly act toward Germany or any other Scandinavian powers. Although each of the major powers interested in Northern Europe

was anxious to resolve the Scandinavian tension, the justice of Sweden's position was recognized and Norway was forced to enter negotiations at a disadvantage.

G. Plebiscite.

A substantial segment of Swedish opinion still believed that the action of the Storting on June 7 was not supported by Norwegian public opinion. This would account for the calmness of the Norwegians when a more normal reaction would have been exuberant and even aggressive. The first setback for the Swedes had come on Sunday, June 11, which was Pentecost Sunday when multitudes flocked to the churches. A religious revival the previous winter had stirred the spiritual depths of the people, but the grave events of the previous week had drawn them even more to seek Divine Guidance. From the pulpits up and down the land there were no theatricals, no chauvinism, only a prayerful calm arising out of the conviction that Norway had taken the only course open to it in justice. In fact, there were many expressions of sorrow at leaving King Oscar II. In Our Savior's Church in Christiania, Pastor Gustav Jensen concluded his sermon with the words, "And so there is one thing which we will be reminded of. That is our old King. We shall remember him with thanks for every good thought which he has given our land, and hope that God will give him joy in his old age." The pastor's voice broke at this point and sobs were heard through the

the congregation. Thereupon he continued, "We shall also be reminded of our dear kinfolk, and we shall hope that the bonds which now have been burst because they have been too tight may open up a new and better understanding and in the bonds of sympathy." The forces of nationalism and religious revival had found mutual ground, and this served in no small measure to strengthen the will of the Norwegian people to remain calm but determined throughout the crisis. Swedish religious circles, however, were disturbed that Norwegian pastors, to the very last man, had failed to see the injustice that the Norwegians had done to the Union and to their king. (23, p. 346-348)

While the Norwegian government, during the weeks that followed, was carrying on a secret diplomacy to gain immediate recognition and to obtain a king, the people in general were unaware of the activity. As the negotiations continued it became apparent that the Swedes were determined to make the Norwegians suffer a bit, the Norwegian government quietly failed to muster out of service by July 3 the recruits who had taken their basic training. The cavalry and artillery were scheduled to be disbanded in the middle of August, the advanced infantry maneuvers, and special weapons divisions should be sent home by the middle of September. In all of these instances the Norwegian government quietly planned to keep these men in service and add to them the new classes being called up

for military service. In this manner the army could be doubled without having to issue mobilization orders. Yet everyone could see that war was in the wind and accepted the course calmly. Railroads and bridges near the border were prepared for dynamiting. However, by the end of July the outgoing class was mustered out.

From Sweden's side, on June 10, the same day that the king sent his protest back to the Storting and called a special session of the Riksdag into session, the general staff made preparations for mobilization. When the special session of the Riksdag assembled on June 20 the military staff, in due course, was called in to give reports. On June 23 several regiments were ordered to begin maneuvers, and railroads and bridges on the Swedish side were ordered prepared for dynamiting, with guards to be posted at strategic points, discreetly and without arousing particular attention.

As the two sides faced each other, Sweden had a potential army of 170,000 men, with 248 field artillery pieces, while Norway had a potential 76,000 men with 220 field artillery pieces. Neither side had called up its full potential at that time. The Swedish navy had 47 vessels while the Norwegian had only 34, 9 of which were torpedo boats, as against 30 torpedo boats for the Swedes. The numerical superiority of the Swedes was enhanced by the greater percentage of career officers and men, but

but offsetting this was the common training and equipment that both sides had received in the past. Because neither side was prepared for war, one cannot help but chuckle at the predicament of the Norwegian Chief of Staff, who reported that the daily production of ammunition in Norway was only sufficient for three hours of firing each day. The situation in Sweden was not appreciably better.

Against the background of these military preparations, interspersed with rumors of spies from both sides, the Norwegians sat out the first few weeks of the summer. When the Riksdag, on July 25, received the report of its Special Secret Commission on the conditions to be imposed upon the Norwegians as the price of secession, the Norwegians for the first time learned what was expected of them. There was, to some degree, an easing of tension in getting an answer to one of the unknowns, and both the government and press of Norway remained calm. In large measure this was due to the strict control on anti-Swedish expression which the government imposed. Inasmuch as the Norwegians had already officially expressed their willingness to hold a plebiscite, the people diverted their attention to making this the expression of their solidarity.

The plebiscite had been set for Sunday, August 13, and efforts were made to get a tremendous turnout.

The Norwegian women, who still did not have the right of franchise, took part in the electioneering. Newspapers, cabinet members and members of the Storting sought to make the occasion an expression of the national solidarity, and even the state railway system offered free transportation to all bona fide voters. Sunday, August 13 was one of those rare days of sunshine throughout all of Norway. Eighty-five percent of the electorate came to the polls, casting a nearly unanimous vote for secession: 368,208 yes and 184 no.⁸ In addition, 244,000 women indicated their informal "yes" vote in writing to the Storting. The turnout was quite surprising in view of the fact that many men were at sea or for various reasons unable to come to the polls. Hardly ever had a country been so united as Norway was on August 13, 1905.

The Swedes reacted gloomily to the news of the Norwegian election. Swedish newspapers had for some time maintained that there was a strong division of opinion in Norway on the declaration of June 7, and their reaction after the election was to claim terrorism and undue influence. Because the ballot was secret, claims that terrorism was significant can be discounted. However, it is possible that some were "persuaded" to remain away

⁸ Most of the negative votes came from Christiania (40), as might be expected, and from Alten (13) which long has been known for its nonconformity and radical leanings.

from the polls, but it is doubtful that there were enough of these to have made any appreciable difference in the outcome.

On August 22 the Storting approved the proposal of the government to open negotiations with Sweden and to reach agreement with the Swedish proposal set forth in the Riksdag resolution of July 27.

A difficult situation faced the government. Although most of the Swedish conditions were acceptable, the one which required the demolition of the border fortresses would have left the road to Christiania open to Swedish invasion at any time. Michelsen thought that the matter could be negotiated, but other members of the government, probably speaking for a substantial portion of the population, felt that any yielding on the matter of border fortresses would be abject surrender. Attempts to sound out the four Swedish delegates in advance of the forthcoming conference and to obtain some concessions on the demolition of the forts, met with no success. The Norwegian emissary, Benjamin Vogt, one of Norway's leading lawyers, was able only to discuss the preliminary arrangements, such as the date and site of the meeting, subject to the approval of the governments. Vogt reported to the government that the Swedes would not yield and that it looked to him as though Sweden would mobilize and go so far as to declare war unless Norway yielded on the

conditions of negotiation. Karl Staafl (1860-1915), a Liberal lawyer and a rather friendly disposed member of the Swedish Cabinet, had indicated to Vogt that a formal request for negotiations should be forthcoming from Norway. Vogt's firmness in refusing to demolish the border fortresses, particularly Kongsvinger and Fredrikssten, had stiffened the attitude of the Swedish cabinet more than before. This report by Vogt to the Norwegian government was discouraging and was further indication that throughout the entire summer the Norwegian government had been unsuccessful.

When the Norwegian government reported to the Storting which had convened after a short vacation on August 21, two days of stormy debates ensued in secret. The Castberg-Konow (Left) faction insisted in rejecting the Swedish conditions but offered no alternative plan. Prime Minister Michelsen, sternly called the faction as chauvinistic as the nationalist members of the Swedish Upper House who desired war. On August 22 the government proposal came to a final vote of 104 to 11 granting the recommendations of the government that a formal request be made to Sweden and that the delegates be given full powers to represent Norway.

The site of the meeting which the Swedes preferred was Stockholm. Norway's delegate, Benjamin Vogt had replied that the conference should alternate between

Karlstad and Trollhättan. To this the Swedish cabinet replied that the alternation was unacceptable to them, and in a further exchange of telegrams Karlstad was chosen, and the date for the first session was set for the following week, August 31.

Before the Norwegian delegation left for Karlstad, a report from the Defense Department showed that the military position of Norway was weak and that further preparation was necessary in the event of a resort to arms. Michelsen therefore was compelled to promise that if a crisis developed at Karlstad he was to seek a postponement of sessions in order to give the military a chance to build up their strength. The Chief of Defense took a dim view of his arm of the government and stated that everything depended upon negotiations, whereupon Michelsen commented that he then would mobilize King Edward of England.

The two deputations went into the Karlstad Conference with no intention of yielding and goaded by tense public opinion on each side. The outlook was not bright.

Chapter VI

THE KARLSTAD CONFERENCE

In the ancient city of Karlstad, Sweden, on Thursday, August 31, 1905, the delegations from Norway and Sweden met to consider the terms and conditions laid down by the Swedish Riksdag as condition precedent to the recognition of the dissolution of the Union.

At 12:45 the Swedish delegation had arrived at the Masonic Hall where the discussions were to take place. At the stroke of 1:00 the Norwegians came across the square, accompanied by a large crowd. It was bright sunshine but the five gentlemen seemed very serious as they approached the meeting place. Prior to leaving Christiania Michelsen had received three crank letters, one of which had threatened that "he would get his" at Karlstad. Up in the Masonic Hall the Norwegians found that the large ceremonial room was to be used for conferring while each delegation had a side of the hall with an individual office for each delegate. The physical arrangements were excellent.

