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Title: An Inquiry into the Bases and Effects of Teacher Militancy through an Analysis of Collectively Bargained Contracts in Oregon's Largest School Districts

Abstract approved: Dr. Carvel W. Wood

Purpose of Study

The objectives of the study included: (1) a brief survey of the historical forces operant upon public school teachers organizing for bargaining, (2) an analysis of human needs and alienation as causal factors of teacher militancy, and (3) a statistical study designed to locate evidence, if any, of professional need satisfaction and professional alienation remission in negotiated master contracts. The statistical design incorporated the Analysis of Variance (F test) as an instrument to test, at the .05 level of significance, the null hypothesis that collective bargaining by teachers in Oregon's largest districts has had little or no impact on their work environment as measured by the incidence of specific indicators in master contracts. In the
event of a null hypothesis rejection, two a priori alternative hypotheses were formulated and the Least Significant Difference (LSD) test was chosen to test for the difference(s).

Procedures

Objective one was met through a review of the pertinent literature which showed contemporary teacher militancy to be an outgrowth of a number of historical factors, the most important being President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 which stimulated collective bargaining throughout the public sector. Objective two was met through a review of the pertinent literature which connected teacher militancy to teachers' quest for professional autonomy and for professional control in the work environment. Objective three was met first by the construction of three chronologically arranged experimental cells in order to measure any treatment effects in successively bargained master contracts while tracking the results of negotiation settlements from Oregon's consultation law (1973-74) through passage of Oregon's complete collective bargaining law (1974-75) to the first contracts negotiated subsequent to the "Scope of Bargaining" decision by the Oregon Employment Relations Board (1975-77). Secondly, a list of 24 Curricular Items or indicators with professional autonomy and control content was compiled which, individually, would indicate an incremental incidence of teacher gains in professional autonomy and
control. Thirdly, a random sample of 19 from Oregon's 43 largest unified school districts was taken and a search for the relevant master contracts was conducted. Finally, Curricular Items were tabulated and logarithmically transformed into continuous data.

Results

The use of the F statistic resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis, indicating that there was a significant difference in the incidence of Curricular Items between the three cells. The use of the LSD test resulted in the confirmation of both a priori alternative hypotheses.

Conclusions

From the statistical rejection of the null hypothesis, it could be concluded that there was evidence that teachers in Oregon's largest districts have been using either consultations or collective bargaining as a means of satisfying professional autonomy needs and achieving professional control over the work environment. From the statistical confirmation of the first alternative hypothesis (that the incidence of Curricular Items was greater in the second cell than in the first), it can be concluded that teachers in Oregon's largest districts have been more successful in satisfying professional needs and achieving professional control with collective bargaining than with consultations. From the statistical confirmation of
the second alternative hypothesis (that the incidence of Curricular Items was greater in the third cell than in the first), it can be concluded that teachers in Oregon's largest districts continued to satisfy professional needs and achieve professional control through collective bargaining after the invocation of restrictions on the scope of bargaining.

Remarks

The implications of the study would seem to confirm the efficacy of collective bargaining as a viable, institutionalized means of achieving full professional status for Oregon's public school teachers.
An Inquiry into the Bases and Effects of Teacher Militancy through an Analysis of Collectively Bargained Contracts in Oregon's Largest School Districts

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I. INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Historically, employees in the private sector of the national economy have rarely organized for the purpose of bargaining collectively with their employers about the nature of the product they have been employed to produce. Indeed, Grodin and Wollett (1975:137) have argued that the fact that American unions and managers are generally economically oriented is a source of great freedom for us all:

*If either the unions or management decided to make decisions about the nature of services provided or products manufactured on the basis of their own ideological convictions, we would all, as consumers, be less free.*

While it could be cogently argued that this is a relatively narrow point of view shared by private sector unions and managers and is, in fact, a source of bondage for us all (see Fromm 1962:38-62), virtually no one has been willing to argue that professional employees, in private or public sectors, should not or must not be allowed a broad range of autonomy and authority with respect to the specialized services they perform (Weitzman
Professional employee status, however, is not a static position or level, Myers (1973:19-29) has argued, but a continuum along which employees are "professionalizing" or moving from a low to a high level of autonomy, esteem, authority, and esoteric knowledge. The quest to achieve full professional realization in a resistant bureaucratic work environment (Noda 1972) has, of necessity, generated employee-employer conflict and a public policy means of encouraging professional goal attainment through conflict management: the institution of collective bargaining or bilateral decision making (Adams 1970; Elam et al. 1967:50-56; Doherty et al. 1966:14).

Public school teachers fit the professionalizing model (Myers 1973:31-52) in that they have relatively low but slowly improving status (Doherty and Oberer 1967:5; Randles 1973:222) while remaining essentially powerless (Elam et al. 1967:46) and are seeking autonomy and greater control over their work (Moskow 1966:2-3) through an essentially conservative collective bargaining process (Lieberman 1975:102) which they have been gradually recognizing as their only means of achieving their professional goals (Doherty and Oberer 1967:122; Dunn and Bailey 1973:120-21). This quest for professionalization has been called "militant professionalism" (Elam et al. 1967:51) and the intensity of teacher militancy has been increasing (Næststrom and Brelsford 1976) as teachers attempt to gain more
control over the school curriculum—their area of expertise and specialized knowledge (Porter 1975; Moskow 1966:2; Doherty et al. 1966:2). In an analysis of collectively bargained agreements between teachers and boards of education, Buresh (1975) found that most contracts were security–need centered but felt that the long range trend was toward high-level need satisfaction. Randles (1973:224–25) has seen the trend as toward the remission of professional alienation in the work environment.

The problem areas encompassed by the study include: (1) a survey of the historical forces operant upon public school teacher organization for collective bargaining and (2) an analysis of human needs and alienation as causal factors of teacher militancy coupled with (3) a statistical study designed to locate significant evidence, if any, of need satisfaction and alienation remission over time in collectively bargained master agreements and contracts.
Significance of the Study

An extensive search\(^1\) through research literature, including dissertations and dissertation abstracts, revealed that, while other researchers have explored human need-satisfaction and de-alienation as causal factors of teacher militancy and teacher interest in collective bargaining, no research has been found that subjected a random sample of master contracts, bargained in the same state under both an incomplete and a complete collective bargaining law,\(^2\) to statistical hypothesis testing in order to ascertain whether there is evidence of professional need satisfaction and increasing professional authority in the workplace. Indeed, Stevenson (1974) recommended, in his analysis of the effects of collective bargaining on Michigan school curriculum, that such a study should be undertaken.

Subsequent to Stevenson's recommendation, Thompson and Ziemer (1975) examined 28 contracts from "major school

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\(^1\)Particularly helpful was a computerized search through the collections of the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC).

\(^2\)A complete collective bargaining law would allow teachers and boards to resolve an impasse and reach a bilateral agreement through the invocation of a legal strike mechanism. Only eight states currently allow teachers to strike legally: Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
districts" for the National School Boards Association, but the study seems to have been multi-state (i.e., multi-legal environment) and no claim was made for randomization or hypothesis testing. Buresh (1975) examined contract language but his randomized chi-square design essentially called for filling in Maslow's need hierarchy with excerpts from 30 contracts as they contrasted with school district operating cost level and the length of the contract period. Babineau (1977) examined randomly selected collective bargaining agreements in Pennsylvania and used the Pearson Product Moment Correlation to find low correlations between school district size and maximum teacher salary as compared with curriculum and instruction "implications" in contract language.
Statement of Hypothesis and Objectives

The general objective of the major portion of the Review of Literature was to provide the reader with the historical and paradigmatic means requisite to a meaningful interpretation of the intent of the statistical design. The statistical portion of the study was constructed in order to conclude whether there was significant evidence that Oregon teachers in larger districts have been achieving professional needs and control within the work environment by negotiating relevant curricular items into their master agreements and contracts.

A statistical design was created to test the null hypothesis: Collective bargaining by teachers in Oregon's largest districts has had little or no significant impact on their professional work environment as measured by the incidence of specific indicators in master agreements and master contracts. The design included a One-way Analysis of Variance to test the null hypothesis and a Least Significant Difference (LSD) test, in case of a null hypothesis rejection, to locate the significant chronological difference(s) in reference to two directional a priori alternative hypotheses.
Fundamental Assumptions and Limitations of the Study

Paradigmatic Assumptions. Conflict theory, like any other social theory, tries to explain why people think and act the way they do. The purpose of any social theory is to lend perspective to those causes and conditions in life which seem to be most significant in understanding and explaining human behavior. Conflict theory is one of many viable social theories and there is no intent here or anywhere else in this study to make grandiose claims about its ability to explain all there is to explain about human thought and action. All that is claimed here is that conflict theory is an important and useful instrumentality because it has general application throughout many aspects of social life and, for the purposes of this study, the paradigmatic status of conflict theory was assumed. Subsumed beneath the conflict paradigm are two dynamic factors: (1) the urge by the human organism to achieve growth and homeostatic need satisfaction and (2) the quest by the human organism to escape the pains of alienation from work or life-activity, from the self, and from the social environment.

Historical Assumptions. The historical background portion of Chapter II was grounded on the assumption that any history is an attempt to select from the record of the past those significant facts and events that lend us
understanding of ourselves and our times. Further, the assumption was that causation and process exist in history but history itself is an outcome and not an independently operating causation or process. History is what has come to happen because something else did happen. Assumed also was the understanding that historical facts, like any other facts, can be objective only in terms of their relationship to something else; that they are significant only as evidence articulating some idea or theory and, moreover, that they are usually discovered only through the use of that idea, theory, or paradigm. In summary, readers in history often get a sense of *déjà vu* or of the historical record repeating itself. This study has assumed that if recurrent historical patterns suggest themselves against background randomness, it is because they are perceived paradigmatically, that the recurrent patterns are ultimately psychological in process, and that they are historical in form but not substance. The human mind is assumed to be relatively free and absolutely unique.

**Statistical Design Assumptions.** By making a random selection of school districts, an accurate reflection of the inherent randomness of all nature was assumed. If a pattern, a significant difference between the cells, should be found, it would reflect the effects of organized human thought and activity. The analysis of variance ("F") statistic, which was chosen for the study, is robust enough to
handle unequal cell size; nevertheless, equal cell size would lend justifiable strength to credibility if little to statistical accuracy.

Limitations. Human limitations, including those of the researcher, must always be assumed. Because the population of the statistical study was limited to 43 unified Oregon school districts with an average daily membership (ADM) of 2500 or more, no generalizability is claimed beyond the statistical population, ADM category, or legal environment.
Definition of Terms

Collective Bargaining (also negotiations, professional negotiations). Collective bargaining is a bilateral decision-making process protected by law whereby employee organizations and employers negotiate wages, hours, and other conditions of employment in a good faith attempt to reach and sign an enforceable employment agreement—which, in this study, will be referred to as a master contract. "Hard bargaining" between the parties may result in an impasse because, while both parties are legally required to try to come to an agreement, neither party is required to make a concession to the other. Impasse resolution procedures include mediation by a neutral third party (usually an agent of the state), and interest arbitration (usually mandated if a court injunction or an exception in the law for certain employees precludes a legal strike), or a legal strike. Oregon's first-rank or complete public employee collective bargaining law went into effect in October 1973.

Confer, Consult, and Discuss. Sometimes referred to as consultations, "confer, consult, and discuss" bargaining is "soft bargaining" under permissive legislation (and sometimes considerably less) whereby the public employer retains the power to make final decisions, and the strike is precluded as a means of impasse resolution.
If consultations end in an agreement and if the agreement is written, the resultant master agreement may or may not be enforceable in the courts, depending upon a given state's legal environment. Oregon passed permissive legislation that encompassed teacher consultations in 1965; the law was substantially overhauled and strengthened in 1969.

**Curricular Item.** A Curricular Item is one of 24 indicators delimited for the purposes of the statistical design portion of the study (see Exhibit I); the occurrence of an item in a master contract or agreement is an indicator that teachers are achieving higher level professional needs and growth and more control over the curriculum or their work environment.

**Curriculum.** For the purposes of this study, the curriculum can be defined as the teacher's professional work environment and as such includes all subject matter areas, all instructional materials, methods and methodology, and all situations or experiences that may help to develop the understandings, skills, appreciations, and attitudes within the student clientele that the school requires as a qualification for graduation and offers to students as preparation for entry into a vocational field and/or towards a rewarding and fulfilling life-experience.

**Scope of Bargaining.** Under collective bargaining statutes, employers and employees are required to bargain
in good faith over matters of wages, hours of work, and "other terms and conditions of employment"; the latter phrase particularly tends to open up a vast domain or "scope" for bargaining activity. In the private as well as the public sectors, quasi-judicial labor or employment relations boards and the courts have tried to bring order out of potential chaos by categorizing the "scope of bargaining" realm into three major categories: (1) Illegal subjects for bargaining—those topics precluded by law from the bargaining process, (2) Mandatory subjects—those topics that must be bargained over in good faith at the insistence of either party and where employee organizations may use the legal strike in an attempt to end an impasse, and (3) Permissive or Voluntary subjects—those remaining topics that may be bargained over if both sides wish, but cannot be legally carried into impasse proceedings (e.g., a strike) as a condition of settlement. It is in the permissive area in both sectors where employee influence has tended to expand and where unilateral management prerogatives or rights have tended to recede.
Summary

This study was undertaken with the dual purpose of:
(1) lending historical perspective to the relatively recent interest public school teachers have shown in organizing for collective bargaining and (2) articulating the conflict paradigm by analyzing human needs and alienation as the subsumed causal factors of teacher militancy. The statistical design portion of the study was constructed to test for significant levels of evidence, if any, of the effects of teacher need satisfaction and alienation remission in master agreements and/or contracts. Specifically, a One-way Analysis of Variance was used across three chronologically arranged treatment cells to test the null hypothesis that collective bargaining by teachers in Oregon's largest districts has had little or no significant impact on their work environment as measured by the incidence of specific Curricular Items or indicators in master agreements and master contracts.
II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

The survey of pertinent literature in Chapter II will overarch dual concerns: first, a foundational history of collective bargaining as it relates to the professionalization of public school teachers and, second, a discussion of the psychological and social bases of teacher militancy—the quest for professional autonomy and power in the work environment. The historical review portion will make little attempt to present a chronological or legalistic survey; instead, Part One will attempt to impart the sense of what has happened. The discussion of the conflict paradigm in Part Two will attempt to provide a philosophical backdrop as well as the theoretical basis of the experimental design itself.
Part One:

The Historical Background of Teaching

Employee Collective Bargaining

Historical Perspectives in Employee Organization

Throughout colonial times, employees were relatively less motivated than they would be in a later era to join together for mutual aid because they were protected from the capricious actions of their employers by: (1) waning but still operant feudalistic traditions of mutual obligation, (2) post-feudal colonial labor laws which regulated apprenticeship (career education) and many conditions of employment including discharge (job security), (3) the sheer scarcity of skilled and unskilled labor in an essentially exploitive frontier environment which caused price rises to lag behind wage increases, (4) the

3 Commons (1918, I:11, 20) has extended the colonial or "dormant" period of employee organization to the late 1820s and further noted that any "class struggle" by American wage earners preceded the factory system and the alienation of the worker from the means of production.

4 For a brief but informative discussion, see Carl N. Degler (1970:3-4). Richard Hofstadter has argued that tradition and obligation offered little if any protection at all to employees in the colonial era prior to 1750 (Hofstadter 1971:42-53).
"safety valve" of a relatively nearby frontier\(^5\) where skilled labor, especially, commanded status with remuneration at nearly twice European values, (5) the localized and non-competitive nature of business and industry, and, perhaps most important, (6) the close relationship between an employer and his half-dozen or fewer employees. None of these observations is meant to imply that the concerted actions of a few employees in terms of strikes and slowdowns were unheard of in the colonial era,\(^6\) but only that such disruptions were, in the modern sense, unorganized, uncoordinated, and quite localized (Sloan and Whitney 1972:48-49).

