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Signature redacted for privacy.

Robert S. Iltis

This study seeks to show how a member of an empowered group is able to argue
on behalf of a disempowered group. Other theorists in the field of other-directed
protest have claimed that these protestors have a negative effect on the
disempowered group and only serve to raise their own positions. But this thesis
seeks to show that this position is not always accurate. The rhetoric of Galen
Fisher, a protestor of the Japanese internment during World War II, is an example
of a protestor who was largely successful in having a positive effect on the
Japanese and not seeking to raise his own status in society. I found that Fisher’s
history with the Japanese, as well as his method of placing praise and blame on
various members of the empowered groups contributed to a successful, if not
immediately effective, other-directed protest.
Other-Directed Protest: A Study of Galen Fisher’s Anti-Internment Rhetoric

by
Cynthia D. Boes

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Other-Directed Protest: A Study of Galen Fisher’s Anti-Internment Rhetoric

Statement of the Problem

American history is filled with actions that people have felt compelled to protest against: the Vietnam War, abortion rights, women’s rights, civil rights and many more. If a group feels put upon or discriminated against, members of that group generally protest against the group that is discriminating. There also comes a time when people outside the discriminated group step in and begin protesting for the rights of others. This is called other-directed moral protest (Stewart, 1991). Men fighting for women’s rights or people from one racial group fighting for civil rights of other races are examples of other-directed moral protest.

Other-directed moral protest occurs when the persecuted group is unable to communicate their needs to the group in power. For example, during World War II, Japanese-Americans felt their civil rights were denied when they were interned without a trial. Although several Japanese-Americans argued that the internment was unconstitutional, most non-Japanese-Americans did not accept their arguments. When non-Japanese people spoke up against the internment, their arguments were more acceptable to much of the general public. A persecuted group is often unable to communicate their needs to the group in power. If a member of the group in power argues on the behalf of the non-empowered groups it could potentially be more successful. Without this outside assistance many groups’ voices would not be heard.
Problems may arise between the persecuted group and the defending non-member of the group. Non-members must have some understanding of the true needs and values of the group they are defending or the protest may focus on the wrong issues or end with an undesired result. The persecuted group must also be aware of and accept their defenders in order that they may share their ideals with them. Group members can be more successful than non-members if they are able to truly communicate their own needs and understand their own values (Alcoff, 1991). A member may lack the objectivity needed, however, to give a convincing argument. There may be issues outside the groups that lead to the perceived persecution. A person who is too close to the issue may not be able to see the extenuating circumstances.

Problems also may arise if the defender does not understand the needs and values of the persecuting group. During World War II, the United States government interned Japanese-Americans for two main reasons. One reason was to prevent spies for Japan from giving any information that would help Japan in the war. Another reason was that the government was trying to protect the people of Japanese ancestry from hate crimes committed by people angry at the country of Japan. Whether the Japanese internment was constitutionally valid or not did not negate the real concerns with spies and hate crimes. Thus, for an other-directed protestor, ignoring the needs of the persecutor would have been as potentially ineffective as ignoring the needs of the persecuted would have been immoral.
Galen Fisher is an example of an other-directed moral protestor. He argued against the Japanese internment camps of World War II. He testified before the Tolan Committee, a committee designed to make decisions about what to do with the enemy aliens in vital locations on the Pacific Coast. He also wrote twelve articles from 1940-1946 regarding the internment of Japanese-Americans. His articles appeared mainly in *The Christian Century* but also in *Survey Graphics, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* and *Far Eastern Survey*. He also wrote “The Drama of the Japanese Evacuation,” an article which appears in *A Touchstone of Democracy*. Fisher spent much of the war fighting against the internment of Japanese-Americans and was a member of several organizations dedicated to that fight, while not being a member of the Japanese-American group.

By investigating the anti-Japanese internment rhetoric of Galen Fisher we can learn more about the idea of moral protest, specifically other-directed moral protest. The arguments against internment of American citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry were not successful in the short run. The internment lasted the entire time of the war. It is, however, important to look at the way voices are heard even in times when arguments are unsuccessful. Ultimately, despite the fact that the internment was not stopped, the government offered redress to those who were interned, which indicated that the arguments against the internment were valid. The lack of success in the protest rhetoric does not make it an unimportant subject to study.² The significant research question in such a case is how a member of a
majority group is able to argue on behalf of a minority group in a way that is acceptable to both groups.

Review of the Literature

Protest Rhetoric

Protest rhetoric, moral reform rhetoric and civic protest rhetoric are subjects that have been widely discussed in the field of communication. Study of moral protest has largely taken the form of self-directed protest, or protest aimed at issues that directly affect those who are protesting. King and Jensen (1995) study music as protest rhetoric. Lake (1983, 1991) wrote two articles on Native American protest, focusing on the Red Power movement and its lack of effectiveness on the European-American population. Morris & Wander (1990) study the way rhetoric contributed to the collective memory of white America in regards to Native Americans. Carlson (1992) studies the rhetoric of the Moral Reform movement and questions how a group begins to “question its place in the social order” (p. 17). Condit (1987) studies the Civil Rights movement to show that protest is a discursive practice between two sides to help persuade a third group: the audience. The Civil Rights movement is an example of rhetoric that was both self-directed, when done by African-Americans, and other-directed, when done by European-Americans.

There is also some study on other-directed social or moral protest. Stewart (1991) considers abortion, animal rights and anti-apartheid protest other-directed
because those protests are led by those who do not feel dispossessed and are fighting for the rights of others rather than themselves. Stewart's article focuses on issues of ego in other-directed protest. He studies the ways in which protestors bolster their images through their protest, promoting themselves as highly ethical and moral people fighting for the rights of others who could not fight for themselves. Stewart states that "the ego function is a necessary ingredient in the rhetoric of any collective effort that challenges powerful, entrenched institutions" (p. 92). This ego function is present in self-directed social protest as well, according to Stewart, but is manifested in a different way. Self-directed protesters use the ego function to help bolster timid members of the group whereas other-direct protesters use the ego function to congratulate themselves for what they are doing. Although Stewart does not condemn the ego function of other-directed protest, other critics have.

Linda Alcoff's (1991) article, "The Problem of Speaking for Others," discusses the consequences of a speaker from one group speaking on behalf of a different group. Although Alcoff mentions that in some communities, speaking for others is rejected out of hand, she does not maintain that extreme position. Alcoff writes that one problem with speaking for others is that a speaker's social location can have an impact on the meaning that the speaker did not intend. The other problem is that one's social location not only adds meaning, but can be dangerous, especially in the case of privileged people speaking for less privileged people. In some situations, the speaker is asked to speak by a member of the less privileged
group. Even though the underprivileged group asked for representation, these situations still have problems because the group being represented has no ability to effect the interpretation the speaker makes of their the needs and desires. Alcoff admits that the person speaking has the ability to make a message more significant for different audiences by taking into consideration the context of the speech. Despite this, Alcoff says, "The speaker is not the master or mistress of the situation...they can never know everything about this context" (p. 15). Even a speaker with the best of intentions cannot control how the audience is interpreting their words.

Despite all of the problems, Alcoff (1991) does not advocate a complete retreat from speaking for others: "The major problem with such a retreat is that it significantly undercuts the possibility of political effectiveness" (p. 17). Instead of retreating from the social and political responsibility of speaking for others, Alcoff suggests four interrogatory practices to evaluate instances of speaking for others in order to determine whether the effects are more beneficial than costly. Her first practice is to closely analyze, and fight against, the impetus to speak in the first place. Second, the speaker must determine how her location and context is affecting her words. The third practice is to realize the accountability and responsibility the speaker has for what she says. The fourth and central point is to evaluate the probable or actual effects of the words, not just based on location and context, but also on how the audience will receive the words. She concludes her
article by stating that "speaking for others is often born of a desire for mastery" (p. 29) and that the effect is often a reinforcing of social hierarchies.

Japanese Internment

On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed and approved Executive Order 9066 (EO 9066), authorizing the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas in the United States as he saw fit (Roosevelt, 1942). As a result of this executive order, 112,000 persons of Japanese descent from the western United States were evacuated from their houses and interned in one of ten relocation centers (the term most preferred in government documents) or internment camps. The internees consisted of 40,000 foreign-born Japanese, the Issei, and 70,000 American-born persons of Japanese descent, the Nisei. Because of this order, the question of the constitutionality of the internment camps was raised. Was a perceived threat against the safety of a majority of American citizens a sufficient reason to intern a minority group of American citizens?

Despite the difference in citizenship, the Issei and the Nisei were treated the same during World War II. In the days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt "issued proclamations declaring all nationals and subjects of the nations with which we were at war to be enemy aliens" (War Department, 1943, p. 3). This proclamation enabled the military to issue restrictions upon the Issei. The first restriction placed upon the Japanese was a curfew on the Pacific Ocean coastline from Washington to California. Between 9 P.M. and 6 A.M., all
enemy aliens, those of German, Italian and Japanese descent, were required to be in their residence. EO 9066 allowed the curfew and other restrictions that the Commanding General would impose to include the Nisei, even though they were American citizens. The order stated that the Secretary of War could designate military areas:

...from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with such respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. (Roosevelt, 1942, p. 1)

The next step included evacuating all people of Japanese descent from Western Washington, Western Oregon, all of California, and southern Arizona. The Japanese, between March 21, 1942 and October 30, 1942, were given the choice to migrate from restricted areas to another area of the country without any government support, or to be voluntarily moved to one of the fifteen assembly centers designated for this purpose. Although many Japanese chose to migrate, most chose to move to assembly centers. The final step the government took was to move the Japanese from assembly centers, located in Washington, Oregon and Nevada, to one of ten relocation centers or internment camps, located in Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, Arkansas, California and Idaho. Manzanar, one of the assembly centers in California, became a relocation center as well (War Department, 1943).

Since the internment, many researchers (Bosworth, 1967; Girdner & Loftis, 1969; Grodzins, 1949; Myer, 1971; tenBroek, Barnhart and Matson, 1968) have
written denouncing the internment of Japanese-Americans as unconstitutional.

Shortly after the war ended Morton Grodzins, a political scientist (McWilliams, 1969) and member of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study of the University of California, began researching the effect of California’s hostility towards the Japanese in a study of the internment and resettlement during World War II. He finds that the evacuation was due in large part to discrimination and previously held antipathy towards the Japanese farmers. Dillon Myer was the director of the War Relocation Authority for a majority of the war. The War Relocation Authority, or WRA, was in charge of overseeing the internment camps. In 1971, Myer provided further evidence to suggest that discrimination and anti-Japanese sentiment was the main reason for the evacuation.

Other researchers of the Japanese internment have focused on areas other than constitutionality. Michi Weglyn (1976), Arthur Hansen (1991) and Roger Axford (1986) focus on the Japanese experience. Weglyn provides a story about how the Japanese survived and excelled in the internment camps. Axford and Hansen interviewed several prominent internees in order to record their first-person accounts of the events leading to internment and happenings inside the camps. Roger Daniels (1989), a historian, provides governmental, legal and personal documents related to the internment.

In my research, I have found no other articles or books discussing the other-directed moral protest of the Japanese Internment period. Many books have been written on the period of Japanese internment during World War II. These
books focus mainly on the experience of the Japanese, government reports, and arguments promoting internment. Some articles have also been written regarding the internment but they do not relate to other-directed moral protest, either. Chiasson (1991), Bishop (2000) and Mizuno (2000) study journalism issues surrounding the internment camps: the lack of free press in the camps (Mizuno, 2000) and the failure of the newspapers to be watchdogs protecting civil rights (Chiasson, 1991; Bishop, 2000). Bearden (1999) studies the reaction of the State of Arkansas to the internment camps located there. Shaffer (1999) researches the opposition to internment but writes from an historical viewpoint and the article is not a rhetorical study.

Gina Petonito's article “Racial Discourse and Enemy Construction” (2000) presents the argument that the rhetorical argument to promote the internment was based on race. Her article attempts to show “ways powerful people utilize culturally available constructs to vilify the ‘Other’” (p. 20). In several newspaper editorials or other articles from the World War II era she cites, Petonito notes “Us and Them” discourse. She warns against making assumptions on the racist attributes of the past based on the feelings of the present. This argument is especially important in the subject of internment camps. Many the articles on internment were written in a manner suggesting that the argument was decided first and then the supporting facts were gathered later. The assumptions of racial prejudice appear in most anti-internment works but, according to Petonito’s
argument, the writers should have looked at both sides of the argument with the ideals of World War II era Americans, rather than 21st century Americans.

Despite the lack of research on protest rhetoric during the period of internment, this period of time is important to study because it gives another example of other-directed protest. The active racism against the Issei and Nisei is another example of racism from groups in power to differing cultural groups. Studying this time period and the protest rhetoric involved is important to help understand the fight against racism in America.

Galen Fisher

Galen Fisher was an important figure in the defense of the Japanese during the period of World War II and the internment camps. According to Robert Shaffer (1999) Fisher was “Perhaps the most important white supporter of Japanese American rights during the war” (p. 613). Other historical works support Shaffer’s judgment. Dillon Myer, the director of the War Relocation Authority during World War II, after the war acknowledged Fisher as an individual who contributed to the success of the WRA. Myer praised Fisher as a supporter whose “writings were helpful and informative” (p. xix).

Evacuation,” an article which appeared in *A Touchstone of Democracy*. Fisher spent much of the war fighting against the internment of Japanese-Americans and was a member of several organizations dedicated to that fight. He was one of the original members of the Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Aliens of Japanese Ancestry (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). He was vice chairman of the Western Area Protestant Church Commission for Wartime Japanese Service (Myer, 1971). He was also a member of the West Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play (Myer, 1971). Fisher was one of many who argued in defense of the Nisei to the Tolan Committee, also known as the House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration (Girdner & Loftis, 1969).

The Tolan Committee came to California, Oregon and Washington to hear arguments for and against the internment of Japanese. One hundred fifty witnesses testified during the hearings. Fisher testified in San Francisco on February 21, 1942. The Tolan committee heard the arguments but ultimately ignored arguments against internment of the Nisei and Issei in favor of rumors that fifth column activity, or sabotage, led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
Method

Other-directed moral protest points to the need for a rhetorical criticism that focuses on two different groups: the rhetorical audience and the disempowered group being argued for. A rhetorical audience, according to Lloyd Bitzer (1968), is more than just a group of listeners or readers: "properly speaking, a rhetorical audience consists only of those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change" (p. 44). The rhetorical audience may consist of the speakers themselves or it could be an ideal audience. In any case, for other-directed moral protest to be successful, the rhetorical audience must be analyzed to determine what information it needs to make appropriate changes. The disempowered group must be analyzed to determine what social position the speaker has (Alcoff, 1991) and to determine what effects the protests will have on that group.

The rhetorical audience for a majority of Galen Fisher’s anti-internment rhetoric consisted of the readers of The Christian Century and the Tolan Committee. The disempowered group included the Japanese-Americans, or Nisei, and the alien Japanese, or Issei, who would benefit from any positive results of Fisher’s rhetoric. Traditional methods of rhetorical criticism will work to discover the answer to the research question: how a member of a majority group is able to argue on behalf of a minority group in a way that is acceptable to the audience and empowering for the disempowered group. Through an analysis of the audience, the disempowered group, the history of the internment camps, the life of Galen Fisher
and an analysis of the rhetoric, the research question will be answered.

Specifically, I will analyze the invention, style and organization of the rhetoric to discover how Fisher used his rhetoric to provide the best possible argument for all concerned groups: the readers of *The Christian Century*, the Tolan Committee and the Japanese-Americans.

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1 See Supreme Court decisions on the Endo, Korematsu and Hirabayashi cases regarding the constitutionality of the curfews, evacuation and internment.
2 According to Parrish, the quality of the speech and its effectiveness is more important than the actual effect. "Many of the great speeches of history have been made in lost causes" (p. 7). The critic’s concern in a piece of rhetoric should be whether the rhetor used all the available means of persuasion, as Aristotle’s definition suggests and a study of the *ethos*, content, order, motives appeal and style of the rhetorical artifact will show whether it was, indeed, effective.
3 *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* by Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart and Floyd W. Matson (1968); *America’s Concentration Camps* by Allan R. Bosworth (1967), *The Great Betrayal* by Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis and *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* by Morton Grodzins cite Fisher’s works as well as mention his importance in the fight against internment.
4 Fisher also wrote several books in his lifetime. In 1923, well before the war with Japan started, he wrote a book about Japan. Fisher had spent 20 years in Japan throughout his life. He worked with the YMCA and wrote this book specifically for missionaries and those Christians concerned with missionary work in Japan. In 1952, seven years after World War II ended, he wrote a book about John R. Mott. He had known Mott from his years spent in Japan with the YMCA. Three years later he wrote *Citadel of Democracy*, a book about Stiles Hall: a part of the YMCA.
History

Internment history

The events at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 were a shock to most Americans. James Michener (1976) wrote that Americans considered the Japanese military to be inferior and unable to make such a successful attack against the most powerful military of the time. Soon after the Japanese military attacked and decimated the ships docked in Pearl Harbor, America was at war with Japan. The events in the following months showed a definite progression towards internment for all Japanese-Americans. On December 7, the President declared that all Japanese aliens were to be considered enemy aliens and signed a proclamation allowing the Attorney General to intern all Japanese enemy aliens (Biddle, 1962). Although he had the right to do so, Attorney General Frances Biddle (1962) wrote that he avoided interning any Japanese, thinking it ill advised, unnecessary and cruel. Despite Biddle’s hesitation, many Americans believed that internment was inevitable: Amy Uno Ishii’s school told all Japanese families not to bother to register for the September term because they would not be around to go to school (Hansen, 1991).

Canada led the way in exclusion and internment. On January 14, 1942, all Canadian male Issei over the age of 16 were sent west of the Cascade Mountains. On February 27, male and female citizens and aliens were all sent to work camps and mining ghost towns. These Canadian-Japanese had all of their belongings disposed of or confiscated and were not allowed to return to British Columbia until
March 1949 (Weglyn, 1976). America soon followed Canada’s lead. In the third week of January, Mr. Justice Owen Roberts’ report of the Commission on Pearl Harbor related tales of espionage in Hawaii. This report helped turn the tide in favor of stricter measures to prevent sabotage and espionage (Biddle, 1962).

According to Biddle (1962), General J. A. DeWitt, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, was against internment in January 1942, calling it “damned nonsense” (p. 214). DeWitt did not hesitate to evacuate Japanese-Americans from sensitive areas, however. On January 21, he sent a recommendation of restricted areas to the Attorney General (Biddle, 1962). In its 1943 report, the War Department stated that initially “of course, only aliens of enemy nationality were affected, and no persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States were required to move under the program” (p. 6). The War Department also felt that “in essence, there was no substantial dislocation or disruption socially or economically of the affected groups” (p. 6). On January 29, Major Bendetsen and General DeWitt had discussed emptying Bainbridge Island, a farming community in the Puget Sound in Washington State. In the telephone conversation, when Bendetson questioned the legality of evacuating the Japanese-Americans and asked whether permits would be required, DeWitt answered, “I don’t think it would be necessary to do that” (Daniels, 1989). On February 3rd, General DeWitt and Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, discussed the movement of the Japanese. In their discussion, they indicated a hope that the Japanese-American citizens would be willing to move out of restricted
areas voluntarily. The legality of moving citizens was a potential problem for them that they realized they would have to overcome.

Biddle continued to be against the internment and told Secretary of War Harold Stimson that no civilians could be evacuated unless a place was declared a military zone. Biddle also told Stimson that Japanese-American citizens could not be singled out as the only American citizens evacuated from any location with the alien Japanese (Biddle, 1962). On February 1, the Departments of War and Justice drafted a release regarding prohibited areas on the West Coast and potential evacuation. Biddle wanted to release a statement declaring, “The Department of War and the Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at this time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race” (Daniels, 1989). McCloy, Assistant Secretary of the Department of War, Provost Marshall General Allen Gullion and Lieutenant Colonel Karl Bendetson, Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs all rejected the statement. It was deleted from the press release (Biddle, 1962).

On February 4, Governor Culbert Olson of California gave a radio address regarding the war. In his address, Governor Olson said that it was believed that it would be easier to determine whether Italian-American or German-American citizens were loyal than it would be for Japanese-American citizens. Governor Olson also stated that measures were being taken to provide for the security of America and said that he was sure that all Japanese would wish to cooperate to show their loyalty towards America (Daniels, 1989).
In America, the Japanese were asked to show their loyalty in early February when the evacuation began. According to Dillon Myer (1971), “the California State Personnel Board issued an order barring from civil service positions all citizens who were descendants of alien enemies. Although it covered all groups, this order was applied only against Japanese Americans” (Myer, 1971, p. 17). Although protests were issued by the ACLU and a San Francisco unit of the American Friends Service Committee, and the state’s attorney general labeled the ban as unconstitutional, the dismissal was carried out (Grodzins, 1949). In addition to the civil service ban, military zones were established. On January 29, the San Francisco waterfront and Los Angeles airport became prohibited areas for all enemy aliens, requiring any aliens living in the vicinity to move by February 19 (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). Additional military zones were established between February 9 and 12 which included nearly all the westerly halves of Oregon and Washington (War Department, 1943). According to Grodzins (1949), on February 13, 1942, the legislators from the Pacific Coast delegations passed their final recommendation requesting mass evacuation. Three days before that recommendation, however, the plans were already begun for an evacuation of the Japanese in the United States. Francis Biddle reported that “On February 11, the President told the War Department to prepare a plan for wholesale evacuation, specifically including citizens” (Biddle, 1962, p. 218).

A recommendation was passed from the Secretary of War to the President that resulted in the first official legislation to affect the Japanese in America. On
February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066. In this order, Roosevelt stated:

I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such actions necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commanders may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with such respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.

