AN ABSTRACT OF THE ESSAY OF

Mika Yasuo Timmons for the degree of Master of Public Policy presented on September 23, 2013.

Title: A Comparative Case Study of Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon and Preferences in Victim Assistance

Abstract approved:

Michelle L. Inderbitzin

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) Human Trafficking Task Forces bring together federal, state, and municipal governmental agencies and law enforcement agencies (“agencies”), and non-profit organizations and other service providers (“organizations”), for one main purpose: to reduce the trafficking of humans in the United States. The Task Forces are critical tools that implement victim protections of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA 2000”) and Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Acts (“TVPRAs”).

In this comparative case study, I examine the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon from 2010 to 2013. I use the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to explain how the organizational factors and beliefs of these two Task Forces influence the ways in which they provide anti-human trafficking resources and assistance. I also examine how, under some circumstances, these organizational factors and beliefs lead to an underserving of victims of labor trafficking relative to victims of commercialized sex trafficking.

I conclude with policy recommendations for the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon in light of the roll out of plans for the next iteration of TVPRA as part of the Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking in 2013.

Keywords: human trafficking, labor trafficking, sex trafficking, task force, Oregon, Washington, Advocacy Coalition Framework, TVPRA 2013
© Copyright by Mika Y. Timmons
October 11, 2013
All Rights Reserved
A Comparative Case Study of
Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon and
Preferences in Victim Assistance

by
Mika Yasuo Timmons

An ESSAY
submitted to
Oregon State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of

Master of Public Policy

Presented on September 23, 2013
Master of Public Policy essay of Mika Y. Timmons presented on September 23, 2013.

APPROVED:

Michelle L. Inderbitzin, representing Sociology

Scott M. Akins, representing Sociology

Hilary S. Boudet, representing Sociology

I understand that my essay will become part of the permanent collection of Oregon State University libraries. My signature below authorizes release of my essay to any reader upon request.

Mika Y. Timmons, Author
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I express my gratitude to a number of individuals that helped me through this Master of Public Policy program and with this body of work.

I want to improve the ways that we provide assistance to victims of human trafficking and, thus, I am grateful to the interviewees that shared their time to participate in this study.

Thank you, Professors Michelle Inderbitzin, Scott Akins, and Hilary Boudet for your continuous feedback, sense of humor, and encouragement to challenge myself. I am greatly honored to have been one of your students as well as your advisee.

To my graduate assistantship advisors, Professors Scott Akins, Sarah Henderson and Sally Gallagher, thank you for including me in your work and expanding the breadth of my education to include women in international politics, a myriad of consciousness altering drugs, and sociological perspectives of world religions. I also appreciate the Director of Institute for Natural Resources, Lisa Gaines, for her mentorship.

Dr. Brent Steel and Dr. Denise Lach, thank you for helping me in my pursuit for knowledge by accepting me into the Master of Public Policy program.

I am surrounded by my inspirational and supportive friends including: Linda Williams, Ramneek Williams, Sandy Letzing, Sarah Cline, Suman Pant, Jayendra Gokhale, Marie Anselm, Meghann Rhynard-Geil, and Marisa Martin.

The person I cannot thank enough for his unwavering support is my husband. Thank you, Chris, for always believing in my work.

Finally, I thank my parents and siblings for their love and care.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ON THE CREATION OF THE BJA/OVC HUMAN TRAFFICKING TASKFORCES ......................................................................................................................... 3

LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE FRAMING OF ANTI-HUMAN TRAFFICKING EFFORTS ......................................................................................................................................................... 3

THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK .............................................................................. 5

DATA AND METHODS .................................................................................................................. 9
  Online Data Collection ........................................................................................................... 10
  Interviews ............................................................................................................................... 10

ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................. 11
  Theme 1: Human Trafficking Assistance: Choosing All or One ................................................. 12
  Theme 2: On the Turf of the Collectivists and the Neo-Abolitionists ......................................... 15
  Theme 3: Financial Objectives and How “Sex Sells” ................................................................. 17

DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................... 20

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................. 25

AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .......................................................................................... 28

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 29

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 32

APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................. 36
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1. Diagram of Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1. Types of Assisted Victims of Human Trafficking</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIST OF APPENDICES**

Appendix A. Map of 2010 BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces | 36
Appendix B. Worksheet for Online Data Collection | 37
Appendix C. Funding Histories of Task Forces According to Federal Grant Awards | 38
Appendix D. Semi-Structured Interview Questions | 39
Appendix E. List of Interview Citations by Order of Appearance in Text | 40
**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJA</td>
<td>Bureau of Justice Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEC</td>
<td>Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Internal Revenue Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OATH</td>
<td>Oregonians Against Human Trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHTTF</td>
<td>Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OJJDP</td>
<td>Office for Juvenile Justice and Drug Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVC</td>
<td>Office for Victims of Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PITF</td>
<td>President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T Visa</td>
<td>T Nonimmigrant Status Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVPA 2000</td>
<td>Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVPRAs</td>
<td>Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Visa</td>
<td>U Nonimmigrant Status Visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARN</td>
<td>Washington Anti-Trafficking Response Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WashACT</td>
<td>Washington Advisory Committee on Trafficking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Human trafficking, or modern day slavery, is an illicit industry with hidden populations of victims. “Human trafficking” is an umbrella term for the following types of trafficking: forced labor, sex trafficking, bonded labor, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labor, child soldiers, and child sex trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2006). Estimates of human trafficking suggest that globally between 27.5 and 30 million people are forced into human trafficking per year (Not for Sale Campaign, 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2012) and that between 14,500 and 17,000 victims are trafficked into the U.S. per year (Freedom Center, 2012). These estimates for the United States have remained unchanged since 2006 (Siskin & Wyler, 2011). Exact numbers of human trafficking victim populations are difficult to ascertain due to numerical discrepancies between observed and estimated cases, methodological challenges, and data collection problems (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2006).

This study focuses on two specific misconceptions about human trafficking. First is the misconception that women and girls are the main victims. In fact, boys and men represent one-quarter of known victims of human trafficking around the world (UNODC, 2012). Moreover, neo-abolitionist feminist perspectives on human trafficking, which focus on the sex-sector trafficking of women and girls, impede efforts to identify and respond to the trafficking of men and boys (Chuang, 2010). Women, men, boys, and girls alike can fall prey to coercion and exploitation and can be forced to perform sexual services, labor, or work in involuntary domestic servitude or debt bondage (U.S. Department of State, n.d.).

The second misconception is that the most common type of human trafficking is commercialized sex trafficking. Indeed, reports by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)/Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) Human Trafficking Task Forces in 2007-2008 and 2008-2010 estimated that the vast majority of suspected trafficking incidents were related to sex trafficking (Kyckelhahn, Beck, & Cohen, 2009; Banks & Kyckelhahn,

---

1This 2009 UNODC report investigated 65 of the 193 United Nations countries and may not fully account for men and boys in human trafficking.
However, when the OVC awarded grants to 32 agencies and victim service providers from 2008-2009 to assist foreign nationals victims of human trafficking, the results showed that 64% of their victims as victims of labor trafficking, 22% as victims of sex trafficking only, and 10% as victims of labor trafficking and sex trafficking (Banks & Kyckelhahn, 2011). Observing the influence of the OVC funding requirements and the increase in the number of reported cases of labor trafficking, the BJA and OVC developed a collaborative model in 2010 to encourage grant recipients to adopt a comprehensive approach to assist victims of all types of human trafficking (Banks & Kyckelhahn, 2011).2

In a comparative case study of the development of the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon after receiving BJA/OVC Task Force grants in 2010, I examine how, under some circumstances, labor trafficking is underserved relative to commercialized sex trafficking. Despite similar timelines and funding schedules, the Task Forces in Washington and Oregon have resulted in different anti-human trafficking outcomes. In short, the Human Trafficking Task Force of Washington has a comprehensive anti-human trafficking strategy that promotes assistance to all types of human trafficking. In contrast, the Human Trafficking Task Force in Oregon prioritizes anti-trafficking efforts against commercialized sex trafficking over labor trafficking and other types of human trafficking.