The Swedish delegation of four was headed by Prime Minister Christian Lundeberg, a member of the Upper House who had been a successful steel industrialist and had entered politics as a Conservative. His skill as a capitalist and negotiator was to serve Sweden well. His colleagues included Count Fredrik Wachtmeister (1855-1919),

a wealthy landowner and general director, who as a Conservative member of the Upper House was then serving as Foreign Minister of the Union and hence a target of much Norwegian criticism. The third member of the delegation was 43-year old Hjalmar Hammarskjöld,¹ an Agrarian and expert in international law who had spent much of his life in service to the state. At the time of his selection he was President of the Riksdag. Perhaps the most colorful of all, he was an inveterate smoker filling council chambers with heavy cigar smoke. He loved to be mysterious and dramatic, and his testiness and nervousness made him a difficult negotiator; but he lived to render valuable service in the League of Nations. To round out the Swedish delegation the Riksdag had picked a Liberal well known for his sympathy for the Norwegians, Justice Minister Karl Staaff (1860-1915). Staaff, a lawyer, had been taken reluctantly into the newly formed Lundeborg coalition cabinet on his promise that he would not disclose cabinet discussions to the Norwegians or other outsiders. His appointment was regarded in Norway as propitious, but he proved to be a singularly difficult obstacle in reaching unanimity on the border forts question. The secretary of the Swedish delegation was the bureau chief Dr. Johannes Hellner (1866-), later to become foreign

1 - Father of Dag Hammarskjöld, the late Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Minister of Sweden. The delegation represented a cross-section of Riksdag parties.

On the Norwegian side the Storting chose virtually the opposite numbers of the Swedish delegation. Prime Minister Christian Michelsen, a tall, dignified Van Dyke bearded shipping magnate with a legal education faced Lundeborg. Michelsen was a connoisseur of art, particularly old Norwegian tapestry and paintings, and had a genial gracious bearing. He had entered politics as a conservative or Right, but swung to the Left. He had served as a member of the Norwegian section of the Joint Council prior to 1905, and thus was well known to the Swedes. Facing Foreign Minister Wachtmeister was Foreign Minister (unrecognized) Jørgen Løvland (1848-1922), a member of the Left whose career had begun by auspiciously taking highest honors in the Kristiansand Teachers Training College. Later he took a law training and entered government service as a customs collector. He was a keen enemy of the Swedes, as shown by the fact that it was he who had blocked the signing of the protocol at the last meeting of the Norwegian section of the Joint Council with Oscar. Opposite Hammarskjöld, the President of the Riksdag was Carl Berner (1841-1914), the President of the Storting and also a member of the Left, whose career had included being Registrar of Records. The most colorless,

he had been included because of his position as head of the Storting and a leader of the Left. The last member of the delegation was Benjamin Vogt (1863-), a brilliant Supreme Court lawyer and Right leader whose desertion of the Rightist Hagerup ministry had paved the way for the coming of the Michelsen ministry. It was expected that he would match legal wits with Hammarskjöld. Vogt was well known in Swedish government circles, and it was he who had been sent to Sweden on June 11, immediately after the Storting declaration of independence on June 7, to try to obtain immediate recognition of Norway. Although he had failed, he was widely respected on both sides of the border. The secretary of the Norwegian delegation was Dr. Andreas Urbye. Both of the secretaries, Hellner and Urbye, were instructed not to make public their notes without official authorization, and it was not until World War II that they exchanged notes preparatory to publication which occurred simultaneously in 1953. As with the Swedes, so the Norwegian delegation represented the political spectrum.

The delegations which faced each other were evenly matched.

A. The First Phase.

The first few minutes were an opportunity for the delegates to greet each other and to extend introductions to new faces. Because of the closeness of the two

languages no interpreter was necessary. Each delegate had a host of advisors on hand, and many of them kept diaries (39,7) which furnished interesting sidelights on the conference. The Norwegians thanked the Swedes for the hospitality which had been shown through giving them the best hotel in Karlstad. The warmth and courtesy shown in the opening moments seemed a good omen.

After a few minutes Lundeberg gave a sign to the Swedes who then withdrew to one side of the large table placed crosswise in the middle of the ceremonial hall. The Norwegians went to their individual rooms. The Swedish delegation then gathered by a window and conversed in subdued voices. No one could hear what was said but shortly thereafter Staaff went over and called the Norwegians, who then came in and took seats opposite each other at the long conference table. Lundeberg, the prime minister, rose and gave a short greeting to the Norsemen. Michelsen, Norway's prime minister, answered politely. The next hour was occupied in dealing with details, and Lundeberg proposed that the chairman of each delegation preside for a full day alternately with the other, and he announced that he was the Swedish chairman. Michelsen, in turn, announced that he had been appointed the chairman for the Norwegian side. When Lundeberg then proposed that they draw lots as to who should be chairman for the first day, Michelsen, with true courtesy proposed that

since the conference was held on Swedish soil, the Swedish chairman should have the opportunity to open.

It was quickly decided that except when otherwise decided all discussions should be secret. No stenographic notes were to be kept. It was Lundeberg's thought that it was inadvisable to have any press discussion because of its possible bad influence on the course of the conference. Wachtmeister, the Swedish foreign minister, however, proposed that there be press releases to be agreed upon at the end of each day, and this was accepted. It was also decided to meet twice a day, from 11:00 to 1:00, and from 3:00 to 5:00. Michelsen then asked for a review of the agenda, and when Lundeberg mentioned the border fortresses Michelsen was quick to draw the line on which the conference nearly foundered. Michelsen pointed out that while the conditions imposed by the Swedish Riksdag mentioned the newly constructed fortifications, the general opinion in Norway was that these did not include Kongsvinger and Fredrikssten, both of which had long historical traditions in Norway and which it would be most difficult for Norway to yield to destruction and demolition. This remained the unyielding position of the Norwegian delegation throughout the conference.

The conferees then met their obligation to the press by allowing photographers to preserve the event for posterity. The meeting adjourned, but the secretaries in

the corridors had some difficulty when they came to issuing the agreed press releases. The Norwegian delegation had characterized Løvland as foreign minister, but the Swedes refused to recognize that Norway was yet independent or had a foreign office.

With Michelsen in the chair on the second day the delegates promptly entered upon the hardest question to face them - the Swedish condition that the border forts, especially Kongsvinger and Fredrikssten, must be destroyed.

In the debate which ensued Michelsen tried to point out that there were two defense lines for the eastern border of Norway, one lying east of the Glommen River, and the other lying west thereof. The fortress of Kongsvinger lay west of the Glommen and about 20 miles from the border; in no sense could it be considered an offensive fort. Fredrikssten, on the other hand, was directly on the border between Norway and Sweden and had been built in 1644 as a supply center by Hannibal Sehested; three times it had been besieged, but never had it been taken. Although Kongsvinger had been built later, in 1683, it also had strong historic symbolism for the Norwegians. Lundeberg replied that the forts had an offensive potential. He added that when the Swedes asked for their razing, they tried to be as discreet as possible by insisting only on the destruction of the newer portions. The Norwegians could retain the old sections of those two forts. The

Swedes had no intention to humiliate the Norwegians, as Michelsen claimed. Løvland, Norway's unrecognized new foreign minister, added that there was a strong difference between Norway and Sweden along this border. Christiania, Norway's political, cultural and material center, was just inside the border, and these forts were necessary for an effective defense of the capital; and if Norway was to have a defense at all it must be for the defense, first and foremost, of Christiania. The Swedish capital, Stockholm, on the other hand was far removed from the Norwegian border. A neutral zone, continued Løvland, was an ideal, but it laid the way to Christiania open. This was too high a price. Wachtmeister, his opposite number, argued that a neutral zone was a pledge of brotherhood between the two kingdoms and if Norway kept its border fortresses then Sweden would have to erect corresponding forts on its side. Such action would begin an arms race, which could hardly strengthen the cause of peace. Instead it could be a tragedy for both people. Hammarskjöld, the international lawyer, added that the new forts would have to go, including the new portions of Kongsvinger and Fredrikssten. According to him it was not difficult to see which was which since the new portions had been constructed in the last few years when the conflict between Norway and Sweden became acute.

On the following day, September 1, even Staaff,

the Swedish minister of justice, who was believed to be friendly toward Norway, maintained that he had heard nothing which could show him that the fortresses were exclusively defensive, and had no offensive character. And, he argued, in view of Norway's support of peace movements there should be no difficulty for the Norwegian people to agree to the demolition of the border fortresses.

Michelsen thought to break the deadlock by pointing to the political background for the Swedish conditions. He realized that because Norway had unilaterally dissolved the Union on June 7, Sweden had to require conditions in order to save face. However, his colleague Løvland pointed out, loss of Christiania's defense fortresses would be costly for Norway. In reply Lundeberg sharply stated that the dissolution of the Union was also a terrific loss for Sweden. Continuing, he contradicted the Norwegian position that the fortresses were defensive by citing page and volume of the minutes of the Storting in 1900-1901 where it was stated by military authorities (Stang) that these same fortresses could be used offensively. They therefore constituted a threat to Sweden. Consequently the retention of the fortresses by Norway would be regarded by Sweden, itself, as a humiliation. Vogt, the international lawyer, acidly stated that if the Swedish delegation sought to pacify public opinion in Sweden why not

say right out "Canossa".³ If Lundeborg's demand of the previous day of demolishing all forts from Kongsvinger to Fredrikssten remained a condition of settlement, then there was little hope, indeed, for these discussions. The Swedish reporter (but not the Norwegian secretary) in his notes stated that Vogt then proposed that the neutral zone be guaranteed by other European powers if the fortresses were destroyed. To this suggestion Hammarskjöld, according to the Swedish secretary, asked for time to consider. The forts had to be made useless; it was not enough just to take away the artillery.

