AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF
Keiichi Ito for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education presented on August 23, 1993.
Title: A Durkheimian Analysis and Synthesis of Four Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education

Abstract Approved : Edwin D. Strowbridge

The purpose of this study was to analyze four contemporary approaches to moral education from the sociological perspective of Durkheim. These four approaches were inculcation, values clarification, the moral discussion approach, and the just community approach.

In this study Durkheim's theory of morality and moral education were identified, and the parameters were selected from the key concepts of Durkheim. The four approaches were analyzed by seven parameters: transmitting social values, teaching discipline and moral conduct, stressing the group or society, emphasizing altruism or affective components of morality, imposing values prior to autonomy, the teacher as an authority and a socializer, and the child as a reactor and an asocial being.

Results of the analyses indicated that inculcation and the just community approach had several parameters of moral education in common with Durkheim, because both of them
accepted the socialization process which was the fundamental concept of Durkheim's education theory. On the contrary, values clarification and the moral discussion approach had nothing in common with Durkheim, because they focused on individual moral learning or value clarifying, and rejected the teaching of the content of values.

The conclusion reached was that a practical moral education such as the just community approach, needed to employ Durkheim's notion of socialization. However, the limitations of Durkheim's theory, which missed the existence of spontaneous relationships among children, were also pointed out. Consequently, a synthesis of the four approaches involved respect for the child's spontaneity and peer relationship within the framework of Durkheim. Finally, an outline of an integrated moral education program was proposed.
A Durkheimian Analysis and Synthesis of Four Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education

by

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A THESIS submitted to Oregon State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Completed August 23, 1993
Commencement June 1994
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A DURKHEIMIAN ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF FOUR
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO MORAL EDUCATION

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Not only in the United States but also in other advanced nations, such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany, moral education is an important issue in schools. The report of the Japanese Education Council (1987), for example, identified the enrichment of moral education as one of the important tasks in reforming the elementary and secondary school curricula. It focused on the well-balanced development of children's intellect, morality, and physical fitness, as well as to the development of good citizens with sound bodies and minds who will be competent as responsible builders of the future society.

The Curriculum Council of Monbusho (The Ministry of Education in Japan, 1989) also indicated that the situation of today's Japanese children has become difficult. The rapid growth of the economy and the accompanying social change, such as urbanization, information, the marked increase in nuclear families, and excessive competition in entrance examinations, have all had a grave influence on the consciousness and behavior of the school children of today.
When we consider the causes and background of undesirable behavior, such as bullying and suicide, which have been increasing among Japanese children, we realize that they are lacking in respect for human life and consideration for others, lacking in the sense of independence, responsibility and norm consciousness in society, and basic habit.

According to the survey of Monbusho (1987), in the seven months from April 1st to October 31st, 1985 some cases of bullying took place in 52.3% of all elementary schools, in 68.85% of lower secondary schools, and in 42.5% of upper secondary schools. Then the report indicates that in school the teacher should emphasize moral contents: good habits and manners, consideration for others, respect for parents and teachers, love for one's country, and so on.

On the other hand, in the United States, Mulkey (1987) introduced an FBI report which pointed out a lack of inner control among American youngsters. Crimes committed by youths aged 15 and younger during 1985 were as followed:

- Murder, non-negligent manslaughter...... 381
- Aggravated assault.......................... 18,021
- Robberies.................................... 13,899
- Rapes........................................ 2,645 (p.1)

There is also an increase in drug, alcohol, and other harmful substance abuses which reveal the problems of moral education. Wynne and Hess (1987) investigated youth trends, such as homicide, suicide, out-of-wedlock births, premarital sex, illegal drug use, delinquent conduct, and test scores.
They indicated that the character of typical U.S. youths has substantially declined over the past 20 to 30 years, because they have abandoned traditional values and replaced them with new, more individualistic ones. Then they said, "A first step can be to examine the character of our young—to look carefully at day-to-day conduct—and see what can be done to help it change in more wholesome directions" (p.57).

The former Secretary of Education, William Bennett (1991) also maintained,

The vast majority of Americans share a respect for certain fundamental traits of character. Because they are not born with this knowledge, children need to learn what these traits are. They will learn them most profoundly by being in the presence of adults who exemplify them. But we can help their grasp and the appreciation of these traits through the curriculum. (p.135)

These traits are, he asserts, honesty, kindness, compassion, loyalty, faithfulness, and so on. We may call this kind of moral education "inculcation" or "a value-oriented approach"; that is, the instillation or internalization of certain values that are considered as desirable. However, is this kind of approach effective? Should we follow these proposals?

In the United States, the inculcation approach to moral education has been called "character education" or "traditional moral education." Wynne (1986) regards the character education movement (1880-1930) as an American tradition in moral education. It is said that the most
widely propagated list among public educators in the 1920's was the Hutchins code. His ten laws for controlling the conduct of children are as follows:

1. The law of Health - The good American tries to gain and to keep perfect health.
2. The Law of Self-control - The good American controls himself.
4. The Law of Reliability - The good American is reliable.
5. The Law of Clean Play - The good American plays fair.
7. The Law of Good Workmanship - The good American tries to do the right thing in the right way.
8. The Law of Team-work - The good American works in friendly cooperation with his fellow workers.
9. The Law of Kindness - The good American is kind.
10. The Law of Loyalty - The good American is loyal.

(Charters, 1927, pp.51-52)

According to Wynne (1985-6), the character education movement articulated many traditional moral aims such as promptness, truthfulness, courtesy, and obedience. It emphasized teaching materials in history and literature, school clubs, rigorous discipline codes, and daily flag salutes.

However, the early Hartshorne and May's study (1928-30) cast doubt on the effectiveness of traditional character education. These two researchers concluded that the relationship between pupil good conduct and the application of a formal character education approach was slight. In other words, good conduct appeared to be
relatively situation-specific. After this study was reported, the character education movement began to decline.

In the mid 60's and 70's two approaches to moral education became popular in public schools, and dominated moral education literature of that era. The first approach was values clarification, a wide set of strategies that aim at helping students clarify their own values (Raths, Harmin, and Simon 1966, Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum 1972). The second approach was that of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969, 1975), a cognitive developmental approach to moral education, which asserts that individual moral growth goes through a predictable structure of stages.

Both approaches aimed at sensitizing students to values or moral issues, encouraged judgment-action consistency, and tried to build a sense of self-confidence and interpersonal trust. On the other hand, both programs rejected the teaching of specific values as indoctrination. Their objections to the inculcation of values can be summed up as followed:

1) There are not such moral virtues.
2) Inculcation or the value-oriented approach to moral education does not work.
3) The imposition of conventional knowledge and structure which constitutes inculcation or the value-oriented approach is no longer relevant in a modern era which is
rapidly changing.

4) Inculcation or the value-oriented approach does not promote moral growth.

5) As regards the content of value, resistance on the part of parents and conflicts between religious and ethnic groups exist.

Values clarification, therefore, focuses on the process of valuing rather than on transmitting values. In other words, the developers of values clarification are not concerned with the particular content of values, but attempt to help the student decide what to value. In the values clarification model, "right" and "wrong" are relative, depending on the situation and especially on the child's point of view. It is important that the child must be free to choose his/her own values without the adult's encumbrances. The values clarification process is designed to promote intelligent value choice through a process of choosing, prizing, and acting (Raths, 1966). Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum (1972) introduced a variety of practical strategies for teachers and students.

On the other hand, like values clarification, Kohlberg (1969) criticized the inculcation approach and offered an alternative approach to moral education based on the theory of moral development rooted in the cognitive aspect of psychology. Kohlberg's theory includes six stages: Stage 1,
the punishment-and-obedience orientation; Stage 2, the instrumental-relativist orientation; Stage 3, the interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation; Stage 4, the "law and order" orientation; Stage 5, the social-contract, legalistic orientation; Stage 6, the universal ethical-principle orientation. These stages are the parameters for Kohlberg's theory and practice to moral education.

Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) proposed the Socratic peer discussion of moral dilemma which has an aim: stimulation of movement to the next higher stage of moral reasoning. The research showed that one-fourth to one half of the students in one semester of such discussion groups would move to the next stage up. The moral discussion methods, refined by Galbraith and Jones (1975) and Beyer (1976), were disseminated in the United States.

In the middle 70's Kohlberg's moral education practice moved from a focus on classroom moral discussion programs to the establishment of just community programs in high schools. In the just community programs, Kohlberg revised his theory and employed a collective aspect of moral education. So Kohlberg's moral education theory became more practical and more comprehensive. In this dissertation, Kohlberg's moral education is divided into the moral discussion approach and the just community approach, because
the former's emphasis on moral education is different from the latter's one, and each of them shows a crucial aspect of moral education.

However, Ryan (1986) criticized not only values clarification but also Kohlberg's moral education. At first, the new approaches to moral education such as values clarification and Kohlberg's moral education were concerned with the ideas, with intellectual skills, and with structures of thinking. There was little attention to doing-to moral action or to how one ought to behave. Second, the dominant methods of moral education emphasized process. Uncomfortable about imposing their own values on others, teachers were cheered to hear at workshops and to read in education journals that they could avoid doing so and still have a positive impact on the moral lives of children.

Third, teachers were not to express their own views on moral issues or to urge certain position or actions on their students. They found it painful to watch students struggle with principles that seemed to them morally obvious and to keep silent in the face of students' misjudgments. Therefore, Ryan asserts, "We must help children acquire the skills, the attitudes, and the dispositions that will help them live well and that will enable the common good to flourish" (p.233). In short, he maintains that we should reevaluate character education.
In order to analyze and evaluate these four approaches: inculcation, values clarification, the moral discussion approach, and the just community approach, Durkheim's moral education theory will be chosen. Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist, is considered to be the first person who proposed a scientific moral education theory. His sociological approach to moral education occupied a very important position in moral education history, because it has not only a scientific point of view but also the comprehensive concept, which today's theorists and practitioners of moral education are concerned with (Chazan, 1985).

The popular approaches to moral education in the United States have been mainly developed by psychological or philosophical points of view, not by a sociological one. Therefore, analyzing these approaches by Durkheim's theory is meaningful. His sociological aspect which treats moral education as a social fact should not be neglected even in today's situation.

According to Durkheim, the three basic elements of morality are the spirit of discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy. With regard to these elements Bouas (1993) says, "In a school setting, a disciplinary code specifies individual and group behavioral norms regarding rights, privileges, and responsibilities. Concern for
individual autonomy protects students from excessive imposition. The element of group attachment restrains abusive exercise of individual rights" (p.182). Thus, she argues that Durkheim's three elements of morality appear to provide a healthy balance against the dangers of excessive individualism and social authoritarianism.

For Durkheim, education is a socialization of the young generation. Through moral education children must have a consensus of social values and beliefs. Values consensus forms the fundamental integrating principle in society. If members of society are committed to the social ideals, they will tend to share a common identity, which provides a basis for unity and cooperation. Therefore, according to Durkheim, schools are essential to the survival of a society since they are concerned with the socialization of children, and the preparation of them for adult life. In school, the teacher as a representative of society has an important task. He/She must be firmly committed to social values and beliefs, because it is through his/her commitment to these values and personal example he/she sets that the child experiences and incorporates the moral rules.

Therefore, discipline, attachment to social groups, autonomy, socialization, and teacher-child relationships will be treated as the key concepts of Durkheim's theory.
In this dissertation, the research will be done in the following order. In chapter 2, a clear presentation of Durkheim's theory of morality and moral education will be identified. The parameters of moral education will also be selected from Durkheim's concepts of moral education.

Chapter 3 has as its primary focus the identification of the four approaches to moral education in American schools: inculcation, values clarification, the moral discussion approach (Kohlberg's first wave), and the just community approach (Kohlberg's second wave). The problem with which the researcher is concerned, whether values clarification and the moral discussion approach adequately address their objections to the inculcation approach, will also be discussed.

In chapter 4, as a main purpose of this research, the four contemporary approaches will be analyzed by the parameters of moral education which will be selected from Durkheim's key concepts. Analyzing by the parameters of Durkheim's moral education, the dissertation will also make a clear distinction between the emphases of the four approaches.

In the final chapter, results of the analyses will be discussed and evaluated. A synthesis of the four approaches based upon Durkheim's framework will be argued, and an outline of a new moral education approach will be proposed.
CHAPTER 2

DURKHEIM'S THEORY OF MORALITY AND MORAL EDUCATION

The purpose of this chapter is to identify Durkheim's theory of morality and moral education. The parameters of moral education will also be selected from Durkheim's concepts of moral education. These parameters will be used as the standards of analysis in chapter 4.

Durkheim had concentrated his attention upon moral problems. Through his works, such as *The Division of Labor in Society* (1883/1960), *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1885/1938), and *Suicide* (1897/1962), Durkheim tried to explain the essence of morality, the role that it plays in societies, and the way that it grows and develops in expressing the ideals of societies. He was also concerned about abnormal forms of behavior in modern Western society, particularly about abnormal forms of the division of labor and about suicide as an abnormal form of modern individualism.

In the preface of *The Division of Labor in Society*, Durkheim declared "to treat the facts of the moral life according to the method of the positive sciences"(p.32). Moral facts, in the view of Durkheim, consist of rules of actions recognizable by certain distinctive characteristics.
Therefore, it is possible to observe, describe, classify, and look for certain laws explaining those characteristics.

In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim also wrote, "The first and most fundamental rule is: Consider social facts as things" (p.14), because it is to help us free ourselves and consult our own feelings when we seek to establish the essence, origins, and functions of the different human institutions. He also argued that the determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it, and not among the states of the individual consciousness. This means that the cause of social institution should be explained not by the psychological viewpoint but rather by the sociological one, because the social fact consists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling which are external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion.

Durkheim lays down two empirical tests of the existence of a social fact. The first of these is that it has the property of being "general throughout the extent of a given society" (p.13), at a given stage in the revolution of that society. Thus, he distinguishes a social fact from a psychological fact which is universal to human nature. The second test that he applies is that "A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint" (p. 13). He states,
A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn either by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it. (p. 10)

In Suicide, Durkheim showed that the suicide movement cannot be accounted for either through psychopathic factors, through race and heredity, through geographical factors, or through imitation and other purely psychological factors, or other personal motives, but can be due entirely to social causes. From an analysis of the statistical data, Durkheim classified three types of suicide: the egotistical suicide, the altruistic suicide, and the anomique suicide. In this research Durkheim stressed that the curve of suicide should be accounted for only sociologically.

It was in the last few years of the 19th century, and the first few of the 20th, that Durkheim at Sorbonne gave a great deal of attention to education, and prepared lectures on topics which have been collected as Education and Sociology (1922/1956) and Moral Education (1925/1973). Let us look at Durkheim's theory of morality which is mainly based upon these two works.

(1) Durkheim's Theory of Morality

Socialization

Durkheim approaches education as a social fact. He
tries to think as a scientist in his attempt to analyze and understand education in its relationship to the social system. At first, he declares:

As a sociologist, it is above all as a sociologist that I shall speak to you of education. Moreover, in proceeding in this way, far from handling phenomena with a biased frame of reference, I am, on the contrary, convinced that there is no method better suited to demonstrating their true nature. Indeed, I regard as the prime postulate of all pedagogical speculation that education is an eminently social thing in its origins as in its functions, and that, therefore, pedagogy depends on sociology more closely than on any other science. (Education and Sociology, p.114)

During the past centuries, philosophers and pedagogues, for example, I. Kant, J.S. Mill, J.F. Herbart, have agreed that education is an individual thing. For them, the object of education would be to realize the attributes distinctive of the human species in general. In other words, they assume that there is an ideal, perfect education, which applies to all men indiscriminately.

Durkheim, however, disagrees with them because they fail to consider the real man of a given time and place, the only one that is observable. So, Durkheim insists on looking at the fact in history, in order to realize that education has varied infinitely in time and place.

In the cities of Greece and Rome, education trained the individual to subordinate himself blindly to the collectivity, to become the creature of society. Today, it tries to make of the individual an autonomous personality. In Athens, they sought to form cultivated souls, informed, subtle, full of measure and harmony, capable of enjoying beauty and
Thus Durkheim stresses historical observation to determine the nature of education. According to him, it is wrong that one begins by asking what an ideal education must be, abstracted from conditions of time and place, because it is to admit that a system of education has no reality in itself. In fact, each society has a system of education which exercises an irresistible influence on individuals.

According to Durkheim, there are customs to which we are bound to conform in every society. If we flout them too severely, they take their vengeance on our children. Consequently, when the children become adults they are unable to live with their peers, with whom they are not in accord. Whether they had been raised in accordance with obsolete or strange ideas, they are not of their time and, therefore, they are outside the conditions of normal life.

In other words, there is, in each period, a prevailing type of education from which we cannot deviate. The customs and ideas that determine the prevailing type of education are the product of a common life, and they express its needs. They are, moreover, in a large part the work of preceding generations. This corresponds to one of the most
important definition of Durkheim's sociology: "A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint" (The Rules of Sociological Method, p.13). Thus, Durkheim recognizes education as a social thing; that is to say, it puts the child in contact with a given society, and not with society in general. In other words, he approaches education as a "social fact".

On the other hand, Durkheim claims that education is the means by which society perpetually recreates the conditions of its very existence. Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient homogeneity.

Education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in advance, in the mind of the child, the essential similarities that collective life presupposes. But, on the other hand, without a certain diversity, would all co-operation be impossible? Education assures the persistence of this necessary diversity by becoming itself diversified and by specializing. (Education and Sociology, p.124)

In each of us, according to Durkheim, there exists two beings, the individual being and the social being. The individual being is made up of all the mental states, which apply only to ourselves and to the events of our personal lives. On the other hand, the social being is a system of ideas, sentiments, and practices, which express in us not our personality, but the group or different groups of which we are part of. These are religious beliefs and practices,
national or occupational traditions, and collective opinions of every kind. Therefore, Durkheim asserts that to constitute the social being is the end of education.

In the primitive constitution of man, according to Durkheim, this social being is not a given, and it has not resulted from a spontaneous development.

Now, if one leaves aside the vague and indefinite tendencies which can be attributed to heredity, the child, on entering into life, brings to it only his nature as an individual. Society finds itself, so to speak, with each new generation, faced with a tabula rasa, very nearly, on which it must build anew. To the egoistic and asocial being that has just been born it must, as rapidly as possible, add another, capable of leading a social and moral life. Such is the work of education. (Education and Sociology, p.125)

Among animals that live in rather simple societies, heredity can transmit the instinctive mechanisms that assure organic life. However, among men the aptitudes of every kind that social life presupposes are very complex. They cannot be transmitted from one generation to another by way of heredity. It is through education that transmission is effected. In other words, education creates in man a new man as a social being.

Consequently, Durkheim's observation of education leads to the following formula:

Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the
special milieu for which he is specifically destined. (Education and Sociology, p.71)

**Discipline**

In his book *moral Education* Durkheim indicates three basic elements of morality which are fundamental dispositions or mental states at the root of the moral life. They are, first, what he calls "the spirit of discipline", second, "attachment to social group", and third, "autonomy".

According to Durkheim, there is an aspect common to all behavior that we ordinarily call moral. All such behavior conforms to preestablished rules. It involves consistency and regularity of conduct.

To conduct one's self morally is a matter of abiding by a norm, determining what conduct should obtain in a given instance even before one is required to act. This domain of morality is the domain of duty; duty is prescribed behavior. (Moral Education p.23)

For Durkheim, morality consists of a system of rules of action that predetermine conduct. The function of morality is to determine conduct, to fix it, and to eliminate the element of individual arbitrariness. Furthermore, morality is basically a constant thing.

A moral act ought to be the same tomorrow as today, whatever the personal predispositions of the actor. Morality thus presupposes a certain capacity for behaving similarly under like circumstances, and consequently it implies a certain ability to develop habits, a certain need for regularity. (Moral Education p.27)

To assure regularity, it is necessary that customs be
strongly founded. But these customs are forces internalized in the person. However, a rule is essentially something that is outside the person. A rule, according to Durkheim, is not a simple matter of habitual behavior. It is a way of acting that we do not feel free to alter according to taste. It is beyond personal preference. Indeed, in a rule there is something that resists us, but we do not determine its existence or its nature. It is independent of what we are.

Therefore, there is another thing in the concept of rules which is beyond the notion of regularity. Durkheim calls it "authority".

By authority, we must understand that influence which imposes upon us all the moral power that we acknowledge as superior to us. Because of this influence, we act in prescribed ways, not because the required conduct is attractive to us, not because we are so inclined by some predisposition either innate or acquired, but because there is some compelling influence in the authority dictating it. Obedience consists in such acquiescence. (Moral Education, p.29)

Generally speaking, if we abide by the rule, it is not only to defer to the authority that is its source, but also to recognize useful consequences of the prescribed behavior. However, in the case of morality, we ought to abide by the rule regardless of the consequences our conduct may have for us. Durkheim stresses that we must obey a moral precept out of respect for it and for this reason alone.

While all rules command, the moral rule consists entirely in a commandment and in nothing else. That is why the moral rule speaks to us with such
authority—why, when it speaks, all other considerations must be subordinated. It permits no equivocation. (Moral Education, p.31)

Now, let us arrange two points of morality which Durkheim indicates. First, since morality determines, fixes, and regularizes man's conduct, it presupposes a certain disposition in the individual for a regular existence—a preference for regularity. Second, since they determine conduct imperatively from sources outside ourselves, in order to fulfill one's obligations and to act morally, one must have some appreciation of the authority sui generis that informs morality. In other words, the meanings of regularity and of authority constitute two aspects of a single complex state of being that is described as the spirit of discipline, which is the first basic element of all moral temperament.

On the other hand, discipline has a social usefulness in and of itself, quite apart from the behaviors it prescribes. In effect, social life is one of the forms of organized life. All living organization presupposes determinate rules, and to neglect them is to invite serious disturbance. Therefore, regularity is no less indispensable for social life. However, discipline has often been viewed as a violation of man's natural constitution, since it impedes his unrestricted development. Durkheim is opposed to this contention.
An inability to restrict one's self within determinate limits is a sign of disease— with respect to all forms of human conduct and, even more generally, for all kinds of biological behavior. (Moral Education, p. 38)

All life is a complex equilibrium whose various elements limit one another. This balance cannot be disrupted without producing unhappiness or illness. The activities, in whose favor the equilibrium is disrupted, become a source of pain for the person. The individual needs restraint to reach determinate goals. Without limitations, the individual would suffer the inevitable frustration and disillusionment entailed by limitless aspiration. This issue is a central theme of "Suicide".

Durkheim indicates:

If more suicides occur today than formerly, this is not because, to maintain ourselves, we have to make more painful efforts, nor that our legitimate needs are less satisfied, but because we no longer know the limits of legitimate needs nor perceive the direction of our efforts. (Suicide, p. 386)

Therefore, through discipline we must teach children to rein in their desires, to set limits to their appetites of all kinds, to limit and, through limitation, to define the goals of their activities. This limitation is the condition of happiness and of moral health. Durkheim says,

Discipline is useful, not only in the interests of society and as the indispensable means without which regular co-operation would be impossible, but for the welfare of the individual himself. By means of discipline we learn the control of desire without which man could not achieve happiness. Hence, it even contributes in large measure to the development of
that which is of fundamental importance for each of us: our personality. The capacity for containing our inclinations, for restraining ourselves— the ability that we acquire in the school of moral discipline— is the indispensable condition for the emergence of reflective, individual will. (Moral Education, pp. 48-49)

The rule is a means of emancipation and freedom, because it teaches us to restrain and master ourselves. In short, discipline performs an important function in forming character and personality in general, since the most essential element of character is the disposition to self-mastery, the capacity of restraint or inhibition, which allows us to contain our passions, desires, habits, and subjects them to law.

Attachment to social groups

The second element of morality is the attachment to social groups. First of all, Durkheim divides the objectives of human behaviors into two categories which are acts concerning only the individual himself (personal) and acts concerning something other than the individual who is acting (impersonal).

According to Durkheim, behavior, whatever it may be, directed exclusively toward the personal ends does not have moral values. There are not today, nor has there ever existed, any people among whom an egoistic act has been considered moral. Therefore, behavior prescribed by the
rules of morality is always behavior in pursuit of impersonal ends.