I first provide background on the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces and a discussion of the literature on the framing of anti-human trafficking efforts. I then describe my theoretical framework – the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Weible, 2007) – and apply it to explain how changes in beliefs and practices amongst actors in Washington and Oregon led to very different outcomes in terms of each Task Force’s service provision to victims of human trafficking. I conclude with suggested directions for future research and policy recommendations to improve regional anti-human trafficking assistance to all types of human trafficking.

---

2 See Appendix A for Map of 2010 BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Force Grant Recipients.
BACKGROUND ON THE CREATION OF THE BJA/OVC HUMAN TRAFFICKING TASKFORCES

In 2000, the United States government adopted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA 2000), which provided a federal definition of human trafficking as a criminal act of using force, fraud, or coercion to maintain or obtain work. Each of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Acts (TVPRA) of 2003, 2005, and 2008 furthered eligibilities for T Nonimmigrant Status Visas (T Visas) and U Nonimmigrant Status Visas (U Visas) for human trafficking victims related to immigration. The TVPA 2000 also created governmental mechanisms to guide federal anti-human trafficking efforts within the U.S. and abroad through a three-pronged approach of prevention, protection, and prosecution (Polaris Project, 2008). At the cabinet level, the TVPA 2000 created the President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking (PITF) to coordinate federal human trafficking efforts between a number of federal agencies including the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). In 2004, the BJA with the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) created Human Trafficking Task Forces across the United States — including the two examined here in Washington and Oregon — to execute the human trafficking victim protections of the TVPA 2000 and TVPRAs. From 2013 to 2017, the BJA/OVC will support Human Trafficking Task Forces that have strategies such as: effective collaboration, conflict resolution, building trust, establishing roles of members, member participation, and resource and information sharing (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2012). Thus, my focus is founded on how the Task Forces in Washington and Oregon behave and implement these strategies to influence the provision of assistance to victims of human trafficking.

LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE FRAMING OF ANTI-HUMAN TRAFFICKING EFFORTS

The types of human trafficking victims that are counted and how they are counted can vary between NGOs, agencies, and international organizations (Jahic & Finckenauer, 2005). The language of anti-human trafficking laws, policies, and successes developed in
the early 2000s under the Bush Administration (Alvarez & Alessi, 2012). During this era, neo-abolitionist feminist scholars and advocates such as Catherine MacKinnon, who focused on violence against women and the victimization of women helped to frame the language of anti-human trafficking and focused on women and children as sex slaves (Gozdziak & Bump, 2008; Jahic & Finckenauer, 2005; Kim, 2010; Musto, 2009; Pope, 2010). Soderlund argues that the conservative religious approaches related to gender and sexuality over time resulted in “raid-and-rehabilitation methods for reducing sex trafficking” (as cited in Gozdziak & Bump, 2008, p. 32).

The neo-abolitionist feminist language around human trafficking carried over into federal-grant requirements and focused anti-trafficking initiatives on anti-prostitution and sexual exploitation campaigns (Alvarez & Alessi, 2012; Chapkis, 2003; Chuang, 2010; Jahic & Finckenauer, 2005). These perspectives overwhelmingly skewed the focus of policy makers and researchers towards sex trafficking (Gozdziak & Bump, 2008). “The construction of a victim who appeals to the public and policymakers must be sexually blameless, and anti-trafficking policies continue to focus on the notion of the ‘innocent,’ unwilling victim” (Peters, 2010, p. 18). Moreover, women, minors, and children were likely to be perceived as being victims of commercialized sex trafficking while men are more likely to be viewed as migrant workers (Chuang, 2010). The stories that remained untold by the neo-abolitionist feminists are those victims of non-sex types of human trafficking (Chang & Kim, 2007).

Most victims of labor trafficking are initially migration seekers (Cho, 2012) and to debunk the images that focus highly on sex trafficking and “severe forms of exploitation,” the TVPRAs have made gradual shifts to provide immigration relief for victims of international human trafficking under the T Nonimmigrant Status visa (T visa) (Cianciarulo, 2008). Yet, because local law enforcement agencies may not have proper

---

3 In a novel approach, Cho and Vadlamannati (2012) accesses highly confidential data from the Counter Trafficking Module (CTM) of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) containing private information of over 25,000 human trafficking victims from 153 countries between 1995 and 2010 and tests the robustness of 70 push and 63 pull factors identified in preexisting literature on human trafficking. Cho concludes that most victims of human trafficking are initially migration seekers and that the likelihood of the occurrence of migration is impacted by the demand for low-skilled labor, higher GDP per capita of destination countries in comparison to countries of origin of victims, globalization, and exposure to foreign contacts.
training to recognize labor trafficking victims, sex trafficking victims are identified easier than labor trafficking victims, which make sex trafficking cases easier to prosecute (Sheldon-Sherman, 2013). T visas are underutilized by non-U.S. labor trafficking victims because the stringent T visa qualifications, which include: demonstrating that there was no opportunity to leave the United States, proving that there was “extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm,” and providing assistance to law enforcement with “reasonable requests” to cooperate in investigations (Bistricter, 2011).4

Changes in anti-human trafficking perspectives and the implementation of policies are occurring at the legislative level and the TVPRAs are trying to diminish neo-abolitionist feminist impacts to better assist victims of all types of human trafficking. However, the TVPRAs are “top-heavy” with directives at the federal law enforcement level (Sheldon-Sherman, 2013) and local decision makers, such the agencies and organizations involved in the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces, must put these changes into practice, thus justifying my focus on the Task Forces examined here.

THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

A multitude of theories of public administration and public policy could be used to simplify the complex world of anti-human trafficking. The BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces are policy instruments developed at the federal level and executed at local levels by decision makers and public servants acting on behalf of communities. The Weberian and goal-oriented “top-down” approach (1946) and other “bottom-up” approaches including street level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980) and representative bureaucracy (Kelly, 1998) partially answer questions regarding the anti-human trafficking activities in Washington and Oregon.

These approaches explain little about how divergent perspectives and contrasting relationships in the Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon contribute to the ways that agencies and organizations channel their attention and

---

4 There is an annual allotment of 5,000 T Visas for international victims of human trafficking. However, from 2002 to 2010, 1,862 out of 2,968 applications for T visas for foreign victims of human trafficking were granted and nearly 30% of applications for T visas were denied (Siskin & Wyler, 2010).
resources to focus on certain types of victims of human trafficking more than other types of victims of human trafficking. In the next section, I describe the Advocacy Coalition Framework, a more progressive theory of public policy than the aforementioned classical theories, as an overarching framework to explain how, under some circumstances, victims of labor trafficking are underserved in comparison to victims of commercialized sex trafficking.

