

## THE JAPANESE CONSOLIDATION MOVEMENT: CHANGING NOTIONS OF TERRITORIALITY IN COASTAL JAPAN<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

The Japanese system of local management has been heralded as a successful system for managing coastal resources. Despite such general success, however, fishing cooperatives and their respective members currently face internal and external pressures from over-fishing, pollution, and life in an industrialized society. Further, the Japanese government has pushed for the consolidation of management groups in society - including Fishing Cooperative Associations (FCAs). This article examines the effects of the consolidation (*gappei*) movement on the structure of Japanese fishing cooperative associations and the lives of cooperative members, especially in regards to members' changing notions of territoriality. One case study is presented from Northeastern Japan where environmental and societal difficulties have pushed FCA members to informally alter their management practices. FCA members in Shichigahama, in central Miyagi Prefecture, consolidated local FCAs in 1999, have as of yet refused to officially allow 'outsiders' direct access to individual fishing territories. The reasons for the refusal of Shichigahama fishers to officially alter territories and the issues surrounding their view will be presented. Despite pressure from the central government, consolidation is not an easy path; nor is the result necessarily predictable, as the Shichigahama case shows. The paper concludes with the reminder that notions of territoriality change as local conditions change.

**Keywords:** Japan; coastal fisheries; consolidation/amalgamation; territoriality; case studies

### INTRODUCTION

In Japan, contemporary Fishing Cooperative Associations (FCAs) are extensions of traditional village institutions (Cordell 1989; Ruddle and Akimichi 1984; Ruddle 1987) and are supported by the legal system. However, as Iida (1998) points out, in resource management, establishing rules is only one key to success. Not all Japanese FCAs have been successful in sustaining resources and the livelihoods of FCA members. Some FCAs have been limited by internal struggles (Barret and Okudaira 1995) while others face struggles imposed from outside forces (Befu 1980; Marra 1986; McKean 1981). Additionally, the Japanese government has pushed for the consolidation<sup>2</sup> of management groups in society, including agricultural cooperatives, municipalities, and FCAs. One rationale for such a move includes securing a minimum economic base, such as through taxes (from the new requirement of at least 30,000 residents in municipalities) or deposit levels in credit unions (from a larger membership base). However, the FCA populace, in general, has a history and background which affect the outcome of such economically-driven schemes. In the case of the consolidation of Japanese FCAs, one of the most important issues to be overcome is the control of fishing territories.

This paper focuses on one case study located in Miyagi Prefecture in the Northeastern region of Japan's Pacific Coast. In Shichigahama, located in central Miyagi Prefecture and bordering the Matsushima Bay, buying and selling and credit union activities have been consolidated, but "branch" FCAs – the formerly independent FCAs—now have responsibility for their own fishing territories. Shichigahama FCA officials believe this will change in time, but FCA members were not ready for such a radical departure from tradition<sup>3</sup> at the time of the eventual consolidation in October of 1999. As it was, by 1999 the consolidation negotiations had already taken twelve years with talks first beginning in 1987 (Gyokyo 2000). Some of the reasons the territorial issue was so contentious, including economic considerations of the species harvested, ancestral obligations, and social obligations, will be elaborated

upon in this paper. Prior to that, however, some background on the Japanese FCA system and further details of each case study must be provided.

## FISHING COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS<sup>4</sup>

Today, to commercially fish or gather in coastal water, all fishers in Japan must maintain membership in a Japanese Fishing Cooperative Association (FCA). The FCA system of resource management and membership is based upon the 1901 Fisheries Law which, in turn, is based upon traditional practices (Kalland 1995; Ruddle and Akimichi 1984; Ruddle 1987) and an older law, the "Ura" Law (Yamamoto 1995). Prior to 1901, Fishery Guilds had been responsible for management of the fishing territories. Guild membership was limited to those born in a fishing village and social sanctions were used to enforce rules on the types of gear allowed, season for harvesting as well as where one could fish (Weinstein 2000). In 1881 fishing cooperatives were established to control coastal resource use. As modern versions of the guilds, they also required membership to be based upon residency and added the requirement of an apprenticeship period. In 1901, Fisheries Legislation was passed that granted exclusive rights to the inshore waters to local Fishery societies, the principal purpose of which, "was to ensure order and peace within the inshore" (Weinstein 2000: 402).