What does impersonal ends mean? Is it moral to act, not to personal interest, but to that of some other person? Durkheim answers "No!", because every man's personality should have equal value. In other words, if it is not moral to act to personal ends, it is not moral to act to others' ends. Therefore, moral action should pursue impersonal objectives. However, the impersonal goals of moral action cannot be either those of a person other than the actor, or those of many others. Then, the impersonal objectives must necessarily involve something other than individuals. Durkheim asserts that they are supra-individual.

Outside or beyond individuals there is nothing other than groups formed by the union of individuals, that is to say, societies. Moral goals, then, are those the object of which is society. To act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest. (Moral Education, p.59)

Durkheim's ends of moral behavior can now be summarized as the following:

1) The ends of human behavior can be divided into two categories, personal and impersonal.

2) Behavior directed exclusively toward the personal ends does not have moral value.

3) Moral behavior is always behavior in pursuit of impersonal ends.

4) Behavior directed toward the interest of other people
individually can be amoral because what applies to oneself must apply to others as well.

5) If each individual taken separately has no moral worth, the sum of individuals can scarcely have more.

6) The impersonal goals of moral action should be supra-individual, which is society.

7) Only those actions directed toward the good of society are moral.

Although Durkheim asserts that only society can provide the objectives for moral behavior, to do so the concept of society must satisfy the next two conditions. First, we have to realize that society has a character distinct from that of its members. As the organism itself is something other than a sum of its cells, so is society a psychic being that has its own particular way of thought, feeling, and action, differing from that peculiar to the individuals who compose it. In addition to this, we must have an interest in linking ourselves with society.

The individual and the society are certainly beings with different natures. Durkheim, however, doesn't see any kind of antagonism between the two. For him, "the individual is not truly himself, he does not fully realize his own nature, except on the condition that he is involved in society" (Moral Education, p.68). Durkheim believes that man is, in large part, a product of society. It is also from society
that there comes whatever is best in us, all the higher forms of our behavior.

Language is social in the highest degree: it has been elaborated by society, and society transmits it from one generation to the next. Furthermore, language is not merely a system of words; each language implies a particular mentality, that of the society which speaks it, which thus expresses its own temperament, and it is this mentality which provides the foundation for individual mentality. (Moral Education, p.69)

Language, as well as science, constitutes society itself, living and acting in us. Society is outside of us and envelopes us, but it is also in us and is everywhere an aspect of our nature. Durkheim emphasizes that between society and us there is the strongest and most intimate connection, since it is a part of our own being, since in a sense it constitutes what is best in us.

Society goes beyond the individual. It has its own nature distinct from that of individual. Consequently, it fulfills the first necessary condition for serving as the object of moral behavior. But, at the same time, society joins the individual. There is no gulf between it and him/her. It thrusts us into strong and deep roots. The best part of us is only an emanation of the collectivity. This explains how we can commit ourselves to it and even prefer it to ourselves.

When we are deeply attached to society, altruistic behavior will occur surely. As we have seen previously,
Durkheim concluded that others' individuals interests could not be the moral end, since there is no reason that another like one's self should be in a preferred position. However, at the same time Durkheim maintains that conscience confers a certain moral character on actions undertaken on behalf of one's fellow man. If we have attachment to society and cling to the social ideal, it is natural that we feel the bond to other members who have also a little of the ideal in each of them. Thus, attachment to society products altruistic conducts. In a word, altruistic behavior prepares and inclines one to seek ends genuinely and correctly moral.

If one loves his country, or humanity in general, he cannot see the suffering of his compatriots—or, more generally, of any human being—without suffering himself and without demonstrating, consequently, the impulse to relieve it. (Moral Education, p.83)

On the other hand, Durkheim asserts that morality is made for society and at the same time it is made by society.

It is impossible for the individual to have been the author of the system of ideas and practices that do not directly relate to him, but that aim at a reality other than himself and of which he has only an ever so vague feeling. Society in its totality has independently a consciousness adequate to the job of establishing this discipline, the object of which is to represent itself, at least to the extent that it is self-aware. (Moral Education, p.86)

Moreover, the fact that morality varies from society to society certainly shows that it is a social product. The morality of Greek or Roman cities is not ours, because that of each people is directly related to the social structure.
of the people practicing it. Therefore, a moral system is built up by the same society whose structure is thus faithfully reflected in it.

Then Durkheim maintains if society itself has instituted the rules of morality, it must also be society that has invested them with their authority. In this context, he defines authority: "Authority is a quality with which a being, either actual or imaginary, is invested through his relationship with given individuals, and it is because of this alone that he is thought by the latter to be endowed with powers superior to those they find in themselves" (Moral Education, p.88).

Therefore, according to Durkheim, whenever we deliberate how we should act, there is a voice that speaks to us, saying, "that is our duty." It speaks to us in an imperative tone we feel that it must come from some being superior to us. It is society. Our moral conscience is its product and reflects it. When our conscience speaks, it is society speaking within us. In a word, when we are constrained by moral discipline it is really society setting the limits and restraining us.

Discipline and the attachment to the group are not distinct and independent, but two aspects of society. Discipline is one side of society which commands and dictates us. Attachment to the group implies the other side
of society which protects and attracts us. Durkheim says,

On the one hand, it seems to us an authority that constrains us, fixes limits for us, blocks us when we would trespass, and to which we defer with a feeling of religious respect. On the other hand, society is the benevolent and protecting power, the nourishing mother from which we gain the whole of our moral and intellectual substance and toward whom our wills turn in a spirit of love and gratitude. (Moral Education, p.92)

Those two elements which Durkheim has described are the same as the duty that is morality insofar as it prescribes, and the good that is morality insofar as it seems to us a desirable thing, a cherished ideal to which we aspire through a spontaneous impulse of the will. For Durkheim the thing which integrates the duty and the good is society.

**Autonomy**

In *The Division of Labor in Society* Durkheim distinguished between the mechanical and organic types of social solidarity. The mechanical societies, which existed throughout most of the history of human society are based on moral and social homogeneity. In this society individualism is lacking, and justice is directed toward the subordination of the individual to the collective conscience. On the other hand, the organic society is based on the primacy of the division of labor. Heterogeneity and individualism will replace homogeneity and communalism, and division of labor will provide all that is necessary to unity and order. The
movement from primitive social forms to modern ones was a process of growing differentiation.

Durkheim insisted that moral diversity was expressive of the social diversity of modern life, that individual consciences were more fully developed and more emancipated from the collective conscience, and that the collective conscience indeed came to express above all a faith in individual dignity, in the need for justice and liberty. In short, one of the central assertions of *The Division of Labor in Society* was that individual freedom expanded as social development progressed.

To be a person is to be an autonomous source of action. Man acquires this quality only in so far as there is something in him which is his alone and which individualizes him, as he is something more than a simple incarnation of the generic type of his race and his group. (p.403)

Thus, Durkheim maintains that one of the fundamental axioms of our morality—perhaps even the fundamental axiom—is that the human being is the sacred thing par excellence. Therefore, "any kind of restriction placed upon our conscience seems immoral since it does violence to our personal autonomy" (Moral Education, p.107). In other words, autonomy is not only a rule of logic but also a rule of morality that our reason should accept as true only that which it itself has spontaneously recognized as such.

However, morality consists of a system of rules of action, then we have to obey the rules regardless of our
preferences. Thus moral rules are external to the will. They are not of our fashioning. Consequently, in conforming to them, we defer to a law not of our own making. Durkheim explains this contradiction by using the example of our knowledge of the outside world. If we have this knowledge scientifically, the world is no longer outside us. It has become a part of ourselves, since we have within us a system of symbolic representations that adequately express it. Everything in the physical world is represented in our consciousness by an idea. Therefore, Durkheim asserts, in order to know what the physical world is like and how we should adapt to it, we simply look within ourselves and analyze our ideas about the objects.

Conforming to the order of things, because one is sure that it is everything it ought to be, is not submitting to a constraint. It is freely desiring this order, asserting through an understanding of the case. To the extent that science builds itself, we tend increasingly to rely on ourselves in our relationship with the physical universe. Consequently, Durkheim insists that science is the well spring of our autonomy. In the moral sphere there is the same autonomy to be found.

We can investigate the nature of these moral rules, which the child receives from without, through education, and which impose themselves on him by virtue of their authority. We can investigate the reasons for their being, their immediate and more remote conditions. In a word, we can create a
Although the science of morality is still young, there remains the means of liberating ourselves. This is what lends substance to the general aspiration for greater moral autonomy. We are limited because of finite beings and passive with respect to the rule that commands us. However, this passivity becomes at the same time activity, through the active part we take in deliberately desiring it. Therefore, Durkheim emphasizes that thought is the liberator of will. He also maintains that we can only conquer the moral world in the same fashion that we conquer the physical world by building a science of moral matters.

Then, Durkheim concludes the third element of morality as follows:

To act morally, it is not enough—above all, it is no longer enough—to respect discipline and to be committed to a group. Beyond this, and whether out of deference to a rule or devotion to a collective ideal, we must have knowledge, as clear and complete an awareness as possible of the reasons for our conduct. This consciousness confers on our behavior the autonomy that the public conscience from now on requires of every genuinely and completely moral being. Hence, we can say that the third element of morality is the understanding of it. (Moral Education, p.120)
(2) Durkheim's Moral Education

Socialization

According to Durkheim, we are all born into society as asocial beings. Hence, we have to learn language, skills, or customs to survive. In addition to this, we must develop a sense of commitment to society, an internalization of its central values and ideals. If there were not an underlying consensus regarding the central values and ideals of society, society could not survive. In other words, each society must accomplish socialization in ways that are appropriate to the values and beliefs it needs to instill.

Therefore, educational institutions are essential to the survival of a society since, to the extent that they have taken over the duties of the family and other organs of social life, they are concerned with the socialization of children, and the preparation of them for adult life. The schools could encourage children to adopt the fundamental principles of their society. Thus, education consists of socialization experiences that result in the internalization of society's central values and beliefs.

In a word, for Durkheim, education is a socialization of the young generation. From the viewpoint of moral education, we can say Durkheim's notion of socialization is transmitting social values thought to be desirable by
society. Hence, "transmitting social values" can be chosen as the first parameter of Durkheim's theory.

Teaching discipline

Contrary to the popular notion that moral education falls chiefly within the jurisdiction of the family, Durkheim emphasizes that the task of the school in the moral development of the child can and should be of the greatest importance. Although the familial education is an excellent first preparation for the moral life, it can scarcely develop the spirit of discipline, that is to say, respect for the rule. This is because the morality practiced in the familial setting is "a matter of emotion and sentiment."

In any case, according to Durkheim, children must learn respect for the rule. They must also learn to do their duty because it is their duty, because they feel obligated to do so even though the task may not seem an easy one. The school has a whole system of rules that predetermine the child's conduct.

The child must come to class regularly, he must arrive at a specified time and with an appropriate bearing and attitude. He must not disrupt things in class. He must have learned his lessons, done his homework, and have done so reasonably well, etc. There are, therefore, a host of obligations that the child is required to shoulder. Together they constitute the discipline of the school. It is through the practice of school discipline that we can inculcate the spirit of discipline in the child. (Moral Education, p.148)

School discipline, in Durkheim's view, is not a simple
device for securing superficial peace in the classroom, but the morality of the classroom, just as the discipline of the social body is morality properly speaking. School discipline also can serve as intermediary between the affective morality of the family and more rigorous morality of civic life. The child should learn to respect rules in general by respecting the school rules.

An undisciplined class, according to Durkheim, lacks morality. When children no longer feel restrained, they are in a state of ferment that makes them impatient of all curbs, and their behavior shows it outside of the classroom. The mob easily shows immoral disorders easily because a mob or crowd is a society, but one that is inchoate, unstable, without any regularly organized discipline. A class without discipline is like a mob. Therefore, Durkheim stresses that the teacher should pay attention to maintain a well-disciplined class, which has an air of health and good humor. The child, then, is in his/her place, and finds it good to be there.

At the same time, Durkheim cautions teachers not to regulate everything, even though rules are indispensable. In other words, school discipline should not embrace all of school life.

It is not necessary that children's attitudes, their bearing, the way they walk or recite their lessons, the way they word their written work or keep their notebooks, etc., be predetermined with great
precision. (Moral Education, p.153)

If the teacher requires these attitudes, children see in such requirements only detestable or absurd procedures aimed at constraining and annoying them which compromises the authority of the rule in their eyes. Moreover, if the children submit passively without resistance, they become accustomed to doing nothing except upon somebody's order. Therefore, Durkheim cautions that the teacher should be careful about the consequences of such abuse of discipline.

It is by respecting the school rules that the child learns to respect rules in general, that he develops the habit of self-control and restraint simply because he should control and restrain himself. It is a first initiation into the austerity of duty. Serious life has now begun. (Moral Education, p.149)

Discipline restrains us and regularizes our behaviors, but without restraint we cannot be social and moral beings. It is certain that Durkheim's moral education accentuates discipline and the moral conduct. From Durkheim's concept of discipline, "Teaching discipline and moral conduct" can be selected as the second parameter of moral education.

How to develop attachment to the group

In order to have attachment to the group, the child must realize that society has a character distinct from the individual. In other words, the child must have a concept of social reality. To do so, the teaching of morality should stress on intellectual dimension. This is also the reason
why Durkheim advocates teaching science, and selects autonomy as the third element of morality. However, it is not enough. The child must have a feeling and affection for the collectivity.

In Durkheim's view, the source of the second element of morality is in our faculty of empathy. It resides in the sum of those tendencies that we call altruistic and disinterested. Durkheim considers that the child is already accessible to a nascent altruism which education has only to develop. In order to attach the child to social groups, he stresses the following points:

1) Since the weakness of altruistic sentiments at the beginning of life derives from the limitations of the child's consciousness, we must extend it gradually beyond the bounds of the organism. Therefore, the important thing which we must give the child is "the clearest idea of the social groups to which he belongs."

2) It is not enough to give the child an image of groups. Moreover, the image must be repeated with such persistence that it becomes, through the sole fact of repetition, an integrating element in himself/herself, such that he/she can no longer do without it.

3) Since, in the long run, one only learns to do by doing, we must multiply the opportunities in which the sentiments communicated to the child can manifest
themselves in actions.

How do we apply these points in school? Durkheim indicates that there are two vehicles to develop the idea of the social groups: first, the school environment itself; second, what is taught.

Before children come to school, they have only been acquainted with two kinds of groups: the family and the group of friends. But political society presents neither of these two characteristics. There is great distance between the moral state in which children find themselves as they leave the family and the one toward which they must strive. Then, intermediaries are necessary. Durkheim believes that the school environment is the most desirable.

In order to commit ourselves to the collective end, we must have a feeling and affection for the collectivity. Before one gives one's self to a group, he/she must be fond of life in a group setting. When children leave their families and enter school, it is at the moment that we can instill in them the inclination for collective life.

The school is a society, a natural group capable of branching out in derivative groupings and in all sorts of ramifications. If the child, at this decisive time, is carried along in the current of social life, the chances are strong that he will remain oriented in this way throughout his life. (Moral Education, p.239)

Then one of the purposes of moral education in school is to make children acquire a linking for a collective life by
taking advantage of an association of the same class.

There is pleasure in saying "we," rather than "I," because anyone in a position to say "we" feels behind him a support, a force on which he can count, a force that is much more intense than that upon which isolated individuals can rely... Such phrases as the class, the spirit of the class, and the honor of the class must become something more than abstract expressions in the student's mind. (Moral Education pp.240-41)

The important point is to give children a taste for this pleasure, and to instill in them the need for it. Therefore, the teacher's task is to multiply the circumstances in which a free elaboration of common ideas and sentiments can take place, to bring out the positive results, to coordinate them, and give them stable shape. Durkheim shows examples such as a common emotion that grips the class upon reading a touching piece, a judgment passed on some historical character or event after general discussion of its moral value and social bearing, and a common impulse of esteem or blame, which any of a thousand events in every life may suggest-reprehensible or praiseworthy behavior.

Another means that could awaken the feeling of solidarity in the child, Durkheim supports, is the very discrete and deliberate use of collective punishments and rewards. Through using these methods rationally, the teacher is able to make children understand that we are not self-sufficient, but a part of a whole that envelops,
penetrates, and supports us. Thus, Durkheim recommends to use the collective power involving collective norm in school. This collectivity facilitates the child's altruistic behavior.

From Durkheim's the second element of morality, the two parameters can be selected: "Stressing the group or society" and "Emphasizing altruism or affective components of morality."

**Autonomy and teaching**

As we have seen previously, according to Durkheim, science is the wellspring of our autonomy, and morality has its roots in intelligence. Particularly according to our conception of social reality, we will be more or less disposed to tie into it. But the conception of social reality is theoretical and complex. Therefore, school curriculum has an important role both fostering the attachment to society and developing autonomy. Especially, in Durkheim's view, the teaching of physical and natural sciences are useful because they play an enormous role in determining the way in which we understand society.

However, there is a serious obstacle to understand the social reality. It is something what Durkheim calls "oversimplified rationalism." Durkheim rejects Descartes' idea because it leads to oversimplified rationalism. He
This state of mind is characterized by the fundamental tendency to consider as real in this world only that which is perfectly simple and so poor and denuded in qualities and properties that reason can grasp it at a glance and conceive of it in a luminous representation, analogous to that which we have in grasping mathematical matters. (Moral Education, p.250)

For Durkheim, in modern times Descartes was the most illustrious and distinguished exponent of this attitude. If society is considered only from a naively simplified point of view, then one comes to the conclusion that there is nothing real in society except the individuals composing it, that it is nothing in itself, and that it does not have a special personality, sentiments, and interests peculiar to it.

But society is something more than a simple composition of individuals, which means it is not only an independent reality, but a being worthy of love and service. Therefore, the teacher must give children a sense of the real complexity of things. This sense must finally become organic to them and constitute a category in their minds. The biological sciences are especially useful in making the child understand the complexity of things and the vital importance of that complexity.

That small living mass (the cell) is of course made up of inorganic elements-atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and carbon. We have here inorganic elements, which in combination and association suddenly manifest completely new properties characterizing
life. Here is one thing that will make the child understand—and the child can understand all this—that in one sense a whole is not identical with the sum of its parts. This can lead him on the road to understanding that society is not simply the sum of individuals who compose it. (Moral Education, p.264)

Durkheim believes that our rationalism must be rid of its simplicism and be increasingly imbued with a sense of the complexity of things. Moral behavior has as its end entities that are superior to the individual, but that are also empirical and natural, that is to say, societies. Societies are part of nature. So, Durkheim maintains that natural science can help us better understand the human realm, and equip us with precise ideas and good intellectual habits which can help us in directing our behavior. Physical science also allows children to acquire wholesome intellectual habits, which strengthen their moral conduct.

Moreover, Durkheim argues, there is one reality that above all we must understand and teach, since it is the chief object of moral conduct. This is social reality. To become attached to society, children must feel in it something that is real, alive, and powerful, which dominates the person, and to which they also owe the best of themselves. Then history can give the student a very adequate idea of society.

Society is not the work of the individuals that compose it at a given stage of history, nor is it a given place. It is a complex of ideas and sentiments, of ways of seeing and of feeling, a certain intellectual and moral framework distinctive of the
entire group. Society is above all a consciousness of the whole. It is, therefore, this collective consciousness that we must instill in the child. (Moral Education, p.277)

Thus, history is the crucial subject which makes children live in close intimacy with the collective consciousness. In any case we must obtain scientific knowledge and social reality to reach autonomy which Durkheim stresses as the third element of morality. Hence, physical science, biological science, and history should be emphasized.

At the same time, Durkheim maintains that the teaching of morality is a necessary condition in today's school, because "the moral conscience of contemporary people is confronted with the greatest change; intelligence has become and is becoming increasingly an element of morality" (Moral Education, p.120). Therefore, we have to teach children the symbolic explanation of the rule itself, its cause and reason for being.

Fauconnet (1922/1956) says, "It seems indispensable, to Durkheim, even in primary school, that the master teach the child about the situation in which he is called upon to live: family, corporation, nation, the civilized community that tends to include the whole of humanity; how they were formed and transformed; what effect they have on the individual and what role he plays in them" (p.45).

Thus, it is certain that Durkheim stresses teaching morality. But how do we teach morality? As to teaching
morality, Durkheim recognizes that imposing moral values on the child is needed. For Durkheim, imposition is not violating the child's rights, but it is the teacher's duty. Durkheim regards the imposition as positive and necessary, because without it a child could not become a moral being. Since the aim of education is socialization, an internalization of social values and social ideals is also indispensable.

However, Durkheim argues that teaching morality is neither to preach nor to indoctrinate: it is to explain. "If we refuse the child all explanation of this sort, if we do not try to help him understand the reasons for the rules he should abide by, we would be condemning him to an incomplete and inferior morality" (Moral Education, p.120). Thus, Durkheim clearly denied indoctrination, and put stress on explanation. Therefore, the meaning of Durkheim's imposition is not the same thing as indoctrination. The imposition is the teaching that the teacher explains and leads the child to the right place.

Indeed, Durkheim views scientific intellectual consideration of the rational of moral principles as an inescapable element of modern education. Furthermore, he maintains that moral education should not be indoctrinative. However, he also insists that the teacher must impose (or teach) moral values to the children in order to reach to
autonomy. Therefore, "Imposing values prior to autonomy" can be selected as the fifth parameter of moral education.

Teacher

Within the schools the specific tasks of moral education must be accomplished by the teacher. According to Durkheim, an important quality of the teacher is authority. As we have seen previously, children must learn discipline in school. However, in order for children to subject themselves to the prescriptions of the rule, they must feel the moral authority in it. Since children come to understand the rule through the teacher, and since it is the teacher who reveals it to them, it can have only such authority as the teacher communicates to it.

What, then, is a requirement needed to be an effective teacher? Durkheim stresses that the teachers really feel in themselves the authority they must communicate and for which they must convey some feeling.

The teacher must believe, not perhaps in himself or in the superior quality of his intelligence or will, but in his task and the greatness of that task. It is the priest's lofty conception of his mission that gives him the authority that so readily colors his language and bearing... Just as the priest is the interpreter of God, he is the interpreter of the great moral ideas of his time and country. (Moral Education, p.155)

Indeed, there is a reason to fear lest the child view the regulation of the school too concretely as the expression of
the teacher's will. But Durkheim has indicated that the rule is no longer a rule if it is not impersonal. Therefore, Durkheim cautions that teachers must make the child understand that the rule imposes itself on them as it does on him/her, and that they cannot remove or modify it. The teachers also should make the child understand that they are constrained to apply the rule, and that it dominates them, and obliges them as it obliges the child. In any case, the teacher's authority is not only the condition of an orderliness, but also the moral life of the class depends on it.

If the child submits to the rule and respect it, it is because the teachers affirm it as worthy of respect and respects it themselves. Therefore, when the child breaks the rule, the teachers must certainly show that they are no way sympathetic with the offense, that they reject it, that they disapprove of it with a disapproval consonant with the importance of the misdeed. Durkheim asserts, "To punish is to reproach, to disapprove " and "the essence of the penalty is blame" (Moral Education, p.181).

Doubtless blame ends in severe treatment. But such severe treatment is not an end in itself. It is only a means.

It is a matter of reaffirming the obligation at the moment when it is violated, in order to strengthen the sense of duty, both for the guilty party and for those witnessing the offense—those whom the offense
tends to demoralize. (Moral Education, p.182)

Therefore, every element of the penalty that does not promote this end, all severity that does not contribute to this end, is bad and should be prohibited.

Durkheim is against corporal punishment. He believes that one of the chief aims of moral education is to inspire in the child a feeling for the dignity of man. However, corporal punishment is a continual offense to this sentiments. Since the teacher as the authority of the rule has the strong influence on the child, the three points should be stressed. First, within the class, the teacher is alone with the children who are in no position to resist him/her. He/She must then resist his/her own inclinations. Second, not only must the teacher eschew corporal punishment, but all kinds of punishment that might injure the child's health must be forbidden. Third, the authority of the teacher is too great to allow children to be exposed to the influence of one and the same teacher throughout the course of their studies. It is important that the diversity of teachers succeeding each other prevent the influence of any one from being too exclusive, and therefore, too restricting to the individuality of the child.