On Saturday, September 2, Michelsen, Berner and Hammarskjöld each produced authorities pointing to the historical position of Kongsvinger, and their offensive or defensive character. Inasmuch as the question was deadlocked, the delegates decided to pick up some of the other less controversial items on the agenda.

Michelsen opened the discussion of the Lapp question and presented the Norwegian position that the annual migrations involved about 8,000 reindeer from Norway to Sweden, but about 80,000 to 100,000 from Sweden to Norway.

3 A reference to the penitent pilgrimage of the excommunicated Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV in 1077 to seek the forgiveness of Pope Gregory. The Pope kept Henry waiting outside the walls in sackcloth and ashes barefoot for three days before receiving him with absolution. The Emperor was utterly humiliated.

These migrations denuded the forests, trampled the range, invaded areas not hitherto contemplated in the treaty and laws. The Lapps often took with them many reindeer from Finland. He proposed, therefore, a treaty for a specified number of years rather than in perpetuity. There were a number of agreements that had to be considered, some dating back to 1751. Wachtmeister concurred that he himself had seen much of the damage done by the reindeer. The day ended with substantial agreement on most points of the Lapp question.

On Monday, September 4, the delegates once more met and this time took up the transit question which involved the free passage of railway and road traffic over arteries that crisscrossed the border, and both sides came to fairly quick agreement that no impediments should be imposed upon the other.

On the same day the delegates took up the proposal for an arbitration treaty, and this was referred to Löfvland and Hammarskjöld, both lawyers, for making a draft. It is interesting to note that the Norwegians wished a treaty requiring arbitration without exception, like the Netherlands-Danish treaty. Staaff, the Swedish Liberal, surprised the Norwegians by claiming that the new international Court of Arbitration had had too limited an experience and background and lacked a body of international law on which Sweden could build much confidence. Although

Norway was willing to accept the principle of unlimited arbitration of outstanding disputes, Sweden felt that there were certain areas in which they could not grant jurisdiction to three or four men of a foreign nationality. The Swedes cautioned, "Who knows under what influences they might be laboring?" Therefore Sweden was in favor of eliminating from the jurisdiction of the arbitration treaty any question of national interests or national sovereignty or vital interests. Eventually, over a number of days, Løvland persuaded Hammarskjöld to agree to complete arbitration of questions except those involving vital interests.

The waterways question was taken up for discussion on Tuesday, September 5, and the Norwegians and Swedes reached substantial agreement very quickly. It appeared that the waterways in part were used for transporting logs and for waterpower, and the principle of reciprocity was agreed upon. By Wednesday, September 6, the nerves of the delegates were fraying, and Hammarskjöld displayed this as he reported on the arbitration agreement that he and Løvland had worked out. Hammarskjöld still hung to the reservation of "vital interests" while Løvland argued that this exception was too broad and vague. He feared "a nation, in a moment of agitation, can call anything a 'vital interest'. Hundreds of wars have arisen on this question, for example the wars over the three crowns in

the Swedish coat of Arms". The Swedish reporter, Hellner, (39, p. 54) thought that Hammarskjöld had considerable pride in the authorship of the arbitration treaty and therefore resented Løvland's changes. Hammarskjöld had the idea that this treaty could perhaps become a master form for other treaties throughout the world. At any rate, the delegates agreed on the arbitration treaty, since the Norwegians did not insist on having the Swedes yield.

This covered all of the points of the agenda on their first reading, and the discussion promptly ran into serious problems as Michelsen took up the discussion on the border fortresses for the second reading. It was his position that Norway could not accept the demolition of Kongsvinger and Fredrikssten. The other forts in connection with a neutral zone could be razed, but it would have to be a truly neutral zone in which (1) no troops could be assemble, and (2) no military supplies could be stored. (Hellner reported that there was a long silence during which the situation was critical. He feared that Lundeberg would answer that in view of the categorical position of Michelsen there was no point to any further discussion.) However, Lundeberg refused to budge in his opposition to a great power guarantee because of the desire of Sweden to keep the great powers out of Scandinavia. The debate went hot and heavy with Hammarskjöld filling the hall with cigar smoke. In the course of the discussion

Berner asked Lundeberg what the Swedish idea of the line of neutral zone should be. A messenger was sent out for a map, but Vogt, seeing that Hammarskjöld had a map in front of him, asked if he couldn't use that one. He received the abrupt answer that Hammarskjöld's was marked with several lines which could not be shown to the Norwegians. When Hellner came back from his mission he heard Hammarskjöld reading several newspaper articles from Norwegian newspapers of 1902 and 1903 in which the offensive character of the forts had been claimed. The Norwegians were much embarrassed, and Berner nervously took the occasion to begin reading a newspaper and laughing to himself; Michelsen was red in the face and his gaze shifted. Vogt bowed his head and would not look anyone in the eye. After Hammarskjöld had finished reading the articles Vogt asked the question, "What will best serve the cause of peace? Answer: creating trust between peoples. But one does not do this in Norway by insisting upon the razing of the forts. The least yielding by Norway on this point will be overwhelmingly difficult for Norway. A neutral zone guaranteed by the great powers would give some guarantee of peace." When Hammarskjöld tried to speak, Michelsen interrupted him angrily by saying they had enough public opinion in each of the kingdoms without listening to European public opinion. The delegates could not be unaware of the fact that Norway, since

June 7, had tried to open relations with other nations and had succeeded in getting friends. He knew that Europe would say to the Norwegians that Norway should give to Sweden what was rightfully Sweden's, but he was equally certain Europe would not tolerate the humiliation of Norway. In order not to waste time, "let us see the realities of the situation." Wachtmeister countered that he thought European opinion was on the side of Sweden. Lundeberg asked for a memorandum of the Norwegian proposal, which was handed to him in the afternoon. Hellner, in his parenthetical comments, (39, p. 59) stated that Michelsen was magnificent, as well as warm, impulsive and at the same time composed.

In the afternoon session the Swedes felt that the memorandum submitted by Michelsen was not clear enough, and the meeting adjourned.

Thursday, September 7, was the critical day when the Norwegians submitted a new memorandum conceding a neutral zone ten kilometers wide from 61° N. down to Svinesund, including the razing of all forts in that strip except Fredrikssten with its outlying parapets which were to remain untouched in the condition they then were; no new forts could be constructed in this area; and an international guarantee of the neutral zone should be sought by each country after the conference. Lundeberg abruptly terminated the discussions and asked for a conference with his

delegates. Michelsen asked if the meeting should be adjourned until the afternoon, but Wachtmeister replied that it would not take that long to consider the memorandum.

As the delegates withdrew Vogt took Hellner aside and said that this was the limit to which the Norwegians could go. He meant for this to get back to the Swedes, and Hellner hurried to Håmmarskjöld, who pointedly answered "You tell them that I slammed my briefcase shut as soon as Michelsen began to make an exception for Kongsvinger." The time was 11:45 A.M. when the Swedish delegation withdrew. During the tense minutes that followed it was obvious that the Norwegians were nervous. At 1:30 the Swedes returned and announced that the conference would resume at 3:30.

The afternoon session opened with the Norwegians receiving a Swedish memorandum insisting upon the razing of all the forts and demanding an acceptance by Saturday, September 9. This was clearly an ultimatum.

The Swedish memorandum on Thursday afternoon, September 7, proposed an intermission until Saturday morning. When Prime Minister Michelsen objected on the ground that he needed more time to work on the national budget, Lundeborg, his counterpart, stiffened. So did Wachtmeister, his foreign minister, who, like the rest of the Swedes, was irritated. He asked for a delegation conference which

lasted a long time. Word came that Michelsen was wanted in the conference. Lundeberg also announced that it was impossible to postpone the discussions until the following week; his colleagues were uneasy over the long discussions, in fact, everyone was uneasy. Michelsen then asked if the Swedish memorandum should be regarded as an ultimatum. "Yes", answered Lundeberg; they were "uneasy in Stockholm over rumors of a military build-up in Norway, and Sweden was letting her opportune moment slip by". Michelsen bluntly replied that he rejected this view and that the uneasiness in Stockholm was due to the uneasiness of the general staff. Neither in Norway nor in Sweden could the general staff be allowed to assume political responsibility. Three battalions had been called up in Norway to relieve units on duty, and that was all there was to it. If Sweden wanted to flout European public opinion by invading Norway on Saturday, then go ahead! (Vaersaagod!), Michelsen is reported to have said. He chided Lundeberg for his fear of three poor Norwegian battalions on guard duty while Sweden had thousands under arms, which Lundeberg met with, "Not I, but the general staff in Stockholm!"

When the delegates filed in again Lundeberg gave the explanation Michelsen had told him privately. He said that the Swedish delegates did not share any mistrust, but he wanted to be able to set his colleagues in Stockholm at

rest. He also wished to put the Norwegians on notice of the rumors. In light thereof, Lundeberg then proposed that the intermission last until Wednesday, September 13. As the men rose Vogt pathetically told Hellner, "Lots of hate between the two peoples has been sowed this day!"

Urbye, the Norwegian secretary of the delegation to Karlstad, in the meantime had gone through his notes of the previous discussions, and had furnished Berner with data to show that in the previous day's negotiations the Swedes had agreed to a neutral zone along the lines proposed by the Norwegians. (37, p. 101-106) This caught the Swedes by surprise, and they backed down.