Almost immediately upon the conclusion of

\(^{5}\)In the 1890s, Frederick Jackson Turner advanced the idea that the American frontier had been a "safety valve of discontent" and the "safety valve" theory has been the object of vigorous discussion among historians ever since. The "safety valve" seldom operated after the Industrial Revolution on unskilled urban workers as Turner had hypothesized; it did, however, operate among skilled urban workers. The "safety valve" also operated in a more indirect manner among the industrially unskilled rural population adjacent to the frontier as an alternative to moving into the urban environment, thus keeping urban working conditions from further deterioration (Bil linton 1960:8-10). Indeed, the Homestead Act of 1862, which provided for western land to go free of charge to anyone who cultivated it, was passed in part at the urging of organized labor in the east (Commons 1918, I:562-53).

\(^{6}\)Commons (1918, I:25-26) found no wage-earner strikes before 1786. Strikes occurring before that date, he argued, were in reality "strikes of masters ... against municipal regulation of prices and not against the bargaining power of employers."
hostilities in the American Revolutionary War, 1775-83, and the formation of the United States in 1789, a multi-faceted revolution began to occur in the American workplace. The old traditional and legal relationships between employees and their employers began to recede and eventually disappeared altogether. The frontier "safety valve" moved outward and became more and more distant from burgeoning urban centers and began to take on an importance more psychological than physical to the urbanized employee (Sloan and Whitney 1972:49; Degler 1970:129).

The building of a vast and complex infrastructure (roads, canals, and railroads) accelerated the exploitation of the continent's seemingly inexhaustible natural resource base and, in turn, undermined the localized nature of old-style business and manufacturing organizations. Even before the dawning of the nineteenth century, employers found themselves in a national marketplace competing with other employers for raw materials and sales of finished products. The competitive pressures eventually occasioned the rise of the factory system—the expansion of the work force centralization and hierarchical organization of employer-employee relationships concomitant with the specialization in function of productive and distributive activity of employees. The depersonalization of the workplace aided the competitively squeezed employer in looking inevitably toward the human factor of production for the
cost-cutting requisite to his staying in business: the hours of labor were lengthened, jobs were farmed-out to prison labor, working men were subjected to wage cuts, and women and children were paid less than the men for the same work.

It was the economic development of the frontier which led to the creation of the world's first bona fide labor organizations (Sloan and Whitney 1972:49) and it was the closing of the frontier (i.e., of the "safety valve" of frontier opportunities whether real or imagined) that created a permanent working class philosophy and a permanent employee organizing movement (Taylor and Whitney 1975:6). To the extent that a working class philosophy is coexistent with a working class movement which transcends the parochial boundaries of a single trade or the duration of a single strike, it should be noted that the labor movement per se began in Philadelphia in 1827 when the trades formed a union (Perlman 1922:4,9). Although other large eastern cities also witnessed the creation of trades' unions, the movement did

Taylor and Whitney (1975:6) have hypothesized that a working class philosophy came into being when American industrial workers began to see their occupational status as relatively permanent and not as just an ephemeral interlude along the escalator of upward and/or outward mobility. A working class philosophy is the belief that occupational peer group organization and activity in relation to the employer is more likely to result in the satisfaction of human needs than is fragmented individual effort. Commons (1918,1:15-16), however, has distinguished between "class consciousness" with its overtones of revolutionary antipathy toward capitalism and a more institutionally conservative "wage consciousness" which connotes an acceptance of the existing order if not the worker's economic position within it.
not become permanent until it began to outlast panics and depressions in the last third of the nineteenth century. Generally, however, unionism became a stabilized movement in the United States only when the "abundance consciousness" of the pioneer days had been replaced in the mind of labor by a "scarcity consciousness" or when optimistic feelings of unlimited opportunity were replaced, in the workers' minds, if not the capitalists', by pessimistic feelings of opportunity or job scarcity (Perlman 1928:6-8).

"Scarcity groups" regularly endeavor to "own" as groups the limited opportunities at their disposal. . . . It would be erroneous to try to account for an industrial struggle solely by the specific demands which are its proximate causes: wages, hours, freedom from discriminatory discharge, etc., while leaving out this group "hunger" for controlling the job opportunities to the point of "ownership" (Perlman 1928:242).

In addition to the socio-economic factors attendant to the employee organizing movement was the deceptively attractive new capitalistic philosophy of laissez-faire advanced by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*. As a theory of marketing and manufacturing, laissez-faire held that human progress could best be aided if the government would divorce itself from special economic interests and thus free each enterprising individual to be guided only by enlightened self-interest. In the mass, the theory held, enlightened self-interest choice-making on the part of each would then be the only guiding hand needed for the achievement and perfection of human happiness. Encouraged by
Americans' traditional (out of the colonial experience) suspicion of excessive governmental power over the individual and the seemingly boundless exploitive resource bounty of the North American continent, the doctrine of laissez-faire led eventually away from "free" or open enterprising individualism to the closed and rapacious individualism of the "robber barons." In time, the doctrine of laissez-faire, as altered, became a central pillar in the rationalizing "scientific" philosophy of environmental and human exploitation known as "Social Darwinism"—which was appreciated more in the United States than anywhere else. This compelling theory held that the unremitting and remorseless "struggle for survival" and subsequent "natural selection" and the "survival of the fittest" constituted the sine qua non of human (i.e., humane) progress and inevitable perfection. The position of the unorganized employee in this process, especially if he was unskilled, penurious, malnourished, unemployed, and uninformed about employment prospects was problematic at best.

To meliorate the downward pressure on wages and the grinding hardships accruing in the wake of incipient

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8 For a brief but excellent discussion of the pervasive influence of Social Darwinism from the mid-nineteenth century through the present, Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in American Thought is indispensable.
capitalism and its legitimizing evolutionary philosophies of nature and man, some skilled workers joined together in organizations that came to be called trade unions. In its organization and operation, the trade union model was fundamentally different from the later labor or industrial union model in that: (1) it represented only its own members, in a closed shop, with the employer; (2) it unilaterally and in secrecy adopted a trade agreement, which contained the "bill of prices" and the work rules or employment rights, and imposed it on the employer as the condition for continued work; and (3) it enforced the agreement with fines levied against contrarily-minded fellow workers (Feller 1973:724-25,828).

9 For a comprehensive discussion of trade union history, see Selig Perlman's The History of Trade Unions in the United States (1922) and John R. Commons' History of Labor in the United States (1918,I,II).

10 Unskilled industrial workers have been more easily replaced by struck employers than skilled workers so their organizational successes were quite limited until the protective Wagner Act of 1935 and the subsequent formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Essentially, the Wagner Act mildly discriminated against unilateral trade union practices and encouraged, to the extent of virtually creating, the industrial union model while protecting collective bargaining—a bilateral decision-making process which had gained prestige by the turn of the twentieth century. It was not until the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, however, that the developing labor law was used to directly undercut trade union power by: (1) outlawing the closed shop, (2) forcing all unions to bargain in good faith, and (3) all but severing the connection between union membership and employment rights (Feller 1973:734-35).
Such employee organizing efforts were seen, however, as inimical to the best interests of society and the natural order at first by employers and then by the state courts, and, upon the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War, by the national courts. Organizing came to be viewed as a conspiracy against society and the proprietary rights of employers and of fellow employees. When the prosecution of individual conspirators ultimately proved to be too cumbersome, the collective labor injunction was formulated, by the 1880s, and its use along with a panoply of employer union-breaking devices dominated labor relations until the federal government declared its neutrality in the world's most violent labor wars\(^\text{11}\) with the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. By 1935, this neutrality had changed to encouragement of the industrial union model and of collective bargaining with the passage of the Wagner Act. Eventually, government policy reverted back to protective neutrality with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959. At present, the majority of American industrial managers have come to accept the industrial union model and, in a few cases, even desire collective bargaining (Feller 1973: 762-63). For the most part, American employers have

\(^{11}\) For a penetrating analysis of labor strife over the last century, one of the best contemporary works is Jeremy Brecher's *Strike!* (1972). Brecher's biases run toward "ordinary people" and somewhat away from the institutionalized aspects of Capitalism and Unions.
cooperated with the creation of a system of industrial jurisprudence through the articulation of collectively bargained master contracts or private law because they have derived worthwhile benefits: (1) a cooperative and stable work force, (2) an occasional better settlement on hours, wages, and working conditions than could have been obtained without a union, (3) a means to procure employee consent of the work rules and the managerial right to impose them, (4) a means to "channel the natural desire of employees to exercise strategies of independence," and (5) a means by which higher management could police lower management's compliance with policies through employee use of the grievance mechanism (Feller 1973:760-66).

Overall, it has been argued that the objective of the labor struggle in the United States has been "the recognition of the union as a co-partner in industrial government" (Perlman and Taft 1935:630). Indeed, aside from an occasional radical flourish and the revolutionary rhetoric emanating from its periphery, American unionism has been a conservative socio-economic force on a par with the moderating effect of a wide distribution of private property (Perlman 1922:303). An authority on American labor history, Selig Perlman (1922:279), has observed that:
The puzzling fact about the American labor movement is, after all, its limited objective. . . . The social order which the typical American trade unionist considers ideal is one in which organized labor and organized capital possess equal bargaining. . . . Yet [the unionist] does not appear to wish to saddle himself and fellow wage earners with the trouble of running industry without the employer.
Historical Perspectives in Public Employee Organization

The right of a public or private sector employee to join and participate in employee organizations as an individual had its basis in the Constitution of the United States. The First Amendment prevented Congress from making any law abridging "the right of the people peaceable to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." The Fourteenth Amendment, in turn, placed a proscription on the several states to "make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, made the protections of the first ten Amendments (which had been valid only in relation to the federal power) for the first time incumbent upon the state governments as well. The First and Fourteenth, then, gave public employees, as citizens, the right to assemble peaceably and to petition the government; denial of these Constitutional rights afforded all citizens would then be a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

Stinnett et al. (1966:22) have observed that local governmental boards (e.g., school boards) are agencies of the state and, as such, have no prerogatives beyond Constitutional limitations.
The federal Constitution did not, of course, spell out what was meant by peaceable public assemblage, petition, or equal protection. As a result of this omission, confusion gave rise to a complex array of militant unions, "company" associations, and innocuous clubs who "petitioned" by writing friendly letters to congressmen, engaging in lobbying activities, and/or seeking bona fide collective bargaining. Overall, Edwards (1973:888-89) has argued, the Constitutional right or permission to organize is essentially meaningless unless the right is protected by statute compelling or, at the least, permitting public employers to "meet and confer" or to bargain collectively in good faith over the conditions of employment.

Trade unionism among governmental workers began when the workers at several naval shipyards organized and struck until President Andrew Jackson finally acceded to the radical idea of the ten-hour work day then in effect for like workers in the private sector (Grodin and Wollett 1975:1-2). Unionized governmental workers at that time

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The National Trades' Union was instrumental in securing the same ten-hour day for its federally employed members as it had already done by 1835 for those of its members employed in the private sector. Perlman (1922:26-27) has noted that Jackson's response was more one of a political favor in reference to the desires of his organized supporters than one of being intimidated by militant workers. The ten-hour day became the rule only in those localities where the men belonged to trade unions and struck and then only to the extent that they struck; the Washington, D.C. Naval
tended to be skilled and to be members of craft unions whose existence primarily served skilled employees in private industry. Indeed, the fact that the state and federal governments had to successfully compete with job standards in private industry was instrumental in undermining the organizational activities of governmental workers until relatively recent times (Grodin and Wollett 1975:2).

Mixed unions, where a majority of the members are employed in the private sector, monopolized public employee organizing until after the devastating Great Panic of 1873. In the 1880s, however, wholly public employee associations began to appear; formed primarily for benevolent purposes (i.e., as social clubs or to initiate retirement systems, credit unions, group life insurance plans, etc.), these associations played virtually no part in the nation's labor movement through their organizational decline just before the First World War. A brief resurgence in public employee union organizing activity was squelched in the public furor and antipathy following the Boston Police Strike of 1919.13

Shipyards was among the last major yards to lobby Jackson into the ten-hour day. In 1840, President Van Buren established the ten-hour day for all government work by executive order; by then the NTU had become a casualty of the Panic of 1837.

13 Which ultimately made a President out of an "inconspicuous, sow faced" Massachusetts governor when he was widely heralded for telling Samuel Gompers that "there is no right to strike against the public safety of anybody, anywhere, at any time" (Allen 1964:45).
Most public employees returned to less controversial association activity which lasted as an active movement until about 1950. During the great labor upsurge of the depression thirties, however, a few public employees once again began to take an interest in labor organizations. At that time all types of governmental employees began to form exclusive (i.e., unmixed with private sector members) organizations composed mostly of coherent occupational groups: firemen, policemen, and teachers were among the first to organize. Nevertheless, public employee unionization progressed slowly until the 1960s when public employee unionization—local, state, and federal—became preeminent in the national labor movement (Grodin and Wollett 1975:3).

Blue collar membership in private sector unions began a steady decline with the increased use of automation beginning in the 1950s. Although about two-thirds of the employees in manufacturing industries were organized at this writing, only about one-sixth of the total private sector union membership was white-collar. Standing in stark contrast to the mediocre white collar organizing successes by the private sector unions were the public sector union and association successes in organizing well over half.

An interesting contemporary phenomenon has been the movement by associations of professional employees such as technicians, engineers, and teachers to represent their membership in collective bargaining activities where their performance is indistinguishable from that of the formal unions (Grodin and Wollett 1975:7-8).
of the state and local workers (if teachers, who make up nearly one-third of such employees and who are overwhelmingly organized, are included) and almost 60% of the federal service (Flippo 1976:472; Zagoria 1972:161; Taylor and Whitney 1975:541). At the present time, organized governmental workers comprise about 20% of all organized workers and their membership growth in both absolute and relative terms continues.

The sharp increase in the rate of public employee organizational growth has clearly demonstrated that the public employees are interested in obtaining the same organizational advantages enjoyed by private sector employees (Sloan and Whitney 1972:509). Like private managers, the most effective public managers find it difficult to provide their employees with a sense of independence, freedom, and power. It would seem that there is no other way than through organized and collective force that an employee can feel independent enough to challenge the actions, whether arbitrary or not, of his formal superiors in the workplace (Flippo 1976:469-70). Indeed, even well-paid employees have voted overwhelmingly for a union or an association which could effectively serve to provide them with the dignity of independence necessary to their self-esteem (Flippo 1976:372). But governmental employees did not suddenly develop autonomy needs or the discomfitsures of alienation in the 1960s, so the sharpness of the
organizational membership increases to date can hardly be explained solely by these factors. The big difference was a change in governmental attitudes about the propriety of bargaining in the public sector—specifically, changes in the attitudes of the executive branch of the federal government and in many state legislatures, which has implied a shift in public attitudes.

Traditionally, legislators and judges at all governmental levels have just assumed that the two sectors were unalterably different (Edwards 1973:887). Even the man who saved American capitalism to the undying enmity of the capitalists (in part by encouraging private sector collective bargaining), Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was antipathetic to public employees even organizing, not to mention bargaining or using the ultimate bargaining weapon: the strike (Mitchell 1969:89; Randles 1973:201). In a letter to L. C. Stewart, President of the National Association of Federal Employees, dated August 16, 1937, Roosevelt stated in part:

... I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employees. ... A strike of public employees. ... looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable (Harter 1977:2; Grodin and Wollett 1975:31).