In school the teacher is also a model for the child's behavior. For example, "the child can know his duty only through his teacher or his parents; he can only know what it
is only through the manner in which they reveal it to him through their language and through their conduct" (Education and Sociology, p.88). Since the child is a traditionalist and inclines to imitate, the teacher who has authority should realize his/her own importance as a model. In short, in Durkheim's view, the teacher is an authority, a representative of society, a transmitter of social values, a socializer, and a model for the child.

The child

As we have noted, Durkheim's claim is that education consists of a methodical socialization of the young generation. Then the child is seen as a being who should be socialized. To the egoistic and a social being that has been born society must, as rapidly as possible, add another, capable of leading a social and moral life. However, Durkheim does not completely agree with John Locke's idea that education is all-powerful. He writes, "Education does not make a man out of nothing, as Locke and Helvetius believed; it is applied to predispositions that it finds already made" (Education and Sociology, p.82). But what are the the predispositions?

According to Durkheim, there are two basic predispositions or two built-in characteristics of the child's nature, which expose him/her to our influence. The
first one is his/her character as a creature of habit or traditionalism. The second one is his/her suggestibility, especially his/her openness to imperative suggestion. Generally speaking, childish behavior is characterized by its complete irregularity. Indeed, the child shifts from one impression to another, from one activity, one sentiment, to another with extraordinary speed. But at the same time, the child is a veritable creature of habit.

Once he has developed certain habits, they dominate his behavior to a far greater extent than with adults. Once he has repeated a given act several times he shows a need to reproduce it in the same way. He abhors the slightest variation... Once he has become accustomed to a certain game he will repeat it indefinitely. He will reread the same book to the point of satiety. He will dwell on the same picture without becoming bored. (Moral Education, p.135)

Indeed, the child is inconstant, but he/she is also a traditionalist. This tendency toward traditionalist, in Durkheim's view, is a source of support for the influence that we must exert over the child. Then, teachers or adults should use the power that habit has over the child to correct and curb instability itself. Here is a first step toward the moral life.

However it is not enough that the child be accustomed to repeat the same behaviors under the same conditions. Children must have the feeling that beyond them there are moral forces that set bounds for them, forces that they must take into account and to which they must yield. Hence
parents and teachers have to evoke in the child this necessary feeling by building on his/her great receptivity to suggestions of all sorts.

Durkheim argues that J.M. Guyau was the first to have noted that the child is naturally in a psychological situation strongly analogous to that of the hypnotized subject. There are two conditions. First, the hypnotized subject is as completely passive as possible. The idea suggested under these conditions fixes itself in the mind with so much force because it encounters no resistance. Second, even if the suggested act is surely to occur, this first condition is not sufficient. The hypnotist must say something imperatively.

These two conditions are fulfilled by children in their relationship with parents and teachers. First, they find themselves quite naturally in the condition of passivity in which hypnotic procedures place the subject. Therefore, the child is so vulnerable to the contagion of example, so inclined to imitate. As for the second condition, it is quite naturally fulfilled in the imperative tone in which teachers puts their orders. To impose their will they must be firm, and they must affirm with resolution. Durkheim writes,

Thanks to the fact that habit so easily dominates the mind of the child, we can accustom him to regularity and develop his taste for it; thanks to his suggestibility, we can at the same time give him his
first feeling for the moral forces which surround him and upon which he depends. (Moral Education, p.143)

Durkheim views the child as a asocial being. So, through education the teacher must make the child a social being by using the two predispositions. From Durkheim's concept of the teacher and child, the two parameters of moral education can be selected: First, "The teacher is an authority and a socializer", second, "The child as a reactor and an asocial being."

Durkheim's theory offers important concepts of moral education which today's theorists and practitioners have to examine. Durkheim defines education as socialization of the child, and maintains that the three elements of morality are discipline, society, and autonomy. He also proposes how to develop them in school and describes the teacher's role and the child's characteristics. Finally, let us arrange Durkheim's concepts and the parameters of moral education.

Table 1. Parameters of Moral Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socialization</th>
<th>1. Transmitting social values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>2. Teaching discipline and moral conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>3. Stressing the group or society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Emphasizing altruism or affective components of morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>5. Imposing values prior to autonomy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Table 1, continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>6. The teacher as an authority and a socializer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child</td>
<td>7. The child as a reactor and an asocial being</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOUR CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO MORAL EDUCATION

According to Superka (1976), there are mainly five values education approaches: inculcation, moral development, analysis, clarification, and action learning. In this chapter four of those popular approaches to moral education are discussed: inculcation or the value-oriented approach which is primarily concerned with the content of values, the values clarification approach which focuses on the process of valuing, and the two Kohlberg's approaches (the moral discussion approach and the just community approach) which emphasize the developmental aspect in moral education. They will be identified and showed how they differ from each other.

(1) Inculcation

The great tradition

In today's America one of the advocates of the inculcation approach is Edward Wynne. Wynne (1985-6) argues, "Whether the dominant educational system has been formal or informal, the transmission of moral values has persistently played a central role" (p.5). There are two reasons. First, human beings are uniquely adaptable animals and live in
nearly all climates and in diverse cultural systems. Young persons must be socialized gradually to the right practices appropriate to their environment. Second, without moral formation, the human propensity for selfishness can destructively affect adult institutions.

Therefore, Wynne asserts that we should reevaluate the great tradition in education. For him, one of the origins of it is in Plato's "Republic". He supports Plato rather than Socrates, because Plato recognized the necessity of constraint for teaching children.

According to Plato, Socrates was put to death because the Athenians disapproved of the moral training he was offering to the Athenian young men. But such variations do not lessen the strength of the general model. Despite his affection for Socrates, Plato in the Republic (circa 390 B.C.) emphasized the importance of constraining the learning influences on children and youths, to ensure appropriate moral outcomes. (pp.5-6)

According to Wynne, the height of prosperity of the great tradition in America can be found in the "character education movement" between 1880 and 1930. The character education movement fostered moral conducts such as promptness, courtesy, and obedience. It emphasized school clubs, pupil discipline codes, assemblies, and so on.

Then, Wynne proposed that the teacher should follow the great tradition in moral education. The characteristics of the great tradition which he sums up are:

1) The tradition was concerned with good habits of conducts
as contrasted with moral concepts or moral rationales.
2) The tradition focused on day-to-day moral issues: telling the truth in the face of evident temptation, being polite, or obeying legitimate authority.
3) The great tradition assumed that no single agency in society had the sole responsibility for moral education.
4) The tradition assumed that moral conduct, especially of the young, needed persistent and pervasive reinforcement.
5) The tradition saw an important relationship between the advancement of moral learning and suppression of wrong conduct.
6) The tradition was not hostile to the intellectual analysis of moral problems.
7) The great tradition assumed that the most important complex moral values were transmitted through persistent and intimate person-to-person interaction.
8) The great tradition usually treated "learners," who were sometimes students, as members of vital groups, such as teams, classes, or clubs.
9) The great tradition had a pessimistic opinion about the perfectibility of human beings, and about the feasibility or value of breaking with previous socialization patterns. (pp.6-7)
In these elements Wynne emphasized not only the moral conduct, but also group activities which generate student
collective life. Today, in American schools, most academic learnings are individualistic. Therefore, students need to be educated the spirit of collectivity, such as school spirit or the concept of community.

Character education in the United States

The Character Education Curriculum (CEC) developed by the American Institute for Character Education in San Antonio, Texas, is also seen as a representative of the inculcation approach. The main goal of the CEC is to develop responsible citizens. According to the proponents of the CEC, this program is not an original, unique, or innovative concept in education, but is one, due to the increasing problems facing students, parents, and educators, that must be recognized as an important function of schools today.

Let us look at one example of a moral lesson of the CEC. First, the teacher presents a problematic situation:

A young boy accompanies his friends to the mall on a weekend only to find that when they reach the mall, each boy is expected to steal as much merchandise as possible in the store. After one hour, the boys will then meet, determine which boy has stolen the largest amount in dollars and cents according to the price tags on the merchandise, and the winner will take all! The boy who does not want to go along with this scheme is faced with being called "Chicken!", "Sissy", and worse. Unable to resist the taunts, he may join his friends and, as a result, have his life affected seriously. (Mulkey, 1989, p.1)

By discussing such an experience in the classroom in a non-threatening atmosphere, the students review the
difficulty in resisting such taunts, but recognize their ability to say "No!". The aim of this lesson is to resist negative peer pressure and to say "No!" to substance abuse. In other words, the teacher tries to instill values and conducts which are considered desirable.

Like the Hutchins Code, the CEC has the core code called the "Freedom's Code". It was written by Russell C. Hill, a founder of the American Institute for Character Education.

FREEDOM'S CODE
The standards of informed and self-reliant people of good will
Be Honest – Be Generous – Be Just – and Live
Honорably among all People –
Be Kind to Those whose Lives you Touch and Do your Fair Share to Help Those in Need –
Have Convictions and Courage and yet be Tolerant of Other People's Faults and Opinions –
Make Creditable Use of your Time and Talents and Provide Reasonable Security for Yourself and your Dependents –
Understand your Obligations as a Citizen and Fulfill Them Creditably –
Stand with all People of Good Will Everywhere for Truth and Be an Unyielding Defender of the Basic Human Rights that provide Freedom, Justice, and Equality for the People under an Honest Government of Law –
This is the Measure of a Good Life among Free People. These are the Standards people must Live by to be Free.

In this program, instructional materials are provided for classroom teachers of Kindergarten through ninth grade to use with their students to meet the following objectives:

1. Raise self-esteem
2. Promote self-discipline
3. Improve decision-making and problem-solving skills
4. Instill positive attitudes and values
The unit topics in the CEC are: courage and convictions, generosity, kindness, and helpfulness, honesty and truthfulness, honor, justice and tolerance, use of time and talents, freedom of choice, freedom of speech, citizenship, right to be an individual, and right to equal opportunity, and economic security.

The CEC attempts to develop an awareness in students about others and their responsibility for every right they are given. Students learn the importance of becoming responsible citizens by participating in large and small group discussions and activities, resisting negative peer pressure, determining the consequences of their behavior to themselves and to others, and developing self-discipline for achieving their goals.

In the CEC, the teacher's role is very important. The teacher's manual says,

Teaching Character Education demands that you, the teacher, identify your own values before attempting to help students develop their values or show them how important standards are to their lives. The example set by your actions should reinforce the concepts presented in the lessons. (Mulkey, 1989, p.1)

In this program, the teacher's attitude toward himself/herself, the children, education, and life is crucial, because it should be a model to the student.

On the other side, the CEC proposes that the teacher should use various kinds of teaching methods such as
discussio, role playing, and group work. Indeed, the CEC focuses on clarifying the students' values. But it is certain that the major focus of its objectives and activities is inculcation. It is because the CEC teachers believe that there are values which we have to teach. For example, the teacher's manual indicates that in discussions the teacher's role is one of a facilitator to the group. The teacher's reaction to students' statements, no matter how shocking, might be to ask, "Why do you say that?", or "Why do you feel that way?" The teacher should set an example of open-mindedness and tolerance of others that will affect the students' thinking. However, it also says,

By the fact that lessons are presented in a framework of units which emphasize specific values, such as honesty, truthfulness, justice and courage, their purpose is to logically guide students to the right answer. Certainly, you should feel free to express your opinions, to tell the students what is right and what is wrong; however, if you wait until the end of the lesson or after the students have had an opportunity to express themselves, you will greatly increase the chances of the students internalizing the value concept being discussed. (Mulkey, 1989, p.4)

In the CEC, the main purpose of a lesson is to logically guide students to the "right answer", and to internalize the desirable values. In the United States today, the CEC appeals to many teachers and parents who are worrying about children's misbehaviors.

The CEC focuses on the teaching of morality. On the other hand, Wynne emphasizes students' activities stressing
moral conduct. However, both of them aim at instilling or internalizing certain values that are desirable. These inculcation approaches to moral education are very common in schools all over the world.

The criticisms of inculcation

As we have seen briefly in chapter 1, there are some criticisms of the inculcation approach. Now let us consider these more in detail.

1) "There are no such values."

When one turns to the details of defining each virtue, one finds equal uncertainty or difficulty in reaching consensus. For example, let us think about honesty. Does honesty mean one should steal to save a life? Does it mean that a student should not help another student with his/her homework? (Kohlberg, 1975) It is easy for us to agree to the abstract values, but not easy to the concrete values.

The developers of values clarification deny the assumption that absolute values exist and are known. They view values as relative, personal, and situational. Therefore, value education should not identify and transmit the right values, but help the student identify his/her own values (Harmin and Simon, 1973).

2) "The inculcation approach to moral education does not work."
Kohlberg (1969) indicates the result of Hartshorne and May's research as a failure of character education. According to Kohlberg, what Hartshorne and May (1928-30) showed is the following:

1. You cannot divide the world into honest and dishonest people. Almost everyone cheats some of the time; cheating is distributed in a bell curve around a level of moderate cheating.

2. If people cheat in one situation, that does not mean they will or will not cheat in another. There is very little correlation between situational cheating tests. In other words, it is not a character trait of dishonesty that makes a child cheat in a given situation.

Values like honesty, patriotism, and truthfulness may be beautiful ideas, but they do not resolve specific dilemmas in which people find themselves.

3) "The imposition of conventional knowledge and structure which constitute the inculcation approach is no longer relevant in the modern era of rapid change."

Inculcating virtues will not help students learn to cope with the future. In today's world, Kirschenbaum and Simon (1973) argue, change is so rapid, and new alternatives arise so quickly in every area of life-choice, that no one set of specific beliefs and behaviors could possibly answer all the choice situations of the future. In a value conflux
society, school teachers might have an entirely different set of values which are exposed to the child. And different teachers have different values.

4) "The inculcation approach does not promote moral growth because it is concerned with instilling certain values or indoctrination."

The cognitive developmental approach to moral education, according to Kohlberg, pays attention to the developmental stage of the student, and has the aim of aiding movement of each to the next stage, not a convergence on common patterns. However, the inculcation approach does not have this aspect. Consequently, the teacher instills difficult values which children do not understand, or easy values which they already have known and are bored about. Moreover, in Kohlberg's theory, promoting moral growth should be focused on the moral reasoning, that is to say, the structure of valuing. But the inculcation approach only emphasizes the content of values.

5) "There is resistance on the part of parents, and conflicts between religious and ethnic groups."

Many religious, racial, and ethnic groups are distinguished by their values, the philosophical and theological bases for the morality, and their different standards of behavior. Consequently, some parents feel strongly that schools should not interfere with their
position as moral agents, and insist that school should stay out of moral education. Some parents also object to the schools taking a more active role in moral education, because they fear that what will start out as moral education will end up as indoctrination.

(2) Values Clarification

In the late 60's and 70's, the traditional values in the United States seemed to be destroyed by social issues such as the Vietnam War, the women's liberation movement, the minority demand for equality, and the free sexual liberation movement. Then, the values clarification approach presented a strong statement to this kind of value flux in society. Raths, Harmin, and Simon (1978) write,

Since we see values as growing from a person's experiences, we would expect that different experiences would give rise to different values and that any one person's values would be modified as those experiences accumulate and change. A person in the Antarctic would not be expected to have the same values as a person in Chicago. And a person who has an important change in awareness or in patterns of experiences might be expected to modify his or her values. Values may not be static if a person's relationships to the world are not static. As guides to behavior, values evolve and mature as experiences evolve and mature. (p.26)

The proponents of values clarification are less concerned with the particular value outcomes of any one person's experiences than the process that is used to obtain those values. According to them, life is different through
time and space, we cannot be certain what experiences any one person will have. Therefore, they focus on the process of valuing, "not on the transmission of the right set of values" (Simon, 1976, p.127).

The developers of values clarification maintain that the fundamental failing of traditional approaches to such behaviors as lying, cheating, and stealing, is that they deal in indoctrination. Avoiding indoctrination, values clarification focuses on how to value, not on what to value. As a result, in the values clarification model "right" or "wrong" is entirely relative, depending on the situation or a person's point of view.

Raths and his colleagues (1978) argue that to arrive at our own values, we must engage in the process of choosing, prizing, and acting on the values. The values clarifying process involves seven subprocesses:

Choosing : 1. freely
            2. from alternatives
            3. after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative
Prizing : 4. cherishing, being happy with the choice
            5. enough to be willing to affirm the choice to others
Acting : 6. or doing something with the choice
            7. repeatedly, in some pattern of life (p.28)

Unless something satisfies all seven of the criteria mentioned above, they do not call it a value, but rather a "belief" or "attitude", or something other than a value. There are three assumptions about this process. First, the
process of valuing is based on a conception of democracy, which says that people can learn to make their own decisions. Second, it is based on a conception of humanity stating that human beings are capable of being thoughtful and wise, and that the most appropriate values will emerge when people use those capacities in defining their relationships with each other and with an ever-changing world. Third, it is based on the idea that values are personal things, they cannot be very personal until they are freely accepted, and that they cannot be of much significance if they do not penetrate the life of the person who holds them.

Then, how does the teacher help students develop their values? The proponents of values clarification assert that values often grow from 1) goals or purposes, 2) aspirations, 3) attitudes, 4) interests, 5) feelings, 6) beliefs and convictions, 7) activities, and 8) worries, problems, and obstacles. They call these expressions value indicators which approach values but which may not meet all of the criteria. In school, the teacher should pay attention to the value indicators of students and help them clarify their own values through the seven steps. So, the teacher needs to communicate an acceptance of the student's expressions of values, although not necessary an agreement with what is expressed.
In the dialogue, the teacher is recommended to use a clarifying response which is the core of this approach. They are characterized by the following:

1. A clarifying response avoids moralizing, criticizing, giving values, or evaluating.
2. It puts the responsibility on the students to look at their behavior or ideas and to think and decide for themselves what it is they want.
3. It also entertains the possibility that the student will not look or decide or think. It is permissive and stimulating, but not insistent.
4. Usually an extended discussion does not result. The purpose is for the student to think the temptation to justify thoughts to an adult.
5. It is often for individuals, because values are personal things. The teacher often responds to one individual, although others may be listening.
6. It operates in situation where there are no "right" answers. It is not a question for which the teacher has an answer already in mind.

(Raths et al., 1978)

Now let us look at the concrete strategies of values clarification. In the book *Values Clarification* Simon, How, and Kirschenbaum (1972) offers various kinds of teaching strategies. For example:

**Twenty Things You Love to Do**

This activity helps students examine their most prized and cherished things. Students are asked to write down twenty things they like to do. Next, students are asked to code their list using the right column of their paper. They can put the suggested symbol at the top of each column and proceed to fill out each row according to the following direction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$3</td>
<td>Check each activity that cost more than $3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Put an A for activities you prefer doing alone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>P for activities you prefer doing with people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-P</td>
<td>A-P for activities you prefer doing alone or with people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Check each activity that you need planning to do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N5</td>
<td>Check each activity that you have not listed five years ago.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1-5 Number the top five, the ones you like to do best.
Date Write the approximate date you list did each activity. (pp.30-32)

**Rank Order**
This strategy gives students practice in choosing among alternatives and in publicly affirming and explaining or defending their choices. The teacher will give students three or four alternative choice for responding to each question and ask them to rank order these choices according to their own value-laden preferences.

Which season do you like best?
( ) Winter
( ) Spring
( ) Summer
( ) Fall

Which pet would you rather have?
( ) A cat
( ) A dog
( ) A turtle
( ) A parakeet

(pp.62-63)

These practices might help students become aware of their values and develop a good mood in the classroom, because what the teacher asks students are personal preferences and feelings. Therefore, every student can answer and participate in this lesson. Furthermore, sharing these can promote understanding of individual differences among students. Since the teachers treat all opinions as being equally valid, and accept any kind of choice unconditionally, the students must be enthusiastic over these strategies. However, there is a fundamental difference between nonmoral issues which can be chosen by personal preferences or feelings and moral issues which should be judged by moral justification.
The limitations of values clarification

Now, we are going to consider the following values clarification session on cheating.

Teacher: So some of you think it is best to be honest on tests, is that right? (Some heads nod affirmatively.) And some of you think dishonesty is all right? (A few hesitant and slight nods.) And I guess some of you are not certain. (Heads nod.) Well, are there any other choices or is it just a matter of dishonesty versus honesty?
Sam: You could be honest some of the time and dishonest some of the time.
Teacher: Does that sound like a possible choice, class? (Heads nod.) Any other alternatives to choose from?
Tracy: You could be honest in some situations and not in others. For example, I am not honest when a friend asks about an ugly dress, at least sometimes. (Laughter.)
Teacher: Is that a possible choice, class? (Heads nod again.) Any other alternatives?
Sam: It seems to me that you have to be all one way or all the other.
Teacher: Just a minute, Sam. As usual we are first looking for the alternatives that there are in the issue. Later we'll try to look at the consequences of the alternatives we've identified. Any other alternatives, class? (No response.) Well, then, let's list the four possibilities that we have on the board and I'm going to ask that each of you do two things for yourself: (1) See if you can identify any other choices in this issue of honesty and dishonesty, and (2) consider the consequences of each alternative and see which ones you prefer. Later, we will have buzz groups in which you can discuss this and see if you are able to get clear about this.
Ginger: Does that mean that we can decide for ourselves whether we should be honest on tests here?
Teacher: No, that means that you can decide on the value. I personally value honesty; and although you may choose to be dishonest, I shall insist that we be honest on our tests here. In other areas of your life, you may have more freedom to be dishonest, but one can't do anything any time, and in this class I shall expect honesty on tests.
Ginger: But then how can we decide for ourselves? Aren't you telling us what to value?
Sam: Sure, you're telling us what we should do and believe in.
Teacher: Not exactly. I don't mean to tell you what you
should value. That's up to you. But I do mean that in this class, not elsewhere necessarily, you have to be honest on tests or suffer certain consequences. I merely mean that I cannot give tests without the rule of honesty. All of you who choose dishonesty as a value may not practice it here, that's all I'm saying. (Raths et al., 1978, pp.137-9)

In this session, since the teacher tried to avoid indoctrination, he/she accepted a student's judgment to which he/she does not agree personally, and tries to avoid leading the student to his/her value. So, the teacher said, "In other areas of your life, you may have more freedom to be dishonest." The proponents of values clarification say, "When operating within this value theory, it is entirely possible that children will choose not to develop values. It is the teacher's responsibility to support this choice" (Raths et al., 1978, p.48).

Kazepides (1977) criticizes this point.

In the hands of an unthinking V.C. advocate the young might be led to consider all matters of value as nothing more than matters of personal preference for which they do not have any good reasons. Instead of learning, for example, that honesty, truth-telling, clarity, precision, etc., are presuppositions of rational thinking and talking, the students could come to believe that these are only matters of feeling or personal preference. (p.107)

In this session, the teacher concluded, "You have to be honest on tests or suffer certain consequences. I merely mean that I cannot give tests without the rule of honesty." In other words, the teacher controls his/her students' behavior by force. It is indoctrination which he/she must
avoid, because he/she did not explain to the student why the rule of honesty is needed in his/her class. Without reference to some worthwhile content there can be no justification for interfering in the lives of other persons.

Values clarification teachers do not recognize the difference between moral values and nonmoral values, and treat all values as equal. As a result, the teacher fell into the contradiction the author mentioned above. Kohlberg (1975) offers the following criticism:

The teacher is to stress that "our values are different," not that one value is more adequate than others. If this program is systematically followed, students will themselves become relativists, believing there is no "right" moral answer. For instance, a student caught cheating might argue that he did nothing wrong, since his own hierarchy of values, which may be different from that of the teacher, made it right for him to cheat. (p.673)

When the teacher deals with moral issues in his/her classroom, he/she cannot admit that all opinions are equally valid. However, the values clarification teacher was lacking in this viewpoint. Lockwood (1975) indicates:

The advocates of values clarification do not seriously entertain such fundamental questions as: assuming Adolph Hitler, Charles Manson, Martin Luther King, and Albert Schweitzer held values which met the seven criteria, are their values equally, valid, praiseworthy, and/or good? (p.46)

Another problem of values clarification is to neglect moral justification or to avoid using "why" question. The advocates of values clarification believe that requiring a student's justification of his/her position can be
detrimental to self-confidence or self-esteem. Therefore, Raths and Simon caution teachers against using "why" questions, because they tend to make students defensive, and force them to rationalize their positions. In other words, they worry that students who have no clear reasons for choice, might make up reasons for the benefit of the teacher and conform to peer expectations.