The aims of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) are to examine how policy-oriented learning and external factors influence the beliefs and policy changes of policy subsystems. In ACF, the policy subsystem comprises policy-oriented groups called “advocacy coalitions” and coalition participants such as elected officials, judges, stakeholders, practitioners, researchers, interest groups, and other actors (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). The actors have opinions, beliefs, and specialized knowledge regarding the policy of interest to the subsystem (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In ACF, the actors in the advocacy coalitions are the decisions makers and they use the “logic of appropriateness” to make decisions that are the most appropriate or “logic of consequences” to maximize their outcomes (March and Olsen, 1996). The analysis of the task forces in Washington and Oregon will examine how the two types of logic direct attention and resources towards certain types of trafficking victims.

Policy subsystems are networks of advocacy coalitions and coalition participants that are interconnected to each other through a specialized policy or they are oriented in a policy region (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Sabatier and Weible note that “overlapping and nested subsystems” can be present when policy participants from different policy subsystem levels connect to each other or when several policies connect through participants within a policy subsystem level. For example, when smoking control measures failed under the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan in the 1970s, international and local advocacy groups and organizations joined under a policy subsystem and led the mobilization of smoking control measures and reduction in smoking patterns (Sato, 1999).

Policy Subsystem Attributes
The attributes of policy subsystems are: developmental stages, levels of policymaking, and levels of belief. First, how policy-oriented learning and external factors influence the beliefs and policy changes of policy subsystems depends on whether the developmental stage of a policy subsystem is mature or nascent. Policy subsystems are mature if they are stable over time, usually over several decades, and have policy participants that act semi-autonomously with shared specialties in their specific policy areas (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Second, the levels of policymaking are the macro-level that spans broad political and socioeconomic systems, meso-level that focuses on advocacy coalitions, and micro-level that exists as a network of ties between individuals. Lastly, the policy subsystems in ACF have three levels of belief systems. “Deep core beliefs” that are ontological and normative in nature and they span entire policy subsystems at the macro-level. “Policy core beliefs” are applications of deep core beliefs that span across parts of policy subsystems. “Secondary beliefs” are narrow and pertain to specific characteristics of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).

**Exogenous Variables**

The ACF diagram below (Figure 4) illustrates how exogenous factors influence policy subsystems (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Some of these factors are: cultural values, impacts from other policy subsystem, the degree of consensus needed for major policy change, openness of a political system, short-term constraints, and resources of subsystem actors (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Another coalition resource is public opinion because advocacy coalitions can channel money into changing the opinions of policy participants and to lobby for legislators that favor the objectives of the coalition.
Coordination Patterns

Unique to ACF is the “devil shift,” which is an event due to conflicts or cleavages between actors within advocacy coalitions or between advocacy coalitions themselves. Devil shifts take place when competing coalitions perceive oppositional actors as more distrustful, powerful, or evil than they likely are and thus increase the strength and density of ties within advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Other ways in which advocacy coalitions organize policy core preferences and negotiate agreements are called “coordination patterns.”

The following are a few examples of coordination patterns and how they solve tensions. The “hurting stalemate” occurs when all parties believe that negotiation is a waste of time and they refuse to compromise. “Maintaining composition” is when groups of stakeholders recognize that it is better to negotiate now than to be circumvented in the long run. The pattern of encouraging the “importance of building trust” works to dispel distrust amongst members, regardless of the difficulty of subsystem problems. Finally, advocacy coalitions sometimes find “alternative venues,” such as different stakeholders, key decision makers, or other channels of decision making, which will support an advocacy coalition’s mission (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).

(From Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 202)
In the following sections, this case study on the Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon will use the Advocacy Coalition Framework to suggest how agencies and organizations engage in policy-oriented learning. More specifically, the case study will use ACF to explain how these agencies and organizations in Washington and Oregon used coalition resources, personal relationships, and negotiation strategies to transmute their beliefs on labor trafficking and sex trafficking to the preferences of the Human Trafficking Task Forces in Washington and Oregon. Here, I turn to a description of how I gathered information about these two Task Forces.

DATA AND METHODS

Case Selection

I focus on the Human Trafficking Task Forces of the Bureau of Justice Assistance with Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) for a couple of reasons. Their purposes are to be multidisciplinary and collaborative partnerships that ally victim service providers and organizations with regulatory and law enforcement agencies at local, state, and federal levels (Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.). I selected the two BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces in Oregon and Washington for two reasons: ease of access and similar implementation timelines. Moreover, the Human Trafficking Task Force in Washington has been continually identified as a model task force for other BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces across the United States.

In terms of timelines, the Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force (OHTTF) formed in Multnomah County, Oregon, in 2005. The Washington Anti-Trafficking Response Network (WARN) formed in Washington State in 2004. The Washington Advisory Committee on Trafficking (WashACT), which guides the Washington Anti-Trafficking Response Network, formed in 2006 and has jurisdictional power in the Western District of Washington of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Around 2008, both OHTTF and WARN/WashACT received grants from BJA/OVC to support their anti-human trafficking initiatives. In 2010, both OHTTF and WARN were amongst the thirty-nine BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces that received grants to comprehensively assist all types of victims of human trafficking (see Appendix A).
WashACT is continually highlighted as one of the national model task forces for the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces across the United States.

**Online Data Collection**

Using a structured approach (see Appendix B for the Worksheet for Online Data Collection), I first examined the websites of the two taskforces and 23 task force member agencies and organizations (9 websites in Washington and 14 websites in Oregon) to assess whether: 1) the task force or task force's members cross-reference each other online, 2) information is available on anti-trafficking policies, and 3) information is provided on specific anti-human trafficking programs or projects. A total of 101 additional items of online data include: online documents, such as newsletters, program materials, flyers, etc. that were linked and downloadable from agency and organization websites. I also used Facebook profiles of agencies and organizations when they were available.

To supplement the interview responses and online data collection, I found financial documents to verify which agencies and organizations received federal anti-human trafficking grant funds. I found 26 online grant award summaries from 2005 to 2013 on the websites of BJA, OVC, and Office for Juvenile Justice and Drug Prevention (OJJDP). A summary of these grants is provided in Appendix C. I used Guidestar.org, a non-profit organization that provides free public access to financial information of non-profit organizations, to find annual Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 990 Tax Forms. The IRS 990 Tax forms were publicly available for eight of the anti-human trafficking non-profit organizations that were selected for this case study.

**Interviews**

Using the information found online, I selected 23 potential interviewees representing 100% of the membership organizations of the Washington Task Force and 100% of the membership organizations of the Oregon Task Force. Of these 23 potential interviewees, 21 participated in semi-structured interviews for this study with one interview conducted per agency or organization – 8 agencies and organizations from Washington (representing 88% of the membership organizations of the Washington Task
Force) and 13 agencies and organizations from Oregon (representing 83% of the membership organizations of the Oregon Task Force). I categorized 13 interviews as being from non-profit organizations or service providers (two from Washington, six from Oregon) and eight as from local, state, or federal government agencies or law enforcement agencies (six from Washington, seven from Oregon).

I asked each interviewee about their organization’s role and collaborations with other members in their Task Force (see Appendix D for the Semi-Structured Interview Questions). Interviews consisted of very similar questions for all agencies and organizations. Interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, with an average length of 45 minutes. I then transcribed and analyzed my notes using the methods prescribed by the interpretive phenomenological method of analysis, which is a method of qualitative analysis that is useful for identifying and examining shared themes of interview responses and in-depth cases within a case study (Fade, 2004). The tables presented in the analysis section represent counts of mentions by the 21 interviewees.