Although the order was careful to provide for those affected by any military areas, and required that any action taken include provisions of food, clothing and medical supplies, it was very broadly stated. The possible repercussions of the order could have been even more dramatic. No boundaries were placed upon the Secretary of War in the designation of military areas and the people to restrict therein. In fact, EO 9066 allowed the military to circumvent the constitutional rights of American citizens without the burden of declaring martial law. This order could have been used to deal with German and Italian nationals but was used almost exclusively against the Japanese. The President told Attorney General Francis Biddle that the decision to evacuate must be a military issue, not a constitutional issue (Biddle, 1962). In the weeks after EO 9066 was passed, Congress made no protest against the order. Although politicians from the West Coast states and some southern states were the main advocates of the bill, a majority of the other legislators did not question the sweeping authority given to the military by EO 9066. According
to Grodzins (1949), "The vast majority of national legislators showed complete disinterest" (p. 331).

Although EO 9066 did not specifically name a nationality to be affected by orders of the Secretary of War or a designated military commander, the War Department had a plan in mind. In their 1943 Final Report, the War Department reported that it had suggested to their designated military commander, the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, not to include Italians in the evacuation. In a later report, a classification of all potentially dangerous residents of the West Coast, only the Japanese aliens and Japanese-Americans were chosen for evacuation.

Attacks by Japan on the West Coast fueled the urgency for the military to take action. According to the War Department (1943), "for a period of several weeks following December 7th, substantially every ship leaving a West Coast port was attacked by an enemy submarine" (p. 4). On February 23, 1942, Goleta, California, a town near Santa Barbara, was attacked by an enemy submarine. The attack lasted fifteen minutes but created no extensive damage; there were no deaths and no fires started, the end of a wooden jetty was splintered (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). Goleta was a town with vital oil installations and, according to the War Department, was attacked as the only place where a submarine could have surfaced without being in coast gun range. Brookings, Oregon was also attacked when a plane dropped bombs on, according to the War Department, the only place on the Pacific Coast where an enemy airplane could have eluded aircraft warning
devices. Astoria, Oregon was also attacked in a place the War Department said was the only place a surfaced submarine could have approached undetected. Even though the War Department attributed these attacks to subversive action by Japanese residents on the Pacific Coasts, J. Edgar Hoover denied that the attacks were related to ship-to-shore messages in a report he sent to Attorney General Biddle (Biddle, 1962).

In early February, the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, also called the Tolan Committee, was chosen to conduct a number of hearings in major cities on the West Coast. The hearings were not widely supported, as some who opposed believed, as Congressman A. J. Elliott did "that the trip of the Tolan Committee...is just another useless expenditure of Federal funds" (Grodzins, 1949, p. 328). Most of the witnesses in the hearings favored evacuation (Myers, 1971) but neither side had much effect on the evacuation. The arrangements for the hearings were not completed until February 14 and the first of the Tolan Committee hearings was held on February 21, 1942, two days after EO 9066 was ordered (Grodzins, 1949)

On March 19, the Tolan Committee issued its report to the House. The hearings were held in the four major cities of the West Coast: San Francisco, Portland, Los Angeles, and Seattle. Approximately 150 witnesses spoke before the committee in the four cities. According the preliminary report of March 19, the witnesses included the governors of California and Washington, mayors of all four cities, city managers and police chiefs. Attorney General Warren of California, the
California Joint Immigration Committee, the American Legion of California, the State Federation of Labor, the Native Sons of the Golden West and the California State Grange also testified. The Japanese-American Citizens’ League spoke alongside several church and other groups representing the Japanese, Germans and Italians (Daniels, 1989).

The preliminary report issued by the Tolan Committee included statistics regarding the Japanese and a suggested evacuation policy based on the testimony heard. According the report, of the 126,947 Japanese in the United States, 92.5% lived in restricted military areas. 41,000 of these Japanese were aliens, 71,000 were citizens. The committee reported that “all witnesses before the committee were unanimous in the view that military considerations must be paramount in assessing the need for and the character of evacuation” (Daniels, 1989), and continued by stating that evacuation should not be cruel or violate constitutional guaranties. The report listed several reasons that the witnesses gave for the evacuation of aliens and citizens: homogeneity of the group, potential mob action and disruption of family units. The committee ended its section on evacuation for the Japanese by saying, “A profound sense of certain injustices and constitutional doubts attending the evacuation of the Japanese cannot shake the committee in its belief that no alternative remains” (Daniels, 1989). The committee also discussed the evacuation of German and Italian aliens in the preliminary report. The committee said that nothing had been said about interning second-generation Germans or Italians. In regards to the aliens, the committee said, “Surely some
more workable method exists for determining the loyalty and reliability of these
people than the uprooting of 50 trustworthy persons to remove 1 dangerous
individual” (Daniels, 1989). In fact, in a memorandum of March 31, it was
determined that the 80,000 Italian and German aliens would be dealt with on an
individual basis (Daniels, 1989).

In March, evacuation and internment began in earnest. On March 2,
General DeWitt issued a proclamation that restricted the western half of
California, Washington and Oregon and the southern half of Arizona to Japanese
aliens and Japanese-Americans (Daniels, 1989). General DeWitt mentioned
German and Italian aliens but said that they would not be evacuated until all
Japanese had been moved. This proclamation made it evident to the American
people that the enemy aliens were not the only people in America to be affected by
evacuation. The evacuees, often astonished by the scope of the evacuation, were
only given a few days to take care of their homes, businesses and possessions
(Weglyn, 1976).

Further legislation was added to EO 9066 to extend the likelihood of
internment. On March 11, 1942, President Roosevelt signed another Executive
Order, EO No. 9102, which established the War Relocation Authority (WRA) to
be responsible for the relocation of the evacuees. The WRA was a civilian group,
which helped to diminish the possible martial law aspects of the curfew and
evacuation. On March 11, General DeWitt also created the Wartime Civic Control
Administration or WCCA. The WCCA was an operating agency under DeWitt’s
command designed specifically to plan for the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 (War Department, 1943).

According to Grodzins, around this same time, war department officials began drafting a bill to present before the House and Senate. Because of the possible constitutional issues involving EO 9066, the War Department wanted another law to strengthen the legality of the evacuation. The bill proposed penalties against anyone who violated restrictions imposed by the Secretary of War as allowed by Executive Order 9066. According to Mortin Grodzins (1949), S. 2352 was first introduced before the Senate March 9, 1942 and H.R. 6758 was first introduced before the House March 10, 1942. In a closed session of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, the bill received its fullest consideration. The debates surrounding the bill did not make it clear that the evacuation could include American citizens: “At every point, however, they identified those to be evacuated with (1) enemy aliens incarcerated on suspicion by the Department of Justice; or (2) alien enemies, generally; or, at the very least, (3) ‘dual citizens.’” (Grodzins, 1949, p. 333). The debates in the House did discuss the potential of evacuation of citizens, but there was little criticism against this. On March 17, the House passed H.R. 6758 with one objection by Congressman Michener of Michigan who thought that the bill should be given more thought. Mr. Rich from Pennsylvania assured him that “‘citizens of this country will never be questioned about [being in military zones], as a matter of fact’” (p. 340). This response was incorrect, as
Japanese-American citizens were indeed included on those being evacuated from military areas. Michener made no further comment and no other Members of the House questioned the bill further. S. 2352 went before the Senate on March 19. Much erroneous information was given in the Senate regarding espionage during Pearl Harbor and numbers of aliens on the West Coast (Grodzins, 1949). Again, all the information given was regarding alien Japanese. Two dissenting voices were heard, but the bill was passed. On March 21, President Roosevelt signed Public Law number 503 which made it illegal to ignore the War Department’s decrees.

At first, all Japanese were encouraged to leave Military Area Number One voluntarily. The inland states were hostile and unwilling to accept the migrants and so, after nine thousand Japanese left voluntarily, the Western Defense Command issued Proclamation no. 4 which said that the alien and citizen Japanese would no longer be allowed to leave voluntarily: “Within a few days following March 12, site-selection parties were formed and dispatched to the interior states in the Western Defense Command to seek sites for the development of Relocation Centers” (War Department, 1943, p. 44). On March 19, 1942, General DeWitt sent an order to the Commanding Generals of the Northwest, Northern California, Southern California and the “Southern Land” ordering the evacuation of all Japanese, alien and citizen, from Military Area Number One. The order included some information about where the Japanese were to stay and how they were to be cared for (Daniels, 1989). The US Engineer corps was given from March 20 to April 21 to complete 13 of the 15 evacuation locations.
The first evacuation took place on March 21, 1942, long before the evacuation locations were completed and ready for inhabitants. The first relocation consisted of over two thousand people from Los Angeles to the Manzanar Assembly Center in the Owens Valley of California (War Department, 1943). Although the first evacuation was considered voluntary, on March 29, while the Tolan Committee was holding hearings in Portland, Oregon, the first compulsory evacuation took place. The Japanese from Terminal Island in California were forcibly removed to Manzanar. Terminal Island contained a fishing colony that was in close vicinity to a naval base. There were two thousand Japanese on the island, eight hundred of whom were aliens. The Japanese were given two days to completely vacate the island (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). Thus, by the end of March, the internment of all persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast of the United States was inevitable. Although protests continued to take place, the military and the government had already reached their decisions long before and were not to be moved.

**Audiences**

The Rhetorical Audience

Galen Fisher's rhetorical audience included the members of the House Select Committee on National Defense Migration and the readership of *The Christian Century*. The House Select Committee on National Defense Migration was a group of senators sent to evaluate the alien and Japanese situation on the
West Coast. Congressman John Tolan of Oakland, California was the chairman of the committee and thus the committee was commonly called the Tolan Committee (Myer, 1971). Other members of the committee included John Sparkman of Alabama, Frank Osmers of New Jersey, Carl Curtis of Nebraska, Laurence Arnold of Illinois and George Bender of Ohio (Girdner & Lofts, 1969). The committee was urged to come to the West Coast by Carey McWilliams, the chief of the division of immigration and housing for the California Department of Industrial Relations. James Rowe, assistant to attorney general Biddle, helped arrange the trip to the West Coast (Grodzins, 1949). A majority of the witnesses favored evacuation, according to Dillon Myer (1971) and so Fisher’s anti-internment rhetoric was the minority opinion heard before the committee.

Fisher’s other audience, the readers of *The Christian Century*, was a lay audience unable to enact any real governmental change. *The Christian Century* is a weekly periodical published in Chicago, Illinois and has existed since 1884. It is a highly respected magazine that deals not only with religious issues, but cultural, social and political issues as well. In 1941, the magazine sold 29,177 subscriptions to Christians throughout the United States (Ayers, 1941), some of whom would have been aware of the activity occurring on the West Coast, and some of whom would not. Fisher had written two articles for the magazine prior to World War II (Fisher, 1937; Fisher, 1940). This prior knowledge of the editorial policies of *The Christian Century* would have helped Fisher design an article that was appropriate for the magazine.
As a majority of the Japanese population in America lived on the West Coast, many of Fisher's readers would have been uninformed about the issues facing the Japanese prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. After Pearl Harbor, the information that this population received was largely informed and affected by the facts of the war, as well as by the rumors and misinformation that came with the war. While discussing the evacuation, Dillon Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority for a majority of the war, wrote in 1971, "In many cases, the general public received information confused by scare headlines and trumped-up stories that helped to cover up the facts" (p. xiv). Though the public relied on the news to provide them with correct information on the situation in the West, in many cases that information was skewed. Many government officials also contributed to the misinformation of the American people. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox took a trip to Hawaii in December. Myer (1971) stated that on returning to the U.S., Knox "made a most unfortunate statement to reporters when he said 'the most effective fifth column of the entire war was done in Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway'" (p. 16). This statement was extremely damaging, especially as there was no fifth column activity carried out by Hawaiian residents.

The majority of the general public's information originated from politicians and journalists from California, where the largest concentrated population of Japanese lived. According to Dillon Myer, the anti-Japanese sentiment had been building steadily since the beginning of the century (Myer, 1971). Grodzins found that "Japanese animosity was a regional force of great potency, sufficient on the
national level to set the immigration policy of the nation” (p. 15-16). The anti-Japanese sentiment was deeply rooted in the minds of the residents of the Pacific states. Grodzins maintained that for over forty years the dislike and distrust had been building in these states and after the war it spread to the other states. Since most of the states of the nation did not have any Japanese living in them, the legislators of those states allowed the biases of the politicians from the Pacific Coast dictate legislation regarding the Japanese.

Of the over 110,000 evacuees, seventy thousand were Nisei. Most of the other evacuees, although technically aliens, had lived in the United States for twenty to forty years. For many, the sole reason that they were not citizens was because citizenship was not an option for them. In 1790, the United States passed a law stating that only free whites could become naturalized citizens. Despite the law, many Japanese people continued to come to America. According to Dillon Myer, Alameda County in California and Sacramento, California were the locations of the two first colonies in America in the 1860s. The Japanese came to help work on farms and at the time were welcomed by the Californian farmers as replacements for the Chinese workers. The sentiment in California at the time was that anti-Chinese and Japanese workers were regarded as “a more docile and obedient lot” (Grodzins, 1949, p. 3) than the Chinese. The new Japanese workers were not willing to merely work for others, however, and, according to Myer (1971), their ambition and desire to better themselves resulted in hostile feelings and anti-Japanese legislation.
In *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*, Grodzins (1949) details several laws passed in California targeted towards Asian immigrants. The first such law, passed in 1906, was designed to segregate “oriental” students from all other students. When it became clear that this law caused some anger in Japan, the United States Government stepped in and reached a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Japan. This agreement forced San Francisco to de-segregate their schools in exchange for a promise of limited immigration from Japan. In 1907, California again targeted its immigrants with the California Alien Land Law, which prohibited aliens from owning agricultural land. This law produced a setback for those Japanese who wanted to work for themselves and not for the European-American residents of the state. This law was occasionally circumvented when the American-born children of aliens were listed as the owners of land.

Unless Japanese workers were able to buy land through their children, they had little chance of getting ahead. Yuri Kochiyama was nineteen years old when she and her family were evacuated. Even before the war began, Kochiyama had difficulty finding a job. She stated that she never felt the results of racism while in school but the work world was different. It was very rare for Issei or Nisei to get jobs in white companies: “Most Japanese were either in some aspect of fishing, such as in the canneries, or went right from school to work on the farms” (Kochiyama, 1995, p. 190). This separation between the Japanese and the European-Americans helped to spread anti-Japanese sentiment.
All Japanese were widely considered to be non-Americans. In several newspaper editorials or other articles from the World War II era, Gina Petonito (2000) found an “Us and Them” discourse. She noted that in many editorials dealing with race, the author would inevitably discuss the non-European race as “them” or “they” and the audience of the article was always assumed to be European-American, which was shown through the use of “us” and “we.” This separation of “real Americans” with other races contributed to the feelings that the Japanese were not loyal to America and would betray America during the war. Non-white Americans identified their races in the letters to the editor, further extending this separation. Petonito observed that the non-white writers did not object to this separation but contributed to their own “non-American” status.

Before the war began, the majority of the American people did not exhibit strong feelings against the Japanese. Several polls were taken in the period before the war, although some of those polls showed anti-Japanese sentiment, most showed that the Japanese people were not the most significant problem for most Americans. A 1938 Roper poll asked towards which foreigners did the American people feel the least friendly. A majority of the respondents (30%) answered German people; Japanese people were second with 20% (Roper Organization, 1938). The next year, however, the Gallup Organization (1939) asked, what the most important problem was for Americans. Although the “Japanese problem” was included in the possible answers, it received no votes. Later in 1939, the Roper Organization conducted two polls, one asked what nationality made the worst
citizens and the other asked what group, in general, represented an important problem. The Japanese people were not a significant problem for the majority of the respondents. Only two percent felt that the Japanese made the worst citizens and that the Japanese were the most problematic group.

Even after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, many Americans showed no aversion towards the Japanese. In December, 1941, soon after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the National Opinion Research Center conducted a poll asking which group of enemy aliens was least loyal to the United States: Germans, Italians, Japanese or “other”. The Japanese came in third with 25% of the vote. In January 1942, the Gallup Organization took the final poll before the internment regarding the Japanese. They asked whether the Japanese people or the Japanese government were the main enemy of America. 64% of the respondents felt it was not the people, but the government, of the remaining respondents, 13% felt it was the people, and 15% felt it was both the government and the people. In a confidential report of the Office of Facts of Figures, a March, 1942 poll showed that only one-half of Americans outside Southern California favored internment of Japanese aliens and only 14% were in favor of internment of Japanese-American citizens (Biddle, 1962). These polls do not show an attitude of hostility towards the Japanese. This seeming tolerance may have contributed to the eventual evacuation of the Japanese.

In California, there were several groups that considered themselves friends of the Japanese who strongly believed in the rights of the Nisei. The tolerance
shown towards the Japanese in the first weeks after Pearl Harbor lowered the defenses of the advocates for the Japanese and so, when demands for mass evacuations surfaced, the advocates were unprepared to help defend the Japanese. According to Grodzins (1949), in the weeks after Pearl Harbor, there were only three instances of the Japanese minority being mentioned in Congress. These three were from Congressmen Gearhart and Voorhis from California and Congressman Coffee from Washington. Each of these comments was positive and indicated no desire for internment. Senator Sheridan Downey of California and Mayor Harry P. Cain of Tacoma, Washington also were publicly supportive of the Japanese (Biddle, 1962). Grodzins believes that because of positive reactions from Americans in these first few weeks after Pearl Harbor, “significant protests over the mass treatment of Japanese were made only after evacuation became public policy” (p. 19).

Although several groups fought for the rights of the Japanese, many more actively fought for Japanese evacuation. According to Grodzins (1949), the major opponents of the Japanese residents were agricultural and business groups, The American Legion, the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, the California Joint Immigration Committee and some chambers of commerce. Besides these major groups, many others demonstrated antipathy towards the Japanese. In California and Oregon, several labor unions and clubs actively opposed the residency of the Japanese. The Lions, Elks and the Supreme Pyramid of Sciots passed resolutions opposing the Japanese. The United Spanish War
Veterans, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Disabled American Veterans of the World War and the Military Order of the Purple Heart all supported mass evacuation (Grodzins, 1949). 1942 was an election year in California and, according to Bosworth (1967), many political groups made clear their anti-Japanese sentiment. Citizen groups often voiced their opinions regarding the evacuation of the Japanese from their towns. The members of the Orange Cove Civilian Defense Council of Orange Cove, California drafted a resolution on March 16, 1942 stating that “this is no time for namby-pamby pussyfooting, fear of hurting the feelings of our enemies.... It is not the time for consideration of purported minute constitutional rights of those enemies” (Daniels, 1989). The actions taken by these groups contributed to the mass feelings of the American people against all Japanese.

Some of the anti-Japanese sentiment was due to rumors passed by the anti-Japanese groups, as well as by the media. Myer (1971) states two of the most widely believed rumors concerning the Japanese. The first was in regards to their total population. Most people believed that the Japanese population much greater that the true figure and that Japanese-Americans would soon outnumber European-Americans in California. In actuality, a 1940 census showed that the total number of people of Japanese blood in the United States was 126,947 (Bosworth, 1967, p. 35). Another rumor was that the Japanese birth rate was significantly higher than the birth rate of other Americans. In actuality, the birth rate was merely a fraction higher than the rest of California. Although these rumors were untrue, Californian
officials did nothing to prove these rumors wrong. Instead, they contributed to the
rumors by issuing "badly juggled statistics" (Myer, 1971, p. 13) to the public. In
the War Department's 1943 report, there were lists of contraband seized from the
Japanese: 60,000 rounds of ammunition, rifles, shotguns and more. Francis Biddle
(1962), former Attorney General, reported that of that contraband, one truckload
came from a sporting goods store and more came from the warehouse of a general
store. The other contraband seized included flashlights, firecrackers and road
maps, common items in any family's home.

The news media from California was especially important in producing a
false impression of the Japanese to the general uninformed public. Grodzins
reports that Mr. V.S. McClatchy was not only the publisher of the Sacramento
Bee, but also was spokesman of the Oriental Exclusion League of California, a
group seeking exclusion of all Japanese (Grodzins, 1949). McClatchy died in
1938, but before his death published many anti-Japanese articles in his newspaper.
William Randolph Hearst also owned several papers in California, including the
San Francisco Examiner. His publications and the Los Angeles Times, "kept up a
drumfire of editorials, columns, and slanted news stories that...caused the public
generally to become fearful and emotional regarding the alleged dangers in their
midst" (Myer, 1971, p. 15).

Grodzins' (1949) analysis of the Californian sentiment against the Japanese
showed that the media were effective in flaming the anti-Japanese feeling. He
analyzed five metropolitan newspapers in California from January 8 to March 8 to
determine their content regarding the Japanese. He found that in those two months, less than seven percent of the newspaper that was allotted to stories regarding the Japanese were positive news stories, whereas nearly sixty percent was dedicated to unfavorable news stories regarding the Japanese. Grodzins also analyzed letters sent to the justice department between December 8, 1941 and September, 1942. Of the letters regarding evacuation of the Japanese, 262 were opposed and 890 approved. Although America as a whole may have felt that the Japanese in America were not a great threat, California was leaning heavily in the other direction.

Fisher, as an advocate for the Japanese, was aware of the lack of knowledge that existed in the general public. While he, along with the other advocates, was unprepared for the evacuation order, he did attempt to give his audience the truth about the situation on the West Coast. His argument in April, 1942 was designed to inform the public of the truth of who the Japanese were.

The Issei and Nisei

In 1940, there were nearly 113,000 people of Japanese ancestry living in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington. Of them, 41,000 were aliens, or Issei (War Department, 1943). The Issei came to America, as many immigrants have, to earn a better living for themselves and their families. The Issei tried to mingle in America, but in most cases were rejected by European-Americans. Like other aliens, they became clannish when their overtures of friendship were rejected.
(Girdner & Loftis, 1969). Grodzins (1949) suggests that the forced separation, caused by rejection from European-Americans, set Japanese-Americans apart from the rest of America.