It is true that peer pressure, especially at junior high or high school level, may become an obstacle in classroom discussions. However, eliminating this obstacle is one of the most important point of classroom management. The teacher should try to establish a good atmosphere in his/her class. The value clarification approach has offered a lot of strategies for doing so. Then the teacher should use "why" questions.

Strictly speaking, the advocates of values clarification do not deny "why" questions completely. One example is "Cave-in Simulation" in the book *Values Clarification*.

The class, on an outing to some nearby caves, has been trapped hundreds of feet below the ground by a cave-in. There is a narrow passageway leading up and out of the cavern where they are trapped. Night is coming fast and there is no one around for miles to help. They decide they will form a single file and try to work their way out of the cave. But at any moment there might be another rock slide. The ones nearest to the front of the line will have the best chances for survival. (Simon et al., 1972, pp.287-8)

Then, the teacher asks the students "why should you be at
the head of the line?" After hearing each other's reason, the students will determine the order by which they will file out.

In this session the "why" questions were used. Each member of the class will give his/her reasons for why he/she should be at the head of the line. The authors write, "This can be a very powerful activity. But it would only work if there is a great deal of trust in the group and they have already done quite a few values-clarifying exercises" (Simon et al., 1972, pp.288-9). If they really think so, why don't they focus on "why" questions?

"Why" questions require moral justification which bears on the quality of opinion. Fundamentally the values clarification approach, as we saw earlier, assumes that values are relatively personal, and situational, and that all opinions are equally valid. Then, Lockwood (1975) argues,

> While the stress is on the rational or "intellectual" aspect of valuing, values clarification proponents prescribe a role for the teacher which derives from Carl Rogers' description of client-centered therapy. For example, the teacher who would employ values clarification is urged to be nonjudgmental, trusting, a good listener, student-centered and, at times, to express "Unconditional acceptance of the student and problem." (p.40)

Therefore, they cannot use "why" questions, and they have to avoid dealing with moral justification. Although values clarification offered a lot of good strategies in helping
students to become aware of their own values, it was not a complete moral education, but rather an approach of humanistic education which focuses on feeling, preference, and emotion that are important parts of life.

On the other hand, Kohlberg's approach to moral education puts emphasis on moral justification. In the dilemma discussion, the teacher always uses "why" questions to focus on the reasoning of the student's moral judgment.

(3) The Moral Discussion Approach (Kohlberg's First Wave)
The cognitive developmental approach to moral education

Kohlberg's approach to moral education is based on a cognitive theory which specifies how moral development occurs. According to Kohlberg (1975), the cognitive developmental approach was fully stated for the first time by John Dewey. The approach is called "cognitive" because it recognized that moral education, like intellectual education, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the child about moral issues and decisions. It is called developmental because it sees the aim of moral education as movement through moral stages.

In the 1950's, Kohlberg (1958) conducted empirical research in the area of moral development. His core sample was comprised of 72 boys, age ten through sixteen, in Chicago. He interviewed each of them about a series of
dilemmas. The following example, Heinz's Dilemma, is the most often cited in the literature.

In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could get together only about $1,000, which was half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.  

(Kohlberg, 1981, p.12)

Then, Kohlberg asked in the interview, "Should Heinz have done that?" and "Why?" According to Kohlberg, the content of moral judgment must be distinguished from the structure of moral judgment. The choice endorsed by a subject (steal or do not steal) is called the content of judgment in the situation. The subject's reasoning about the choice defines the structure of judgment. Kohlberg puts emphasis on the reasoning, rather than "Yes" or "No". Then, he classified the various reasons, and constructed the three levels and six stages of moral development (each level consists of two stages).

The stage theory of Kohlberg is derived from the work of Dewey and Piaget. Dewey (1964) postulated three levels of moral development:
1) the pre-moral or preconventional level of behavior motivated by biological and social impulses with the results for morals;
2) the conventional level of behavior in which the individual accepts with little critical reflection the standards of his group;
3) the autonomous level of behavior in which conduct is guided by the individual thinking and judging for himself whether a purpose is good, and does not accept the standard of his group without reflection.

Dewey's thinking about moral levels was theoretical. On the other hand, Piaget (1932) proposed the cognitive stages of moral reasoning in children through interviews and observations. He defined the three stages as follows:
1) the pre-moral stage, where there was no sense of obligation to rules;
2) the heteronomous stage, where the right was literal obedience to rules and an equation of obligation with submission to power and punishment (roughly ages 4-8);
3) the autonomous stage, where the purpose and consequences of following rules are considered and obligation is based on reciprocity and exchange (roughly ages 8-12).

Kohlberg redefined Dewey's levels and Piaget's stages, and proposes the following six stages of moral development.
Table 2  Definition of Moral Stages

1. Preconventional level
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the later being Stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

2. Conventional level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention - "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.
3. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

(Kohlberg, 1975, p.671)

The concept of these stages has four characteristics.

1) Stages are structured wholes: With regard to the Heinz dilemma, one teenager, for example, might justly stealing with a selfish, Stage 2 reason: "If his wife dies, who will cook his meals and wash his clothes?" The same person may value friendship because friends watch out for your
interests, and help you in a pinch. In this way, individuals are consistent in the level of moral judgment. In other words, stages are organized systems of thought.

2) Stages form an invariant sequence: Under all conditions except the extreme trauma, movement is always forward, never backward. Children always go from Stage 1 to Stage 2, Stage 2 to Stage 3, and so forth. They do not skip stages or move through them in mixed-up orders. Not all children eventually attain the highest stage, but to the extent they do go through them, they proceed in order. Kohlberg's (1969) longitudinal study of American boys supports this characteristic.

3) Stages are hierarchical integrations: Thinking at a higher stage includes or comprehends within it lower stage thinking. Stage 4, for instance, is more adequate than Stage 3, and Stage 3 than Stage 2, and so on. Each higher stage has new logical features, incorporates the logical features of lower stages and addresses problems unrecognized by, or unresolved by, lower stages.

4) Stages are culturally universal: A stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. Moral development is not merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the child's culture but reflects something more universal in development, something that would occur in any culture. The study of moral development
in the United States, Taiwan, Mexico, Yucatan, and Turkey indicates the cultural universality of the sequence of stages. (Kohlberg, 1971b)

Moral discussion

Turiel (1966) reported an interesting result of the child's moral judgment. His experiment used 44 seventh-grade boys. The 44 subjects, according to Kohlberg's stages 2, 3, and 4, were equally distributed among 3 experimental groups and 1 control group. In the treatment condition, subjects were exposed to either the stage 1 below, 1 above, or 2 above the initial dominate stage. The control group was not administered a treatment condition. Then, he found that +1 treatment was the most effective of the three treatments.

This finding supports Kohlberg's schema of stages as representing a developmental continuum, in which each individual passes through the stages in the prescribed sequence. The developmental interpretation is also strengthened by the finding that subjects assimilated the next higher stage more readily than the lower stage, even though they could understand the concepts of the lower stage.

Turiel (1969) also indicates, "A factor causing the use of new modes of thought may be cognitive conflict." The concept of cognitive conflict corresponds to the concept of
disequilibrium, which Piaget has presented. The movement from one structure to the next occurs when the system is put into a state of disequilibrium. Thus, change in structure would involve the establishment of a new equilibrium after the occurrence of disequilibrium. This process shows assimilation and accommodation.

Following the Turiel's research, Moshe Blatt (1975) led classroom discussions of hypothetical moral dilemmas like Kohlberg used in research interviews. The Blatt's research stresses: 1) Arousal of genuine conflict, uncertainty, and disagreement about genuinely problematic situations, 2) The presentation of modes of thought one stage above the child's own.

The moral discussion program took place in a Reform Jewish Sunday school class which Blatt taught composed of thirty children aged 11-12 and coming from professional or academic families. The program lasted for twelve weeks, a total of twelve hours of discussion. Blatt presented moral dilemmas which engaged the class in a good deal of heated debate, and tried to leave much of the discussion to the children. He also encouraged arguments that were one stage above those of class. In this way, Blatt found that one-fourth to one-half of the students in one semester of such discussion groups would move (partially or totally) to the next stage up, a change not found in control groups.
Kohlberg calls this finding the "Blatt effect".

One major replication of the Blatt effect was the Stone Foundation Project. It engaged over twenty high school social studies teachers in the Boston and Pittsburgh areas in a developmental moral discussion. The Stone Project not only replicated the Blatt effect in twenty schools, it also demonstrated that three elements, controversial dilemmas, mixture of student at two or three stages, and Socratic probing or asking "why", are necessary in the moral discussion approach. (Kohlberg, 1978b)

Beyer (1976) proposed a clear strategy about how Socratic teaching can induce cognitive change in moral discussions, called the Five Step teaching method. In the moral discussion, the teacher should help students engaged in sequence in five distinct activities as follows.

**Step 1 Presenting the dilemma**
To launch a moral discussion, teachers or students present a dilemma to a class. After students hear or see the dilemma, the teacher should ask questions in order to help students to clarify the circumstances involved in the dilemma, define terms, identify the characteristics of the central character, and state the exact nature of the dilemma and the action choice open to the central character.

**Step 2 Dividing on action**
Once students have stated the dilemma, each individual should take a tentative position about what action he or she thinks the central character should take. This can be done by asking students to reflect briefly on the situation facing the central character and then to state tentatively whether the character should or should not take a certain action, usually answered in terms of a written "Yes" or "No" response to an action alternative.

**Step 3 Organizing small group discussion**
Small group discussions maximize student-to-student
interaction, generate thinking about a variety of reasons for supporting a particular position, create a supportive feeling within each group, and set up the larger class discussion that follows. The students in a group can list all reasons they have for their position, choose the best of these reasons, and then state why this reason is the best one.

**Step 4 Conducting a class discussion**

A discussion with the full class gives students a chance to report the reasoning which supports their positions and to hear reasons given for other positions or different reasons given for the positions they have taken, to challenge these reasons, and to hear their own reasoning challenged.

**Step 5 Closing the discussion**

Students can be asked to summarize all the reasons given for the positions being considered and then choose individually the reason they now find most persuasive. (pp. 197-8)

According to Beyer, to be most useful a dilemma should meet four criteria: 1, be simple as possible; 2, be open-ended; 3, involve two or more issues that have moral implications; 4, offer a choice of action and pose the question "What should the central character do?" The word "should" has to be emphasized, because this word focuses thinking on moral reasoning.

In addition to this, effective dilemmas focus at a particular transitional stage level. For example, a good dilemma for children at Stage 2 and 3 might focus on issues of concern for others versus an individual's interest. "Should you stop to help a friend who's had a bike accident if you're late getting home for your birthday party?" Similarly, a good dilemma for children at Stage 3 and Stage 4 might a conflict between the law and group alliance.
"Should you turn in a good friend who you know has committed a crime?" (Scharf, 1978, p.76)

To do moral discussion effectively, teachers should promote student-to-student interaction and keep the discussion a moral discussion. Teachers also should stimulate reasoning at a next higher stage and use probe questions to help students examine ideas they had ignored or to think about reasoning at a higher stage. In other words, in the moral discussion teachers should not be authoritarian but be a facilitator.

According to Kohlberg (1975), the dilemma discussion approach to moral education is free from indoctrination. The change is in the way of reasoning rather than in the particular beliefs involved, because the aim of this approach is to aid movement of each to the next stage, not convergence on a common pattern, and because the teacher's own opinion is neither stressed nor invoked as authoritative. It enters only as one of many opinions, hopefully one of these at a next higher stage.

At the same time, the moral discussion approach is also free from value relativism. This is because it based on Kohlberg's stage theory, and because it admits that some judgments are more adequate than others. The student, in the discussion, is encouraged to articulate a position which seems most adequate to him and to judge the adequacy of the
reasoning of others. Therefore, Kohlberg believed that the moral discussion approach was one of the most effective methods of moral education.

However, the next two problems of the moral discussion approach remained. First, in moral discussion the teacher and students deal with only hypothetical dilemmas. How do they deal with real-life moral dilemmas? Second, when the students discuss hypothetical dilemmas, it is possible to close the discussion as open-ended, which means that the teacher does not care about the content of the student's judgment (Yes or No), and only focuses on the structure of judgment (reasonings). But in the case of real life moral dilemmas, the content of judgment becomes important, and cannot be neglected.

Concerning the limitation of the moral discussion approach, Kohlberg (1971b) already recognized it. He argued that moral discussion classes such as those of Blatt experiments were limited, not because they did not focus on moral behavior, but because they had only a limited relation to the "real life" of the school and of the child.

The issue of "real life" brings us to what should be a central concern of moral education, the moral atmosphere of the school. To extend classroom discussions of justice to real life is to deal with issues of justice in the schools. Education for justice, then, requires making schools more just, and encouraging students to take an active role in making the school more just... Ultimately the issue of participation raises the issue of the social structure of the school and a complete approach to
moral education means full student participation in a school in which justice is a living matter.
(pp.82-84)

Then, Kohlberg's moral education expands into a participatory democracy in high schools.

(4) The Just Community Approach (Kohlberg's Second Wave)

In the mid 1970's Kohlberg's approach to moral education moved from a focus on classroom discussion programs to the establishment of "just communities" in high schools. In this approach he pays attention to the moral atmosphere, the democratic governance, and the fostering of a sense of community.

Just community at correction

At first, Hicky, Scharf, and Kohlberg (1975) developed a just community program in a cottage of about 25 incarcerated women and six correctional officers. Generally speaking, traditional prison setting lacks any of the elements of experience required for moral growth. Discussion and argumentation are discouraged, and role-taking is prevented by the rigid social structure and authoritarian bureaucracy.

Kohlberg and his colleagues obtained permission to run the cottage as a democratic community. Inmates and guards agreed to work together democratically to arrive at
decisions about how to govern their cottage and how to enforce the rules they made. The program had been in operation for two years. It was in most ways a success, because after two years only 16 percent had returned to prison or had become entangled with the law (Kohlberg et al., 1975).

From this experiment, they learned that the real-life dilemmas which inmates raised from their prison experiences were at least as challenging, and often harder to resolve than the hypothetical dilemmas used in the moral discussions. There was a gap between how the group thought the conflicts should be resolved and how they actually were resolved. Since life in prison reflected the lowest stages of moral reasoning, everyone acted either to avoid arbitrary punishment or to further personal instrumental interests. Therefore, inmates who in discussions would suggest higher-stage resolutions to real-life conflicts admitted that they could not act on those resolutions and hope to survive in prison society.

Then, they recognized the importance of the moral environment or the moral atmosphere to bridge between judgments and actions. To establish atmosphere justly, they focused on democratic governance emphasizing respect for rules and attachment to the group. From this experiment, Kohlberg was encouraged to move ahead with the just
community approach in high school.

Just community in high school

In 1974 an alternative school within Cambridge High and Latin School, called the "Cluster School", was formed by a group of parents, students, and teachers. Both the students and the staff volunteered to participate in the program. The students initially were selected from volunteers by random lottery stratified by neighborhood, race, year in school, and sex to reflect the larger high school population. The heterogeneous mix of backgrounds and ages produced a variety of responses at Stage 2, 3, and 4 of the Kohlberg scale, to moral dilemmas that came up in community meetings and classroom discussions.

The enrollment in the school varied from 50-72 students in grades from nine to twelve. The first year the school had 72 students, and there was agreement that this number was near the upper limit for effective small group interaction and participatory democracy. All the students participated in the Cluster School core curriculum in English and social studies. Students from ninth to twelfth grade enrolled in the same classes. This core curriculum centered on moral discussion, and on role-taking experience (opportunities for students to take the perspective of others) and communication. It also centered on relating the
governance structure of the school to that of the wider society.

Many alternative schools, Wasserman (1978) indicates, strove to establish a democratic governance, but few have achieved a vital participatory democracy. There are three main reasons. First, democracy was not perceived as a central educational goal but as one of several important and sometimes conflicting school goals. Second, democracy in alternative schools bored the students, since the students preferred to let teachers make decisions about staff, courses, and schedules rather than to attend lengthy, complicated meetings. Third, it is extremely difficult to make policy in a large student-staff meeting.

On the other hand, Kohlberg's just community school has different points of view as follows:
1) Democracy was perceived as a central moral education goal.
2) This approach focuses on issues of morality and fairness. Issues concerning drug use, theft, disruptive behavior, class cutting, and grading were rarely boring if handled as issues of fairness.
3) There are only 72 students, because the community needed to be small enough so that all members could have direct access to participation in community meeting.

In the just community approach, Kohlberg emphasizes
both direct and indirect conditions for moral growth. Direct conditions include the quality of discussion and interaction in classes, committees and community meetings, and other group contexts. Indirect conditions refer to the general moral atmosphere of the school. Moral development takes place because the school provides a number of contexts where the students have the opportunity to express their views, listen to another, and make group decisions.

In each context, the effort is to stimulate moral growth through the following means which are similar to the just community approach to corrections.

1) Exposure to cognitive conflict: In all these contexts, students and staff alike discuss real-life issues involving moral dimensions: how should we deal with a student who has broken the rule forbidding the use of drugs in the school, or what should we do about a student who has stolen money from another member of the community? Students and staff members present their views and try to work out a resolution.

2) Role taking: Staff and students consider the feelings and points-of-view of other people involved in an issue. They consistently try to put themselves in the person's position as a way of increasing their own understanding of the problem under discussion.

3) Consideration of fairness and morality: The group discusses issues which it confronts in terms of fairness to the individual(s) involved and to the community. Students also talk about basic human rights and compare them to pragmatic or legalistic bases for decisions.

4) Exposure to the next higher stage of moral reasoning: Staff members guide discussions so that students have opportunities to consider higher stage reasons as the basis for a decision. They encourage students who think at contiguous stages of the Kohlberg scale to discuss issues with each other, and they use the Socratic method of questioning to introduce one-stage-higher arguments if those do not emerge spontaneously from the students themselves.
5) Active participation in group decision making: The members of the school make and enforce their own rules. The staff makes an effort to stimulate a concern for the fairness of the rules and to develop a sense of responsibility which is essential when students and staff have the power of sanction. (Wasserman, 1978, pp.166-7)

School structure was built on community meetings, small group sessions, advisor groups, the discipline committee, and the staff-student-consultant meetings. In this participatory democracy the community meeting was the central form of government; it was here that the final agreement was reached as to the policies and rules for the school. Its function was to promote the controlled conflict and to open an exchange of opinions about fairness that were essential to the moral development of the individuals in the community.

They opened school with no rules of their own but with an agreement to abide by the rules of the larger school. They established rules and decision-making procedures in the community meeting. The meeting of the school as a whole established rules and disciplinary procedures for disruptive behavior, unexcused absence from school, drug use, and grading. They also discussed race relations in the school, student recruitment and enrollment, and the content and design of curriculum.

In the Cluster School, for example, the enrollment issue was discussed. By the second year, the community was
wrestling with fundamental moral and social problems. Blacks in the group raised the fairness issue, and called for more equal representation in the community. There were 47 whites, 18 blacks, and 6 openings to be filled at the time. Only one of the six students on the waiting list was black. The blacks, explaining their feelings of isolation as a minority, proposed that all six places be given to blacks. I'm going to try to tell you how I feel about the situation. Because, you see, I'm one of the people that wants some black people to come in... From what I feel I would be more comfortable with them here. I want them here. I want to let some new black people come in and experience the school.

A white student argued that fairness meant considering the discomfort of black students, now in the minority, who felt uncomfortable.

It doesn't matter to me whether they're black or white, they're people. But why can't everybody just accept the fact that the blacks would feel more comfortable and get a better education with more blacks in school? And why can't we just let the people that have signed up be black and come to the school, because that will improve all the blacks in the school.

Another white student tried to pull together the feelings of community.

All the people in this community right now are all saying in some way or another-usually they don't want to say it-but they're expressing feelings that they care about the other people and how their education goes and how their working with this community goes. And I feel that the blacks in this community can't work as well and feel as comfortable without more blacks in this community. It's not fair. Everybody knows that everybody in this school, no matter how it sounds now, cares about the other people. Then why
can't you allow six more blacks in, so twenty-whatever blacks will be able to get a good education in this school and a good sense of democracy and just everything. And you know, why can't we just let six more blacks in, it would help the whole things. The whole community, the whole school would be helped by that. (Wasserman, 1976, pp.170-171)

Finally, the community voted almost unanimously to adopt the proposal. At the same time, they continued to discuss the issue and to suggest ways to incorporate the opposing views in a final resolution of the issue.

The evaluation of moral atmosphere

How do we evaluate and analyze moral atmosphere? Power and Reimer (1978) developed standards for evaluating the moral atmosphere. They focused on the collective normative values and the sense of community, and constructed a hierarchy under the Kohlberg's scale of Stage 2, Stage 3, and Stage 4.

Table 3. Stages of Collective Normative Values and the Sense of Community

| Collective Normative Values | Stage 2: There is not yet an explicit awareness of collective normative values. However, there are generalized expectations that individuals should recognize concrete individual rights and resolve conflicts through exchange. | Stage 3: Collective normative values refer to relationships among group members. Membership in a group implies living up to shared expectations. Conflicts should be resolved by appeal to mutual collective normative values. | Stage 4: Collective normative values stress the community as an entity distinct from its individual members. Members are obligated to act out of concern for the welfare and harmony of the group. |
(Table 3, Continued)

**Sense of Community**

Stage 2: There is no clear sense of community apart from exchanges among group members. Community denotes a collection of individuals who do favors for each other and rely on each other for protection. Community is valued insofar as it meets the concrete needs of its members.

Stage 3: The sense of community refers to a set of relationships and sharings among group members. The group is valued for the friendliness of its members. The value of the group is equated with the value of its collective normative expectations.

Stage 4: The school is explicitly valued as an entity distinct from the relationships among its members. Group commitments and ideals are valued. The community is perceived as an organic whole composed of interrelated systems that carry on the functioning of the group. (p.113)

The positive influence of the Cluster School derives not simply from the strength of its atmosphere but primarily from the norms being perceived as operating at a stage higher than the stage of most of the individual members. Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg (1989) indicate that not only the individual stage development but also community value stage development occurred in the just community schools.

**The revision of Kohlberg's theory**

In the just community approach, the teacher and the students try to deal with real-life moral dilemmas. In this approach the content of judgment which was neglected in the moral discussion approach, comes to be crucial, since they have to resolve the issues which affect their school life.
The active involvement with the practice of moral education at Cluster School has led Kohlberg (1978a) to realize the psychologist's abstraction of moral cognition (judgment and reasoning), and the abstraction of structure in moral cognition and judgment are not a sufficient guide to the moral educators. They have to deal with the concrete moral content as well as structure, and behavior as well as reasoning. In this context, Kohlberg recognizes that the educator must be a socializer teaching value content and behavior, and that moral education should be partly indoctrinative.

In his earlier view, Kohlberg denied indoctrination completely. For Kohlberg, indoctrination is philosophically invalid, because the value content is culturally and personally relative. Therefore, teaching content is a violation of the child's right. Moreover, indoctrination is psychologically invalid because it cannot lead to meaningful structural change. However, dealing with real-life dilemmas, he revises his view.

I no longer hold these negative views of indoctrinative moral education, and I believe that the concepts guiding moral education must be partly "indoctrinative." This is true, by necessity, in a world in which children engage in stealing, cheating, and aggression and in a context wherein one cannot wait until children reach the fifth stage to deal directly with moral behavior. (Kohlberg, 1978a, p.15)

Therefore, Kohlberg concludes that moral education can be in the form of advocacy or "indoctrination" without violating
the child's right. Why did Kohlberg revise his theory? There are three main reasons as the following:

1) Focusing on the conventional level.

The new study of the developmental of moral judgment suggests that adolescents are not likely to develop beyond a conventional level. (Kohlberg, 1980) Most high school students are at Stage 2, 3, and 4 of the Kohlberg scale. Therefore, focusing on a conventional Stage 4 is a realistic and adequate goal for using the just community approach in high school. At the same time, Kohlberg's experience with American adolescents also indicates that they lack stability and conventional morality.

