

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Steven J. Veit for the degree of Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies in Foreign Language and Literature, Speech Communication, and Education presented on July 30, 1999. Title: NAFTA and Chiapas: Problems and Solutions.

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On New Year's Eve 1993, there was little indication that popular President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was about to take a monumental fall. Mexico was in the midst of unprecedented prosperity. The world's oldest ruling political party, Mexico's PRI, enjoyed substantial support. Allegations of corruption within an authoritarian regime were now frivolous charges obscured by economic success. The nation was poised to become a major player in the global market; vying with Japan to be the second largest trading partner of the U.S.A. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the largest trading partner of the U.S., Mexico and the United States became effective January 1, 1994.

Just after midnight 1994, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) went to war in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. Approximately 2500 peasants (mostly indigenous men of Mayan descent) had mobilized against the

Mexican government. The violence sparked world wide interest in the human rights of Mexican Indians. Ten days later, as the EZLN retreated into the jungle, an international audience remained captivated by the struggle. The Mexican Army did not advance. The EZLN refused to lay down its arms.

Within the year, the Mexican economy collapsed. Soon thereafter, President Salinas went into voluntary exile amidst charges of high crimes against the state.

Was it just a coincidence that the rebellion coincided with the implementation of NAFTA? Did the treaty really present such an enormous threat to Mexico's underclass? Did NAFTA contribute to the nation's political problems? The following thesis answers these questions. It is the product of years of travel and study throughout Chiapas and Mexico, both before and after the rebellion. The intricacies of the relationship between NAFTA, the Mexican government and the EZLN are revealed.

The government's position and rebel demands are reconcilable. This is an important conclusion. But Mexico is a poor country embroiled in a rebellion to the south as well as a precarious economic treaty with the world's wealthiest nation to the north. In addition, the EZLN has come to represent the world's beleaguered poor in an era of free trade. As Mexico's past and present are explored, conclusions about the country's future have implications that go beyond NAFTA.

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NAFTA and Chiapas: Problems and Solutions

by

Steven J. Veit

A THESIS

submitted to

Oregon State University

in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of

Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies

Presented July 30, 1999
Commencement June 2000

Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies thesis of
Steven J. Veit presented on July 30, 1999

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NAFTA and Chiapas: Problems and Solutions

Introduction

On New Year's Day 1994, a big story overshadowed some of the football scores and parade highlights. News broadcasts across the United States flashed scenes from Mexico of rifle toting guerrillas clad in ski masks. The rebels tookover several towns, including San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, and were poised to march north to the capital, Mexico City. By the end of the day, the reports from Mexico inspired as much controversy at my New Year's party as the football games. Many of my friends, drawing comparisons from other Latin American countries, were convinced that a civil war was imminent south of the border. Unlike my buddies, I had studied and traveled extensively throughout Mexico. I assured them that the rebels were still hundreds of miles south of Mexico City and that Mexico was far more stable than most of its Central and South American neighbors. Nevertheless, I expected intervention by the Mexican Army. After all, wouldn't the United States military intervene in a similar situation within its own borders? Not to do so would invite civil war. Between highlights of the football games and the Chiapas rebellion, I convinced most of them and myself that the situation would probably be resolved after a few days of battle.

I was merely half right. The Mexican Army did intervene; but five years later, the struggle rages on in

Chiapas. Clearly, despite my studies and travels, in 1994 my knowledge of Mexico's political and social problems was severely limited. I had not overlooked the nests of abject poverty which led to the violence in Chiapas. The splendor of the land and the friendliness (*simpatía*) of the people simply distracted me. Plus, I knew that Mexico, unlike so many Latin American countries, had not suffered a violent revolution in decades. The country afforded a sense of stability.

For most of this century, Mexico was stable. Over the last seventy years, a single political party has ruled. Major conflicts were carefully avoided with the help of an agrarian reform policy that catered to the *campesinos* (peasants) as a distinct constituency. Most other Latin American governments never attempt to accommodate peasants to this degree.¹ The uprising in Chiapas, however, proved that the Mexican government had only fashioned a facade of stability.

I returned to Mexico on several occasions after the revolt subsided. Soon it was clear that I had to modify my conceptions of the nation in order to examine the problems in its southern state, Chiapas. It is difficult to remain a believer in a stable Mexico while doing research in this volatile region. I attended political rallies, followed human rights observers, interviewed accessible individuals, and absorbed as much local literature and news as possible.

Unlike some activists and professional journalists in Chiapas, as a rule I avoided the frequent conflicts and bloodshed. Nonetheless, at one juncture I could not resist a little excitement. I pilfered a plastic yellow vest in order to attach myself to over 100 similarly attired Italian "human rights observers"² who were headed to Taniperlas, Chiapas. I crashed the party. They kicked me off the bus. I was lucky. A riot broke out upon their arrival in Taniperlas. Dozens were injured. Thirty or so members of the Italian "international invasion force"³ were subsequently banished from the country.

They had been looking for trouble. A riot was inevitable. At first, I did not realize how explosive the situation was and wanted to be part of the action. A bit later it became clear that I did not miss anything of great importance. My experiences and investigations had led me to the conclusion that the trouble in Chiapas was symptomatic of far larger lingering economic and social problems throughout the entire country. These problems have gained greater significance with Mexico's new role as an equal economic trading partner with the world's wealthiest nation, the U.S.A. I had finally managed to acquire a larger understanding of the people and events that led to the Chiapas Zapatista rebellion of 1994.

Mexico desires prosperity and liberty. NAFTA, an economic partnership with the nation's affluent northern

neighbors, presents endless possibilities. It also heightens the class disparities in Mexico which contributed to the upheaval in poverty stricken Chiapas.

Mexico faces a host of challenges as the 21st century approaches. Expectations run high for a nation that could become a fully integrated and dynamic member of the global community in the coming decades. However, the country must find solutions to the penury and hopelessness that shackle so many of its people. The poor in any country are never a pretty sight. But the poverty of Mexican *campesinos*, subsistence farmers who can barely sustain themselves and their families, has few equals. Chiapas is not the only Mexican state harboring guerrilla activity. Yet it is the powder keg that will serve as a litmus test for how the nation forges its future.

The vast majority of Mexicans are not part of the Zapatista movement and do not consider the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas an important personal issue.⁴ Although the Chiapas rebels may not have millions of supporters nation wide, they do not have throngs of detractors either. There are many who disparage them, but as a largely indigenous movement the Zapatistas represent much of Mexican society. About 90% of all Mexicans are *mestizos*, those of Indian and European, usually Spanish, descent.⁵ Aztec, Mayan, Toltec, Olmec, indigenous heritage is embraced. It

is preserved in museums, literature and ancient ruins; celebrated in Mexican music and art, murals and statues.

Like the Mexican population, *campesinos*, peasants, are also predominately *mestizo*. But a major proportion of Chiapas' population, and *campesinos* in particular, are full blooded descendants of the ancient Mayan cultures that settled this part of the world over 1000 years ago. To be sure, there are a great number of other more recent Indian settlers of Chiapas from various other parts of Mexico. This fact is evidenced by the different indigenous languages spoken in the state. However, in Chiapas, where the Zapatistas themselves reflect the specific Indian cultures of the region, the movement still does not enjoy the support of a majority of the *campesinos* or general populace.⁶

Chiapas' indigenous/*campesino* communities are often more polarized than united. One noteworthy age old problem rooted in the Spanish conquest continues to separate them: land ownership.

The question of agrarian reform divides all the people of Chiapas. Some remain loyal to the government for personal and communal benefit or because they see hints of economic as well as political reform in this new era of free trade. Others have justifiably lost their patience. Poverty is rampant, government promises of land reform go unfulfilled and *campesinos* are inhumanely exploited for the cheap labor they provide to large land holders. Of this

group, a few thousand opted for violence to solve the socio-economic problems of the rural poor.

On the first of January 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States of America and Mexico officially took effect. Meanwhile, Chiapas, southern Mexico, suddenly found itself in a state of war. The Zapatista National Liberation Army, known in Spanish as the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN), declared war on the government and the "... federal Mexican Army, the pillar of the dictatorship from which we suffer, monopolized by the party in power and headed by the federal executive... Carlos Salinas de Gortari" (Díaz 21). *El Despertador Mexicano* (The Mexican Awakener), the group's official publication, reported "The Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle" which included the military goal to defeat the Army and advance to the capital. There was also a plea to the rest of Mexico for support "in the struggle for work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace" (Díaz 21). The uprising left more than one hundred dead, hundreds wounded and thousands displaced in Chiapas before President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who sent in the Army to quell the revolt, declared a unilateral cease fire on the twelfth of January. The EZLN, or Zapatistas as they were soon universally recognized, retreated into the Lacandon Jungle.

They welcomed the cease fire initiative and suspended all military operations, but refused to relinquish their arms.

The EZLN's social and military goals justify their call to arms. Beyond their rhetoric of revolution, the Zapatistas maintain they are Mexican nationals. A champion of the poor, they demand adherence to the Mexican Constitution. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI in its Spanish initials), Mexico's ruling party, is held responsible for betraying historic commitments to social welfare and land reform by opening the country up to free trade and foreign investment.⁷ This betrayal is all too familiar to indigenous and *campesino* communities.

Indian communal lands were appropriated by the *latifundios* (large estates) during the decades leading up to the Mexican revolution (1910-17). While the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) brought a certain degree of stability and economic growth to Mexico, millions of Indian *campesinos* remained virtual serfs. As a result, the revolution of 1910 consisted of numerous uprisings by indigenous communities, including the one commanded by Emiliano Zapata. As the revolution came to a close, Mexico's new president, Venustiano Carranza, was forced to endorse agrarian reform.

Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 proclaimed,

...that all land within the territory claimed by the Mexican state belonged to the Mexican

'nation' [and] formally sanctioned the communal landholding system, known as the *ejido*, which had been outlawed in 1856, and declared that henceforth communal lands could not be sold (Almazán 46).

The *ejido* encapsulated much of Mexico's social and agricultural reforms.* It promised land to *campesino*/indigenous communities through protection of communal lands or partition of large estates.

Since the revolution, the pace of agrarian reform has been agonizingly slow. Still, rural populations, regularly subjected to economic exploitation as a source of cheap food for urban dwellers and cut-rate labor for factories, have seemed "willing to sacrifice economic development for territorial security and viewed the Mexican state as the guarantor of the latter" (Almazán 46).

Chiapas produces a large percentage of Mexico's natural gas and hydroelectric power as well as considerable amounts of coffee, beef and lumber. In contrast, most of Chiapas'

*The *ejido* is "... a community-based system of land tenure in which the government protected privately held parcels and communal lands within the community from the market. Before changes to the constitution in 1992, *ejido* lands could not be bought, sold, or rented--although a widespread clandestine rental market existed. The *ejidos* existed under state sponsorship, which encouraged political patronage, corruption, and centralization of power within the *ejidal* communities. Also part of the social sector are the agrarian communities, which are indigenous lands based on historical claims and which have operated more autonomously than the *ejidos*" (Barry 12-13).

rural communities lack electricity. The state's standard of living as well as its education levels fall far below the national average while infant mortality rates remain well above that of the rest of Mexico.⁸ In spite of this exploitation of human and natural resources, as long as the government supported the *ejido* system and considered petitions for the return of communal lands to indigenous communities, the *campesinos* could depend on a measure of territorial security. Accordingly, before the EZLN's declaration of war, unrest and violence tended to be sporadic and localized. However, indigenous territorial security began to crumble as Mexico suffered through agricultural and economic crises in the years leading up to NAFTA.

By the late 1970s, the Mexican government realized that a new agricultural policy was necessary in order to stimulate the rural sector of the economy. The *ejido* came under criticism as an unproductive economic drain on the nation.⁹ The *ejido* system had created the inefficient *minifundios* which condemned much of the country's peasants to subsistence farming and poverty on tiny plots of land.¹⁰ Only in a few regions of northern Mexico did collective *ejidos* work well. Private farms still owned some of the best territory, including fifty percent of all irrigated land, but they produced seventy percent of marketable food on twenty percent of the land and made themselves

indispensable to the country, especially during times of crisis.¹¹ Through the 80s, Mexico's economy faltered. The *ejido* shouldered a lot of the blame. Criticism of the *ejido* reached an apex in the 90s when president Salinas proposed a series of amendments to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution that "included the creation of mechanisms for the privatization of *ejido* lands; freedom for *ejido* owners to sell their property; and the establishment of procedures to enable private firms-- both national and foreign-- to invest in the countryside" (Almazán 48-9). These amendments were necessary to stimulate the free trade and foreign investment required for Mexico's entry into NAFTA. They also led to a loss of legitimacy of the Mexican government in the eyes of most indigenous communities. Large numbers of Mexicans were outraged. The EZLN capitalized on this outrage. Nothing short of further government betrayal seemed to be at hand.

The feared violations of *campesino* territorial security were heightened by Mexico's entry into NAFTA. The *ejido* was being destroyed and it looked as if existing communal lands would eventually be sold to private firms. The situation was reminiscent of the days before the revolution when a vast majority of land was held by *hacendados* (landowners) in *latifundios*. Agrarian reform, one of the tenets of the revolution, was in danger. Therefore, the uprising in

Chiapas may be seen as a reaction to the economic opening of the northern Mexican border.¹²

Many in Mexico feel a certain solidarity with the plight of the indigenous people of Chiapas, but the magnitude of the EZLN uprising surprised all Mexicans.¹³ Certainly, on New Year's Day 1994, I personally had no idea how well prepared and armed the Zapatistas were; hence, my naive prediction of a few days of battle. I was not alone. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, expecting U.S. congressional approval of NAFTA, not only suppressed facts concerning the existence of an armed group in Chiapas, but also gravely underestimated the Zapatista's strength as well as the social and political dimensions of the problems that led to the insurrection.¹⁴ For most Mexicans, it was not the chronic misery of the indigenous people or the existence of an armed group in the state of Chiapas that surprised them, but the outbreak of violence.¹⁵

In the United States, reactions to the events in Mexico varied. State Department spokesman Mike McCurry, facing a host of NAFTA critics, continued to bolster NAFTA and denied that the conflict had anything to do with the free trade agreement.¹⁶ Despite State Department claims, it was no coincidence that the rebellion coincided with the implementation of NAFTA. The EZLN had made it clear that NAFTA was the equivalent of a death sentence for indigenous Mexican communities.¹⁷ Although there was a swift and more

or less effective military response from the Mexican government against the EZLN, exaggerated reports of events made it easy to believe that Mexico was suffering a national crisis.