Not all Japanese families retained their Japanese heritage and customs. Many showed their loyalty to their new country over their old. The family of Amy Uno Ishii, an internee, was completely American. Although dual citizenship was common for Nisei, Ishii stated, "In our family there was no such thing as dual citizenship... My father and mother said, 'We're Americans. We came to America... We hope to die here, not in Japan'" (Hansen, 1991, p. 51). George Fukasawa, another internee, had a similar experience. He said that his parents never thought of returning to Japan. "They came over here with the express purpose of making their fortune here and raising their children. They wanted to visit their home country, of course, and they made several trips back there, but they considered America as their home and their children as Americans. So that's the attitude that we were brought up with" (Hansen, 1991, p. 224).

The Japanese were known for being hard-working. 45% of employed Japanese on the West Coast worked in the agricultural industry, 23% were in the wholesale and retail trade, 17% were in personal service and 4% were in manufacturing (War Department, 1943). According to the National Defense Migration Preliminary Report of March 19, 1942, Japanese truck farmers produced 42% of the truck crops in California. In Los Angeles, 20% of employed Japanese
worked in retail or wholesale with 75% of the Los Angeles fruit and vegetable business. (Daniels, 1989)

Although the War Department (1943) indicated that a majority of Japanese, Nisei and Issei, were known to be disloyal to America, the evidence indicates otherwise. Despite rumors of fifth column activity, "not one case of any act of espionage or sabotage by any Japanese American was ever reported, either on the mainland or in Hawaii" (Myer, 1971, p. xiv). The Nisei, like most second generation Americans, felt very American and rejected the land of their parent's birth (Kochiyama, 1995). Their loyalty was a part of their life even though they felt the discrimination against them. Many volunteered for military service and most accepted evacuation with little question. Despite the forced segregation in the work world and discrimination in other areas of life, Yuri Kochiyama (1995) said that she considered herself to be very American. When Kochiyama's mother would refer to her as Japanese, Kochiyama would argue that she was not Japanese, she was American. Kochiyama did not even use the term "Japanese-American"; the fact was simply that she was an American. At the time, she admits feeling ashamed of her parent's homeland. Her loyalty was for her homeland, the United States.

Mike Masaoka, then secretary of the Japanese American Citizens' League, wrote a Japanese American creed in 1940. The creed was published in the Congressional Record May 9, 1941 and, according to Bosworth (1967), sustained many Nisei through the evacuation and the war. In the creed, Masaoka wrote:
I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very background makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this Nation... Although some individuals may discriminate against me, I shall never become bitter or lose faith, for I know that such persons are not representative of the American people... I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of fair play will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and achievement, and not on the basis of physical characteristics... I pledge myself to do honor to her at all times and all places; to support her constitution; to obey her laws; to respect her flag; to defend her against all enemies, foreign and domestic; to actively assume my duties and obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and without any reservations whatsoever, in the hope that I may become a better American in a greater America (Bosworth, 1967, 50-51).

Kibei were also often considered to be disloyal to America. According to Bosworth (1967), the Kibei were Nisei who received at least three years of schooling in Japan. Some Kibei, upon returning to the United States exhibited a preference for Japan and distaste for America and its Caucasian majority. Whether or not the Kibei liked living in the United States or not, they tended to have more problems on their return to America. According to Michi Weglyn (1976), the Kibei were ostracized by the Caucasian-Americans and the Nisei, who appeared to be too "Japanesey" for them. Sue Kunitomi Embrey (Hansen, 1991), a Nisei evacuee said that the Kibei were considered odd. According to her, they did not make the adjustment between living in Japan and America well. Not all Kibei were disloyal, however, and several showed their patriotism to the country of their birth during World War II.

Nisei and Kibei soldiers were an integral part of the U. S. military. Sue Kunitomi Embrey (Hansen, 1991), told of one Kibei she knew who used his bilingual skills in U. S. military intelligence. Bosworth related an incident in India
during World War II in which a Kibei named Kenny Yasui proved his patriotism toward the United States. Yasui used his knowledge of the Japanese language to pose as a Japanese colonel. He ordered sixteen Japanese soldiers to stack their weapons and follow him. They obeyed and were captured when Yasui brought them to US headquarters. Kochiyama’s (1995) male classmates all volunteered for the military. Many other young Nisei joined the military, fought and died for their country. The 442nd in Germany was a division made up entirely of Nisei and was the most highly decorated division in the war. Although the 442nd was a small regiment, it suffered almost 9,500 casualties during the war in Europe and received more than 18,000 individual decorations. According to Allan Bosworth (1967), the Army’s estimates of casualties for the 442nd was “314 percent of the unit’s original strength” (p. 15). Bosworth estimated that 33,000 Japanese-Americans served in World War II and were divided equally between Europe and the Pacific.

The Japanese who stayed home to face internment also continued to show their loyalty to America. The Japanese-American Citizens’ League, or JACL, was formed in 1937 and in the early months of the war was dedicated to demonstrating the loyalty of Japanese-American citizens (Grodzins, 1949). According to Grodzins, the JACL organized fundraisers for the military, organized Red Cross drives and offered suggestions for helping to determine the loyalty of the Japanese in America. The JACL also organized a large meeting of Japanese-American organizations to brainstorm alternatives to evacuation. The Los Angeles meeting was, unfortunately, too late as it was done on February 19, the very evening that
the president signed Executive Order 9066. The JACL declared themselves spokespeople for the Japanese-Americans and assured the government that they would comply with any order that arose from military need (Grodzins, 1949).

Many Japanese tried to show their loyalty by acting in a way that would help the government. Fred Wada, an Oakland man, led a group of ninety Japanese to Utah to begin a farming community. They purchased 3800 acres for two dollars an acre and worked sixteen to eighteen hours per day (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). Many Japanese sent recommendations to the government for ways that internment could be avoided. On February 20, 1942, Hi Korematsu wrote as a representative of the Proponent Committee for Evacuated Alien Resettlement Program, a committee whose European-American members included Galen Fisher. His recommendation was that the Japanese aliens be sent to work in a co-op to produce food to help America rather than use the funds that would be necessary to run the internment camps (Daniels, 1989). On March 17, 1942, Arthur Shiwo wrote a letter proposing a similar plan. He proposed that the government allow Japanese to form an organization with 60% farmers, 20% merchants and 20% miscellaneous help (Daniels, 1989). T. G. Ishimaru wrote on March 18, 1942 concerned about whether he should continue to farm his crops or whether this would be useless. “Nothing is more discouraging than being indefinite,” Ishimaru wrote. “Our facilities are at your disposal toward the best interest of the government and nation” (Daniels, 1989). Many other letters from Japanese-Americans showed that
they felt that evacuation was inevitable and they wanted to do whatever they could to help.

Kochiyama said that despite the internment of herself and her family, she felt no anger towards America. “I didn’t feel the anger that much because I thought maybe this was the way we could show our love for our country” (Kochiyama, 1995, p. 192). Michi Weglyn (1976) felt that by quietly allowing the government to intern herself and the other 110,000 Japanese, they might somehow make up for the treachery of Pearl Harbor, even though they had not been responsible for it.

Not all Japanese-Americans were ready to comply with the government, however. Upon learning of the evacuation, two Issei chose to commit suicide rather than face evacuation (Grodzins, 1949). One man with a physical deformity hung himself rather than subject his daughter to any ridicule she might receive in the close quarters of the camps because of his deformity. He felt that if he were no longer alive, her chance at getting friends and potentially getting married would be much greater. The other Issei, Hideo Murata, shot himself in the head. He was found holding an Honorary Citizenship Certificate that he had received after World War I, in honor of his service to the United States.

Three Japanese-Americans rebelled against military orders and went to court to fight the injustice they felt against them. George Hirabayashi was one of the first Japanese-Americans to fight against the limitation of rights. As a native-born American, he ignored the March 21, 1942 act that proclaimed enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry to be subject to a curfew (Axford, 1986). In
May 1942, his case was appealed to the Supreme Court and lost. In an interview with Roger Axford, Hirabayashi said that he chose to go to jail rather than to the internment camps. Shortly after Hirabayashi’s trial, Mitsuye Endo filed for a writ of habeas corpus to release her from the WRA center. The court dismissed the case because she had neglected to apply for leave and therefore had not “exhausted her administrative remedies” (Dembitz, 1994, p. 47). Fred Korematsu also was arrested and convicted for refusing to leave a restricted military area. He appealed the case and the Supreme Court concurred with the military in that the evacuation was militarily necessary and, although they recognized the necessity of considering whether race was a factor, dismissed the case as groundless (Takahata, 1994).

For the most part, the Issei and Nisei proved to be loyal Americans. Whether they showed a willingness to cooperate with military orders or rebelled in their desire to be treated as citizens, they showed that they were truly Americans. Fisher, with his extensive experience with Japanese in Japan and in America, was well acquainted with the loyalty and American feeling that the Japanese possessed. His knowledge of their desires and his involvement in their plans would help him as he attempted to represent them to the readers of The Christian Century and the members of the Tolan Committee.
Galen Fisher

Galen Merriam Fisher III was born in Oakland, California April 12, 1873. According to Krauss and Alexander (1984), his grandfather moved to Oakland from Hawaii, where his great-grandparents had been missionaries and his great-uncle founded the Grove Farm Plantation. The Grove Farm Plantation was one of many plantations in Hawaii that hired Japanese workers in 1885 after an agreement was reached between the Japanese and Hawaiian governments. Fisher’s great-uncle, George Wilcox, was known for his decent treatment of his workers, including his refusal to whip them, despite the acceptance of this practice throughout Hawaii.

Fisher, a life-long bachelor, was a well-educated man, although he did not receive all the education he desired. He received his Bachelor’s degree from the University of California at Berkeley and received his M. A. from Harvard University. During his time in Berkeley, Fisher became President of Stiles Hall, a building that is affiliated with the YMCA. The YMCA was an important organization for Fisher throughout his life. In 1897, he was asked by John R. Mott to accept the position of Secretary of the International Committee of the YMCA in Tokyo, Japan. Despite his desire to continue his education and begin a career in Christian ministry, Fisher accepted the position and worked for the YMCA in Japan from 1897 to 1919. While there, he served as the secretary of the Committee on Christian literature. In 1908, Fisher accepted the request to edit the sixth issue of The Christian Movement in Japan with Ernest W. Clement. In this book, Fisher
wrote an article on Christian literature in Japan and translated several passages written by Japanese writers. Fisher also attended and wrote on The Three Religions Conference in Tokyo in 1912, the first conference to include traditional Japanese religions, Buddhism and Shintoism, with the relative newcomer, Christianity.

Upon returning from Japan, Fisher took the position of Secretary of the Rockefeller Institute of Social and Religious Research, where he worked from 1921 until 1934. In 1929, Fisher wrote an article for the *American Journal of Sociology* regarding current research projects in the sociology of religion. He also continued to focus on the Far East in his work at the Institute. In May, 1924 he wrote two articles regarding Japan. The first appeared in the *Missionary Review of the World*, regarding the Japanese Christian leadership in Japan. The second article, published for *The Survey*, was a response to the Immigration Bill, H.R. 7995 which stated “An immigrant not eligible to citizenship shall not be admitted to the United States unless such immigrant is a non-quota immigrant” (quoted in Fisher, 1924b). According to Fisher, this law would apply to all Japanese except students, diplomats and illegal aliens and he believed that it completely nullified the 1908 “Gentleman’s Agreement” between the United States and Japan. Although Fisher insisted that he would not take a position on the controversy surrounding this bill, he did lay out several problems with the bill that might sever the relationship between the United States and Japan.
In late 1930, the Institute sent a group of researchers to China, India and Japan as part of the Appraisal Commission of the Laymen’s Foreign Missions Inquiry, a two-year investigation of the Far East. Fisher also wrote two books during his time at the Rockefeller Institute, which emphasized the passions of his life: education, Japan and Christianity. In 1928, he demonstrated his interest in education when he co-wrote *Undergraduates: A Study of Morale in Twenty-Three American Colleges and Universities* with Richard Edwards and Joseph Artman. Fisher also showed his continuing interest in Japan and the Japanese people when he wrote *Creative Forces in Japan* in 1923, which described the people of Japan, their militaristic tendencies, social problems, religious resources and the Christian Movement at work in the nation. Even at this early date, before rumors of war were widespread, Fisher wrote about problems in the relationship between the United States and Japan.

Tension between the United States and Japan was caused by the immigration of the Japanese people to California, according to Fisher. His book, *Creative Forces in Japan*, described different reasons for that tension. Japan’s dense population and limited land contributed to the increase of immigration to California, a state with the same land area as Japan but with one-sixteenth the number of people. As the Japanese came to America, many people from California developed what Fisher called the “California point of view” (p. 60). Fisher believed that the physical, social, religious and political differences between Caucasians and Japanese led to Californians believing that the Japanese were
unassimilable into American society. He stated that Californians often believed that the Japanese who had moved to America would fight against America in case of war with Japan. The Californians also believed that the Japanese efficiency and willingness to work long hours were taking jobs away from Americans and that the Japanese tendency to thriftiness and proclivity to procreate rapidly would lead to the Japanese people owning a large portion of California. Many Californians preferred the Chinese residents of the state because they seemed more humble, while “the Japanese know they are as good as the white man and want to be treated accordingly” (Fisher, 1923, p. 61).

Fisher believed that a combination of the “California point of view” and governmental legislation was creating a rift between the Japanese and non-Japanese residents of California. He described the situation as “dangerously near a rupture” (p. 62), but felt that there were ways to prevent further discord. One step he advocated was further limiting immigration of laborers and Japanese brides. Another suggestion was to “do everything possible to Americanize [the Japanese]” (p. 63). He felt that the Japanese would be as easily Americanized as the South Europeans were and that the keys to the Americanization were language and religion. With these steps toward mending the developing rift, Fisher believed that the relationship between Japan and America could be healed.

After his retirement from the Rockefeller Institute, Fisher remained active in various groups about which he was passionate. He directed studies at Springfield College, the Pacific School of Religion and the Southern California
Conference of Congregational Christian Churches. He was a trustee of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a member of the International and National committees of the YMCA and was a research associate in the Political Science Department at the University of California at Berkeley (Anderson). In the months before World War II began, Fisher and General David P. Barrows organized the Committee on American Principles and Fair Play. They felt that this committee would help “stem the then-rising tide of anti-Japanese agitation which threatened to lead to mob violence and curtailment of constitutional liberties” (Fisher, 1955, p. 30). Fisher served as the Executive Secretary of the committee for the first year. He also aided people in other parts of California who desired to start their own Fair Play Committees. In a letter to Rev. John M. Yamasaki, Fisher explained that it would be best to have non-Japanese citizens be members of and spokespeople for the committee. Such membership would help give the committee a higher amount of credibility.

Fisher’s writing continued in this period before the war. In 1937, he wrote about a meeting he had in Japan with Mr. Kagawa, a member of the Japanese Diet and leader of several experimental farms and cooperatives in Japan. Fisher co-wrote the eighth volume of *The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* in 1938 with Dr. Hugh Borton. He produced a chapter on Kumazawa Banzan, a Japanese scholar of the seventeenth century, and translated an article by Banzan. He also wrote journal articles about Japan. He wrote “The Revolution in East Asia” for *The Christian Century* in 1938 and “Understanding and
misunderstanding Japan” for the *Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science* in 1941.

During World War II, much of Fisher’s time and energy was spent aiding the Issei and Nisei. Besides being one of the founders of the Northern California Fair Play committee, Fisher was also vice chairman of the Western Area Protestant Church Commission for Wartime Japanese Service (Myer, 1971), and a member of the West Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play (Myer, 1971). As early as late December of 1941, Fisher began researching and writing about the role of the Issei and Nisei during the attack on Pearl Harbor when he wrote an unpublished study: *Japanese in Northern California Since the War Began*. In February, 1942, Fisher argued before the Tolan Committee. His argument was an attempt to provide alternatives to the sweeping evacuations, which seemed inevitable at the time. On February 20, 1942, Hi Korematsu, the Proponent Chairman of the Committee on Alien Resettlement, wrote a letter and presented a cooperative farm plan to Carl Taeusch of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Washington, D.C. Fisher was the first person listed on the proposed advisory committee for the cooperative farms (Daniels, 1989). Fisher wrote eight articles for *The Christian Century* in regards to the Japanese evacuation. The first article, in April, 1942, was written at the request of Charles Clayton Morrison, the editor of *The Christian Century* (Hansen, 1942) and a member of the ACLU National Committee (Daniels, 1989). The article was published prior to mass evacuation and was a response to wide-spread rumors regarding the actions of the Japanese
during the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Fisher also contributed to *A Touchstone of Democracy*, a pamphlet that was published by the Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches. His article, “The Drama of Japanese Evacuation,” provided details of the events that led to the evacuation and relocation of the Japanese and described the enemy of the Japanese as “Public Hostility” (p. 31).

In 1942, the Issei and Nisei were evacuated, or interned, to various locations on the Pacific coast. Fisher felt that the internment “was due in large part to the anti-Japanese hysteria that swept over the mass of white residents” (Fisher, 1955, p. 28). He continued his research and defense of the Japanese despite the fact that he felt that “any group which dared to help the evacuees or defend their unquestionable constitutional rights had to face public suspicion and criticism” (p. 28). In July, 1942, Fisher made a trip to the East Coast to further his research on the internment. On his trip, Fisher met with War Relocation Authority chiefs, a Congressional Representative, members of a council of churches, editors and lawyers (Fisher, 1942d). He also visited Keetley Colony, a farming community in Utah led by a Japanese man from Oakland. This community was made up of close to 5,000 Issei and Nisei who had left the Bay Area before the forced evacuation (Nichols, 1995). Fisher had helped Mr. Wada, the colony organizer, to plan the organization of the colony in February 1942 (Fisher, 1943b). He wrote an article regarding the community in 1943, “Japanese Colony: Success Story,” for *Survey Graphics*. In August and September of 1943, Fisher wrote a series of four articles
regarding the Japanese-Americans. These articles were in response to the evacuation and anti-Japanese sentiment that was still spreading throughout the country.

Fisher worked closely with the Japanese people during their internment. In 1943 he visited the highly volatile internment camp, Tule Lake. Tule Lake was populated with Japanese who were openly resistant to the American government and who indicated a desire to leave America rather than be subjected to the life they found in the camps. While there, Fisher spent time with ministers, school teachers and Caucasian staff members to help understand the spiritual, educational and physical needs of the internees of Tule Lake (Fisher, 1943a). He also spent time helping Japanese students receive scholarships and assisting others who were dealing with legal issues. Fisher corresponded with the military and attended meetings for other groups interested in the plight of the Nisei and Issei. He wrote narrative accounts of the feelings of Caucasians towards the Japanese and of the Japanese towards Caucasians, both stories labeled as “overheard” conversations. In 1944, Fisher wrote another article for The Christian Century describing changing feelings about the Japanese-Americans as the war was continuing. He indicated a need for a plan to help the Japanese return easily and comfortably to the West Coast.

After the war, Fisher continued to dedicate himself to education, Christianity and the Japanese people. In August, 1945, he made a statement to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization regarding citizenship rights
for Japanese people who served on governmental agencies during the war and for parents of those who fought in the war. In late 1945, he also wrote his final article for *The Christian Century*, "Justice for the Evacuees." Fisher also continued to work at Pacific School of Religion, acting as Trustee and Interim President and helping the school search for two presidents. Harland Hogue, author of *Christian Seeds in Western Soil* described his contribution to the school as second only to the school's first president, John Knox McLean.

Fisher received several accolades to honor the work he had done throughout his life. In 1945, he received an honorary Doctor of Divinity from Pacific School of Religion. In 1950, the Emperor of Japan presented Fisher with the award of the Third Order of Merit of the Order of the Sacred Treasure. In 1952, he received the Churchmanship award from the Congregational Christian Churches. In 1953, the Rotary Club of Berkeley conferred upon Fisher the Benjamin Ide Wheeler award, which honored him as Berkeley's most outstanding and useful citizen (Anderson, n.d.).

Fisher continued writing until the end of his life. In 1952, he wrote a biography of John R. Mott, the man who asked him to work for the YMCA in Japan in 1897. In 1954, Fisher began work on his final book, *Citadel of Democracy*. This book gave a history of Stiles Hall, the YMCA building he had been a part of in his undergraduate years at University of California at Berkeley. Fisher died on January 2, 1955, shortly before this book was published.
This study of Galen Fisher's anti-internment rhetoric provides beneficial insight into other-directed protest. Fisher's life reflected a passion for the Japanese people. When they were threatened with being unjustly removed from their homes, he naturally felt the need to fight for them. Fisher was one of a small number of European-Americans willing to fight for the rights of the Japanese-American people, and was one of the most prolific writers on the situation. Without his work in supporting the Japanese, many people may not have known the significance of the event. That fact makes him an important figure in the study in the moral protest of the Japanese internment. The internment, in turn, is an important event for the study of other-directed protest. This unique period in America's history shows a definitive distinction between two sides of an issue: pro-internment and anti-internment protestors. That Executive Order 9066, the presidential order that led to the internment, was later revoked and deemed unconstitutional and reparation payments were made to victims shows that the internment was an event that called for protest. Through a study of the time leading to internment, and specifically Fisher's rhetoric, new insights may be made into the subject of other-directed protest.

1 Bendetson would be promoted three days later to lieutenant colonel, the youngest colonel at the time. (trumanlibrary.org)

2 In 1976, President Gerald Ford revoked the order; claiming evacuation was wrong and unconstitutional (Daniels, 1994).
Tolan Committee Testimony Interpretation

On February 21, 1942, Galen Fisher began his defense of the Japanese in America. Several events had taken place in America which foreshadowed the coming internment of all Japanese, regardless of citizenship: Pearl Harbor, Canada’s internment, the California State Personnel Board’s firing of Japanese workers and the signing of Executive Order 9066 (EO 9066). In early 1942, Carey McWilliams, the California Commissioner of Immigration and Housing, urged the House Select Committee on National Defense Migration, also known as the Tolan Committee, to come to the West Coast to investigate problems related to discrimination against the Japanese. The Tolan Committee, which had been organized under House Resolution 113, was initially designed to “inquire further into the Interstate migration of citizens, emphasizing the present and potential consequences of the migration caused by the national defense programs” (Daniels, 1989). John Tolan of California and four other members of Congress held hearings in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle and Portland, Oregon (Grodzins, 1949).