The "sovereignty theory" of governmental power was clearly the backdrop for Roosevelt's opinion although its corollary, the "extra loyalty theory," in relation to the expectations placed upon public employees, was strongly
implied. The oldest (unto the antiquity of Kings\textsuperscript{15}) and nowadays least revered mode of distinction between the two sectors, the sovereignty theory, held that the government, even as an employer, was the ultimate seat of all legitimate societal power and that power could not and should not be: (1) opposed by the countervailing power of labor unions and (2) unlawfully delegated to a union or any other entity. Essentially, Rocha (1973:87) has argued, the sovereignty theory was a vestige of a bygone age of small (and relatively weak) government and has become ill-suited to meet the needs of a modern democracy in which decisions concerning what government can do are worked out by people through their representative special interest groups and not by courtiers and a king. The "extra loyalty theory" called upon public employees to commit themselves to furthering governmental programs even if that meant sacrificing their own interests; like the sovereignty theory, it has become an ill-suited guide for labor relations by an extensive, complex government in its proprietary role (Grodin and Wollett 1975:31-33). Nevertheless, the "sovereignty" and "extra loyalty" theories are far from dead; the public employee strike

\textsuperscript{15}It was once said that "Kings" or governments could do no wrong. W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor under President Lyndon Johnson, has reminded us, however, that Kings were not final because they were infallible but deemed infallible only because they were final (Elam et al. 1967:10).
proscription in the federal government and all but eight state governments is evidence of their continued, if declining, health.

Somewhat more persuasive to most observers than the "greybeard theories" based on obsolete notions of the nature of the public sector, Grodin and Wollett (1975:33) have argued, are three arguments against public sector collective bargaining grounded in contemporary realities:

1. Modern government at all levels has grown to be extremely complex and governmental authority is often divided among several levels (e.g., local, township, county, large cities, and state). A central argumentative question about the propriety of co-equal, bilateral decision making over the conditions of employment would have to be: with whom is the public employee to bargain? The answer may lie within an observable tendency in the United States as well as in other industrialized democracies which have permitted public sector bargaining for some time: ever more centralized decision making (Grodin and Wollett 1975:39; Peterson 1976:123).

2. There has also been the concern on the part of the critics that the public sector lacks the natural limits inherent in the private sector where cross elasticity of demand would see an inordinately high wage settlement result in consumer substitution and eventual loss of business and union members which, in turn, would force a
redress in wage pricing. The demand for government services is highly inelastic, the argument has gone, and consumer substitution is practically impossible. In actual practice, however, perfect competition models do not operate error-free and many factors block perfect substitutability. In addition, the demand for government services has not proven to be as inelastic as claimed. In the final analysis, Grodin and Wollett (1975:33-34) have pointed out, the public itself is the public sector's natural limit with the power of public outrage at excessive demands and the power of the franchise. Additionally, research has clearly shown that union impact on wages in both sectors has been greatly overrated; unions seem to have had their greatest impact on timing and form of remuneration, not on the amount (Lewin 1973:316; Aaron 1976:454), and one study by Zvelke and Frohreich (1977:86) has shown that, for public school teachers at least, collective bargaining may even have a negative effect on wages.

3. The last and most serious of these critical concerns has rested on the fear that institutionalizing private sector practices in the public sector might cause a perversion of the democratic process. In fact, however, the "distortions" caused in the political processes by public sector unions have not been radically different from the "distortions" caused by other special interest groups like the NAACP or the Chamber of Commerce (Grodin
and Wollett 1975:35). In the end, the ultimate solution to this concern may very well be what it was in the beginning: wise legislation and a watchful electorate.

No one has yet argued that there are no differences between the private and public sectors; the nature of government requires that adjustments be made in adapting private sector patterns and precedents to public sector bargaining (Edwards 1973:908). What can be argued from the standpoint of the employees is that the differences are fewer and less unbridgeably serious than heretofore thought. According to one-time Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg:

Many believe that there are many similarities between private and public employment; in both there are (1) an employer and employees; (2) attitudes which do not differ markedly from the attitudes in the private sector; (3) employers who want to be free from restrictions and to secure a work force as cheaply as possible; (4) employees who want to improve their living standards, to have legal rights [in the workplace], and to resolve grievances on their merits. Unions in both sectors have comparable goals for their members. . . (Grodin and Wollett 1975:35).

Indeed, corroborating research by Martin (1976) has found that union-management relationship patterns at the local level are basically similar when comparing federal government agencies with private sector organizations. The differences in the patterns were judged to be more of degree than of kind in terms of organizational experiences, attitudes, and the backgrounds of the bargaining parties (Martin 1976:75).
Public Employee Collective Bargaining Becomes Public Policy

As a United States Senator, John Kennedy was involved in many unsuccessful attempts to legislate a measure of protection for federal employee bargaining; as President, Kennedy appointed a task force to study the accruing employee-management problems in the federal service. On November 30, 1961, that task force, headed by Supreme Court Justice to be Arthur J. Goldberg, expressed the opinion that responsible unions would strengthen and improve the federal service. In January 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order (EO) 10988 which laid the permissive ground work for bargaining in the executive branch of the federal government. By allowing three levels of union recognition and ultimate unilateral decisions by executive agency heads, EO 10988 tried to allow for optimal flexibility—instead it created unintended confusion and frustration (Sloan and Whitney 1972:510-16). In October 1969, President Nixon issued EO 11491 which substantially changed and improved upon EO 10988; it allowed exclusive recognition only, created an agency similar to the NLRB to oversee federal service bargaining (the Federal Labor Relations Council), allowed binding arbitration on grievances and established negotiation impasse-breaking procedures which (the strike being proscribed) could end in binding arbitration. The last major Executive Order that brought fundamental changes to the
Executive Department's labor relations program was in 1975 when President Ford signed EO 11838 which consolidated small, inefficient bargaining units, broadened the scope of bargainable topics (i.e., weakened internal agency regulations) and made the scope of grievance procedures bargainable.

These Presidential Executive Orders have allowed protected collective bargaining to become de facto public policy at the federal level, they have served as encouragement to state legislatures in passing protective or permissive legislation, and they have initiated widespread organizing and bargaining activities by state and local governmental employees (Doherty and Oberer 1967:45). But all of the EOs share one fatal flaw: they are not statutory law. Under them courts have no power to intervene and serve as neutral parties in the bargaining process; as EOs, they could be changed, cancelled, or ignored at any time by any President for any reason. As unilateral promulgations, they have provided a flawed basis for a bilateral relationship (Grodin and Wollett 1975:23).

Until recently, prospects for a nationwide public employee bargaining law looked bright but, suddenly, an "increasingly chilly" public attitude toward public employees has slowed Congressional momentum. Compounding the slowdown were the Constitutional issues raised by the recent five to four U.S. Supreme Court decisions in National League of
Cities v. Usery and California v. Usery where the high court overturned the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which set wage and overtime requirements for state and local employees, as contrary to the Tenth Amendment. The decision would seem to have strengthened states' rights and to have limited the federal power (Weitzman 1976:243-44).

Almost every state-level legislative season in the United States has concluded with the passage of more state statutes lending some bargaining protection to most state and local employees. As of January 1976, 37 states had enacted collective bargaining statutes covering most or all of their public employees.16 Eight of these states have authorized or legalized public employee strikes for most classifications.17 Attorney General opinions in Arkansas and Virginia (but not the courts) have authorized collective bargaining; in Illinois public employees have bargained under a gubernatorial executive order and in New Mexico the State Personnel Board has issued regulations authorizing bargaining. In all, there are currently nine

16 Sometimes public school teachers are treated separately or excluded and occasionally "home rule" statutes and charters are used by their municipal possessors to act outside of the state's public bargaining laws. Oregon is among the "home rule charter" states (Edwards 1973:911; Harter 1977:11).

17 Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
states with no legislative or executive authorization for public employee bargaining (Weitzman 1976:233).\textsuperscript{18}

At the present time, Edwards (1973:885) has noted, arguments over the propriety of collective bargaining in the public sector are largely academic. More pointedly, Lee C. Shaw, a Chicago management consultant working in both public and private sectors, has approvingly quoted a National Governors' Conference report: "Neither the pillars of city halls nor the foundations of the civil service crumbled when conditions of employment were negotiated instead of being fixed unilaterally" (Zagoria 1972:36).

The key issue, Lewin (1973:310) has argued, is not the emergence of public sector bargaining or the incidence of disruptive strikes,\textsuperscript{19} or even decision-making trade-offs between public managers and organized employees; the key issue is the impact of bilateral decision making through the bargaining process on public managers and on public services. There has been no factual basis for presuming that public employee bargaining produces only negative or only positive results (Lewin 1973:310-11).

\textsuperscript{18}Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia.

\textsuperscript{19}Indeed, the interesting irony here is that anti-strike penalties not only do not have the effect of deterring strikes but may even prolong them as the employee union uses the continuation to extract amnesty or a "no reprisals clause" (Gray and Dyson 1976:131).
The backdrop of public and teacher attitudes about teachers and teaching has been colored by the lessons of the past. While not optimal even now, general attitudes about public school teachers and what they do have improved considerably over those of the colonial era when practical minds, intended toward agriculture and the conquest of a continent, attached small import to the niceties of formal schooling and subsequently recruited teachers from the lower strata. Even as revolutionary events quickened in Boston, Jonathan Boucher\textsuperscript{20} noted from Maryland that:

\begin{quote}
Not a ship arrives either with redemptioners or convicts, in which schoolmasters are not as regularly advertised for sale, as weavers, tailors, or any other trade; with little other difference, that I can hear of, excepting perhaps that the former do not usually fetch as good a price as the latter (Doherty and Oberer 1967:1).
\end{quote}

Some colonial teachers performed well but the evidence is that the majority, even considering the standards of the eighteenth century, did not. There were widespread complaints of ignorance, carelessness, drunkenness, job desertion, immorality, and financial irregularities. Even those teachers who were diligent in taking their appoint-

\textsuperscript{20} Boucher was a staunch colonial Loyalist who, with the outbreak of hostilities, sailed for England where he wrote a perspicacious analysis of the causes and consequences of the American Revolution—dedicated ironically enough to his former neighbor, George Washington.
ments seriously were kept from learning their craft well by the extremely low salaries and, whether cause or effect, short tenure.

The esteem with which the general public held teachers at the beginning of the nineteenth century vacillated between contempt and indifference and it ascended only slightly by the time of the beginning of the twentieth. The history of teacher compensation has generally been coincidental with other indicators of status; however unfair or unfortunate, "salaries tend to be indicative of the value placed on services rendered" (Randles 1973:213). During the era after the Civil War, Horace Mann noted that:

... We pay best, 1st, those who destroy us,—generals; 2nd, those who cheat us,—politicians and quacks; 3rd, those who amuse us,—singers and dancers; and last of all those who instruct us,—teachers (Randles 1973:214).

Away from civilized New England and out on the developing frontier, the public attitudes about teachers and teaching were even less congenial; as one midwesterner thoughtfully recalled:

The man who was disabled to such an extent that he could not engage in manual labor, who was lame, too fat, too feeble, had the phthisic or had fits or was too lazy to work—well, they usually made schoolmasters out of them (Doherty and Oberer 1967:5).

Until 1830, teaching was considered to be a man's task. The tradition of male domination in educational matters stretching back into antiquity was perpetuated through the early national period of the United States by
the low status of women generally—evidenced by their very low educational level—and the concern that females would be too easily intimidated by unruly students. The obloquies attendant to the dame schools of colonial times only added to the prejudice. In time, however, women came to be more favored as school teachers because "their manners are more mild and gentle, and hence more in consonance with the tenderness of childhood," because they were "of purer morals," and because a booming economy paid males salaries that local taxpayers were unwilling to match (Doherty and Oberer 1967:3). After 1860, various wars and industrial booms completely reversed the numerical sexual bias in teaching until by the 1920s females composed 83 percent of the nation's total teaching force.

During the period of the ascendancy of women teachers, both teaching sexes continued to be poorly educated and trained, poorly compensated, and they continued to enter and leave teaching with such rapidity that occupational tenure continued to average a few years at best and the mean teacher age hovered at just above 21. Throughout the nineteenth century, in other words, teaching continued to be regarded as one of the most casual of occupations; rewards were scant and practitioner competence and dedication to craft (prerequisites of any profession) remained, with some exceptions, virtually nonexistent. None the least of the long-range causes of such a sorry state of
affairs was the abysmally low salaries paid teachers. Until the 1920s, teachers traditionally arrived at salaries through individual bargaining which, coupled with their lack of bargaining strength and the widespread use of favoritism, insured continued low salaries, low status, and, over the long run, low quality practitioners. Near the midpoint of the 1920s, however, teachers and others began to press for the abolition of individual bargaining and fight for the adoption by school boards of "position" schedules (i.e., each grade level with its own schedule, elementary being paid less than high school) and then through the depression and war years for the adoption of the contemporary "single" salary schedules where academic preparation in credit hours and teaching experience in years operate as the sole criteria for salary assignment—thus erasing grade-level and sex differentials.

On the whole, salaries for school teachers have improved modestly in relation to other occupational and professional categories over the last half-century, 21 and, whatever the cause, so has the status of teachers in the public eye. Contributing factors would have to include the

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21 The best research evidence of the effect of collective bargaining on teachers' salaries during the period 1961-76 has ranged from none (Musemeche and Adams 1977:479-81) in the sense that inflation was matched, to insignificant (Balfour 1974:301), to minimal (Brown 1975:63).
fact that males are reentering teaching in great numbers with the intent of making teaching their lifetime career and they are continuing in their positions longer (Rabinowitz and Crawford 1960:385,387). Male entrants into teaching have been almost twice as likely to be of blue collar background than entrants into any other profession (Mason 1961:13) which probably has had carry-overs in teacher attitudes about the craft of teaching and the teacher's role in it. At least one factor that ought not be included, it seems, would be the notion that teachers tend to have more education nowadays than in the last century and before. Corwin (1965:312) has found that a college degree is not as distinctive today as a high school diploma was in 1900 nor does a teaching degree mean that a teacher has attained a high degree of intellectual competence since, nationwide, teacher training has been the least rigorous of any professional program (Koerner 1963:50-56). Koerner (1963:44-45) found that the average academic aptitude of teacher trainees as a group was higher only than the group that flunked out of college. While the intellectual quality of teachers has been improving and university education

\[22\] The theory that the "proletarianization" of teaching has brought people into the occupation whose social backgrounds predispose them toward militancy has been contradicted in a study by Fox and Wince (1976:57-58) who nevertheless found that sex and age were of fundamental importance as determinants. On the other hand, the weight of the research, as surveyed by Moore and Marshall (1973:285-296) would seem to support the theory of proletarianization.
schools have been getting more rigorous, the disturbing fact remains that the public has not yet demanded that those who instruct the young be intellectually superior people (Doherty and Oberer 1967:7). Nevertheless, Myers (1973:63-71) has argued, with the accruing influx of career men and women, what was once a mere job has turned into an occupation and is presently moving toward a profession; teaching is moving toward the profession end of the professionalization continuum.
Public School Teachers as Professional Employees

If the line of division between managers and employees in the public sector in general has become blurred, between teachers and their immediate supervisors it has often become virtually non-existent. Nevertheless, taken as a totality, the hierarchy of status relationships in the school bureaucracy generates behaviors on the part of teachers and principals which have been markedly similar to management-employee behaviors in the private sector. Professionalism notwithstanding, principals, if not always department heads, have tended to behave like managers (like subordinates of superintendents) and teachers have tended to behave like employees (Randles 1973:246).