The Zapatista rebellion was stymied in Chiapas and any solidarity amongst the Mexican people and the EZLN failed to produce a political base broad enough to inspire a violent national revolution. While the events in Chiapas did not represent a minor conflict, neither did the uprising ever reach the dimensions often reported in the Mexican and American press. The rebels have avoided a larger conflict and total military defeat due to the impact their struggle has had on a sympathetic public, both within and outside Mexico. The Mexican government has been unwilling to exchange horrendous international publicity for a military victory.

The Zapatistas, with the enigmatic Subcommander Marcos as its spokesman, launched an effective publicity campaign that started with the rebellion in Chiapas and continues to this day. Marcos reflects this campaign with a rhetorical style described by Mexico's Nobel Prize winning poet Octavio Paz as "... unequal and full of the highs and lows of a roller coaster, imaginative and lively... Sometimes vulgar and coarse; other times brilliant and eloquent, satiric and realistic, tiresome and sentimental ..." (Delarbre 368-9).

Marcos' rhetoric and the images of the Zapatistas cloaked in ski masks make for favorable propaganda and have produced a popular victory of sorts for the EZLN in the months and years following the initial armed rebellion. One effect of the publicity campaign has been an obfuscation of the original declaration of war and military goals of the EZLN. As a result, many noted analysts, such as Paul Rich, have come to the conclusion that the "Chiapas uprising has never been about ultimate military success ..." (74). But any examination of the EZLN cannot ignore the fact that the Zapatistas have resorted to military action to resolve socio-economic problems.

The rhetoric and theater of the EZLN could not be effective without the existence of critical, social and economic problems in Chiapas. For the Chiapas guerrillas,

It is obvious that Mexico cannot take full advantage of NAFTA without enormous amounts of capital. They suspect that the majority of the present working class population can never realize any advantage from the agreement. The indigenous in states such as Chiapas see NAFTA as making their pitiful situation even worse (Rich 79).

Thus, the publicity campaign by the EZLN is directed against NAFTA and its political-economic agent *neoliberalism*, the contemporary incarnation of capitalism, as the social and economic philosophies responsible for the plight of indigenous people and the rural poor. In addition, suspicions of the capitalist giant north of the border are not without merit. America's economic muscle and military

might are always a concern. And nationalist Mexico still smarts from what it regards as U.S. armed intervention in the Mexican-American war (1847-8) and the 1910-17 Mexican Revolution.

The revolt in Chiapas reveals what can happen to a developing country thrust into the world market at the expense of privatization and the loss of social programs. The Chiapas guerrillas, always eager to appeal to all Mexicans, are not exaggerating when they claim that NAFTA is associated with disaster for the entire Mexican underclass. The harsh reality is that it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to protect the poor from economic pitfalls in a free market.¹⁸ In economically powerful countries such as the United States, world market alliances engender debate and controversy. On the other hand, in relatively poor countries like Mexico, these alliances can be entirely menacing to enormous segments of society that cannot hope to compete against wealthier nations. People become divided and sides are inevitably chosen. Few in Chiapas are independent, and the PRI has a surprising number of supporters. Political and diplomatic options are regularly eschewed. Violent revolts can be expected.

The impoverished conditions in Chiapas and other parts of Mexico predate NAFTA, contemporary neoliberalism and the PRI, which has been the dominant political party for the last seventy years. During the course of its history,

Mexico has been described as a poor, underdeveloped Third World country. Most recently, under the PRI, this characterization has been modified little but to add that the country has become "... a monarchy with republican forms, centralized [and] antidemocratic." (Krauze, *la dictadura* 181). Author Mario Vargas Llosa has pointed to this system as "the perfect dictatorship".¹⁹ The centralized economic policies that accompany this government have resembled, at best, those of much of the rest of Latin America: "[a] mercantilist version of capitalism ..." with all the "poverty, discrimination [and] underdevelopment that dictatorships generally bring" (Vargas Llosa 25). In this respect, it is somewhat ironic that the rhetoric of the EZLN vilifies neoliberalism and NAFTA--contemporary realities which could portend an economic freedom that Mexico has never experienced. Furthermore, with the advent of NAFTA and the Zapatista rebellion, political change is evident. The PRI, for the first time in its history, has lost elections in various states as well as in Mexico City and now shares power in the Mexican congress. Could it be that the Zapatistas (who are not allied with any particular political party) and NAFTA are unwitting partners in this important political plurality? Maybe. But NAFTA also represents a form of repression not altogether distinct from that of the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and the decades leading up to the Mexican Revolution when the *ejido* was

outlawed. In any case, the Mexican road to modernization in a free market is fraught with the perils of poverty, threats to *campesino*/indigenous communal lands and hints of Yankee imperialism that alternatives offered by a charismatic revolutionary group such as the EZLN have found popular support.

The crisis in Chiapas did not halt Mexico's entry into NAFTA, and conditions have yet to change in southern Mexico. The Mexican Army, the EZLN, and the *Guardias Blancas* (paramilitary groups usually supported by large land holders) remain armed and poised for action. Accounts of bloodshed are gruesome reminders that revolutions die hard. Moreover, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and apparent failure of communism, the EZLN has found a sympathetic audience among Leftists throughout the world. The uprisings in Chiapas come at a time when large segments of the Left are discouraged, and the revolt has become a rallying point for those who are suspicious of the benefits of NAFTA and similar neoliberalist schemes.²⁰ It appears that NAFTA and the uprisings in Chiapas are intimately connected; and there is still no end the rebellion in sight.

As Mexico integrates itself into NAFTA and seeks solutions to internal turmoil, an examination of the relationship between the two principal positions that continue to be at loggerheads could produce solutions to a crisis that has implications throughout the Americas.

Although economic liberalization in Mexico (represented by the Mexican government, NAFTA and what is now commonly referred to as neoliberalism) and the arguments of the EZLN, which support the *ejido* and political reform, appear mutually exclusive, the positions can be reconciled. Both sides see themselves as patriots, but the nationalism actually divides the nation. In this era of global trade and economic treaties (Mexico has recently added economic treaties with other Latin American nations and is certain to reach an agreement with the European Union),²¹ all will benefit from a united Mexico. The following historical accounts will be followed by an analysis which endeavors to discover how the development of political plurality in Mexico together with a policy of gradual economic liberalization can contribute to real Mexican stability and prosperity.

Chapter 1 Zapata and his Legacy

The figure of Emiliano Zapata possesses a resonance, a great power and presence for Mexicans and indigenous peasants, including the Mayans, who always, as much in the pre-hispanic era as during the colonial and revolutionary periods, have remained in the periphery of Mexican society.¹

The endless surf and beaches of Baja California. *Mariachi* music. Salsa (the music and the hot sauce). The *simpatía* of the people. The rain forest and ruins of Palenque. Spanish that flows from the lips of women like an exotic melody. These were my first impressions of Mexico. Enough to satisfy any young man's palate. Then I began to study in Mexico. I learned the language and more about the country. I grew up. Stunning scenery, waves and salsa were still to be found. But there were also ragged, barefoot Chiapas *campesinos* lugging firewood and water to their slums. Shanty towns behind the Marriot Hotel at the Mexico City airport. Cardboard shelters in Tijuana. Sometimes I placated myself with assurances that similar conditions existed in my country, the U.S.A., and that economic opportunity had raised the standard of living for many in both nations. I looked forward to the implementation of NAFTA and the growth of the middle class in Mexico that might alleviate much of the nation's poverty.

After the Chiapas rebellion of 1994, my investigations forced me to admit that the conditions in Chiapas, and

perhaps the greater part of Mexico, really did not compare with those anywhere in the U.S.A. People stricken by poverty in the ghettos of Chicago or the Indian Reservations of the Dakotas might liken their conditions to those of third world countries such as Mexico;² but if Mexico is a third world country, Chiapas is its grimy underbelly. The natural beauty of the state cannot hide the nests of poverty that multiply and fester below most third world norms. My optimistic outlook with respect to NAFTA and the rise of a large middle class in Mexico was soon replaced by a pathetic sympathy for Chiapas' peasants. I delved further into the causes, history and goals behind the Chiapas rebellion. My feelings were tempered a bit as I examined the EZLN, its conflicts with the government and disputes with a number of *campesino* communities,³ and studied the implications of NAFTA as well as neoliberalism.

I would like to think the following analysis is a result of impartial research. This is unlikely. The quixotic challenge of traveling through Chiapas and southern Mexico in an attempt to understand the Zapatista cause was more fulfilling than my bookish grappling with neoliberalism. On both sides, my sources are predominately literary; and I cannot lay claim to any sensational, gripping adventures in Mexico. But even a jaded capitalist gringo on a scholarly mission through a rugged country has to be moved by the struggles of Mexico's Indians and

campesinos that the present day Zapatistas represent. Furthermore, the namesake of the EZLN, Emiliano Zapata, now signifies much more to me than Hollywood images of a Mexican cowboy and revolutionary. His figure does possess a resonance, and his presence looms large not only in Chiapas and within the EZLN, but throughout the entire country.

"From the perspective of his worshipers today, Zapata was a simple man ready to purge Morelos of tyrants who robbed the people of their lands and took the bread from their lips" (Ruiz 317). There is no doubt that Zapata is an icon of the Mexican revolution (1910-1917). The manner in which his name is evoked within the current Zapatista movement demonstrates that the man is still venerated 80 years after he was betrayed and murdered.

Though he may be worshiped, no man is born a revolutionary. Zapata became one almost against his will. In 1909, he was a novice village leader in the state of Morelos. Zapata studied community records to determine land and water rights for *campesinos* whose agriculture permits were routinely denied even for subsistence farming. After repeated legal appeals, the hostility of his enemies was undiminished. Undaunted, Zapata created his Plan of Ayala.

Signed by Zapata in 1911, the Plan of Ayala called for the return of stolen communal lands to *campesino* and indigenous villages. The *latifundios* were not to be destroyed. But the *hacendados* were expected to give land

back to those who held the proper deeds; or give up a third of their territories--with compensation--for the good of all Mexicans. In 1914, at the height of the revolution, Zapata took a more radical position. Urban property in enemy hands was to be nationalized and communal ownership of farm land was decreed. This was the impetus for a revival of the *ejido*.⁴

Zapata sought an economic revolution and was willing to pay the price with blood.⁵ In December of 1914, his popularity and generalship brought him and the Zapatistas to Mexico City where he occupied the presidential palace with another charismatic leader of the revolution, Pancho Villa.

"At this moment, when [Zapata] was at the height of his power, [his] natural anarchism showed its generous and tragic content" (Krauze, *Mexico* 294). Zapata refused to hold any position of power and offered to burn the presidential chair "to end ambitions."⁶ He was also unwilling to subordinate himself to Villa and abandoned the capital. Subsequently, Villa's government collapsed and he escaped to the north with his troops as Obregón and Carranza took the city.

Meanwhile, Zapata turned south to his roots in Morelos. He dominated this region, expropriating or destroying *latifundios* as well as exacting taxes and protection money from the *hacendados* he allowed to remain in business. Zapata's reticence to govern in the capital did not thwart

his agrarian reforms in Morelos. His appointed mediators settled all disputes over territorial boundaries. At the end of the revolution, with Villa defeated and Carranza in the presidential palace, Zapata's Plan of Ayala still garnered national support, and he remained the dominant military and political force in Morelos.

With the drafting of the 1917 constitution, Carranza was faced with an assembly of the growing *mestizo* class which envisioned a Mexico ruled by true Mexicans, Indians and *mestizos*.⁷ As a result, the new president was obligated to adopt the basic principles of Zapata's Plan of Ayala.

The news was received with little fanfare in Morelos. Carranza, a large landholder himself, had consistently and personally disappointed Zapata in the past by resisting any pressure for land reform. For most of Mexico, the revolution was over. But Zapata, convinced that Carranza would be overthrown, pledged to keep fighting. Although Zapata's troops were diminished and fraught with infighting, Carranza was unable to defeat them. Zapata, the indomitable defender of agrarian reform, became more famous than the president. He was a legend in his own time who survived battle after bloody battle.

The circumstances surrounding the death of Emiliano Zapata, at thirty-nine years of age, add to his legend. Riding describes the treachery of officers and a desperate president willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in order

to destroy an old nemesis who, up until then, had been insuperable:

In April 1919, [General] González ordered one of his officers, Colonel Jesús Guajardo, to feign defection to Zapata's side with 500 men and, to give credibility to the ploy, he even allowed the 'rebels' to attack a federal column and kill fifty-nine soldiers. On April 9, Zapata met with Guajardo and agreed to confer the following day at Guajardo's head-quarters in the Chinameca hacienda. After waiting in the sun for hours outside the hacienda, Zapata finally accepted an invitation to a beer and a meal inside. As he and a ten-man escort rode through the gates of the hacienda, he was shot down by a fusillade, dying instantly. His body, draped over a mule, was taken to González's head-quarters in Cuautla that night. As poor peasants paraded past Zapata's coffin, many of them crying with grief and trembling with fear, Carranza and the 'revolutionaries' in Mexico City raised glasses of champagne to celebrate the demise of the 'gangster' (46-7).

Pancho Villa met a similar fate, though routed in battle years before he was murdered in 1923. The two great heroes of the Mexican revolution actually lost the war to the political and economic elites of the day. Officially, Zapata was an outlaw in post-revolutionary Mexico, but his legacy would never die. "Eager to appease the peasants who had supported the popular guerrilla, the winning forces wrote many of Zapata's demands into the new constitution and erected monuments to the fallen rebel across the country" (Oppenheimer 101-2). Agrarian reform became a pillar of the new government and history was rewritten. Zapata and Villa were transformed into victorious revolutionaries.⁸

Most of the combatants and casualties of the Mexican revolution were not *mestizos* but Indian, the indigenous people of Mexico. At the time, they comprised almost half the population of the country. Practically all were peasants. Generally, they united with *mestizos*, many of whom were also peasants, *campesinos*. To the north, *campesinos* who joined Villa or the nationalist armies of Carranza reacted to joblessness and falling agricultural wages. By contrast, local land and water issues drove Zapata.⁹

Loss of *ejido* lands during the modernization of the virtual dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911), as well as the economic stagnation in the last years of his rule, gave rise to *campesino* revolutionary armies that have been unique to Mexico throughout its history. In no other Latin American country has the peasantry assumed such a significant role in the major national political movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁰ Because of the racial and cultural makeup of these armies, Indian demands were often indistinguishable from those of other peasants. "Even the Zapatistas of Morelos and Guerrero, who in the main spoke Nahuatl and wore Indian costumes, were fighting for their communal lands rather than any ethnic identity" (Riding 201). *Mestizos* did not necessarily identify themselves as Indian even though they lived in predominantly Indian communities. However, Zapata's demand for the restitution

of communal lands cannot be easily separated from the desire of indigenous people to maintain, control and develop their own cultures.¹¹ Accordingly, Emiliano Zapata's call for land reform, *tierra y libertad* (land and liberty), crossed bloodlines and united much of the rural poor. Agrarian reform became a large part of the Mexican national agenda in the decades that followed the revolution. Therefore, the martyred Zapata does appear a victorious revolutionary.