2) Visiting a kibbutz

In 1969 Kohlberg (1971a) visited a kibbutz (an Israeli collective settlement) and spent time observing and interviewing. Then he learned from the Madrich, or educator, who was in charge of the high school program:

Underneath the informality of the Madrich is a considerable amount of iron, and this iron is based on the theory of collective education. The madrich tells us, "I demand high values. What I mean by high values are certain social values. I am not talking about the kibbutz, socialism or some other generality. I am talking about living within a society." The iron kibbutz education, then, is not kibbutz ideology, but the iron of the welfare of the peer group and of the kibbutz in which it is embedded. (p.358)

The Madrich is not acting on his own behalf alone or expressing only his values, but is representing the kibbutz
society to the youth. Kohlberg (1980) writes, "Even the children from disadvantaged and troubled backgrounds who go to the kibbutz high school eventually attain and practice fourth-stage good citizenship as kibbutz members" (p.56). In the just community approach, he was getting to employ the teacher's role as an advocator like the Madrich.

3) Reconsidering Durkheim

In his earlier writing, Kohlberg (1971) denied Durkheim's theory, because "it leads to a definition of moral education as the promotion of collective national discipline which is consistent with neither rational ethics nor American constitutional tradition" (p.28). However, in establishing a just community Kohlberg modified his initial conception, and accepted the necessity of the respect for rules and the power of the collective which Durkheim stressed.

Kohlberg's revision indicates the necessity of teaching certain moral contents, and the importance of the teacher's role as an advocator. In other words, Kohlberg comes to admit a part of the inculcation approach.
CHAPTER 4

THE ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR APPROACHES
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DURKHEIM

In this chapter, the four approaches to moral education: inculcation, values clarification, the moral discussion approach (Kohlberg's first wave), and the just community approach (Kohlberg's second wave), will be analyzed by the seven parameters of moral education selected from Durkheim's theory in chapter 2.

(1) Transmitting Social Values

According to Durkheim, each society sets up a certain ideal of man, of what he should be, as much from the intellectual point of view as also from the physical and the moral one. This ideal is, to a degree, the same for all citizens. But, at the same time he says, "without a certain diversity all co-operation would be impossible; education assures the persistence of this necessary diversity by being itself diversified and specialized" (Education and Sociology, pp.70-71). However, Durkheim stresses that there must be underlying consensus regarding the ideals of society, or it could not survive. Therefore, education is aimed at morally socializing the children to act in certain
ways consistent with the norms and ideals of their society.

Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands. (Education and Sociology, p.70)

For Durkheim, moral education consists of socialization experiences that result in the internalization of society's central values and beliefs. In other words, he maintains that transmitting social values should be occupied the central position in moral education. How about the four approaches?

**Inculcation**

From the viewpoint of the inculcation approach to moral education, the school is an institution with a basic function of maintaining and transmitting some of the consensual values of society. In other words, this approach makes emphasis on transmitting moral values which are desirable to the student.

Wynne (1985-6) asserts whether the dominant educational system has been formal or informal, the transmission of moral values has persistently played a central role. He supports the character education movement as the great tradition in America between 1880 and about 1930.

The character education movement articulated numerous traditional moral aims: promptness, truthfulness, courtesy, and obedience... It emphasized techniques
such as appropriately structured materials in history and literature; school clubs and other extracurricular activities; rigorous pupil discipline codes; and daily flag salutes and frequent assemblies. (p.7)

Following Durkheim's theory, he maintains that transmitting moral values should be central in moral education.

According to Ryan and Lickona (1987), moral values are not relative, in the sense of being purely subjective or arbitrary, but objectively grounded in human nature and experience. For example, to be fair, honest, and caring in our relations with others is to act in ways that are consistent with, and enhancing of, our essential human dignity. To be unjust, deceitful, and cruel is to act in ways that violate our essential human dignity.

They also maintain that moral knowing begins with learning moral content: those values which constitute the moral heritage passed on from one generation to the next. Each new generation and each individual may alter or add to that heritage, but the heritage provides a foundation.

On the other hand, the value concepts are emphasized in the Character Education Curriculum (CEC). For example, the Kindergarten kit which has animal stories with lessons on honesty, generosity, helpfulness, kindness, and fairness. The materials from A to F are designed for use in graded or non-graded schools; Level A is Grade 1, Level B is Grade 2, and so forth. And Level G is for the middle school. The
contents of values are shown in table 4.

Table 4. Assignment of Topics by Levels of Character Education Curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Topics</th>
<th>Level K</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courage and Conviction</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity, Kindness, and Helpfulness</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty and Truthfulness</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honor</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Tolerance</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Time and Talents</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Choice</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom of Speech, Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to be an Individual</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to Equal Opportunity, Economic Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mulkey, 1989)

On the whole, these inculcation approaches support Durkheim's idea that socialization is one important aspect of moral education.

Values clarification

In contrast to inculcation, values clarification denies transmitting moral value, or teaching the content of values which is desirable by society. Values clarification assumes that the world is consistently changing, and that today there are no conclusive or verified answers to the value questions. The developers of values clarification criticize that traditional approaches to value education or inculcation involve persuasion. "The 'right' values are predetermined and taught by one method or another of selling, pushing, urging those values upon others" (Raths et
They also point out that these approaches have the air of indoctrination, and have lost the idea of free inquiry, thoughtfulness, and reason. In their view, inculcation seems not to be how to help the child developing a valuing process, but rather how to persuade the child the right values. On the contrary, the advocates of values clarification believe that today there is no right value for everyone. Consequently, they maintain that the teacher cannot transmit the right values.

Simon and Olds (1976) write, "We cannot give children an absolute set of values, but we can give them something better. We can give them a system that they can use arrive at their own values" (p.17). As we have seen, the developers of values clarification are less concerned with the content of value but rather with the process of valuing. "Because life is different through time and space, we cannot be certain what experiences any one person will have" (Raths et al., 1978, p.26).

Values clarification has made inroads into American public education because it avoids controversies about which values should be exposed in a school. The values clarification teachers think that children should be free to choose their own values. They also maintain that moralizing and indoctrination or inculcation are hazardous to
intellectual growth, and that teachers should foster self-esteem and personal liberty rather than particular attitude or beliefs. Therefore, we can conclude that values clarification reject transmitting the content of social values.

Kohlberg's first wave

Kohlberg, like the advocates of values clarification, rejects transmitting moral values that society considers worthwhile, since he believes that the content of moral values is culturally and personally relative. Therefore, the notion of socialization as transmitting the social values is neglected in his theory. Kohlberg (1971b) says,

When such "socialization" or rule enforcement is viewed as implying explicit positive educational goals, it generates a philosophy of moral education in which loyalty to the school and its rules is consciously cultivated as a matter of breeding loyalty to society and its rules. (p.30)

One difficulty with inculcation approach, according to Kohlberg (1981), is the fact that everyone has his/her own bag. Although it may be true that the notion of teaching virtues, such as honesty or integrity, arouses little controversy, it is also true that a vague consensus on the goodness of these virtues conceals a great deal of actual disagreement over their definitions. One person's integrity is another person's stubbornness, one person's honesty in expressing your true feeling is another person's
insensitivity to the feeling of others. In other words, the content of values depends on what the person's own values. Consequently, Kohlberg (1975) claims that teaching value content is a violation of the child's rights.

Character education and other forms of indoctrinative moral education have aimed at teaching universal values (it is assumed that honesty or service are desirable traits for all men in all societies), but the detailed definitions used are relative; they are defined by the opinions of the teacher and the authority of the teacher for their justification. (p.673)

In the course of development, according to Kohlberg, children naturally tend to acquire more advanced structure of thought. These advanced structures are superior to those that preceded them developmentally, because they solve a wider range of social problems. Hence, the aim of moral discussion approach is the stimulation of movement to the next stage of moral reasoning. In this approach, Kohlberg is concerned with the structure of moral judgment rather than the content of moral judgment.

Thus Kohlberg, like Raths and Simon, rejects transmitting social values because he believes that the content of value is relative, and that it depends on the individual's point of view.

Kohlberg's second wave

The just community program which treated real-life moral dilemmas has led Kohlberg (1978) to realize that his
notion that moral stages were the basis for moral education, rather than a partial guide to the moral educator, was mistaken.

I realize now that the psychologist's abstraction of moral "cognition" (judgment and reasoning) from moral action, and the abstraction of structure in moral cognition and judgment from content are necessary abstractions for certain psychological research purposes. It is not a sufficient guide to the moral educator who deals with the moral concrete in a school world in which value content as well as structure, behavior as well as reasoning, must be dealt with. In this context, the educator must be a socializer teaching value content and behavior. (Kohlberg, 1978a, p.14)

Thus, Kohlberg revises his position, and recognizes that moral education needs a process of socialization. In the just community program Kohlberg is concerned with the moral content - the values, norms, and goals - the community provides. The teacher's role, then, becomes to advocate the content of norms of justice and community. Kohlberg (1987) summarizes these roles of advocacy as follows:

(a) Helping to raise issues and raising issues themselves.
(b) Helping the chair of the democratic meeting to encourage or ensure participation by all as far as possible.
(c) Advocating positions on the issue that will develop the group's expectations of justice and community.

According to Kohlberg and his colleagues, the central points to the conception of moral atmosphere are students' perceptions as to whether there are shared expectations or norms held by the self, by the majority of peers, and by the
teachers at the school. Power and Reimer (1978) divide these norms into norms of justice (norms against violence, intimidation and disrespect, norms against cheating, theft, and so on), norms of community (norms of participation and attendance, norms of helping or aid, and norms of integration), and norms of convention (prescriptions regarding conventional behaviors such as dress code, behavior in the hall).

The teachers of the just community school have strong opinions about the use of drugs, school attendance or cheating which cannot directly be imposed on students through authority, but only become influential insofar as they are couched in terms of consideration of justice or community. Thus, Kohlberg accepts some part of Durkheim's idea of transmitting social values or the necessity of socialization, but at the same time he revises it democratically. He says that "staff advocacy does not represent the introduction of moral constraints, but is consistent with the role of the teacher as a member of a democratic moral community" (Kohlberg and Higgins, 1987, p.122).

Table 5. The Summary of the First Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmitting social values</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inculcation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

: The core of the inculcation approach is transmitting the content of social values. Following Durkheim, the advocates of inculcation
believe that socialization is one of the main purposes of education.

Values clarification  No
: This approach strongly denies transmitting the social values. The advocates of values clarification assume that each of the student has his/her own values. Therefore, they think that transmitting social values leads to indoctrination.

Kohlberg 1  No
: Like values clarification, Kohlberg believes that the content of value is personal, situational, and relative and only the structure of judgment is universal. Therefore, Kohlberg rejects transmitting social values.

Kohlberg 2  Conditionally Yes
: From the practical point of view, Kohlberg accept teaching the content of values without violating the child's right. In the just community program Kohlberg recognizes the necessity of socialization, as long as the teacher's advocacy is democratic. This means that Kohlberg revises his theory, and accepts Durkheim's socialization under the democratic school setting.

(2) Teaching Discipline and Moral Conduct

According to Durkheim, the spirit of discipline is the first element of morality. In the notion of discipline, he underscores the three points. First, to conduct one's self morally is a matter of abiding by a norm, and determining what conduct should obtain in a given instance even before one is required to act. Second, morality consists of a system of rules of action that predetermine conduct. They
state how one must act in a given situation. Third, morality is basically a constant thing, and so long as we are not considering an excessively long time span, it remains ever the same. A moral act ought to be the same tomorrow as today, whatever the personal predispositions of the actor.

Durkheim maintains that discipline is in itself a factor of education. He says,

Through discipline and by means of it alone are we able to teach the child to rein in his desires, to set limits to his appetites of all kinds, to limit and, through limitation, to define the goals of his activity. This limitation is the condition of happiness and of moral health. (Moral Education, pp.43-44)

All discipline promotes a certain regularity in children's conduct, and provides them with determinate goals that limit their horizons. It regularizes and constrains their behaviors.

Durkheim emphasizes school life which develops the discipline of children. In the school, there is a whole system of rules that predetermine the child's conduct. There are also many obligations that the child is required to shoulder. Through learning discipline and moral conduct, children become social and moral beings. Consequently, Durkheim asserts that school discipline is the morality of the classroom.
Inculcation

Both Mulkey and Wynne are worrying about the fact that American teen-agers are lacking in inner control. There is the increase in drug, alcohol, and other harmful substance abuse, unwed teenage mothers, high school dropouts, and suicide. Therefore, they insist that character education should be central in education. For instance, the teacher's manual of the Character Education Curriculum writes, "The main goal of the CEC is to develop responsible citizens" (Mulkey, 1989, p.1). Responsible citizens are those who before acting, recognize the consequences of their behavior to themselves and others, and identify self-discipline as the means for achieving their goals in life.

The CEC teacher pays attention to moral conduct. The lessons and activities of the CEC help students to say "No!" to substance abuse, to develop good self esteem, to use self-discipline to achieve goals, to work together cooperatively, to assume responsibility for their behavior, and to resist negative peer pressure.

On the other hand, Wynne (1991) also focuses on discipline as one of the main purposes of moral education.

Discipline is most effectively implemented through developing clear, appropriate classroom rules and norms, communicated in writing to students and their parents. A clear, yet simple, system of punishment for infractions is part of this communication. Parents must be supportive. Faculty can encourage helpful behaviors among students by providing opportunities for them to be of help to the class or school, by
monitoring their conduct, and by designing formal systems of recognition for good conduct. (p.151)

Schools which hope to develop pupil good character must (1) decide what forms conduct (which realistically may occur in their school) are undesirable, (2) prohibit such misconduct through clear, direct statements, (3) widely circulate such statements among teachers, students, and parents, (4) provide for incremental, simple, unpleasant punishments for misconduct, (5) ensure that violators are identified, and appropriately punished, (6) aim to enlist all community members, including pupils, in the process of code enforcement, (7) try to understand, and reform, persistent violators, and (8) be prepared to "exile" unreformed violators to other environments, and, if appropriate, provide them with occasions to develop insight and display contrition. (Wynne, 1987)

Wynne (1985-6) focuses on moral conduct, and recognizes that good habits of conduct is one of the outstanding characteristics of great tradition.

The tradition was concerned with good habits of conduct as contrasted with moral concepts or moral rationales. Thus, the tradition emphasized visible courtesy and deference. In the moral mandate, "Honor thy father and mother," the act of honoring can be seen. It is easier to observe people honoring their parents than loving them. Loving, a state of mind, usually must be inferred. (p.6)

Thus, inculcation approaches to moral education place emphasis on discipline and moral conduct.
Values clarification

As we have seen previously, values clarification rejects transmitting the content of values. This does not mean that values clarification neglects discipline in classroom. The values clarification teachers, of course, do not admit a lack of controls with the climate in the classroom. The required climate is one of acceptance of and respect for students.

The requirements for value clarifying are not lack of control or permissiveness. Teachers may limit behavior in any reasonable way, it seems to us, and still maintain an atmosphere conducive to value clarifying. What is needed, however, is intellectual permissiveness backed by an honest respect for the experiences, thought processes, and values of students. Teachers can limit classroom behavior and be consistent with this value theory as long as they do not limit thought. (Raths et al., 1978, pp.235-6)

However, in values clarification, discipline is not a central concern but only passively a necessity condition. In other words, the proponents of values clarification seem to think that discipline is a necessary obstacle, that is, that discipline itself is not good for children to choose freely, but we have no choice so we should accept it as passively as possible.

On the other hand, values clarification stresses value conduct. Today, according to the advocates of values clarification, there is widespread concern that youth, and adults in some cases, do not seem to live by any consistent set of values. They act impetuously, erratically, and
sometimes destructively. Our population is becoming other-directed, and we note wide discrepancy between what people do and what they say. Therefore, values clarification aims to sensitize students to value and to encourage judgment-action consistency.

However, they don't mean action as moral conduct on which Durkheim insisted. For Durkheim, morality consists of a system of rules of action. Behavior directed toward individual interests does not have a moral value. But the advocates of values clarification are less concerned with an action which has individual interests or social interests. They are concerned with an action which is chosen spontaneously by using the 7 valuing process.

Especially the next two step are related to action immediately. For instance, the 6th step is acting upon choices.

Where we have a value, we believe it should show up in aspects of our living, in our behavior. We may do some reading about things we value. We may form friendships or join organizations that nourish our values. We may spend money on values. We very likely budget time or energy for them. In short, for a value to be present, life itself must be affected. Nothing can be a value that does not, in fact, give direction to actual living. The person who talks about something but never does anything about it is acting from something other than a value, in our definition. (Raths, et al., 1978, p.28)

The 7th step of VC is repeating. This step shows that Raths and his colleagues are interested in habituation.

Where something reaches the level of a value, it is
very likely to influence behavior on a number of occasions in the life of the person who holds it. It will show up in several different situations, at several different times. We would not think of a behavior that appeared only once in a life as representing a value. Values tend to be persistent. They tend to show up as a pattern in a life. (p.28)

However, in practice the strategies of values clarification focus on clarifying values, not on acting, since values clarification teachers assume that students already have various forms of experiences, activities, and habits. This is why they often give the students questions such as "How did you feel when that happened?", "Did you consider any alternatives?", "Have you felt this way for a long time?". In the books of values clarification, there are few strategies of teaching in order to take action. Most of them pay attention to clarifying and processing values.

In spite of admitting the necessity of discipline and theoretical emphasis on action, values clarification does not have the same notion of discipline and moral conduct which Durkheim maintained. This is because the proponents of values clarification believe that the teaching of discipline or moral conduct is similar to indoctrination.

Kohlberg's first wave

Piaget (1932) disagrees with Durkheim's discipline because it leads to restriction, not to cooperation.

It is absurd and even immoral to wish to impose upon the child a fully worked-out system of discipline
when the social life of children amongst themselves is sufficiently developed to give rise to a discipline infinitely nearer to that inner submission which is the mark of adult morality. (pp. 411-412)

Following Piaget, Kohlberg thinks that moral development does not result from the teaching of discipline, but from children's spontaneous cognitive growth. Therefore, Kohlberg rejects Durkheim's idea that morality consists of a system of rules of action that predetermine conduct.

From the results of the study of Hartshorne and May (1928-30), Kohlberg concludes that the inculcation approach does not work. It showed that people's moral actions are influenced more by situational factors than by the values they are exposed to. In other words, if a person cheats in one situation, it does not mean he/she will or will not cheat in another. In short, it is not the character trait of dishonesty that makes a child cheat in a given situation.

Kohlberg, therefore, focuses on the moral reasoning behind moral conduct. This means that he makes a distinction between persons' espoused values (content) which refers to the action, and the way they structure their judgments about moral issues (form). Kohlberg has consistently identified with the Kantian position of rationalism, hence moral judgments should focus on people's reasons for deciding what they ought to do or refrain from doing. He believes that the moral judgment is the only distinctively moral factor among all the factors which influence moral behavior. In other
words, it is a better test to predict moral action.

Following Dewey and Piaget, Kohlberg (1972) asserts that the goal of moral education is the stimulation of the "natural" development of the individual child's own moral judgment. The child uses his/her own moral judgment to control his/her behavior. Kohlberg's developmental theory of morality is based upon each stage being a structured whole. According to him, the previous stages are integrated into succeeding stages in a hierarchical fashion. Each higher stage is more predictive of moral action. Therefore, people who reason at the higher stages are less likely to be influenced by situational factors and more likely to act consistently on their values.

In an early version of Milgram's electrical shock experiment, Kohlberg (1984) finds that all of the subjects rated as "heteronomous" obeyed the order of the malevolent experimenter, while 86 percent of the subjects rated as "autonomous" disobeyed the experimenter at some time. Other empirical studies (Krebs, 1967, Hann, Smith, and Block, 1968) suggest that advance in moral judgment correlates with more mature moral action. Consequently, Kohlberg (1980) believes that a developmental moral education stimulates the child's application of his/her own moral judgments to his/her actions. It means that moral maturity in judgment and in action are closely related, and true knowledge of principles
of justice does entail virtuous action.

The effort to force a child to agree that an act of cheating was very bad, when he/she does not really believe it, will only be effective in encouraging morally immature tendencies toward expedient outward compliance. In contrast, a more difficult but more valid approach involves getting the child to examine the pros and cons of his/her conduct in his/her own terms (Turiel, 1966). Kohlberg believes that the moral discussion approach develops this ability.

To sum up, Kohlberg rejects the idea of Durkheim's discipline which restricts conduct because he focuses on the development of moral reasoning which facilitates moral conduct. In other words, he does not neglect moral conduct but strongly stresses the moral reasoning which prescribe it.

**Kohlberg's second wave**

Empirical studies showed certain relationships between moral judgment and moral action (Kohlberg, 1984). However, it is not clear from those studies whether change in moral judgment produced in educational programs would actually lead to changes in moral action. In educational practice, Kohlberg recognizes that the teachers, unlike psychologists, have to deal with value content as well as structure, behavior as well as reasoning. In this context, Kohlberg now
comes to maintain that the educator must be a socializer, teaching value content and behavior. In his early writing, Kohlberg (1971b) recognizes:

To extend classroom discussions of justice to real life is to deal with issues of justice in the schools. Education for justice, then, requires making schools more just, and encouraging students to take an active role in making the school more just. (p.82)

In the just community program Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg (1989) puts more emphasis on school setting and activities that enable students to actually learn to do and apply moral thinking, and undercore rather real-life moral dilemmas than hypothetical moral dilemmas. Treating with this program, Kohlberg employs the Durkheimian notion that learning respect for rules is one basic element of moral education. Kohlberg saw the application of Durkheim's notion of discipline in the kibbutz.

Kohlberg learned from his kibbutz visit that respect for rules need not be viewed as an allegiance to an arbitrary set of rules handed down from an authority on high, but can be seen as respect for the agreements that a group of students make among themselves and with their educators. (p.55)

Kohlberg modified this Durkheim-Kibbutz system democratically in the just community program. Since this program establishes its rules, it must also provide a structure that enables the community to determine fair consequences for those who break the rules. This is one major purpose of the discipline or fairness committee. The discipline committee is comprised of six to eight students
and two teachers. The task of this committee is to hear cases of rules violations and interpersonal problems of disrespect; giving sanction; enhancing interpersonal understanding.

When individuals fail to maintain the rules, the question of fair consequences and fair punishment are not theoretical, but involve making decisions about real consequences for one's friends and other community members. Most adolescents are hesitant to accept responsibility for enforcing rules among their personal friends and classmates, even those rules that they believe should be forced and that they have committed themselves to uphold. In these circumstances they initially become willing and even eager for the adults to administer the appropriate punishment. (Kohlberg and Higgins, 1987, pp.105-6)

In the just community school the discipline committee's roles and duties develop over time. Since the committee is acting for the school, it becomes clear that the individuals who comprise the committee are fulfilling a schoolwide responsibility. Kohlberg attempts to ensure that the group democratically discusses and votes on rules and, at a deeper level, agrees upon norms of equal respect for persons. The practice creates concrete rules of respect for property and prohibition of stealing, cheating, and physical and verbal abuse. Thus, Kohlberg concludes that only through democratic discussion and voting can there develop a sense that a collective or shared norm has been created.

In short, Kohlberg focuses on the student's behavior or discipline in the just community program. However, he recognizes that the authority of discipline should derive
from the rational decision of democratic community, not from
the teacher's authority of Durkheim.

Table 6. The Summary of the Second Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching discipline and moral conduct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inculcation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: The inculcation approach strongly supports the necessity of teaching discipline and moral conduct. Inculcation teachers believe that both of them should be central in moral education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Values clarification                  |
| No                                    |
| : Although values clarification teachers admit the necessity of discipline in practice, they reject discipline as an element of value education. They try to encourage judgment-action consistency, but their strategies attempt mostly to clarify values not to suggest on acting. |

| Kohlberg 1                            |
| No                                    |
| : Kohlberg, like Piaget, disagrees with Durkheim's discipline because he thinks that it is an obstacle to facilitate children's spontaneous cognitive growth. Kohlberg is concerned with the moral reasoning which are related to cognitive growth, not to the moral conduct which is predetermined. |

| Kohlberg 2                            |
| Partly Yes                            |
| : In the just community approach Kohlberg accepts the notion of respect for rules and focuses on moral conduct. In this program, school rules are made by group members, and the discipline committee occupies an important position. In short, Kohlberg modifies Durkheim's concept of discipline and moral conduct democratically. |
(3) Stressing the Group or Society

Durkheim is known to be a representative scholar of a social conception of morality. It is true that he underscores the social aspect of morality. According to Durkheim, to act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest.