Later that day Michelsen sought out Lundeberg and asked if the Swedish proposal on border forts was an ultimatum. Lundeberg answered by a counter-question, was the Norwegian proposal an ultimatum. Michelsen answered "No", to which Lundeberg said that neither was the Swedish,-- only a proposal for modification. In addition Lundeberg expressed his regrets for the clash earlier that afternoon.

B. Intermission.

The same evening the disheartened delegates hastened to their capitals after Michelsen had promised not to mobilize the Norwegian army, and to maintain the greatest secrecy. The press was given a cryptic communique that the delegates found it necessary to confer with their governments.

In retrospect, according to Professor Lindgren, (19, p. 179) the Karlstad Conference would probably have foundered if it had not been for this intermission which gave the Norwegian delegates an opportunity to win the support of the cabinet and Storting. The delegates had conceded more than planned, and a new orientation and authorization was needed.

While Karlstad Conference had been in progress, the Norwegian military position continued to be weak. Fredrikssten, which should have 517 men, only had 49. Ørje Fort, which should have 384 men, only had 57, while at Urskog where there ought to be 142 men, there were a scant 10. Colonel Stang was invited to give a public talk on border forts, but he was muzzled by the cabinet which felt that any such discussion was dangerous, not to say harmful. The defense minister on September 3 had called up a "half-mobilization" of forts, or about 600 men. It was probably news of this which had troubled the general staff in Stockholm and nearly disrupted the Karlstad Conference. He also tried quietly to move supplies toward the Swedish border. The navy regretted not having bought two destroyers from England because they heard rumors that the Swedes now were adding them to their fleet. Later this rumor was found groundless.

The Karlstad Conference had received much publicity to begin with, but the tight secrecy imposed by the

delegates left the reporters only fantasy and rumors out of which to fabricate stories. All kinds of nonsense was printed, ranging from the personal opinions of "experts" to stories of spies, fleet and troop movements, mobilization, foreign intervention and sketches of the rural life in Sweden. When most reporters tired of the assignment, only the Norwegian and Swedish press remained to the end. Some of the news accounts served to irritate the delegates, but they read all.

The tight secrecy extended even to the explanation of the intermission, during which time the Swedish papers blamed the Norwegians for the interruption of the negotiations. (Wahlstrand's documents now show that it was the Swedes who asked for the adjournment). (39, p.6-65, 157-163, 386-390) And some Swedish papers suggested that the Norwegians might refuse to return to Karlstad.

Each day the delegations had wired or telephoned their capitals. The telephone was unsatisfactory because it could so easily be monitored. The telegrams were sent in secret code, and in most instances the cabinets stayed in session each night until the last message had been received from Karlstad and an answer framed. So keen was the tension that the Swedish crown prince took it upon himself to decode the messages to Stockholm, rather than wait for the technician.

The days of the intermission in Norway were filled with briefing the cabinet and later the Storting was called into secret session. Michelsen sought a mandate to sign as favorable an agreement as possible, and meetings with the cabinet took place Saturday and Sunday.

Of all the Swedish demands the Norwegians regarded the razing of the four border forts as the least acceptable. At the same time everyone in the defense department, from the defense minister to the field generals, admitted that the Norwegian military position was extremely unfavorable. It was estimated that against 28,000 Norwegian men stood 80,000 Swedes. What was even worse the Swedes had assembled in their annual maneuvers, thereby holding an advantage in mobilization. The Norwegians had demobilized at the end of July. (9, p. 104)

As one general staff officer stated, the chances of Norway winning were one in a hundred. On the other hand, to yield to the Swedish demands was surrender. It was therefore generally agreed that the government should yield on the matter of razing, if necessary, all fortresses, but on the condition that there be an arbitration agreement and a neutral zone. Under arbitration by the third party Norway would yield the fortresses, but not upon the sole demand of Sweden. As Councillor Bothner stated after the military advisors had admitted that the fortresses had very little significance, one should be justified in

laying some weight upon the growing international peace movement. (39,p. 394) Apparently several had come to the same conclusion, for on September 8 Michelsen had telegraphed Kaiser William II with the proposal that he be an arbitrator in this military question. However, on Monday, September 11, the kaiser telegraphed his regrets. Løvland confessed that he had discussed the situation with Professor Ernst Sars who had given his opinion that Norway was bound to yield on the demands for razing the border forts. Any talk about national surrender was irrelevant if an arbitration agreement and neutral zone were obtained. The cabinet ended its sessions with the rather unanimous conclusion that an arbitration agreement and a neutral zone gave a greater guarantee of security to Norway than any of the existing border fortresses. As Vogt stated, Norway should not negotiate from the standpoint of fear but rather that there might be cordial relations in the future between Norway and Sweden.

Although the cabinet had reached unanimity, there was no assurance that the Storting or the people would concur. The danger existed that the Storting, if not aware of the trend of the discussions and negotiations, might refuse to ratify the Karlstad agreement and so create a crisis. Accordingly, it was decided to hold a private meeting of the Storting that same day, Monday, September 11. Although the meeting was secret and no stenographers

were present, the details of the discussion are found in several diaries of the participants.¹¹ (12, p. 182 et seq.) When the Storting adjourned at 2 A.M. it was clear that the large majority agreed with the cabinet and that the few dissenters, notably Konow and Castberg, represented only a small faction. President Berner warned everyone that they were sworn to secrecy and the use of discretion and that because of the dangerous position of the country nothing must be told of this session. Konow and Castberg violated this pledge promptly.

Meanwhile, informal negotiations with the foreign powers resulted in a dispatch from the Danish foreign office that Russia, Germany and England had instructed their ambassadors in Stockholm to exercise pressure in the direction of a peaceful settlement. Nansen, in London, had tried unsuccessfully to talk with Lord Lansdowne. Wedel Jarlsberg, who had a tendency to exaggerate, had written Michelsen from Copenhagen that Sweden's claim of having the great powers on her side was groundless. Another letter from Norway's roving informal ambassador, Nansen, reported that Sir Runnell Rodd had received assurances from the Swedish foreign minister, Count Wachtmeister, that Sweden had no intention to disturb the fort of Fredrikssten. Nevertheless Nansen felt that it was of greatest

11 Also the unpublished diary of Johan Castberg.

importance that the foreign powers exercise influence over Sweden. While he was in England he urged the government in Norway to seek the help of Germany.

As the Norwegian delegates on Tuesday evening took the train back to Karlstad, the presses began to roll in Stavanger. The morning edition on Wednesday reported that there had been a secret meeting of the Storting in which, by a vote of 97 to 20, the Swedish demands had all been accepted. Although it was too late to stop the local sale, all copies bound for Sweden were confiscated. Meanwhile, in Stockholm as the Swedish delegation boarded the train a similar rumor "from a reliable source" reached them. Of course, there had been no such vote in the Storting, but in the news blackout the press was fishing for news and had jumped at false conclusions.

On the Swedish side of the border the cabinet had heard a different picture. The defense minister had reported that the entire fleet was close to the Norwegian border. It was keeping a watchful eye on the entire Norwegian fleet which was bottled up at Melsomvik.

All of the army regiments were at their appointed stations, and all railroads, bridges, and borders were under close guard. Some discussions took place as to who should lead various sections of the military power in Sweden in the event Norway failed to yield to the

Swedish demands. But the close watch which England, France and Russia kept caused the cabinet to enter upon some serious discussions. Some favored an unyielding position and felt that war might be a good way of arresting the moral decadence which had overtaken Sweden. In the final analysis the Norwegian position on the forts at Kongsvinger and Fredrikssten created the greatest difficulties.

Whereas the Norwegians had met secretly with the Storting, the Swedes confined their discussions to the cabinet (or council of state). This body found itself evenly divided between two points of view. The first, supported by Lundeborg and Hammarskjöld and three others, demanded the razing of all four groups of fortresses (including Kongsvinger) with the alternative of breaking off negotiations. The other group, which included Wachtmeister and Staaff and three others, were willing, if necessary, to insist only upon the razing of the three fortress groups (omitting Kongsvinger). In no event would they permit the negotiations to founder if no agreement could be reached on Kongsvinger. In other words, the Swedish delegation to Karlstad was evenly divided.

On the evening of Tuesday, September 12, as the Swedish delegation boarded the train at Stockholm a secretary reported later that the platform was jammed with people standing in utter silence. Their silence was

so penetrating that everyone felt hushed and serious.

As the two delegations traveled toward Karlstad once more, an editorial in Agder, a newspaper in Flekkefjord, Norway, rather accurately stated the thinking of the majority of Norwegians as follows:

"The Norwegians have gone far to meet the Swedish requests. It is possible that they will go even farther. It is possible that they may even have to give in and raze the new parapets and fortresses, although, of all things, this will be felt as an abject surrender. But this we can do only if Sweden immediately joins us in a binding arbitration agreement whereby all future wars between the two kingdoms may be avoided."¹²

V. Agreement.

As the conference at Karlstad resumed, the London Times and Globe demanded that the government intervene for the cause of peace. The Norwegian newspapers reported that a unit of 800 soldiers had been on hand at the Christiania railway station as a show of military strength when the delegates had left the previous night.

From Wedel Jarlsberg, in Copenhagen, came a telegram that the Russian czar had given his ambassador orders to join with the German and English ambassadors to prevent an outbreak.¹³ Similarly the Danish ambassador had urged that the Norwegian delegates delay any settlement for a few days.

