

Management of the North Sea flatfish fishery: exploring alternative ITQ systems

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




The fishery

• 2 main species





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The fishery

- 2 main species
- 7 countries
- Beam trawls and demersal trawls







Individual quotas

1976

Managing the (Dutch) fishery

70's introduction of individual quotas


1975 TAC decrease catch of sole 40% and plaice 10%

- ➔ intensified race for fish
- ➔ 1st individual quotas in the world BUT

TAC not really enforced Trade not allowed but happened




Managing the (Dutch) fishery



SOCIOEC Managing the (Dutch) fishery








Managing the (Dutch) fishery

2000 Long term management plan Decommissioning Individual Transferability Co-Flatfish allowed schemes quotas management management plan groups TAC enforced 1976 1985 1988 1992 2009 1006 1000 2005 2008 TAC on advised levels Sole and Plaice recovering



Managing the (Dutch) fishery



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
ITQ and co-management

- Quota linked to vessels

 no external investors
- Trade intensified within groups

➔ how do constraints on the quota trading impact the fishery?

Investigation using bio-economic model






- Bio-economic model of fisheries
 - Multi-species
 - Multi-fleet
 - Spatially explicit
- Calculate the optimal effort allocation given that
 - Total profit is maximized every year
 - Quota can be traded (lease only)
 - Within fleets (default)
 - Between fleets of a country (National trade relative stability)
 - Between fleets of all countries (international trade loose relative stability)



- Economic module
 - 7 fleets from NL, DE and defined in DCF data
 - Cost structure from 2008
 data
 - Costs depend on the fish area
 - Revenue (value of landings)
 depends on catch composition
 - Profit depends on renting quota





- Price module
 - 2010-2012 real prices used
 - Then scenarios:
 - 5% fuel price increase per year
 - 5% fish price decrease per year
 - Price elasticity for shrimp (price decreases when landings increases) and sole
 - Price quota calculated as shadow prices (marginal increase of profit due to one extra ton of quota)





- Entry-exit module:
 - Based on past profitability
 - New vessels have same characteristics than current vessels (no introduction of new gears)
 - Free access to the fishery (no licence or quota access limits)



Model description


- Stock-fleet interactions:
 - Non linear relation between catch, effort, biomass: Cobb-Douglas function
 - landings coverage by fleets:
 - Plaice 54%, shrimp 84%, sole 69%
 - Weight of species in fleet revenue
 - 29 to 100%
- Potential shortcoming
 - No change in selectivity (innovative gears
 - Other species taken as proportion of sole plaice and shrimp
 - Limited data to parameterise the Cobb Douglas function









• What is traded?






• Who would trade with who?







- How external factors affect the quota trade?
 - Fuel price increase
 - no demand for plaice
 - Lower demand for sole




– Fish price decrease

 Decrease in demand for both sole and plaice



- How external factors affect the quota trade?
 - Larger beam trawlers decrease their activity
 - Lower demand for quota





Conclusion

- Market driven by limiting species: sole
- Fuel & fish price changes will have high effect on trade
- Fleets with high fuel consumption particularly vulnerable
 - \rightarrow Explain switch to alternative gears



Rough quota trading model, need to be more dynamic

Inclusion of new gears less fuel intensive

 Understanding the dynamics and opportunities to switch to alternative fisheries



Thank you for your attention

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