If there was victory for Zapata, it was hollow. Land reform did become law, but was enforced selectively and sporadically in the post-revolutionary years. Mexico's agrarian reform subordinated *campesino* communities and organizations to the state, obligating them to apply to the government for usufruct rights on land that in many cases historically belonged to them.¹² A huge national bureaucracy was created to hold out the promise of land reapportionment and discourage peasants from joining political or social organizations hostile to the ruling party. Even in the 30s, when President Lázaro Cárdenas distributed 18 million hectares to *campesino pueblos*, he routinely suppressed *campesino* organizations considered too radical by the government's corporatist structures.¹³

Cárdenas tried to encourage communal farming in the Indian tradition by reviving the *ejido* system. In order to ensure that large landholdings would not reappear, it was illegal to sell or rent an *ejido*. The state retained

ownership of the land and peasants who worked an *ejido* could not mortgage it. They often opted to rent or sell the land illegally or, more frequently, subdivided *ejidos* into small, individual plots. "Built into the political solution [of the *ejido* system] were the seeds of social and economic disaster" (Riding 183). The resulting *ejidos* condemned the *campesinos* to the perennial penury of *minifundismo* (subsistence farming) on inefficient parcels of land. Agrarian reform soon became a myth perpetuated by Cárdenas' successors through fiery rhetoric as well as expropriation and distribution of some private farms.¹⁴

In order to maintain order in Mexico, it is imperative to have *campesino* support. To these ends, the PRI has always invoked the name of Emiliano Zapata. It has also controlled the countryside through *campesino* organizations such as the National Peasant Confederation (the CNC in its Spanish initials), the Union of Peasants and Workers of Mexico, and the Independent Peasant Confederation. For decades after Cárdenas' presidency, these peasant organizations served as a chain of command from the government directly to the *campesino* masses.¹⁵ Renewed promises of land distribution kept poor rural districts loyal to the PRI. The PRI controlled the country.

Often, there was "... little relationship between the amount of land that [the government] claimed to have expropriated and the area that was in fact handed out to the

peasants" (Riding 184). It was not uncommon for *campesinos* to receive a small percentage of the land officially expropriated by the government for *ejidos*. As a Mexican population explosion created new generations of landless peasants, the *ejidos* were increasingly formed on infertile semi-arid land. Hardship in the countryside increased and eventually induced flight to urban areas.

Not everyone escaped to the cities. During the 50s and 60s, the government permitted *campesinos* to settle in the Lacandon Jungle of Chiapas. In this isolated wilderness, hundreds of miles south of Mexico City or Zapata's home state of Morelos, Mexicans secured *ejido* lands and in many cases united with native inhabitants. Peasants from all over the country were represented. The languages spoken ranged from Spanish to indigenous Nahuatl, Mixe, Totonaco and Chontal. "To emigrate to the most inhospitable region of the southeast of the country, perhaps one of the most inhospitable in the world, signified for all of them the beginning of the path to liberation" (Díaz 46-7). These people did not emigrate alone; the Catholic church accompanied them. Along with the church, came Bishop Samuel Ruiz whose liberation theology might guide all to their freedom as foreseen in the Sacred Scriptures.¹⁶

While thousands of peasants escaped to urban areas or the Lacandon Jungle, Mexico experienced what Barry refers to as a "Green Revolution" (29). For three decades (1940-70),

the government concentrated on modernizing commercial agriculture by looking to the United States and other industrialized countries for its model of agricultural development.¹⁷ Some *ejido* petitions were granted, but when Mexican agriculture experienced a crisis in 1970, *campesino ejidos* were perceived as an inefficient drain on the economy. This crisis has persisted, to some degree or another, until today. There is no single explanation for the crisis, but Mexico's inability to reconcile land reform commitments with an emphasis on high-yield industrialized production seems to have set the stage for stagnation.¹⁸ Basically, the Mexican state has failed in its unenviable task of supporting small communal farmers while giving a free hand to commercial ones. A wide range of critics have repudiated this policy as contributing to a form of archaic mercantilism,¹⁹ or criticized it as exclusive "state capitalism" (Barry 141). The crisis deepened when global supplies of grain became scarce in the early 70s. Suddenly, Mexico could not feed itself. Some economic problems were alleviated by a Mexican oil boom. However, because the country had been an exporter of food and was able to sustain itself in the past, there was fear that increases in food imports would jeopardize the nation's sovereignty.²⁰

Mexico needed to stimulate its agricultural sector. The inefficiency of the *ejido* was often blamed for food shortages. As a result, free-market solutions and

amendments to the agrarian reform provisions encapsulated in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution became more and more prevalent in the 70s and 80s. Land handouts and government promises continued, but high production farming on large tracts of land was the necessary goal. By the mid 80s, after the government had seized some 96 million hectares for repartition into *ejidos*, the collision course between peasant demands and production goals crystallized: the 96 million hectares would still not accommodate the millions of peasants who petitioned for land. "The government had become a prisoner of the agrarian myth that it had invented: land handouts were not the answer, but officials dared not say so because the peasants would not believe them" (Riding 189).

Unrest is rare where *campesinos* farm *ejido* land. In Zapata's home state of Morelos, where over 2.5 million peasants have benefited from agrarian reform policies, the hope of further land handouts preserves order among the millions who still wait for their plots of land. Thus, reality or myth, agrarian reform has effectively demobilized much of the peasantry and maintained a measure of peace.²¹

The *campesinos* of Chiapas find it difficult to believe that the government has been prisoner to an agrarian myth. Agrarian reform has never been effective in the state because of the resistance of local elites.²² These large land holders, *hacendados*, represent a consolidation of

properties that raises production and cuts down on the inefficiency of *minifundios*. However, they are also heirs to the same oligarchy that appropriated land during Mexico's colonial and postcolonial periods.²³ Inevitably, these *latifundios* accelerate "class divisions in rural Mexico and thereby increase social tensions ..." (Barry, 124).

Tensions are then exacerbated by a government bureaucracy that on average delays approval of *campesino* land claims in Chiapas for seven years even when those claims are provisionally accepted by state authorities. In addition, many peasant organizations, most notably the CNC, are of little help. Localized constituencies have been abandoned in favor of a national productivist orientation.²⁴

Chiapas has been a hotbed of activity for quite awhile. During the last decades, *campesinos* formed a variety of alternative peasant organizations associated with communist and socialist parties as well as clandestine guerrilla operations. It was just a matter of time before a militant group came to the fore in the name of Mexico's *campesinos* and Emiliano Zapata.

Before the EZLN rebellion of 1994, guerrilla activity in Chiapas was sporadic. Most violence consisted of conflicts between peasants, agrarian reform authorities and ranchers. The violence usually followed land grabs by communal groups of *campesinos*. Because Mexican law authorized *campesino* land claims only within seven

kilometers of peasant settlements of twenty or more households, peasants often found it necessary to settle desirable, private territories in order to initiate an *ejido*.²⁵ Frequently, these peasants were armed. Landowners retaliated to such land grabs with armed force and hired guns known in Chiapas as *Guardias Blancas* (White Guards).²⁶

Confrontations of this nature have a long and sordid history. In the 70s, in order to appease the peasants, *campesinos* were permitted to settle in eastern Chiapas, the last frontier of the Lacandon Jungle. Grasslands soon displaced tropical forests as newcomers, unaccustomed to the cultivation techniques of the Lacandon Indians, introduced intensive cultivation of the traditional peasant cornfield.²⁷ Coffee and cattle also became large cash crops. Land was easily exhausted. Settlers became separated into groups of subsistence farmers and those marketing cash crops. The conflicts continued and more Indians and other *campesinos* were forced deeper into the diminishing Lacandon Jungle. In this jungle, the EZLN was born.

Chapter 2 The EZLN

Beyond the context of the Mexican Revolution and the rest of this historical review, the literature exhibits numerous inconsistencies concerning the origins of the present day Zapatistas. In order to determine the beginnings as well as the goals and ideology that drive the EZLN, I was tempted to venture into some prohibited zones of Chiapas in search of firsthand information. The government has several good reasons for prohibiting entrance into these zones. Activists, large groups of human rights observers and journalists often provoke violence. On occasion, violence between opposing groups of *campesinos*, landowners and/or the *Guardias Blancas* erupts suddenly; and government officials may want to hide their own involvement in the conflicts as well as protect those who do not live or work in these areas. In December of 1997, when 45 civilians, all indigenous men, women and children, were massacred in Acteal, Chiapas,¹ I was in the bordering state of Oaxaca. Upon reading the news, I was in no hurry to return to Chiapas. Traveling the road of discovery in a bullet-proof vest or coffin was not in my plans. In the spring of 1998, my last trip to Chiapas, the forest was ablaze. Wild fires show no respect for battle lines. Zapatista territory was consumed with the same facility as the rest of the countryside. With the smoke growing thicker day by day,

there were rumors of government plans to smoke-out the Zapatistas. (I later learned that the entire country was in the midst of its worse fire season on record with much of the smoke and ash crossing the borders of Texas to the north and Guatemala to the south.) I became a bit disoriented. It could have been the smoke or the whispers in my ears, but I actually entertained ideas of wandering blindly into the forest to await the escape of Subcommander Marcos. I bided my time. Soon it was apparent that many questions as to the beginnings and ends of the EZLN would be better left to literary sources. Oppenheimer and Le Bot each interviewed Marcos on separate occasions after the rebellion. And Díaz, Collier, Montemayor and Barry have spent years studying the socio-economic problems of the region. They seemed much more qualified than I was. Once relieved of my fantasy in the jungle, I steered clear of the prohibited zones and dedicated myself to the heroism of collecting data and conversing with forthcoming individuals.

Montemayor stipulates that the origins of the EZLN are related to dozens of smaller but similar struggles that have sprouted up throughout Mexico during the last thirty years. These struggles reflect the profound, complex roots of the Zapatistas.² Montemayor also cites Díaz on several occasions. Díaz links the EZLN to the emergence of the National Liberation Force (the FLN in its Spanish initials) in Chiapas. The ultimate goals of the FLN were to take

political power for the *campesinos* of the countryside as well as the workers in the cities and install a popular republic with a socialist system. Eventually this would lead to the defeat, militarily and politically, of the bourgeois.³ Apparently, part of the plan was to create the EZLN after combining the struggles of the urban proletariat with those of the Indians and *campesinos*. Nothing short of the defeat of capitalism was the stated goal. When questioned by Díaz, several Zapatistas confirmed the link with the FLN. Logistic and political problems resulted in the formation of the EZLN long before the goals of the FLN could ever be achieved. In San Cristóbal de las Casas, I asked Graciela, a former assistant to Bishop Samuel Ruiz (an influential and high profile Zapatista supporter and proponent of liberation theology) about the connection between the EZLN and the FLN. She replied, "They are basically one and the same."

While Díaz is specific in describing the origins of the EZLN, Oppenheimer is even more direct and to the point. Drawing conclusions from Zapatista communiques, internal rebel documents and his interview with Marcos, Oppenheimer does not demure when he states,

...there is little doubt that the Zapatistas grew up as a traditional Marxist guerrilla group, which changed its rhetoric after the January I rebellion, when its media-savvy leader discovered the advantages of playing up the Indian participation in his uprising-- the one aspect of his revolt that had captured the world's imagination (45).

Oppenheimer declares that the leadership of the EZLN is mostly white middle-class and that they had succeeded where Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and others had failed: "The white middle-class Mexican rebel leaders had won the allegiance of scores of Indian communities" (45).

Collier is more diplomatic. His analysis is a striking reminder that the current Zapatistas have much in common with their forbearers whose call for *tierra y libertad* united the rural poor during the Mexican revolution. He stresses that although the Zapatistas are demanding rights for indigenous peoples, "...they are first and foremost calling attention to the plight of Mexico's rural poor and peasants, both indigenous and nonindigenous" (7). In discussing the origins of the EZLN, Collier understates the role of "... independent and mostly left-oriented peasant organizations that formed during the 1970s" (54) and focuses on religious conflicts between diverse Protestant, Evangelical, and Catholic churches. In his view, these conflicts "created an environment in which only a *secular* movement, like that of the Zapatistas, could hope to unite peasants across religious lines and attract both women and men, young and old" (56).

Collier notes that the Indigenous Congress of 1974, organized by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, marked the beginnings of many radical peasant groups, including EZLN.⁴ This was the first official convention of Indians convened so indigenous

people themselves could voice their problems and offer their own resolutions without government intervention. Current Zapatista demands reflect a majority of the issues raised at the Indigenous Congress of 1974, among them land, health, education and economic concerns. However, the Catholic Church's attempts at winning converts from other religions prevented it from providing a platform from which Indians of all beliefs could speak with a universal voice. Undeterred, Bishop Ruiz organized thousands of lay workers to win converts in the Lacandon Jungle. Liberation theology, adapted by Bishop Ruiz and others from the book of Exodus, helped in these efforts. It states that the oppressed Indians of Chiapas are in effect the people of Israel fleeing a corrupt regime equal to that of biblical Egypt. The destiny of the Chiapas Indians is to build a new society in the Lacandon jungle.

According to Collier, liberation theology "... has, in recent years, been at the center of social justice movements throughout [Chiapas]" (54). The EZLN, recognizing religious schisms, has retained its popular base by distancing itself from any particular theology. It has galvanized its followers along secular lines. On January 12, 1994, the Zapatistas emphasized this point:

We have no links to Catholic religious authorities, nor with those of any other creed... Among the ranks, the majority are Catholic, but there are also other creeds and religions... We are not religious, nor are we against religion. We respect beliefs, but

each one of us is in the battle for our poverty. There are catechists among us, also *sabáticos* (Seventh-Day Adventists)... (Collier 65-6).

When questioned by a journalist in May of 1994 about the EZLN's connection to liberation theology Marcos replied, "We liberate ourselves but without theology" (Le Bot 52-3).