This confusion about the appropriate relationship between teachers and other educators has been illustrated by the two traditional styles of teacher organizations. Since its charter by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1916, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has taken the position that all supervisory personnel, occasionally including department chairmen, are agents of the board of education, the employer, and as such has excluded them from membership. On the other hand, the
much older\textsuperscript{23} National Education Association (NEA) has traditionally argued for the "unified membership" of all educators regardless of their hierarchical status. Until quite recently, the NEA shunned economic welfare activities, as beneath the dignity of an association pursuing unselfish social service, while expecting the public, grateful for increased professional effort, to voluntarily come forward with handsome salaries and fringes. Even the AFT with its image of union militancy did not actually see one of its locals engage in direct, table-talk negotiations on specific issues until the late 1930s and it continued to formally disavow the strike weapon until the 1950s. Indeed, it was not until 1947 that the AFT declared collective bargaining to be a matter of national level policy. That same year, the NEA began to shift ground when its convention passed a resolution which called upon each state affiliate to seek "salary adjustment" through "group action" (NEA 1947:47).

\textsuperscript{23}After a number of false starts, a small group of 60 superintendents, principals, college presidents, and professors representing ten state associations met in Philadelphia in 1857 and founded the National Teachers Association. Membership was open only to "gentlemen" associating for the purposes of "professional improvement"—a non-economic concept that meant elevation of character, advancement of interest in the teaching profession and the promotion of popular education (Wesley 1957:23). By 1920, both the NEA and the AFT had about 10,000 members; the NEA, enrolling about five percent of the nation's teachers (although the member State Associations approached 60 percent) was being rapidly outdistanced by the AFT's "bread and potatoes" approach to organization (Perry and Wildman 1970:3–5).
In a very fundamental sense, the contemporary era of teacher militancy began in New York City in 1961 when, in a direct and hard-fought confrontation, a local affiliate of the AFT defeated an NEA-supported coalition in a representation election. In the ensuing years, the small AFT (one-tenth the size of the giant NEA) has managed to win the majority of contested elections both in and outside the large urban areas while the NEA and the State Associations have continued to dominate the uncontested elections and the countryside (Perry and Wildman 1970:12-13). The fact is, however, that the vast majority of representation elections were uncontested (by the AFT) and, in an effort to keep them that way, the NEA, recovering from the New York City shock, has fully embraced collective bargaining to the point where little more than its rhetorical style distinguishes its overt behavior from that of the AFT or any other union (Harter 1977:4; Randles 1973:207).

Aside from similar behavioral patterns, there have been some organizational and demographic differences between the NEA (including State affiliates) and the AFT; interestingly, the differences have not been of the stereotyped "professional" organization versus "union" variety. The AFT, for example, was the earlier and more effective of

24 And the subsequent rapid-fire shocks in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Wilmington, and Washington, D.C.
the two organizations in defending academic freedom (Perry and Wildman 1970:8) and nowadays it has remained active in teacher training and recruitment and has even brought about some imaginative innovations in staffing and educational practices in a few urban slum schools (Doherty and Oberer 1967:24). The AFT, in one fundamental difference of organizational emphasis, has generally concentrated its efforts at the local level while letting the State Associations concentrate their efforts at the state capital in the legislature and the department of education; presently the NEA's Uniserv concept has been effectively redressing the membership service imbalance at the local level.

Demographic factors comprise the majority of the differences between the two organizations. The AFT has had a higher percentage of males than the NEA or the profession generally; the AFT also has had a higher percentage of junior and senior high school teachers—but that was where the men were. Ironically, AFT members have been more inclined to be members of professional bodies like the National Science Teachers Association or the National Council for the Teaching of Social Studies—both of which continue to be organs of the NEA. On the other hand, NEA members have been three times as likely (in 1963) to be members of the PTA (William T. Lowe in Elam et al.1967: 249-51). Moore and Marshall (1973:279) have noted that teachers did not resort to collective action until a
sufficiently large number of them became committed to class-
room teaching as a profession in the early 1900s and that, at the present time, unionization has had its greatest appeal to those teachers most firmly committed to their occupation—that is, to those with the highest levels of education and teaching experience. Furthermore, teacher militancy has been increasing as teachers have come to feel their power in organization, while the traditional demo-
graphic determinants of teacher militancy (e.g., sex, age, teaching experience) seem to have subsided (Nasstrom and Brelsford 1976:247,255).
Part Two:
Teaching Employee Militancy as an Articulation of the Paradigm of Conflict Theory

The Paradigm as a Design for Order in Random Nature

What Thomas Kuhn has called paradigms, Robert Merton (1957:87-89) has referred to as orientations, James Duke (1976:5) as theoretical orientations, and Alvin Gouldner (1970:28-60) as background assumptions—which he has further refined into those of unlimited scope or "world hypotheses" and those which apply to a specific scientific discipline or "domain assumptions." Whatever the label or refinements,

In its established usage, a paradigm is an accepted model or pattern. . . In this standard application, the paradigm functions by permitting the replication of examples any one of which could in principle serve to replace it. In a science, on the other hand, a paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions (Kuhn 1970:23).

The value of a paradigm is that it allows the mind to make a priori sense out of randomness;25 Kuhn (1970:15) has argued that without a paradigm, all of the randomly-

25More exactly, the randomness of the Einsteinian universe of relative probabilities and absolute uncertainties. In the Newtonian universe of an inexorably fixed sequence of causal, mechanical relationships, one could define a paradigm as a method of "extracting" meaning. The ironic implication is that the Newtonian universe is inductive but deterministic while the Einsteinian is deductive but an indeterminate field allowing the exercise of free will choice making among the infinite uncertainties (see Barnett 1957:34-35).
gathered facts pertaining to a given field of interest or theory would seem equally relevant against a background of confusion. More simply, "nature is too complex and varied to be explored at random" (Kuhn 1970:109); one can escape the uncertainty and insecurity of random chaos if one forms a set of expectations in relation to what is being sought because "truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion" (Kuhn 1970:18).  

Without a paradigm, then, there can be no normal science (Kuhn 1970:100), no meaningful fact gathering, no efficient problem solving—particularly those problems that would never have been dreamed of, let alone undertaken, in the absence of a paradigm (Kuhn 1970:24-25). Indeed, to reject a paradigm without replacing it with another would be to reject science itself (Kuhn 1970:79); but, as Rose (1967:213) has cautioned, to accept it would be, in a sense, to engage in self-fulfilling research because the eventual conclusions would be implicit in and predetermined by the paradigm. Fortunately, in this regard, it is difficult to make nature fit a paradigm; researchers have been constantly confounded by what seems to be a conspiracy on the part of nature to undermine even the most carefully designed and controlled experiment (see Kuhn 1970:52-53, 135).


27 Kuhn (1970:10) has defined normal science as research firmly based upon prior scientific achievement.
The Conflict Paradigm as a Normative Condition in Human Interrelationships

Before the concepts of human need satisfaction and alienation as subsumed causational factors of teacher militancy or conflict are examined more fully, it will prove useful to discuss what teachers seem to want—that is, to articulate the directions of need satisfaction and de-alienation or the teachers' quest for professional power. Obviously, if teachers have been seeking to satisfy their human needs, they have found themselves in conflict situations from time to time (e.g., conflicts arising from the teacher's and the administrator's need for autonomy in the professional work environment). Likewise, if alienated teachers, through group organization as well as individually, have been seeking more subjective impact on their work environment, it follows that they have been in conflict situations with the holders of power in that work environment.

Parsons (1939:457-67) has warned that caution must be exercised when analyzing occupational behavior on the basis of individual motives; professional employees act out many roles (e.g., taxpayers, hobbyists, spouses, parents, siblings). Moreover, Elam (1967:50) has emphasized, the fundamental tension within a professional-employee society is not between the individual and the system but between the parts of the system—between the professional employee and the bureaucratic principles of organization.

According to Bonnette (1975), "If teachers are not satisfied with their participation in the organizational decision-making process, then they will seek more involvement in decision-making through the collective bargaining process."
Indeed, the complexity of the power relationship has been such that the excessive use of power has generated conflict as equally as have the employees' feelings of powerlessness (Pearlin 1962:314-26; Gellerman 1963:221; Randles 1973:232). The functions of conflict as a paradigm, then, cannot be ignored in any discussion of the object of human need satisfaction or the individual's subjective efforts to gain or regain more control over his environment. What can be ignored, Coser (1964:8,31) has argued, is the limited notion that conflict per se is always dysfunctional.

Duke (1976:2-3) has reminded us that the conflict paradigm has had a long and illustrious history in sociological theory and in the last century it was the dominant paradigm. The conflict paradigm entered a period of decline and quiescence, however, during the first half of the century. Collective bargaining as a process has become, of course, consciously institutionalized conflict and has not become merely a matter of zero-sum or winner-take-all gaming—it has also been integrative in the sense that both sides can "win" (Lewin 1973:310-33). For example, teachers "winning" a grievance procedure at the bargaining table may "lose" an administrator the unbridled prerogative of unilateral and perhaps even capricious action but the teachers' gain in confidence (power) and safety (psychological need) may in turn be reflected in an augmented willingness to try innovative ideas because he or she would know that the inevitable momentary setbacks and failures would have minimal costs: thus, everyone would eventually "win"—students, teachers, administrators, and the public generally (Flango 1976:152-53). For the most widely referenced and perhaps best discussion of distributive and integrative bargaining and other related matters, see Walton and McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (1965).
twentieth century with the overriding influence of the func-
tional and integrational paradigms led by such theorists as Emile Durkheim, Robert Merton, and, preeminently in America, Talcott Parsons. Although Parsons has been recognized as one of this country's foremost Weberian scholars, Coser (1964:21) has noted that his work is more closely related to the Durkheimian quest for social cohesion in the face of anomie or alienation than to the Weberian insistence that conflict cannot be excluded from social life. Specifically, Parsons held that conflict is primarily a disease whose consequences include social disruption, dissociation, and dysfunction (Coser 1964:21). Coser (1964:27) and Duke (1976:212) have both concluded that as a functional theorist, Parsons' stature was supreme in a generation of corporation-sociologists whose research objective, assigned by the decision makers in public and private bureaucracies, was the maintenance of the status quo—the existing order and the functionalist-integrationist paradigm (see also Rose 1967:213 and Merton and Lerner 1951:293).

As Duke (1976:2-3) has noted, since the 1950s there has been a renewal of interest in the conflict paradigm which both preceded (see the work of Coser 1964) and accompanied the revival of radicalism in the 1960s. The much older paradigm is that conflict cannot be excluded

31 Which managed for a while to get into the "bad company" of the Social Darwinists which, in part, illumi-
nates Parsons' work as a search for the evolutionary factors of social cohesion—so that all might survive and not just the "fittest" (see Coser 1964:15-26 and Duke 1976:91).
from social life; the acute problem presented by the paradigm is not how to cure a disease but how to manage or control a social force. Georg Simmel was the preeminent intellectual force in this older (and, after the 1960s,\textsuperscript{32}) newest idea and it was his central thesis that conflict is a form of socialization. Simmel (1955:13-32) argued that no group can be entirely harmonious for if it were, it would then be devoid of process and structure; the function of conflict is to "resolve divergent dualisms."

Far from being the inescapable dysfunctional consequence of disease, then, conflict to a certain degree, has been an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life (Coser 1964:31). Indeed, it has been cogently argued that in the world of thought and activity,

\ldots conflict creates associations and coalitions by bringing together people who might otherwise have nothing to do with each other. It binds a group together and provides a safety valve which allows a release of pressure and thus aids in preserving the group. The closer the relationship, the more intense the conflict; contradiction and conflict not only precede unity but are operative in it at every moment of its existence. Conflict is an index of the stability of relationships; it binds antagonists and establishes and maintains balance of power (Keltner 1970:229-30).

\textsuperscript{32}Conflict behavior which seriously disrupts or even sweeps aside social systems may, in great measure, be a consequence of the relative rigidity of the system and the insufficiency of institutionalized safety valve mechanisms (Coser 1964:44-45,47,79,151-57).
In emphasizing the functional aspects of social conflict, there has been no denial that uncontrolled social conflict has usually been dysfunctional. Bilateral decision making through collective bargaining has prevented uncontrolled social conflict (Lewellen and Sturbaum 1973: 136)—and as such has been ultimately conservative (Lieberman 1975:102). The realization of most societal goals in modern, complex societies has required the application of power (Etzioni 1968:314); moreover, power exertion and the resultant social conflict may very well have been inevitable under modern conditions (Miller and Form 1964:294). Implicit in the adoption of the Presidential Executive Orders back in the 1960s and in the subsequent collective bargaining statutes passed within a dozen years by state legislatures is the acceptance if, indeed, not the "endorsement of social conflict as a proper vehicle for

33Kemerer and Baldridge (1975-76:62), however, have argued another defensible point of view: "Our central conclusion is that collective bargaining itself is only a neutral decision-making process. It has no inherent capacity for either harm or good." A somewhat less defensible if understandably shrill point of view that has not been atypical of those school superintendents first faced by seemingly militant teacher bargaining behavior is the argument that bargaining tends to be amoral, essentially illogical, often unreasonable, and only by accident crucially related to the facts (Randels 1973:202).

34The hint of determinism is difficult to avoid when proceeding from virtually any premise; here, however, the reference is to the choice of means and not to any "fixed" ends of human endeavor.
settling differences between organized groups" (Lewellen and Sturbaum 1973:136)—including, of course, teachers and boards of education.35

Bilateral decision making as a means of school conflict management will reduce the area of unilateral decision making (George W. Taylor in Elam et al 1967:18); while management in general will lose some prerogatives with the process, middle-managers are apt to lose the most (Kemerer and Baldridge 1975-76:51). While Lieberman 36

35 Of particular importance in this regard was the thinking of the philosophically pragmatic theorist of the American labor movement, John R. Commons. In contradistinction to the conservative assumption of Thomas Hobbes, as it survived in the thinking of laissez-faire liberals, that interhuman conflict was inherent in the sinful nature of man, Commons believed that conflict was external to the human organism per se. First of all, conflict occurred because humans developed individual habits and group customs (which became routinized into complex institutions) in order to dispel the inefficiencies and discomfitures of random behavior and the resultant variety of those human habits and customs naturally collided in human interaction. Secondly, conflict also arose because of the scarcity of goods which was essentially a problem of production and distribution. In other words, Commons believed that human conflict derived from the relatively externalized nature of human relationships and not from the inherent nature of humans; his argument was that the will is free, if not often rational, and that the human condition is perfectable. Commons further theorized that "transactions" were the dynamic element in American society; in particular, the "bargaining transaction" between equals resulted in the control of conflict through the adoption of working rules that increased both goods and human interdependence in such a way that both sides gained (see Harter 1965:89–90 and 1967:65–66).

36 Myron Lieberman, professor at the University of Southern California and a consultant on employment relations to the American Association of School Administrators, has taken the position that managerial abuses are inevitable "regardless of the intentions of particular individuals" and that "employees need protection from unions as well as from employers" (Lieberman 1975:102).
(1975:102) has argued that the loss of "arbitrary and capricious power" is not really a loss, he has also noted that it would prove instructive to consider the effects teacher organization will most certainly have on instructional development. Echoing a line of thinking stretching back to the turn of the twentieth century (see Randles 1973:244 and Lutz and Azzarelli 1966:31,33), John Dewey reasoned that:

... until the public-school system is organized in such a way that every teacher has some regular and representative way in which he or she can register judgment upon matters of educational importance, with the assurance that this judgment will somehow affect the school system, [my] assertion that the present system is not, from the internal standpoint, democratic seems to be justified. . . .

... For no matter how wise, expert, or benevolent the head of the school system, the one-man principle is autocracy.

... What does democracy mean save that the individual is to have a share in determining the conditions and the aims of his own work; . . .