ANALYSIS

Three themes emerged from both the online and interview data, suggesting how the anti-human trafficking policy subsystems in Washington and Oregon differ in their preferences to assist victims of human trafficking. The first theme suggests how agencies and organizations in Washington acknowledge that they choose to assist all types of human trafficking victims, while many of the agencies and organizations in Oregon demonstrate that they prefer to assist victims of sex trafficking rather than victims of labor trafficking. The second theme points to the organizational perspectives and coordination patterns of the advocacy coalitions that foster these preferences. Finally, the third theme illustrates how the preferences of the advocacy coalitions influence the policy subsystems in Washington and Oregon and how the reduction in coalition resources in

---

5 The WARN and WashACT members have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to not disclose confidential information about the activities of WARN and WashACT to the general public. This MOU may have contributed to a distrust of the interviewer and biases amongst interviewees in their reflections on WARN and WashACT.
Oregon ultimately leads to an underserving of victims of labor trafficking relative to victims of commercialized sex trafficking.

**Theme 1: Human Trafficking Assistance: Choosing All or One**

In Washington, WashACT and WARN emphasize assisting victims of all types of human trafficking. Demonstrating the trickle-down of these objectives and the cohesion within WashACT and WARN, the interviewees in Washington responded that they provide equal assistance to all victims of human trafficking, including victims of labor trafficking, sex trafficking, domestic trafficking and foreign-born trafficking. One interviewee pointed to the progressiveness of the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem in Washington by discussing how their agency/organization collaborates with other agencies to provide assistance to victims of all types of human trafficking. According to the interviewee, 85% of the cases that they deal with on a regular basis are related to labor trafficking while only 15% of cases are related to domestic sex trafficking (interview 1). Elaborating on collaborative efforts to assist victims of labor trafficking, this interviewee described how their agency/organization had trained park rangers to spot “signs of human trafficking” in forests where victims were gathering plants used in bouquets sold in markets – training that ultimately resulted in the identification and rescue of several victims, as well as the prosecution of two traffickers (interview 1).

The interview responses from agencies and organizations in Oregon revealed the prevalence of neo-abolitionist feminist perspectives in the anti-human trafficking policy arena in Oregon. As the literature suggests, this perspective reinforces and skews the perspectives of decision makers towards sex trafficking (Gozdziak & Bump, 2008) and a disproportionate number of anti-human trafficking programs in Oregon focus on commercialized sex trafficking, child sex trafficking, and domestic trafficking, rather than on foreign-born trafficking or labor trafficking (interview 2, 3). According to some agencies and organizations located near Portland, Portland is the child sex trafficking capital of the United States (Alfonsi & Fahy, 2010; Elseth, 2010). This media image reinforces neo-abolitionist feminist perspectives of agencies and organizations (interview 3), which also encourages agencies and organizations to underserve victims of labor trafficking relative to victims of sex trafficking.
One interviewee summarized how the clash between perspectives of neo-abolitionist feminist and comprehensive anti-human trafficking agencies and organizations in Oregon results in a bifurcation of anti-human trafficking programs. According to the interviewee, the outcome is that victims of labor trafficking are underserved relative to victims of commercialized sex trafficking,

*The division between foreign [labor] and commercial[alized sex trafficking] victims is very pronounced. There’s not much collaboration and there are split task forces that naturally lead to missed opportunities. The OVC/OJP grants require servicing all forms of trafficking, but there is not an interest in collaborating locally or combining social services or task forces.*

*A big part of it is that there’s a lot more media coverage of CSEC, so more victims of CSEC might be identified [than foreign-born victims]. People are just more sympathetic [to CSEC] and agencies can feed off of that to a certain extent. When it’s foreign trafficking, it is a lot more controversial because it brings in the political side of immigration. Both kinds should be eligible for the same services, but one side is more covered.* (interview 3)

Another interviewee, whose agency/organization is listed online as a member of the OHTTF but has never been an active member of any anti-human trafficking task force in Oregon, expressed that their agency/organization is interested in providing assistance to victims of labor trafficking but that “no other agencies want to share resources” on this issue (interview 4).

Table 2 shows counts of interviewee mentions by state of the types of victims of human trafficking that agencies and organizations assist. While only two agencies and organizations in Washington reported that their programs assisted “all types of human trafficking,” several agencies and organizations in Washington chose to name the types of victims of human trafficking – still demonstrating that their programs and services assisted all victims of human trafficking. The responses from the agencies and organizations in Oregon split into two branches. Interviewees named victim groups in distinct clusters that were oriented around either sex trafficking or labor trafficking. Cluster examples include “sex trafficking, domestic trafficking, and sex trafficking of women and children,” and “labor trafficking, foreign-born trafficking, and trafficking of
men and women.” Only two interviewees in Oregon named “sex trafficking” and “labor trafficking” together (interview 3, 5).

Table 1. Types of Assisted Victims of Human Trafficking by Counts of Mentions and by State.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Human Trafficking Assisted</th>
<th>Washington</th>
<th>Oregon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All types of trafficking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex trafficking</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor trafficking</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child sex trafficking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic trafficking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born trafficking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The online analysis of the programs and activities of agencies and organizations in Oregon and Washington demonstrates that agencies and organizations in Oregon have stronger preferences to assist victims of sex trafficking than the agencies and organizations in Washington. According to the online analysis of the websites of agencies and organizations in Washington, seven of nine websites showed programs and services dedicated to victims of human trafficking, including victims of labor trafficking and sex trafficking. Of the fourteen websites of agencies and organizations associated with the advocacy coalitions in Oregon, six agencies and organizations have programs and services dedicated specifically to victims of human trafficking, mostly victims of child sex trafficking. Eight of the fourteen websites of agencies and organizations showed that general programs and services offered to victims of crimes that were also accessible to victims of human trafficking. Overall, the websites of agencies and organizations in Oregon demonstrated that few anti-human trafficking services and programs were available to victims of labor trafficking, which demonstrates the underserving of victims of labor trafficking relative to victims of commercialized sex trafficking.
Theme 2: On the Turf of the Collectivists and the Neo-Abolitionists

Many of the interviewees associated with WARN or WashACT commented on the harmonious and collectivist relationship between WARN and WashACT. They commonly described the relationships between the agencies and organizations of WARN and WashACT as “likeminded,” “accessible,” and “work[ing] well together” (interviews 1, 8-11, 15). Furthermore, interviewees highlighted that collectivist personalities and leadership styles are the key factors that distinguish WARN and WashACT apart from other task forces across the country. Interviewees’ comments included:

*The biggest thing is not so much about agencies and organizations but it is more about the people. Recognizing that it isn’t going to be perfect and really understanding what each other’s limitations/missions are is important. Key lessons we’ve learned are establishing and maintaining relationships and checking your ego at the door.* (interview 1)

The coordination patterns of WARN and WashACT in Washington generally focus on forming decision settlements regardless of the interpersonal challenges between agencies and organizations. WARN and WashACT overcome their challenges through responsibilities tied to negotiations and funding, making negotiations, and building trust to dispel distrust amongst members. In general, the interviewees were very satisfied with the relationship of WARN and WashACT with their agency or organization and attributed their satisfaction to the victim-centered approach of WARN and WashACT or the Enhanced Collaborative Model of the BJA. The Enhanced Collaborative Model was designed by BJA in 2010 for Human Trafficking Task Forces to take a comprehensive approach to combating all types of trafficking, including male and female, adults and minors in sex trafficking, labor trafficking, and the trafficking of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens (BJA, 2010).