The census of 1990 revealed that nearly 90% of Mexicans declared themselves Catholic.⁵ Practically all the Mexicans with which I have come into contact are Catholic. In Chiapas, when the subject of the Zapatistas' secular appeal was raised, the question was generally received with curious blank stares. After a little prodding, Gabriel, a hotel security guard and former soldier who had been stationed in San Cristóbal de las Casas after the initial rebellion, frankly asserted, "The problems in Chiapas began when the Catholic Church started losing so many Indians to the Protestants." On a scorching afternoon in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas, with smoke from the wild fires hanging in the air like a filthy curtain, I sought refuge in a local bar. After a couple of icy *cervezas*, an architect sitting on the stool next to me proffered, "In many respects, it is a religious war." Personally, I believe the Zapatistas have a secular appeal. On the other hand, I doubt many join the movement for secular reasons. Religion, most specifically the Catholic Church, plays a large role in the lives of most all Mexicans. And the Zapatistas, particularly Marcos, have shown themselves to be masters at appealing to a great

variety of religious sentiments. Ironically, liberation theology, which has been associated with the Catholic Church in Chiapas (not the Vatican), may actually facilitate appeals to various religions. Graciela first studied liberation theology at a Jesuit university in Guadalajara and proceeded to apply this education at the Roman Catholic diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas under the tutelage of Bishop Samuel Ruiz. Despite Zapatista disclaimers, its secular temperance and liberation theology's overall failure to unite *campesinos*, Graciela's claim that liberation theology "has inspired Zapatistas of all religions" rings true given her experience and Bishop Ruiz's overt support for the guerrillas.⁶ After all, Chiapas *campesinos* have a long divided history. Just because liberation theology cannot unite a majority does not mean it has not found a home within the popular EZLN.

According to Collier, the physical beginning of the EZLN (not the official naming of the organization) was in 1983 when Marcos, then known as Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, and five "...idealists from Mexico's north arrived [in Chiapas] to join forces with dissident peasants and Indians in a movement that immediately went underground to begin military and political organizing" (81). Barry gives a simpler synthesis of the above mentioned origins of the Zapatistas: "More than two decades of campesino organizing--shaped to varying degrees by leftists, the Catholic Church,

and state agencies--contributed to the formation of the EZLN" (160).⁷

The origins of the EZLN can provide a basis for examining the ideology that helped inspire and incite this mass of *campesinos*. Zapatista ideology should not be confused with its goals. Apart from the original military goals that accompanied the 1994 declaration of war, Zapatista objectives of a legitimate democracy for Mexico as well as food, education, work, housing and health care for Chiapas' *campesinos* strike a universal chord and are not difficult to understand or admire. Even the call for a full revival of the *ejido* system, while complex in practice, is not an altogether unjustified or surprising demand. However, these goals are often eclipsed by distrust of the EZLN's means to its ends. Doubts about Zapatista ideology, its solutions, motives and leadership, arose in the nascent hours of the 1994 revolt.

"We want socialism...in our case it will be different. Here it is going to work" (Krauze, *Mexico* 784). The Indian commander who pronounced these words during the January 1, 1994 occupation of San Cristóbal was not just expressing his beliefs. He had been educated to these ends. He embodied Zapatista training and elicited memories of the defeated, passé Latin American communist guerrilla. A revolutionary loaded to make us bear his untenable solutions. The Zapatistas can never completely shed this image. But thanks

to Marcos, the word 'socialism' has not reappeared on the list of Zapatista demands.

Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, a.k.a. Subcommander Marcos, was not supposed to assume the leadership role during the takeover of San Cristóbal de las Casas. He was, by all succeeding reports, one of the white, middle-class organizers of the guerrilla group. But the voice of authority was to be that of an Indian officer, Commander Felipe. Felipe was not up to the task. Within hours of the occupation of San Cristóbal, the Zapatistas not only had to prepare for a government assault on their positions, they also needed to manage the international media which descended upon the bucolic, colonial town in force. Felipe, a fair representative of his *campesino* troops, spoke rudimentary Spanish and not a word of English, the two languages hurled around town by the press corps and terrified tourists. The commander issued prepared statements in his native tongue and halting Spanish. He was quickly overwhelmed by the media offensive. Marcos seized the initiative.

He had certainly prepared himself for the opportunity. Before his disappearance into the Chiapas jungle in the early 80s, Marcos graduated from college with a degree in philosophy, wrote a graduate thesis on French Marxism, and had been a teacher of graphic design and communications. As a native, educated Mexican, his Spanish was flawless. He

also spoke passable English as well as a couple of indigenous dialects. At San Cristóbal's central plaza, the abundantly armed Subcommander spoke with the press; his expressions concealed by a black ski mask. Marcos exuded authority. Yet he was amicable and exhibited a wry sense of humor. When reporters asked him why he, unlike Commander Felipe, covered his face, Marcos responded with a chuckle, "Well, those of us who are the most handsome must protect ourselves." He promptly admitted that he might not be very handsome but did enjoy "making propaganda" for himself.⁸ The press loved him.

Marcos also manipulated the propaganda of the EZLN. After the takeover of San Cristóbal, Commander Felipe read from The Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, first published in the January 1, 1994 edition of **The Mexican Awakener**, the previously underground Zapatista publication. The declaration made no mention of Indian rights and virtually ignored indigenous people as an ethnic group.⁹ At its core was class struggle and agrarian reform. This should come as no surprise. The original Zapatistas of Emiliano Zapata, not driven by class struggle per se, were also fighting more for communal lands than for any particular ethnic rights or identity. Within days, Marcos shifted the focus of Zapatista aims and ideology, and saved the movement from military defeat.

Sometime during the first week of the rebellion, Marcos realized that communist rhetoric and propaganda did not play any better in Mexico than it did in most of the rest of the world. It was obvious the insurgents were not going to incite a national revolt. Yet something else was equally evident. The media, particularly the western European press, was fascinated by the plight of oppressed Indians intent on overthrowing the Mexican government. With the Mexican Army closing in, Marcos changed tactics. Suddenly the war was presented as a specifically Mexican, indigenous rebellion for human rights that had nothing in common with the failed communist revolutions in Central America and other parts of the world. The story was a media and military coup for the EZLN. As the Zapatistas were forced to retreat into hiding, the government could not advance in the face of mounting international scrutiny.

Marcos and the Zapatistas quickly became media stars. To accomplish this feat, the Zapatista leadership simply publicized an identity (oppressed indigenous *campesinos*) that had already been reenforced within the movement and could easily be projected to a sympathetic public. Once protected by the public eye, the EZLN initiated a media offensive with an all out attack on neoliberalism (the Zapatistas brandish the term and thus avoid the communist implications of anti-capitalist rhetoric) in conjunction with a call for indigenous rights. But the original

Zapatista oratory is not easily forgotten and continues to raise questions about the aims and ideology of the EZLN.

If the Zapatista uprising was not purely the work of a group of white, middle class, Mexico City radicals, it is equally improbable that it was a completely independent, spontaneous Indian uprising. Contrary to Zapatista claims of a purely indigenous leadership, the rebellion was most likely the result of a "...carefully planned offensive by a white-dominated Marxist guerrilla group that had found considerable support among long-exploited Mayan communities" (Oppenheimer 49). This summation is bolstered by reports of Zapatista ideological outbursts at the outset of the uprising which called for socialism and a revolution against capitalism.¹⁰ These outbursts are compounded by the EZLN's January 1, 1994 Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle which, among the aforementioned demands, also calls for a dictatorship of the proletariat.¹¹

Thus are suspicions aroused about the motives, ideology and leadership of the EZLN. These doubts and suspicions are profound and result in disparate reports of events and the preparedness of the EZLN. Descriptions of the Zapatistas as a poorly armed band of freedom fighters are almost as frequent as portrayals of them as a well trained and supplied army prepared for a long war. During the 1994 rebellion, when reports of a battle between the Mexican Army and landless *campesinos* armed with wooden toy guns became

public, questions as to the degree of government culpability were just as prevalent as doubts about the copiously armed Zapatista leaders who could have deceived these *campesinos* and sent them into battle like cannon fodder.¹²

Militant fervor, deception and calls for class struggle, forged by years of attempting to follow the path of the famous Latin American communist revolutionary, Ernesto 'Che' Guervara, and Marxist-Leninist ideology,¹³ characterized the movement during the first days of the 1994 uprising. But now, international support has grown for what appears to be a struggle for indigenous/*campesino* rights in Chiapas. The EZLN has drawn attention to the plight of Chiapas' peasants. Even so, persistent doubts about Zapatista motives and leadership recall a spent ideology (communism) that has run its revolutionary course in Latin America as well as Europe. The movement does not offer any clear, sustainable agenda or ideology. In many respects, this may explain why the EZLN has failed in its efforts to capture the hearts and minds of the vast majority of Mexicans who are in "... no mood for a social upheaval" (Oppenheimer 152).

These facts are not lost on Marcos. He recognizes the shortcomings of communist revolutionary rhetoric and is purposely vague on questions of ideology as he stresses the Mexican and Indian roots of the movement. References to a class struggle against capitalism have all but disappeared,

the "... option of war has been closed" (Montemayor 159), and the EZLN has resolved to become politically, socially as well as militarily effective.¹⁴ This new face of the EZLN has been referred to as "neozapatism."¹⁵ Neozapatism now overshadows the persistent nebulous nature of EZLN ideology as well as doubts about its leadership, motives and indigenous-Mexican roots. Although there is no evidence that this tactic gains the EZLN more support in Mexico than it already has, or in Chiapas where the Zapatistas remain popular, there is no doubt that it has attracted a large global audience.

In an interview with Yvon Le Bot, Marcos recalls being surprised when some French supporters told him, "Lack of definition is what permits you [the Zapatistas] to survive" (Le Bot 306). Of course, he is equally pleased with himself when he claims,

Anarchists see the EZLN as an anarchist movement, the Trotskists see clearly the influence of Trotsky, Maoists plainly see Maoist approaches taken to their ultimate consequences, Leninists a Leninist approach... everyone sees a piece, a form of zapatism that reflects them ... (Le Bot 306).

Marcos goes on to insist that this lack of definition can not continue. At one point Zapatista ideology will have to be defined.¹⁶ At present, the ideology of the EZLN remains conveniently vague, as if the Zapatistas had "no other guiding light than the desperation of Chiapas' poverty-stricken Mayans" (Oppenheimer 47).

I say conveniently vague because lack of definition seems to be in vogue today, especially where the EZLN draws most of its international support: western Europe. Contemporary European left-of-center social democratic governments do not fit into the old leftist mold. The Communist Party exists as a practical relic while Socialists are often relegated to a supporting role in the workings of Parliament. The class struggles by workers and the poor as well as the social struggles for political freedom and human rights have been won more by a confluence of democratic ideals than any particular Marxist agenda. To quote William Pfaff, an editorial page columnist for the International Herald Tribune in Paris, "In practice as well as principle, [these] battles were won long ago, with representative government established everywhere in the West and the assumption, by states, of responsibility for at least the minimal well-being of its citizens."¹⁷ Social-Democratic parties and governments are now leftists bereft of ideology. According to Pfaff,

Leftists politics has become problem-solving. This is new. Twenty years ago ideological division dominated British, French, and Italian politics, and there were terrorists at large in West Germany. The diversity, pragmatism, and lack of ideology of the left now in power in western Europe are positive qualities. They demonstrate how far we have come from a bad past.

Lately, with the PRI sharing power in congress for the first time in its history, Mexico has shown signs of a new

political freedom. Still, the Zapatistas certainly cannot claim victory in the battles of the poor or for human rights in Chiapas. Theoretically, according to the European model, they should still be immersed in an ideological struggle; something akin to the stated goals of the January 1, 1994 Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle. However, the 1994 uprising did not unify Mexicans or inspire the massive protests and activism the EZLN expected.¹⁸ Consequently, the Zapatista ideological stance had to soften in order to attract national and international support.

Marcos distances the EZLN from traditional communists by denying any ambitions for power in Mexico. This is also a distinction between the EZLN and the PRD, the dominant leftist political party in Mexico. The PRD still attempts to ally itself with the EZLN in order to attract votes. Because the EZLN has yet to define itself, and does not compel its members to vote, there has been a lot of friction between the two camps and the Zapatistas feel they have been unfairly used.¹⁹ Despite the new face of neozapatism, the EZLN is not ready to solve problems by becoming politically integrated into Mexican society. On the other hand, Marcos is proud to cite Ernesto 'Che' Guervara as a referent for the Zapatistas, explains away ideological outbursts by some Zapatistas as an inevitable result of converging ideas in the movement, and is unafraid to admit that the EZLN was originally steeped in Marxism and led by middle-class

reactionaries.²⁰ According to Marcos, the EZLN has moved beyond its Marxist-Leninist origins and has subordinated itself to a leadership of indigenous *campesinos*.

Le Bot's interview with Marcos reveals a skilled communicator who has a clear grasp of how to overcome his critics. His focus on indigenous people who are "discriminated [against], always in the minority [and] humiliated ..." (Le Bot 22) stirs international interest about human rights abuses in Chiapas. Denunciations of war, descriptions of the EZLN as a "political and ethical enemy" (Le Bot 245) of the Mexican Army, and clever claims that a national uprising "does not mean a struggle for power but for a change to a democratic system " (Le Bot 196) all serve to assuage fears of violence. This tack puts distance between the movement and the failed armed struggles of communist guerrillas in neighboring Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

When questioned by Le Bot about the EZLN's January 1, 1994 Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle which ignored Indian rights and called for a dictatorship of the proletariat, Marcos deftly responds that the demands were not Marxist but Social-Democratic.²¹ The Declaration's call for war and a dictatorship of the proletariat are subsequently disregarded as Marcos concentrates on the eleven demands of the Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle: work, land, roof, food, health, education independence, liberty, democracy,

justice and peace. "Only when the first ten points are fulfilled will peace be possible" (Le Bot 198).²² In this way, it appears that these eleven demands of the Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle have always been a call for Indian rights that are also applicable to all of Mexico's poor. Marcos reiterates this point when he states that the EZLN is purely "... an indigenous movement that aspires not to be only an indigenous movement, that refuses to be limited to being only an indigenous movement..." (Le Bot 337).

Philosophically, it looks as if the EZLN and Marcos started with the cart before the horse, got stuck, retreated and now finally have it turned around. By Marcos' own admissions the movement has changed course; moved beyond its original communist rhetoric, militarism and calls for class rebellion. And even if one finds Marcos a bit too media savvy, no one can deny that the Zapatistas have called attention to the grave problems facing the indigenous people and *campesinos* of Chiapas.