Rumors of troop activities were flying on all sides.

¹² September 12, 1905.

¹³ This proved to be true. (27, p. 39)

The Norwegian defense minister received intelligence reports of troop concentrations from as far north as the border opposite Narvik down to the southern border of Norway. The Swedes were turning back Norwegian tourists and cyclists, and travelers from Stockholm reported that special trains were speeding to the Norwegian border with hundreds of soldiers.

Under these circumstances the Norwegian Defense Minister Olssøn mobilized the Norwegian battalions, totaling about 7,800 troops, and the entire fleet was readied for battle. However, there had not yet been general mobilization of all Norwegian troops.

From the Swedish side the Stockholm Dagbladet put out an extra edition with the false rumor that all five military classes in Norway had been mobilized and stood at the border, and that a Norwegian detachment in Vaerdalen had already crossed the border into Sweden.

In an atmosphere of heightening tension the delegates assembled again at the great hall in Karlstad. Each delegation remained in its offices except for Lundeborg and Michelsen, who sat on a sofa at one end of the hall and spoke in low voices. Secretaries coming and going tried to get snatches of the conversation without success. The two chiefs discussed a Norwegian proposal (39, p. 179-180) that there be a broad arbitration agreement and a neutral zone which has been proposed earlier. They would consent

to the razing of all fortresses except Fredrikssten, which was to remain untouched. In the event that the Swedish delegation could not agree, then pursuant to Article IX of the Hague Convention the two nations should submit to an investigation commission the question of the extent to which the Norwegian border forts might be considered a threat to Sweden. The commission would decide, in the interests of peace, which forts ought to be razed. The Norwegian proposal went further and indicated a willingness also to submit the matter to the mediation of one of the European chiefs of state or the President of the United States of America, as Sweden might choose. After about 45 minutes of quiet discussion the secretaries in the anterooms noticed that the voices of the two were rising in volume, then the two parted company, each to return to his delegation.

At about this time Michelsen received a telegram from Christiania reporting that Wedel Jarlsberg, in Copenhagen, had learned that the Russian, English, French and German representatives were conferring and probably would take a step in unison during the course of the day.¹⁵

At 2:00 P.M. a deathly pale young man with a white scarf around his neck and a short thin, grey coat, was brought in to the Swedish secretaries. Was he a Norwegian

¹⁵ Russian archives bear this out.

spy who had been captured, or was he a Swede bearing news that the Norwegians had made an attack? His story, quickly told, was that he was Lieutenant Stålhane of the Swedish general staff. He had been spying in Norway and had hastened back to Karlstad with a secret report. Apparently he had hearsay information from a Norwegian who had overheard a Norwegian sheriff telephoning a District Chief. The conversation disclosed the fact that the Storting on September 12 after a violent debate had given its approval to the proposal of the cabinet to yield to the Swedish demands on the razing of the border forts. Upon learning this the lieutenant had saddled a horse and had hastened to the border without taking time for sleep for four days and nights. Just before crossing the border he had bought some Norwegian newspapers which reported that the bitterness in Christiania against the government was so great that the Storting's members had had to leave the parliament building by way of an alley. A journalist who had spotted them had run after them shouting epithets. Unfortunately, while on the train to Karlstad the lieutenant had placed the newspapers on a seat and a Norwegian journalist had snatched them from him so that he could not offer the written proof. This startling information was considered so important that the secretaries interrupted the conference of the Swedish delegates. But, the legally trained Hammarskjöld

remarked that " this was nothing to build on". Rumors continued to fly as the Swedish and Norwegian patrols stood about one hundred meters apart at the border. An Associated Press correspondent reported that two Swedes had been killed. In private conversation Justice Minister Staaff, one of the delegates, told a secretary that it was certainly true that two men had vanished. A few hours later the Karlstad Tidningen published the story of the two men as true. In the afternoon sessions both delegations met together in the great hall and the discussions at times were so noisy that people in the ante-rooms could hear their voices.

When the afternoon discussions had finished Michelsen telephoned to Christiania to express his pleasure over Wedel Jarlsberg's news about the activities of the great powers.¹⁶ As for the mobilization, he had no advice. He believed that this was a matter for the Christiania authorities to deal with according to their best judgment.

The meeting on Thursday, September 14, continued under extreme tension. The Swedes had submitted a counter-proposal expressing no opposition to a broad arbitration

16 Russia, France, Germany and England made identical but not joint representations to Stockholm that it would be bad for Europe if a general war should break out. (27, p. 39)

agreement and the establishment of a neutral zone. However, the Swedish delegation refused to allow in such neutral zone the retention of any modern fortress which could be a continual and direct threat to the other country, and therefore all modern armor on Fredrikssten would have to be demolished; but the ancient fortifications could remain. To the Norwegian proposal to submit the question of fortifications to an investigation commission under the Hague Convention the Swedes tendered a rejection. After a few minutes of discussion the delegations parted, leaving Michelsen and Lundeberg to continue the discussions. Once more, secretaries reported that their voices waxed loud. So great was the tension that Hammarskjöld confided to his secretary that he felt himself useless in the debates which had reduced themselves to demands and contradictions, and he felt that he was on the verge of a breakdown, saying, "My nerves can't tolerate anything like this".

Back in Christiania the leaders of the opposition, Castberg and Konow, had written two articles in Dagbladet and Intelligenssedler thereby revealing that the Norwegians had violated their promise of secrecy to the Swedes on September 7 by discussing details of the Karlstad Conference in the Storting, and they further stated that the majority favored acceptance of the Swedish demands. These articles appeared on the streets on the evening of

September 13, and copies of the newspapers could easily have been in the hands of the delegates by forenoon of Thursday, September 14 and may well have been an explanation for the embrace which Lundeberg and Staaff gave each other about 1:30 P.M. that same day. One of the secretaries, Hellner, unaware of the newspaper articles, surmised that Staaff had been a hold-out and had finally yielded to Lundeberg's more conciliatory approach, (39, p.71) and a partial compromise on Kongsvinger.

About 5:00 P.M. the same day Captain Åkerman, the Swedish military advisor, told the secretaries that Lieutenant Stålhane, who had just returned from Norway as a spy, had moments earlier been at the telegraph office when he saw Karl Wedel Jarlsberg send a telegram to Christiania. Although he had not been able to see the addressee, he had read that it was a congratulatory message, and he guessed, naturally, that the Norwegians were congratulating each other upon an advantage which they had won. (39, p. 72) However, Councillor Bothner in Christiania wrote in his diary that a telegram sent at 4:55 in code ordered the cabinet immediately to advise the presiding officer of the Storting that the articles by Castberg and Konow had reached the Swedish negotiators at the most critical moment in the negotiations. They had made the Norwegian position in the highest degree untenable as far as any reasonable solution was concerned;

"by their indiscretions they knocked the props from under us". Lindgren, in his recent book, takes the position that the Norwegians had already given way prior to the arrival of the papers in Karlstad, but that the articles served Michelsen as a means of putting the blame for the Norwegian failure at Karlstad on the parliamentary opposition. (19, p.189 and footnote)

It is certain that the Swedes utilized the articles as strengthening their negotiating position for demolishing all border forts. They argued that the Storting had conceded as much, despite the protestations of the delegation from Norway. (39,p.405)

Back in Karlstad anger ruled the Swedes who regarded the Norwegian appeal to the great powers, even on an informal basis, as a breach of trust. Consequently their attitude hardened appreciable toward Norway. Hellner stated in his notes that war was imminent at this point and reported that Løvland had sat with his watch in his hand calculating the hour that war should break out. It was certain, however, that because the Norwegians were caught in an embarrassing position by the articles, they were forced to retreat faster than they had wished.

Lundeberg seized the critical moment to exchange telegrams and telephone conversations with Councillor Berg, the crown prince, and other leaders in Stockholm who prepared the government for some compromise on

Kongsvinger and Frédrikssten. Shrewdly, Lundeberg demanded full power to negotiate further. (39, p. 316 et seq.) Already in Stockholm many, including Prince Carl, were urging an immediate acceptance within 48 hours of the last Swedish offer of September 14, or else the Swedes would return to their original position of demanding the complete razing of all border forts. But Lundeberg, in further conversations and telegrams, demanded from Stockholm why he had not gotten full power to proceed with negotiations. He further stated that if the power was not forthcoming then the consequences would have to fall upon the cabinet in Stockholm. It was apparent that there was a breakdown in confidence and relations between the Swedish delegates at Karlstad and the government in Stockholm. Yet the Swedish delegates were closer to a reasonable settlement than the colleagues in Stockholm. After considerable debate in Stockholm on Saturday, September 14, a telegram was finally dispatched over the signature of Crown Prince Gustaf stating that the earlier telegram was not a statement of lack of confidence in the delegates. The telegram concluded by giving unlimited authority to negotiate. (39, p. 322) That night at 12:30 a telegram from Karlstad arrived stating that the fortress question seemed to at last have found a satisfactory solution and that the conference was reaching agreement.

Indeed, had not the conference reached agreement

at this time it is doubtful that Michelsen could have restrained the growing fears in Norway. Neither could Lundeberg have controlled the growing martial spirit in Sweden. Both countries had been dangerously close to war. (9,p. 141) The success of the conference hinged on mutual respect which these two leaders of state had for each other. It is significant that while neither of them was a diplomat they had succeeded in negotiating an historic first,--a peaceful divorce of the two kingdoms of a dual monarchy. The final agreement drafted between the delegations made concession to both sides. The Swedes conceded a general arbitration treaty and a neutral zone as demanded by the Norwegians. The Norwegians, in turn, on the issue of forts conceded the razing of the new sections of Kongsvinger, and both sides agreed that the old portions still standing might remain and be considered outside the neutral zone.