In Oregon, the neo-abolitionist feminist perspectives draw the line on the shared but parceled turf and obstruct the efforts between agencies and organizations to collaborate. The tensions are so deeply rooted in the agencies and organizations in Oregon that anti-human trafficking programs are almost irreversibly tailored to assist and serve victims of sex human trafficking over victims of labor trafficking, and as one interviewee noted: “The social services [for foreign-born and commercialized sex
trafficking victims] can’t be combined because providers offer such different services, but we could work a lot better together instead of approaching just foreign born or CSEC. It happened over time,” (interview 4). Another interviewee, arguing against federal policies that encourage collaboration between agencies and organizations for all types of human trafficking, commented that,

*We’ve all considered working together, to work formally together, but you’d have to track services from beginning to end on collaboration when we already know how to work together. We’ve talked to Senate and said ‘Please stop sending us comprehensive grants that make us work together.’ Generally, kids need different services than adults. It would water down the services that we would provide.* (interview 6)

This response demonstrated a willingness of this agency/organization to cooperate with other agencies and organizations in Oregon. However, when the interviewees in the same advocacy coalition as interviewer 6 were asked for the names of collaborating agencies and organizations and organizations, most of the interviewees provided only the names of members in their advocacy coalition rather than the names of agencies and organizations outside of their advocacy coalition.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework coordination patterns of the “hurting stalemate” and “maintaining composition” can be used to illustrate how the advocacy coalition groups in Oregon collaborate and negotiate on shared but parceled turf of the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem of Oregon. The “hurting stalemate,” is a tactic when actors refuse to compromise with each other they believe that negotiation is a waste of time, and “maintaining composition,” a piecemeal tactic when actors negotiate to avoid being circumvented by competitors in the long run (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). One of the main solutions for the “hurting stalemate” and “maintaining composition” coordination patterns that increases collaboration amongst advocacy coalitions is consensus-based decision making amongst members (Weible, 2006).

These coordination patterns are applied to the responses from several of the interviewees in Oregon and one interviewee commented that, “Our function is with sex trafficking, not labor trafficking. I sit on the federal work group that deals with labor trafficking in the event that a labor trafficking case has turned into sex trafficking case,
but we have no distinction between foreign and domestic sex trafficking” (interview 7). The advocacy coalitions in Oregon that are in a “hurting stalemate” or “maintaining composition pattern” could move beyond ideological barriers and assist all types of victims of human trafficking if agencies and organizations within the anti-trafficking policy subsystem choose to make decisions for anti-human trafficking initiatives based on compromises.

**Theme 3: Financial Objectives and How “Sex Sells”**

WARN and WashACT continually receives BJA/OVC funding for its anti-human trafficking activities (see Appendix E) because WARN and WashACT have effective proactive investigation strategies to collectively improve the identification and rescue of victims of human trafficking, which are lessons that they share with Task Forces across the United States (interview 1, 8, 9; Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.). The BJA and OVC lists of grant awardees and the IRS Form 990s tax forms, show that WARN is the main grantee of BJA/OVC grants and it distributes funds to other member agencies and organizations of WARN, the subgrantees of the BJA/OVC grants. According to the interviewees, agencies and organizations in WARN and WashACT have such supportive relationships that this pass-through funding bears little impact on the relationships between member agencies and organizations (interview 8, 10, 11).

Other interviewees in Washington note that participation in WashACT is voluntary and unpaid, and that agencies and organizations of WARN and WashACT consider funding as a collective challenge. For example, one interviewee pointed that, “[We’re interested in] expanding the task forces and we are trying to identify what our gaps in victims’ services are. Currently, we are good at acute services like providing housing, mental services, etc. in the short term but after three months though, there’s a huge drop off in services” (interview 9). Overall, the members of WARN and WashACT expressed that they were mainly concerned with how to more effectively operate to increase capacity as a coalition with limited funds.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework describes a “devil shift” as a schism that shifted power within policy subsystems (Sabatier & Weible 2007). The “devil shift” that occurred in Oregon shifted power from one advocacy coalition to several advocacy
coalitions and they were caused by three financial events. The financial events were the three-year OJJDP grant that focused primarily on the commercial sexual exploitation of children in Oregon, the discontinuation of BJA/OVC Task Force Funding for OHTTF in 2010/2011, and the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Force grant that was awarded to an OHTTF member in 2012. Between 2005 and 2011, the policy subsystem of Oregon received of $1,099,941 in federal funds, which does not include the $500,000 grant from the Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to assist children in commercial sexual exploitation. The total sum of grants for the Oregon policy subsystem is greater than the total of $770,000 that the policy subsystem of Washington received in federal funds (see Appendix C).

The disparity of federal funding between the policy subsystems in Oregon and Washington suggests two points. First, agencies and organizations in Oregon may be more reliant on federal funding sources than the agencies and organizations in Washington. Second, the agencies and organizations in Washington may have more diversified funding strategies than agencies and organizations in Oregon, which may include private donations, support from foundations, and other entities. As a demonstration of the reliance on government funding, one interviewee in Oregon noted that their agency/organization switched to the task force for commercially sexually exploited children because they needed access to resources and said,

*I used to attend Oregon Task Force meetings and signed an MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] to be in its steering committee. But the [committee for commercially sexually exploited children] pulled together community resources for collaboration against human trafficking because it got a grant, so we signed on as collaborator.* (interview 5)

Another interviewee on the other side of the turf battle in Oregon says that their agency/organization chose to continue providing direct assistance to victims of labor trafficking despite the financial schism and fragmentation of the Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force. The interviewee whose agency/organization lost its federal Task Force funding during the “devil shift” suggested there is now an increased need for services for victims of labor trafficking,

*The needs for immigration legal services are so much greater than our capacity is able to meet. We do a large volume of high quality work, but we still have a*
remainder of people that haven’t been served. It’s all time and money permitting...We are acutely aware of more people trying to get into our program, not just for human trafficking cases, but for immigration legal services in general...We just have so many requests for U-visas, T visas, and extensions for permanent residencies. (interview 12)

Another interviewee reported that because of the high demand for labor trafficking assistance, their agency/organization forgoes helping victims to apply for critical T Visas, which take up to three years to apply for and involve high staffing costs, and instead handles high caseloads by helping victims to obtain a Continued Presence status from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which allows stays only up to one year (interview 3). In addition to the challenges in applying for T Visas (Bistriniter, 2011) as suggested in the literature review, the loss of resources and funding for these agencies and organizations that are on the other side of the neo-abolitionist feminists leads to a shortage in assistance for victims of labor trafficking and also underserves these victims by providing them with alternative services that only temporarily alleviates the labor trafficking problem. According to several interviewees, some federal funding does go to individual agencies and organizations to support non-sex types of anti-human trafficking programs, but the only existing type of federal funding for coalitions in Oregon is from the OJJDP grant, which is aimed at the prevention of commercial sexual exploitation of children and young adults.

Two interviewees saw funding as an opportunity for restructuring the advocacy coalitions (interview 6, 13). Suggesting that their advocacy coalition oriented itself to follow the funding trail, one interviewee said,

How to be engaged, so that when funding goes away we don’t lose [our victims], is important. When our funding went away in the 90’s, we lost [our victims]. Policy change is important so that we aren’t running after grants. (interview 6)

Policy-oriented learning occurs in policy subsystems when new information or experiences change behaviors (Sabatier and Weible, 2007), and policy-oriented learning is a cyclical process because behaviors within policy subsystems can ultimately change information and resources that are available outside of policy subsystems. Grant funding is a coalition resource that can change how advocacy coalitions behave, but depending on how advocacy coalitions behave once they receive grant funding, advocacy coalitions can
change the policy-oriented learning of policy subsystems. For example, the 2009 OJJDP grant to assist children in commercialized sex trafficking changed the behaviors of the neo-abolitionist feminist agencies and organizations in the Oregon policy subsystem. The neo-abolitionist feminist agencies and organizations left the Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force to form a new advocacy coalition that focused on the commercial sexual exploitation of children. The new advocacy coalition was awarded the 2009 OJJDP grant and this increased the capacities of the members of the advocacy coalition to investigate cases of sex trafficking. This ultimately increased the number of cases of commercial sexual exploitation of children and focused public attention and resources such as donations on sex trafficking. Thus, resources like grant funding can change behaviors within policy subsystems but behaviors can conversely change the level resources that are available to policy subsystems.