... The best minds are not especially likely to be drawn where there is danger that they may have to submit to conditions which no self-respecting intelligence likes to put up with; . . . (Dewey 1940:64-67).

By 1937, Dewey (1940:348), in a speech to school superintendents, had concluded that:

... the democratic principle requires that every teacher should have some regular and organic way in which he can directly or through representatives democratically chosen, participate in the formation of the controlling aims, methods and materials of the school of which he is a part.

The academically conservative Council for Basic
Education, in changing its traditional hostile stance toward "teacher unionism" to more neutral ground, recently stated, "If the unions could give an iron-clad guarantee that the effect [on teaching and learning] will be improvement, we'd probably be all for them" ("Postscript. . ." 1977:13). Some have felt, however, that criticisms based on "iron-clad guarantees" tend to cut both ways: until recently, boards of education and superintendents have held monopoly-power and their track record in remaking schools for the better is not too good (Randles 1973:245).

School Boards alone have not been able to persuade the public to provide the wherewithal that would make public school teaching an attractive career for bright and energetic college graduates. It is conceivable that strong and determined teacher organizations can provide just the leverage needed (Doherty and Oberer 1967:122).

In addition, Lieberman (in Elam et al 1967:38) has argued, teachers, weak in dissociation, cannot protect the public interest in education:37 for example, working for the eradication of racial hatreds, securing more and better instructional materials, and the protection of academic freedom—the students' right to know. Indeed, Wildman (1967:8) concluded that the public interest might best be served by adopting a broad definition of bargainable

37The public interest, of course, has also been expressed and protected within a realm of publicly mandated, unilateral decision-making responsibilities which have been assigned to boards of education through the authority of the state legislatures and courts and which traditionally lie outside the scope of legally bargainable topics.
topics or subject matter. Formal adoption of such a public policy, on the other hand, will most likely be unnecessary because the scope of bargainable topics seems to have expanded with the process of bilateral decision making in the public sector (Wildman 1967:10) which has proven to be consistent with the private sector experience (Shils and Whittier 1968:365) and the stated expectations of the Chief Justice of the United States, Warren Burger:

... There is virtually no subject concerning the operation of the school system that could not also be characterized as a potential subject of collective bargaining. Teachers not only constitute the overwhelming bulk of employees of the school system, but they are the very core of that system; restraining teachers' expressions to the board on matters involving the operation of the schools would seriously impair the board's ability to govern the district (Burger 1976).
Randles (1973:213-16) has noted that as the conditions of employment have continued to improve, the seeds of discontent and conflict have begun to germinate between teachers and boards of education—and a compounding irony has been that school superintendents have been caught in between. Raymond E. Callahan (in Lutz and Azzarelli 1966:16) has found that the history of educational governance has been in great measure the history of the struggle of school boards to maintain power and control in the face of the struggle of school superintendents to gain the ascendency in educational policy determination. Randles (1973:239) has further noted that the power and influence of superintendents is a recent historical phenomenon, since 1900, and represents a preview of the oncoming struggle for power by organized teachers.

HUMAN NEED SATISFACTION

The character of one's job becomes the focal point of attention after one has achieved some reasonable level of physical comfort, usually bought with hard coin. Under those conditions, the importance of job satisfaction has been so frequently documented by research it can no longer be ignored by either private or public employers (Randles 1973:215).

Randles (1973:215) has further hypothesized that financial considerations per se may very well have become
less important in an absolute sense for public school teachers. Doherty and Oberer (1967:19) have noted that teachers' negotiation priority rankings have seen salaries fall out of the top priority ranks and a recent sophisticated statistical study by Bruno and Nelken (1975:81) failed to find salaries as having a significant impact on the propensity of teachers to strike. Another study by Chaney (1973:188) has shown that striking teachers were better off economically than non-striking teachers and that struck districts had a higher level of current expenditures per student than non-struck districts. Weitzman (1975:209) has argued that professional employees develop fewer loyalties toward the place of work than do other workers and thus job satisfaction is frequently considered a bargainable condition of employment among them—the meaningful participation in decision making raises the professional's self-image. While noting that the scope of bargaining in education is expanding and that the process is getting more complex, Elam (1975:74,105) editorialized that teachers would not abandon collective bargaining because the process has made many gains possible, "not the least of which is self-respect." Charles S. Benson (in Doherty et al.1966:2) has postulated that collective bargaining cannot fail to raise the teacher's professional self-image because the disillusioned teacher is offered an alternative to carping and destructive
criticism while the professionally ambitious teacher is offered a means to influence educational policy without having to leave the classroom and become an administrator. Doherty (1967:13-14) has suggested that what teachers really want through collective bargaining is comfort and security from the effects of what they see as too much administrative innovation. In more recent research, however, Buresh (1975) found that while most teacher contracts were security-need centered, the long-term trend seemed to be toward the inclusion of more opportunities for higher order human need satisfaction. On the basis of an opinion survey, Stevenson (1974) found that collective bargaining in Michigan did have an effect on curriculum particularly in respect to class size and the establishment of curriculum councils.

The weight of the empirical evidence would seem to have established human and professional need satisfaction as a major dynamic factor in the organization of teachers for collective bargaining. The models of human needs, however, are many and it will serve good purpose to

38Not included in this discussion but worth investigating would be Douglas McGregor's "Theory X" and "Theory Y" and Chris Argyris' human maturation model. Essentially, McGregor (1960:33-34,47-48) has argued that traditional managers operate on the self-fulfilling "Theory X" assumption that workers are childlike, irresponsible, and have an inherent dislike for work and a strong predilection toward security. Enlightened managers, however, operate more effectively on a more realistic assessment of human capabilities, "Theory Y," which assumes
briefly outline the few usually encountered in teacher bargaining literature: Herzberg, Gellerman, and Maslow.

Frederick Herzberg (1959:113-19) has proposed that human beings have two basic need continuums: the need to avoid pain and survive and the need to grow, develop, and learn. In relation to the job environment, Herzberg has classified the first need continuum as a set of "hygiene factors" (wages, company policy, working conditions) which are necessary in order to provide a healthy base for motivation but, as such, do not motivate. "Motivators," Herzberg has argued, are those factors which spur people to greater effort—such as recognition, achievement, and growth. When hygiene factors have been satisfied, the organism (such as a teacher) reaches homeostatic balance or equilibrium and further satisfying activity is insignificant. Motivational factors, on the other hand, Herzberg has judged as highly subjective and related to environmental mastery and thus can never be fully satisfied because the environment, psychological and physical, is much too large to ever be mastered; every success reveals a greater challenge and the hope of more exhilaration in workers to be mature, responsible adults who seek work as being as natural as play and who seek responsibility and creative endeavor more than security. Argyris (1957: 50-51), in turn, has based his work on the assumed conflict between the needs of mature individuals for independence, variety, and challenge on the one hand, and the demands of organizations for dependent and submissive employee behavior on the other.
Enlarging on Herzberg's ideas, Saul Gellerman (1963:177) has noted that:

When a motivator goes too long without some kind of gratifying experience to sustain it, it will drift out of prominence just as a fully rewarded satisfyer [hygienic factor] does, but instead of merely dwelling placidly in the background it is likely to acquire an alias in the form of some material need and continue to influence the individual's actions indirectly. In this manner, a satisfyer becomes a symbol or substitute for the motivator and is then pursued almost gluttonously. This can be seen in so-called "symptomatic wage demands" in which salary increases are sought even though money needs are not all that severe... In effect, the individual asks to be compensated with material rewards for having to endure a lack of psychological rewards.

The need hierarchy hypothesized by Abraham Maslow (1943:370-96), portraying humans as perpetually wanting animals, has become the most widely accepted model of human needs (Flippo 1976:374). Essentially, Maslow hypothesized that human needs are structured into a hierarchy on a five-step pyramidal form, thus illustrating

39 Flippo (1976:376) has criticized the Herzberg model as being method bound because individuals tend to blame hygiene factors for job failure and dissatisfaction while taking personal credit for job successes.

40 Maslow (1943:370-96) suggested five fundamental need categories or priority levels: (1) Basic physiological needs such as food, oxygen, water, and shelter; (2) Safety and security needs such as religion, job tenure, and an orderly society; (3) Social needs such as love and affection and association with others; (4) Esteem needs such as social approval, self-esteem, self-assertion, autonomy, and status; and (5) Self-actualization needs such as achievement and self-fulfillment.
that the needs at the lowest level or base of the conceptual pyramid have the higher priority while those higher or more human needs toward the middle and top have lower priority. Because Maslow held that human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs and not by gratified ones, the human effort at need satisfaction can be conceptualized as an urge to climb up the pyramid from bottom to top while the human experience with need satisfaction can be pictured as endless wave-like movements between the lower and upper portions of the pyramid. The human need to know and understand and aesthetic needs were both recognized by Maslow (1954:81-106) but were not systematized into the need hierarchy because he identified them as growth needs and his hierarchy systematized only non-growth or homeostatic needs. Maslow (1968:49,205) conceived homeostatic needs as preponderant in priority strength to growth tendencies and he argued that at least the lower level, safety needs, once satisfied, served as a safe base from which growth could proceed.

Maslow recognized that not all people follow the hierarchical pattern and he realized that both desires and satisfactions vary with the individual.  

41 Flippo (1976:376) has noted research dealing with Mexican and American workers of a common parent company which suggests that Maslow's need hierarchy may be culture bound. Flippo (1976:380) also noted that while Herzberg's theory of two continuums does not have the prestige of Maslow's one, Herzberg's analysis fares better with higher level technical jobs where employees are better educated.
Maslow (1954:100) reasoned that people are never completely satisfied on any need level, but an adequate amount of gratification of highest priority needs must be achieved before a lower priority need can be perceived.\textsuperscript{42}

In a study using Porter's Perceived Need Deficiency Scale, patterned after Maslow's need hierarchy correlated with Carlton's Militancy Scale, Giandomenico (1971) found a significant and positive relationship between perceived need deficiency and militancy. Giandomenico found, further, that deficiencies in two areas were consistent predictors of militancy: (1) the feeling of self-fulfillment of teaching from the self-actualization category and (2) opportunity for participation in the determination of methods and procedures from the autonomy category. In a complementary study by Chaney (1973:190), unrest or militancy was found to stem as much from the feeling that conditions were not improving at a fast enough pace as from antipathetic feelings directed toward existing conditions; "those who have been promised much but delivered little feel justified in taking strong actions [i.e., strikes] to achieve their goals and aspirations." In concordance, Ronald Corwin (in Elam et al. 1967:51) has concluded that

\textsuperscript{42}Maslow (1954:100-101) suggested that an average individual might be 85 percent satisfied in physiological needs, 70 percent in safety needs, 50 percent in social needs, 40 percent in esteem needs, and 10 percent in actualization needs—although full self-actualization, he hypothesized, is rare and happens in somewhat less than one percent of the population (Maslow 1968:204).
militant professionalism is intended to compromise both the control that administrators have gained over public education and the control traditionally exercised by the lay public. Somewhat more cautiously, Doherty and Oberer (1967:121) have hypothesized that teachers seem to want to organize and struggle through the collective bargaining process in order to improve their morale and achieve professional status:

Teachers have always sought professional status. Ironically, they may achieve this status by first learning how to act like militant trade unionists, thus securing the economic base that will allow them to concentrate on professional problems (Doherty and Oberer 1967:125).

ALIENATION AND THE QUEST FOR POWER

Professionalizing behavior cannot be fully appre- 
hended by having looked out into the social environment from the viewpoint of the individual's need structure; a perspective must also be drawn toward the individual from the group as both the subject and object of social forces. Before the contemporary meaning of the concept of alienation, a socially patterned malady affecting the individual, can be fully appreciated, the term, and idea it represents, must be explored along the lines of its semantic development.

Fromm (1955:112) has observed that while the use of the word alienation to mean estrangement from the
creative results of one's labor or life-activity is a relatively recent one, the concept was known in antiquity. Alienation is what the prophets of the Old Testament referred to as "idolatry" (Fromm 1962:57-59); when idolatrous man bows down to the work of his own hands, he bows down to a representation of his own life-forces in an alienated form. In a similar vein, Rotenstreich (1963:551) has found that the Greek root of alienation (αλλοϊωσίς, contemplation) was rendered into Latin as alienatio and employed through the mediation of εξορασία (ecstasy or ecstasy) which connotes one's going outside of oneself to the stage of going above oneself.

Eventually, Rotenstreich (1963:552) has noted, a philosophical system was constructed around the idea of the unity of subject and object—but a dialectical unity which attempted to maintain the distinction yet achieve a synthesis. Both Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx adopted this philosophical paradigm. Hegel took God (or Idea) as the subject of history and the externality of nature as the domain of God's self-alienation and development—the process of history being God's return to himself (Fromm 1962:44; Rotenstreich 1963:553). As far as the individual is concerned, Hegel held that human alienation was a denial of the self, which, if carried to its logical extreme, would amount to the eradication of the mind. For Hegel, then, Rotenstreich (1963:554) has argued, alienation
was either a misplaced realization of mind or else a sphere outside of it— but certainly not above it and definitely not an ecstatic or even a worthwhile achievement.

Ludwig Feuerbach returned in his thought to the earlier idea that alienation was an achievement of the realm above man but in a secular way; he reasoned that while alienation was an achievement, it was a false one (Fromm 1962:44; Rotenstreich 1963:554) because it meant that man projected the best of himself into a non-existent object or Spirit outside of himself and became, thereby, alienated (Bell 1959:937). The cure for alienation, Feuerbach reasoned, was man's reintegration with himself; he deemed transcendence of the human realm to be impossible—the achievement of alienation was actually pathological and, in the divine sense, illusory (Bell 1959:937; Fromm 1962:44; Rotenstreich 1963:554).

Marx, the generator of modern conceptions of alienation, agreed with Hegel that alienation was a denial of human potential and essence and, thus, was not elevation (ecstasis) but degradation (Rotenstreich 1963:554-56). Marx also agreed with Feuerbach, as Rotenstreich (1963:556) has pointed out, that alienation could not go beyond the human realm but he argued further that it could not, in fact, even go beyond the immediate or historical realm. Marx saw alienation as Entaeusserung, the
estrangement of the subjective and objective selves (of the self and the accomplishments of its life-activity), and Entfremdung, the estrangement of the subjective self or seeing one's self as a detached object or thing, such as a commodity or a factor of production (Bell 1959:933; Fromm 1962:44-48).

Rotenstreich (1963:555) has concluded that in the abandonment of the transcendent realm (ecstasis) the concept of alienation came to mean an improper transcendence (Hegel), then a fictitious one (Feuerbach), and finally a terrifying one (Marx). Moving from the philosophical realm to the legal one, however, Rotenstreich (1963:550) found that Saint Augustine's alienatio had also had the earlier and simpler meaning of "transference" such as one's personal property being transferred to another, thus making it alien to its former possessor; alienatio mentis meant, again in the legal sense, simple absent-mindedness. In non-legal usage, however, the concept of alienatio came to imply a situation lacking mental sanity (Rotenstreich 1963:550); the French aliéné and Spanish alienado are older words for the psychotic person and alienist is still an English word for psychiatrist (Fromm 1955:111). With the increasing prestige of Hegel, Marx, and Max Weber, the Latin-derived English word "alienation" began to assume the less drastic and more modern meaning of self-estrangement. While the word alienation has lost the implication of psychosis, it
has come to connote "one of the most severe socially patterned defects" that a human being can experience (Fromm 1955:111) and as such has attracted the attention of the social scientists:

Investigations of the "unattached," the "marginal," the "obsessive," the "normless," and the "isolated" individual all testify to the central place occupied by the hypothesis of alienation in contemporary social science. . . . It has become nearly as prevalent as the doctrine of enlightened self-interest was [three] generations ago. It is more than a hypothesis; it is a perspective (Nisbet 1953:15).