The Zapatista media campaign is not limited to the Mexican and international press. Marcos is on the Internet with his own Web site. "The use of such technology casts doubt on the rebellion as one led by peasant Indians" (Rich 82). Nevertheless, the Internet gets the word out. Marcos utilized it effectively in organizing the July 1996 First Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism in the mountains of southern Mexico where

leftists from 41 countries united to protest NAFTA and neoliberalism.²³ The media drive has been so successful that to many analysts the EZLN no longer represents an armed rebellion but a "postmodern revolution" (Rich 74). Author Carlos Fuentes has pointed to the rebels as the "first postcommunist guerrillas," while Le Bot adds that the Zapatistas "...have transformed themselves into antiguerrillas" (76-7). Attention is now drawn to claims that the rebellion has never been about military goals or seizing power. Le Bot even draws comparisons between Marcos and Ghandi.²⁴

Needless to say, such comparisons are hard to swallow. Aside from the 1994 Zapatista rebellion, the EZLN is still capable of initiating violent confrontations comparable to those carried out by the *Guardias Blancas* or other paramilitary groups bent on removing *campesinos* from private land. Most have to do with the illegal establishment of autonomous municipalities in Chiapas. These municipalities are supported by Zapatistas who enter towns and forcibly remove *campesinos* not associated with the EZLN in order to form communities that are independent of government control. Government authorities are eventually called in to reestablish the townships.²⁵ Accusations abound in response to the kidnapping and killings that seem to occur on a daily basis; and it is not always clear who the guilty parties are.

Perhaps Zapatista ideology is not as nebulous as Marcos would have us believe. There is no doubt that the EZLN is ensconced on the left. Marcos does admit that while the Zapatistas never entertained the possibility of obtaining power, they have always assumed that fulfillment of their demands would come from the political left or center-left in Mexico.²⁶ Yet Marcos is still capable of taking matters into his own hands. The First Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism is proof of his mastery of anti-capitalist propaganda and his enduring ability to utilize ideology and initiate action.

Despite the anticapitalist gatherings and rhetoric, Marcos is entrepreneurial. Professor Paul Rich at the University of the Americas, Puebla, Mexico, reports that Marcos has been working on a CD-Rom:

'A space like the visit to the Louvre museum, but that would be a visit to the Lacandon Jungle'...This would supplement Marcos' home page on the World Wide Web, his flirtations with a proposed designer line of sweaters... and his recent appearance on the music video channel MTV. In Mexico these days, revolutionaries oppose NAFTA--but not profits (84).

It looks like Marcos could be an adept capitalist leading a leftist revolution in Mexico. This image certainly adds to his persona and status as an enigma. Via the internet and open letters to the public he has presented himself as everything from a San Francisco homosexual to the son of a Tampico furniture store owner.²⁷ Marcos, with a pipe clenched between his teeth and visage perpetually hidden by

a black mask, must relish his mysterious profile. It is an image reminiscent of the Mexican *caudillo*, or worse, a masked *caudillo*.^{28*}

In short, Zapata and Villa, the two heroes of the revolution, actually lost the war. The Mexican government is prisoner to an agrarian myth,²⁹ and leftist peasant rebels are led by an urban, middle-class, MTV, capitalist-savvy, masked man. How could anyone have been surprised when Marcos claimed in mid 1994 that "... 'fake Zapatistas' had made their appearance throughout the country, soliciting funds and offering military training[?]" (Oppenheimer 265).

Were the Zapatistas real Zapatistas?... How could one write about a country where one could not only not trust what people said, but wasn't even sure whether people were who they were supposed to be? Studying Mexico, as one U.S. academic had once told me, was like working in Plato's cave: You only saw shadows and never knew which shadow belonged to whom (Oppenheimer 265-6).

The Chiapas *campesinos* have been brought out of the shadows by the EZLN. The rebellion has illuminated the need for true democracy in Mexico and better peasant organization. But the EZLN has not offered a clear agenda or positive, realistic and sustainable solutions to the

* "... Mexico still suffers from a legacy of *personalismo*, that the perception of one's power and of whom one knows is more important than what one knows. *Personalismo* will be put ahead of the law, and from *personalismo* comes *caudillismo* (authoritarianism)" (Rich 76-7).

problems that face the poor in Chiapas or the country as a whole.³⁰ Behind the masks, the Zapatistas work in the dark and refuse to see even a sliver of light reflected by NAFTA and neoliberalism.

Chapter 3 Neoliberalism

... neoliberalism constitutes a global offensive against life and humanity: poverty, unemployment, abandonment of social rights, privatization of welfare and public services, ecological destruction, dismantling of social organizations, authoritarianism, ideological regimentation, social automation and the submission of everything human to the logic of money and the market... (The First Inter-continental Meeting for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism).¹

...a rejection of paternalism and mercantilism... to bring to the continent full democracy and modern capitalism... to manifest the intellectual ferment and real challenge before Latin America. Now we have an opportunity to restructure the continent, making it more human, free and prosperous. This is the [neo]liberal challenge (Levine 9-12).

Neoliberalism: A philosophy that has as its ultimate goal political and economic freedom (Steven Veit).

Within the goals of neoliberalism as outlined by Levine, is a key word that can define neoliberalism itself: capitalism. During the last decades, capitalism has accompanied revolutions in information, communication and transportation. Economies have opened, international trade agreements such as NAFTA have been created, and globalization has become a reality. The definition of 'capitalism' has been amplified. The global economy, a logical result of the scientific and technological advances of the twentieth century,² has produced a new face of capitalism: neoliberalism.

Why 'neoliberalism'? Why not 'neocapitalism' or some other term that accurately describes contemporary globalization? Neoliberalism refers to the liberalization or opening of global economies to the market and international trade. But the word does not adequately describe the flexibility of this new face of capitalism as applied to different spheres of free trade or its neoclassical economic roots.³ Also, if understood in the context of North American politics and economics, 'neoliberalism' could have a meaning more in line with socialism and contrary to free-market capitalism.⁴ The word 'neoliberalism' circumvents the implications of 'capitalism.' It is part of the new lexicon employed by the left in order to distinguish itself from old communist rhetoric.

Until the failure of communism in the Soviet block and most of the rest of the world, leftists "...pointed to the capitalist system as the enemy..." (Pazos, *Chiapas* 11-12). Now the enemy is neoliberalism and, particularly within the EZLN, NAFTA. But in reality, neoliberalism and NAFTA still represent the same old enemies:

If we analyze the expressions used by the majority of leftist politicians, intellectuals and journalists, they no longer speak of a struggle against capitalism... now the enemy is neoliberalism. The word **neoliberalism** is substituted for the term **capitalism** in the political lexicography of the **neosocialists**. They also do not clearly identify Yankee imperialism as the exploiter, they simply declare themselves enemies of

NAFTA, which for them materializes the relationship with Yankee imperialism (Pazos, *Chiapas* 12).

Pazos points out how many in the EZLN slip into old communist terminology by calling for "'the end of capitalism,' '[a] struggle against the bourgeois,' [and the] 'installation of socialism'...concepts which make clear their ideological affiliation" (12). And if we substitute 'capitalism' for 'neoliberalism' in the above statement from The First Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism, the phrases sound hauntingly familiar; Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and "... schemes expressed with different words" (Pazos, *Chiapas* 12-13).

In contemporary leftist rhetoric, 'neoliberalism' is frequently employed as a euphemism for 'capitalism.' It is also a term avoided by many economic analysts when describing contemporary, globalized, free-market capitalism.⁵ Still, the word 'neoliberalism' has gained acceptance across the Latin American political spectrum⁶ and regularly describes the economic and social policies that have led to NAFTA (i.e., the capitalist tenets of economic liberalization, privatization and deregulation, among others). It will also be used here in this sense. Yet those who embrace the mantle of neoliberalism transcend simple laissez-faire capitalism and call for political as well as economic freedom. One of the challenges of neoliberalism is to "...bring democracy to the [Latin

American] continent" (Levine 9). Hence, 'democracy' is another key term that defines neoliberalism. Neoliberalism includes capitalism but also encompasses democracy as an indispensable political goal.

The desperation and poverty in Chiapas and other parts of Latin America gain significance as we compare their overall standard living to conditions in other nations. Under the scrutiny of these comparisons, Mexico fares poorly when compared to many Asian countries as well as those of western Europe and North America. Since the end of World War II, two terms have come to represent this poor showing: 'underdeveloped' and 'Third World.'⁷ Mexico's problems are then understood as a matter of economic and political development which can be resolved by recognizing and applying what is known, with reasonable probability, about developed countries.⁸

Here we begin with the powerful fact that no noncapitalist country has attained the levels of political, civil, religious, and intellectual freedom found in all advanced capitalisms. To make the case differently, the state of explicit political liberty we loosely call 'democracy' has so far appeared only in nations in which capitalism is the mode of economic organization (Heilbroner 74).

Capitalism not only won, it turned into a marvelous machine of prosperity, led by people who could take an idea and turn it into an industry (Time).⁹

The great "...economic success stories in the world have been capitalist, first in Europe, then in North America and ... Asia" (Berger 42). The question now before us is

not whether capitalism can function, but how and under what conditions can it best benefit the masses. Neoliberalism answers this question by stressing the "moral superiority of democracy..." (Berger 48) and the empirical superiority of economic liberty. Market based, liberal economies have shown they can produce. Now it is just a matter of ensuring political freedom along with economic liberty.

Developed democracies in the world today are inevitably tied to a capitalist system. The economies of these nations are mixed to varying degrees, but ultimately they are cemented to capitalism and economic freedom. Capitalism can also be found, to some degree or another, in authoritarian countries. Put simply, democracy cannot exist without economic freedom (capitalism), but capitalism can exist without democracy.¹⁰ Authoritarian nations may reap some wealth through capitalist incentives. But if the standard of living steadily increases, people turn their attentions to other necessities and the political participation of the masses becomes imperative.¹¹

With the possible exception of the United States, all of today's democratic economic powers took off economically under capitalist regimes that had little democratic tradition. Capitalism became a catalyst for making these societies democratic. In turn, the societies became ever more productive. The link between capitalism and democracy is so profound that the current world economic crisis, which

has yet to engulf the democracies of North America and the fledgling European Union, is perceived as an indictment of authoritarian Asian economies and poor global regulation rather than neoliberalism itself.¹²

A purely capitalist laissez-faire country does not exist and neither does a completely laissez-faire, free-market world. The State does play an important regulatory role in every government.¹³ But as the 21st century approaches, capitalism has won the day. Interventionist, communist States have shown themselves to be economic disasters with governments that lead to a level of control by the State over all daily aspects of life as to make democracy impracticable.¹⁴ Authoritarian, communist nations, such as China and Cuba, now search for ways to foster private enterprise and domestic as well as foreign investment while turning a blind eye to "...old Marxist dogma that identifies private enterprise with human exploitation" (Mendoza 105).

The neoliberal challenge of economic and political liberty is accompanied by support for private property and the sovereignty of the individual. Individual rights are vital as they, along with a separation of powers, assure basic freedoms even if totalitarian parties win elections. On the other hand, in regards to private property, "in no society where --as occurs in Latin America-- private property is concentrated in the hands of a very few can

there be real democracy" (Vargas Llosa 31). The solution is to extend and propagate the access to private property so that more and more citizens have a chance to acquire it. In this way, both economic and political liberty may be nurtured.

Private property and enterprises will be established as government opens the economy to international competition, allows for the privatization of companies run by the State, eliminates business as well as syndicated monopolies, opens the transportation, telecommunication and transport industries, and generally deregulates the market in favor of private investment.¹⁵ However, in Mexico and most of the rest of Latin America, economic inequality is so pronounced that the solution to the question of private property cannot be left to the market alone. "Even the most ardent free market advocates usually acknowledge that nonmarket strategies are needed..." (Barry 239). The Mexican government, supported by the World Bank, has initiated nutrition programs for the poor and subsidy strategies for grain farmers as well as credit and financial support for the peasantry.¹⁶ The neoliberal ideal of economic liberty will also progress as the government ensures that employees, laborers and citizens in the lowest income brackets receive preferences for the acquisition of stocks within the companies they work for or other newly established private enterprises.¹⁷ A government might also relinquish control

of its most sacred cow in order to advance dissemination of wealth: The privatization of social security in Chile, "--the so called provisional reform... --" (Vargas Llosa 32), has been effective in the dissemination of wealth even during times of crisis.

Neoliberalism allows for the fact that players in the world market cannot apply the above-mentioned neoliberal economic policies equally amongst themselves. But Chile has led the way in Latin America by implementing nearly all of them. As a result, Chile has achieved a rate of growth and development unequalled in Latin America.¹⁸ In April of 1998, Latin American leaders met in Santiago, Chile, to begin negotiations on the Americas Free Trade Area; a free trade agreement between Latin American countries that could be implemented by 2005.¹⁹ Unfortunately, prior to achieving its status as an economic leader on the continent, Chile had to endure years of dictatorship during economic liberalization before democracy finally found a foothold in 1990. Since then democracy has flourished in the country along with economic liberty.

The example of Chile is disturbing because it suggests that a dictatorship is necessary to foster economic liberty before political liberty can come to pass. On the other hand, as John F. Kennedy said, "'One cannot choose the time in which one lives'" (Echeñique, 84). Like the regimes that predated the democracies of Europe, the dictatorship that

existed in Chile during the 70s and 80s was but one of many throughout Latin America.²⁰ Now Chile and the entire western hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba, have "representative, civil governments]... [and] the consensus of the people in favor of a democratic system" (Vargas Llosa 23). The Chilean dictatorship under Pinochet distinguished itself from others in Latin America by successfully cultivating economic liberty before acquiescing to the people's demands for democracy. Economic liberty and the fruits of capitalism inevitably encompassed the other neoliberalist ideal of political freedom. This course prevented Chile from becoming just another Latin American military dictatorship, one that leaves its people with little in the way of political or economic freedom, and guided the nation to its highest levels of economic development and social liberty.²¹

If Vargas Llosa had considered the results in Chile when he called Mexico the perfect dictatorship, perhaps he would have opted for the label 'incompetent dictatorship.' At least Mexico has avoided some of the flagrant, extreme human rights abuses that plagued the Chilean dictatorship. But how can Mexico be included in the Latin America of civil and representative governments if the country is still ruled by a perfect dictatorship? The answer lies in the ideals of the Mexican constitution. Ideals still to be realized.

The dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz ended with his exile to France in 1911. The ensuing assassinations of Villa, Zapata, Carranza and Obregón, the last *caudillos* of the Mexican revolution, only reinforced the authoritarian tradition.²² A result of the Mexican revolution was the First Article of the Constitution of 1917 which declared Mexico a Representative Republic, Democratic and Federal. A practical ideal compromised by post-revolutionary bloodshed. Along with the murders of Villa and Zapata, President Carranza was assassinated after a brief military conflict with Obregón in 1920, and Obregón met the same fate in 1928 while campaigning to regain the presidency. The surviving president, Plutarco Elías Calles, escaped the bullet by creating the PNR (known as the PRI since 1946) and integrating it with the military. The PNR was born with perpetual power guaranteed.²³ Calles assured the party's perpetual power by voluntarily stepping down in favor of his hand picked choice for president; a policy faithfully practiced every six years by succeeding presidents. Thus, a perfect dictatorship was established in Mexico's tradition of *caudillismo* without burning the constitution and igniting another revolution. The Legislative and Judicial branches were subordinated to the president. Elections have traditionally been won by the PRI through bankrupt agrarian reform policies aimed at appeasing the peasants, and the "...abundant use of treasury funds and a thousand

subterfuges ranging from coercion to fraud..." (Krauze, *la dictadura* 183).

The desire for democracy in Mexico is supported by the country's constitution. However, there is almost no tradition of economic freedom.²⁴ *Caudillismo* has not only undermined democracy and the First Article of the Mexican Constitution, but also carefully maintained a closed economy. Mexico has really been an incompetent dictatorship; an interventionist State where mercantilism and protectionism have ruled.* In addition, State support of the *ejido* has impeded capitalization and created an enormous bureaucracy along with the *minifundios*. This has resulted in a government economy of subsistence farmers antithetical to the principals of private property and incapable of accumulating sufficient capital to feed the masses.²⁵ To a degree, the masses are pacified. Just the same, with a multitude of peasants lie the seeds of disaster manifested in the illegal renting and selling of government *ejidos*. In turn, corruption is rampant and individual rights are routinely ignored in a nation bereft of political as well as economic liberty.

* mercantilism is an economy "...in which groups of business men, in collusion with the government and syndicate leaders, split privileges and markets" (Pazos, *Chiapas* 31 [Trans. Steven Veit]).

Since there are few examples of political liberty thriving before economic liberty, a problem arises similar to the question of the chicken or the egg: In a poor country such as Mexico, where the people have suffered poverty, mercantilism and a single party political system, can democracy usher in economic liberalization or must a market economy precede democratization? For Mexico, it appears that both economic and political liberty are developing more or less simultaneously.

The PRI, responsible for Mexico's perfectly incompetent dictatorship, now shares power in Congress. Mexico is finally demonstrating some of the ideals expressed in the First Article of the Constitution of 1917. This does not indicate the existence of true Mexican democracy any more than the nation's entrance into NAFTA indicates an overall application of neoliberal economic options. The transition to real democracy and economic liberty is not instantaneous. Parts of northern Mexico have been able to take advantage of economic liberalization.²⁶ But the pace of economic liberty matches the pace of political liberty. It is slow and painful for many, particularly to the south, in Chiapas. And if the neoliberal tenet of democracy comes to pass in Mexico, would the nation's suffering during economic liberalization translate into votes against neoliberal, free-market policies? Perhaps. Despite this possibility, the flexibility of neoliberalism demands adherence to

democratic choices and allows for gradual economic liberalization. Given the incompetence of Mexico's dictatorship, a legitimate democracy with strong popular support is probably the only system that can, sooner or later, promote economic liberalization and successfully manage the suffering of the under class.²⁷

It is possible that the end is near for the PRI. Still, it is difficult to predict a prosperous future for any nation that has never known political or economic freedom. Mexico's entire political and economic history has run counter to neoliberal ideals.²⁸ NAFTA does represent a new ideal for Mexico: economic liberty. But the uprising in Chiapas has slowed progress by "...creating a climate of tension and insecurity that reduces investment, the creation of jobs and growth" (Pazos, *Chiapas* 87).

Despite Zapatista claims to the contrary, neoliberalism and NAFTA cannot possibly be the cause of the problems in the region. Chiapas has suffered with the rest of the country through decades of an interventionist, corrupt State. To believe that recent attempts to open markets and deregulate the economy are responsible for the long standing poverty in Chiapas and the nation as a whole requires a severe case of amnesia.²⁹ The fact that Marcos and the EZLN present their cause as a revolution against neoliberalism instantly calls into question the motives of the EZLN leadership. Don't they know that NAFTA and neoliberalism

represent a new course for Mexico? Marcos is not a mysterious masked defender of Indian rights, but a manipulative middle-class white intellectual who has utilized "...the Lacandon Indians to bring his political messages to the world without doing anything concrete to resolve their immediate problems and aspirations..."

(Mendoza 253). The armed rebellion in Chiapas is a political ploy; a facade for the same old tired ideology of the Latin American leftist guerilla. Suppositions that the Zapatista movement is a novel, post-communist phenomenon moved Octavio Paz to write:

History has not cured our intellectuals. The years of atonement they have gone through since the end of totalitarian socialism, far from dissipating their deliriums and softening their rancor, have exacerbated them...
(Oppenheimer 273).

Paz went on to predict that society would receive Marcos' "theatrical ways...[and] manifestos with a 'big yawn' once his time in the limelight expired" (Oppenheimer 273).

Before his death in 1998, Paz expressed his fear of a chaotic future for Mexico. Political plurality is now a real possibility. If the opportunity is lost, a totalitarian *caudillo* could emerge. Paz remained an optimist: "'In the long run, the forces of openness, modernization and democracy will prevail... But it will be a very painful, very difficult road'" (Oppenheimer 318).

For Mexico, there is no turning back. Political plurality, democracy and economic freedom are struggling for

survival. Moreover, if a dictator does come to power in Mexico he will likely continue the traditions of *caudillismo* and mercantilism leaving little hope for economic and political freedom. Although the country shows signs of democratic reform and economic liberalization, maybe it is time to view the problems in Mexico as primarily political. The nation has shown that it cannot prosper under a dictatorship. Now might be the time to prove that democracy can lead to economic freedom.

Up until March of 1994, the PRI had an adequate if not perfect record in preventing revolutions and presidential assassinations. The assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio was the first murder of a presidential candidate in Mexico since Obregón was gunned down in 1928. Colosio was the hand-picked candidate of Salinas. His death, coming so soon after the Zapatista uprising, was a brutal illustration of how Mexico's problems, economic and otherwise, "...were of a political nature and would not go away just with economic corrections" (Oppenheimer 318). Unlike the capitalism that predated the European democracies, economic liberty in Mexico is integrally connected with, and dependant on, the political order.³⁰

Globalization is a reality, not a choice;³¹ and neoliberal goals in this global economy are to have rich, productive neighbors, "...because the volume of commercial transactions and international harmony are not only going to

depend on our economic health but on that of our neighbors' " (Mendoza 46). This is the idea behind NAFTA. The United States has generally always enjoyed a stable border with prosperous Canada. The opposite is true with respect to relatively poor Mexico. Why would the U.S., Canada and Mexico enter into an agreement with the intention of making an unstable situation worse?³² To claim that free trade agreements are just another example of imperialism and exploitation is to ignore the obvious: The U.S. and Canada have much to gain by having a stable and prosperous neighbor to the south. However, prosperity, democracy, NAFTA and economic liberty for Mexico will be stymied if political remedies are ignored.

Because of the violence and instability that followed the Mexican revolution, Mexico's political elite has systematically shunned democracy and political plurality as ideas that could divide and weaken the country.³³ Notwithstanding this intransigence, political parties, international banks, corporations and nations insisting on full economic liberty for Mexico before political liberty is realized are also working in Plato's cave; shouting in the dark along with the Zapatistas who scream for an end to neoliberalism.

Chapter 4 Common Ground

During the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94), 251 nationalized companies were privatized. These companies were worth some US\$23 billion and represented but a small portion of Mexico's nationalized sector. The program was heralded in the U.S. as a positive step toward free trade. The initial wealth created helped Salinas convince the Clinton administration that Mexico was ready for NAFTA.

Economic liberalization in Mexico spawned a new breed of mercantilism that spread the wealth among family members and cronies of the ruling elite. At the beginning of Salinas' presidency, there was a single Mexican billionaire. By 1994, toward the end of Salinas' term, there were 24 Mexican billionaires. Also, economic disaster struck. Not only was the peso devalued, but the average Mexican worker lost 52 per cent of his real income.¹ Subsequent criminal investigations uncovered egregious crimes committed at the highest levels of government. Fraud, extortion and murder all played significant roles in the rise and fall of the Mexican economy. It was no coincidence that "...virtually all of the new Mexican billionaires were personal cronies of the President's brother, and most participated in the privatization program" (Ayres 126).

Ayres makes a comparison between Mexico's problems and those of African and Asian dictatorships as well as Persian Gulf monarchies who routinely rob their countries with impunity. He also notes that privatization should start "... with housing and the land..." (126). Maybe so. Yet as long as Mexico is prisoner to a government comparable to the aforementioned corrupt regimes, there is no fear of reprisals for blatant looting of the country's assets. In this case, economic liberalization does not bring national prosperity nor does it represent neoliberalism.

Mexico is showing signs of bucking the trend. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, in order to avoid a trial for high crimes against the state, has lived in voluntary exile since leaving office. His brother, Raúl Salinas de Gortari, will likely never escape. He is serving a life term in jail. Moreover, the current president, Ernesto Zedillo, has shown tolerance for Mexico's new found political plurality. He has vowed to break with seventy years of tradition and endorse primary elections to select the next PRI candidate for the presidency.² Even so, the economic disaster has fostered zealous criticism of neoliberal policies; especially from the EZLN.

Le Bot mentions that the Zapatistas have "... a propensity to confuse a market economy with neoliberalism" (105). If the two are confused and repudiated equally, peasant communities will be condemned to a subsistence

economy. In other words, the Zapatistas and *campesinos* in general really do need the external investment that a market economy can bring, but they do not need to compete in the laissez-faire neoliberal world of NAFTA. However, this perspective presupposes that neoliberalism always requires radical economic remedies irrespective of democracy or the needs and desires of the masses. This is simply not the case. As economies are

... oriented more toward the market, we [still] can not know what is preferable: a gradual process or a radical cure... The process of converting a state economy to a market economy, in the old socialist societies, seemed to call for a radical cure. But Latin America is not eastern Europe and the Latin American state system is not socialism (Berger 51).

Even though the roots of neoliberalism are found in neoclassical economics, neoliberalism is distinct in its flexibility while remaining synonymous with a market economy. Neoliberalism also conforms to the democratic choices of the people even when these choices conflict with neoliberal economic policy. After all, democratic choices can and do find a place in the market.

Market liberalization in Mexico and the implementation of NAFTA resembled more a North American/Mexican experiment in trickle-down economics than neoliberalism in action.³ The process did not make use of a multitude of neoliberal economic options or consider the struggle for real democracy in the country. While it is true that Mexico has yet to

privatize many of its nationalized industries, most notably the oil industry, a sort of "free-market radicalism" (Castañeda 422) has taken hold and exacerbated economic disparities as well as the problem of corruption. The situation continues to deteriorate:

Mexicans are indeed paying dearly for the long PRI rule, which has had an effect on the country's personality as well as its pocket-book, and for plunging into an experiment like NAFTA without public discussion (Rich 80).

The nation's northern neighbors also plunged into NAFTA without much discussion and debate about the effects the treaty would have on Mexico. Canada and the U.S. demonstrated little concern over Mexico's corrupt, inept dictatorship, and dismissed the idea of gradual economic liberalization for the country.⁴ A full range of neoliberal programs were not deliberated at all before NAFTA was signed. Naturally, all three governments were caught unawares when the EZLN attacked.

Neoliberalism is not a common referent within the North American political or social spectrum. Because of the political and economic liberty prevalent within the U.S., a case could be made for the success of neoliberal policies within that nation even though the term is rarely, if ever, used or recognized by politicians, the media or general public (not to mention a variety of economists). When the term is applied, the flexibility of neoliberal economics and the philosophy's call for democracy are ignored.

Neoliberalism is thus limited to the laissez-faire, free-market world of NAFTA.

The Zapatistas restrict neoliberalism to the free-market world of NAFTA as well. In this world, Mexico "... has truly embarked on a full-fledged process of economic integration with a 'nonequal'" (Castañeda 322). Consequently, the benefits of NAFTA are confined to the industrialized northern part of the country. Conversely, impoverished southern Mexico is left unprotected. Unable to produce competitive products, *campesinos* stand to lose any privatized *ejidos* to creditors or large landholders without receiving sufficient capital gains to acquire the property necessary to prosper from the treaty. The geographic and economic diversity of Mexico requires the obvious observation: what is good for Mexico's north is not necessarily good for Mexico's south.⁵ NAFTA is the radical laissez-faire cure for a problem that demands a different remedy. As the Mexican and North American sponsors of the treaty disregarded less painful neoliberal alternatives, like a gradual process of opening regional (Caribbean) markets first, harsh economic liberalization in Mexico made it easy for the EZLN to seize on "a devil --neoliberalism and NAFTA --" (Rich 77) in order to win a media campaign. It really does not matter that neoliberalism encompasses much more than what NAFTA represents, including the Zapatista demand for true democracy. The EZLN is fighting a

war. The manipulation and maneuvering of artillery, or in this case lexicography, is justified. Given the alacrity with which Marcos has managed the media, it is not presumptuous to assume that this tactic has been employed deliberately; another effective piece of soldiering that has attracted an international audience.

The analysis offered by Pazos in ¿Por qué Chiapas? (Why Chiapas?) reflects the success of Zapatista strategy. His observation that the EZLN and neosocialists simply substitute 'neoliberalism' for the term 'capitalism' lends credence to his assessment of Zapatista rhetoric as Marxist-Leninist "... schemes expressed with different words" (12-13). But he neglects the literature of those who embrace the mantle of neoliberalism (i.e. Berger, Levine, Vargas Llosa et al.) which indicates that the Zapatistas have twisted the meaning of the word to their advantage. This suggests that Pazos is too steeped in neoclassical economics to recognize the scope of Zapatista strategy. Had he exposed how the EZLN has publicized a distorted version of neoliberal goals and remedies, Pazos could have made a stronger case for the implementation of more of his free-market cures for Mexico. In effect, Marcos defined neoliberalism for Pazos as laissez-faire capitalism and Pazos eagerly swallowed the bait.