It is not a simple juxtaposition of individuals who bring an intrinsic morality with them, but rather man is a moral being only because he lives in society, since morality consists in being with a group and varying with this solidarity. Let all social life disappear, and moral life will disappear with it, since it would no longer have any objective. (The Division of Labor in Society, p.399)

This does not mean that Durkheim makes light of the individual. Indeed individual and society are beings different natures, but Durkheim does not see any kind of antagonism between the two. Generally speaking, people are so accustomed to opposing society to the individual, that many theories that make frequent use of word society seem to sacrifice the individual. However, Durkheim rejects this idea because he believes that the individual is not truly himself/herself; he/she does not fully realize his/her own nature, except on the condition that he/she is involved in society. In other words, for Durkheim the society is neither a problem nor a burden for the individual. On the contrary, it is a life-giving resource. Durkheim maintains that society is the benevolent and protecting power, the nourishing thing from which we gain the whole of our moral
and intellectual substance, and toward whom our wills turn in a spirit of love and gratitude.

Durkheim asserts that the final goal of moral education is to attach the child to groups. The sense of group can only be acquired through practice in the context of already existing association. To achieve this goal, the school or the class must really share in a collective life. Durkheim maintains that such phrases as the class, the spirit of the class, and the honor of the class must become something more than abstract expression in the student's mind. Hence, it is certain that Durkheim accentuates society or groups.

**Inculcation**

Wynne focuses on treating students as members of vital groups such as teams, classes, and clubs in order to develop character-building. These groups were important reference points for communicating values, for example, group loyalty, and the diverse incidents of group life that provided occasions for object lessons. Wynne (1987) writes,

"Vital collective life" means that the student groups will have real—although limited—responsibility and authority. Some students will assume positions of leadership, and be given consequential power. Groups will also be encouraged to engage in expressive activities, involving matters such as singing, ceremonies, the recitation of oaths, and the wearing of identifying badges, or clothes. (p.107)

Wynne claims that human life survives only through the constant collective social control and suppression of our
aspirations for omnipotence and animal release. In The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim points out that appropriate diversity can foster group productivity and cohesion, and that all individual talents ultimately attain fulfillment through engagement with others. Accepting this idea, Wynne also maintains that group life does not imply a denial of real individual differences, but rather needs such variations. At the same time, individual development ultimately must be assisted by group engagement. In other words, Wynne (1987) insists that groups are important in moral education, and group activities are compatible with individuality.

Students in vital collectives strive to do their parts well in their own self-interest, and for the good of the group... Effective groups give stress to caring, supportive member-to-member relationships, and improving the overall performance of the group. (p.111)

On the other hand, the CEC seems to focus on the individual rather than on groups. For example, developing self-concept is considered to be the first point in the CEC. As we have seen, the main goal of the CEC is to develop responsible citizenship. Students who are most likely to become responsible citizens are those who have a good self-esteem;

Hence, those students who accept responsibility, increase their own self-esteem. We do not think less of ourselves when we fulfill our duties and obligations. Although we may not like having to fulfill them, it is when we do that we feel a sense
of accomplishment and feel better about ourselves. It is when we fail to assume our obligations that we become defensive and become resentful of those persons who do fulfill their obligations. Lack of self-esteem can prevent anyone from becoming a responsible citizen and achieving his/her potential. (Mulkey, 1987, p.5)

The CEC lessons are designed to help teachers raise the self-esteem of all of their students. Good self-esteem can have positive effects on a person's personality that may last the rest of his/her life. Although the CEC is designed to do group work, on the whole it stresses the individual moral values which are necessary as a responsible citizen.

Values clarification

Values clarification rejects Durkheim's society-centered theory, because it primarily focuses on the individual values. In contrast to the Durkheim's idea that morality is made for society and at the same time it is made by society, the advocates of values clarification maintain that values are a product of personal experiences.

They (values) are not just a matter of true or false. We do not go to an encyclopedia or to a textbook for values. Our definition of valuing shows why this is. People have to prize for themselves, choose for themselves, integrate choices into the pattern of their own lives. Information as such does not convey this quality of values. Values emerge from the flux of life itself. Consequently, we are dealing with an area that is not a matter of proof or consensus, but a matter of experience. (Raths et al., 1978, pp.33-4)

As we have seen, Durkheim claims that morality consists of a system of rules of action that predetermine conduct, and
that the rules of moral action are beyond personal preference. On the contrary, values clarification regards values as personal things determined by the individual or his/her experience, not by social forces.

In educational practice, values clarification recommends that teachers should use the teaching strategies focusing on individual values. The clarifying responses, for example, is often for the individual.

A topic in which Clem might need clarification may be of no immediate interest to Priscilla. An issue that is of general concern, of course, may warrant a general clarifying response—say to the whole class—but even here the individual must ultimately do the reflecting. Values are personal things. The teacher often responds to one individual, although others may be listening. (Raths et al., 1978, p.56)

According to Raths and his colleagues, there are three sources of content which are suited for clarifying thought. The first sources are those aspects of a person’s life that they call "value indicators": goals, aspirations, attitudes, interests, feelings, beliefs, activities, and worries. The second sources are those personal issues that we all face and that so frequently complicate living. The third ones are those issues that are somewhat more social than personal. Some of these issues deal with the relationship between the individual and society at large: what an individual should do about rules, or what an individual should do about handling the tension between self-interest and social interest. Thus, values clarification teachers treat social
issues, but they underscore what the individual wants society to do, rather than what the individual must do as a duty which society requires.

The value clarification teachers may also select from a list of topics and conduct discussions by means of open-ended questioning techniques. This is done in group settings, but the emphasis is on individual responses and growth. Students are not required to share their opinions. If they do not want to talk, they may say "pass", because "Comparing or contrasting the individual belief to an established set of standards or community mores is not inherent in the values clarification exercise" (Ervay, Hoffman, and Grokett, 1983, p.419).

The proponents of values clarification reserve the term "value" for those individual beliefs, attitudes, activities, or feelings that satisfy the seven criteria. The clarification process is a very personal and individualized process, both in the ways clarifiers proceed and in the range of problems that come up for clarification. Simon (1976) concludes, "Values simply can't be given to anyone else. One can't value for other people. Each individual has to find his own values" (p.135).

Kohlberg's first wave

According to Kohlberg (1980), there have been three
broad streams of Western educational ideology: romanticism, cultural transmission, and progressivism. The first stream of thought, the romantic one, commences with Rousseau. Neill's (1960) Summerhill is an example of a school based on this principle. Romantics hold that what comes from within the child is the most important aspect of development. Therefore, the educational environment should be permissive enough to allow the inner "good" to unfold and the inner "bad" to come under control.

The cultural transmission ideology stresses internalization of basic moral rules of the culture. In contrast to the child-centered romantic school, which stresses the child's freedom, the cultural transmission school is society-centered, and focuses on the child need to learn the discipline of the social order.

Kohlberg rejects not only the radical individualism of the romanticist but also radical collectivism of the cultural transmission school. Following Dewey, Kohlberg (1981) supports progressive concepts and focuses on the cognitive-development based on the notion of a mutual interrelationship between the organism and the environment:

The maturationist theory assumes that basic mental structure results from an innate patterning. The environmentalist learning theory assumes that basic mental structure results from the patterning or association of events in the outside world. The cognitive-developmental theory assumes that basic mental structure results from an interaction between organismic structuring tendencies and the structure
of the outside world, not reflecting either one directly. This interaction leads to cognitive stages that represent the transformations of early cognitive structures as they are applied to the external world and as they accommodate to it. (p.59)

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory was practiced in moral discussions of the classroom. In this approach, Kohlberg and Blatt hypothesized that if students were given the opportunity to discuss moral dilemmas in the classroom, and were thereby exposed to moral reasoning one stage above their own, the resulting cognitive conflict would help stimulate movement toward the next stage of development. Their research indicated that the discussion of moral dilemmas is an effective means of promoting individual moral judgment development (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975).

In this way Kohlberg's moral education theory put stress on the interaction of the individual and the group. He also recognizes that moral development is not a completely individual process but requires social interaction, taking others' perspectives. However, in reference to the moral discussion approach which is an application of Kohlberg's stage theory, the main purpose is to develop the individual's cognitive moral growth rather than collective morality.

Kohlberg's second wave

In the mid 70's, the practice of developmental moral
education focuses on the establishment of just community schools which accentuates a group-based moral education. Visiting an Israeli kibbutz, Kohlberg (1971a) found that the kibbutz had a strong impact on promoting the moral development of the youth. The psychology underlying kibbutz moral education was not that of Piaget, but that of Durkheim. Therefore, the main point of the just community program which is different from the moral discussion approach, is that Kohlberg accepts some parts of Durkheim's collective theory which he denied in his earlier writing.

According to Durkheim, a central part of moral education is a sense of belonging to a group. Durkheim says, "In order to commit ourselves to collective ends, we must have above all a feeling and affection for the collectivity" (Moral Education, p.239). However, such feelings cannot arise in the family where solidarity is based on blood and intimate relationship. Therefore, to instill in the child a feeling for collective ends, the school or the class must really share in a collective life. Durkheim's central conception is that the group, society or community is a whole or collectivity greater than the sum of its individual parts, and that the experience of membership in the whole induces moral sentiments and actions by the individual.

Durkheim argues that moral character develops in a context in which students have to limit their behavior for
the sake of a community. The norms and rules of the community, made compelling by the authority of groups or society, help students to learn that they must live up to a certain social obligation. This constraining force of discipline is complemented by the attractive force of attachment to the group. Thus, morality is the expression of desire as well as duty.

In the just community program Kohlberg employs Durkheim's elements of morality: the spirits of altruism and of discipline. In this program, a classroom or small school community is often able to engage in adolescents (Stage 3 or 4) a sense of altruism and responsibility which friends and family may not. Following Durkheim, then, Kohlberg has emphasized that the good as altruism is cultivated by a sense of community, by a feeling of group cohesion or solidarity, and by a shared valuing or attachment to the school community and each of its members.

The teacher is seen as facilitating the functioning of peer group collective norms that are motivationally based on a strong sense of community. The just community approach holds that responsible moral behavior is a function not only of individual psychological disposition, such as moral judgments of rightness and moral self, but also of shared group norms and a sense of community, the moral component of school climate or group character. (Higgins, Power, and
Stressing group norms and a sense of community which produces altruistic conducts, Kohlberg also aims at developing individual morality. In other words, through democratic processes Kohlberg tries to establish the harmony between the individual and the group.

Table 7. The Summary of the Third Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inculcation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wynne</td>
<td>CEC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

: Wynne strongly stresses group activities such as teams, classes, and clubs, because he believes that groups have an important function on moral education. On the other hand, CEC puts emphasis on individual responsibility to make the student a good citizen, rather than groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values Clarification</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
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</table>

: Values clarification teachers focus on individual values, not on social values, because they maintain that values are personal things determined by the individual experiences. They do not stress on the group-based education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kohlberg 1</th>
<th>No</th>
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</table>

: In the moral discussion approach, Kohlberg focuses on the individual moral development. Indeed, Kohlberg recognizes the necessity of social interaction between the individual and the group, but he mainly emphasizes the cognitive domain of the individual morality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kohlberg 2</th>
<th>Yes</th>
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</table>

: The just community program tries to establish a group-based moral atmosphere. Kohlberg accepts Durkheim's viewpoint, that is to say, attachment to groups. He facilitates the functioning of peer group or collective norm. Like Durkheim, Kohlberg attempts to harmonize the individual with the group.
Emphasizing Altruism or Affective Components of Morality

Durkheim underscores both cognitive and affective component of morality. He believes that scientific knowledge is the key factor of moral education. "We liberate ourselves through understanding; there is no other means of liberation. Science is the wellspring of our autonomy" (Moral Education, p.116). According to Durkheim, the complete moral education calls for a teaching of morality because students need the explanation of the rule itself, and its causes and reasons for being. On the other hand, natural sciences can help children better understand the human realm, and equip them with precise ideas, good intellectual habits which can help them in directing their behavior. Through science education, teachers must make children understand the conception of social reality.

In addition to this, according to Durkheim, to become attached to society, the child must feel in it something that is real, alive, and powerful, which dominates the person, and to which he/she also owes the best of himself/herself. In the class, therefore, the teacher has to make children have a feeling and affection for the collectivity.

Durkheim reasons that altruism is always sacrificing the self for something greater than the self, another self
can never be greater than the self except as it stands for the group or for the society. Attachment to society is to cling to the social ideal. Since each of us has a hand in this collective ideal which makes for the integrity of the group, the bond to the group means the bond to the social ideal and to other individuals.

The individual experiences personal fulfillment in accepting the discipline of the group, because in doing one's duty one becomes more intimately involved in group life. Thus, Durkheim saw in human nature a profound harmony between the good of individual and the good of the group.

For Durkheim, benevolence or charity also has a moral value because it points to a moral propensity to sacrifice, to go beyond one's self, to go beyond the circle of self-interest, it clears the way for a true morality. Accordingly, a central part of moral education is the sense of belonging to, and sacrificing for, a group. In this way, Durkheim stresses not only cognitive but also affective component of morality focusing on altruism.

**Inculcation**

Wynne (1987) insists that schools should value both cognitive and affective dimensions of morality. He criticizes the fact that in many American modern schools teachers have a tendency to focus only on cognitive and
individual learning, and claims that they should adopt more cooperative learning involving the affective component. He also underscores school spirit.

School spirit enriches school collective life by stressing the importance of intragroup concerns. Thus, students are instructed to care about each other, as co-citizens in the same school. And to be proud, and responsible, about the reputation of their school. This means they become less self-centered and more other-centered. (p.114)

Furthermore, a number of subsidiary factors enhance spirit: the school newspaper, assemblies, school colors, homecoming, press releases publicizing school achievements, a school song, the general evaluation of school ceremonial life, the fostering of responsible fun involving faculty and students, the enlistment of support from alumni, and the spotlighting of noteworthy incidents in school or community history. According to Wynne, the moral agent is neither raw intellect nor disembodied reasoning, but has feelings and emotions and passions that play a great part in the moral life.

As regards the balance between cognitive and affective components of morality, Ryan holds the similar idea of Wynne. According to Ryan (1989), man is a reasoning being, a knower. The emphasis on the moral agent's knowing means that students need to come to know their culture's moral wisdom, that is, what has been learned over the years. To ensure against moral passivity, the young need to know how to think
morally and how to reason through an issue or problem rather than receive someone else's decision.

Ryan (1989), however, also stresses that we need to help the child acquire not simply intellectual skills and habits of the mind, but habits of the heart. We must help the young learn to love the good.

A part of this moral affect is love of self, concern for one's own well-being. The moral education of the affect involves the growth of self-love outward from the self to family and friends and to communities seen and unseen, to develop an ever-growing definition of what it means to love the good. Affect has one other function, perhaps its most important. It is a bridge between knowing and the third component of character-action; in other words, affect is the link between thought and action. (p.9)

On the other hand, the CEC mainly accentuates character development with cognitive learning. In the CEC there are over 100 thirty-minute lessons of the middle school level, which include determining the cause and effect of alcohol; drug and other substance abuse; recognizing the importance of assuming responsibility for developing individual talents; determining the problems that trying to be "in" can create; identifying the positive characteristics of a strong leader; recognizing the role of time management in reaching goals; identifying the influences which form a person's reputation; recognizing how consumption and production affect our economic security; and identifying the rights and responsibilities of citizens to vote, serve duty, and fulfill their other obligations (Mulkey, 1989). Unlike Wynne
and Ryan, the CEC focuses on cognitive and individualistic components of morality rather than on affective and collective one.

**Values clarification**

The cognitive domain refers to the third step of the values clarification process. This is choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative.

The selection of an alternative impulsively or thoughtlessly does not lead to values of the type we are defining. For a value to guide a person's life intelligently and meaningfully, we believe it must emerge in a context of understanding. Only when the consequences of each of the alternatives are understood and considered is a choice not impulsive or thoughtless. There is an important cognitive factor here. (Raths et al., 1978, p.27)

In the second edition of *Values and Teaching* (1978), a new chapter on "Values and Thinking" is added. In this chapter, the authors describe ten categories of thinking which are related to valuing (comparing, classifying, observing and reporting, summarizing, interpreting, analyzing assumptions, problem solving, criticizing and evaluating, imagining and creating, coding and reactions to coding).

In spite of stressing cognitive domain theoretically, values clarification teachers practically seem to underestimate the cognitive domain rather than the affective one. For example, the dialogues between teachers and
students are rather short.

The purpose (of clarifying response) is for the students to think, and this is usually done best alone, without the temptation to justify thoughts to an adult. Therefore, a teacher would be wise to carry on only two or three rounds of dialogue and then offer to break off the conversation with some noncommittal but honest phrase, such as "Nice talking to you" or "I see what you mean better now". (Raths et al., 1978, p. 56)

In the discussion, the teachers are not encouraged to engage in lengthy follow-ups to student responses, but usually use trigger-type questions, and end discussion quickly. Furthermore, they avoid "why" questions which seems to be very important in moral education. In their view, "why" questions tend to make students defensive, prodding them into making up reasons or excuses when they really have done in mind. Thus, values clarification is not interested in the cognitive structure of students' thinking.

On the other hand, the affective side—the side of feelings, attitudes, interests, hopes, purposes, aspirations, and other things like these—is emphasized in clarifying processes. Raths and his colleagues say, "In our criteria for a value, we also stressed prizing and cherishing as very important components. This suggests joy and zest in life; it suggests a motivation for achievement" (Raths et al., 1978, p.324).

The fourth step of valuing process is "prizing and cherishing".
The values we are defining have positive tones. We prize a value, cherish it, esteem it, respect it. hold it dear. We are happy with our values. A choice, even when we have made it freely and thoughtfully, may be a choice we are not happy to make. We may choose to fight in a war, but be sorry that circumstances make that choice reasonable. In our definition, values flow from choices that we are glad to make. We prize and cherish the guides to life that we call values. We judge them positively. (Raths et al., 1978, p.27)

The teaching attitude of the values clarification also focuses on affective components. For example, the advocates of values clarification attempt to accept what students say unconditionally. They believe that it is vital for a teacher to establish a mood that is accepting. So, the values clarification teacher communicates that he/she does not judge where students happen to be at any point in their lives. This is meant to assist others in accepting themselves, and in being honest with themselves and each other, no matter how confused or negative their thoughts of feelings might be.

Lockwood (1975) points out that values clarification proponents prescribe a role for the teacher which derives from Carl Rogers' description of client-centered therapy which focuses on individualistic affection. Although the proponents of values clarification assert that "Clarifying is not therapy", there are surely similarities between the two. For example, the teacher who would employ values clarification is urged to be non-judgmental, trusting, a
good listener, student-centered and, at times to express unconditional acceptance of the student and problem.

In this way values clarification stresses the affective aspect of human values. However, it is far different from Durkheim's altruism sacrificing the self for group. Values clarification always focuses on individual values, but hardly the notion of altruism.

Kohlberg's first wave

As a Piagetian, Kohlberg assumes the inseparability of cognition and affection. He maintains that "cognition" and "affection" are different aspects of the same mental events, and that the development of mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives.

Indeed, moral judgments often involve strong emotional components, but Kohlberg seems to underscore cognitive rather than affective components.

An astronomer's calculation that a comet will hit the earth will be accompanied by strong emotion but this does not make his calculation less cognitive than a calculation of a comet's orbit which had no earthly consequences. And just as the quantitative strength of the emotional component is irrelevant to the theoretical importance of cognitive structure for understanding the development of scientific judgment, so too the quantitative role of affect is relatively irrelevant for understanding the structure and development of moral judgment. (Kohlberg, 1971b, p.44)

According to Kohlberg, the development of sentiment which is
involved in moral judgment is a development of structures with a heavy cognitive component. The quality (as opposed to the quantity) of affects involved in moral judgment is determined by its cognitive-structural development.

For instance, Kohlberg (1971b) provides the following example.

Two adolescents, thinking of stealing, may have the same feeling of anxiety in the pit of their stomachs. One adolescent (stage 2) interprets the feeling as "being chicken," "being afraid of the police," and ignores it. The other (stage 4) interprets the feeling as "the warning of my conscience" and decides accordingly. The difference in reaction is one in cognitive-structural aspects of moral judgment, not in emotional "dynamics" as such. (p.45)

In other words, Kohlberg's position is "prescriptivistic" and "constructionistic" rather than "descriptivistic" or "emotive." He thinks that moral judgments are to be understood ultimately as universal constructions of human actors which regulate their social interaction rather than as passive reflections of either external states of other humans or of internal emotions.

Since Kohlberg maintains that moral judgment dispositions influence action through being stable cognitive dispositions, not through the affective charges, he rejects the idea that moral decisions are a product of the algebraic resolution of conflicting quantitative affective forces.

Kohlberg (1981) concludes:

The moral force in personality is cognitive. Affective forces are involved in moral decisions, but
affect is neither moral nor immoral. When the affective arousal is channeled into moral directions, it is moral; when not so channeled, it is not moral. The moral channeling mechanisms themselves are cognitive. Effective moral channeling mechanisms are cognitive principles defining situations. (p.187)

Indeed, in the moral discussion program moral dilemmas arouse in students not only cognitive conflict but also affective disequilibrium. When the students are faced with a moral conflict that they cannot resolve, they are likely to be motivated to think through new possible solution to the conflict. However, it is true that Kohlberg puts more emphasis on cognitive than on affective factors.

Kohlberg's second wave

Peters (1975) points out that Kohlberg, like Piaget, is particularly weak on the development of the affective side of morality, of moral emotions such as "guilt", "concern for others", "remorse", and so on. Gilligan (1982) also criticizes that Kohlberg's theory based on a male model ignored altruism, care of "response" on which woman's morality focuses. Gilligan's feminine model of moral development focuses on connections and responsibility to others rather than on reciprocity and the balancing of claims. According to Gilligan, we need a psychology of love and morality that encompasses both knowledge and feeling, both the self and others.

As we have seen previously, Kohlberg was mainly
concerned with the cognitive development and neglected an altruistic aspect of morality in the moral discussion approach. However, establishing the just community in high schools, Kohlberg introduces an affective aspect of morality which Durkheim maintains. For Durkheim, the collectivity is the authority behind "the right" of rules and the object of altruistic aspiration toward "the good." The individual experiences personal fulfillment in accepting the discipline of the group because in doing one's duty one becomes more intimately involved in community life. In other words, Durkheim does not see any antagonism between the good of the individual and the good of the group, and believes that true happiness could only be found in self-sacrifice for the group.

Therefore, Kohlberg adopts what Durkheim calls "attachment to the group" - an affective bond between the individual and his/her peers that leads the individual to want to live up to the normative expectations of the group. Kohlberg believes that collective moral education is compatible with participatory democracy, as appeared in his observation of the kibbutz. In his research on kibbutz adolescents, Reimer (1977) points out that the group's norm and the student's emotional attachment to the group function to keep his action in line with the group's commonly shared moral judgment.
Hence, Kohlberg employs the power of the collective—the moral authority of the group—to provide a support system for adolescents to act on their higher stage moral reasoning. If students, who operate at Stage 2 or Stage 3 level, lack the consistent internal motivation to act on what they judge to be right, then the group or community can provide the external motivation for such action.

Consequently, in the just community program, a sense of the group as valuable and united, the source of altruism and solidarity, is enhanced. Through collective acts of care and responsibility for the welfare of the group and each of its members, the sense of justice is also enhanced. In sum, the just community approach involves a shift in expectation to include not only treating others fairly and respectfully but also caringly, since Kohlberg uses the power of the affective side of collectivity.

Table 8. The Summary of the Fourth Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emphasizing altruism or affective components of morality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inculcation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wynne supports the necessity of altruistic moral education in the group setting. On the other hand, the CEC focuses on cognitive learning from the individual point of view, rather than on affective learning stressing the group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Values clarification

: Values clarification teachers are concerned with affective components such as prizing and cherishing. In spite of stressing affective dimensions, they view them individualistic, not social, not altruistic.