Alienation has been defined in the contemporary sense by Erich Fromm (1962:45-48) as a psychopathological condition in which an individual does not experience himself as the subject of his own acts but as the object of whatever he has created—for example, as the object of the externalized manifestation of his powers, such as the object of machines, of money, of bureaucratic organization, even of religion.43 Melvin Seeman (1959:783-91) clarified the meaning of alienation by extracting five alternative meanings from the pertinent literature: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.

Drawing from alienation as it originated with Marx, Seeman (1959:784) defined powerlessness as the expectancy held by an individual that his own behavior cannot

43Merton (1946:143) has noted that "the very same society that produces this sense of alienation and estrangement generates in many a craving for reassurance, an acute need to believe, a flight into faith."
determine the occurrence of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks. Moving closer to human relationships, Etzioni (1967:81) defined power as an individual's ability to induce or influence another individual to carry out his directions or any other norms he supports. Thinking in terms of bureaucratic organization, Pearlin (1962:315) further refined the definition by noting that "powerlessness is intensified when subordinates cannot affect ... superordinates' behavior." Connecting powerlessness with conflict, Randles (1973:232) argued that conflict is equally generated by the excessive use of power and feelings of powerlessness.

Seeman (1959:786) distinguished between powerlessness, the inability to control outcomes, and meaninglessness, the inability to predict outcomes while admitting their obvious connection: "In some important degree, the view that one lives in an intelligible world may be a prerequisite to expectancies for control." Seeman (1959:788-89) defined the isolation category of alienation as the feeling of being estranged from society and the typically highly valued goals or beliefs that its culture carries.

Once again drawing from Marx as well as John Dewey, Seeman (1959:789-90) defined self-estrangement as the inability of the individual to find self-rewarding activities that engage him. More specifically, Fromm...
(1955:111) defined this aspect of alienation as a "mode of experience in which the individual experiences himself as an alien." Perhaps the best description of self-estrangement was constructed by C. Wright Mills (1951:188):

Men are estranged from one another as each secretly tries to make an instrument of the other, and in time a full circle is made: One makes an instrument of himself and is estranged from it also.

Normlessness was defined by Seeman (1959:787) as a situation in which the social norms regulating individual conduct have broken down or are no longer effective as rules of behavior. Dean (1961:754) noted that normlessness as a component of alienation is derived from Emile Durkheim's concept of anomie; as Durkheim discussed it, anomie had

44 For Emile Durkheim and especially for the American sociologist Talcott Parsons (see previous discussion under "The Conflict Paradigm as a Normative Condition. . ."), alienation or anomie was perceived as an abnormal and pathological reaction to the specialization of labor which was itself a normal and even a healthy process effecting social solidarity (Durkheim 1964:353). Durkheim's views stand, of course, in stark contrast to those of Karl Marx who felt that alienation was the normal if unhealthy reaction to the specialization of labor which was the process of removing the individual further and further from the sources of his own spontaneous life-activity (Pacheco 1978:317). Max Weber was at one with Marx in direct contradistinction to Durkheim in so far as judging alienation as a normal if unhealthy reaction to the expropriation aspect of the specialization of labor (removing the individual from the sources of his life-activity) but Weber's view was much broader than Marx's because he concluded that the process of expropriation which leads to the alienation of the individual is not a phenomenon of the "means of production" but of the "means of administration"—the hierarchy of authority in any bureaucratically organized institution, such as the situations facing soldiers, scientists, and civil servants, and not just industrial employees (Giddens 1971:234; Gerth and Mills 1946:50). Weberian alienation forms the general conceptual backdrop for this study.
three characteristics: (1) a painful uneasiness or anxiety, (2) a feeling of separation from group standards, and (3) a feeling of pointlessness to life. Neal and Rettig (1963:599) have added another shade of meaning in defining normlessness as the high expectancy in an individual that socially unapproved behavior is required in goal attainment.

Aiken and Hage (1966:497) have argued that a persistent theme pervades most contemporary discussions about the alienation of modern man in that the conceptual term has been defined, measured, and discussed as if it were some kind of free-floating human condition independent of the specific social contexts which produce it. The findings of a number of studies have suggested that highly centralized organizations, those allowing minimal participation in agency-wide decisions and minimal individual autonomy in assigned tasks, are most likely to have high rates of work alienation (Aiken and Hage 1966:498). Aiken and Hage (1966:506) further found that in those organizations where professional employees were denied access to power or denied freedom from excessive constraints, or both, work alienation was greatest.

Public school teachers lack authority, Myers (1973:10; see also Wollett 1969:1020) has argued, because of the hierarchical authority pattern that typifies bureaucratically-oriented school districts; "bureaucracies demand a vertical
structure of authority whereas professions tend to follow a horizontal structure." Myers (1973:17) also found that lack of authority is a critical problem because it strikes at the heart of teacher professionalization: "It is impossible for teachers to become further professionalized without an increase in their authority." Ronald Corwin (in Elam et al. 1967:50-51) has reasoned that, in terms of teachers, militant professionalism can be seen, in part, as the struggle of teachers to gain more control over their work — not just more responsibility, but commensurate authority with sufficient autonomy to feel through actual activity the powers of the professional-subjective self.

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45 Myers has also noted that much of the energy expended by superiors in a vertical organizational structure is used maintaining their positions; they are compelled to keep subordinates subordinate:

If subordinates look too good, they can be a threat to his position. If subordinates come up with ideas, it implies that the superior does not have ideas. Any change is a threat to his position. Often, then, superiors suppress good ideas. The superior tends to hire persons who are less capable than he (Myers 1973:10).

46 The arena of the struggle, to a degree, is larger than the confines of a single school district. Goodlad (1975:110) has commented that during the curriculum reform movement of the 1960s, project directors sometimes saw teachers as intractable or incapable of changing, so "teacher-proof" materials were seen as the answer.

47 In a factor analysis of teacher militancy, Porter (1975:7) found an inclination on the part of militant teachers to seek increased professional authority and responsibility.
Saul Gellerman (1963:220) has reminded us that higher education not only teaches the individual to think critically and to analyze problems for himself, it also makes him rather intolerant of restrictions on his right to do so. This is why the first few years of employment after college can be so disillusioning. . . . The net effect of a more educated pool from which employees can be hired is an increasing pressure to enlarge both the scope of jobs and the degree of latitude given to individuals in these jobs.48

Teacher alienation from the work role seems to be more closely related to superior-subordinate (administrator-teacher) relationships than it is to Max Weber's concepts of the alienating effects of the ideal bureaucracy.49 More to the point, Randles (1973:225) has pointed out that teachers seek participation in decision making not only to satisfy individual psychological needs, but to assume some control over forces which affect their role within the school organization. In a sense, teachers are reacting to being occupationally trapped; the absence of professional advancement opportunities has forced teachers to leave, in effect, the actual practice of their profession when they desire to advance upward in the organizational hierarchy (Alutto and Belasco 1974:226).

According to Moskow (1966:4), the hyper-hierarchization of American schools and the nearly total

---

48 Interestingly, limitations on professional autonomy often emerge in organizations in which decision making is controlled by nonprofessionals (Alutto and Belasco 1974:217).

49 For a fuller discussion than that sketched out in this chapter, see Weber (1964:333-36).
separation and alienation of classroom teachers from school district decision makers has come with a fairly recent phenomenon called consolidation. In 1962, the year of the Kennedy Executive Order which heralded the contemporary era of teacher militancy, there were fewer than 35,000 school districts in the United States—a decline of 50 percent over the previous ten years and of 70 percent over the previous twenty (Moskow 1966:4). Randles (1973:222) has added, in scanning the dubious advantages of the economies of scale in school consolidation, that

... the "good old days" of employer-employee relations may generate nostalgia; but nothing about today's complex educational organizations suggests the practices of the good old days will suffice in this decade.

In this context, organizational membership has been shown to augment strongly teachers' sense of power (Randles 1973:251). A sense of power leads, naturally enough, to tests of power and such tests are the essence of the institutionalized conflict of collective bargaining or bilateral decision making which in turn is the cornerstone of contemporary employer-employee peace in the workplace (Randles 1972:253).

50 From a study by Gerald H. Moeller, "Bureaucracy and Teachers' Sense of Power," Administrators Notebook XI: 3(November 1962). See also George Ehrenhaft (1972) who found that collective bargaining affected curriculum in Brookdale Middle School by enlivening teacher interest in professional matters and by causing the administration to solicit teacher advice regarding curricular decisions.
While attempts at collective organization and bargaining by American industrial employees began with the building of the national economy after the Revolution, it was not until the passing of the omnipresent frontier a century later that private sector labor organizations became a permanent viable force. For the greater part, public sector employee bargaining received its impetus from President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10988 in 1962. Public school teachers, in their turn, have moved closer to professional status and the evidence is that their goal may very well be achieved through the process of collective bargaining.

Contemporary inquiry has shown that an old theory may be operant in human interrelationships; conflict is a natural and necessary means of communication between human beings and, while it can be dysfunctional, it is not predetermined to be if properly managed by trained and thoughtful people. Research and mundane experience has shown that professional employees, and specifically teachers, are neither immune to human need structures nor to the societal malaise of alienation. Indeed, teachers' militant behavioral patterns can be understood only in relation to the natural drive to attain satisfaction of social, esteem, self-actualization and growth needs as well as the healthy quest to gain professional impact in the work environment.
Throughout the decade of the 1960s and into the 1970s public school teachers along with other public sector employees have organized in overwhelming numbers on a nationwide as well as a statewide basis for the purpose of collective bargaining. A survey of the research and analytical literature would seem to explain the bulk of this teacher militancy in terms of two distinctly separate but subtly interrelated points of view: (1) Teachers would seem to be striving for higher level need fulfillment (or homeostatic need reduction) and professional growth in terms of the Human Needs Model and (2) Teachers would seem to be attempting to alleviate or escape the discomfiture of alienation by asserting subjective control over their professional image of themselves in the workplace.

If teachers are, indeed, seeking professional need satisfactions and professional authority or control over their work and if they have had some success, then it is not unreasonable to expect to find some supporting evidence. One place to look for the supporting evidence of success would be within the master contracts that teachers have negotiated with their respective boards of education.
Collective bargaining typically revolves around the topical areas of wages, hours, and working conditions; it is within the latter of these topics where one might best expect bargaining teachers to achieve some success in both high-level need satisfaction and de-alienation.  

For the purposes of this study, the conditions of labor for teachers could be further delimited to the primary interests of teachers as professionals in a unique workplace: direct and substantive influence in the decision-making processes in relation to the resources, methods, policies, and procedures attendant to the school curricula.  

In summary, if negotiating teachers could get specific items relating to their autonomy within and control of their work as professionals into an enforceable master contract, then those "curricular items" would be evidence of some teacher success in attempting to satisfy high-level needs and redress alienation.

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51Wages and hours do, of course, have high-level Maslowian need implications (e.g., status and esteem needs) that are distinct from their usual marketplace (low-level Maslowian needs) assignments and, in turn, they are also important considerations in the study of teacher alienation (e.g., when the art of teaching is reduced to a commodity because its work-rewards have been reduced to the abstract level of monetary value), but their consideration has been omitted because of the delimitations of this study.
Selection Procedures: Curricular Items and Districts

A review of the pertinent literature and conferences with Education professors at Oregon State University (primarily Dr. Carvel Wood and Dr. Henry Ten Pas) resulted in a compilation and distillation of curricular items appropriate for the purposes of this study. An annotated list of the selected Curricular Items can be found in Exhibit I.

It will be obvious from the first reading of the list of 24 selected Curricular Items (see Table 1, p. 83) that the individual items are neither of equal weight nor significance and a brief reflection will raise concerns about the variation in the weight and significance of each item as it might appear in different master contracts. For example, Academic Freedom would not be of equal weight and significance with teacher autonomy in Teacher Inservice Development; nor would a weak Academic Freedom clause be equal to a strong one. In order to bring order out of the seeming chaos of "apples and oranges," it must be emphasized that this study does not seek to evaluate the nuances and ramifications of meaning in each item in each master contract.

Table 1. Curricular Items

I. The School Day
   1. The Student Day
   2. The Teacher Day
   3. Preparation/Rest Periods
II. Classroom Responsibilities
   4. Class Size
   5. Teaching Load
   6. Student-Teacher Ratio
   7. Prep Load
   8. Class Load
   9. Class Assignments
  10. Academic Load
III. Out-of-Class Activities
   11. Extracurricular Duties
IV. Advisory Committees
   12. Curriculum
   13. School Policy
   14. Teacher Inservice/Growth
   15. Budget
   16. Teacher Selection
   17. Auxiliary Personnel Selection
V. Professional Autonomy
   18. Academic Freedom
   19. Classroom Control
   20. Diagnosis/Referral
   21. Permanent Records
   22. Substitute Call
   23. Textbook ("Software") Selection
   24. Instructional Supplies and Equipment ("Hardware") Selection
contract—such would be a never-ending task. The study has made the assumption that an Item, however strong or weak or strangely worded, has appeared in the written instrument of a teacher-board settlement only after it was proposed by one party (usually teachers—boards do not usually propose limitations on their own perceived prerogatives), considered by the other party, and then, in some accommodational form, agreed to by both. Briefly, even the weakest form of a specific Curricular Item would be evidence that teachers were attempting to achieve professional need satisfaction and alienation remission. Simply, the study has sought Items of evidence, not examples of quality contract clauses.

A copy of the Oregon School Directory: 1976-77 was consulted in order to isolate all unified districts with an Average Daily Membership (ADM) of 2500 students or more. A copy of the Directory for 1973-74 was also consulted in order to be sure that the ADM for all districts eligible for the study remained at 2500 or above for the time period within the statistical design (1973-74 to 1976-77). One school district, Estacada, was eliminated because its teachers were not unified under one master contract for the entirety of the time span that the study embraced. The lower school district size limit of 2500 ADM was chosen because the overwhelming majority of districts that size
and larger had negotiated master agreements for the 1973-74 school year. Unified districts were chosen in order to be sure that all teachers in all grades, one through twelve, were covered by the same settlement and because school district consolidation has been identified as an important factor in teacher alienation (Moskow 1966:4 and Corwin 1970:5-12). In all, 43 Oregon school districts met the criteria for selection; they were then alphabetized and numbered from 1 to 43 (see Appendix I).

In order to meet the randomization requirement needed for confidence in generalizing the results and as a basic necessity for the use of the selected statistical tool (the F statistic), an HP-2000F computer was programmed in the BASIC language \((X = \text{INT}(43*\text{RND}(1)+1))\) to generate nine lists of 30 random numbers between and including 1 and 43. The first single digit number in the first list was used to select one of the nine lists; the third list was chosen and the first 19 unduplicated random numbers were matched to the numbers assigned to the 43 alphabetized districts. The number 19, at 44 percent of 43, easily meets the requirements of the Central Limits Theorem. (See Appendix II for a list of the 19 Oregon districts randomly

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53For the purposes of this study, "Master Agreement" will refer to the results of teacher-board conferences in Oregon under the old "confer, consult, and discuss" law of 1965 while "Master Contract" will refer to the results of a negotiated settlement under the 1973 Public Employee Bargaining Law. Outside Oregon the de facto impact of the semantic distinction abates somewhat.
selected for this study.)