Many different groups argued before the Tolan Committee in February, 1942. The Tolan Committee’s preliminary report stated that “the committee took testimony from all interested groups who signified a desire to be heard and from public officials, Federal, State, and local, who were qualified to throw light on problems connected with evacuation.” (Daniels, 1989). Grodzins further explained that “the Tolan Committee witnesses were a highly selected group. In every case
the statements were prepared; almost every witness was a responsible community leader” (p. 412-13). Those leaders included governors, mayors, attorneys-general, chiefs of police, members of the American Legion and other agricultural organization, publishers, members of the ACLU and religious organizations. 135 people testified before the committee and of those, 20 were Japanese-American and 10 of those were from San Francisco. The Japanese-Americans were members of the Japanese-American Citizens’ League, magazine editors, members of church groups and other citizens whose credentials were not listed.

The Tolan Committee hearings were held with several objectives in mind. The primary objective of the hearings, according to the committee’s March, 1942 preliminary report, was to discover “problems of evacuation of citizens and aliens from military areas” and “so that local communities could voice their attitudes toward the developing problem.” (Daniels, 1989). McWilliams and Rowe’s purposes for the committee were to “let the people ‘blow off steam,’ expose the self-interest of those urging evacuation, and permit opponents of the movement an opportunity to be heard” (Grodzins, 1949, p. 254). As Girdner and Loftis (1969) put the point, “The Army, the Navy, the Department of Agriculture, and the Justice Department requested that the committee... be ‘a sounding board for facts, figures and fears on the ground where Japanese invasion of the continent is expected first’” (p. 107).

Galen Fisher presented testimony before the committee on February 21, 1942. His testimony consisted of five sections – one oral and four written
statements – two of which were definitely written by Fisher. The written
statements were delivered together to the Tolan Committee and were referred to
during the oral statement. The remaining two statements were signed by or
attributed to other members of the Fair Play Committee. Fisher’s three statements
– the two written statements with the oral statement – worked together to show
Fisher’s concern for the Japanese and his hope that mass evacuation could be
avoided. The first statement was a pragmatic argument outlining the unnecessary,
impractical and risky nature of mass evacuation. The second statement continued
the first by showing how evacuation, which he seemed to consider unavoidable,
should be handled. In the oral statement, he answered questions posed to him by
Mr. Tolan regarding his written statement. Unfortunately, the timing of the
hearings negated any effect Fisher’s rhetoric would have had on his audience:
“The committee did not complete arrangements for its western trip until February
14 and did not conduct its first hearing in San Francisco until February 20.
Evacuation had become a certainty before the Tolan Committee heard a single
witness” (Grodzins, 1949, p. 254).

First Written Statement

The organization of Fisher’s first written statement to the Tolan Committee
was based on a deductive argument, or an enthymeme. An enthymeme, according
to Aristotle (trans. 1985), is the strongest of the proofs and is more likely to excite
a favorable reaction from the audience than other types of reasoning. Enthymemes
are “drawn from few premises and often less than those of the primary syllogism; for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies it” (p. 42).¹

The enthymeme Fisher used in the first written statement framed the majority of the statement and provided the persuasive foundation for the argument. The enthymeme stated that since America’s aim was to win the war and maintain national security, mass internment was a threat to that aim, America should be opposed to mass internment. Fisher used his opening paragraph to support the first premise: America’s aim was national security. His only evidence to support it was EO 9066: the President’s proclamation. Fisher’s aim in this statement was to show that interning the Japanese would not be beneficial to aid America in winning the war; on the contrary, it would hinder that aim. The audience – the Tolan Committee – would have been well aware of the passage of EO 9066 days earlier and, further, would have agreed that winning the war was the primary aim of America. By using premises that were acceptable to the audience, Fisher increased his chances of persuading the audience to accept his claim: the Japanese should not be interned.

Fisher (1942a)² defended his second premise – mass internment was a threat to winning the war and achieving national security – in the rest of the introduction and throughout a majority of this written statement. He said removing people, regardless of race, should only take place after investigation had shown them “to be dangerous or decidedly suspicious” (p. 11199). Fisher here began his
claim that not all Japanese were guilty. However, he was not suggesting that only those who were tried and convicted should be evacuated. He approved of evacuating those who were "decidedly suspicious" (p. 11199). This concession may have been dangerous on his part, as many people of the time would have said that all Japanese in America were suspicious. The concession was necessary, however, for his audience. They would not have accepted a plea to not intern any Japanese\(^3\) and therefore Fisher chose to support his premise with an acknowledgment of treacherous Japanese. He would spend time in his defense showing that not all Japanese were treacherous, however, thereby reducing the risk of his concession.

Fisher continued his written statement with the defense of his second premise: internment is a threat to winning the war and maintaining national security. He organized the statement in ten numbered points. While he did not organize the points in this order, two of his them focused on why mass evacuation was impractical, four of the points showed why it would be unnecessary and another four showed the risk of mass evacuation. Not all the points directly defended the second premise but indirectly worked to bolster those that did support it. By arguing that mass internment was not practical or necessary, the argument that it was bad for the country was given added weight.

In the first two points, Fisher argued that the removal of all Japanese was impractical. The first point stated that "the huge numbers involved make sweeping evacuation impracticable" (p. 11199). The "huge numbers" to which Fisher was
referring included not only the 90,000 Japanese in California, but the "much larger numbers of Germans and Italians" (p. 11199). Generally, Fisher did not mention Germans or Italians in regard to the internment; he mentioned each group only once more in the Tolan testimony, and not at all in "Our Japanese Refugees." Even here, he described the huge numbers as the 90,000 Japanese, and added as a kind of second thought "not to mention...the Germans and Italians" (p. 11199). Fisher correctly was assuming that the Japanese would be the main target for evacuation, and therefore it was them he was trying to defend.

Throughout Fisher's testimony and into his Christian Century article, he often mentioned people who may have been well-known at the time and with whom he was closely associated. This form of name-dropping may have been an attempt by Fisher to increase his credibility or ethos. The first person Fisher mentioned in the first written statement was Richard Neustadt. Neustadt had testified regarding the impracticability of sweeping evacuation earlier in the day, thus the committee would have been familiar with his testimony. Fisher's reference to Neustadt was also important because Neustadt was the regional director of the Federal Security Agency (Girdner and Loftis, 1969). He worked with the military and "agreed to place all of the facilities of the organizations under his direction at the disposal of the Wartime Civil Control Administration" (War Department, 1943). By using a credible and respected source in his testimony, Fisher was able to increase the credibility of his message.
Fisher's second argument on the practicality of mass internment, and the second numbered point of statement, was that there had been a lack of planning. Fisher stated that the Government had "no definite plans" (p. 11199) for evacuation. Fisher made this statement very definitively, as if he knew the workings of the government in regards to internment. Fisher then mentioned the farm cooperative plan again, which he described as "the most specific plan I have heard of" (p. 11199). This statement is less definitive, there may have been other plans conceived at that point that he was not aware of. There were two problems with that plan, according to Fisher. The first was the huge government loans that would be required to support the rural Japanese. The other problem with the cooperative farm plan, according to Fisher, was that this plan would only "accommodate the 50,000 rural Japanese resident population" (p. 11199), and could not account for the city-dwelling Japanese who were "unsuited to agriculture" (p. 11199). By rejecting this plan and stating the government had no other plan, Fisher provided his audience with the final reason that evacuation was not practical.

Fisher's third point began his discussion that mass internment was unnecessary. According to Fisher, over 60,000 of the Japanese in California were Nisei. Fisher stated that "very few [Nisei] are dangerous, if we may judge by the fact that during December only 2 or 3 of them were detained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation" (p. 11199). He then stated that he had "not heard of many more being detained since then" (p. 11199). These two statements suggest that
Fisher felt the FBI was doing their job. Those who had been detained were generally released as well (Grodzins, 1949). The solution to the problem of disloyal Nisei could be solved easily, Fisher said, by interning those found to be dangerous, "without disturbing the large majority" (p. 11199). As only two or three had been detained, and no arrests had been made, the large majority, and maybe the entire class of Nisei were loyal to America. Fisher did not spend any time here discussing the Constitutional issues involved in evacuating citizens. His point here was not that it was wrong to evacuate the Nisei, but that they were not dangerous and so evacuation was not necessary.

While Fisher had shown, in his third point, that the Nisei were not a threat, his fifth point added to his argument that mass evacuation was unnecessary by showing that the Issei were the most likely candidates as fifth columnists. Any "organized and extensive fifth column activity...would presumably have to be led by experienced alien Japanese" (p. 11199). The danger, then, would have been not only an organized sabotage, but one which was far-reaching. A single person who was loyal to Japan would not have been necessarily sufficient to prove to be a risk. The risk must be "extensive" (p. 11199). Evacuating all Issei would not be necessary, however, because "most of the natural leaders" (p. 11199) had been detained in the days after Pearl Harbor. According to Grodzins (1949), on December 7th, the day Pearl Harbor was bombed, 736 Japanese nationals had been arrested and by February 16th, 2,192 had been arrested. Those who were arrested were the "natural leaders" Fisher described. They were people whom the Justice
Department had been watching for a year and a half. Fisher stated that any other leaders could easily be detained without evacuating all Japanese. This is very similar to Fisher's third point regarding the Nisei, but it is different in a very important sense: citizenship versus residency. While some of his audience may have accepted that American citizens should not be interned, the Issei, as non-citizens, would not have the same rights. The government was well within their Constitutional rights to intern the Issei. Fisher's defense of the majority of the Issei attempted to avoid internment because it was not necessary rather than because the government had no right to do so.

Fisher's third reason that mass internment was unnecessary was his eighth numbered point. There, he said that the Japanese were as loyal at the time he gave the testimony as when Governor Olson and other publicists praised them for their loyalty and civic devotion in the governor's statement a few weeks earlier. Fisher then asked, "Has the set-back given to the Allied arms by the military machine of Japan made our political leaders...turn against our Japanese citizens as scapegoats for the remote culprits" (p. 11199)? The setbacks Fisher referred to included the fall of Wake Island, Guam and Manila, Philippines. These three defeats, along with others, lowered the morale of the military and America in general. By calling the Japanese military a machine, Fisher depersonalized it and emphasized the orderliness and mechanical aspects. The metaphor "scapegoats" (p. 11199) refers to one group being sacrificed in the place of a guilty group. The reference is a common religious notion. Originally the scapegoat, in the Old Testament, was a
goat that was chosen as a representation of evil spirits and then released to rid the
Jewish people of those spirits (Moody Press, 1962). The scapegoats in this
instance were the Japanese in America and the evil spirits were the “remote
culprits” (p. 11199): the Japanese army. The setbacks that the military experienced
in their battles with the Japanese machine made punishing America’s real enemy
more difficult. Fisher’s question was a warning for Governor Olson and the
American government to avoid picking on the easy, but innocent, target: the
Japanese in America.

Fisher added to this section by describing the character of the Japanese-
Americans and showing indirectly how interning them would be unnecessary. He
said that their “most marked traits are loyalty and gratitude” (11199). Governor
Olson and others had praised the Japanese as loyal and civilly devoted. Here
Fisher described them as loyal, but changed civic devotion to gratitude. He may
have wanted to emphasize gratitude to show that if the Japanese were not
evacuated, they would show gratitude to the nation by an increase in loyalty.
Fisher did admit to some exceptions to those who were loyal and grateful. “The
exceptions are likely to be found chiefly among the Kibei” (p. 11199). The Kibei
were Nisei who were sent to Japan during their youth. Among the Kibei, Fisher
felt that those who had gone to Japan before they finished grammar and high
school were the highest risk. According to the War Department (1943),

“the 557 male Japanese less than twenty-five years of age who
entered West Coast ports from Japan during 1941 had an average
of 18.2 years and had spent an average of 5.2 years in Japan. Of
these, 239 had spent more than three years there. This latter group spent an average of 10.2 years in Japan” (p. 14).

According to Fisher, the Kibei consisted of less than a quarter of the Nisei.

According to tenBroek, Barnhart and Matson (1954) less than ten thousand of the 72,000 Nisei had actually spent time in Japan. This exception to Fisher’s argument on the loyalty of the Nisei did not weaken his argument. The relatively low numbers of Kibei made the point important to mention, but did not negate Fisher’s main point: evacuation of all Japanese, regardless of their past and situation, was unwise.

Fisher’s ninth point provided the final evidence that mass internment was unnecessary. The Japanese American Citizens’ League (JACL) had done a great service to the nation, according to Fisher. The League was made up of citizen Japanese and Fisher felt that it could “be of great value in maintaining their undivided loyalty to the United States” (p. 11200). Fisher emphasized the loyalty the Nisei had towards the United States. Their loyalty was “undivided” (p. 11200) and therefore they would be of no danger; they had no loyalty to Japan.  

Fisher’s argument that sweeping evacuation would be a danger to the country began in his fourth numbered point. He said that internment would hinder the war efforts because of the Japanese-Americans who were currently serving in the military. “To evacuate their families, or even their alien parents alone, would impair their morale and breed disaffection among the whole body of Japanese-American citizens” (p. 11199). Fisher also warned that even evacuation of the
Issei would cause “disaffection,” if they were parents of soldiers. Fisher was
asserting that the loyalty the Nisei had for America, as shown by the many Nisei
entering the military, would potentially cease if parents were evacuated. The
affection for America would be gone for all Nisei, not just the military. The
“whole body of Japanese-American citizens” (p. 11199) would suffer from
evacuation of the parents of a subgroup. This argument was an appeal to the
military. Fisher said that keeping the morale of the Japanese-American soldiers
high was desirable for “military efficiency” (p. 11199). The distraction of the Nisei
soldiers was counter to military effectiveness and thus national security would be
at risk.

Fisher’s sixth point added to his claim that internment would be a risk to
the war effort and national security. He stated that treating the Japanese Americans
harshly would provide the Japanese government with “the finest sort of
propaganda” (p. 11199). The quote had no referent listed, but it was attributed to
the Japanese military rulers who said that they were “the protectors and deliverers
of the colored races of Asia from the arrogant and race-biased white nations” (p.
11199). By using the word “finest” (p. 11199), Fisher stated that interning a group
on the basis of their race was the best way for leaders in Japan to spread the
sentiment that they were protecting the rest of the world from America. Fisher
stated that this would be similar to the propaganda used by the Nazis in America’s
treatment of African-Americans.
Fisher ended his sixth point with a conditional enthymeme: "If we violate in any degree the equal rights of our fellow citizens of Japanese stock, we mock our pretensions of fighting to defend democracy" (p. 11199). The verb "violate" (p. 11199) suggests not only the breaking of a law, but is also contains connotations of rape and violence. Fisher was against violation "in any degree" (p. 11199) of American rights. This statement left no room for exceptions to the rules. He also described the Japanese as "our fellow citizens of Japanese stock" (p. 11199). The Japanese were thus not a completely separate group, but were also American citizens from a different lineage. Fisher concluded the statement by saying we "mock our pretensions" (p. 11199). Violating the rights of any citizen, therefore, showed the world that the stated purposes of the war were lies. Fisher argued that the war was a fight to "defend democracy" (p. 11199) and not just a defensive war. Interning the Japanese indiscriminately would therefore mean that the entire war, with Germany as well as Japan, would become a mockery and that America's aim of a victory for democracy would be useless.

Fisher's seventh point alluded to post-war consequences of mass internment. He began by saying that as America was confident of winning the war, any threat to national security by the Japanese would be a threat during that time only. Thus, the problem would come after peacetime, once the Japanese started to filter back into American life. Fisher used the enthymeme: "If...we isolate [the Japanese] and give them cause to resent unnecessary discrimination imposed during the war, then they will not fit smoothly into our national life, but will
present another acute race problem” (p. 11199). Here, Fisher called evacuation “unnecessary discrimination” (p. 11199). This phrase suggests that there would possibly be discrimination that was necessary, but also states that evacuation was discrimination. The necessary discrimination may have been the arrests of the Issei leaders, the suspicious Nisei and the Kibei. Those specific groups could reasonably be interned. Fisher’s argument was that a general evacuation, without any reasoned and justified determination of those most likely to be fifth columnists, was not necessary. The justification that was made for evacuating the Japanese boiled down to a matter of discrimination and nothing else. The result of that discrimination would be “another acute race problem” (p. 11199). The United States had race problems with the African Americans at that time. This new problem would also be severe.

The final reason Fisher gave for not evacuating the Japanese was the lack of evidence of any fifth column activity. This point showed not only that mass internment was unnecessary, but also that it would hurt America. He said that the FBI had found “little evidence pointing to fifth-column activity...although they have been hunting hard to find it” (p. 11200). If the FBI was working hard to find evidence of treachery and found little evidence, interning the entire Japanese population would not be necessary. Fisher also said that “a high military authority” told him that “he took no stock in the alarmist predictions that fifth-columnists in California were only waiting for the ides of March” (p. 11200). Fisher may have been referring metaphorically to the predictions of some officials, especially
California Attorney General Warren, that no sabotage had been found because the Japanese were waiting for a later date (Grodzins, 1949). These predictions were "alarmist" because they were designed to provoke fear, but as the anonymous military authority indicated, they were based on no evidence.

While the FBI had found no evidence of anti-American conspiracy, the media and uninformed officials fed the fears of citizens by providing "evidence" that sabotage was happening. After explaining the lack of evidence of fifth-column activity, Fisher expressed hope that a "panicky public will not try to stampede our military and judicial authorities into evacuating thousands or tens of thousands of people" (p. 11200) Fisher here suggested that the citizens were potentially out of control. This lack of control had the possibility of stampeding the government and military, and therefore causing those groups to be even more out of control. If evacuation occurred because of a "panicky public" (p. 11200), the result would inevitably be chaotic and would go against the nation's goal of winning the war and achieving national security. Indeed, one of the reasons for internment was because of the government's fears that a "panicky public" might harm the Japanese (War Department, 1943). Fisher's warning was an attempt to reduce this potential harm.

Fisher finished this section by providing another, more suspect, group on which the government and military should focus their attentions. He warned of the "greater menace in the form of Nazi partisans in our midst" (p. 11200) that may have been overlooked. This a fortiori argument contended that the Nazis were a
greater menace because, while Japanese spies could be easily spotted because of their different features, the German or Italian spies would not look different than any other white American. In fact, according to Grodzins (1949),

present data reveal only one (minor) conviction of a Japanese alien in the United States for having unauthorized relations with the Japanese government. In June, 1942, a Japanese alien was sentenced to prison for a term of two to six months for having failed to register properly under terms of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Pacific Citizen, June 11, 1942). (p. 137 note).

Fisher's warning, therefore, was well founded for while there were no Japanese spies arrested, Nazi spies had been. Among those arrested for espionage was Fritz Duquesne and twenty-three of his cohorts. They were arrested in June 1941, ten plead guilty and fourteen were convicted in December 1941 (Ronnie, 1995).

At the end of the statement, Fisher provided a list of people and groups with whom he associated. This list would have served to further Fisher's credibility in the eyes of the Tolan Committee. The people Fisher chose to put on list of credentials were from most aspects of life. The first was his brother, Ralph T. Fisher. Ralph Fisher was a member of the Northern California Committee on Fair Play and Fisher described him as being of the American Trust Company.

President Ray Lyman Wilbur and President Robert G. Sproul, chairman and vice chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations, were mentioned. Dr. Henry F. Grady, Gen. David P. Barrows, Alfred J. Lundberg, F. J. Koster and Maurice Harrison were mentioned as fellow members of the Committee on National Security and Fair Play along with Presidents Wilbur and Sproul. By listing these names, Fisher added to his ethos.
The objective of the Tolan Committee was to hear facts, figures and fears regarding the problems of evacuation. Fisher's first written statement presented that information to show that mass evacuation should be avoided. The categorical enthymeme went a step further, as well. He not only presented evidence regarding the situation with the Japanese on the West Coast, but also sought to present evidence to benefit America as a whole during the war. To do this, Fisher presented an argument that covered the issues of the necessity, practicality and risk of evacuation and backed those arguments with evidence he received from the government and from his personal experience. By presenting a pragmatic, factual argument, Fisher avoided most of the emotional appeals he would use in his second section.

Second Written Statement

Although Fisher submitted the second statement to the Tolan Committee at the same time as the first, there were several differences. The first difference was in the audience: whereas his first written statement was clearly directed at those who had the power to evacuate or not evacuate, his second statement was directed at those in power as well as at private citizens. That the statement included suggestions for citizens could mean Fisher intended to use this statement in a different situation. The statement actually was used later by Henry Grady in a press release from the Fair Play Committee (Grodzins, 1949).
The focus of the second statement is different than the first and seems to be a postscript to the first statement. His focus changed from giving reasons not to evacuate to making suggestions for the way that the government should handle the evacuation. In the second paragraph of the second written statement, Fisher noted that he was glad that the military and government desired “constructive, nonpartisan criticisms and suggestions” (p. 11203). Fisher here focused on giving the military and government the kind of suggestions they had requested. He attempted to assist the government in winning the war by giving suggestions for what to do if some kind of evacuation were to happen. His attempt to be nonpartisan may be evident in his approval of the government action to that point in time, while warning about the consequences of future action. Fisher also did not hesitate to offer criticism, however it was not aimed at the government or military, but at the civilians.

Fisher started his second written statement by putting his audience at ease. He claimed that the Fair Play Committee welcomed Executive Order 9066, which he described as “the President’s proclamation of February 20, placing all residents in vital military areas under the control of the Secretary of War” (pp. 11202-3). Fisher likely did not realize at this time the full extent of the order: “to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commanders may determine” (Roosevelt, 1942, p. 1). Proclamation No. 1, which ordered all Japanese out of Military Area No. 1, had not yet been ordered when Fisher presented this statement; it would be ordered two weeks later. In his
confusion regarding the extent of power allotted in EO 9066, Fisher wrote that the "extreme gravity of the situation justifies this drastic step. And as Californians, no less than as American citizens, we accept it as a wise solution" (p. 11203). Fisher also praised the military and the government for allowing Freedom of Speech and being willing to listen to suggestions and criticism. Fisher used that willingness to offer four suggestions to the Tolan Committee and to his "fellow citizens" (p. 11203): (1) put civilian authorities in charge of evacuees, (2) keep evacuation to a minimum, (3) let local governments cooperate with the federal government and (4) care for the evacuees. Fisher's statement was initially delivered to the Tolan Committee and not citizen groups.