It is useful to understand the historical context of such changes. In the 1870s, the Japanese government sent civil servants abroad to "learn the most modern governance, economic, educational, military and technological methods" (Weinstein 2000: 401). At this same time, Japanese studied Western resource management practices. As the rest of Asia fell into colonial or dependency status to the Western powers, their approach was strategic: they too could be modern and enlightened and "equal." Overall, the government's strategy of incorporating Western models of law, education, etc. proved extremely successful. One failure, however, came in fisheries management (Weinstein 2000). Over time, however, flaws were seen in the system; specifically the transferability of rights meant that fishers would remain poor as they transferred their rights to moneylenders to get the capital to purchase new technology (Ando 1995; Weinstein 2000).

In the 1930s, the government, through the efforts of individuals such as Takatoshi Ando, a public servant in Hokkaido, worked to break the fishers free from the hold merchants and middlemen had in controlling the capital and marketing of the harvests. In this period, credit federations were established and fishers began to market their own catch (Ando 1995). During the Occupation in the immediate post-World War II period, legislation was passed that prevented fishing rights from being transferable, thereby preventing the rights from being turned over to money lenders (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984; Weinstein 2000). This law, the 1949 Fishing Cooperative Association Law, is still in place and all Japanese commercial fishers in the inshore areas are members of Japanese Fishing Cooperative Associations (FCAs). FCAs are not simply local offices, but are regionally and nationally linked organizations which market products, supply gear, and work as credit unions.

FCA membership entitles fishers to usufruct (use) rights to resources found within the territory of their local FCA; the FCA holds the right to the resource. Rights for different resources and technologies must be applied for separately by the FCA to the prefectural government and may include small-scale net and trap fisheries, aquaculture, and large-scale set-net fisheries (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984). Permits for the in-shore rights such as aquaculture must be re-applied for every five years. At the practical level, the system is very much "use it or lose it" and some FCAs in the region run the risk of losing their rights as membership dwindles: in a hypothetical case, an FCA with no members cultivating *nori* could be forced to forfeit their right to that resource if another FCA applied for the permit. The fishers, as committee members of their local FCA, are the primary managers of each local resource, though they do work in concert with government fisheries regulatory commissions and scientific staff at the prefectural and national levels (Short 1989; Weinstein 2000).

Resource management is one of the most important functions of Japanese FCAs. Access to fishing commons is limited to part or full-time members in an FCA; to become a member one must also

be a resident of the community where the FCA is located, most often a member of a family of long-term residence (and long-term FCA membership). FCAs own the fishing commons; FCA members hold rights to the resources. Legally, the rights can not be rented or sold to individuals and must be forfeited if not used by the family. Management of fishing territories ultimately rests at the local level (Short 1989) and though there may be general guidelines set at the prefectural level, FCA members decide for themselves how to best manage their resources.

## THE CONSOLIDATION MOVEMENT IN JAPAN

The primary consideration involved in consolidating fishing cooperative associations was an economic one with deficits being the primary concern. This interest is not limited to the fisheries but can be found throughout various sectors in Japan including farming (JA), municipalities, and even sports (the consolidation of teams, or even leagues in Japanese baseball is currently under discussion). In the fisheries, part of the argument against deficits is a concern about limited capital for investments. Added to this problem, the changing environment of the 1990s aggravated fears relating to economic insecurity generally. Being in the red was a looming problem in this time period (though much less than with JA—Japan Agriculture—an organization which was caught in the bursting of the bubble in 1991 with having lent out too much money to non-JA members), but other concerns included overfishing, the decline of active FCA members, increasing numbers of retirees, declining prices, and increasing (cheap) imports of marine products (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations n.d.). With such concerns in mind, it is thought the consolidation of FCAs will improve economic security. Though the consolidation efforts are being pushed for by JF (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations), the government has aided the process through the passage of various legislation; the prefectural governors are also aiding the movement (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations n.d.).

The consolidation/amalgamation movement is talked about in the JF Group (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations) PR literature as a revolution. More than simply the combining of FCAs, the overall nature of the work is said to need re-consideration. JF Group says they need to take a closer look at all the individual parts (buying, selling, credit union aspects, etc.) and see what should be expanded, what can be cut out, etc. (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations n.d.). Now in its 15<sup>th</sup> year, the momentum of the consolidation movement should increase given that the “Amalgamation Promotion Law” comes into effect in 2007.