As illustrated above, the agencies and organizations in the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem of Washington prefer to assist victims of all types of human trafficking. On the other hand, the neo-abolitionist feminist agencies and organizations of the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem in Oregon prefer to assist victims of commercialized sex trafficking. One of the results from policy-oriented learning of the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem in Oregon is that victims of labor trafficking are underserved relative to victims of commercialized sex trafficking.

DISCUSSION

The websites of the Washington Anti-Trafficking Response Network (WARN) and the Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force suggested that both groups are cohesive advocacy coalitions with task force members that represent organizations, victims’ service providers, and law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. However, the interview responses from the agencies and organizations in Washington and Oregon illustrate two different scenarios.

The groups WARN and WashACT represent the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Force of Seattle, which together operate as an advocacy coalition in a mature policy subsystem in Washington. Policy subsystems comprise advocacy coalitions that are
oriented around a policy or policies (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Washington has a mature policy subsystem because WARN and WashACT hold regular meetings with member agencies and organizations that are open to community members and other interested groups (interview 14), and there are high levels of consensus and openness in the subsystem. These member agencies and organizations specialize in different areas of human trafficking and share their knowledge and experience with each other (interview 1, 8, 9, 10, 11).

WARN and WashACT, as an advocacy coalition, operate cohesively and have not had major conflicts since 2006 (interview 15). Six of eight interviewees reported that they are part of WARN, while two interviewees pointed that they are primarily members of WashACT instead of WARN and three interviewees stated that their agency or organization is a founding member of WARN. All interviewees noted the hierarchical but peaceable relationship between WashACT and WARN, with WashACT being the guiding advisory group and the official BJA/OVC human trafficking task force and WARN being the subcommittee of the task force. One interviewee commenting on the relationships between the WashACT and WARN said, “We do our own work, but we really work together in big picture. Internally, we’re serving our own clients. It’s great to collaborate, we have great relationships, and without it we wouldn’t be able to successfully serve clients” (interview 15).

The analysis of websites for the agencies and organizations in Washington revealed that five of ten websites of member agencies and organizations of WARN or WashACT cross-referenced WARN or WashACT on their own websites. The level of cross-referencing between the websites of agencies and organizations in Washington is indicative of regular website maintenance by web administrators. Web administrators may not be the same actors that participate in collaborations between agencies and organizations. Therefore, the cross-references between websites did not illustrate the proximity or closeness of relationships between agencies and organizations in WARN or WashACT. This analysis of the websites and the interview responses suggests that agencies and organizations in Washington rely on informal and interpersonal networks.
The Human Trafficking Task Force in Oregon is very different from that of WARN with WashACT. Nascent policy subsystems are in the process of forming and have shorter time periods (Sabatier and Weible, 2007) and the analysis of the online data and interview responses indicates that there is a nascent anti-human trafficking policy subsystem in Oregon. This policy subsystem in Oregon shifted from a centralized structure led by the Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force (OHTTF) in 2005 to a fragmented structure in 2013, where advocacy coalitions each serve one type of victim of human trafficking and compete with each other for resources.

The agencies and organizations in Oregon are in competition with one another in this nascent policy subsystem for several reasons. The OHTTF represented the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Force in Multnomah County when it received funding from BJA/OVC from about 2005 to 2010 (interview 2). In 2009, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) awarded a three-year grant to a newly forming task force that focused primarily on commercial sexual exploitation of children in Oregon (interview 2, 3, 12). The interviewees in Oregon indicated that agencies and organizations over time dropped the OHTTF as a central advocacy coalition for anti-human trafficking activities in Oregon because the OHTTF wanted to assist all victims of human trafficking rather than focus on specific victim groups (interview 2). Over time, the OHTTF shifted from being an operational task force to OATH (Oregonians Against Human Trafficking), a non-profit group whose mission is to be an information source on human trafficking for the Oregon community.

According to the interviews, there are three potential causes of why the OHTTF advocacy coalition collapsed and caused a “devil shift,” a conflict or cleavage between actors (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). First, the OHTTF’s anti-human trafficking grant funds from the BJA/OVC discontinued after the 2010 Human Trafficking Task Force grant (interview 2). Second, the BJA/OVC shifted the leadership of the Oregon anti-human trafficking policy subsystem when it awarded a member of the OHTTF, instead of the OHTTF, a BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Force grant in 2012 (interview 3). It is likely that the BJA/OVC selected this member of OHTTF for its leadership skills and its capacity to bring the conflicting members of the OHTTF back together again.
However, since the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem in Oregon had “internal issues and conflicts between agencies and organizations that were deeply rooted in different beliefs on the valence of human trafficking victim groups” (interview 2, 3), the OHTTF fell apart and lost many of its members. The interviewees reported that currently only a few of their organizations and agencies remain as partners with OATH. The shared website of OATH and OHTTF, shows that OHTTF is still the central human trafficking task force for Oregon and lists fourteen active member agencies and organizations, despite the reports from several interviewees reported that their membership in the OHTTF is inactive and that the anti-human trafficking subsystem of the OHTTF is fragmented.

The unintended consequence of the dismantling of the Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force as the central anti-human trafficking advocacy coalition was that it created opportunities for several other anti-human trafficking advocacy coalitions to develop (interview 3). The coalitions that branched off specialize in assistance to specific groups of human trafficking victims. However, the online analysis did illustrate the existence of several anti-human trafficking advocacy coalitions in Oregon that are each oriented around one type of human trafficking victim. Currently, several advocacy coalitions compete with each other for anti-human trafficking funding and resources. These coalitions are: the Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force (OHTTF), Oregonians Against Human Trafficking (OATH), Multnomah County Community Response to Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Multnomah County (“CSEC Committee”), Child Abuse Teams of several municipal law enforcement agencies, Task Force for Domestic Born Victims of Human Trafficking (“Domestic Born Task Force”), and Task Force for Foreign Born Victims of Human Trafficking (“Foreign Born Task Force”).

Many interviewees demonstrated that they do not have close relationships with the OHTTF, despite being listed as member agencies and organizations by the OHTTF. Of the thirteen interviews conducted with agencies and organizations listed online by OHTTF as its members, six interviewees reported belonging to the CSEC Steering Committee. Three interviewees said that they did not belong to any task force or committee and four interviewees said that they were both directly involved in some task
force and indirectly involved in OHTTF. No interviewees suggested that they were involved in only OHTTF or OATH and several interviewees asked for clarification for the terms, “OHTTF” and “Oregon Human Trafficking Task Force.”

The analysis of the cross-references between websites of agencies and organizations in Oregon was not suggestive of strong collaboration between agencies and organizations. Of the fourteen agencies and organizations in Oregon, three agencies and organizations cross-referenced the CSEC Committee or the Child Abuse Team or other groups related to child sex trafficking, and four agencies and organization listed OHTTF or OATH as an associated task force. The remaining seven agencies and organizations did not show relationships with any task forces on their websites.