After the 19 unified Oregon school districts were chosen, a search was conducted for the contracts needed to carry out the statistical design. As anticipated, recent teacher-board master contracts were easy to procure, but old and out-dated contracts were extremely difficult to obtain. The statistical problems then were: (1) Would unequal cell sizes yield meaningful results and, if so, (2) What would be the minimum number of contracts needed in each of the first two cells (the third, of course, would be 19) to produce credible results, and, lastly, (3) Should the districts appearing in the smallest cell (i.e., the first cell) have contracts occurring across all three cells in order to obtain optimal statistical results.

After conferring with Dr. Wayne Courtney and Dr. Frederick Klopfer, both experts in research design at Oregon State University, and after consulting the standard text on statistical power analysis (Cohen 1969), the following decisions were made:

(1) Unequal cell size would present minimal problems inasmuch as the study dealt with relatively stable written agreements and contracts.

(2) Less than five districts' agreements represented in cell one or nine contracts in cell two would be unacceptable. Both figures should be nearly doubled if at all possible.
(3) The districts represented in cell one should be carried across all cells.
Research Design and Data Collection Procedures

The statistical design can be visualized in this manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Sample of 43 Unified Oregon School Districts above 2500 ADM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1973-74</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_1 ) Not fewer than five agreements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(same district across all cells where possible)

\( X_1 \) Represents the population sample of the last year (1973-74) under the 1965 "Confer, Consult, and Discuss" Law. This cell acts as an experimental control group because good faith collective bargaining was not legally required of the parties at issue. More simply, if consultations reached a stubborn impasse, the teachers had no legal recourse but to acquiesce to their board's position.

\( X_2 \) Represents the first master contracts negotiated under the protective umbrella of the 1973 Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Legally, it became incumbent upon both sides to bargain in good faith and teachers could carry a stubborn impasse into a legal strike and/or take a "refusal to bargain collectively" charge to the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB)\(^{54}\) and, ultimately, to the appellate courts.

\(^{54}\) The Employment Relations Board at that time was acting under the name Public Employe [sic] Relations Board (PERB).
Represents the first master contracts negotiated after the Scope of Bargaining decision by the Oregon Employment Relations Board which limited the mandatory items of bargaining.

The statistical design model was essentially an extended Posttest Only Control Group Design as found in Campbell and Stanley (1963:8,25-27) and can be symbolically expressed in this manner:

\[
\begin{align*}
R & \quad 0_1 \\
R & \quad X_1 \quad 0_2 \\
R & \quad X_2 \quad 0_3 \\
\end{align*}
\]

where \( R \) represents the principle of randomization,

\( X_1 \) represents the "treatment" effect of the 1973 Collective Bargaining Law,

\( X_2 \) represents the "treatment" effect of the Scope of Bargaining decision,

\( 0_1, 0_2, \) and \( 0_3 \) represent observations or measurements of treatment effects.

The mathematical model for the study can be expressed thus:

\[
Y_i = \mu + \alpha_i + \epsilon_i
\]

where \( Y_i \) = one evaluated contract score,

\( \mu \) = the fixed constant—it is, of course, the assumption that the "population" is stable that allows statistical analysis,

\( \alpha_i \) = the differential effect—i.e., teachers seeking high-level needs satisfaction and alienation remission.
$e_i$ = the error factor.

Projecting, then, from this standard mathematical model, a design was set up to test a null hypothesis (H₀) across three experimental units or cells using the F statistic (One-way Analysis of Variance) for a significant difference at $\alpha .05$ (risk level) between the cells:

H₀: $X_1 = X_2 = X_3$

The three cells (here symbolized by $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$) represent tabulations of teacher-board agreed-upon Curricular Items within three succeeding time periods (1973-74, 1974-75, and 1975-77). The tabulations or nominal data were then altered by the natural logarithmic function in order to "transform" the data into the continuous or equidistant interval data requisite to the use of the F statistic. The transformation function also allowed the dependent variable or data to meet the other requirements for the proper use of Analysis of Variance:

1. The transformation corrected for any skewness and produced the requisite normal curve in the data source.

2. The transformation also equalized the variances (i.e., pulled in the tails or closed the range). This stabilization is especially important for accuracy in this study because of the unequal cell size (i.e., tolerance in variance equalization is greater for equal cell size).

In summary, the assumptions requisite to the use
of Analysis of Variance are that independent random samples must be drawn from normal (curve) populations having equal variances or mean square errors ($S^2$). The statistical design for this study has met the above assumptions and can be used to test the null hypothesis: Collective bargaining by teachers in Oregon's largest districts has had little or no significant impact on their work environment as measured by the incidence of specific indicators in master agreements and master contracts.
Data Analysis Procedures

The Oregon State University Cyber computer was programmed (using Nie et al. 1975) to generate a complete Analysis of Variance Table from data-coded IBM cards and the computed F was then compared to a tabular F from a standard F Table for the significance testing at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean of Squares</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\Theta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\Theta$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confirmation of the null hypothesis would conclude the design: there would be insufficient evidence to support the notion of significant differences in the incidence of Curricular Items over time. It could not be properly concluded from the confirmation, however, that there was not a difference—only that evidence of a difference could not be found. On the other hand, rejection of the null hypothesis (i.e., the determination that there was a significant difference) would bring into play a Least Significant Difference (LSD) test on two (as limited by the

\[55\] When an F ratio is statistically significant, a special form of the t test can be used to determine which sample means differ significantly from one another. The standard error of this special t test is derived from the variances of all population samples instead of from just the two samples being compared. The special t test used in this study was the LSD test.
degrees of freedom) a priori, alternative hypotheses in order to find out where the difference was:

\[ \text{Ha}_1: \ X_1 < X_2 \]
\[ \text{Ha}_2: \ X_1 < X_3 \]

The choice of \( \alpha .05 \) as the "risk level" (in advance of the statistical analysis of the independent variable) is the prerogative of the researcher. The risk factor of \( \alpha .05 \) was chosen for this study because it represents this researcher's choice of the optimal path through the Type I-Type II error maze.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{56}\) The problem is that effort expended to reduce Type I errors automatically increases Type II errors and vice versa. A Type I error is the rejection of a null hypothesis that should have been retained, a major research blunder, and a Type II error is the acceptance of a null hypothesis that should have been rejected.
Summary

The statistical design used the One-way Analysis of Variance tool to test a null hypothesis across three chronologically arranged experimental cells in order to ascertain whether the quest on the part of public school teachers to achieve professional need satisfaction and professional control over their work, in an atmosphere of lawful delimitation and protection, has had significant impact within the professional work environment as measured by the incidence of the negotiated insertion of Curricular Items into randomly selected, conferred upon master agreements and collectively bargained master contracts. Stated more simply, the statistical design tests the null hypothesis: Collective bargaining by teachers in Oregon's largest districts has had little or no significant impact on their work environment as measured by the incidence of specific indicators in master agreements and master contracts.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

The statistical design called for a random sample of 19 out of 43 unified Oregon school districts with an Average Daily Membership (ADM) of 2500 or more. Once the 19 school districts were identified, they were arranged into three chronological or treatment groups and a search for their collectively-bargained master agreements and contracts was conducted. As anticipated, out-of-date master agreements and contracts proved to be very difficult to procure while those in use at the time of the search were fairly readily available. The conclusion of the search produced the predicted unequal cell size. The a priori decision had been made to proceed with the statistical study if the first cell contained at least five agreements, the second cell nine contracts, and the third cell nineteen contracts. In order to strengthen the statistical accuracy of the study, those districts whose contracts were located for inclusion in the first cell (1973-74) also had their subsequent contracts carried across cells two and three; similarly, those additional districts whose contracts were located for inclusion in cell two were carried in their subsequent contracts into cell three (see Exhibit II).

The conclusion of the contract search allowed the
study to proceed on the following base (also see Exhibit II):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$X_1$</td>
<td>$X_2$</td>
<td>$X_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 9$</td>
<td>$n = 19$</td>
<td>$n = 19$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X_1$ Represents the last year (1973-74) under the 1965 "Confer, Consult, and Discuss" Law.

$X_2$ Represents the first master contracts negotiated under the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act of 1973.

$X_3$ Represents the first master contracts negotiated after the Scope of Bargaining decision by the Oregon Employment Relations Board.

Once the school districts were identified and all of the available master agreements and contracts were procured, a search was conducted through each contract for previously identified Curricular Items (see Exhibit I). The incidence of Curricular Items (i.e., evidence of professional need satisfaction and of professional alienation remission) was tabulated in nominal form and subsequently computer-transformed by the natural logarithmic function into the continuous data requisite to the use of the F statistic (see Exhibit II). The transformation function also corrected for any skewness in the data and equalized the variances; both corrections were especially desirable in a design incorporating unequal cell size.
The statistical design was constructed to test a null hypothesis (Ho) across three cells using the F statistic (One-way Analysis of Variance) for a significant difference at α .05 (risk level) between the cells. The design also called for a Least Significant Difference (LSD) test, in the event of an Ho rejection, in order to locate the significant differences in relation to two a priori alternative hypotheses (Ha₁ and Ha₂).

Table 2. The Logarithmically Transformed Data used in the Statistical Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973-74</th>
<th>1974-75</th>
<th>1975-77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X₁</td>
<td>1.0986</td>
<td>26.6183</td>
<td>26.7307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₂</td>
<td>1.4010</td>
<td>1.4069</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X₃</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1.2069</td>
<td>48.0555</td>
<td>47.6653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X̄</td>
<td>1.221</td>
<td>1.4010</td>
<td>1.4069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΣX²</td>
<td>4.1069</td>
<td>48.0555</td>
<td>47.6653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings Related to the Null Hypothesis

The null hypothesis predicted that there would be little or no significant difference in the incidence of Curricular Items between the chronological or treatment cells. A One-way Analysis of Variance was run on the Cyber computer at Oregon State University which produced the following results at the $\alpha .05$ significance level:

Table 3. Analysis of Variance Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.9569</td>
<td>5.9784</td>
<td>12.0140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21.8953</td>
<td>.4976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33.8522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the computed $F$ ($12.0140$) was compared to the tabular $F$ value ($3.21$), it was concluded that the null hypothesis was rejected and, concomitantly, that the a priori alternative hypotheses were thus far retained.

Table 4. Decision on the Null Hypothesis

Given: $H_0: X_1 = X_2 = X_3$

$\alpha = .05$

df = 2, 44

F Tabular = 3.21

F Computed = 12.0140

$CF \geq TF = H_0$ reject

Decision: $H_0$ = rejected

$H_{a1}$ and $H_{a2}$ = retained
Findings Related to the First Alternative Hypothesis

The special $t$ test chosen for testing both a priori hypotheses in the study was the Least Significant Difference (LSD) test at the $\alpha = .05$ risk level.

The first a priori hypothesis ($H_{a1}$) predicted that the second population sample (1974-75) would contain a significantly greater incidence of Curricular Items than the first population sample (1973-74).

When the computed LSD value (.6632) was compared to the difference between the two sample means (1.2788), it was concluded that the first alternative a priori hypothesis was confirmed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Decision on First Alternative Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Given:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{a1}$: $X_1 &lt; X_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{X}_1 = .1221$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{X}_2 = 1.4009$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference = 1.2788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computed LSD = .6632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference $\geq$ LSD = $H_a$ confirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Decision:                                       |
| $H_0$ = rejected                               |
| $H_{a1}$ = confirmed                           |
| $H_{a2}$ = retained                             |
Findings Related to the Second Alternative Hypothesis

The second a priori hypothesis (Ha$_2$) predicted that the third population sample (1975-77) would contain a significantly greater incidence of Curricular Items than the first population sample (1973-74).

When the computed LSD value (.6632) was compared to the difference between the two sample means (1.2848), it was concluded that the second alternative a priori hypothesis was confirmed.

Table 6. Decision on Second Alternative Hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Given:</th>
<th>Ha$_2$: $X_1 &lt; X_3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>= .05</td>
</tr>
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Decision: Ho = rejected
Ha$_1$ = confirmed
Ha$_2$ = confirmed
Summary of Results

The null hypothesis that there was little or no significant difference in the incidence of Curricular Items across three chronologically-arranged treatment cells was rejected by a One-way Analysis of Variance test at the $\alpha .05$ level of statistical significance. The first alternative a priori hypothesis that the first experimental cell contained significantly fewer Curricular Items than the second experimental cell was confirmed by an LSD test at the $\alpha .05$ level of significance. The second alternative a priori hypothesis that the first experimental cell contained significantly fewer Curricular Items than the third experimental cell was also confirmed at the $\alpha .05$ level of significance.

Table 7. Recapitulation of Statistical Conclusions

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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of the Study

The objectives of the study included: (1) a brief survey of the historical forces operant upon public school teacher organization for collective bargaining, (2) an analysis of human needs and alienation as causal factors of teacher militancy, and (3) a statistical study designed to locate significant evidence, if any, of professional need satisfaction and professional alienation remission incorporated over time into negotiated master agreements and contracts.

The history of private sector collective bargaining has rarely included the efforts of employees to bargain over the nature of the product they have been employed to produce. Indeed, private sector employees, if not always their leaders, have traditionally organized to expand the benefits of their status along the relatively narrow lines of more wages, fewer hours, and safe and stable conditions of employment. Public sector employee organization to improve wages, hours, and working conditions can be traced back to the Jacksonian Era. At first, public sector employees were usually organized into mixed unions with their private sector counterparts and the organizational success of all employee unions followed the national
economy's "boom and bust" cycles. The major obstacle, however, to the organization of public sector unions and their efforts at bargaining was the deep-seated and long-term emotional and philosophic antipathy harbored by the general public. Not until President Kennedy's EO 10988 and subsequent action by state legislatures which encouraged and protected public employee organization for bargaining did the public sector become by far the most unionized—over 50 percent compared to about 20 percent for the private sector.

For practical reasons, professional employees in both sectors of the economy have been traditionally allowed more autonomy and authority in their specialized work and, when organized, they have sought to expand their control over the "conditions of employment" or the nature of the services they perform. It has been argued that all employees, in occupational classifications, are located along a status continuum and, through concerted action, they are "professionalizing" or attempting to move from the lower to the higher end. Resistance to professionalization comes about through the nature of the bureaucratic work environment which generates employee-employer conflict; collective bargaining has become widely accepted as the best institutionalized means of managing this conflict.

Public school teachers fit the professionalizing model. Historically, they have had low but improving
status while remaining essentially without professional autonomy and authority in the workplace. Recently, teachers have adopted collective bargaining as their most effective means of achieving professional status; their quest, coupled with their means, has been labeled teacher or professional militancy.

The statistical portion of the study was constructed in order to conclude whether there was significant evidence that teachers in Oregon's larger school districts have been achieving professional needs and control within the work environment by negotiating relevant Curricular Items into their master agreements and contracts.
The first activity in constructing the statistical design was the postulation of the null hypothesis: collective bargaining by teachers in Oregon's largest districts has had little or no significant impact on their work environment as measured by the incidence of specific indicators in master agreements and master contracts. Three experimental cells were arranged chronologically (1973-74, 1974-75, and 1975-77) and in such a way as to measure the treatment effects of proceeding from a consultation law (1973-74) through passage of a complete collective bargaining law (1974-75) to the first contracts negotiated after the "Scope of Bargaining" decision by the Employment Relations Board (1975-77). The design called for a One-way Analysis of Variance to test the null hypothesis at the \( \alpha = 0.05 \) risk level and a Least Significant Difference (LSD) test, in the event of a null hypothesis rejection, in order to locate the significant difference in reference to two directional a priori alternative hypotheses.

Next came the careful location, compilation, and distillation of a list of factors or indicators with professional autonomy and control content. The result was a list of 24 individual Curricular Items which, if one or more were found in a master agreement or contract, would indicate an incremental incidence of negotiating teachers
gaining autonomy in the workplace and control over their specialized services.