Kohlberg 1

: Kohlberg's approach is called the cognitive developmental approach to moral education. He focused on the cognitive rather than on the affective side of morality. Consequently, the moral discussion approach does not treat altruistic morality. Kohlberg believed that the cognitive structure prescribed man's conduct.

Kohlberg 2

: In the just community approach Kohlberg employs an affective bond between the student and his/her peer. Revising his theory, Kohlberg accepts Durkheim's notion of altruism. Under the democratic school setting, he focuses on the group norm, or on the moral authority of the group which provides altruistic behaviors.

(5) Imposing Values Prior to Autonomy

In his theory, Durkheim accentuates autonomy as the third element of morality. He argues that any kind of restriction placed upon our consciences seems immoral, since it does violence to our personal autonomy.

We must have knowledge, as clear and complete an awareness as possible of the reasons for our conduct. This consciousness confers on our behavior the autonomy that the public conscience from now on requires of every genuinely and completely moral being. (Moral Education, p.120)
Therefore, Durkheim thinks that the complete moral education calls for a teaching morality which is neither to preach nor to indoctrinate; it is to explain.

At the same time, however, he affirms the imposition of moral rules on the child at certain ages. In his theory, the aim of education is socialization; education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Durkheim doesn't see imposition as a necessary evil, but it is one of the important elements to reach "autonomy". In other words, the child needs imposition of a certain number of moral states and conducts which are demanded by the society. At the same time, teachers must explain the reason for them.

We can investigate the nature of these moral rules, which the child receives from without, through education, and which impose themselves on him by virtue of their authority. We can investigate the reasons for their being, their immediate and more remote conditions. (Moral Education, p.116)

In short, Durkheim recognizes the need of the teaching morality. In the teaching, indoctrination is rejected, but the imposition is admitted as one process of teaching to reach autonomy. Therefore, we should understand that the meaning of Durkheim's imposition is not indoctrination but inculcative teaching which involves explanations and leads to moral values.
Inculcation

Ryan (1989) supports Durkheim's claim that teaching morality is explanation, and says "we must not simply stuff students' heads with rules and regulations but engage them in the great moral conversation of the human race" (p. 11). Ryan and Lickona (1987) propose that an adequate approach to character development must build on the multidimensionality of morality. Their view holds that human character involves the interplay of three components: knowing, affect, and action.

They maintain that moral knowing begins with learning moral content. Knowing a value means knowing what behavior it requires in concrete situations. Moral knowing also includes moral reasoning why such values are important and good and strategies for making decisions in a systematic way. The second component is moral affect, which constitutes the essential bridge between moral knowing and action. Third, moral action is the component of moral agency which brings knowing and affect to fruition.

According to Ryan and Lickona, moral knowing begins with learning moral content. Those values which constitute the moral heritage passed on from one generation to the next. In school teachers have to convey this moral heritage. In other words, Durkheim's imposition, which is not indoctrination but the explanation of the moral value, is
necessary. In this context, Ryan and Lickona recognize the necessity of teaching moral content, and accept Durkheim's imposition as a means to reach autonomy affirmatively.

The goal of the CEC is to develop responsible citizenship. Responsible citizens (autonomous persons) are those who think before acting, who recognize the consequences of their behavior to themselves and to others, and who identify self-discipline as the means for achieving their goals in life. Students who are most likely to become responsible citizens are those who have a good self-esteem. Hence, those students who accept responsibility increase their own self-esteem. In the CEC discussion the students are given opportunities to express themselves, and the teacher's role is a facilitator to the group. But the final goal of the discussion is logically to guide students to the right answer. Indeed, this program never uses the words such as imposition and indoctrination, but stresses instilling positive values which are desirable.

On the other hand, Wynne (1985-6) does not deny "indoctrination", but sees it a necessity in education. Of course indoctrination happens. It is ridiculous to believe children are capable of objectively assessing most of the beliefs and values they must absorb to be effective adults. They must learn a certain body of 'doctrine' to function on a day-to-day basis in society. There is good and bad doctrine, and thus things must be weighed and assessed. But such assessment is largely the responsibility of parents and other appropriate adults. (p.9)
He maintains that on the whole school is, should, and must be inherently indoctrinative. The significant questions are: "Will the indoctrination be overt or covert, and what will be indoctrinated?" (p.9) In short, inculcation approaches recognize that children need adult guidance, restriction, or imposition prior to autonomy.

**Values clarification**

Values clarification denies indoctrination or inculcation, because it is based on the premise that none of us has the "right" set of values to pass on other people's children. The proponents of values clarification recognize that the world is constantly changing and that there are no conclusive or verified answers to value questions. Thus, they argue that all inculcating, instilling, and fostering added up to indoctrination.

Simon (1976) concludes on indoctrination as follows:

The indoctrination procedures of the past fail to help people grapple with all the confusion and conflict which abound in these baffling days... The only thing that indoctrination did for people in the past was to help them postpone the time when they began the hard process of hammering out their own set of values. (pp.127-135)

The sequence of the values clarification teaching process is as follows:

1. The teacher calls to attention one of the student's attitudes, feelings, activities, beliefs, goals,
aspirations, interests, or worries-what we call "value indicators."

2. The teacher communicates an acceptance of students' expressions of values, although not necessarily agreement with what is expressed.

3. A follow-up message built on one of the seven valuing processes is communicated to invite students to do additional thinking on what they have said or done.

   (Raths et al., 1978, p.48)

The values clarification teachers expect that children will have more values, be more aware of the values that they have, have values that are more consistent with one another, and use the valuing process as they continue to grow and learn.

In values clarification, an autonomous person is the person who has the values which satisfy the criteria of having been freely chosen, having been chosen from among alternatives, having been chosen after due reflection, having been prized and cherished, having been affirmed to others, having incorporated into actual behavior, and having been repeated in one's life.

Kirschenbaum (1973) argues,

We will continue to examine what we prize and cherish, make thoughtful choices from alternatives, act on our beliefs and goals - but only when we feel the need to do so and not just to meet someone else's criteria. It seems to me that one of the overall goals of values clarification is to return
the locus of evaluation to the person, so that he is
the controller of his own valuing process. (p. 97)

Therefore, the child himself/herself is the controller of
his/her own valuing process. The proponents of values
clarification caution that the teacher should avoid
moralizing, criticizing, giving values, or evaluating.
Indeed, the aim of the values clarification approach is to
make the child to be an autonomous person who masters the 7
valuing process, but it clearly rejects Durkheim's notion of
imposition.

Kohlberg's first wave

Kohlberg, like the proponents of values clarification,
denies imposition and associates it with indoctrination.
According to him, indoctrination is philosophically invalid
because the value content taught is culturally and
personally relative, and the teaching content was a
violation of the child's rights. Indoctrination is also
psychologically invalid because it could not lead to
meaningful structure change.

On the contrary, the aim of Kohlberg's moral discussion
approach is stimulation of movement to the next stage of
moral reasoning. This is not indoctrination, because it does
not inculcate specific beliefs, but rather teaches the
students a form of reasoning which develops naturally in the
best moral thinkers. In other words, "The developmental
approach to moral education is based not on social authority but upon the natural authority of the more advanced stage for the developing child" (Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971). Thus, the stimulation of moral development defines an educational process respecting the autonomy of the child.

Piaget's research (1932) led Kohlberg to believe that autonomy comes from mutual respect in peer relationships. By contrast with heteronomy, whose source is constraint, 'autonomous rationality' has source in reciprocity. Following Piaget, Kohlberg focuses on student-to-student interaction and role taking in the moral discussion approach. Fully moral discourse does not rest on authority but consists of reasoning based on a moral attitude or point of view which claims to be autonomously moral, that is, independent of appeals to either authority or self-interest. He found a hierarchical order of child development, requiring an invariant one-way progression. The post-conventional stages represent the individual's development toward autonomy.

According to Kohlberg (1971b), the stimulation of moral development defines an educational process respecting the autonomy of the child.

The experiences by which children naturally move from stage to stage are nonindoclinative, that is, they are not experiences of being taught and internalizing specific content. These experiences are listed as those involving moral conflict (in the cognitive-conflict sense) and exposure to
other, higher modes of thinking than one's own. Insofar as the teacher deliberately uses such experiences as her method of moral education, she is not being "indoctrinative." (p.72)

Like Durkheim, Kohlberg also respects the moral autonomy, but he clearly rejects imposition prior to autonomy.

**Kohlberg's second wave**

Piaget (1932) believes that autonomy comes from mutual respect in peer relationships. Therefore, Kohlberg puts emphasis on the mutual respect in peer relationship not only in the moral discussion program but also in the just community program.

However, Kohlberg revised Piaget's notion of autonomy. For Piaget, the development of moral autonomy and moral maturity emerges from the spontaneous dialogue and cooperation in the peer group. On the other hand, Kohlberg believes that such interpretation largely rests on the development of the collectivity of a set of group norms and an atmosphere of group solidarity conducive to dialogue with mutual respects. In a word, he maintains that this collective development is one that the teacher must help structure and advocate.

In contrast to the moral discussion approach, in the just community approach Kohlberg (1978a) accepts advocating the content of values which is adequate from the viewpoint
of whole community. In other words, he maintains that the teachers, as a member of the community, should express their own views on moral issues.

I no longer hold these negative views of indoctrinative moral education, and I now believe that the concepts guiding moral education must be partly "indoctrinative." This is true by necessity in a world in which children engage in stealing, cheating, and aggression and in which one cannot wait until children reach the fifth stage in order to deal directly with their moral behavior. (p.84)

Thus, Kohlberg asserts that moral education can be in form of advocacy or "indoctrination" without violating the child's rights, as long as teachers advocacy is democratic (or subject to the constraints of recognizing students participation in the rule-making and value-upholding process), recognizing the shared rights of teachers and students.

However, his acceptance of indoctrination is somewhat different from the notion of Durkheim's imposition because of protecting the rights of children. To create the just community, he argues that the moral advocacy of the teachers must strictly be bounded by the safeguards of a democratic process in order to avoid indoctrination. In the just community program both students and teachers have the same rights—one person, one vote. Therefore, it is possible that students can reject the teacher's advocacy.

It is clear that Kohlberg recognized the limits of the Piagetian theory in practice because of the fact that he
accepts some parts of Durkheim's theory. However, at the same time, Kohlberg kept Piaget's framework which rejected Durkheim's imposition. In other words, the just community program, while designed to stimulate a natural sequence of moral development, also involves the advocating of specific content such as the values of community and collective responsibility. However, the teacher does not have the right to impose his opinions on the students because of the "one person, one vote" system.

Table 9. The Summary of the Fifth Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imposing values prior to autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inculcation</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inculcation approaches accept the necessity of imposition in moral education. Although each of them has different shades of meaning, they accept Durkheim's notion of imposition where the teacher should explain the right values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values clarification</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Values clarification teachers deny Durkheim's imposition as indoctrination, because they believe that the child can clarify his/her own values by himself/herself. They also reject all inculcating, instilling, and fostering of the students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kohlberg 1</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like values clarification, Kohlberg rejects Durkheim's imposition as indoctrination. He believed that the teaching content of values was a violation of the child's rights. So he made emphasis on moral reasoning in the moral discussion approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kohlberg 2</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                           | In the just community approach, Kohlberg admits the teacher's advocacy without violating the
child's rights. However, this does not mean he accepts Durkheim's imposition prior to autonomy because of the "one person, one vote" school setting.

(6) The Teacher as an Authority and a Socializer

For Durkheim, education consists of a methodical socialization of the young generation. He recognized that the task of the school in the moral development of the child should be of greatest importance. Therefore, the teacher is a key person as a socializer in the moral socialization of children. As a socializer, the teacher must show the example for children. Hence the teacher also is a model for the child's behavior. In school, the child can know his/her duty only through his/her teacher.

At the same time, Durkheim stresses that the main quality of an effective teacher is authority.

In this authority, which derives from a quite impersonal source, nothing of arrogance, vanity, or pedantry must enter. It is entirely brought about through the teacher's respect for his role or, if one may put it this way, for his ministry. This respect is transmitted through word and gesture from his mind to that of the child, where it is imprinted. (Moral Education, p.155)

In school the rules are revealed to the child through the teachers. In other words, a rule can scarcely have any authority other than that with which the teachers invest it, that is to say, the idea of which they suggest to the child.
Therefore, the teachers really feel in themselves the authority they must communicate, and for which they must convey some feeling. In addition to this, the teachers must help the child understand that the rule imposes itself on them as it does on him/her, since the origin of authority is society.

Durkheim maintains that the teacher's authority is not only the condition of an outward orderliness, but also the moral life of the class depends on it. Therefore, it should be tempered with benevolence so that firmness never degenerates into boorishness or harshness. Durkheim cautions that teachers should be frightened by their powers. In Durkheim's view, the teacher is an authority, a socializer, and an exemplar of the student's moral life.

**Inculcation**

For inculcation approaches, one of the most obvious forms of moral education is the example that the teacher, as a socializer, provides for the students. In other words, the teachers are also supposed to be models of moral excellence for their students. Therefore, teachers need to be constantly aware of the powerful influence that their actions in the classroom have on the students.

Ryan (1986) underscores not only teachers' explanations but also their urgings and exhortations. For example, a
youth who is flirting with racist ideas may not question this kind of sloppy thinking until he/she feels the heat of a teacher's moral indignation. He writes;

Exhortation should be used sparingly, and it should never stray very far from explanation. Nonetheless, there are times when teachers must appeal to the best instincts of the young and urge them to move in a particular direction. (p.232)

According to Ryan (1988), teachers are expected to be "good examples" to the young, not only models of rationality but models of morality, since children need the moral models. In moral education, thinking about and speaking about "oughtness" of life is necessary. Thus, a major aspect of the teacher's role in moral education and character development is that of helping students acquire the skills of moral discourse. Teachers also need to clearly communicate the centrality of moral questions in their own lives, help students grapple with moral questions, and, when appropriate, share their own views. The rub, of course, is when appropriate.

Wynne (1989) also maintains:

"Good" youth environments—including schools—will place young persons into persisting, relatively stable groups under general adult direction and monitoring, providing the members of such groups with significant collective and individual responsibilities, and maintaining systems of values, symbols, and reinforcement that encourage group members to move toward traditional adult life. (p.25)

According to him, the great tradition's simple assumption is
that adults know more than children, and thus they should bear some authority over them. Adult direction and intervention are important components of character formation.

On the other hand, in the CEC the teacher is also supposed to have an important role. However, the role of CEC teachers in moral education is somewhat different from Ryan's or Wynne's. Teaching character education, Mulkey (1987) argues, demands that the teacher identifies his/her own values before attempting to help students develop their values or show them how important standards are to their lives. Then, the teacher needs to have a good self-concept in order to project a positive attitude toward students in the classroom. Thus, the teacher is a model or a socializer. But in discussions, for example, the teacher's role is to facilitate the group. The teacher's reaction to students' statements, no matter how shocking, might be ask, "Why do you say that?", or "Why do you feel that way?" The teacher sets an example of open-mindedness and tolerance of others that will affect the student's thinking. Therefore, in the CEC the teacher seems to be an facilitator and adviser. Unlike values clarification, the lessons of the CEC are presented in a framework of units which emphasize specific values, and their purpose is to logically guide students to the right answer. However, it is certain that the teacher is
Values clarification

Values clarification does not deemphasize the role of the teacher in values education, but shifts the emphasis from the role of the teacher as a source or a representative of moral truth to the teacher who helps the student to develop the valuing skills. In other words, values clarification takes a non-directive approach, suggesting that students do not need or want the guidance of teachers.

If the teacher-no matter how subtly-were to make judgments or provide standards in a value-clarifying discussion, he would be depriving students of the privilege of making their own decisions about the topic under consideration. Moreover, he would be implying that students cannot do their own thinking and their own valuing, an implication that, if frequently repeated, would tend to convince students that it is so. The result would be the conformity, apathy, indecisiveness, and overdissenting of which we spoke earlier. Value confusion, in short, cannot be cleared by a process of clever teacher direction. (Raths et al., 1966, p.113)

According to the proponents of values clarification, the teacher must let the students thrash around ideas in a completely free, open environment. The teacher seems to be viewed as a model therapist or facilitator who helps the clients to develop and draw upon their own abilities.

Therefore, in the valuing process the teacher's authority need not be stressed at all. What the adult does is to create conditions that aid children in finding values,
if they choose to do so. When operating within this value theory, it is possible that children will choose not to develop values. In this case it is the teacher's responsibility to support this choice.

The outstanding role of a teacher's attitude in values clarification is the unconditional acceptance of the student and the problem. Therefore, neither delight nor horror can be expressed at the issue or the student if the teacher is to help. Even when a young child talks about a decision that involves sexual activity that terrifies the teacher, the teacher must accept the issue, as calmly and seriously as possible, as something that is real and important to the student involved.

Moreover, the teacher should give plenty of space for children to think and clarify questions to help them do so. For example, "Are there aspects of the situation that you are not free to change?", "Could I help you brainstorm some other options?", and "Seems to me that X would probably happen. Have you thought of that?" are desirable. Only the seven valuing processes suggest how to assist a person in thinking through a decision.

The teachers must restrain themselves from suggesting which alternative the student would be wise to select. They resist leaning toward one choice over another. Instead, the teachers ask questions, and assist the student in thinking
through the problem for himself. In short, it is vital for values clarification teachers to establish a mood that is accepting. The values clarification teachers are neither authorities nor socializers, but they are only neutral facilitators.

**Kohlberg's first wave**

From the cognitive-developmental perspective, the job of the teacher is "promoting moral growth" rather than simply encouraging children to come to terms with their own freely chosen values. According to the result of the Stone project which replicated the Blatt effect in 20 schools, all teachers in the classroom in which students changed used extensive or Socratic probes of reasoning; they asked for "why's." Consequently, Kohlberg (1978) claims that Socratic probing is central to teacher behavior in cognitive-developmental moral education.

Kohlberg (1980) calls this moral discussion approach neo-Socratic, not only because the teacher has the role of Socratic questioner, but because the teacher, like Socrates, is assumed to be a moral philosopher animated by a concern for the ideal form of justice. It is assumed that the teachers, and ultimately the student, can be concerned about the universal form of justice or of moral reasoning. They can free themselves from advocacy and indoctrination for the
sake of philosophic dialogue. Furthermore, the teachers can have faith that the pursuit of the philosophic good will settle the more immediate questions of conduct and behavior as Socrates assumed.

At the same time, the teacher must not only engage children in moral discussion but also give them an opportunity to achieve higher forms of moral judgment. During the discussion the teachers gauge the typical developmental level of a student's judgments. They then introduce an alternative perspective derived from a moral judgment position that is just one level higher than the student's level. Their comments are "matched" to the student's judgmental level, but a bit more advanced. This technique was drawn from experimental research showing that "plus-one" exposure is the most effective means of inducing positive moral change.

The teacher's role in discussion is to introduce a moral dilemma, and to draw out students' reasons for the dilemma. As students consider such conflicts, they reexamine their own perspectives and begin molding new ones. The teacher facilitates this process by encouraging students to explicate their opinions in depth, thus sharpening any conflicts that might exist between members of the group.

In moral discussion, Kohlberg emphasizes that the teacher is best conceived of as a facilitator rather than as
an authority. The teacher's own opinion is neither stressed nor invoked as authoritative. It enters only as one of those at a next higher stage. This "plus-one" matching as the teacher's role in the moral discussion shows that the facilitator in the moral discussion is clearly different from the facilitator in values clarification.

Kohlberg's second wave

However, in the just community approach Kohlberg revises his position and maintains that the teacher should be a socializer and an advocate rather than a facilitator. This shift is primarily the result of the realization that in school children engage in stealing, cheating, and aggression, and that in a context wherein one cannot wait until children reach the fifth stage to deal directly with moral behavior. Kohlberg (1985) says,

I have accepted the idea that the teacher is and should be an advocate for certain moral content. The teacher in real life has to go beyond being a process facilitator, a Socratic questioner or a Carl Rogers reflector and supporter of development. This latter stance is quite workable for hypothetical moral dilemmas, but if there is an actual episode of stealing, the teacher is going to advocate for what we hope is the right answer in this moral decision. (p.34)

In the just community school teachers act more like Durkheim's representatives of society or the Israeli kibbutz group leaders advocating collective responsibility than as process-facilitators. Kohlberg (1980) also writes,
I call the kibbutz form of moral education neo-Platonic as well as Durkheimian because its teachers constitute an analogy to Plato's guardians... Like Plato's Republic, all its adult citizens are active in thought and deed on behalf of fourth-stage conceptions of the common good... In working with alternative teacher advocates, our practice evolved into something closer to the theory of the Republic, of Durkheim, of the kibbutz than of the Socratic theory. (p.56)

However, Kohlberg tries to avoid possible indoctrinative tyranny by the Platonic guardians or the Kibbutz madrichim. Indeed, teachers have strong moral opinions about the use of drugs, school attendance, and cheating. However, they cannot directly be imposed on students. They only become influential insofar as they are couched in terms of considerations of justice or community. In other words, moral advocacy of justice can be done by appealing to reasons which the teachers themselves accept, rather than by the use of the teachers' authority.

In addition to this, the system that prevents advocacy from being indoctrination is the establishment of participatory democracy in the classroom or in the school.

The teacher can only advocate as one, the first among equals, from a rational point of view, and not through reliance on authority or power. The teacher should be one member of a democratic political community, in which each person has one vote. (Kohlberg, 1985, p.35)

The Dewey-Piaget theory dictates a staff role as process-facilitator, as inquiry-question asker, reflective-active listener, and as facilitator of democratic procedure. But
the teachers of the just community program advocate. They advocate for the same reason that they hope the students will advocate for. They advocate in the name of making the school more just or fair and more of a community. In other words, the teacher of the just community school is a socializer and advocate in the realm of participatory democracy.

Table 10. The Summary of the Sixth Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The teacher as an authority and a socializer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inculcation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: Wynne maintains that the teachers should have an authority and responsibility to show the right answer or to lead children to the right direction. However, the CEC views the teacher as a socializer, not as an authority.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Values clarification** | No |
| : The teacher should be a facilitator. The important role of the teacher is to accept what the students say unconditionally, and to refuse to give any hints or advices, in order to avoid indoctrination. |

| **Kohlberg 1** | No |
| : Like values clarification teachers, the teachers in the moral discussion should be facilitators. But to develop the child's moral growth, hopefully, the teacher has a role to show one stage higher moral reasoning. However, the teacher should neither be an authoritarian nor a socializer. |

| **Kohlberg 2** | Partly Yes |
| : In the just community approach, the teacher should be a socializer, the person who advocates collective responsibility. But the teacher, in this approach, is not an authority, or a power holder, but only one member. |
The Child as a Reactor and an Asocial Being

According to Durkheim, the work of education is to make the child, as an egotistic and asocial being, social and moral. The children must learn to control themselves, to constrain and master themselves, and formulate their own principles. They must also acquire the taste for discipline and order in their conduct.

Durkheim sees that children have great receptivity to suggestions of all sorts. Therefore, the teacher must show good examples as a model for children, and speak to them imperatively. Consequently, we can accustom them at an early point to self-control and moderation.

In Durkheim's view, the child is also an asocial being who has egotistic tendencies. Generally speaking, we tend to base egotism in the natural constitution of man, while we see altruism as a product of culture and education. However, Durkheim disagrees with this point of view. He rejects that definition of selfishness and altruism which makes of them two unconnected and antagonistic states of mind. Durkheim says,

What differentiates altruism and egotism is not the nature of the pleasure that accompanies these two sorts of our observable behavior. It is the different direction that this activity follows in the two cases. When it is egotistical, it does not go beyond the acting subject; it is centripetal. When it is altruistic, it overflows from its subject. The centers around which it gravitates are outside of him; it is centrifugal. (Moral Education, p.214)
In this way, Durkheim argues that egotism and altruism derived from the same tendency in the natural constitution of man, but the direction of egotism is opposite to that of altruism. Therefore, the fact that the child is egotistic means that the child has a tendency of altruism. Education develops this tendency to be centrifugal. Hence, we must give the child the clearest possible idea of the social groups to which he belongs. In this process, Durkheim takes a view of the child as reactor rather than initiator.