The first suggestion Fisher gave was that any care of evacuated people be put under the care of a civilian governmental agency. Fisher wanted care of anyone evacuated to be in the hands of "civilian governmental agencies experienced in matters of social welfare" (p. 11203). Fisher understood, even before the problems of the hasty evacuation had started, the problems that would be included in moving a large number of people. At this point, Fisher likely believed that the evacuation simply meant the Japanese would voluntarily move to a different part of the country; the evacuation that had already taken place was a voluntary move and no internment camps were involved. Nevertheless, the social problems Fisher was trying to solve were likely similar to the actual problems in moving the Japanese. According to Girdner and Loftis (1969), there were many problems as a result of the mismanaged evacuation. Many Japanese returned to
their home towns to find their houses were occupied, looted or even, in one case, completely moved. Business owners suffered from mismanagement or lawsuits from those who had cared for the businesses to now take ownership. Storage facilities were often found vacant or looted and, if everything was fine upon return, the internees faced the remainders of discrimination. If a civilian governmental agency had taken care of the movement of the Japanese before they were moved, those problems would not have been as rampant.

The second suggestion Fisher gave was that “removal of aliens and citizens be kept at the minimum consistent with military necessity and national security” (p. 11203). Fisher did not, therefore, exclude citizens completely from evacuation. Since he said in the beginning of the article that the government had asked for nonpartisan suggestions, Fisher may have mentioned citizens to make his suggestions nonpartisan. Rather than focusing on the extreme position that no Japanese-Americans should be evacuated, Fisher tempered his argument by including the citizens as well as the aliens of Japanese origin. The removal of citizens and aliens, though, was to be only when necessary militarily or for national security purposes. The other reasons given for internment were vigilantism and race riots, public morale and sabotage (Grodzins, 1949). The only reason that would be acceptable to Fisher, according to his second suggestion, would be sabotage.

To add incentive to this suggestion, Fisher’s first reason for keeping removal to a minimum was an appeal to country’s need for food. He said that
uprooting Japanese and Italian alien farmers “obviously would reduce production of the food essential to winning the war” (p. 11203). Fisher mentioned Italian and Japanese aliens in this suggestion. This is the second of two references Fisher made to Italian aliens’ possible inclusion in evacuation. This point would have fit nicely with Fisher’s ten reasons that evacuation would hinder national security, from his first written statement, and was actually one which lawmakers had taken seriously. On February 6, the Committee on Alien Nationality andSabotage listened to testimony from the Department of Agriculture on the possible problems of removing farmers from the West Coast. It was determined that between 30-35% of the production of vegetables were produced by Japanese farmers. California represented more that 25% of the produce in the United States at that time (Grodzins, 1949). The Western Grower’s Protective Agency and other farming interest groups claimed that the majority of Japanese crops were specialty crops but, in fact, 60% of California’s tomato crops were controlled by Japanese farmers.

The second reason to keep evacuation to a minimum was an appeal to the fear of the audience. Fisher warned that mass evacuation might “convert predominately loyal or harmless citizens into desperate fifth columnists” (p. 11203). Fisher implied here that the citizens were at the time loyal and harmless and the evacuation would have changed them into fifth columnists. He also qualified his statement by saying the citizens were “predominately loyal or harmless” (p. 11203). That there were not possibly disloyal citizens was never Fisher’s claim. He merely wanted the evacuation to include those who may have
been disloyal. Others should be allowed to be free. That the citizens were “loyal or harmless [italics mine]” (p. 11203) shows that even some who may not have been completely loyal to the United States may not have wanted to act against it. The result of this indiscriminate evacuation would be the creation of “desperate fifth columnists” (p. 11203). The word desperate adds urgency to the problem of their potential disloyalty. They would no longer have hope and therefore would be an added danger to America.

Fisher’s third suggestion took the form of a statement of fact: “the problem of providing permanent homes... cannot be solved by Government agencies without the cooperation of local officials and private citizens” (p. 11203). The problem would be finding permanent homes for the evacuees. Here Fisher appeared to be under the impression that those who would be relocated could find homes. Fisher’s first written statement, however, referred to isolating the Japanese. Fisher may have been covering all his bases by arguing the problems with interning the Japanese and the problems with getting homes for them. In reality, finding homes was not a problem since the evacuation included internment. To find homes for all the potential relocated Japanese, the federal Government would need help from the local government and private citizens. To provide evidence for this point, Fisher gave an example of 9,000 people who had left their homes already. Fisher reported that most had only been able to find temporary homes: those Japanese who lived in the community were warned not to welcome the Japanese refugees.
Fisher's last suggestion was framed by three possibilities to care for evacuees: allow them to settle themselves, set up work projects for them or support them, completely. Fisher appeared to favor the first possibility, because he spent the rest of the paragraph showing how the government and citizens could make it work. The second possibility, setting up work projects, was already discussed in his first statement regarding the cooperative farm plan. Fisher had already rejected it because of the loans, and hence expenses, needed. He may have felt it unnecessary to spend time in this statement discussing subjects he had already refuted. Fisher did not discuss the third option – supporting the Japanese – in this article. As he had already rejected the cooperative farm plan because of the expenses, complete support, with its increased expense, may have seemed more unacceptable and therefore unproductive to discuss.

For the first possibility to work so the evacuees could work and support themselves, the new communities would have to allow them to settle. To convince his audience to allow the evacuees to settle in their communities, Fisher said it might seem like he was "demanding a heavy sacrifice, but without various kinds of sacrifice we cannot hope to win the war" (p. 11203). He also called it "one of the inescapable sacrifices" (p. 11203). The descriptions of sacrifice used here were "heavy" and "inescapable" (p. 11203) and he used the word sacrifice three times. Fisher's emphasis of a heavy and inescapable sacrifice was appropriate in the time of war. The sacrifice he mentioned was not the standard sacrifice expected during time of war, which would have been going to fight or die. The sacrifice he wanted
from them was for them to assist their fellow citizens: the Japanese. That sacrifice, according to Fisher, would have to be done by citizens “if [they] mean it when [they] glibly agree to bear any necessary hardship” (p. 11203). Fisher challenged his audience to accept their part in the burden of war. He told them that “perhaps communities… will have to accept this as one of the inescapable sacrifices” (p. 11203). While citizens may not have understood the full effect of war when it started months earlier, Fisher claimed that it was time for them to take war seriously. For Fisher, this meant accepting the Japanese into their communities.

Fisher continued his statement with more patriotic urgings. He told his audience that “the integrity of our nation and all the liberties guaranteed by it are at stake” (p. 11203). Fisher’s forceful point was that mass evacuation of the Japanese would damage the foundational principles of America. Not only would it hurt in the time of war, as the other assertions he made suggested, but he implied that it could permanently harm America’s integrity and liberties. Fisher continued this appeal by telling citizens that “only the Government should call the signals…. [and] set up no impediments in the way of the military and other Federal authorities, and to place [themselves] at their command” (p. 11203). The communities that had “resented” (p. 11203) Japanese coming to live amongst them to the point that fellow Japanese were “warned not to harbor them” (p. 11203) were not allowing the government and military to do their job. This warning is similar to Fisher’s hope, in the first written statement, that “a panicky public will not try to stampede” the government and military into hasty decisions. In both
statements, the public is described as a powerful force, able to hinder the
government's decisions. Fisher described the war as "a life-and-death struggle to
preserve our hard-won democratic heritage" (p. 11203). The citizens of the nation,
then, were responsible for maintaining the integrity of the nation. To do this, the
government and military needed to be in control and citizens needed to stay out of
their way. Although these statements appear to be aimed at private citizens, they
also work to appeal to his main audience: the Tolan Committee. By stating that the
Government should be in charge and citizens should follow their lead, Fisher
connected with the members of government who would read his statement.

Fisher described the war as "a life-and-death struggle to preserve our hard-
won democratic heritage" (p. 11203). This description recalled the wars that had
been fought to that point, an appropriate description for the time. Fisher then stated
"we should be traitors if we flouted democratic principles of justice and humanity
in our treatment of either aliens or citizens, even under the stress of war" (11203).
The very thing that the Japanese were being accused of – treachery – would be true
of those who initiated indiscriminate evacuation. The treachery would be true, as
well, even with the time of war, with the stress involved in battling another nation.

Fisher ended his statement with an appeal "to maintain order under law and
the respect for persons summed up in the words 'fair play'" (p. 11203). The appeal
was for "official representatives, municipal county, State, and nation, and to our
fellow citizens of whatever origin" (p. 11203). The appeal was not only for those
sitting in the Tolan hearings, but was for officials and citizens throughout the
United States. It made evident the fact that Fisher was writing this statement as a representative of the Fair Play Committee.

Fisher’s second written statement, added to the previous statement, covered the predominant issues of the advocates of the Japanese: limited evacuation and care for evacuees. Whereas he praised the government and military for the actions they had taken to that point, he also warned them to continue taking action in the most effective way. He again warned against a mass evacuation but broadened his message to include provisions necessary for those who would be evacuated. The inclusion of warnings for citizens in this statement broadened the audience to involve more than just the five men sitting on the committee. Both parts of the audience were warned to treat the Japanese in the most human way possible. If Fisher’s audience did not heed his warning, they would become traitors themselves.

**Oral Statement**

The oral statement Fisher made before the Tolan Committee was not a structured speech; Fisher discussed each topic as an answer to a question posed to him by Congressman Tolan, the chairman of the committee. The questions were all related to parts of the written statements he submitted to the committee. His manner of addressing each question suggested which one he was most interested in discussing at this point of the testimony. Without showing any disrespect for the committee or downplaying the importance of the questions, Fisher briefly
answered the questions related to the cooperative farm project designed by graduates of agriculture and the Institute of Pacific Relations. He answered the third question, regarding his opinion on public feeling for the Japanese, in greater detail. While Fisher did not spend much time presenting his oral statement, by physically testifying before the committee was able to clarify points in his written statements and, more importantly, show his physical support for the Japanese.

The first question posed to Fisher was “Has your organization any suggestions for settling or supervising evacuees?” Fisher mentioned the cooperative farming plan proposed by Hi Korematsu, which he said State and Federal agricultural authorities had approved. He then said, “I will not here recount its details” (p. 11197). Fisher included some information about the proposal in his written statements, but not in any detail. His answer showed his unwillingness to focus on the plan for his testimony. Fisher may have been reluctant to discuss the Korematsu farm plan in the oral statement because his first written statement included the same information. The chairman asked for the plan to be submitted as an exhibit, which Fisher agreed to do. In the Tolan Committee records, however, the plan was not included with the statements of Fisher, but was included with the testimony of Mayor Frank Gaines of Berkeley, California.

Later in the oral statement, the chairman revisited the plan. He mentioned Fisher’s written statement, which stated that many Japanese would not be suited to farm work. Fisher provided more specific details to add to his first written statement which said that “many city dwellers” (p. 11199) would be unsuitable to
agriculture. He briefly explained here that "a considerable minority would not" (p. 11198) be suited to farm work. By this, Fisher went on to explain, "I should guess that about one-half of the Japanese are city dwellers, and that means one-fourth of the total Japanese population in [California]" (p. 11198), would not be suited to farming. Fisher's figures were fairly accurate. The War Department (1943) estimated that in 1940, of the 40,374 workers in California over the age of 14, 47% worked in agriculture. 23% worked in wholesale and retail trade, which included produce stands. Of the rest, some may have grown up on farms or otherwise were familiar with agriculture and could therefore adjust to farming life.

When the chairman of the Tolan Committee questioned Fisher about his relationship to the Institute of Pacific Relations,¹¹ Fisher explained the Institute. The Institute of Pacific Relations was "an international body comprising eleven national groups -- Great Britain, Canada, United States, China, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and, [at the time] inactively, France, the Netherlands and Russia" (p. 11198). Although Fisher ended his answer after listing the countries involved, the chairman led Fisher to continue by saying, "Yes" (p. 11198). In the second part of his explanation, Fisher mentioned more specifics of the Institute: studies and conferences based on political, social and economic problems of countries in the Pacific Ocean. Fisher also mentioned President Wilbur of Stanford.¹² The chairman led Fisher again to continue his testimony by saying, "Yes" (p. 11198). At that time, Fisher emphasized that he was "not speaking for that body" (p. 11198). By downplaying his role in the Institute of
Pacific Relations, Fisher may have been trying to focus attention on the credibility of his words, rather than his relationships. The Congressman did not further press the subject, and continued with his next question.

Congressman Tolan's final question was whether Fisher wanted to express any opinion regarding public opinion of the Issei. In this section, Fisher referred to Mr. Neustadt, Mr. Clark and others who had testified to the committee that resettling such a large group as the Japanese, Germans and Italians would be practically impossible. Although Fisher was hesitant to use the Institute of Pacific Relations as a means to gain credibility, he here used two of the testifiers – Mr. Neustadt for a second time and Mr. Clark for the first time – to increase the acceptability of his argument. Fisher's willingness to discuss Neustadt's testimony about the impracticability of removing a large number of people, despite its appearance in the written testimony, shows that this information was an important issue. He may have felt it was a strong point for backing up his argument and therefore was willing to spend more time discussing it.

Fisher also replied to this question by stating that public opinion had been "whipped up by interested parties who are not thinking primarily of the national security..." (p. 11198) but of personal interests. By saying that public opinion was "whipped up" (p. 11198) Fisher described public opinion, at that time, as heightened by insubstantial evidence. The people who had influenced public opinion at the time were described as "interested parties" (p. 11198). Here Fisher introduced the idea that some people had something to gain by the internment.
Although Fisher did not spend much time placing blame on guilty parties in his Tolan statements, he did discuss how civilians, the military and the government were potentially to blame for any action taken against the Japanese. In the next sentence, however, he said he would not blame others who were sincere, but may not have thought through all the implications of a sweeping evacuation of the Japanese.

Fisher’s testimony in the Tolan Committee hearings was his first protest against the Japanese evacuation. His job, according to the objectives of the committee, was to voice his opinions regarding the situation. Each of the statements he presented before the committee worked together to show that, while he was most concerned with upholding American principles and needs during the war, indiscriminate evacuation of Japanese aliens and citizens would be wrong. The pragmatic emphasis of his first written statement provided facts and figures to assist this message while providing some arguments from principle: evacuating innocent people would turn Americans into bullies and mock our pretense of fighting for democracy. Fisher’s second statement added to his argument by including citizens in the audience and asking for fair treatment during any evacuation. The oral statement summarized both written statements and provided a European-American face to the argument, which gave it a different emphasis than the arguments made by the Japanese-Americans who were presenting testimony. The three arguments, Fisher’s opinions regarding the situation, showed that
indiscriminate evacuation would be immoral, unwise and dangerous and that even
discriminate evacuation must be well-planned and fair.

1 Textbooks of the twentieth century, according to Bitzer (1959), use Aristotle’s
definition to state that enthymemes are syllogisms that lack a premise or
conclusion. While this may be true in many cases, Bitzer believes that the
definition is far from adequate. Enthymemes are different from syllogisms
because, while syllogisms use premises which are obtained in direct question and
answer between the speaker and audience in order to achieve criticism, rhetors
must develop enthymemes using premises that the audience would supply if they
had been asked in a direct question and answer session. The enthymeme, which is
designed to be persuasive, would not persuade if the premises were not what the
audience would have chosen themselves. Jeffrey Walker (1994) further describes
enthymemes using works by the classical rhetors Anaximenes and Isocrates.
According to Walker, Isocrates described the enthymeme as a stylistic device.
Anaximenes wrote, in Rhetoric to Alexander, that the enthymeme was a
contradiction to an opposition’s point; a concise statement to draw conclusions
which showed the rhetor’s stance and motivated the audience to accept that stance.
Walker concludes that in contemporary society, since rhetors are not trained in
argumentation and enthymemes, use of them are more accidental than purposeful.
2 This is the primary text for this chapter. All future references to the Tolan
Committee hearing will be noted with page number only.
3 The overwhelming majority of pro-evacuation arguments before the Tolan
Committee by prominent members of the community suggests that Americans
were determined to intern at least a portion of the Japanese (Grodzins, 1949).
4 Neustadt favored selective evacuation and eliminating from evacuation those
who had proven their loyalty to investigators and those who had children in the
military (Bosworth, 1967).
5 According to the War Department (1943), the total cost of the evacuation, as of
November 30, 1942 was $88,679,716.69. Of that money, nearly $11 million was
for construction of the assembly centers and more than $56 million was for
construction of the relocation centers. Those figures do not account for personnel
involved in the planning of the internment. A portion of that money could easily
have been given, as a loan, to the Japanese to develop a farm to accommodate a
large number of those who were, instead, interned.
6 “‘The Alien Enemy Act of 1798, in time of war, renders ‘all natives, citizens,
denizens or subjects of the hostile nation...within the United States...liable to be
apprehended, restrained and removed as alien enemies’” (tenBroek, Barnhart and
7 Governor Olson originally “paid tribute to the loyalty of the nation’s minorities
and pleaded that fairness be shown them” (Grodzins, 1949, p. 19) and had been the
chairman of the Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and
Aliens of Japanese Ancestry, according to Michi Weglyn (1976). Olson abandoned his tolerance towards the Japanese in January. He declared “that he was opposed to evacuation but would recommend it to the federal government unless the Japanese showed they were 100 per cent behind the country” (Girdner and Loftis, 1969, 25).

According to Grodzins (1949), the JACL would support internment if it was a true military necessity, but not if it was a mask to cover racism. Grodzins also noted that “though officials of the Citizens League denied the existence of disunity within the Japanese American community, that community was widely split by the evacuation crisis” (200). The main source of disunity was the JACL’s position on internment.

Fisher correctly assumed that the Japanese-Americans in the military would not be evacuated. Many Japanese were in the military, although those in the Western Defense Command, were either transferred or discharged (Girdner and Loftis, 1969). Many more wanted to join as soon as Pearl Harbor started, and even those who were eventually evacuated tried to enlist.

Sproul graduated in 1913 from the University of California at Berkeley with his friend, Earl Warren. He spent 44 years with Berkeley, 28 of which he was the President. He became President of the university in 1930 (Atkinson, 1999).

The Institute of Pacific Relations was directly concerned with the Japanese internment. Following the internment, the Institute used R. D. McKenzie to study the effects of exclusion on the Japanese (Girdner and Loftis, 1969).

Wilbur led the Institute for seventeen years and at the time of Fisher’s testimony, was the international chairman. Wilbur was also one of the founding original members of the Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Aliens of Japanese Ancestry (Girdner and Loftis, 1969, 25). He was another active proponent of the Japanese citizens. On March 21, 1942, Wilber sent a letter to General DeWitt stating “Whenever and wherever the constitutional guarantees are violated in the treatment of a minority, no matter how unpopular or helpless, the whole fabric of American government is weakened...The test of America is the security of its minority groups” (126).

Tom Clark was in charge of the antitrust office on the West Coast. In February, 1942, Attorney General Biddle assigned him “to co-ordinate the work of enemy alien control with the Army and other agencies on the West Coast (Biddle, 1962, 216). Biddle wrote that he later regretted his choice of Clark. Clark had been expected to present the more moderate views of the Attorney General’s office to the army, but instead worked to please the army. He was quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle as saying that he would not recommend any action other than what the military felt was necessary (Grodzins, 1949). Girdner and Loftis (1962) reported that on February 10th Clark wrote to his colleagues that evacuation would not be necessary but six days later joined Bendetson in recommending removal of “all persons deemed inimical to the defense efforts” (29). Clark was also in charge of the removal of the German, Italian and Japanese aliens from the San
Francisco waterfront and the Los Angeles airport area in February, 1942 (Girdner and Loftis, 1969).
"Our Japanese Refugees" Interpretation

Galen Fisher’s *Christian Century* article, “Our Japanese Refugees,” was published thirty-seven days after his Tolan Committee hearing. Not only was the available evidence different, but Fisher’s focus had changed. Fisher used his article to direct praise and blame on several different groups: the military, the government, civilians and the Japanese. In the seven sections of his article, Fisher presented a description of the wrong done to the Japanese, a case for who was to be blamed for the injustice and a way the audience could avoid any blame. In this way, Fisher used guilt as his motivating factor in encouraging his audience’s action.

Fisher (1942b)\(^1\) began his article by describing the violence being done against the Japanese. He began by stating that “the uprooting of 60,000 Americans of Japanese parentage from our western seaboard is for them an ordeal of personal suffering. It is also a test of their ability to rise above resentment and to maintain faith in their America and ours” (p. 424). The metaphor of uprooting presented the idea of the Japanese as a powerless group being manipulated by outside forces. “Uprooting” (p. 424) suggests that the Japanese had formed roots to their homes and were in a fixed place in the West Coast when they were forcibly removed. Fisher also described the evacuation as “an ordeal of personal suffering” (p. 424) for them. These two descriptions introduced Fisher’s idea of a people who had been wronged. When he went on to further state that it was “a test of their ability to rise above resentment and to maintain faith in their America and ours” (p. 424),
he further introduced the Japanese as a people who were more noble than the ones who had wronged them.

Fisher’s description of the Japanese in “Our Japanese Refugees” is somewhat different than in his Tolan testimony (1942a). While in the testimony to the Tolan committee, he allowed for the existence of dangerous and treacherous Japanese, in his article he described them, in all but one instance, only as a people who were being wronged. In the one instance in which he described potential fifth column activity, it was the Issei who had been arrested by the FBI who were potentially at fault. The Nisei were never blamed, and instead were held up as an example of innocent victims.