Forty-three unified Oregon school districts with an average daily membership (ADM) of 2,500 or more were then isolated as the statistical population. A random sample of 19 districts was extracted from the alphabetized list of 43. An extensive and laborious search for master contracts was conducted until all that were available were procured. Outdated contracts were often unavailable so the resultant unequal cell size called for the location and use of the appropriate statistical formulas. Each of the master instruments was read and the Curricular Items were tabulated in nominal form and then transformed by the natural logarithmic function into the continuous data required for the F statistic and the LSD test.

The use of the F statistic resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis. As drawn from the findings, it can thus be concluded that there is evidence that teachers in Oregon's larger districts have been using either consultive or collective bargaining as a means of satisfying professional needs (i.e., increasing autonomy) and achieving professional control (i.e., alienation remission) within their unique work environment. It cannot be concluded solely on the basis of the null hypothesis rejection (1) whether teachers have been benefiting from the permissive consultation laws of 1965 and 1968 or from the full
protective collective bargaining law of 1973 or (2) whether the delimiting "Scope of Bargaining" decision redressed the difference.

The use of the LSD test on the first alternative hypothesis that the incidence of Curricular Items was greater in the second experimental cell (1974-75) than in the first (1973-74) resulted in its confirmation. It can be concluded on the basis of the findings that teachers in Oregon's larger districts have been more successful in satisfying professional needs and achieving professional control under the protective umbra of a true collective bargaining law than they were under the permissive conference law.

The use of the LSD test on the second alternative hypothesis that the incidence of Curricular Items was greater in the third experimental cell (1975-77) than in the first (1973-74) also resulted in its confirmation. It can be concluded on the basis of the findings that teachers in Oregon's largest districts have continued to satisfy professional needs and achieve professional control under the protective umbra of a complete collective bargaining law even after the invocation of restrictions on the scope of mandatory bargainable issues.
Implications and Concluding Remarks

The researcher's list of Curricular Items (see Exhibit I) includes topics that the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB) had ruled "mandatory" (e.g., prep time) or "permissive" (e.g., class-size) after the 1974-75 (cell two) master contracts had been settled. The implications for bias in cell three (1975-77), therefore, should not be overlooked in any evaluation of the quality of the research: mandatory items must be bargained over if either side wishes to, while permissive items may be if both parties choose to. It is possible that items understood by the parties to be mandatory might be more easily placed in a master contract than items understood to be permissive. The understanding of the parties is crucial because "items" are not the same as "labels." ERB ruled specific class-size limiting language as permissive and specific prep-time language as mandatory; how ERB might rule on an association or union demand that teachers "overloaded" with students receive more prep time is anyone's guess at this writing. The difference between mandatory and permissive is not, therefore, always distinct. Any bias contaminating the statistical findings based on the third chronological cell was thus, to a degree, inescapable and, hopefully, minimal.

The degrees of freedom place a limitation on the number of statistical conclusions that can be drawn from
the statistical design but inferences and implications can be properly extrapolated from the data base. For example, the total overall incidence and per district average of Curricular Items tabulated in cell two (1974-75) was virtually unchanged in cell three (1975-77)—97 at 5.10 per district and 96 at 5.05 per district respectively. From this evidence, an inference could be drawn that the "Scope of Bargaining" decision had little or no effect on teachers' quest to increase their level of professional need satisfaction and expand their control over the work environment. Closer inspection of the data, however, reveals that the incidence of Curricular Items remained unchanged in 11 districts while increasing by eight in four districts and decreasing by nine in the other four districts. This slight compacting tendency seems to be substantiated when a comparison is made of the standard deviations of the transformed data, revealing that a value of .7733 in the second cell has declined to a value of .7475 in the third. This would seem to imply that the "Scope" decision might have had some effect after all by focusing the quantity of Curricular Items toward some vague, mutually acceptable number of items per contract. Perhaps it would be worthwhile at some future opportunity for someone to pursue speculations along these lines with formal research.

Some school districts kept no written master agreements as such under the consultation law but nevertheless
complied with their recollection and understanding of the limited verbal master agreement. Occasionally, the verbal master agreements were incorporated in whole or in part into the written school district policies. Consequent to these practices, it cannot be assumed with precision that the incidence of tabulated Curricular Items in the first cell (1973-74) represents the actual number of such items formally agreed to and in effect in all 19 school districts randomly selected for the study.

It would also be imprudent to assume, as a corollary to the preceding, that a high incidence of Curricular Items in master contracts occurs in enlightened work environments while a low incidence occurs in "sweat shop" work environments. Indeed, just the opposite evaluation of the available evidence was possible when contracts with many Curricular Items also seemed to nervously provide for every conceivable threatening contingency (e.g., St. Helens) or, on the other hand, when contracts with little mention of Curricular Items seemed to be phrased with pro forma complacency (e.g., Lake Oswego).

Lastly, the precipitant assumption that Curricular Items exist in master contracts only because professionalizing teachers have demanded and gained them across a bargaining table would also be unjustified. For example, academic freedom serves the democratic public interest and enlightened school district boards and their negotiators
might very well harbor no conceptual objections to its presence in a master contract—indeed, for political as well as liberal-minded reasons, they might even favor its presence.

A culminating implication can be threaded through the above labyrinth of limitations, observations, inferences, and speculations: the 1500% overall increase in the incidence of Curricular Items from master agreements for 1973-74 under permissive legislation to master contracts negotiated for 1974-75 under protective legislation would seem to clearly establish the efficacy of collective bargaining as a viable, institutionalized means of achieving full professional status for Oregon's and perhaps, by extrapolation, the nation's public school teachers.
The effects of professionalizing teachers bargaining collectively over matters with curricular impact within their unique work environment outlines an area for further research with considerable breadth and depth. The potential for further research in the area is as great as the need for it is imperative; the commonweal cannot be well served by ignorance. Further research by students of teaching employee collective bargaining should certainly include:

1. A continuation of the present study in order to ascertain the long-range effects and implications of teacher professionalization in Oregon.

2. The design of the present study altered to differentiate as accurately as possible between "mandatory" and "permissive" Curricular Items in order to ascertain the long-range effects of the "Scope" decision with its subsequent extensions and clarifications.

3. The design of the present study extended to include Oregon's unified public school districts below 2500 ADM.

4. The parameters of the present study extended to include a random sample of all of Oregon's 334 public school districts.

5. A statistical study of long-term teacher
professionalization in legally permissive environments in other states (i.e., under conference legislation).

6. A statistical study of long-term teacher professionalization in environments lacking permissive or protective legislation (i.e., in those states where teacher-board bargaining is legally unrecognized, discouraged, or actually outlawed).

7. A statistical study comparing or contrasting teacher professionalization in: (1) a legally protective, (2) a legally permissive, and (3) a legally deficient bargaining environment [e.g. (1) Oregon, (2) California, and (3) Arizona].

8. A statistical study of the effects of teacher professionalization through collective bargaining on the attitudes and behavior of school district middle management superintendents, and lay boards.
Delimiting Curricular Items for this study was complicated by the fact that some of those ultimately selected were rather general (e.g., academic load) while others were rather specific (e.g., teaching day). Nevertheless, the fundamental accuracy of the research design was not undermined, because only substantially coherent and quantifiable Curricular Items were identified for tabulation. In no instance were Curricular Items subjectively amalgamated for tabulation out of the hints suggested by the drift of contractual language.

The process of collectively bargaining over the conditions of employment can be viewed as employees (in this case classroom teachers) attempting to simultaneously achieve professional needs and limit the traditional unilateral prerogatives of management. While this process implies conflict, it does not necessarily mean unremitting, dysfunctional warfare; management can and does derive benefit from the process too (e.g., a stable and dependable work force).

Traditionally, many teachers have always been allowed to choose their own textbooks, for an example, either by way of managerial design or salutary neglect, but this modicum of autonomy is vulnerable to unilateral decision making unless it is clearly an enforceable
contractual right. Each Curricular Item, then, when placed into a contract, carries with it the aura of enforceability and thus exists as an increment along the continuum of:
(1) professional high-level need satisfaction and (2) alienation remission or the reintegration of the employee with his work, himself, his colleagues, and his community.

Following is an annotated list of the Curricular Items or indicators used in the research design.

I. The School Day

1. The **Student Day** is the session time that teachers actually spend with their students (e.g., 240 minutes per day). The Item here is contract language giving teachers greater control over the time that they spend with students—simply, the goal is a professional-client relationship.

2. The **Teacher Day** is the amount of time per day that teachers are encouraged or required to be in the school building (e.g., eight until four). The Item in this case is contract language giving teachers more control and flexibility in organizing their professional time.

3. **Preparation/Rest Periods** is an Item requiring preparation and rest time as a professional prerogative and right.
II. Classroom Responsibilities

4. **Class Size** as an Item controls the actual number of students each teacher is assigned per period or per hour (e.g., 25 students per 50-minute period). The rationale for the Item is greater teacher time per pupil for professional services.

5. **Teaching Load** as an Item regulates the actual number of student-clients that an individual teacher is assigned on a daily basis (e.g., 125 students per day for secondary teachers or an equivalent computation for self-contained elementary classrooms). The Item rationale is the same as for No. 4 above.

6. The **School Student-Teacher Ratio** is the number of students in a school facility divided by the number of teachers—Including counselors and specialists but excluding aides, principals, janitors, and the like. The Item is contractual control of the ratio.

7. **Prep Load** is the number of different preparations that a secondary teacher is assigned per term-semester-year. The Item in this case is contractual evidence that teachers are seeking to limit the number of "preps" in order to spend more and better-quality professional time with students.

8. **Class Load** is the number of different classes, periods, or "hours" that a teacher is assigned
per term-semester-year. The Item here is contract language seeking to limit the number of individual classes, periods, or "hours" in order to increase the amount and quality of time spent with the student clientele in each time block.

9. **Appropriate Class Assignments** for teachers are based on their university preparation, interest, and generally recognized competence. The Item is contract language seeking to maximize the quality of the professional-client academic relationship.

10. The **Academic Load** comprises the direct and indirect professional duties and activities attendant to instruction (e.g., correcting papers, hall and assembly supervision, film previewing, and milk money collection). The Item here is language seeking to limit the "indirect" (clerk) load in order to reserve more time for the "direct" (professional) load.

III. Out-of-Class Activities

11. The term **Extracurricular Duties** is generally used in reference to out-of-class activities even though this is an anachronistic holdover from the era of a narrower definition of curriculum. The contractual Item here is evidence of the movement away from administratively created and
assigned out-of-class, school-sponsored activities toward the principle of voluntarism for teachers as well as students in initiating, planning, and conducting such activities (e.g., academic, sport, and independent clubs and societies; homecoming activities; formal and tape dances; entertainment and fairs).

IV. Advisory Committees. There are those aspects of the public school environment where the public interest in a functioning democracy is and ought to be preeminent over the autonomy of the professional practitioner and where ultimate decisions must be made by publicly elected or properly appointed legislatures, agencies, and local boards. However, it is incumbent upon ultimate decision makers, especially if they are lay people, to use professional advice in order to prevent democracy from becoming mediocrity. Historically, classroom teachers have been overlooked in the process of lay board decision making; the advent of collective bargaining may redress the imbalance (for a more complete discussion, see Chapter II).

12. A Curriculum Committee is an Item requiring that the professional curricular advice reaching the board of education through a curriculum committee be given bona fide consideration, along with other input, in advance of curricular policy decisions.
13. The School Policy Committee is an Item allowing bona fide advisory input by classroom teachers into building and district governance.

14. A Teacher Inservice/Professional Growth Committee is an Item where contract language guarantees that classroom teachers will share in the decision making processes attendant to their own inservice education and professional growth.

15. A School Budget Priority Committee is an Item guaranteeing that classroom teachers will have substantial input into the financing philosophies of the district.

16. Teacher Selection is an Item guaranteeing involvement in the process of hiring new teachers including positions on "needs" committees and interview teams with bona fide advisory-hiring status.

17. Auxiliary Personnel Selection is an Item guaranteeing input into the process of hiring auxiliary personnel (e.g., teacher aides, substitutes, and classroom maintenance personnel) including placement on "needs" committees and interview teams with bona fide advisory-hiring status.

V. Professional Autonomy in Association with the Student-Client. There are those aspects of the institution of public education where the public interest is best
served when the professional practitioner has substantial autonomy in the use of his or her own professional judgment and skills.

18. **Academic Freedom** as an Item is expressed contractually as the degree of autonomy the classroom teacher has in teaching methodology as it arises from an underpinning of sound theoretical and philosophical considerations. The public interest aspect is not primarily the means of teacher autonomy and self-actualization in methodology but the ends of each student's right (since Brown v. Topeka in 1954), in this democracy, to have access and exposure to accurate information and differing points of view.

19. The **Classroom Control** Item is a contractual guarantee that the classroom teacher is the controlling factor when the educational process is seriously disrupted by unruly students. This would be evidence of a contractual shift from prison-guard status to an autonomous professional-client relationship.

20. The Item here is the presence of contract language that guarantees professional autonomy in the **Exploratory Diagnosis** of special learning disabilities and **Referral** to appropriate professional experts (special education professionals,
counselors, psychologists, physicians, etc.).

21. Contract language that provides for teacher autonomy in the Preparation of the Permanent Records of each student's educational progress is the Item. Professional autonomy in this instance is usually expressed as the teacher's final authority in assigning grades or making evaluation entries on the student's academic record.

22. The Item is contract language that allows professional autonomy in Calling in Substitute Teachers. This Item is expressed as the professional's contractual right to choose his/her own substitute from the school district's "Sub List." For an example, a U.S. History teacher might not want a substitute who is qualified only in wood shop or who has poorly developed classroom control skills.

23. The Item is contract language that allows autonomy in Textual Materials Selection (e.g., textbooks, films, video tapes, maps and charts, handouts).

24. The Item is contract language that allows autonomy in procuring the Instructional Supplies and Equipment requisite to a meaningful educational environment (e.g., window blinds; gym, home ec, or shop equipment; paper and pencils; video players and film projectors; playground equipment).
### EXHIBIT II

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Harter, Lafayette G., Jr.  

Harter, Lafayette G., Jr.  

Helburn, I. B.  

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Martin, James E.

Maslow, Abraham H.

Maslow, Abraham H.

Maslow, Abraham H.

Mason, Ward S.

Merton, Robert K.

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Perlman, Selig

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Rotenstreich, Nathan

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Simmel, Georg

Sloan, Arthur A. and Fred Whitney

Stagner, Ross and Hjalmar Rosen

Sternberg, Richard Stephen
Stevenson, James Lyall

Stinnett, T. M., Jack Kleinmann, and Martha L. Wave

Taylor, Benjamin J. and Fred Whitney

Thompson, A. Gray and Russell H. Ziemer

Vaughan, Jacqueline B.

Walton, Richard E. and Robert B. McKersie

Weber, Max

Weber, Max

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Weitzman, Joan  

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APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

The Statistical Population

Criteria for Statistical Population:

1. Districts with teachers in grades 1-12 all under one master contract

2. Districts with 2500 or more Average Daily Membership (ADM) in 1976-77

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APPENDIX II

The 19 Randomly Selected Districts in the Statistical Population

1. Ashland 5
2. Beaverton 48J
3. Bethel 52
4. Crook County
5. Eugene 4J
6. Hood River 1
7. Lake Oswego 7
8. Lincoln County
9. Medford 549C
10. Newberg 29J
11. North Bend 13
12. Ontario 8C
13. Oregon City 62
14. Portland 1J
15. Redmond 2J
16. St. Helens 502
17. South Lane 45J3
18. Tigard 23J
19. West Linn 3J
### APPENDIX III

LOGAN  
FILE NONAME (CREATION DATE = 78/07/25.)

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