Under the Amalgamation Promotion Law, prefectural governors are aiding JF in the process by providing help and incentives to the FCAs. The ultimate goal is to have one FCA per prefecture, though for many areas of Japan, this will not be feasible with perhaps one FCA per region serving instead. With so many FCAs being consolidated, a major concern is “what is to come of fishing rights?”

The issue of fishing rights, in fact, is a major issue and one which JF takes special pains to address. In the consolidation literature, “fishing rights are *anshin*” (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations n.d.:) Due to the *doui seido* system, whereby decisions are made by consensus, and the fact that the executive groups will now become district or section groups, fishing rights could remain as they were. The ability to realize the objectives of consolidation is strengthened by the “Fundamental Maritime Law” (*suisan kihon houritsu*), passed in 2001.

JF believes the amalgamation plan to be rational. There is strength working from a central point: service increases, needs can be better met, the ability to specialize could be fostered, employees can now specialize rather than work as generalists. Further, JF Group and the government have pointed out that many of the FCA facilities are old and in need of repairs. Individual and small FCAs do not have the resources to buy new equipment and build new structures. However, as a part of the “revolution” proposed, the newly consolidated FCAs will be able to purchase new freezers and oil/gas tanks, build new markets and new FCA offices. In the past, some of these projects would have been paid for with government funds; the hope is with consolidation, a greater part of the economic burden can be shouldered by the FCAs.

Cooperatives must also expand to be able to meet the demands of supplying large, powerful supermarkets (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations n.d.). The numbers of large, national chains are increasing in Japan and small, local shops are in decline. Small cooperatives can easily supply local stores. Larger stores, however, demand products in a large quantity and of equal quality. Equal quality is tricky when your supply is limited. In this regard the buyers have a power advantage. Consolidation helps the supplier to meet such demands. This was seen on an informal scale, for example, in Shichigahama (following case study) when *nori* producers banded together to sell their *nori* as a group, decades before their respective cooperatives had become one. By pooling their products, they were able to sell greater amounts to larger buyers.

Throughout Japan, the circulation system has changed as larger supermarkets have increased. According to the Japanese National Federation of Fisheries (National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations n.d.), in such a system, the producers have been weak in setting the price. The group argues there are a number of merits to making one, consolidated supplier's market. Among these include: improving transport system thanks to increased amounts, increasing speed to market, and improved safety (hygiene). These would be expected from the bulk sales resulting from the consolidation of producers. Other benefits are argued to include the ability to market "brand name" products and the possibility of opening small specialty food product shops at rest stops. Specialty foods have long been favored in Japan, a country where food is culturally important and food products are often bought as gifts from travel. A consolidated producer's market makes it easier to "invent" and market such specialties (JF Group n.d.).

There have been a number of phases of consolidation of fisheries cooperatives in the last 35 years. When the Consolidation Assistance Law (*Gappei Josei Hou*) was first passed in the 1960s, almost 400 FCAs amalgamated in a seven period (1967- 1974). The numbers were fairly low through the rest of the 1970s and 80s. In 1991, however, there was a dramatic change in the number of consolidations taking place with the passage of the Consolidation Promotion Law (*Gappei Sokushin Hou*). It is planned that more than 200 FCAs will consolidate this year alone, bringing coastal fishing cooperatives to a new low of approximately 1300; in 1967 there were almost 2500 FCAs. The movement will gain momentum in the next two years. In 2005, the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations estimates there will be only 800 FCAs and by 2006, the number will fall to only 250.

### THE SHICHIGAHAMA CASE<sup>5</sup>

The specific case presented involves the FCA territories surrounding the coastal town of Shichigahama, Miyagi, Japan. FCA members participate in a broad range of capture and cultivation fisheries; cultivated *nori* (*Porphyra* spp; type of seaweed) is the most important single species economically, grossing just over US\$20 million in 2001; over 100 households are active producers. The town of Shichigahama (population 21,000) occupies most of a small peninsula bordering the southern end of the Matsushima Bay in Miyagi Prefecture. Named as "one of the three most scenic spots in Japan," the Matsushima Bay currently receives some minimal protection through "Matsushima Refresh," a national and prefectural ecological rejuvenation program. The bay is filled with over 200 pine-covered, limestone islands. It was the view of these islands which captured the attention of the renowned 17<sup>th</sup> Century poet Matsuo Basho in 1689 and made the Matsushima Bay particularly renowned in Japan.