The maturity or nascence of the policy subsystems is supported and reinforced by the approaches to decision making of advocacy coalitions and whether those approaches are focused on the development of all participants in the advocacy coalition or just individual participants. The Human Trafficking Task Force of Seattle is one of the leaders amongst the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces because WARN and WashACT have comprehensive strategies to assist victims of all types of human trafficking and are willing share expertise with other task forces (interview 1, 11, 15; Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.). The “logic of appropriateness,” a collaborative approach of advocacy coalitions, is used to suggest that by choosing to provide assistance to all victims of human trafficking, organizations and agencies in Washington implement the strategies of sharing resources and expertise with each other. What highlights the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Force of Seattle as a national model by the BJA/OVC is the cohesion and collaboration at the meso-level, or the network level that exists between involved agencies and organizations.

WARN and WashACT are focused on the development of all participating agencies and organizations; on the contrary, the advocacy coalitions in Oregon are interested in the development of select agencies and organizations. The organizations and agencies in Oregon use the “logic of consequences,” a way of decision making that maximizes outcomes (March and Olsen, 1996). Individual agencies and organizations lead the advocacy coalitions in Oregon by choosing to assist the types of victims that will
provide them with the maximum pass-through funding and resources. In other words, the
decision makers of the advocacy coalitions in Oregon transfer from secondary beliefs to
policy core beliefs that victims of commercial exploitation deserve more resources and
assistance than do victims of labor trafficking. The changes in behaviors and policies
fragmented the OHTTF and focused the anti-human trafficking efforts and resources of
many agencies and organizations on the commercial sexual exploitation of children
(interview 3).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This case study of two Human Trafficking Task Forces under the Bureau of
Justice Assistance and Office for Victims of Crime suggests that room certainly exists for
improvement for the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces for Washington and
Oregon. The following are three policy recommendations for these task forces. The
analysis of the interviewee responses and online data suggest that agencies and
organizations in advocacy coalition groups in Oregon must deconstruct the walls built up
from the divergent ideologies related to the valence of victims of human trafficking. As
the President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking rolls
out strategies for the next anti-human trafficking federal policy period from 2013 to 2017
under the TVPRA 2013, grants will be awarded to regional task forces with collaborative
approaches to assist victims of all types of human trafficking.

The first recommendation is to conduct a policy transfer in the format of a
consultancy to assist the anti-human trafficking advocacy coalitions in Oregon to
overcome their organizational challenges to improve the assistance to victims of all types
of human trafficking. The member agencies and organizations of WARN and WashACT
could share its examples and best practices for collaborating, communicating, and sharing
resources. The shared practices should also include trainings on how to assist victims of
labor trafficking and how to effectively assist victims through applications processes for
T Visas or U Visas. This policy transfer should also have mechanisms such as periodic
assessments and evaluations to help the advocacy coalitions, agencies, and organizations
in Oregon on-progress towards achieving goals for collaboration and assisting all types of
victims of human trafficking. The advocacy coalitions in Oregon should have opportunities to periodically provide feedback on the consulting of WARN and WashACT members as this may encourage the agencies and organizations in Washington to improve their understanding on how to transfer knowledge and increase collaborations. Moreover, a feedback mechanism that is monitored and facilitated by BJA/OVC would help to keep the lines of communication open between the agencies and organizations in Washington and Oregon.

It is possible that in Oregon, there may be personality conflicts that are so distinct that forging collaborative approaches is not the appropriate solution for promoting the assistance to all types of victims of human trafficking. If this is the case, then the transfer of policy knowledge from Washington to Oregon should emphasize the creation and maintenance of partnerships through mediation and conflict resolution. If such strategies are added to the promotion of collaborative approaches, the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem in Oregon may produce better outcomes for cohesiveness amongst advocacy coalitions and assistance to all types of victims of human trafficking.

The second policy recommendation is to increase the involvement of agencies and organizations in Oregon, whose duties and responsibilities are related to assistance for victims of labor trafficking. This type of a reformed local network that supports all victims of human trafficking, including victims of labor trafficking, should add: labor and farmers’ rights organizations, immigration lawyers and legal service organizations, hospitals, shelters and food banks. The network should also involve Oregon state and municipal government departments such as: Agriculture Department, Criminal Justice Commission, Hispanic Affairs Commission, Housing and Community Services, Department of Human Services, Bureau of Labor and Industries, and Occupational Safety and Health Division, and Youth Authority. The Department of Labor already has the training and capacity to investigate civil rights, labor, and wage and hour violations (“The Department of Labor’s Unique Opportunity,” Harvard Law Review, 2013). Thus, a special focus on its inclusion would be beneficial to the advocacy coalitions in Oregon.

The third recommendation focuses on the strategic provision of coalition resources for the human trafficking task forces. Careful consideration should be given to
grants before they are awarded to agencies and organizations, especially grants have the potential to shift the anti-human trafficking focuses of policy subsystems. An example of this kind of grant is the Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention grant that was awarded to select agencies and organizations in Oregon to provide assistance to children in commercial sexual exploitation. The result of this catalytic grant was a reaction amongst agencies and organizations in Oregon that damaged future prospects of collectively providing assistance to all types of victims of human trafficking. The other subsystem resource that significantly influences the behaviors and preferences of agencies and organizations is public opinion. Funds should be directed to conducting more community trainings on human trafficking so that the attention of the public focuses acknowledges the existence of many types of human trafficking rather than specific types of human trafficking. In Oregon, changing public opinions on human trafficking could change the public demand for anti-human trafficking services and the coordination patterns amongst agencies and organizations. If communities in Oregon demonstrate interests in comprehensive anti-human trafficking measures to assist all types of victims of human trafficking, the anti-human trafficking strategies of agencies and organizations may become more collaborative and less influenced by stark ideological differences.

If the conflicts are arising from a scarcity of resources between agencies and organizations, more resources should be provided to specific agencies and organizations that demonstrate an organizational and programmatic need for increases in resources. These agencies and organizations should entities that will promote the strategies of the federal plan to comprehensively assist all types of victims of human trafficking. Otherwise, if there are anti-human trafficking programs and activities have strong priorities but the agencies and organizations themselves are the problem and they are irrevocably unchangeable, states should consider adopting these programs as state-supported programs under government agencies that have the capacity to execute anti-human trafficking initiatives.
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

While this study had a 91% response rate from the listed member agencies and organizations on the WARN/WashACT and OHTTF websites, the sample size was still small and the sample size of agencies and organizations in Oregon was larger than that of Washington. A 100% interview response rate and grant reports with information on the outcomes and progress for individual agencies and organizations would increase the ability to compare the differences between the task forces.

To promote an understanding of how much of an influence in anti-human trafficking the human trafficking task forces have in Washington and Oregon, agencies and organizations outside of the primary networks of partners of the human trafficking task forces and victims served by agencies and organizations should be included in a future study. A theory such as the Network Approach (Silke & Kriesi, 2007) could be used to identify the primary, secondary, and tertiary networks of the human trafficking task forces and illustrate whether their partnerships are exclusionary or not. Moreover, network theory could help to identify alternative networks of agencies and organizations that are filling the gaps in human trafficking victim services that are not being addressed by the human trafficking task forces. Such a study could point to how and where funding and resources should be directed.

Another potential area for future research could include interviewing the original founders of the human trafficking task forces. Analyses of such interviews could illustrate how the personal relationships of founders with certain policy makers were influential in the formation of human trafficking task forces and whether these relationships contributed to the continued support of the human trafficking task forces. Moreover, this approach could provide an explanation for why the human trafficking task forces in Washington and Oregon had different paths of development over time and could indicate a need to improve relationships between the task forces and the Bureau of Justice and Office for Victims of Crime or other federal agencies.