**Inculcation**

Generally speaking, the proponents of the inculcation approach expect adults to shape and determine the immediate behavior of the young to form their character. As children mature, increased emphasis should be given to developing discretion and to applying individual judgment. But first, in a view of inculcation, a strong base of good habits and belief in moral values must be established.

Following Burke (1966), Durkheim (1973), and Freud (1930), Wynne (1985-6) supports somewhat pessimistic views of human nature.

The tradition had a pessimistic opinion about the perfectibility of human beings, and about the feasibility or value of breaking with previous socialization patterns. The tradition did not contend that whatever "is" is necessarily right, but it did assume that the persistence of certain conduct over hundreds of years suggested that careful deliberation should precede any modification or rejection. (p.7)
Wynne thinks that pupils, unless precautions are taken, may choose seriously bad values. Therefore, he claims that it is ridiculous to believe children are capable of objectively assessing most of the beliefs and values they must absorb as effective adults. They must learn a certain body of 'doctrine' to function on a day-to-day basis in society. There is good and bad doctrine, and thus things must be weighed and assessed. But such assessment is largely the responsibility of parents and other appropriate adults.

Ryan (1989) also points out that character education sees the child as malleable, needing formation and a strong environment. It sees the child as capable of good and evil. It sees children as self-centered, and as needing to learn how to reach out beyond themselves. Both Wynne and Ryan have the same assumption that children and adolescents are less informed and not as wise as adults. Wynne (1991) criticizes Kohlberg's "one person, one vote" system of just community schools as misinterpretation of education for democracy. Ryan (1989) also rejects this system because the rights and responsibilities of the students are quite different from those of the teachers.

On the other hand, the CEC teacher's manuals emphasize that students should form their own values through exploring the consequences of acts and events. In the discussion, the teacher should support diverse viewpoints. However, the CEC
discussion is not open-ended like values clarification or the moral dilemma discussion, but closed-ended. In the end of discussion, the teacher summarizes it and logically guides students to the right answer. This means that the developers of the CEC view the child as an asocial being who needs the adult's guidance or direction. In any case, the inculcation approach assumes that the child needs the adult's direction. Thus, the view of children as the object of inculcation is similar with that of Durkheim.

Values clarification

Values clarification denies the traditional moral education or inculcation because it implies a series of methods that are very teacher-centered, that treat the child as a passive and malleable agent, and that come to shape and form. On the contrary, values clarification focuses on the child-centered teaching. Therefore, values clarification teachers 1) encourage children to make more choices, and to make them freely, 2) help them discover alternative when faced with choice, 3) help children weight alternative thoughtfully, reflection on the consequences of each, 4) encourage children to consider what it is that they prize and cherish, 5) give them opportunities to affirm their choices, 6) encourage them to act, behave, and live in accordance with their choice, 7) help them be aware of
repeated behaviors or pattern in their life.

The proponents of values clarification recognize that a child is an initiator of interaction with society and the environment. They assume that children are basically rational, and that they want to clarify, consciously and purposefully, their values and improve their behaviors. Values clarification is based on a conception of humanity that human beings are capable of being thoughtful and wise and that the most appropriate values will emerge when people use those capacities in defining their relationships with each other and with an ever-changing world.

Therefore, the values clarification teachers believe that they do not judge where the child happens to be at any point in his lives. They assume that wherever the child is, he/she can move on. This is a stance of respect for students. They also give the child freedom to choose his/her own values. Therefore, it is possible that the child will choose not to develop values. However, according to the advocates of values clarification, it is the teacher's responsibility to support this choice because of believing that the human being is basically rational and wise.

Kirschenbaum and Simon (1973) write their optimism in people.

If we can recognize, accept, and express our own feelings, if we can consider alternatives and consequences and make our own choice, and if we can actualize our beliefs and goals with repeated and
consistent action, our decisions will lead us toward a future we can cope with and control. (p.30)

Values clarification teachers respect the child's initiative and spontaneity. They encourage the child to clarify his/her own values and to act according to them. Then, they reject the idea that the child should be treated as a reactor.

Kohlberg's first wave

Kohlberg (1971b) sees the child as a moral philosopher. He writes,

The first assumption behind our approach has been that the key to understanding a man's moral conduct or "character" is to understand his moral philosophy, that is, the assumption that we all, even and especially young children, are moral philosophers. By this I mean, in the first place, that the child has a morality of his own. (p.34)

Following Dewey and Piaget, Kohlberg argues that the goal of moral education is the stimulation of the natural development of the child's own moral judgment and capacities. According to Kohlberg, the teacher should refuse to impose an alien pattern on the children, but should aid them to take the next step in a direction which they are already tending. He, therefore, proposed the moral discussion approach, because this approach develops the child's cognitive development spontaneously.

Like Piaget, Kohlberg (1975) disagrees with the socialization argument. Moral stages do not result from cultural teaching but from children's spontaneous
activities. Children develop through social interactions, but interactions of a particular kind. These are interchanges in which others challenge children's assumptions, stimulating them to come up with more comprehensive positions. In such a discussion, children do not merely adopt the thoughts of others, but struggle to formulate their own viewpoints.

According to Piaget (1969), children begin to think logically by learning to consider two or more perspectives in their dealing with others. Therefore, children's spontaneous interaction should be encouraged, and the most beneficial ones are those in which children feel a basic equality, as they most often do with peers. As long as children feel dominated by an authority who knows the "right" answer, they will have difficulty appreciating differences in perspectives. In group discussions with other children, in contrast, they have a better opportunity to deal with different viewpoints as stimulating challenges to their own thinking.

In the moral discussion, student-to-student interaction is emphasized. "Student interaction can be promoted by the way student seating is arranged, by the classroom climate, and by using questions or comments to draw students into the discussion" (Beyer, 1976, p.198). In short, the teacher should try to leave much of the discussion to the children.
The moral discussion approach induces the cognitive conflict which exemplifies Piaget's equilibration model. The children take one view, becomes confused by discrepant information, and then resolves the confusion by forming a more advanced and comprehensive position. It is Socratic. The children give a view, the teacher asks questions which get them to see the inadequacies of their views, and they are then motivated to formulate better positions. The Blatt effect is in keeping with Piagetian theory. In other words, children develop not because they are shaped through external reinforcements but because their curiosity is aroused. They become interested in information that does not quite fit into their existing cognitive structures, they are thereby motivated to revise their thinking.

Thus, in the moral discussion approach Kohlberg focuses on the child's spontaneous development. He views the child as an active moral philosopher, not as a reactor.

Kohlberg's second wave

According to Kohlberg, what prevents advocacy from being indoctrination is the establishment of participatory democracy in the classroom or in the school. The teacher can only advocate as one, the first among equals, from a rational point of view, and not through reliance on authority or power. The teacher should be one member of a
democratic political community, in which each person has one vote.

In other words, Kohlberg's interpretation of educational democracy is schools in which everyone has a formally equal voice to make the rules, and in which the validity of the rules are judged by their fairness to the interests of all involved. If the best education is learning by doing, then students can best learn justice not only by discussing its claims in abstract, but also by acting on its claims in the school day.

In the traditional school when there are problems in the school, for example, when a fight starts, or when cheating gets out of hand, it is not up to the students but to the teachers and administrators. However, within the just community approach students have the responsibility to be "their brothers' and sisters' keepers," as members of a community. Therefore, the just community schools are operated by all members.

Problems of the school are settled by open discussion in meetings with students and teachers together. The members of the just community school also pay attention to informal sociability and community building. The organizational structure of the just community program (Kohlberg and Higgins, 1987) is shown in table 11.
Table 11. The Organizational Structure of A Just Community Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution (Members)</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda committee</td>
<td>Deciding on issues; putting together the agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8 to 12 students and 2 to 3 teachers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory group</td>
<td>Creating an informal atmosphere for discussing personal problems; having a moral discussion on the 1 or 2 important agenda issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 teacher/advisor and 10 to 15 students)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community meeting</td>
<td>Discussing and resolving moral issues; making rules and appealing violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(All students and teachers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline committee</td>
<td>Hearing cases of rules violations and interpersonal problems of disrespect; giving sanctions; enhancing interpersonal understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6 to 8 students and 2 teachers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once a week the students participate in a small meeting called an advisory group. This group has the task of preparing for the community meeting. Since the just community program establishes its rules, it must provide a structure that enables the community to determine fair consequences for those who break the rules. This is one major purpose of the discipline or fairness committee.

In each Just Community program the discipline or fairness committee's roles and duties develop over time. Because the committee is acting for the school or program, it becomes clear that the individuals who comprise the committee are fulfilling a school- or program- wide responsibility. In this sense, membership becomes viewed as a duty, not just something to be volunteered for out of interest. This means that most students and staff will serve on this committee for some period during each academic year.
In the just community approach, Kohlberg sees the student as an active member. In spite of accepting Durkheim's notion of groups, Kohlberg keeps the early view of the child as a moral philosopher. That is the reason why Kohlberg proposed the "one person, one vote" system.

Table 12. Summary of the Seventh Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The child as a reactor and an asocial being</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inculcation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: Like Durkheim, the proponents of inculcation view the child not to be as wise as adults, so that they need the adults' direction. Indeed, the teachers have respect for the child as a human being, but lead children to the the right place. Fundamentally they hold the same recognition of the child with Durkheim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values clarification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: Values clarification teachers view the child not as a reactor but as an initiator. Therefore, they attempt to accept the child's values unconditionally. In any case the child's spontaneous attitude should be central in valuing process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohlberg 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: Kohlberg sees the child as a moral philosopher. In moral discussion, he stresses student-to-student interaction. Since he recognizes that teaching moral content is a violation of the child's right, he facilitates the child's cognitive growth and focuses on his/her spontaneous activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kohlberg 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| : Fundamentally Kohlberg does not change his idea on the child as a moral philosopher. Indeed, in practice he comes to recognize the necessity of the adult's direction, but there is also a restriction for the teacher which is the "one
person, one vote" system. In this situation, the teacher respects students' spontaneity, and is a member who has the same right as students do.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this final chapter of research into theories concerned with the moral education of children, there are three areas of discussion that remain to be considered. First, through the examination of the relationship between the four approaches, there is a need to answer whether values clarification and the moral discussion approach adequately address their objections to inculcation. Second, we must evaluate the results of the analyses of the four approaches from Durkheim's perspective. Finally, we need to examine the synthesis of the four approaches and Durkheim, and propose an outline of a new moral education.

(1) The Relationship of the Four Approaches

Values clarification was completely opposite to the traditional moral education or inculcation because the proponents of values clarification believed that teaching the content of moral values led to indoctrination. According to them, indoctrination was based on the premise that educators knew the right set of values that they were entitled to pass to children. However, the starting point of values clarification was the assumption that the world is
consistently changing, and today there is no conclusive or verified answer to value questions. In other words, none of us could be certain that our values are right for other people. Therefore, they insist that the teacher should not teach the content of values but could teach only a system of valuing. Then the 7 step valuing process was proposed by them. In the valuing process, the teacher should be open and nonjudgmental, and should have respect for the child's own point of view on values.

However, there was a clear limitation of this approach. Kohlberg's criticism was that values clarification teachers stressed that our values were different, not that one value was more adequate than others. So, he concluded, "If this program is systematically followed, the students will themselves become relativists, believing there is no 'right' moral answer." Kohlberg, therefore, proposed the moral discussion approach based upon the cognitive development of children. He claimed that the moral discussion approach was neither indoctrinative nor relativistic because it focused on moral reasoning, not on the moral content, and it was based on the developmental stage theory.

But, when Kohlberg began the just community approach, he himself came to recognize the limitations of the moral discussion approach. Since real-life moral dilemmas were treated in the just community approach, Kohlberg could not
neglect teaching the content of values. Indeed, the moral discussion approach which treated the hypothetical dilemmas was useful to develop the student's cognitive structure. However, it was not a sufficient guide to the moral educators, because they had to deal with value content as well as structure, behavior as well as reasoning. In short, they could not avoid dealing with children's behaviors in a school world.

Through the practice of the just community approach, Kohlberg realized that moral education must be partly teaching the content of values. This means that Kohlberg admitted the necessity of Durkheim's socialization on condition that it was done in a democratic school setting, like the just community approach.

Therefore, we can conclude that values clarification and the moral discussion approach did not adequately justify their objections to the traditional moral education or inculcation approaches.

(2) Results of the Analyses

Results of the analyses of the four approaches from Durkheim's perspective (Table 13) show that the inculcation approaches (Wynne: point 7, and CEC: point 4.5) and the just community approach (K2: point 3.5) are desirable, but values clarification (VC: point 0) and the moral discussion
From Durkheim's point of view, inculcation and Kohlberg's just community approach have several concepts of moral education in common. But values clarification and Kohlberg's moral discussion approach are not seen as moral education because they do not have any of the important parameters of moral education which Durkheim emphasized. The research also shows that Wynne has all the parameters of Durkheim's moral

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Durkheim's parameters</th>
<th>Inculcation Wynne CEC</th>
<th>V C</th>
<th>K 1</th>
<th>K 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transmitting social value</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching discipline and moral conduct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stressing the group or society</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasizing altruism or affective components of morality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposing values prior to autonomy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The teacher as an authority and a socializer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The child as a reactor and an asocial being</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Yes --- 1 point.  
* Partly Yes or Conditionally Yes --- 0.5 point.  
* No --- 0 point.

* Table 13. Results of the Analyses

Approach (K1: point 0) are undesirable.
education theory. The main reason why both inculcation and the just community approach obtained a high score was their acceptance of socialization, that is, teaching the content of social values which is the core concept of Durkheim theory.

On the contrary, values clarification and the moral discussion approach rejected teaching the content of values. This stance is related to the second parameter: teaching discipline and moral conduct, and the fifth parameter: imposing values prior to autonomy.

For Durkheim the aim of education is socialization: to create a new being, shaped according to the needs of society. While the advocates of values clarification and also Kohlberg in the early stages recognized it as restriction and repression, Durkheim believes that only socialization helps the child to be a social being. Therefore, the child should be systematically exposed to his/her country's cultural heritage in order to obtain a sense of identity and personal fulfillment. When the child understands duty and good derived from society, he/she becomes a moral person.

As we have seen previously, socialization involves transmitting moral values. Accepting socialization, in the just community program Kohlberg revised his theory and recognized the teaching of specific contents such as the
values of community and collective responsibility within a democratic school setting. Peters (1973) indicates the importance of learning the content of morality for purposes of moral education. Hamm (1977) and Lickona (1988) also argue that the teaching of the content of values is compatible with Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. Lickona writes,

How does socialization fit into a Kohlbergian developmental approach? One can look for developmental junctures in which a theoretical case can be made for this sort of direct moral instruction. At Stage 1, for example, in which children have a heightened receptivity to a parent's authority and general influence, one can argue that social training is helpful both for conveying specific moral values and general regard for others. (p.190)

He points out that developing a fully adequate conception of moral education means expanding the original Kohlberg emphasis on reasoning to make a larger place for the teaching of moral content.

On the other hand, in spite of rejecting the teaching values, Kirschenbaum (1977), one of the proponents of values clarification, also recognizes that "there are certain value judgments implicit in each process. If we urge critical thinking, then we value rationality. If we support moral reasoning, then we value justice. If we advocate divergent thinking, then we value creativity. If we uphold free choice, then we value autonomy or freedom. If we encourage 'no-lose' conflict resolution, then we value equality"
Obviously, any community or society desires its children to accept its basic values. For example, in the democratic society people value freedom, equality, and respect for one's right. Indeed, some contents of traditional moral education seem to be incompatible with today's society. But this does not mean that the traditional approach misled children in moral education. Although the traditional approach attempted to see the simple relationship between values and behavior, even today the child must learn some contents of basic values in society. Thus, in every society or in every school the teaching values is necessary in moral education. The adult or the teacher, as a socializer, has to convey the values of our moral heritage.

The third and also the fourth parameter which stress the group-based moral education seems appropriate. Both values clarification and Kohlberg's moral discussion approach only focused on the individual, while neglecting the group, showing their imbalance. Kohlberg's just community approach because of its emphasis on collective power, group norms, and altruism, appears more balanced.

Limitations of Durkheim

On the other hand, both the advocates of values
clarification and Kohlberg disagree with Durkheim's concept of teacher and child. This point also has been criticized by Piaget. In *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932) Piaget pointed out the limitation of Durkheim's theory of moral education. According to Piaget, Durkheim only saw the social relations between children and adults, and missed the fact that there exist social relationships that apply to the groups which children form among themselves.

Durkheim thinks of children as knowing no other society than adult society or the societies created by adults (schools), so that he entirely ignores the existence of spontaneously formed children's societies, and of the facts relating to mutual respect. (pp.358-359)

In Piaget's view, there are two basic moral attitudes. The first is moral heteronomy, a blind obedience to rules imposed by adults. Children assume that there is one powerful law which they must always follow. The second morality is autonomy. This morality considers rules as human devices produced by equals for the sake of cooperation. Children achieve moral autonomy in the same way they overcome egocentrism-through interaction with peers. As they interact with peers on an equal footing, they learn that rules are not absolutely handed down from above, but simply are agreements which serve the purpose of cooperative interaction.

Since Piaget believes that mutual respect between children depends upon spontaneous social interaction, he
does not agree with Durkheim that it is the teacher's business to impose rules on the child. Autonomous and inner discipline can exist in a class only to the extent that the work enlists the major part of the child's spontaneous initiative and activity.

Children begin to think logically—to coordinate two dimensions simultaneously—partly by learning to consider two or more perspectives in their dealings with others. Thus, interactions should be encouraged, and the most beneficial ones are those in which children feel a basic equality, as they most often do with peers. Therefore, Piaget (1932) maintains that the teacher should be "a collaborator" (p.367). In other words, Piaget views autonomy as not only an aim but also a means of education, in contrast to Durkheim's view autonomy as an aim of education.

Wallwork (1985) also indicates,

The main problem with Durkheim's concept of the social self, which he helped introduce into modern thought, is its insufficient attention to the role of active reasoning in both moral development and judgment. Moralization is explained by socialization, as if the human subject were a passive slate upon which society writes, rather than the cognitively active agent of Piagetian and Kohlbergian research. Moral judgment is depicted too frequently by Durkheim as an automatic response to socially enforced standards rather than, as Kant understood and as Piaget and Kohlberg underscore, the product of active deliberation and decision-making. (p. 91)

Following Piaget, Kohlberg developed the cognitive developmental theory and proposed the moral discussion
approach focusing on student-to-student interaction. The discussion of moral dilemmas which do not have a right answer, develops the student's moral reasonings. This approach facilitates the student's cognitive development and his/her spontaneous moral growth. Indeed, as the researcher mentioned in chapter 3, there was a limitation of the moral discussion approach, but it also is one of the useful methods of moral teaching.

By respecting children's spontaneity, the teacher can also learn from the values clarification approach. The strategies of values clarification are useful in understanding the student's own values. The teacher can use these to make a favorable moral atmosphere in the classroom. It is certain that the CEC, although it is one of the inculcation approaches, accepts and employs the concept of values clarification, because of developing the child's spontaneity and avoiding indoctrination.

Through the just community approach, Kohlberg recognized the limitation of both Durkheim and Piaget, and he tried to go beyond the two great persons. He encouraged not only the development of student government but also the teacher's advocacy, and paid attention to the moral atmosphere. School teachers following Kohlberg's ideas can fashion a new approach to moral education.
(3) **Integrated Moral Education**

Hall (1978) says,

We know what is needed in moral education: an approach that helps the student to develop his or her own critical moral perspective and, at the same time, conveys the values of our moral heritage. If we are genuinely concerned for the growth of individual decision-making abilities, we will avoid teaching cultural values in an indoctrinative manner. But similarly, if we are concerned with passing on to young people the values of our cultural heritage as a tradition of moral reasoning, we will avoid the relativism that can grow out of an approach that centers exclusively upon individual decision making. (p.13)

To help students develop their own critical moral perspective or spontaneous moral judgment, we should accept the strategies of values clarification and Kohlberg's approaches. On the other hand, Durkheim's concept of socialization is also necessary to convey the values of our moral heritage. The point is how to integrate these concepts in the moral education curriculum.

The Integrated Moral Education Program (IMEP) for elementary and middle school age children which is briefly described in the following, tries to integrate adult teaching or guidance regarding social values and provision of opportunities for children to discuss, reflect, and apply these values. Therefore, the IMEP emphasizes following ideas:

1) Transmitting social values

First, the IMEP teaches the child fundamental and
democratic social values such as justice, equality, liberty, life, personal obligation for the public good, human right, respect for human dignity, and so on. In order to achieve this aim, the teacher must play an active and important role developing the child's character. Since the IMEP emphasizes that children need to be taught the content of social values and moral heritage of the culture, it accepts basically the necessity of socialization which is consistent with Durkheim and inculcation. However, the IMEP makes a clear distinction between teaching moral values and indoctrination because it accepts the child's spontaneity.

2) Respect for the child's spontaneity

Unlike Durkheim, the IMEP respects the child's spontaneity. Therefore, the IMEP helps the child develop a critical and creative moral perspective. The children are given the opportunities to discuss, examine, and criticize the values, and time to develop their character from within their on the basis of their own thinking and experiences. As a result, the IMEP accepts the strategies of values clarification and Kohlberg's moral discussion. Fundamentally, the IMEP sees the child as a moral philosopher and explorer who needs adults' guidance. The IMEP also sees the child as a being who is willing to accept cultural heritage if the adult gives it gradually and rationally within a reliable relationship.
3) Moral lessons

As Durkheim indicated, moral education calls for teaching of morality, the IMEP provides for one hour of a moral lesson every week. This moral lesson is done by the homeroom teacher who knows best about the realities of each student in the class. In this lesson, the teachers use various kinds of materials such as short stories, slides, films, literature, and newspapers which focus on the fundamental values. The teachers also employ various kinds of strategies such as discussion, role-playing, clarifying responses, and probe questions.

Since moral education must be integrated within the whole of school life, the moral lesson should maintain close relations to each subject, information and experiences associated with those subjects, special activities, and school ceremonies. The IMEP also underscores students' activities such as classroom meetings, student councils, and clubs.

4) Moral atmosphere

Basically the IMEP employs Durkheim's group-based moral education focusing on altruism. In the just community approach, Kohlberg also points out that a good moral climate is a bridge between moral judgment and action. Following Durkheim and Kohlberg, the IMEP tries to establish a favorable moral atmosphere both in classrooms and in the
whole of the school. The favorable moral atmosphere includes the notion of not only what Kohlberg calls a just community, but also what Noddings (1984, 1986) calls a "caring community." In this environment, children and teachers explore morality through moral lessons and actual practices. Children must be given opportunities not only to think about justice and care but also to act in a moral way.

As Durkheim maintains, the sense of a group can only be acquired through practice in the context of already existing association. Learning by doing is the best way of acquiring morality. The IMEP is in total agreement with Aristotle's assertion that a man becomes virtuous by performing virtuous acts; he becomes kind by doing kind acts; he becomes brave by doing brave acts.

5) Teacher-child relationship

In the IMEP, the teacher is not an authority but a responsible guide to lead children to the right place. The teacher is a socializer, a model for the child, and a warm supporter. Especially at the beginning of the school year, the teacher should take opportunities to establish a positive relationship with children, let them know that their teacher is concerned with and cares about them. The IMEP also gives attention to peer relationship which are important especially for middle school students. The teacher should also treat them independently. In any case, the
positive and reliable relationship between teachers and students is a crucial characteristic in the IMEP.

In summary, the research indicated that values clarification and the moral discussion approach did not adequately answer their objections to the inculcation approach, because the limitations of them were identified clearly. The results of analyses showed that inculcation approaches and Kohlberg's just community approach had the parameters of moral education in common with Durkheim because they accepted the notion of socialization.

On the other hand, the limitations of Durkheim's moral education theory which missed social relationships among children, were criticized. Therefore, the Neo-Durkheimian approach to moral education, as a synthesis of the four approaches within Durkheim's framework, employs values clarification strategies and Kohlberg's developmental moral education which supplement the limitation of Durkheim's theory. It not only respects the child's spontaneity but also stresses discipline, individual autonomy, and group attachment which are well-balanced between the individual and the group, affective and cognitive components of morality. Hence, a new moral education should be a comprehensive and multidimensional approach.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