In the recent past, close to 90% of Shichigahama's male populace (Shichigahama 1999) fished or gained their livelihood from the sea in some way or another; many ran ferries, water-taxis, or shipped goods in boats while fishing on a subsistence level. Today, however, only about 10% the town's households earn their living directly from the sea; another 10% (approximately) earn their living indirectly through running stalls in the Shiogama Fish market, working as machine technicians (e.g., for *nori* producers, running guest houses for tourists, selling food at beach stalls, etc).

Shichigahama's physical environment shares similarities with many other coastal communities in Japan with its mixture of sandy beaches, rocky shorelines, and cliffs. Additionally, as the town borders both the Matsushima Bay and the Pacific Ocean, the species harvested, as well as the ecological problems encountered, are quite diverse. The Matsushima Bay area has suffered from eutrophication, sea

desertification<sup>7</sup> (*isoyake*), and pollution associated with discharge from the fishcake industry, household wastes, agricultural run-off and wastes from the nearby Shiogama fish market. The primary species harvested in this area of the bay is *nori*, though *asari* and *wakame* harvesting, and minimal amount of gill netting also takes place by a few members. Other FCAs in the area also have members who cultivate oysters, though Shichigahama FCA members gave this up a number of years ago. The Pacific side, though less affected by eutrophication issues than the bayside, has been affected by oil spills, discharge from neighboring oil and steel factories. Harvests from the Pacific coast territories include netting *hirame* and *karei*; diving for sea urchin and abalone; and cultivating *nori*. Both coasts have been subjected to extensive land reclamation.

In terms of eutrophication and other, negative affects of industrial society on the local marine environment, Shichigahama and Karakuwa<sup>8</sup> have striking resemblances. Both have seen the decline of harvests in bay areas, and an especially significant decline in seaweeds in the bays. While Matsushima Bay area cultivators complain of the *datsuraku mondai*, the problem of the *nori* growth stopping and breaking off, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Karakuwa FCA members in the Kesenuma Bay also noted the same effect. Takahashi (2002) further elaborates infection to oysters, suffocation of oysters by inedible seaweeds, and sea desertification as key problems affecting the Karakuwa FCA members' livelihoods. In both Shichigahama and Karakuwa, great changes in the environment, technology and family structure have taken place in the lives of the last two generations of FCA members.

### Consolidation Negotiations

Consolidation of the Shichigahama FCAs was neither smooth nor steady. An executive committee for consolidation was founded in 1987, but it was another seven years before a starting point was agreed upon and the negotiations moved forward. The view of the town officials and the individual FCA presidents was that "Even if consolidation is late, its time will come eventually" (Gyokyo 2000: 41).

In the eventual agreement, a slow transition was decided as the best policy. Sato Etsuo was named president of the newly formed Shichigahama FCA. A town councilman and representative to the Prefectural Fisheries Cooperative Association, President Sato had the political experience and backing to lead the FCA for the subsequent 2 years (when another election was scheduled to be held; already 80, President Sato was set to retire after this point in time). During the initial transition period (1999-2001), with Mr. Sato as president, banking, buying and selling were consolidated, but branch cooperatives remained open with full staff and typical operating hours. The next phase would last from 2001-2004. This ended on July 1, 2004 with most branch cooperatives closing and staff either sent to work at the main branch, or left without a job. The branch offices will still open one morning a week to sell supplies, etc. needed by the FCA members, but the credit unions no longer operate.

Consolidation brings advantages, as most everyone would acknowledge. This includes strength in numbers—both in terms of population and monetary-wise. After consolidation, the Shichigahama FCA membership stood at 2,334 (587 active). As of 2001, it was the largest FCA in Miyagi Prefecture with the greatest banking base.

Despite the above mentioned advantages, and even the fact that the branch FCAs closed in July 2004, the fishing territories remain under the control of the fishing ground committee in each local community. This contentious issue, at least, has not changed.

