

Is risk on fishing quotas homogeneously distributed among EU member-states?

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International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade
(IIFET)
Conference 2016

Outline

1. Fishing Regulation in the EU

European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)

Linking fishing quota distribution with portfolio theory

2. Objectives and Methods

Objectives and Framework

Methods

3. Theoretical Framework

4. Empirical Application

Quotas

Landings

Fleets

Risk

Conclusions

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- ▶ Management of the fisheries
 - maintain sustainably long term fish stocks
 - avoid collapses that can diminish the reproductive capacity
- ▶ Set total allowable catches (TACs): annual catch limits set for most commercial fishes.
- ▶ Overfishing
- ▶ Multi-annual Guidance Programmes: establish an equilibrium between the fishing capacity and the sustainability of the resources.

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- ▶ Total Allowable Catches (TACs): Catch limits set for each species

$$TAC = Q_i \quad i = 1, \dots, N$$

- ▶ Quotas : The sharing out of the quotas between EU countries

$$Q_i = \sum_{j=1}^S q_{ij} \quad j = 1, \dots, S$$

- ▶ Relative Stability Principle : Fixed allocation key based on their historic catches
- ▶ Financial Portfolio: Species portfolio (tonne)

$$SP_j = (q_{1j}, \dots, q_{Nj})$$

- ▶ Investment collection: Portfolio value(€)

$$PV_j = (q_{1j} * p_{1j}, \dots, q_{Nj} * p_{Nj})$$

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Objectives and Framework

- ▶ Innovative approach:
Sanchirico, J.N., et al., (2008)
Edwards, S.F., et al., (2010)
- ▶ Risk (r_{jt}) measurement related to each Fishing Portfolio's Value (PV_j)
- ▶ Test if significant differences on risk exist

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Methods

- ▶ Risk measurement through various indicators
- ▶ Hypothesis testing:
 - Parametric model (ANOVA y ANOVA post hoc)
 - Non-parameric model (Kruskal-Wallis)

Risk Measurement

Risk indicators

- ▶ Semivariance: Uses deviations under the average value
 $S = E(\text{Min}(0, R - c)^2)$
- ▶ Value-at-Risk: maximum probable loss for a given confidence interval, and over a certain period of time.

$$\text{VaR} = \alpha \cdot \sqrt{\sigma^2 \cdot \Delta t}$$


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Value of the Quotas

- ▶ Value of the quotas yearly accumulated (total €)



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
Risk

Conclusions

Landings

Captures


- ▶ Value of the landings of fishery products in EU: by Countries



Landings

Captures

- ▶ Value of the landings of fishery products in EU: by Years



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
Risk

Conclusions

Capacity of the Fleets

Gross Tonnage (GT)


- ▶ Fleets' Capacity by GT: mean value for Countries (1990-2015)



Capacity of the Fleets

Gross Tonnage (GT)

- ▶ Fleets' Capacity by GT: mean value by Years (1990-2015)



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
Risk

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Quotas: Expected value's Semivariance

Do significant differences on risk exist?


► The risk



Quotas: Expected value's Semivariance

Do significant differences on risk exist?

► Graphic analysis



Quotas: Expected value's Semivariance

Hypothesis testing:

- ▶ **Parametric model (ANOVA):**
Normality (Test Shapiro Wilks): NO
Homocedasticity (Test Levene): Country:NO & Year:YES
- ▶ **RESULTS:**
Variable COUNTRY: significant
Variable YEAR: not significant
- ▶ **DECISION:** Complement ANOVA with non-parametric model
- ▶ **Non-parametric model (Kruskal-Wallis):** Confirms the results

Conclusions

1. European fishing quotas, landings and fleets are not homogeneously distributed
 - ▶ Principal quota holders are in average: UK, Denmark and Netherlands (2009-2013)
 - ▶ Landings mainly take place in: Spain, Italy and France (2007-2014)
 - ▶ The fleet distribution among the EU countries (1990-2015) follow a similar pattern compare to the landings

2. Based on the measurement of risk:

- ▶ Risk exists associated to the value of fishing quotas
- ▶ Significant differences on risk exist among countries
 - ▶ High risk: United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands
 - ▶ Medium risk: Ireland, France, Spain, Germany
 - ▶ Low risk: Sweden, Belgium, Portugal, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia

3. The risk is an important complement to achieve the objectives of the Relative Stability Principle.

Further research

- Explore alternative risk indicators
- Apply the potential of the Value-at-Risk
- Combine: Landing and quota evolution with fleet dynamics

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Thank you very much for your attention!