Improved data relating to the effectiveness of the anti-human trafficking activities of task forces would create an understanding of the proportion and numbers of victims of labor trafficking, relative to victims of commercialized sex trafficking, who are not
receiving anti-human trafficking assistance. Human trafficking, by nature, is difficult to track or to measure and the numbers of human trafficking cases in Washington and Oregon may not be accurately calculated. Thus, the effectiveness of the anti-human trafficking activities of task forces are currently unknown.

A comparison of state policies on human trafficking of Washington and Oregon with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Acts may be useful to identify mechanisms of the state policies are useful for the Human Trafficking Task Forces, which could be adopted by future federal policies on anti-human trafficking. Supplemental state-level data on suspected trafficking incidents from the Human Trafficking Data Collection and Reporting Project of Northeastern University, which collects all Human Trafficking Task Forces data, would be useful for this comparison. Likewise, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) could provide statistics on the numbers of receipts, approved, denied and pending T Visas and U Visas for Washington and Oregon.

In a broad sense, there are opportunities to assist all victims of human trafficking. For the advocacy coalitions in Oregon, there is room to improve anti-human trafficking services and programs to address the underserving of victims of labor trafficking. The approaches mentioned above could help to identify future task force strategies for Washington and Oregon if there are systemic issues with the TVPRA 2013 or if external challenges arise in other policy subsystems of Washington and Oregon that ultimately influence local anti-human trafficking policy subsystem.

CONCLUSION

The case study illustrates that, despite similar beginnings in the mid-2000s and funding histories, the distinctions between the cases in Washington and Oregon are rooted in the neo-abolitionist feminist perspective that victims of human trafficking are victims of sexual slavery. The analysis and discussion above applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) to the data collected from twenty-one qualitative semi-structured interviews and twenty-three websites of agencies and organizations in task forces and advocacy coalitions in Washington and Oregon.
The case distinctions are divided into three themes. The first theme suggests that the objective of the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem of Washington is to assist all victims of human trafficking. Meanwhile, neo-abolitionist anti-human trafficking advocacy coalitions in Oregon underserve victims of labor trafficking compared to victims of commercialized sex trafficking by focusing their attention towards victims of commercialized sex trafficking. The second theme illustrates how the agencies and organizations in Washington use collective decision making to assist all types of human trafficking while the neo-abolitionist feminist agencies and organizations in Oregon selectively choose to collaborate with likeminded agencies and organizations. The third theme demonstrates that the approaches to collaboration and organizational preferences of agencies and organizations affect the availability of coalition resources, specifically grant funding.

The financial events in Oregon, especially the 2009 grant from the Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention that focused on assistance for children in commercial sexual exploitation, were the catalysts that set into motion the “devil shift.” The “devil shift” fragmented the anti-human trafficking policy subsystem of Oregon. In Oregon, the methods for collaborations, divergent perspectives on the valence of victims of human trafficking, and usage of coalition resources factor into one ultimate outcome that victims of labor trafficking are underserved relative to victims of commercialized sex trafficking.

The agencies and organizations in WARN and WashACT are touted for having the best practices amongst the BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces, as their collectivist approaches are atypical within the field of anti-human trafficking in the United States. They use the “logic of appropriateness” to make decisions that will benefit the advocacy coalition as a whole and they choose to collaborate to provide assistance to victims of all types of human trafficking. The governance within the WARN-WashACT structure is a loosely formed hierarchy and resources and expertise are shared informally between agencies and organizations. As a result the Human Trafficking Task Force in Seattle strengthens its coalition resources and continually receives task force funding from BJA/OVC.
Under the President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking, the Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States will provide opportunities to deconstruct ideological barriers. The divergent paths of the anti-human trafficking policy subsystems of Washington and Oregon demonstrate that the neo-abolitionist feminist perspective of agencies and organizations in Oregon is a systemic problem that constructs major barriers in human trafficking victim assistance. It is up to the Oregon anti-human trafficking community to create a new and sustainable regime that will promote the assistance to all victims of modern-day slavery.
REFERENCES


USCIS. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status. (2011). Retrieved from http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=02ed3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=02ed3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD.


APPENDIX

Appendix A. Map of 2010 BJA/OVC Human Trafficking Task Forces.

Appendix B. Worksheet for Online Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency/Org Name</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID #</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (Agency/ org/ other)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission/strategies/goals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF referenced on A/O sites?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking types identified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-trafficking projects or programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding sources for anti-HT activities/priorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names of collaborating A/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways of collaborating with A/O s for anti-HT activities/projects?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of collaborations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/O Changes from TVPRA 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook partnerships with A/O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. Funding Histories of Task Forces According to Federal Grant Awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OR</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total Federal Funding for Task Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Grant Amount</td>
<td>BJA Joint Call for FY 2005 Human Trafficking Task Force and Victim Services Concept Papers</td>
<td>BJA FY 08 Law Enforcement Task Forces for Human Trafficking Victims Continuation Grant Program</td>
<td>BJA FY 10 Human Trafficking Task Force</td>
<td>OVC Services for Victims of Human Trafficking</td>
<td>$1,099,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>BJA FY 08 Law Enforcement Task Forces for Human Trafficking Victims Continuation Grant Program</td>
<td>BJA FY 10 Human Trafficking Task Force</td>
<td>BJA FY 11 Enhanced Collaborative Model to Combat Human Trafficking</td>
<td></td>
<td>$770,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Grant Amount</td>
<td>$450,000</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>$99,941</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$170,000</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
In 2009, the Multnomah CSEC Committee was awarded with $500,000 for 3 years for the OJJDP grant for the Improving Community Response to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children
In 2010, both OHTTF and WARN received the same Human Trafficking Task Force Grant.
Appendix D. Semi-Structured Interview Questions

*Background Questions*
Q.01. What are the mission/strategies/goals of your agency/organization?
Q.02. What types of trafficking does your agency/organization work on?
Q.03. How are the anti-human trafficking activities/priorities of your agency/organization funded?

*Collaboration Questions*
Q.04. Which agencies/organizations does your agency/organization collaborate with for anti-human trafficking activities/projects?
Q.05. How does your agency/organization collaborate with other agencies/organizations for anti-human trafficking activities/projects?
Q.06. How often does your agency/organization meet with these other agencies/organizations/groups?
Q.07. Have there been any missed opportunities for your agency/organization to collaborate with other agencies/organizations for anti-human trafficking activities/projects? If yes, then how?
Q.08. How does your agency/organization partner with law enforcement agencies?
Q.09. Describe some key lessons that your agency/organization has learned from working with other agencies/organizations.

*Task Force Questions*
Q.10. How is your agency/organization associated with its task force?
Q.11. How long has your agency/organization been working with the task force?
Q.12. What are the costs and benefits to your agency/organization for being associated with the task force?
Q.13. How does your agency/organization share technical information with other agencies/organizations in task force?
Q.14. How has your agency/organization dealt with coordination/communication barriers of the task force?

*Policy Questions*
Q.15. How have the federal anti-human trafficking policies/Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000/Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 affected the activities/priorities/goals of your agency/organization?
Q.16. How can the task force benefit your agency/organization in the future?
Appendix E. List of Interview Citations by Order of Appearance in Text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Number</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>May 16, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>May 8, 2013</td>
<td>In-person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>May 10, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>May 13, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>May 6, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>May 28, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>June 5, 2013</td>
<td>In-person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>April 29, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>May 13, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>May 6, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>April 26, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>May 29, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>May 17, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>April 29, 2013</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>April 29, 2013</td>
<td>In-person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>