Fisher began his motivation for his audience in the first section. He addressed the audience directly with a moral challenge. After introducing the Japanese, he said that for white Americans the evacuation was a “testing by fire of devotion to the letter and spirit of the federal Constitution, and of their ability to hold justice and national unity above antipathy toward persons of the Japanese race” (p. 424). This statement introduced the Christian concept of a “testing by fire” (p. 424). The testing of fire discussed in the Bible was a test of purity and impurity: a “refiner’s fire” (Malachi 3:2, New International Version). The fire removed impurities from raw gold and silver. In Christianity, that fire tests the good and bad that people do: “the fire shall test every man’s work of what sort it is” (I Corinthians 3:13, New International Version). By referring to the test of fire in his article, Fisher implied that his audience was in their raw form in regards to
their devotion to the Constitution. The internment process was now a testing by fire; after the test was finished, the impurities would be gone and the pure would remain.

By grounding his argument in the federal Constitution, Fisher used a recognizable foundation of the American way of life: in Richard Weaver’s terms (1985), an ultimate term, or more precisely, a “god term” (p. 212). A god term is an “expression about which all other expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving dominations and powers” (p. 212). Fisher was looking for his audience to exhibit their “devotion” (p. 424) to the constitution. Not only were they to follow or obey the Constitution, but were to be completely devoted to it. That devotion would be exhibited by the action he suggested in the conclusion of the article. By using allusions to the Bible and the Constitution, Fisher asked his audience to be good Christian Americans. This challenge, at the very beginning of his article, suggests that he was attempting to convince the audience that they did want to agree with him, even before they knew what they were agreeing to do. He put into question their devotion to God and to America and its foundational principles: justice, the Constitution and national unity.

The concept of justice was one that Fisher also addressed in his Tolan testimony (1942a). In the second written statement, he said, “we should be traitors if we flouted democratic principles of justice and humanity in our treatment of either aliens or Christians” (p. 11203). By the time Fisher “Our Japanese Refugees,” he saw how those principles of justice were being flouted. Fisher’s call
for action added another way that justice could be won. In his Tolan testimony, justice would be served by not evacuating people indiscriminately. In “Our Japanese Refugees,” justice could be served by his audience’s actions to assist the Japanese.

Fisher also specifically addressed his main audience, the 29,000 white Christians throughout the United States who subscribed to The Christian Century. For white Christians, it was “a challenge to demonstrate that Christian brotherhood transcends blood and skin color” (p. 424). Fisher’s Christian audience had the double challenge of devotion to the Constitution and Christian principles. Despite the fact that Fisher’s first challenge was to the broad group of “white Americans” (p. 424), his use of Christian terminology implies that he was thinking of them as Christian, too. The fact that his audience consisted of readers of the Christian Century suggests that he was largely correct.

In the second paragraph, Fisher introduced three key groups/figures of the time: the Supreme Court, the Secretary of War and the President. Fisher said that the Supreme Court had presumably validated Executive Order 9066 to be within the powers of the President. He described the President as having the power to invoke EO 9066 as commander-in-chief during a time of war and the Secretary of War as having authority placed upon him by the President. The Secretary of War, Henry M. Stimson, was the head of the War Department during World War II. Fisher used the President and Secretary of War as the first targets of blame. As
they were very visible people in 1942, his audience would be aware of them and able to place blame.

Fisher used the Constitution to place blame on the President, Secretary of War and the Supreme Court. He charged them with acting against the Constitution when they allowed Executive Order 9066 to give power to the Secretary of War to exclude "any or all persons" (Roosevelt, 1942, p. 1) from military zones. He then mentioned the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Fisher quoted the Fifth Amendment, without designating it as such: "neither the nation nor the states shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of the law'" (p. 424). Fisher used these amendments to begin placing blame upon parties responsible for the internment as there was no "due process of law" for the Japanese evacuees. That Fisher quoted this section of the Constitution is important since, in his second written statement to the Tolan Committee (1942a), he warned them about the loss of liberty. He said, "The integrity of our Nation and all the liberties guaranteed by it are at stake" (p. 11203). At the time he did not know that the liberties had already been taken away.

In both written statements to the Tolan Committee, Fisher (1942a) signified his approval of the President's Executive Order. In the first statement he said, "I approve any measures...in line with the President's proclamation of February 20" (p. 11199). In the second statement he said, "we welcome the President's proclamation of February 20.... We believe that the extreme gravity of the situation justifies this drastic step" (pp. 11202-3). This change in stance can be
attributed to the activities that occurred between February and April 1. In those thirty-seven days, General DeWitt signed proclamation 1, the order to evacuate all Japanese from military areas, and proclamation no. 4, which allowed no voluntary movement by Issei or Nisei and limited movement to evacuation only. Also during that time Executive Order 9102 was signed, which created the War Relocation Authority, or WRA. The Wartime Civil Control Administration, or WCCA, a group designed to assist in evacuation, was created. Senate bill S 2352, House Resolution HR 6758 and Public Law 503 were all signed and passed, which made any disobedience to actions allowed by EO 9066 illegal. Also, the US Army Corp of Engineers was given thirty days to build camps for the evacuated Japanese and the voluntary Los Angeles evacuation and mandatory Terminal Island evacuation occurred. The culmination of these events would have given Fisher a different view as to the acceptability of EO 9066. Fisher had also said in the Tolan testimony that he appealed to the government and the citizens “to maintain order under law” (p. 11203). Since EO 9066 went against the Constitution, it was not consistent with that charge.

Fisher was very cautious in his initial placement of blame on the military. He began by saying he had sympathy with their “grievous losses” (p. 424) at Pearl Harbor and their difficult task of defending the Pacific Coast. By using the phrase “grievous losses,” Fisher made the military’s decision into an emotional decision. By giving sympathy for the military’s difficulties, Fisher tempered the blame that he placed in the next sentence. Despite the losses, he said that the army “had no
right in law to order the compulsory evacuation of 60,000 American citizens, on the basis of their racial character [italics his], without any pretense of judicial hearings” (p. 424). He then accused the military of “branding a racial group as ‘second-class’ citizens” (p. 424). By using the “branding” (p. 424) metaphor, Fisher further emphasized his uprooting metaphor in showing how the Japanese were treated as objects to be managed, or cattle to be branded, rather than people and Americans with the ability to reason and make decisions on their own.

This section parallels Fisher’s (1942a) suggestion in the Tolan Committee testimony that the Japanese were being used as scapegoats for the Japanese military. The setbacks in the Tolan testimony are further described as grievous losses in “Our Japanese Refugees.” The war had not been going much better since Fisher’s Tolan testimony. Rangoon, Burma had fallen to the Japanese and the Japanese military had begun centering their attacks on Midway. The American military and their allies had not yet had a decisive victory. Americans had not begun treating the Japanese-Americans any better since the Tolan testimony, either. That Fisher had to again defend the Japanese against this kind of retributive action for an absent enemy shows that the discrimination continued.

Fisher ended the first section by asking two questions which served as a transition to the second section. The first question asked, “Did not the proof of fifth column activity by Japanese-American citizens in Hawaii on December 7 give the army ample warrant for taking drastic steps?” (p. 424). In this question, Fisher’s unnamed questioner begs the question that fifth column activity provides
a reason for steps to be taken. Fisher never argued that the constitutional rights of citizens should be protected whether or not members of a group were traitors. He instead argued that there were no traitors in the group of Japanese-Americans.

"Drastic steps" is a phrase which implies that action was taken beyond what was necessary or prudent. He does not state that no action was warranted, but only that the ones taken were extreme. Using the word "drastic" helped Fisher presuppose a negative answer to the question. The word "drastic" also mirrored Fisher's (1942a) use of the word in his second written statement to the Tolan Committee. In the Tolan Committee statement, he said, "the extreme gravity of the situation justifies this drastic step" (p. 11203): EO 9066. Fisher's use of the same phrase for the same situation shows that he was, in fact, responding to his own beliefs thirty-seven days earlier. The "extreme gravity" (p. 11203) he mentioned now became "the proof of fifth column activity" (p. 424) for his audience, although during his Tolan statement he did not believe that fifth column activity by the Japanese-Americans had occurred. He said in his first Tolan statement "very few [Japanese-Americans] are dangerous" (p. 11199).

The second question Fisher used to end the first section suggested that the country must be protected from "a possible body-blow, even at the cost of suspending normal constitutional rights" (p. 424). A body blow, in boxing, is a hit that is meant to slow down the opponent and weaken him or her in the long run. The Japanese, as potential fifth columnists, could then be described as America's attacker. Fisher's unnamed questioner assumed that the Japanese-Americans could
inflict blows that, while not immediately fatal, would weaken America. Fisher also mentioned constitutional rights in the transition to the second section. This reference was his third to the Constitution, keeping it well in the minds of his readers.

Fisher continued his argument for the innocence of the Japanese in the second section of the article, which was titled "No Sabotage in Honolulu." He answered the questions asked in the previous section by stating, "The irony of this argument was thrown into glaring relief... [by a] startling telegram" (p. 424). The first two words provide Fisher with a way to show the incongruity between the previous questions – arguments used by those who were for evacuation – and reality. He then says it was "thrown into glaring relief" (p. 424). The word relief means to be put in contrast, to be put into glaring relief suggests that the contrast between the accusations of fifth column activity and the reality was not only visible, but impossible not to see.

The telegram that Fisher mentioned was from the Honolulu Chief of Police. Chief of Police Gabrielson wrote to the Tolan committee on March 14 at the request of Delegate Sam King of Hawaii. King "was disturbed at the character of the testimony concerning Pearl Harbor sabotage given before the Tolan Committee" (Grodzins, 1949, p. 130). He contacted Congressman Tolan on February 25, 1942, requesting that the committee come to Hawaii to hear first-hand testimony. On March 3, King wired again in response to Tolan and mentioned that he has asked several "responsible officers" (Daniels, 1989) to send
statements to the committee. Chief of Police Gabrielson, the President of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and the Chairman of the Honolulu Citizens Council all responded as a result of King’s request. Gabrielson wrote the Tolan Committee on March 14th and said, “there were no acts of sabotage in city [sic] and county of Honolulu December 7” (p. 424). The President of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of the Honolulu Citizen’s Council were also quoted in response to an “equally false rumor” (p. 424) of fifth column activity in Hawaii. They stated that after consulting with the chief of police and military leaders, they could conclude that there were no instances of Japanese blocking traffic and running into airplanes on the ground. That Fisher called the telegram “startling” (p. 424) suggests that no one believed the Japanese to be innocent. This revelation went against the country’s bias against Japanese as well as most of the rumors that had been widespread up to and following the letters from Honolulu.

The quotes Fisher used absolved the Japanese of the blame raised by his questions regarding the justification of the “drastic steps” and protection from a “body-blow” (p. 424). Even though the questions were not made by a real person or group of people, they may have been the important questions on the minds of his audience and therefore he could now move past his defense of the Japanese. In addition, the quotes raised “uncomfortable questions” (p. 424) regarding the internment. That the questions were uncomfortable shows that Fisher did not feel Americans would not be at ease at discovering that their assumptions were incorrect. Fisher used the final paragraph of section two to ask those
“uncomfortable questions” (p. 424) and place blame on other responsible parties. The four questions Fisher asked provided a transition to move to his third section.

The first question issued blame on the Roberts’ report which did not include the refutation of Hawaiian fifth column activity. The Roberts’ report was written after the President sent Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts to Hawaii to evaluate the situation there after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The report, written January 24, 1942, alleged negligence on the part of the military (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). According to Girdner and Loftis (1969) there were two hundred consular agents of Japan on Oahu who had not been required to register with the government. The report did not accuse resident Japanese of spying, but said that some of the unregistered consular agents were guilty, as well as “persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service” (p. 20). Once the Roberts’ report was published, the public took the reported instances of spying to be interpreted as “‘the fifth column at work’” (Grodzins, 1949, p. 130).

Next, blame was placed on the Secretary of War again and the Commander of the Fourth Army, General DeWitt. On February 20, the Secretary of War appointed General DeWitt, the commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, as the military commander authorized to designate military areas as allowed by Executive Order 9066 (Daniels, 1989). Fisher questioned why these two leaders allowed rumors of fifth column activity on Hawaii to persist. The third question is the only one not obviously placing blame on a person or group of people. Fisher asked: “Did the censorship at Honolulu prevent the truth…from
getting to the mainland press” (p. 424). This question implies, however, that Fisher blamed the government or military for the censoring which did not allow important information to reach the residents of the mainland.

Fisher’s fourth question placed blame upon white Americans. He asked, “Why did not more of us supposedly propaganda-proof citizens take the rumors with many grains of salt” (p. 424). This question is significant in several ways. The first significance is in the phrase “supposedly propaganda-proof citizens” (p. 424). Fisher used this phrase to show his audience where they had gone wrong. The audience, which was supposed to be able to reject propaganda, accepted all the rumors that were being spread. That they were “supposedly propaganda-proof” suggests that this was a trait that was important, maybe even a matter of pride to them. Indeed, according to Sproule (1997), after the rampant propaganda of World War I there was a backlash against propaganda in the United States, which culminated in the creation of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis was formed in 1937. The leaders of the Institute feared “that Americans were becoming victims of propaganda and that they were losing their ability to make sense of the litany of competing charges and claims” (p. 130).³ The people of the time had an obsession with propaganda and were very interested to learn how to avoid being deceived in the future. The competing claims regarding fifth columnists in Hawaii were exactly the kind of dual message the Institute was trying to help citizens decipher. That they had been duped by the false rumors during the early days of the war
would have been a blow to their pride and something that they would want to resolve.

The second interesting aspect of Fisher’s fourth question is his use of “many grains of salt” (p. 424). This phrase means to be skeptical or examine carefully, but the phrase is generally accepted to be “take it with a grain of salt.” (Hendrickson, 1987, p. 515). Fisher expected his audience to not only be skeptical, as with a grain of salt, but to be exceptionally skeptical, with many grains of salt. The audience, however, did not examine the information coming in to them and were not skeptical. They merely accepted everything that the military, government and media told them.

The third section, “If the Truth Had Been Known,” added to Fisher’s conception of the guilt of America. He began by stating the pity that the truth was not known. If it had been, Fisher said, the situation would have been “radically changed” (p. 424). Here he was making the assumption that the main reason internment happened was because people did not know the truth, when in fact, in his previous section, he said “the mainland press carried [Gabrielson’s] startling cablegram” (p. 424). If the mainland press carried the letter, it stands to reason that some Americans knew that there was no fifth column activity. There were additional rumors of espionage, though, which were discredited, but which put the Japanese in “grave danger of mob violence” (p. 424). Grave danger implies that the Japanese were in danger of their lives, another exaggeration. In actuality, between December 8, 1941 and March 31, 1942, there were no murders of the
Japanese by white Americans, although three murders had attackers who were unidentified. There was one case of a white American raping a Japanese, five cases unidentified and there were six cases of white Americans inflicting property damage, robbery or extortion on the Japanese, one case unidentified (Grodzins, 1949). Despite the invalidity of the claim, Fisher stated that this danger of mob violence was the justification the military leaders had given for the necessity of a sweeping evacuation of all people of Japanese parentage. Fisher said the danger was from “mob violence” and “anti-Japanese hysteria” (p. 424). These descriptions suggest a group of people out of control and not thinking.

The grave danger that Fisher described was due to “popular swallowing of the now discredited rumors of sabotage” (p. 424). Here Fisher again places blame on the majority of citizens; it was a “popular” acceptance of rumors. That Fisher used the adjective “popular” indicates that it was a widespread belief among people. Fisher further says that the public, instead of being “propaganda-proof”, were not only accepting rumors, but swallowing them. The metaphor “swallowing” suggests that the public was not just hearing the rumors, but internalizing and absorbing them. The public, which had apparently prided itself of being able to distinguish between fact and propaganda, had widely accepted and absorbed the false rumors. They were, therefore, partially to blame for the inevitable internment.

Fisher next absolved the military of blame, saying it was not their business to deny rumors. Fisher shifted the blame on the government by using a conditional
deductive argument: "If the army is thus absolved from blame, then all the greater blame attaches to those federal civilian authorities who... did not promptly make it known" (p. 424). The second premise of that argument was "In defense of the army, it may properly be said that it is not their business to deny false rumors or to guide public opinion" (p. 424). The conclusion is not stated, making this argument an enthymeme, but it is easily understood to mean that the civilian authorities were to blame for the lack of knowledge of the general public. The lack of knowledge, according to Fisher, gave the army justification for the evacuation.

Fisher placed further blame on Americans for a "chain of evil causation" (p. 424). This metaphor adds a negative moral aspect to link past anti-Japanese actions with the present. The chain included "anti-Oriental discrimination, especially in California" (p. 424). Fisher said, "we and our fathers have sown dragons' teeth for sixty years" (p. 424). This metaphor refers to the Greek myth in which the goddess Athena gave dragons' teeth to a mortal named Cadmus to replace warriors who had been killed by the dragon. Cadmus planted the teeth in the ground and soldiers rose up from those teeth (Morford & Lenardon, 1971). The soldiers who rose up were so violent that all but five of them killed each other. By using this allusion to Greek mythology, Fisher showed how Americans were responsible for the violent situation in which they found themselves. The dragons' teeth Fisher referred to were sixty years of anti-Asian legislation, including the Japanese and Chinese immigration laws. Fisher declaimed them as inequitable when compared to quotas allowed to other countries. He quoted Carey
McWilliams regarding the immigration act of 1924 and the laws against Japanese, Chinese and Filipino alien residents becoming citizens.

Fisher described the violent end of the sown dragons' teeth in his next paragraph. In another reference to ancient Greece, Fisher said, "As in a Greek tragedy, the sad dénouement which has now come upon us is the nemesis of a chain of evil deeds" (p. 424). As with the dark ending of a Greek tragedy, so the ending of the situation in the United States, or the "chain of evil deeds" -- the internment -- would likely produce similar results. "Nemesis" can mean "an act or effect of retribution" and the goddess, Nemesis, was the goddess of retribution and vengeance. The internment, then, was the sad ending to the discriminatory practices of the past sixty years. Fisher warned that it also, however, could be a violent ending. The retribution and vengeance, added to the dragons' teeth discussed earlier, would produce that violent end. Fisher had already warned of negative effects of internment in the second written statement of the Tolan testimony. There he warned of "acute race problems" that would result from separating the Japanese on the basis of their race. Those race problems in "Our Japanese Refugees" were the dragons' teeth, which were sown during the internment and in the preceding sixty years.

Fisher also absolved public officials of some of their guilt. He discussed how officials in Washington "say they were forced to yield against their own better judgment" (p. 425) to those promoting mass evacuation of the Japanese. To this, Fisher said, "Unfortunately, there is truth in this complaint" (p. 425). That Fisher
used the word "complaint" rather than "excuse" suggests that he was, in this particular section, absolving them of some of their guilt. He then placed guilt on a group of pro-internment citizens who swayed government opinion who he described as a "raucous chorus" (p. 425). This metaphor suggests a group of people that presented a loud and disorderly protest. Fisher described Henry F. Grady, General David P. Barrows and Chester Rowell⁶ and "prominent representatives of education, labor, religion, industry and law" (p. 425) as making "vigorously appeals" (p. 425) against internment. This description suggested less harshness and more of an urgent call for help, despite the fact that there were fewer instances of this side of the protest. By presenting the two sides of the issue in this way, Fisher was able to show why those who were fighting for the Japanese' rights were more praiseworthy. Their arguments would have been filled with an acceptable energy in contrast with the jarring protest of the anti-Japanese citizens.

Fisher (1942a) had foreshadowed the public's involvement in the internment in his Tolan testimony. In the first written statement, Fisher wrote, "I... hope that a panicky public will not try to stampede our military and judicial authorities into evacuating thousands or tens of thousand of people" (p. 11200). He showed, even before the internment was definite, that the public was responsible for their actions. He also showed that he did not hold the military and judicial authorities accountable for overcoming the opinions of the "panicky public" or
"raucous chorus." The blame was, in this case, placed upon citizens rather than authorities.

Fisher's discussion of anti-evacuation protest provided the transition for his fourth section, "Why Protests Were No Louder." Here he absolved the citizens of some of their blame in not protesting. He said that protests against evacuation were not more widespread because "the mass of intelligent people in the churches and outside...could hardly conceive that the authorities would adopt it" (p. 425). Calling his audience intelligent helped Fisher to appeal to the egos of his chosen audience. The audience Fisher was interested to have read this article consisted of people who were either against the internment or undecided on their opinion towards the internment. The "intelligent people" were those who had not protested evacuation, but theoretically would have opposed it if they had foreseen it. This audience would be more likely to answer Fisher's appeal for aid for the Japanese in his final paragraphs.

One of the reasons people did not believe evacuation would happen was because the non-Japanese population in Hawaii did not call for mass evacuation despite the rumors of fifth column activity on their own island. Instead, the Hawaiians instituted a "temperate policy" (p. 425). Fisher here implied an argument from degree: If Hawaii was temperate in its policies, the mainland should be as well. Hawaii's population was more than 37% compared with the West Coast Japanese population which was 1% Japanese (Grodzins, 1949). Not only was the Japanese population greater in Hawaii, but Hawaii also was closer to
Japan than the West Coast, by fifteen hundred miles (Grodzins, 1949). Hawaii had also been brutally attacked already, while the West Coast had only had a few instances of minor attacks. The lack of evacuation on Hawaii, according to Fisher, led to the European-American civilians on the mainland feeling confident that mass evacuation would not occur in their part of the country either.

The other reason Fisher believed more anti-internment protest would happen was because The President, Attorney General Biddle, Governor Olson and “other high officials” (p. 425) called for “fair play and democratic treatment of all Japanese residents” (p. 425). This point corresponds to one he made in his Tolan testimony. There, he said, “Our citizens of Japanese parentage are just as trustworthy now as they were a few weeks ago when Governor Olson and other publicist paid tribute to their loyalty and civic devotion” (p. 11199). The officials, at the time he wrote “Our Japanese Refugees,” were doubly to blame. Not only had they praised the Japanese publicly, but also Fisher had warned them not to ignore their words when he gave the Tolan testimony.