This is a fair deduction given that ¿Por qué Chiapas? is Pazos' response to the Zapatista rebellion. In

Zapata's Revenge, Barry also focuses on the events in Chiapas. He does classify some nonmarket strategies as the "... more human side of neoliberalism..." (240); but his appraisal of neoliberal convictions as the mere international market postulates of privatization, deregulation and liberalization implies that he too has ignored a wide range of neoliberal literature and acknowledged the Zapatista explanation of the philosophy.⁶

In his analysis of Latin America, Castañeda refers to a "...new strain of Latin American left..." (234) in Chiapas and classifies neoliberalism as the "... pro business, free market... modern right" (134). Because of the broad scope of Utopia Unarmed, and the fact that it was written before the Chiapas rebellion, this characterization of neoliberalism is not colored by Zapatista propaganda. Still, Castañeda's treatment of neoliberalism demonstrates the popular conception of the philosophy as equivalent to radical laissez-faire market solutions for the economic and social problems of Latin America. Castañeda, like so many of his ilk, chooses the invention of a synonym for capitalism instead of a definition of an original, contemporary ideal--neoliberalism: the ultimate goal of political and economic freedom.

All three authors, Pazos, Barry and Castañeda, stress the importance of democracy. Barry laments the "...profound lack of democracy and government accountability in

Mexico..." (7), while Castañeda reminds us that democracy is imperative but always difficult because "... the Jacobin, antidemocratic streak was present in Latin American political culture long before anyone had ever heard of Lenin..." (328). For his part, Pazos insists that the Zapatistas should have searched for a political resolution before turning to violence.⁷ Aside from the proponents of neoliberalism published in El desafío neoliberal (The Neoliberal Challenge), none of the sources cited herein stress the democratic tenets of neoliberalism or its ability to employ a gradual process of economic liberalization when across the board free-market solutions are not viable.

The analyses of events surrounding the Zapatista insurrection tend to obscure a couple of salient points. In the first place, the Zapatistas, in their militant fervor against neoliberalism, overlook the fact that their nemesis is not neoliberalism per se but the unadulterated, 'leave it to the market,' laissez-faire economic solutions that were imposed on the country without any formal democratic debate.⁸ Secondly, the democratic ideal is something that the EZLN and neoliberalism have in common. This common ground can provide a foundation for resolving the social, political and economic problems of Mexico.

Within the dictates of a democracy that holds its leaders responsible for corruption, the various types of

"'capitalisms' prevailing in the modern world" (Castañeda 316), such as the social market economy of Europe, can provide a model for a prosperous future for Mexico and Chiapas within a free-market (neoliberal) system. But much of the rhetoric coming from the Zapatista camp resembles leftist nationalism without a remedy. There is no regard for the different types of capitalism in extant or the democratic ideals of neoliberalism itself. It is as if neoliberalism really was nothing more than neo-classical capitalism taken to its ultimate ends. As far as the ruling Mexican party is concerned, it employs a paternal, exclusionary nationalism. Under the guise of protecting peasants, the government effectively precludes large populations of them from acquiring land, having an equal voice in government and participating in debates about the economic and political future of the nation.⁹ This has a polarizing effect which has left Chiapas and much of the country deprived of economic and political liberty.

The architects of NAFTA may truly desire a prosperous Mexico, but for one reason or another they have completely neglected the fact that most of Mexico's problems are of a political nature. This neglect is so profound that the architects and political sponsors of the treaty cannot and should not be classified as neoliberal. Purely economic remedies for Mexico might bring prosperity to some in the short run. Yet for the long haul, all three countries,

Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, must rededicate themselves to the establishment of true Mexican democracy complete with a separation of powers and guarantees of individual rights. Within this framework, questions of economic liberty and free trade can be left to open debates in the Mexican congress.

The result of such debates will probably lead to some kind of protection for poverty stricken Chiapas. This is only logical as no country

...has captured markets or attained international competitiveness exclusively by opening up economies and letting the chips fall where they may. Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States after World War II were free-traders because they were the world's most efficient producers of the highest value-added goods. They did not become so through free trade; they protected themselves for decades in order to achieve that end (Castañeda 464).

Castañeda's historical account supports the neoliberal idea of gradual economic liberalization for Mexico. It also includes an ultimate goal of economic liberty within the reality of a globalized market.

Because of the incompetence of Mexico's perfect dictatorship and the negligence of the country's northern neighbors, one can hardly blame the EZLN for seizing upon neoliberalism and NAFTA as its enemies. Unfortunately, the armed insurrection and the subsequent powerful media campaign have led to a protracted struggle in which a decision to change Zapatista rhetoric could be perceived

within the movement as tantamount to military surrender and defeat. Be that as it may, the Zapatista leadership, and Marcos in particular, must realize that *campesinos* need the external help of a market economy. Le Bot has referred to this inevitable integration of the peasantry into the market as a "... campesino market economy" (105). Furthermore, the Latin American left in general has finally come to accept international economic integration and the market as inescapable realities that cannot be ignored or shunned.¹⁰

Socialists must learn to live with the most advanced forms of capitalism... But they need not be identified, in their values or their movements, with the 'soul' of capitalism. Socialists should marry democracy out of love, but their union with the market need be no more than a 'marriage of convenience.'¹¹

Castañeda once pronounced, "Marcos had the opportunity to enter into the political arena" (Le Bot 250). Maybe it is not too late. If Marcos recognizes the need for a marriage of convenience with the market and accepts the neoliberal call for democracy as his own, he can forge an agreement with the government without ever publicly acquiescing to the neoliberal enemy. To preserve the peace, he must also take off the mask and thrust himself and the Zapatistas into the quagmire of Mexican politics.

While the EZLN reviles the neoliberal Mexican government, the PRI does not openly identify itself with neoliberalism. Clearly, the ruling party will not allow itself to be defined by the Zapatistas. Yet overall, the

Mexican government has demonstrated few neoliberal ideals. It is true that the transition to real democracy and economic liberty is not instantaneous. But political liberty for Mexico can no longer be subordinated to the goal of economic liberty. For any negotiations with the EZLN to have hope of success, the government must now accept and endorse neoliberalism's incontrovertible democratic principles. The neoliberal remedy of gradual economic liberalization must be given serious consideration as well, especially as applied to Chiapas. It is not important that the government or the EZLN recognize these cures and principles as neoliberal. In fact, it is advisable that the word 'neoliberalism' be dropped entirely from the vocabulary of both parties during private negotiations so as not to rankle sensibilities. (Publicly, Zapatista rhetoric against neoliberalism will probably change very little.) What is important is that the full scope of neoliberal ideals be taken advantage of. It may not be easy to back away from NAFTA in its current form as the agreement appears to be set in perpetuity. "But a deal can be struck" (Castañeda 467). Through these efforts, the EZLN and the government will free themselves from Plato's cave and discover the common ground on which all Mexicans can build their future.

Conclusion
Agrarian Reform and Education

One of the architects of free trade throughout the Americas is the Inter-American Development Bank (not to be confused with the International Monetary Fund). In an interview with the *Los Angeles Times*, the bank's current president, Enrique Iglesias, stressed the importance of economic and social efficiency within a democratic system:

There may be times in which we try to maximize economic efficiency at the expense of social efficiency, and, sometimes, that leads to confrontation. We also have other periods in which we try to maximize social efficiency while neglecting the economic side, and we end in populism, high inflation and backwardness. The big test is to have a good combination of policies that can, at the same time, assure sustainable growth with social justice and a reduction of poverty.¹

Iglesias goes on to insist that the economic reforms put into place in Mexico and other Latin American countries are important for stability, modernization and the distribution of wealth:

...in essence, those reforms were pushed by the big economic mismanagement that we had in practically every country in the region... These are prerequisites to implement solid social policies that will close the gap [between rich and poor]...

Thus Mexico was destined to implement economic reforms before political and social problems were addressed. However, according to Iglesias, political, economic and social reforms do not represent quick cures to the question

of poverty:

Poverty has deep historical roots in the region. It starts with the ways wealth, particularly land, was distributed in Latin America. We also had mismanagement of the economy and the ensuing inflation that imposes a tremendous burden on poor people... But when I look at the major element at the root of poverty and inequality, it is, in my mind, the education gap. It is really too sad to admit that, in this area, we have not done enough.

At the moment, economic and political liberty are developing more or less simultaneously in Mexico. But the interview with Iglesias clarifies why economic liberalization and the implementation of NAFTA preceded political reform in the country. Although Iglesias does not specifically speak to Mexico's fundamental need for political liberty (his answers are framed within the context of a democratic system), he does touch on two areas of importance to the future of Mexico: agrarian reform and education.

"'Wherever there is great property there is great inequality... The affluence of the rich supposes the indigence of the many.'" (Heilbroner 44). These words of wisdom sound like something Karl Marx or Subcommander Marcos might say. In fact, it is an insight given to us by the first great philosopher of capitalism: Adam Smith. Smith also asserts "that we are the creatures of a 'desire of bettering our condition'" (Heilbroner 45). In Adam Smith's Society of Perfect Liberty, these desires are not left alone

to do battle in a free market. The state still has indispensable responsibilities including the duties of erecting and maintaining certain public works and institutions as well as protecting every member of society from injustice or oppression.²

By dispossessing people of their land and failing to provide for an economy that can promote and ensure the acquisition of property, goods and services, the Mexican state has propagated the type of oppression that often leads to violent rebellions. The *ejido* system points to government culpability. It dispossesses people of great tracks of land in order to reapportion it. Yet reapportionment does not result in land for the people. *Campesinos* never own the land. The government retains title to the *ejidos*. The peasants have little if any capital to work the *ejidos* and they cannot mortgage or borrow on the land to acquire said capital. Consequently, they are stuck in everlasting poverty along with millions of other Mexicans, *campesinos* and city dwellers, as the state bureaucracy fails to provide economic opportunity or liberty.

At times, it is truly baffling that the Zapatistas fight for the *ejido*. A better idea, already practiced to a degree, might be just to give the peasants land. A very real fear that *latifundios* would proliferate as *campesinos* sell or lose out to the highest bidder inhibits further

privatization of this nature. Also, there are more *campesinos* than ever before. With the 21st century upon them, their numbers grow. Free land for all peasants is not a viable solution. And the impractical *ejido* system is now hopelessly dated in a country where the need for increased food production as well as alternative economic opportunities for the peasantry will grow with an expanding Mexican population.

The *ejido* has been dying a slow death for years. Economic reform in Mexico and NAFTA suggest that its total demise is not far off. In any event, *campesinos* will not just fade away. Without alternatives to their current agricultural lifestyle, new problems and violent upheavals are bound to occur. On the other hand, economic opportunity in the coming decades could provide *campesinos* with a distinct future. A future where Mexican *campesinos* are no longer peasants.

Education will be instrumental in this development. Education is a Zapatista demand that has few detractors. Some dissenting voices equate state sponsored education of *campesino* and indigenous populations with cultural genocide. But elevating these people from their penury through education and economic opportunity need not destroy their cultural heritage. Mid-21st century Mexican Indians should be able to communicate in Nahuatl (or other indigenous languages) as well as literate, fluent Spanish. Education

can conserve traditions and language as well as ensure the acquisition of new knowledge; a means to property and land. As the past is preserved through family, community and education, leaps into the computer age, or even suburbia, can be facilitated. Zapatista demands for housing, food, employment and peace will be satisfied. *Minifundismo* would be but a memory and those working in the agricultural sector will rarely represent the dwindling peasant class. As has been the case throughout history, cultural changes are inevitable. Still, this must be the destiny of a democratic Mexico that affords *campesinos* the opportunities to support and elevate themselves; that extends a helping hand instead of the oppressive, paternal one that has perpetuated misery throughout Chiapas and the nation.

Globalization is indeed a reality. Never before has the social and economic future of the planet been so dependent on the interaction of its parts. The scientific and technological advances of the last century have created an age of easy travel and accessible information. The world is a smaller place. Even so, we do not need to contemplate and study the entire world in order to understand the consequences of globalization. NAFTA and the events in Chiapas provide us with a microcosm of the reality. In this corner of a globalized world, hard lessons are learned. And more solutions than problems can be found.

End Notes

Introduction

1. George A. Collier, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland: Institute for Good and Development Policy, 1994) 7-8. Collier specifically compares Mexico to Central America and points to the 1982 Mexican debt crisis as the beginning of the end of the government's traditional treatment of peasants. He also defines peasants as "... rural people who produce their own food or who are closely connected to others who produce for subsistence, as contrasted with those who farm commercial crops primarily for sale and profit. In southern Mexico, many peasants, but not all, are *indigenous* people, descendants of those who were conquered and subordinated by the Spanish during the period of colonial rule."
2. Sun y Dpa, "Se aplicó el 33 a 40 italianos," Ocho Columnas [Guadalajara, México] 12 May 1998, 1A. There has been much speculation as to the official role of these observers and whether they had sufficient and legal credentials. The article makes reference to the Italians as "protagonists of the incident." In most cases, "banishment" was a ten year injunction on visa applications for those implicated in the riot. Trans. Steven Veit.
3. Angel Trejo, "¿Brigadas internacionales del EZLN en Chiapas?" Ocho Columnas [Guadalajara, México] 9 May 1998, 14A.
4. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 152-3. National polls reveal that "Mexico [is] in no mood for a social upheaval." In many cases, public opinion has ranked traffic jams as more of a pressing issue in Mexico than the Zapatista rebellion.
5. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition: 1989) 3.
6. Carlos Tello Díaz La rebelión de las Cañadas (México D.F.: Cal y arena, 1995) III.
7. George A Collier, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994) 8.
8. George A. Collier, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994) 16.

9. Marco A. Almazan, "NAFTA and the Mesoamerican States System," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Ed. Alan W. Heston. 559 (1997): 47.
10. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition: 1989) 183. In spite of a ban on the renting and/or sale of *ejidos*, the land has been routinely rented and/or sold outside the law. Also, it is impossible to mortgage the land in exchange for private bank credits. Riding contends that because of these and other factors the political solution of the *ejido* contained "the seeds of social and economic disaster."
11. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989) 192. Riding stipulates that commercial farmers probably contribute "...more to political stability as aberrations of the agrarian reform than they would as victims of arbitrary expropriations."
12. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño Zapatista (Barcelona, Spain: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 92.
13. Carlos Tello Díaz, La rebelión de las Cañadas. (México, D.F.: Cal y arena, 1995) I.
14. Carlos Montemayor, Chiapas: La rebelión indígena de México (México D.F.: Editorial Planeta Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 1997) 33
15. Raúl Trejo Delarbre, Chiapas: La comunicación enmascarada. (México D.F.: Editorial Diana. 1994) 38. Delarbre notes that the events in Chiapas ruptured the over-all national stability and social peace that many Mexicans had considered unshakable.
16. Raúl Trejo Delarbre, Chiapas: La comunicación enmascarada (México D.F.: Editorial Diana, 1994) 118.
17. Marco A. Almazan, "NAFTA and the Mesoamerican States System," The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science Ed. Alan W. Heston. 559 (1997): 49.
18. Paul Rich, "NAFTA and Chiapas," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Ed. Alan W. Heston. 550 (1997): 80. Rich stipulates that the revolt crystallizes the question of what happens in a country during the free market transition period when social programs are being dismantled.
19. Enrique Krauze, "México, ¿la dictadura perfecta?" El desafío Neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A.) 181. Llosa made this declaration in

front of millions of television viewers during an international meeting of intellectuals organized by the magazine *Vuelta*.