Late Saturday night, September 16, a joint com-muniqué was issued as follows:

"From Karlstad it is officially stated that there is every expectation that the negotiations in the near future will lead to a positive result."

The remainder of the conference was devoted to the details of the Lapp transit and waterway questions, the steps to be taken for the approval of the agreements, a statement on the Bernadotte candidature, and the final proclamation of King Oscar II.

Even as the conference was approaching calm waters the Norwegian troops continued to be mobilized. The Swedish defense minister in Stockholm had threatened to resign unless the Norwegians ceased mobilization. Michelsen was in a delicate position inasmuch as the Swedish troops outnumbered the Norwegians three to one. Nevertheless he consented to have the soldiers who were then moving toward the front held at concentration points, but only on condition that Lundeberg order Defense Minister Tingsten to cease moving troops up to the front. Reasonableness prevailed, and the two prime ministers agreed (9,p.140) that troops should be withdrawn at least one kilometer from each border so as to avoid incidents. The Swedish newspapers, particularly Stockholm's Tidningen and Aftonbladet raged at the Norwegians. So tense was the situation that Swedish officers were reported in Norwegian territory cutting telephone wires. Although no news of details had reached the Norwegian public, rumors were rife, and a mysterious telephone call to the government warned that the Norwegian delegates would be stoned by the soldiers on their arrival in Christiania. There was no doubt that the public would have grave dissatisfaction with the terms of the conference.

In Stockholm Defense Minister Tingsten, the crown prince and the king became bellicose. Tingsten indicated

he hoped that the negotiations would break down for he preferred an immediate war to an unworkable neutral zone. The meeting of the cabinet on September 20 nearly resulted in a desperate rash action by Sweden, but by diverting the attention of the king and crown prince to other matters tempers were restrained.

The following day in Karlstad, Thursday, September 21, the Swedes suddenly withdrew their consent to a neutral zone, probably because of fear of rejection of the Karlstad agreement by the Riksdag. When Michelsen threatened to march out of the conference with the entire Norwegian delegation, Lundeborg yielded.

Finally, on September 23, the last full session of the delegates took place amid an exchange of documents, signatures, and compliments for the patience and responsibility of each of the participants.

The following day, Sunday, September 24, the delegations arrived at their capital cities to seek the ratification of the agreements by their respective parliaments. Berner had telephoned to Christiania that no reception committee should be on hand at the railway station. The delegation wished to come home as unnoticed as possible in order not to give occasion for demonstrations or outbursts.

Chapter VII
A NEW SYNTHESIS

The Karlstad agreement now rested in the hands of the two governments. Prior to parting, Lundeberg had told Michelsen that the Swedish Riksdag could not meet until October 2 or 3. This meant that the Norwegian Storting, which was still in session, would have full publicity directed toward its views of the agreement, and the Riksdag could do some second guessing as well as take offense at the language and tone of the Norwegian discussions. There was bound to be some dissatisfaction and caustic criticism of the Swedes, and if the two prime ministers could not control their respective parliaments no one could predict the outcome.

The troops continued to mass on each side of the frontier, and the rumor reached Norway that the Swedish army, due to terminate its annual maneuvers on September 30, was planning an extension indefinitely. The danger of war was still great. Hardly had the delegates returned on Sunday than Michelsen telephoned Lundeberg in Stockholm proposing a mutual military withdrawal. On Tuesday evening, September 26, Lundeberg wired Michelsen his agreement, assuring him that the Swedish maneuvers would end at the regular appointed time. Orders were issued to the Swedish fleet not to sail north of N. 57° 45', which would

keep them inside Kattegat, while simultaneous orders were given to the Norwegians not to proceed east of 10° 40' E. This would keep them inside Christiania Fjord and well within Norwegian waters. Further negotiations with the Swedes that same day resulted in the Norwegians offering to reduce their own troops to half strength, a condition the Swedish thereupon accepted, and none too soon! Already there were reports of several Swedish patrols having crossed the Norwegian border. Thursday morning, September 28, Michelsen wired Lundeberg that he was issuing orders at 5:00 P.M. that day to reduce armaments and curtail fleet movements according to the telegraphic exchanges between the two prime ministers.

The text of the Karlstad agreement was not given to the public immediately. At the instance of Michelsen, Professor Nansen had written articles in Verdens Gang and Morgenbladet paving the way for the publication of the terms of the agreement and putting a damper on chauvinism. Professor Sars had already written an article appearing on Tuesday, September 19, and widely copied throughout the land, dealing with arbitration and the razing of the forts, but making no mention of a neutral zone. Prudently Michelsen had chosen two leading Norwegians to take the edge off any opposition; it would indeed be a brash Norwegian to contradict such authority. After discussing the

Karlstad agreement with the cabinet on Sunday, September 24, and Monday, the text was given to the press at 5:00 P.M. Tension ran high among government members, but the much feared demonstrations were lacking. On the contrary, so great was the relief among the populace that Michelsen was even cheered.

Public reaction both in Norway and Sweden was generally good, and the moderates in both nations expressed general satisfaction with the Karlstad agreement. At last the long silence which had surrounded the conferees had ended and no longer were people left to digest rumors. The Students Union (Studentersamfund) had imposed a voluntary censorship throughout the entire summer and duration of the Karlstad conferences. The military also had been gagged, but upon publication of the agreement Colonel Stang had been billed as a speaker at a public gathering on the subject of "Fortresss". The defense minister ordered him to cancel the meeting or resign from the service. (The meeting was cancelled.) On September 30 the Studentersamfund held its first large meeting, but only professors and lawyers were on the list of speakers; no student was billed. (13,p.47 et seq.) Although no press criticism appeared in Norway, in Sweden a few of the chauvinist papers were offended by the Karlstad agreement.

This did not mean that Norway was unanimous. The Left, led by Castberg and Konow, organized protest meetings as well as republican meetings against a continuation of monarchy, but the double criticism tended to confuse the issue and weaken their standpoint. Everyone feared the consequences if the Karlstad agreement were repudiated.

In the meetings of the Special Committee of the Storting Michelsen went into details on the negotiations and said, "When we went to Karlstad the first time we sought to mobilize Europe as well as we could..... No great power would take the initiative". He reported how he had tried to get the assistance of Denmark, but direct pressure on Sweden had miscarried, and the kaiser advised that "we must be reasonable and agree to Swedish conditions".

The critics of the Karlstad agreement could not come forward with any reasonable alternatives.

On October 6 the recommendations of the cabinet, as well as the report of the critics (a minority report) were presented to the Storting for discussion. Since most of the criticism was aimed at the agreement for razing the forts, Michelsen took the point of view that the forts were inadequate defenses anyhow. Defense Minister Olssøn, in his presentation, argued that mobile defenses were a better and more modern solution than forts. Despite severe heckling from the minority, led by Konow

and Castberg, the Storting voted 101 to 16 to accept the Karlstad agreement. (The 16 consisted of 3 Moderates, 2 Socialists, and 11 from the Left). As subsequent years showed, fears of the minority were unjustified, and Karlstad proved to be right.

The next move was up to the Swedes. The Upper Chamber debated the matter briefly, but voted unanimously to support their prime minister on October 13. The Lower Chamber did not even debate the question but by unanimous voice vote affirmed the Karlstad agreement. On October 16 the Riksdag abrogated the Act of Union and gave the king authority to dissolve the Union by proclamation and recognize Norway as an independent nation. On October 27 the Royal Proclamation was issued by Oscar II, and Norway at last had full independence, after 91 years of Union. Very little publicity or press comment attended the Proclamation on either side.

Norway hardly noticed the King's Proclamation because, following October 9, the Storting had entered into a debate on the next step to be taken. Although the cabinet proposed an invitation to Prince Carl of Denmark to become King of Norway, the Left and the Social Democrats favored a republic. In the ensuing discussions some indiscreet comments were made by Michelsen indicating that while negotiations had been proceeding and the Bernadotte

offer was still in the air, he had opened negotiations for the accession of Prince Carl to the throne of Norway. This led promptly to some criticism from the Swedish press which pointed at this as duplicity. The liberal wing in Norway urged the formation of a republic, and one of the chief speakers was Halvdan Koht,² an historian, who broke with his old history professor, J. E. Sars. To resolve the issue, the Left proposed a plebiscite on whether to have a republic or a monarchy. The cabinet, on the other hand, proposed that there be an immediate Storting election of Prince Carl as King of Norway.

After the Swedish Riksdag had approved the dissolution of the Union on October 16, the cabinet learned that the Danish government would not permit Prince Carl to ascend the throne without some clear expression of the people by way of a plebiscite that he was wanted as king. It was feared that he would come not as King of Norway but as the leader of a monarchy party.

With authority from the Storting Michelsen sent Professor Nansen to Copenhagen to negotiate with Prince Carl, and after conferences between Foreign Minister Raben of Denmark and Professor Nansen, Carl agreed to land in Norway if a plebiscite gave him only a very small

² Halvdan Koht later became foreign minister of Norway.

majority. Thus, on October 23, four days before King Oscar II had issued his Proclamation dissolving the Union, Carl accepted the throne upon the condition that there be a plebiscite in Norway.