### What were the Contentious Issues?

Though the FCA consolidated banking, purchasing, and administrative functions in 1999, the fishing territories have yet, as of 2004, to be consolidated. Each previous fishing territory remained under the administrative control of the now 'district' FCA. The difficult issues involved in negotiations over consolidating fishing grounds include not only difference in economic values of the resources (Pacific side is worth more due to pollution in the Matsushima Bay), the desire to take care of (*mamoru*) one's community's/ancestors grounds, and also one's obligations' to one's social relations.

#### A. Value of various species

Most informants admitted that a main reason the consolidation of fishing territories was a contentious issue was the differing values of the resources found in the seven territories surrounding Shichigahama. These differences resolve around the species caught and the health of the environment. In general, Shichigahama territories can be divided into two groups: those on the Pacific side and those in the Matsushima Bay side of the town. Almost all harvesting of fish and animal species takes place on the Pacific side, including such valuable species as abalone and sea urchin. Further, though the cultivation of *nori* has historically taken place in the Matsushima Bay, today harvesting takes place solely in the Pacific territories<sup>6</sup>. For all intensive purposes, the bayside grounds are limited to the seeding of *nori*, and some extremely limited gillnetting and *asari* gathering. The Matsushima Bay-side territories have suffered extensively from the eutrophication and pollution problems, as well as from land reclamation and dredging of the sea.

Given the environmental damage and the nature of *nori* cultivation today, it should not be surprising that members of (branch) FCA households on the Pacific side of Shichigahama are less than keen on the idea of consolidating their fishing territories and allowing others access to their marine resources. And though some exchanging of access to fishing territories is undertaken currently as an informal practice, Matsushima Bay-side FCA members are at a disadvantage in making the terms of the exchange. Their territories, after all, can only be used to seed *nori*, not harvesting. Value derives primarily from the ability to harvest resources. Seeding, though an instrumental part of the growing process, is not as highly valued, especially as “on land seeding methods” (*rikujou saibyō*) are increasingly being developed and improved. Consequently, many of the younger Pacific side FCA members have been the most vocal in opposition to the consolidation of fishing territories.

Economic considerations of the Pacific –side FCA members are not the only issue at play in the argument against consolidation, however. Social and cultural considerations also play into this issue. Most important are the issues of ancestral and social obligations.

#### B. Ancestral obligations

Interviewing elucidated the idea that current FCA members have the obligation to take care of (*mamoru*) the fishing territories of one’s ancestors. As was explained, one could never be sure an outsider would take care of the fishing territories as well as oneself. The lack of attachment rendered the idea suspicious. Many FCA members were aghast at the idea of consolidating fishing grounds; others laughed outright. But more important than the idea of suspicion is the idea of obligation to one’s ancestors to take care of what has been left in your care. (This section will be expanded as further literature review takes place.)

#### C. Social obligation and Networks

One surprising issue affecting the consolidation of fishing territories is the idea of obligations to those with whom one is connected—including both kinship and purely social connections. Shichigahama FCA members allow outsiders to access their fishing territories in exchange for labor, space in other fishing grounds, and/or some agreed upon monetary amount. The exchanging of access to fishing territories has been going on in Shichigahama since the 1960s—before even the environmental problems of the 1970s which have made such actions a necessity—a time when FCA members were still ranked and all members did not receive an equal amount of space.

For example, Matsushima Bay-side members allow other Shichigahama FCA members (from the Pacific side) to access their territories, but also FCA members of neighboring FCAs such as Sendai and Shiogama. Shichigahama FCA members have close ties, for example, to FCA members on Katsurashima. Katsurashima is a large island located in the inner part of the Matsushima Bay, near the Shiogama Bay. Katsurashima is under the jurisdiction of the city of Shiogama and had 388 residents in 2002. (Shiogama City’s four populated islands had a combined total population of 788). Katsurashima island people use Shichigahama fishing grounds, and vice-versa. One would think that logically, if Shichigahama grounds consolidated then Katsurashima people could then, for example, use the Sendai grounds that Shichigahama FCA members no longer needed. However, as Shun Ito pointed out, “People

are connected and they don't want to sever ties in that way." After all, "your daughter married into a Katsurashima household, or grandma came from that family." Or, as with Torau Akama, a brother married into a household on the island. Obligations to others remain one reason fishing grounds will not be consolidated in the near future.