Fisher told his audience that the “intelligent people” (p. 424) guessed wrong because of four groups who caused the evacuation to take place. The first group consisted of “extremists, led by Japanese-baiters like [William Randolph] Hearst, by irresponsible radio commentators and by politicians bent on catering to mass prejudices” (p. 425). The metaphor “Japanese-baiters” attacks Hearst and similar public voices for implying the Japanese were creatures with no will of their own, able to be baited like a bear. Hearst’s publications were known for their anti-
Japanese slant. Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Hearst press published articles warning about the “yellow peril” of the Japanese (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). His publications published rumors of fifth column activity as fact (Girdner & Loftis, 1969) and “caused the public generally to become fearful and emotional regarding the alleged dangers in their midst” (Myers, 1971, p. 15). The radio commentators Fisher mentioned could have included people such as John B. Hughes, a Los Angeles commentator who was one of the first members of the media to suggest evacuation. He helped to spread the rumors about the Japanese in a month-long series dedicated to the topic of the Japanese (tenBroek, Barnhart & Matson, 1968). The politicians likely included Warren and Olson. The metaphor “catering to mass prejudices” illustrated how Warren and Olson served the public whatever they wanted without questioning the morals of the public’s bias.

The second group on which Fisher placed blame was “business interests eager to crowd out Japanese rivals” (p. 425). The business interests to which Fisher referred likely included the Western Growers Protective Association, the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association, the California Farm Bureau Federation, the Associated Farmers, the Merchants and Manufacturers Association of Los Angeles and various Chambers of Commerce throughout the Pacific Coast (Grodzins, 1949). These groups took advantage of the stressful war situation to forward their longstanding anti-Japanese sentiments. By crowding out rivals, Fisher suggested that the business interests not only wanted their competition gone, but that they were also eager to get rid of them.
The third group was “honest patriots who believed every Japanese was a fifth columnist” (p. 425). This group Fisher blamed much more gently. He described them as honest, rather than as extremists, Japanese-baiters or irresponsible as he had described the previous groups. This group was not evil, just misinformed. Fisher (1942a) had mentioned these “honest patriots” in the Tolan Committee hearing as well. In his oral testimony, he said he “would not impugn the sincerity” of those who though mass evacuation was the only way to protect the country. Those people, he said, just had not thought through the evacuation. In both he recognized that not all people who were advocates of evacuation were bad people; he called them honest and sincere, but misinformed.

The final group Fisher blamed was the military. He said that evacuation was acceptable to the military because they wanted to reduce risks, wanted “to wash its hands of civilian problems” (p. 425), which suggested that civilian problems were dirty and unsanitary. Fisher said that the military were used to treating people as “mechanical units, rather than as bundles of democratic self-determination” (p. 425). This metaphor presents the contrast between robots and people who were able to make their own decisions. Those people’s self-determination was “democratic” (p. 425), another ultimate term that Fisher used to bring his audience to his frame of thinking.

Fisher used the organization of his paragraph on blame to heap extra blame on the military, and specifically General DeWitt, and extra praise on the Fair Play Committee. Immediately after discussing the military’s treatment of people as
mechanical units, he wrote, “So on the very day – March 3” (p. 425) the two groups, the military and the Fair Play Committee, issued opposing statements. At the same time as DeWitt was issuing Proclamation No. 1, the Committee on National Security and Fair Play issued a statement. The statement warned that internment might turn innocent citizens into fifth columnists. Fisher placed blame directly before and after mentioning the Fair Play Committee, which made them appear all the more praiseworthy. Fisher moved from describing the military as failing to handle people as democratic units to the Fair Play Committee’s promotion of the Japanese as loyal or harmless citizens and then on to DeWitt’s issuance of Proclamation No. 1. Fisher here presented the Fair Play Committee as heroes, fighting a losing battle to the four groups: Japanese-baiters, business interests, misinformed but honest patriots and especially the military. This presentation helped Fisher by showing that those who were guiltless were the ones who were actively working to help the Japanese. Activism was an important aspect of Fisher’s article. By praising the activism of the Fair Play Committee, he began the process of appealing for help from his audience.

“The die was cast” (p. 425), Fisher stated after he was finished assigning guilt. This metaphor showed that the results were out of anybody’s hand, the die had been thrown and the numbers would come up one way or the other. Despite the fact that the future had already been determined, Fisher praised “influential groups” who had urged DeWitt “to appoint hearing boards as a means of differentiating between loyal and disloyal of suspicious citizen Japanese” (p. 425).
Again, the blameless people were those who were actively working to help the Japanese. These groups, according to Fisher, also argued against internment for three reasons. The first was that evacuating a group because of their race “would violate the principles for which America professes to be fighting” (p. 425). This argument is one that Fisher had argued before the Tolan Committee the month before. These groups also argued that the evacuation would drive “loyal American citizens of Japanese descent to desperation and disloyalty” (p. 425). Again, Fisher maintains the blamelessness of the Japanese. Not only are they American citizens, but also are loyal, despite charges that they were fifth columnists. This evacuation, part of the “chain of evil deeds” (p. 424), would take those loyal citizens and make them disloyal, the trait they were accused of already having. The third result of evacuation would be playing “into the hands of Japan” (p. 425), which had claimed to be protecting the colored races from “persecuting and arrogant white nations” (p. 425). Not only would evacuation be giving the enemy extra motivation for their fight, it would give Japan “authentic support” (p. 425) for their depiction of America as a persecuting and arrogant nation.

At this point, Fisher asked “What of the effect of the total evacuation on the Japanese?” (p. 425). He had previously discussed the possible effects in his Tolan Committee hearing (1942a). He had warned, “keeping [the Nisei’s] morale high [was] desirable for military efficiency” and internment might “breed disaffection among the whole body of Japanese-American citizens” (p. 11199). One month later, he was able to see the actual effects. Although he had warned
that the Nisei might become disloyal if they were evacuated, he took the opportunity to present the loyalty, blamelessness and moral character of the Japanese again.

He began with the Issei, who he said had “suffered in stoical silence” (p. 425). He described the longing of many of them to become citizens despite the fact that the laws forbade it and “mean-minded Americans have strewn their path with thorns” (p. 425). If the audience had wondered why the Issei had not become citizens, Fisher’s explanation would have answered their questions. In the Tolan testimony, he only discussed the Issei who could have led fifth-column activity. In “Our Japanese Refugees” Fisher did admit that there were some fifth columnists among the alien Japanese. The over two thousand arrests by the FBI had been described in the Tolan testimony as “the natural leaders” (Fisher, 1942a, p. 11199) who had been detained. In this article he assured his audience that there had been no widespread plot discovered. Fisher also said that a “strong attachment” (p. 425) for Japan would be understandable for the Issei, but that theirs was a “divided loyalty” (p. 425) since many had seen sons join the military. Again, Fisher showed that the Japanese were loyal, their sons were, after all, joining the military to fight the enemies of America.

Fisher then described the Nisei’s reaction to evacuation. In the Tolan testimony, Fisher (1942a) had warned of a potential “acute race problem” (p. 11199). In “Our Japanese Refugees” he described the Nisei’s “divers reactions” (p. 425). He said that some felt “humiliated and despondent” (p. 425). Those
individuals may have presented the race problems that Fisher had anticipated. Other Nisei, though, had “resolved to accept evacuation as their peculiar sacrifice for their country and to emulate the American pioneers who wrested success from adversity” (p. 425). The Japanese-Americans were forced to take on the sacrifice that Fisher had asked from communities of non-Japanese Americans. In his second written statement, Fisher wrote that war required “heavy sacrifice... various kinds of sacrifice... inescapable sacrifices” (p. 11203). The communities had not been willing to make those sacrifices; they had rejected any Japanese migrants. The Japanese, therefore, were now the true Americans, making sacrifices in times of war. In their sacrifice, Fisher presented an analogy that compared the Nisei to some of the heroes of the American past: the pioneers. This furthered Fisher’s description of the Nisei as the true Americans.

After illustrating the feelings of the innocent Japanese, Fisher moved to his next section, “Atrocities Committed Against Japanese.” Fisher now described in more detail the actions taken against the Japanese. If his audience accepted his evidence from section two, in this section, they would be likely to believe the Japanese to be innocent and loyal to America. They would be inclined to accept Fisher’s statement that “all this suffering [was] vicarious, on behalf of a Japan whose policies they condemn” (p. 425). Just as Fisher had described them as potential scapegoats in the first written statement to the Tolan Committee, he describes them again as being victims in place of the elusive Japanese enemy. Fisher described the anti-Japanese actions as “atrocities committed against
innocent Japanese by bullies or misguided pseudo-patriots” (p. 425). The blame here is on two groups: those who acted out of a need to pick on a group and those who thought they were acting for the good of the country. This last group not only consisted of fake patriots, but those fake patriots were heading in the wrong direction.

Following the blame of bullies and pseudo-patriots, Fisher moved to an appeal for sympathy. Because of these people, the Japanese felt “uncertainty and gloom” (p. 425). The evacuation was “blighting careers, reducing prosperous families to poverty, forcing abandonment of farms and businesses into which [had] gone the unstinted toil of decades” (p. 425). Fisher described a group of hardworking people who had earned a life of prosperity, only to have it taken away. By using strong language to describe the effects of the “atrocities committed against the Japanese” (p. 425) and by placing the effects immediately after the blame, Fisher was able to add to blame and sympathy. This description would have drawn upon the compassion of the audience. The suffering, according to Fisher, was vicarious, as many of the Japanese had condemned Japan’s policies.

To add to the sympathy the audience felt for the Japanese, Fisher told a story of the suffering of a Japanese man. He said “it would be easy to compile a volume of heart rending stories” but he would only tell one. He told briefly the story of Hideo Murata. Murata was a Japanese alien who was given honorary citizenship after fighting in World War I. He considered the certificate as a “treasured possession” (p. 425). When he heard of the impending evacuation,
Murata "sought light from his old friend" (p. 425), the sheriff of Pismo Beach. When the sheriff told him that no exceptions would be made, Murata went to a hotel, paid the bill in advance and committed suicide. The certificate of citizenship was found in Murata's pocket. Fisher used the story of his suicide and the quotation of the certificate of honorary citizenship to emphasize the pain that evacuation was causing to loyal Japanese.

"The crowd demanded evacuation, and got it." Fisher wrote. This statement was made immediately after the Hideo Murata story. By placing this statement immediately after the emotional story of Murata's suicide, Fisher accentuated the blame he was able to put upon the public. Once again, he made a comment about the mob mentality of those who wanted mass evacuation. Fisher also made a suggestive analogy here to his Christian audience. Although he never directly compared the Japanese suffering to that of Jesus Christ, his audience may have taken the things he said as a comparison of the two situations. Fisher's description of Hideo Murata, an example of all innocent Japanese, as an innocent victim, vicariously suffering for the evil empire of Japan because of the demands of the public, may have resonated with the Christian audience he chose to address.

The result of the demand of evacuation was confusion. Fisher said he would "be the first to pay tribute to the conscientiousness and high-mindedness of all the army officers and the federal officials whom [he had] recently been meeting." Despite these good attributes, things had not gone well. Fisher complemented the military and government in one sentence, and in the next began
to blame them for the way things were done. It was not a military matter as “military training unfits more than it fits men to solve” (p. 426) the problem of evacuating 100,000 people. This was the second time Fisher described the military as the wrong group to take care of the evacuation issue. He suggested it would, therefore, be a relief to the army as well as civilians that a civilian committee took over the details. He assumed that the army would agree that they had not planned properly for the evacuation.

Fisher then used several metaphors to describe the effects of the military-led evacuation. He said, “the cart got before the horse. It was a case of leap first and then look” (p. 426). By using two clichés in a row, Fisher reinforced his point that the military had acted without thinking. The use of such common clichés also suggests that Fisher did not want his audience to miss the point; he used statements that his audience, regardless of education level, would understand. In another metaphor, Fisher said that one of the problems was that the Japanese “sold their property to sharks for a song” (p. 426). Fisher thus laid blame on anyone who purchased property cheaply from the Japanese. Another problem the Japanese experienced due to hasty plans was when voluntary resettlement was allowed. At this time, “some Japanese rushed eastward only to run afoul of exclusion sentiment and threats of bodily harm” (p. 426). Again the Japanese were described as innocent victims and those who rejected and threatened them were blamed.

In the sixth section, “Voluntary Efforts Fail,” Fisher moved into a description of the diligent efforts of the Japanese to assist the government in
evacuation. The first effort was the Hi Korematsu cooperative farm plan. He said that it had been “zealously promoted” (p. 426) by the Japanese and backed by several hundred Christians but the plan failed because of inability to find a suitable place or protests by residents. That the Japanese “zealously promoted” (p. 426) the plan suggests that they were dedicated to making the farm work. Korematsu wrote, in the final page of the February 20th plan sent to Carl Tausch, head of the Division of Program Study and Discussion in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, that his plan “had the understanding and assistance of... United States Department of Agriculture, State Attorney General, United States District Attorney, Farm Security Administration...and others” (Daniels, 1989).

Fisher’s explanation of the cooperative farm in “Our Japanese Refugees” is somewhat different than the explanation in his Tolan testimony. Fisher described the failure of the plan in “Our Japanese Refugees” as being due to a failure to find a suitable site. The plan in the first statement of the Tolan testimony would potentially fail because it would require huge government loans and would not involve those Japanese who lived in cities and would not be suited to farm life. The difference between Fisher’s account of the reasons for the plan’s failure is due to the difference in focus of the two statements. In the first Tolan statement, Fisher was trying to convince the government that evacuation would be contrary to the goal of national security. He used the cooperative farm example to show that there were no plans in place at the time to care for the numbers of Japanese that would need assistance. In “Our Japanese Refugees,” Fisher was focusing on creating a
desire in the audience to take action to help the Japanese. The site for a farm had not been found because potential sites lacked water, had military plants nearby, or "the white inhabitants objected to Japanese settlers. According to Fisher, "Utah seemed to offer the most eligible sites, but even there protests against a 'Japanese invasion' arose" (p. 426). First, Fisher placed blame on the white Americans who were not welcoming the Japanese into their community. Then Fisher created an argument by degree by saying that even in Utah, people did not want the Japanese to come. Utah is known as a Mormon state; currently, around 70% of the state is Mormon (Mooney, 2002). If the state of Utah, which was and is largely a religious state, would not accept the Japanese, than the rest of the country would surely not be willing to help.

Fisher added to the innocent portrait of the Japanese when he told a story of the Maryknoll fathers. The fathers organized an occupational census of the adult Japanese population. On February 19, 1942, the day before EO 9066 became public, the Maryknoll Catholic Mission held a meeting to which all Southern Californian Japanese were urged to attend. Around 1500 people attended the meeting "proclaiming Japanese loyalty to the United States" (Girdner & Loftis, 1969, p. 102). Fisher said that the Japanese "were ready to grasp at any straw and accepted roseate rumors as solid fact (p. 426). The rumors were that the occupational census would be used to help them avoid internment. Fisher described the disappointment the Japanese felt when they discovered the census was not an indication of any "definite plans for employment or resettlement" (p.
426). For the Japanese, “the jolt was severe” (p. 426). They were shaken from their innocent trust and hope by a jolt of the reality of their situation.

Another factor that depressed Japanese was the “recent furor for total evacuation [which was] worked up by ambitious politicians” (p. 426). Fisher placed blame here not on all politicians, only those who were ambitious, and especially “one man who wanted to make the anti-Japanese agitation a stepladder to the governorship” (p. 426). Fisher was likely referring to California Attorney General Warren. Governor Olson lost the gubernatorial re-election in 1942 to Warren (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). Warren was in favor of evacuation. Although he knew there was no evidence of fifth-column activity by the Japanese, he was still convinced the Japanese in America were dangerous. In a meeting with army officers Warren said, “It seems to me that it is quite significant that... we have had no fifth-column activities and no sabotage reported. It looks very much to me as though it is a studied effort not to have any until the zero hour arrives” (Grodzins, 1949, p. 94). He wrote later, in his memoirs, “I have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own testimony advocating it, because it is not in keeping with our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens.... It was wrong to react so impulsively without positive evidence of disloyalty” (Warren, 1977, p. 149). Warren did contest the State Personnel Board’s decision to fire all Japanese-Americans as unconstitutional. He admitted, in his memoirs, that defending one and not the other seems inconsistent, but he was concerned at the time with the security of his state.
Despite the blame placed on ambitious politicians, Fisher did not place blame on all public officials. He expressed hope that the government would ask for help from private agencies, but admitted that "the securing of land and the devising of ways to give useful employment to... so many thousands is something only government can do" (p. 426). He mentioned that he did not, however, want to leave all of the responsibility to the government. Fisher expressed hopes that the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) would be asked to cooperate with the government as evacuation continued. The AFSC was founded in 1917 "to provide conscientious objectors with an opportunity to aid civilian victims during World War I" (AFSC.org). They were committed to issues of social justice and were one of the groups who upheld the rights of the Nisei as citizens (AFSC.org). In early 1942, the AFSC helped to inform the Japanese that the Federal Security Agency was providing services that would to tell them their rights. The AFSC also protested the dismissal of California state civil employees and several representatives of the AFSC protested evacuation at the Tolan Committee hearings (Grodzins, 1949).

Besides help from the AFSC, Fisher introduced his desire for help from citizens. He said that he "hoped that the spirit of voluntarism will be given as free play as possible" (p. 426). This moved directly into his final section when he asked for their help. He gave two suggestions of things that churches in the interior states could do to help. The first was to find work for Japanese Christians in their communities and the second was to assure them that they can live in those
communities for a while. He said that there are around 4,000 Christian Japanese families, and that finding work for even one quarter of them would raise the morale of all of them. In the Tolan testimony (1942a), he had asked communities to accept the Japanese as part of their sacrifice: "In some communities," he wrote, "the entry of Japanese refugees has been resented to the point that long resident Japanese have been warned not to harbor them" (p. 11203). In "Our Japanese Refugees," Fisher helped his audience by giving them the name of a committee that would help facilitate the process. The committee, "formed by representatives of all the Protestant churches having work among the Japanese" (p. 426), was the Commission on Aliens and Prisoners of War created by the Federal and Home Missions Councils of New York. Dr. Herron Smith\(^{10}\) was the chairman of the committee. Fisher gave Smith's address for the audience to contact for more information.

Fisher ended his article with a final testimony to the character of the Japanese and a final plea for assistance. He praised their "enviable record for absence of delinquency and of juvenile delinquency" (p. 426). The "evacuation was unprecedented" (p. 426), he said and presented some dilemmas, which he said had "two-edged difficulty and significance" (p. 426). He said the evacuation "may hinder or help national unity during the war. It may aggravate rather than reduce the problems of interracial assimilation after the war" (p. 426). His final job for his audience was to "follow every stage of the resettlement process with a cooperative hand but a critical eye" (p. 426). By making such a tame plea, Fisher seemed to
accept that the internment would happen and nothing could be done to stop it. He asked the audience to have “a critical eye” (p. 426) which suggests that he was hoping that the process, as terrible as it was, would help prevent future acts of state-sponsored discrimination against a racial group. He left the future somewhat ambiguous when he ended his article by writing, “in it all, the churches may find unexpected opportunities for service” (p. 426). By keeping “a cooperative hand [and] a critical eye” (p. 426) his audience could provide services whenever and however they may arise.

By the time “Our Japanese Refugees” was written, Galen Fisher had accepted the inevitability of internment. While in the Tolan testimony he was asking for mass evacuation to be avoided, here he merely showed why the internment to come was uncalled for and problematic. The article reflected his feelings and attempted to show his audience the problems with the reasoning behind the internment. To do this, Fisher used a variety of methods. His placement of praise and blame was carefully crafted in order not to blame his audience, unless they were unwilling to carry out the action step: helping the transition to internment go smoothly. Fisher also used this article to shed light on the propaganda that had emerged regarding fifth column activity. After presenting the facts of the situation, he ended the article by asking for his audience to view the process with “a critical eye” (p. 426). Finally, Fisher used several phrases to appeal specifically to his Christian audience. Although he was not overtly religious
in the article, his references to topics Christians would be most familiar with enabled him to increase the acceptability of his message.

1 This is the primary text for this chapter. All future references to the Tolan Committee hearing will be noted with page number only.
2 In his memoirs, Attorney General Biddle (1962) wrote that Stimson, a man in his seventies, was the man he most admired on the President’s cabinet. He described Stimson as completely loyal to the President but unafraid of standing up to him. Despite that, Biddle (1962) wrote that he suspected that Stimson felt the evacuation was needless, but did not stand firm to that conviction. Throughout the negotiations for the mass evacuation, Stimson expressed his dislike of the racial exclusion to his assistant secretary: “Mr. Stimson referred to it as a ‘tragedy,’ which seemed to be ‘military necessity,’ because so many Japanese were located in close proximity to military installations” (219-220).
3 This Institute published bulletins that helped the readers know what to look for in propaganda. The bulletins contained lists of fallacious language that would indicate propaganda and ways to avoid being duped. The Institute, which forecasted a subscription list of 2,500 in the first year more than doubled that number, with 5,900 subscribers (Sproule, 1997)
4 McWilliams was the California Commissioner of Immigration and Housing (Girdner and Loftis, 1969). He spoke out for the constitutional rights of the Japanese-Americans and was the person who urged the Tolan Committee to come to the West Coast to listen to testimony (Girdner and Loftis, 1969). He did approve of the evacuation of Terminal Island as the island would have been a possible screen for Japanese spies (Girdner and Loftis, 1969) and expressed amazement at the efficient way the military evacuated the Japanese (McWilliams, 1942), but was, in general, against mass evacuation.
5 United States Attorney General Biddle (1962) and California State Attorney General Warren (1977) wrote in their memoirs of the anti-Japanese sentiment, which influenced government and military officials’ decisions regarding internment.
6 All three were members of the Northern California Committee on National Security and Fair Play with Fisher. Grady was the former assistant secretary of state and was the chairman of the Committee (Grodzins, 1949). He submitted Fisher’s fourth statement as a press release on March 3 (Grodzins). Barrows had helped organize the Fair Play Committee with Fisher (Fisher, 1955). Chester Rowell was a liberal political commentator for the San Francisco Chronicle. According to Morton Grodzins (1949), he was one of only two newspaper columnists who were friendly to the resident Japanese. He wrote many articles for the Chronicle asking for equal treatment of the Japanese, Germans and Italians. Rowell questioned why legislators wanted to investigate violations of alien land laws in January when nothing had been done before Pearl Harbor (Girdner and
Loftis, 1969). On February 23, 1942, Rowell wrote a column that pointed out that Executive Order 9066 could be applied to any citizen of the United States.