In the parliamentary debate which continued, Løvland indiscreetly pointed out that the monarchies in Europe would not look with favor on a republic in Norway. At one point the radical Castberg cast a slur on the Bernadotte family, and the presiding officer called him to time and refused to allow any slurs on the Swedish Royal House. The Storting finally, by a vote of 87 to 29, agreed to accept the proposal of Prince Carl, and a plebiscite was set for November 12 and 13.

In the two weeks before the plebiscite almost the entire Norwegian press favored a monarchy. This did not mean that there was no republican sentiment, but those in favor had almost no sounding board being limited to gathering large crowds at public meetings. The cabinet was pessimistic about the outcome, and pre-election bets predicted only a slight edge in favor of monarchy.

The plebiscite, in which about 75% of the eligible voters cast a ballot, showed a majority of 78.6% for the monarchy and the choice of Prince Carl, with 21.4% against. The press was almost unanimous in hailing this result with approval.

The Swedish press, however, reacted with anger and claimed that there was a Danish-Norwegian conspiracy which had been operating the entire summer. While the press war continued, the Danish government decided to let the matter rest.

On November 18 the Storting certified the election and unanimously elected as King of Norway Prince Carl, who adopted the name Haakon VII. Even the republicans voted for the king. One week later, on November 25, King Haakon VII arrived in Christiania amid fog and snow, to be welcomed by a jubilant throng as the first king of Norway in over 500 years. In June, 1906, in the ancient cathedral at Trondhjem, filled with traditions of ancient coronations, Haakon VII (1872-1957) was crowned King of Norway.

Traces of bitterness still remained, and at the suggestion of Løvland the new minister from Sweden, Ernst Günther (1850-1927), took a vacation during the coronation ceremonies in order to avoid embarrassment. The razing of the frontier forts was completed on schedule August, 1906. In June, 1906, when King Oscar II and Queen Sophia celebrated their golden wedding anniversary, Norwegian flags officially flew in Christiania in celebration, and many telegrams, both official and private, congratulated the royal couple. The following year, when the

aged King Oscar II died, the Norwegian government ordered all flags to be flown at half-mast and the Swedish Minister Günther reported that he only then realized how much Norwegians loved and respected the aged king. Traces of bitterness did reappear in 1909 when Castberg, then the new prime minister, forced the adoption of laws aimed at Swedish investments in Norwegian power projects. But by 1914 the hostility had largely vanished, when the three Scandinavian kings met at Malmö in a spirit of friendship. Within ten years the bitterness of 1905 had largely come to an end to be replaced by trust and understanding.

Thus closed a chapter in world history in which one part of a dual monarchy was allowed to secede and attain independence without bloodshed and with a minimum of bitterness. On the contrary, following the divorce the two countries collaborated more warmly than ever before, and Pan-Scandinavianism, instead of suffering a mortal blow, was strengthened.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

This study opened with a question, Why did the Union of Sweden-Norway break up peacefully in 1905? Implicit, first, is the query, Why did the Union of Sweden-Norway break up at all?

Historically, nations which have differed in basic economies have tended to drift apart; Sweden-Norway went the way of Belgium-Holland and Portugal-Spain, all of which were mis-mated economically. Alone, an economy would not be a determinant, but when combined with other irritants the pocket-book becomes a sensitive organ.

The other irritants included a growing sense of national identity among Norwegians, heightened by language, church, a unique history, literature and music. Sweden had nipped a brief flowering of Norwegian independence by force in 1814. Then a series of crises had further divided the two kingdoms, beginning with the implementation of the Treaty of Kiel, and including the Bodø affair, the 1829 Battle of the Market Place, the "clean" Norwegian flag, the statholder controversy, the differing attitudes toward the royal veto and parliamentarianism, the revision of the Act of Union, the 1885 change in the Swedish constitution which placed Norwegian foreign affairs in Swedish hands, the dispute over the

separate consular corps, and the consistent failure of the Swedes to grant the Norwegians equality.

Throughout the crises each of the kingdoms had sought to submit the issues to negotiation in good faith but without genuine success. For Sweden it had often meant yielding grudgingly, while for Norway the gain had usually been too little and much too late. Extensive but futile discussion over these crises prepared public opinion on both sides to recognize the virtual bankruptcy of further compromise solutions. The final straw was Bosttröm's six conditions and his intransigent spirit. When the crown prince then assumed the role of mediator, the attacks shifted to him. This was a blow at the very symbol of the Union. There seemed no other answer than divorce.

Other dual monarchies or unions had dissolved on the heels of a bloody conflict by this time. It had been so when Portugal left Spain, when Belgium broke away from Holland, and when the Confederacy seceded from the United States of America.

Sweden and Norway found a peaceable separation in 1905. Why?

(1) Fundamentally, the Union of Norway with Sweden throughout its 91 years had been with one of the most progressive nations of the world. None of the crises had

arisen from such moral or emotion-filled issues as taxation without representation, oppression, corruption, or malice, which in other countries had so often given rise to revolutions. They sprang rather from conflict between the Norwegian desire to achieve a national identity and the Swedish hopes of amalgamation and integration into a great Scandinavian kingdom where Swedes could once more play a dominant role. There were times when at the height of Pan-Scandinavianism the two partners were near amalgamation.

(2) Such differences as existed, with perhaps the exception of 1829, had always been discussed without the participants resorting to violence. Although threats had been made, as in 1895, the use of force was shunned.

(3) After 91 years of being unequally yoked, both nations recognized that the "marriage of reason" could never be a "marriage of love". Not until 1905 had all Norwegians been united in the conclusion that separation and "divorce" was the only remaining solution.

(4) Public opinion in Sweden by 1905 had swung away from holding Norway within the Union by force. The Social Democrats and other liberals had passed resolutions in 1905 urging greater concessions to the Norwegians even to the point of independence. Too many government officials, from the king himself to the chief

of staff and responsible leaders, had announced publicly in advance that no force would be used against Norway. Such a tide could not well be reversed.

(5) The respect that both Norwegians and Swedes had for the Bernadotte Dynasty steadied the discussions through many crises. Just before the break in May 1905 the Norwegian members of the Joint Council had taken pains to deal gently with the ailing King Oscar II. Furthermore, the Bernadotte invitation, insulting as it must have seemed to Sweden,¹ was intended as an honor to a beloved king. Oscar, faced with the consular law and forced to choose between his two kingdoms, appeared not to have chosen Norway's interests. Yet both sides maintained respect for this monarch and his family.

(6) The aggressive party, Norway, had experienced a sobering religious revival which had led multitudes at nearly every crisis to turn to Divine Guidance and to pray for the king and the Swedes. The net result was that there was little bitterness or hatred, and the dominant voices were calm. The June 7, 1905 climax was hushed. As one 1905 university student related, "We all sensed that God in His way would find a solution if our cause was right".² There was no fanaticism. So, when the

1 To depose a king and to choose a relative was hardly complimentary.

2 Berge Borrevik, a Stavanger teacher, in a letter to this writer.

dismaying news of the razing of the border forts was made public, most Norwegians could accept it stoically and submissively. The voices of the chauvinists, fortunately, were relatively few in both lands.

(7) The late Victorian interest in peace and arbitration, not to mention the entire history of the Union since 1814, had underscored the confidence of both nations in the possibility as well as propriety of negotiations. Norway had come a long way since the unsuccessful armed revolts of Vincence Lunge and Archbishop Olav Engelbrektsson (1524-1535) and the Lofthus Rebellion (1786-1787). Consequently she was prepared to yield a few forts in order to gain independence.

(8) Each side was sincere in approaching the conference table, and each believed in the sincerity of the other. At one time negotiation nearly collapsed at Karlstad when Lundeberg accused Michelsen of stalling while mobilizing. Yet, when Michelsen had convinced Lundeberg of the falsity of the rumors, the spirit of conference returned. This sincerity was negatively demonstrated by the lack of name-calling, even when tempers flared, as on September 7; and that exchange ended with apologies within hours.

(9) The intermission from September 7 to 13 during which the delegations filled in their governments

with the details of the secrecy-shrouded conference probably saved the Karlstad negotiations. It enabled the Norwegian delegation particularly to pave the way at home for acceptance of the concessions which would have to be made. Furthermore, the discussions in the cabinet and Storting (the latter a violation of the pledge of secrecy) assured the delegates that the ultimate Karlstad Agreement would be ratified without appreciable difficulty. Fortunately the Norwegian delegation was sent back with instructions to negotiate so that there might be cordial relations in the future with Sweden, and hence no need for border forts.

(10) The nations had such confidence in their negotiators that they permitted secrecy and curtailed all public criticism, to the point of a semi-voluntary censorship in Norway. Without "goldfish bowl diplomacy" the parties were able to retreat from extreme or untenable positions without courting public criticism or an aroused nation. Ignorant of what was going on, the press and the masses had no fuel to heighten the heat of discussion or to crystallize and harden opinion prematurely. When the showdown came on September 14, Lundeberg demanded and got from Stockholm full power to break the deadlock and negotiate as he might deem best. When the results were finally made public, the great majority on both sides accepted the results with the disappointment inherent.

(11) The choice of delegates was fortunate. They represented the political spectrum of each side, with the moderates predominating. They were the brains³ of the country in addition to having patience and even tempers. Of the eight delegates Hammarskjöld seems to have suffered most, but even he yielded to his colleagues. Particularly fortunate were the selections of such even-tempered and gracious men as Lundeborg and Michelsen.