Obligation to others is connected to the ideas of trust and "helping one another out." As the partners in exchanges, friends, and relatives have provided help to one another through the years. One can only trust that this relationship will continue, just as one trusts that the partner will continue working with you (and not abandon you for better prices or conditions). Certainly direct relationships are the strongest. Mr. Ito pointed out that with a new generation coming to the fore, he believes the fishing grounds will consolidate. This, if it happens, will be due not only to a change toward "rational" thinking on the part of the younger generation, but also to the fact that they will be further removed from the initially agreeing parties.

Social networking taking place to 'help one another out' (*o-tagai ni*) remains critically important to this way of life in Shichigahama. Though they often go unnoticed in industrial societies, the importance of social ties can not be understated. Social networking and social ties remain invaluable for *nori* cultivation in Shichigahama. There is a tension between wanting to be "one's own boss" and the need to rely on others for access to fishing grounds. Nevertheless, this situation is increasingly being viewed as "helping one another out" (*o-tagai ni yaru*) rather than dependency on, and subservience to, others. Admittedly, there is a degree of unequal relations, however, through emphasis on friendship and *doukyuusei* ties, rather than kinship, some cultivators have worked out a system that is relatively advantageous for all involved.

## DISCUSSION

When this paper was proposed, two case studies were planned to be compared. In the case study excluded, fishing territories have already been combined, providing a valuable comparison with the Shichigahama case presented. Without this comparison, it is difficult to really discuss "changing notions of territoriality." Nevertheless, the Shichigahama case presents a view of some of the specific problems faced with consolidation issues. Economics, taking care of one's ancestors' grounds, and protecting social ties are just a few of the important issues limiting this movement, and doesn't even begin to touch upon ideas like identity affecting other national consolidation movements (especially the consolidation of municipalities). This notwithstanding, consolidations have taken place in the past and fishing grounds have been shared by different FCA/community groups throughout Japan over the years. There are precedents. Shichigahama FCA officials firmly believe the fishing grounds will be consolidated in time; it has to happen they believe. Many feel, however, it will take the death and retirement of the current eldest generation before this takes place.

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## ENDNOTES

- 1 **Draft Paper**, Please do not cite without permission of the author.
- 2 I have used the term consolidation as a more direct translation of the Japanese term, *gappei*, though the National Federation of Japanese Fisheries Cooperative Associations use the term "amalgamation."
- 3 To be certain, there is more at work than tradition such as the economic value of resources found in the differing fishing territories. Nevertheless, there is a persistent cultural value towards community fishing grounds; people who work to protect their local fishing grounds, just as their grandfathers did can not imagine having an outsider take over the task.
- 4 This is a very brief introduction. For a more extensive review of FCAs, resource management issues, and resource management in Japan, some useful texts include: Berkes (1989), Cordell (1989), Kalland (1995), Pinkerton and Weinstein (1995), Ruddle (1987), Ruddle and Akimichi (1984), Ruddle and Johannes (1985), Weinstein (2000), Yamamoto (1995).
- 5 Fieldwork was undertaken in Shichigahama over a number of years using the standard anthropological field methods of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and a formal survey. Visits were first made in 1991-1992 with specific pilot projects undertaken in 1996 and 1997. Extended fieldwork lasted from 1999-2001, with a follow-up visit taking place in July 2004. The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the support of the US-Japan Education Council with a Fulbright Fellowship for the extended fieldwork period.
- 6 For more detail on the effects of the eutrophication on *nor*i cultivation in Shichigahama, please see Delaney (2003). In this is included a detailed description of the unique practice of informally exchanging access to one another's fishing territories by different branch FCA members.



7 In this instance, the causes of sea desertification vary between the two communities; Karakuwa's problems seem to be ecologically-related while the Matsushima Bay, though also suffering from some food chain imbalances, has also seen large swaths of sea dredged for shipping channels.

8 Karakuwa is a community in the northern edge of Miyagi Prefecture. The Shichigahama case is planned to be compared with Karakuwa in a journal article, but the length restrictions on IIFET papers prevented the case from being included in detail here.

**MAP OF SHICHIGAHAMA AREA FISHING TERRITORIES**