February 23, 1942, Goleta, California were attacked by enemy submarine. No one was hurt and no fires started (Girdner & Loftis, 1969). Brookings, Oregon and Astoria, Oregon were also attacked in 1942 (War Department, 1943), but no information was given regarding fatalities or damage done.

Biddle was against mass evacuation of the Japanese and said so in his autobiography (1962): “I thought at the time that the program was ill-advised, unnecessary, and unnecessarily cruel, taking Japanese who were not suspect, and Japanese Americans whose rights were disregarded from their homes and from their businesses to sit idly in the lonely misery of barracks while the war was being fought in the world beyond” (213). Biddle became Attorney General in September, 1941. Although he did not question the legality of interning the alien Japanese, Biddle (1962) said the Nisei’s rights “were the same as those of the men who were responsible for the program: President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson, and the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, commanding officer of the Pacific Coast area, and Colonel Karl Robin Bendetsen of the General Staff (213).

Fisher was a member of the committee, which also consisted of Fisher’s brother, President Robert Sproul, Dr. Henry Grady, General David Barrows and many other noteworthy citizens. The Committee’s primary purpose, according to Fisher, was “to support the government and the armed forces in preserving national security and winning the war, and at the same time, to foster fair play, especially toward law-abiding and innocent aliens and citizens of alien parentage” (1942a, 11203).

Smith testified before the Tolan Committee and was in charge of the Methodist Japanese missions on the West Coast (Grodzins, 1949).
Conclusion

The internment of Japanese-Americans is a unique event in American history. Our nation, which prided itself on its democratic way of life, ignored the constitutional rights of 70,000 of its citizens. It also was unique because, unlike many circumstances that inspire protest, the time period was relatively short. There were only five months between the threat of internment and the fact of internment and only three years before internment was finished. We can now see the final chapter in the internment period: the revoking of the order as unconstitutional and payment of reparations to the victims. In this window of history, we can see how other-directed protest works, and the results of it fairly clearly. Galen Fisher was one of the main non-Japanese protestors of the time. Besides his Tolan testimony and his *Christian Century* articles, he founded and spent time with the Fair Play Committee and worked on the cooperative farm plan with Hi Korematsu. During the internment he was in constant contact with internees, through mail and personal visits to the camps. He also made a trip to Washington D.C. to discuss the internment with lawmakers and other involved persons. Fisher, therefore, as a central rhetor during the period before the internment and during the interment provides a good example of how other-directed protest works.

The study of the rhetoric of othering and other-directed moral protests is a largely untapped field. Several theorists have studied pieces of rhetoric that can be included in the rhetoric of othering: studies on abortion protest, animal rights protest and civil rights protest. While their studies can shed light on how their
specific rhetor(s) perform other-directed protest, they do not explain how it can be universally applied to instances of other-directed protest. Two theorists have specifically addressed other-directed protest on a universal level. Charles Stewart’s article on the ego function of other-directed protest and Linda Alcoff’s article on the problems associated with speaking for others both attempt to present a general theory about the rhetoric of othering.

Stewart’s (1991) position is that rhetors who present other-directed protest are fulfilling an ego function. That ego function, also present in self-directed protest, is manifested in several ways. First, the protesters portray themselves as “saviors of the oppressed and exploited” (p. 102). They exhibit pride in membership in the social movement’s organizations, in the struggles they encounter and the victories they win. They emphasize the power of the organizations to which they belong, especially if that organization is the oldest, largest, most powerful or most quickly growing organization in the movement. The intent of the protest, according to Stewart, is “to take advantage of and celebrate the exalted egos of protestors” (p. 103). The protesters feel themselves to be moral crusaders on “sacred quests to assist others, challenge evil forces, and bring about a better world for all” (p. 103). The ego function in other-directed protest is, according to Stewart, more implicit in the message of the protestor.

The goal of Alcoff’s (1991) article is to discourage empowered group members from protesting for disempowered groups. She feels that “the practice of speaking for others is often born of a desire for mastery, to privilege oneself as the
one who more correctly understands the truth about another’s situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise” (p. 29). When one speaks for others, the result often reinforces hierarchies of power. She does not claim that all cases of speaking for others are problematic; sometimes a messenger is needed to advocate for the needs of a group. In order to discover whether speaking for others is called for, Alcoff encourages rhetors to consider four practices. They are to (1) closely analyze, and fight against, the impetus to speak, (2) determine how the social location and context affects the message, (3) realize the accountability and responsibility of the speaker and (4) evaluate the probable or actual effects of the words. When these four issues are dealt with by rhetors, they should know whether speaking for others would be profitable or not.

Fisher’s other-directed protest confirms and disconfirms several claims made in Stewart’s article. When Stewart (1991) describes the ego function as implicit, he makes it more difficult to decipher whether or not the ego function exists. An implicit message is more difficult to interpret. Fisher did overtly show his pride in his organization, the Fair Play Committee. He mentioned it in the list of credentials following his first written statement to the Tolan Committee. He also mentioned it indirectly in the second written statement, and he also referred to it twice in “Our Japanese Refugees.” The reference in the first written statement listed that he was secretary of the committee and that other prominent citizens were members. The reference in the second written statement gave the purpose of the committee and again labeled Fisher as secretary of the Committee. The
committee was mentioned only in passing in the first statement. The second
statement merely described its purpose “to support the Government and the armed
forces in preserving national security and winning the war, and at the same time, to
foster fair play, especially toward law-abiding and innocent aliens and citizens of
alien parentage” (p. 11203). This description was an implicit boast on behalf of the
organization to which Fisher belonged. The reference in “Our Japanese Refugees”
was much different, however, from the Tolan references. Both times Fisher
mentioned the committee in the article, they were in regards to the work that the
committee was doing to assist the Japanese. Fisher did not go into any detail about
his involvement with the Committee. He definitely showed pride in the manner in
which the committee was assisting the Japanese, but made no attempt to associate
himself with it. Fisher did not, however, compare the Fair Play Committee with
other groups in the anti-evacuation movement. He made no attempt to describe
their power, size, age or effectiveness. He was only desirous of showing the
audience that the committee was trying to complete its mission of assisting the
Japanese.

While Fisher showed definite pride in the Fair Play Committee, he did not
exhibit any pride in his own accomplishments. Stewart and Alcoff both assert that
other-directed protest is a selfish act. Stewart (1991) describes other-directed
protest as a tool “not to raise consciousness... but to take advantage of and
celebrate the exalted egos of the protestors” (p. 103). Alcoff (1991) said that other-
directed protest was “born of a desire for mastery... [to] achieve glory and praise”
(p. 29). Fisher’s rhetoric shows the opposite to be true. Fisher spent no time celebrating his own ego. He never mentioned his history in Japan, his books and articles written regarding Japan and in defense of the Japanese in America, or his testimony before the Tolan Committee. He instead spent his time enhancing the public’s opinion of the group he was arguing for: the Japanese. He certainly advocated the quest he was pursuing as moral and righteous and “against the forces of evil” (Stewart, p. 102). He did not, however, place himself on a pedestal as a savior of the Japanese. He also included their ideas for solving the problem – the cooperative farm project – and gave them credit for the plan rather than usurping the credit as a means to bolster his own ego.

Another of Alcoff’s (1991) concerns is that when one speaks for others, the result often reinforces hierarchies of power. Fisher may, in fact, have contributed to this reinforcement of hierarchies in his protest, but the circumstances may have called for his protest, nonetheless. Most social movements occur over a long period of time. In that time, the effected group members have time to build up their credibility in the eyes of their own group and the group in power. The Civil Rights Movement lasted for many years and in that time, Martin Luther King established his credibility and was able to speak to the European-American majority. The Japanese-Americans were not able to present their arguments for many years, however. The event they were protesting – internment – occurred within five months after the threat of it began. Although several Japanese-Americans presented arguments against internment, they did not
have sufficient time to break through racial barriers and allow themselves to be heard. Fisher's rhetoric, therefore, brought their message to those who still did not accept the Japanese-Americans' protest.

Alcoff also presents four practices, which are attempts to shield disempowered groups from power-hungry advocates. The first practice is to closely analyze, and fight against, the impetus to speak in the first place. Alcoff (1991) reasons that many times one's impulse to speak for others is "a desire for mastery and domination" (p. 24). The impetus to speak, in Fisher's case, came from a very time-sensitive situation in which the Japanese needed help from an empowered group member. This point may have been important, however, as the Japanese were speaking for themselves. Nine Japanese-Americans testified before the Tolan Committee on the day that Fisher testified. Fisher's testimony, therefore, as a member of the empowered group, may have overshadowed the messages of the Japanese-Americans and reinforced the hierarchies in place. Alcoff's fear is that when empowered group members speak, they overshadow the disempowered group members' voices. While this may have been true, it is also true that the disempowered group members, in this case the Japanese-Americans, may not be heard regardless of who else speaks. For a European-American in the 1940's, the voice of a fellow group member would likely have been more resonant than a member of another group. He also did not always seek to speak for others. In the editor's notes for *The Christian Century*, Charles Clayton Morrison, the editor, wrote that Fisher's "remarkable article on the situation on the West Coast was
written at the request of the editor” (p. 410). He merely responded to a need from the powered group to understand what the internment entailed.

In addition, Alcoff (1991) writes that instead of trying always to teach, members of the empowered group should listen. Fisher’s testimony and article suggest that he was listening to the Japanese. A student named Hi Korematsu planned the cooperative farm plan that Fisher discussed in both pieces. Fisher did not attempt to introduce his own plans for keeping the Japanese out of the internment camps; he simply presented those that had been already planned by the disempowered group: the Japanese.

The second guideline that Alcoff (1991) presents is that empowered group members should “interrogate the bearing of [their] location and context on what it is [they] are saying” (p. 25). This is done in order that the position of power that the speaker is in does not bear negatively on the disempowered group or the message. Alcoff writes, “This procedure would be most successful if engaged in collectively with others” (p. 25). Fisher may have engaged in this kind of interrogation with the Fair Play Committee. All the members of the Committee were concerned with gaining fair treatment for the Japanese, and they likely discussed their words before presenting them. Evidence for this probability is that Dr. Henry Grady, chairman of the Fair Play Committee, presented a press release on March 3, 1942 (Grodzins, 1949), that was, at least in part, identical to Fisher’s second written statement to the Tolan Committee. While Fisher may not have asked for input in all that he wrote, several members of the committee at least
viewed some of it, and therefore a collective interrogation of position was possible. Fisher was also in constant contact with Japanese-Americans through YMCA and Berkeley. That contact would have kept him aware of the needs of the Japanese and made Fisher better able to defend them.

Alcoff’s (1991) third guideline is that “speaking should always carry with it an accountability and responsibility for what one says” (p. 25). This is a valid point, and Fisher may have felt the force of the accountability and responsibility for his rhetoric. In speaking before the Tolan Committee, a governmental group with a certain amount of power, he may not have felt as comfortable speaking the truth to the extent he did in “Our Japanese Refugees.” He did not, however, let the government off completely in his testimony. He warned of consequences of the actions that were being considered and questioned the democratic loyalty of those who carried out those actions. In “Our Japanese Refugees,” Fisher presented the Japanese as truly loyal Americans, whereas many European-Americans had shown themselves to be less than dedicated to American ideals. His willingness to potentially anger that group shows that he was interested in presenting the truth as he saw it and therefore felt the responsibility and accountability for his words.

The final guideline that Alcoff (1991) presents, and the key in her mind, is that the rhetor should “analyze the probable or actual effects of the words on the discursive and material context” (p. 26). This analysis should not be based solely on location and context, but also on how the audience will receive the words. Fisher’s rhetoric appeared to take into consideration the audience’s reception of his
rhetoric. In the Tolan testimony, he presented most of the facts necessary to convince his audience that mass evacuation would not be beneficial. In "Our Japanese Refugees," however, the situation was decided already. The effects of his words, therefore, would not be a halting of the interment he found so contrary to American ideals, but rather would be to make his audience aware of the injustices done during the period leading to the internment and make them critical of future events so that they could prevent other unconstitutional activity. That he presented such different rhetoric, even within the Tolan argument shows that he was looking at the effects of the different audiences he was addressing and attempting to put forward evidence that would be effective for them separately.

The study of Galen Fisher’s rhetoric also brings to light some additional perspectives about other-directed protest. The first, which is not addressed in other theories surrounding the other-directed protest, is that sometimes a disempowered group does not have the power to argue on their own behalf to a rhetorical audience. The rhetorical audience for Fisher’s anti-internment rhetoric included the Tolan Committee, the unspecified civilian audience who would have been privy to the second written statement to the Tolan Committee and the Christian readers of The Christian Century. Each of these rhetorical audiences consisted mainly of European-Americans. The prejudicial mindset of many European-Americans in the 1940’s would have made them unlikely to listen to a Japanese-American’s rhetoric. In that time period, while many Japanese did protest on their own behalf, the self-directed protest would likely have been heeded only by those
who would have been sympathetic to their cause already. Those who felt the
Japanese-Americans, as citizens, had the same constitutional rights as any other
American would have been the audience willing to listen to the Japanese-
Americans’ rhetoric. Those who did not feel that the citizens of Japanese origin
had the same constitutional rights were the ones who needed to hear the protest
and, at the same times, would likely have been the people who would not listen to
Japanese-Americans’ rhetoric.

Another aspect of other-directed protest that has been covered in this thesis
is the ability of non-group member to be accepted into a group. While Fisher was a
member of an empowered group, he may also have been accepted as a member of
the disempowered group. Self-categorization theory shows how groups are
dynamic (Hogg, 2000) and therefore, depending on the circumstances, will allow
members to join who may not fit all the characteristics of the original group. If
Fisher and the Japanese fit these criteria, then Fisher was not engaging in a rhetoric
of othering. He was instead, arguing for a group of which he had been accepted as
a member.

Self-categorization theory was developed from research done in social
identity theory: “Tajfel first introduced the concept of social identity—‘the
individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some
emotional and value significance to him of this group membership’” (Hogg, 2000,
p 3). Self-categorization theory, more specifically, shows “how social
categorization produces prototype-based depersonalization of self and others and,
thus, generates social identity phenomena” (Hogg, 2000, p 3). Social identity, according to self-categorization theorists, is not a pre-determined entity.

Membership in groups may be based on more than demographic factors. Chatman and Flynn’s (2001) research on group membership in the workplace shows that, “research should focus on the factors that cause specific group norms to emerge, rather than take for granted the direct effects of demographic composition on work processes and outcomes” (p 16). If Fisher were accepted as a member of the Japanese group, despite the difference in race, he would be able to present self-directed, rather than other-directed, moral protest.

The major problem with this theory is that, although Fisher may have been accepted in the Japanese group, he did not share their fate of internment. Chatman and Flynn (2001) state that contact with another group is not enough to provide group membership to an outsider: “To induce group members’ recategorization of different people into a common in-group identity, the contact situation must reflect certain conditions, including, most importantly, an objective that makes members’ shared fate” (Chatman and Flynn, 2001, 5). Fisher had no Japanese blood in him and therefore was not in danger of being evacuated or sent to internment camps. This problem would be especially salient if Fisher was attempting to be a leader of the group. Hogg (2000) theorized that leaders are often the prototypical embodiment of the group. Minority members of groups, therefore, have difficulty attaining leadership positions. Fisher was not trying to lead the group; however, he
simply took the ideas of the Japanese and presented them. His lack of shared fate and lack of prototypicality is therefore not as significant.

Minority members may also be more welcome in new groups during uncertain times (Hogg, 2000). The period leading up to the war was a time of uncertainty for the Nisei. They had already been trying to establish themselves as American and not Japanese (Kochiyama, 1995) and so they may have been more attracted to admitting Fisher as a part of their group. His background was similar in some regards to their backgrounds. He was an American, just as they were but his twenty years in Japan as a missionary gave him an understanding of the Japanese culture they had likely learned through their parents. The time period after Pearl Harbor was attacked increased the uncertainty of the times. The Nisei and Issei may have been more inclined to accept Fisher as a part of their group at this time because of the uncertainty of their future and their need to solve a problem. According to Hogg, groups are accessible in two ways: chronic accessibility or situational accessibility. Based on the situation at hand, the time period after Pearl Harbor may have seemed the appropriate situation for the Japanese to accept Fisher into their group.

Chatman and Flynn’s (2001) research on work groups show how Fisher’s inclusion in the Japanese group could help him in his advocacy. Chatman and Flynn researched the results of work groups that were put together to solve a problem. They found that “members are likely to develop shared views about ways to approach and accomplish their required tasks” (p. 8). Although the Japanese and
Fisher were not in a work group put together in an organization, they were a group working to solve the problem of evacuation. As they had the same goal, by working together they would have shared their viewpoints on how to solve the problem and worked together to discover the best way to achieve their goal. Even if Fisher had not been accepted fully as a member of the Japanese group at the beginning of the war, Chatman and Flynn’s research shows that “following contact, different people may be more likely to recategorize group members by viewing work group membership as more salient than previously assigned demographically based out-group identities” (p. 15). Fisher had worked extensively with the Japanese during his life. He had lived in Japan for twenty years, worked with the Japanese in Berkeley and founded the Fair Play Committee. The fact that Fisher was working together with the Japanese may have become a more important identity than his identity as a European-American.

Demographic differences are not entirely irrelevant in group membership. Chatman and Flynn (2001) state that, on the contrary, in the early stages of a group, “salient demographic differences influence members’ behavior…” (p. 6). While the group of “the Japanese” was not a new group, the group of “those trying to avoid internment” was relatively new. Fisher may have had difficulty being accepted into the group initially, but, as Chatman and Flynn continued, “as a group forms more specific norms, these norms may eclipse the use of demographic differences as proxies for how members should act and treat others” (p. 6). Fisher likely was able to learn those norms early as he had experience living in Japan and
being with Japanese people. Thus, based on the situation and his experience, Fisher may have been acceptable to the Japanese as a member of their group.

While this material is outside the subject of the other-directed protest, the work by intercultural and organizational communication theorists provides information that adds to the works by Alcoff and Stewart. With the possibility that other-directed protestors may be able to join the disempowered groups, the worries of these theorists in other-directed protest can be allayed. If Fisher, and other protestors, are acceptable members of a group, then the problems of egotistical speakers are alleviated. Fisher’s background makes it likely that he was an acceptable person to the Japanese and may have been accepted as a member of their group.

The final topic that this thesis shows is how praise and blame contributes to other-directed protest. All four pieces of rhetoric that Fisher presented included some form of praise and blame. Fisher used the blame to show the problems inherent in the social, military and governmental hierarchies of the time. He used praise to demonstrate what a responsible citizen should do. This presentation increased the credibility of Fisher in regards to the guidelines for other-directed protesters. When placed correctly, praise and blame can be used to undo previously held hierarchies and to bolster the image of a disempowered group. It also works to help an audience desire to be deserving of praise and therefore willing to undertake actions requested in a piece of rhetoric.
The limitation of this study has been the availability of resources. As a historical study, first-hand and primary materials were not easily available. Although I spent some time examining Fisher’s archived documents and studied the primary material that he wrote, there was a limitation of time and ability to research primary materials from Fisher, the Japanese of the time and other related people. A more thorough study of archived documents regarding the members of the Fair Play Committee could have shed more light on his work during the time. Retrieving information from internees from Manzanar, the internment camp he visited, may have shown some reference to Fisher and whether he was an accepted protestor on their behalf. Without this information, the actual reaction to Fisher’s rhetoric by the Japanese-Americans cannot be completely determined. As a result, Fisher’s actual relationship with the Japanese, the acceptability of his message and its cohesion with their actual needs requires further work.

Some suggestions for further research include studying effects of self-directed protest versus other-directed protest. A study in this area could help determine what the differences should be in the style of argument, what situations most call for other-directed protest, and whether the results vary based on who is doing the protest. In the case of 1940’s America, it seems that non-European-Americans would not be as effective in their rhetoric as European-Americans. A study of the self- and other-directed protests could show if there are similar acceptable and unacceptable groups still existing. This study could also show if the message must be different if it should be shared across groups.
Another potential subject for future research would be a study of times when there was a lack of protest, along with any resulting discriminatory practices. For example, during World War I, was there a group that argued on behalf of the German-Americans? If not, a study on this subject could show any parallels between the German- and Japanese-American situations. Both groups were not accepted during their time and faced discrimination. Protesting may have made a difference during the time of the discrimination, and may also have prevented the discrimination from taking place in future times of war. Protests on behalf of the German-Americans during World War I may have prevented the internment of the Japanese-Americans during World War II. Protests on behalf of the Japanese-Americans may have benefited people of Arabic descent following September 11, 2001.

Long-term effects of seemingly unprofitable protest could also be studied. Although the anti-internment protest was not effective in the short run, eventually the government ruled the internment unconstitutional and retribution was made to those who were interned. This long-term effect may have been due, in part, to the protest at the time. Study of the protest of the War in Iraq, another ineffectual protest, could also be studied to determine what long-term benefits it may, or may not, have.

In all, the study of Galen Fisher’s anti-internment rhetoric sheds light on several aspects of other-directed protest. Through his rhetoric during a singular period in American history, we can gain understanding of how other-directed
protest works, whether it is an acceptable form of protest, and how situations can
determine the type of protest necessary. Despite the fact that his rhetoric did not
help stop internment from happening, it likely made the audience aware that an
injustice was being done, and may have prevented such events from happening in
the future.
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