(12) No great powers intervened, except to express their concern that no general European war break out. Russia, the most ambitious of the Arctic nations, was still licking wounds suffered in the war with the Japanese. For the other powers the crisis was a tempest in a teapot while they were more interested in Africa and Asia. At least for Norway the timing was perfect.

(13) The voices of the chauvinists and militarists who had wrecked some previous attempts at compromise were scarcely able to penetrate the stillness of the Masonic Hall at Karlstad. Only once, on September 7, did the Swedish general staff ruffle Lundeborg, and Michelsen performed a singular service when he bluntly advised Lundeborg that the general staff should never be allowed to meddle in political issues. Except for the extremes on the Left, the Norwegians were keenly aware

³ Especially Lovland who had taken highest honors.

of their military inferiority.

In sum, the two sides had been able to give and take without violating the basic integrity of the other. Norway wanted independence with as many badges of national identity as possible, including historic border forts. Sweden was willing at last to grant independence, but not so as to leave a potential enemy on the West. The solution gave Norway independence and its forts without any modern armaments. Such a key could not have been found if each had not been sensitive to the basic concern of the other. Neither nation has ever had reason to regret the Karlstad agreement.

It might be asked whether any of the factors which made the Norwegian secession peaceful could perhaps be introduced into other crises likewise to effect a non-violent solution. Each conflict is unique, and a national history is not for export. Certainly the course of Swedish-Norwegian history cannot be duplicated. Yet some of its elements seem to rise to the level of universals. Cautiously, the following are suggested:

(1) A long tradition of belief in the technique of negotiating conflicts raises the probability of a peaceful synthesis. The habit which has become a rule is not easy to break.

(2) Whether to grant plenipotentiary powers must depend on the specific case. The conferring of such

powers implies a tremendous public support which should bode well for any agreement. Conversely, the timid custom of granting limited power has a tendency to involve more participants who usually cannot evaluate the situation as well.

(3) Secret negotiations with regular daily communiques or press releases enable delegates to take stands and modify views without having to play to any gallery of excitable spectators or newspaper readers. Although there are inherent dangers, if a nation believes in negotiating outstanding issues and has confidence in its representatives and the qualifications of their advisers, no really useful purpose is served by the glaring light of premature publicity.

(4) The lid of secrecy sometimes may be lifted slightly so as to advise the ratifying parliament of the responsibility and trouble it may have to face. In turn, the parliament is burdened with an obligation to maintain a discreet silence and owes a duty to chart as wide a path as possible within which the negotiators may move. In Sweden this was successful, while in Norway Konow and Castberg violated the confidence. The use of this technique will have to depend on the situation.

(5) Each delegation should proceed from the premise of respect for the delegates of the other. Name-calling

destroys the spirit of negotiations. Disagreement should never reduce itself to personal attacks.

(6) Each side needs an enormous respect for authority, the authority of God, of the king, and of the law and the power of reason. Where the authority is relative, admittedly negotiation is more difficult. Yet it must be tried. An authority of some sort must be created. Lives are in the balance. In our modern heterodox world a United Nations may serve such a useful purpose.

(7) Neither side should seek a humiliation of the other. Where lasting cordial relations have been the goal each has generally allowed the other to retain so many of the badges of national identity as might be consistent with security. The Congress of Vienna (1815) and the settlement of 1866 at the end of the Austro-Prussian War illustrate the point. Humiliating treaties, on the other hand, have been notoriously short-lived.

(8) Negotiation should proceed from confidence and trust rather than suspicion and fear.

(9) When deadlock is reached on one issue, agreement should be sought and found on as many other issues as possible. This technique has served to move many a conference off dead-center, and has shown how much in common the two sides really have had. Count Folke Bernadotte and Dr. Ralph Bunche in the Arab-Israeli negotiations of 1948-1949 are more recent illustrations.

(10) The results, when announced, should be accepted officially by both sides as the best obtainable under the circumstances. The self-discipline of a people serves the cause of peace and is put at such time to its severest test.

(11) Finally, a crisis is best solved while it is still only a slow leak and not a blowout. When great powers have taken sides or are themselves initially involved, it is usually too late. Yet pessimism cannot prevail; for a treaty springs from optimism and confidence. It is a meeting of minds.

In laying foundations for peaceful settlements in international disputes a heavy burden falls upon education, both academic as well as popular. This remains a continual challenge to every generation.

None of these elements can be applied like a tire patch in any other crisis. One must guard against rigidity. Yet they may serve as buoys which may possibly guide nations into quieter water; certainly they are not likely to chart a collision course.

For Sweden and Norway, however, Professor Hagerup Bull of Norway summed up public opinion in the autumn of 1905 with the words, "This is the way for civilized people to act".

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE THRONE SPEECH OF KING OSCAR II

June 21, 1905

(Deleted parts are in parentheses)

Good gentlemen and Swedish men!

More than a decade has passed since I called you, representatives of the Swedish people, (together) to a special session. Then it involved the country's internal situation (the important question of the Union and the strengthening of our defenses).

Of a different type is that which now has made me, so soon after the close of the annual regular session, call you again into session setting aside other general and special problems.

To my sorrow the kingdom which for (over 90 years) nearly one century through legal bonds has been united with Sweden, against my will and in conflict with sworn agreements has taken steps with the intention to liberate itself from these bonds. Accusations have been aimed at me that I have violated the Constitution and caused these steps. But I am convinced that I did as my conscience guided me that (each of - illegible-). He who with Justice judges nations shall justify me and find that my way of acting, at the same time that I acted within the

framework of the Constitution, has been determined by righteous and honest respect for the true good of both countries.

What happened implies however not only an assault on my rights as Norwegian king, but also has reference to breaking the agreed upon and existing Union with Sweden. It therefore touches most intimately the Swedish people. Under such circumstances I have seen it as my duty, without waiting, to summon you in order that you (could) can be similarly informed and together with me consider the steps and measures required by the (Norwegian) Storting's resolution, and also decide on those measures that will be found most suitable in counteracting harmful results of it for Sweden.

The suggestion which I thus place before you does not assume meeting injustice with force. However significant the Union must be for the safety of the Scandinavian people, it is not worth the sacrifices that would follow (from) recourse to force. Of no use to Sweden, surely, would be the Union that in such manner would be forced on Norway.

(No! May the Swedish people with wise self-control restrain their weapons. Let the weapons rest. Will the Norwegian people in unrestrained struggle for freedom (independence) loosen all external bonds, let them

go their own way. (May they go their own way.) And may God give Sweden power and unity within its own borders to seek to regain the power that it has lost through the dissolution of the Union.) [Entire paragraph was deleted].

No! May the Swedish people be led by wise self-control. (Through the method of negotiation ought questions of this kind to be solved. The dissolution will certainly come to pass). May God give Sweden the strength and unity to regain within its own borders what she through dissolution of the Union (would come to lose) might lose.

Calling on God's blessing, etc.

APPENDIX "B"
Map of Scandinavia
1905

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Map of Border Fortifications



APPENDIX D

ORIGINAL OF THE THRONE SPEECH OF KING OSCAR II, June 21, 1905

(See Appendix A)

Äd: herrar och ärnade män.

Men en ett örtionde har förflyttat,
sedan jag beklade eder, representan-
ter för det svenska folket, ~~inman~~
till utöfna riksmöte. Det gälder då
en landets inner angelägenhet. Den
~~riktiga saken som man inte och~~
~~starkt och oförantligen~~

Äfven om det är det, som en
förmitt mig att, så snart efter
afslutandet af ärets lagtima
riksdag, bjuda eder att, med äm-
nande af andra ämnen
och särskilda angelägenheter, sams
samlas till riksmöte.

Till min sorg har det ^{gärna ett öfverflyt}
som i ~~öfverflyt~~ genom lagfäst
land varit förenat med Sverige,
mot min vilja och i stid med
hvarandra öfver öfver öfver
i öfverflyt till följande sig från den
land. Beskrifningar hafva utåt
med mig att genom bratt med för-
sättningarna hafva förenat den it-
gädder. Men jag är öfvertygad, att
~~hvarje~~ ^{och} ~~hvarje~~ ^{och} skall gifva
mig rätt och förmå, att mitt land
hvarje, på samma gång det i alla
lagat inom författningens rum,

inläst är som
möte bjöd

som med
somers
dena

och aldrig
något förestånd af upprättlig hån
hålls hids sikans samma hästa.

Det skedd. innebär emellertid ej blott
ingrepp i min rätt som norsk
koning, det syftar därtill att byta
den gamla aftal med Sverige bestående
unionen. Det beror således på det när-
marste det svenska folket, och under
dessa förhållanden har jag, min plikt
liknande, utan någon sammanhål-
let råd, på det att ^{min} Sveriges blifva i
hjälp till att med mig öfverlägga om
de makt och steg, som påberas af svenska
stortingets beslut, samt vidtaga de åt-
gårdar, som mi finner bäst lämpa-
de att motstå för Sverige skadliga
följder deraf.

Det förklarar jag i sådant hänseende
föreligger för råd, gärdar ut på ett
inöfning med motstånd. Huru betyd-
samt för de skandinaviska folkens
trygghet unionen är mi väl känt, och är
den såväl de offer, som skulle betingades
af ett frångående ^{af följden}. Och if jag
mycket för Sverige skulle fören unionen va-
ra, som på detta sätt blifva Norge
fästare.

Äfven så det svenska folket med