20. Paul Rich, "NAFTA and Chiapas," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Ed. Alan W. Heston. 550 (1997): 75. Rich refers to "capitalist schemes." Also, his use of the term "post communist" to describe the rhetoric of the EZLN provides the Zapatistas with a "world view" that includes the Socialist Left, which is still popular throughout much of the world, along with disgruntled Communists.

21. Martha Brant and Brook Larmer, "Alejándose," Newsweek en español April 29, 1998: 14. The article refers to free trade agreements reached among Latin American countries and attempts to form a free trade zone that will extend from Alaska to Chile;

Notimex y Reuter, "Acepta europa negociar ya un TLC con México," El Heraldo de México [México D.F.] 26 May 1998, A1. The article reports that the European Union has approved a framework for negotiating a free trade agreement with Mexico; UPI, "Europa debe crecer más para ayudar a la estabilidad de la economía mundial," El Heraldo de México [México D.F.] 30 Jan. 1999, F5. The article cites a recent summit in Davos, Switzerland where U.S., Japanese and British representatives met with member nations of the European Union to discuss further trade agreements with Latin American nations as well as the necessity of providing the world economy with a strong European currency to off-set any future economic crisis.

Chapter 1

1. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño Zapatista (Barcelona, Spain: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 74. Trans. Steven Veit.

2. Carlos Montemayor, Chiapas: La rebelión indígena de México (México D.F.: Editorial Planeta Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 1997) 188-9. Montemayor cites a letter in the New York Times from Mark C. Ban Norman, a tribal attorney for the River Sioux Tribe in South Dakota, in which the poverty of the tribe is described as at "third world levels."

3. Leonel L. Durante, "'Zapatistas' emboscan a campesinos: un muerto," El Heraldo de Mexico [México D.F.] 15 July 1998, A1. The article refers to a conflict in the community of Los Plátanos where eight peasants associated with the PRI were ambushed by Zapatistas. There are also references to conflicts between Zapatistas and peasants as Zapatistas attempt to install autonomous municipalities in other parts of Chiapas; María Teresa Del Riego, "Dan armas presuntos

zapatistas," Reforma [México D.F.] 24 May 1999, A25.
Discouraged by Zapatista tactics, numerous Zapatistas have given up their arms to be reunited with their families.

4. Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998) 288, 291. Page 288 states that the "...Plan of Ayala did not envision the disappearance of the haciendas." On page 291 Krauze stipulates that Zapata's radical position "...was a call for the ejido..."
5. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989) 43.
6. Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998) 295. Zapata also said, "I didn't fight for that [the presidential chair], I fought to get the lands back, I don't care about politics."
7. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage books Edition, 1989) 47.
8. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 102. Oppenheimer describes Zapata and Villa as "--the rebel leaders who had not only lost in the battlefield but were killed in the process--". Riding (45) mentions that Villa "... retired to a *hacienda* given to him by the government in 1920; three years later he was murdered."
9. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 137-8.
10. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 137.
11. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, México profundo: Una civilización negada (Mexico D.F.: Editorial Grijalbo, 1994) 166.
12. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 139.
13. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 139.
14. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989) 183-4.
15. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989) 185.

16. Carlos Tello Díaz La rebelión de las Cañadas (Mexico D.F.: Cal y arena, 1995) 47.
17. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 28.
18. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 30. Barry calls this a "bimodal structure of agriculture."
19. Mario Vargas Llosa, "América Latina y la opción liberal" El desafío neoliberal Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A.) 25. Llosa imputes most Latin American economies as archaic, oligarchic and mercantilistic.
20. George A. Collier Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland: The Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994) 93. Collier mentions that U.S. talk of using grain exports as a tool in foreign policy led to fear in Mexico of a loss of national sovereignty.
21. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989) 181.
22. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 123.
23. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 34. Le Bot offers Chiapas as an example of how the Mexican Revolution did not dismantle a vast portion of the *haciendas*.
24. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 140.
25. George A. Collier, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994) 48.
26. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 50. The distinction between paramilitaries and the White Guards is not always clear. Oppenheimer does mention that ranchers have also been able to utilize state troops to "crack down" on Indian squatters.
27. George A. Collier, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994) 44.

Chapter 2

1. Hugo Martínez McNaught, "Es viejo conflicto.-PGR," Reforma [México D.F.] 27 December 1997, A1. The article refers to quarreling *campesinos*, the PRI, the EZLN, and paramilitaries as those who may be responsible for the catastrophe. At present, arrests have been made but it is still not clear who was directly involved.
2. Carlos Montemayor, Chiapas: La rebelión indígena de México (México D.F.: Editorial Planeta Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 1997) 69. Montemayor also enumerates various armed organizations that have participated in what he terms "la guerra de baja intensidad" (the low intensity war) of the last thirty years in Mexico. Trans. Steven Veit.
3. Carlos Tello Díaz, La rebelión de las Cañadas. (México D.F.: Cal y arena, 1995) 97.
4. George A. Collier Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland: The Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994) 61. The EZLN itself had not been formed in 1974 but its beginnings can be traced to the Indigenous Congress.
5. Luiz Pazos, Problems socioeconomicos de México (México D.F.: Editorial Diana, S.A. de C.V., 1996) 25.
6. Luiz Méndez, "Ejército ve amenaza en Iglesia.-Samuel," Reforma [México D.F.] 25 May 1998, A1. The bishop was in Spain when he made reference to the "Zapatista call to the outside." This article is only one of several examples of Samuel's vocal support for the EZLN. Trans. Steven Veit.
7. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 160. On page 141 Barry also recognizes that the Tlatelolco massacre of October 1968, where hundreds of protesting students were killed, inspired many to leave the university and leftist organizations to form "... terrorist and guerrilla opposition groups."
8. Andres Oppenheimer, Boarding on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 22.
9. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 46.
10. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 19-20. Oppenheimer specifically points to Zapatista rhetoric during the beginnings of the 1994 rebellion. EZLN rhetoric now focuses on neoliberalism.

11. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 197. Here Le Bot makes no mention of media or public reaction to the declaration. Aside from greater inclusion, it is unclear how a dictatorship of the proletariat jibes with the EZLN's desire for democracy.
12. Raúl Trejo Delarbre, Chiapas: La comunicación enmascarada. (México D.F.: Editorial Diana, 1994) 30-1, 190. On pages 30-1 Delarbre reports that the infamous confrontation could have been fabricated by either of the two sides in an attempt to slander the other: "The dead boy next to a wooden rifle for some symbolized the abuse of power of a federal government which was capable of confronting weak indigenous campesinos who were, in addition, unarmed. But also, the famous scene could be understood as proof of the contempt that the EZLN leadership had for its most vulnerable followers, sending them into war with toy guns." The entire question of the toy guns has yet to be resolved. On page 190, Delarbre makes a strong case for the preparedness of the EZLN. Trans. Steven Veit.
13. Carlos Tello Díaz, La rebelión de las Cañadas. (México, D.F.: Cal y arena, 1995) 99. Díaz points out that the FLN and the EZLN have always used Marxism-Leninism as a guide: "the science of history and society..." Trans. Steven Veit.
14. Carlos Montemayor, Chiapas: La rebelión indígena de México (México D.F.: Editorial Planeta Mexicana, S.A. de C.V., 1997) 133.
15. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 257.
16. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 312.
17. William Pfaff, "The European Left has Bounced Back in a Very Big Way," The Register-Guard [Eugene, Or.] 22 October 1998, A15. The following June, the Social-Democrats lost sweeping elections to right of center European parties.
18. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 254.
19. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 331.
20. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 123-4, 135, 197.

21. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 197.
22. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 318-9. Marcos also insists that adherence to the San Andres Agreements, signed by representatives of the Mexican government and the Zapatistas in February of 1996, is key to any final peace. These agreements satisfy a number of EZLN demands stated in The Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.
23. Paul Rich, "NAFTA and Chiapas," The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science Ed. Alan W. Heston. 559 (1997): 81.
24. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 20. Le Bot points to Marcos as "the inverse figure of the 'heroic warrior' personified by Che Guevara, like a distant cousin of Ghandi..." Trans. Steven Veit.
25. Gabriela Coutiño, "Puntos de vista del zapatismo en la propuesta de remunicipalización" El financiero [México D.F.] 29 May 1998, 46. The article points out that the establishment of autonomous municipalities is a key requirement of the San Andrés Agreements (see endnote 22, Chapter 2). However, the unilateral actions of the EZLN in declaring "supposedly autonomous municipalities are unconstitutional and destabilizing..." Trans. Steven Veit; Jesús H. Saldaña, "Basta de muerte, claman indígenas desplazados por culpa del EZLN" El Heraldo de Mexico [México D.F.] 30 May 1998, A1. The article refers to several Indian families that had to abandon the town of Paraíso, Chiapas, not only because of Zapatista attempts to establish an autonomous municipality but because of the general upheaval that has existed since the Zapatista rebellion; Reuters, "Quedó desmantelado un municipio autónomo en Chiapas" Ocho Columnas [Guadalajara] 17 May 1998, A9. The article describes how 500 Indians had to abandon an autonomous municipality in Las Margaritas, Chiapas, because they had decided to break away from the EZLN; Notimex, "Albores: "Sin tibieza vamos a hacer soberano a Chiapas" La Crónica de Hoy [México D.F.] 5 May 1998, 45. The governor of Chiapas affirms, "Chiapas will not be hostage to a few." There "will not be more autonomous municipalities as these violate the sovereignty and the legal structure of the state." Trans. Steven Veit; Daniel Pensamiento, "Defenderemos nuestras regiones, advierte EZLN" Reforma [México D.F.] 5 May 1998, A5. A communiqué signed by Zapatista commanders affirms that autonomous municipalities will be defended even if "... jail or death is the price to be free..." Trans. Steven Veit.

26. Yvon Le Bot, El sueño Zapatista (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores, S.A., 1997) 251.

27. Paul Rich, "NAFTA and Chiapas," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Ed. Alan W. Heston. 550 (1997) 75; Andres Oppenheimer, Boarding on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 262. Oppenheimer admires Marcos' literary game of hide and seek but is quick to remind us that his true identity has been known since shortly after the 1994 rebellion.

28. Raúl Trejo Delarbre. Chiapas: La comunicación enmascarada (México D.F.: Editorial Diana, 1994) 344. Delarbre describes the phenomenon as "*el caudillismo enmascarado*." Marcos "... spoke and the others [Zapatistas] assented, decoratively bored." Trans. Steven Veit

29. Paul Rich, "NAFTA and Chiapas," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Ed. Alan W. Heston. 550 (1997) 80, 82. Rich expounds on the problems of land reform in his foot notes. On page 82 he stipulates that NAFTA is not going to help the Chiapas peasants as they are outside of the money economy all together. On page 82 he stresses that "Short of building dikes in the Pacific Ocean, land reform is not going to solve the *campesinos'* problems."

30. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge, (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 164.

Chapter 3

1. Jorge Berry, Crónicas intergalácticas EZLN (México D.F.: Planeta Tierra, 1997) 39. The book is a compilation of the information passed between participants of the First Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism that was held at the behest of Marcos and the EZLN in the mountains of southern Mexico in the summer of 1996. Trans. Steven Veit.

2. Luis Pazos, Problemas socioeconomicos de México, (México D.F.: Editorial Diana, S.A. de C.V., 1996) 44.

3. John Brohman, Popular Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996) 26-7. Brohman does not indicate who originally coined the term *neoliberalism*, but he does stress neoliberalism's neoclassical economic origins. Neoclassical economic theory returned to popularity in the early 80s in part because Keynesian economics had failed to provide "...viable solutions for mounting Third World problems."; Peter L. Berger, "América Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural

- comparativa" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A. 1992) 51. Berger reminds us that Latin America probably requires the neoliberal option of gradual economic liberalization rather than the radical economic remedies applied in eastern Europe.
4. Mario Vargas Llosa, "América Latina y la opción liberal" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 24.
5. Robert Heilbroner, 21st Century Capitalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1993). Heilbroner is but one of my sources who never makes reference to neoliberalism as an economic or social term. Capitalism or "free market capitalism" are the words employed.
6. Jorge G. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1993). Castañeda frequently uses the term when describing free market capitalist policies throughout Latin America; Luis F. Aguilar Villanueva, "Las reformas mexicanas: hechos y agenda" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: editorial Norma S.A.) 211. The term 'neoliberal' is not rejected by those in favor of political liberty, free-market policies and/or capitalism. But Aguilar Villanueva notes that the term is "... to simple and does not do justice to the [economic and political] liberal notion of the State." Trans. Steven Veit.
7. Peter L. Berger, "América Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa," El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 40.
8. Peter L. Berger, "America Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa," El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 41.
9. Norman Pearlstine, "Big Wheels Turning," Time 9 Dec. 1998: 70.
10. Peter L. Berger, "América Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A.) 45.
11. Peter L. Berger, "América Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa," El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 46.
12. William Pfaff, "Asian Crisis is Dangerous Attempt to Remake World Economy," Register Guard [Eugene, Or.] 12 February 1998, A15.

13. Peter L. Berger, "América Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa," El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 44.
14. Peter L. Berger, "América Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa," El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 45.
15. José Piñera Echeñique, "Chile: el poder de una idea" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A. 1992) 78.
16. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 240. Barry refers to these programs as social liberalism or the "... more human side of neoliberalism..."
17. Mario Vargas Llosa, "América Latina y la opción liberal" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A.) 32.
18. José Piñera Echeñique, "Chile: el poder de una idea" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 78.
19. Martha Brant and Brook Larmer, "Alejándose," Newsweek en español, 29 April, 1998: 15.
20. José Piñera Echeñique, "Chile: el poder de una idea," El desafío neoliberal, Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 84.
21. José Piñera Echeñique, "Chile: el poder de una idea," El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 80.
22. Enrique Krauze, "Mexico, ¿la dictadura perfecta?" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 182. Krauze refers to Zapata, Villa, Carranza and Obregón, along with Madero, as *caudillos*.
23. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books Edition: 1989) 52.
24. Peter L. Berger, "América Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa," El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 46. Berger makes reference to the lack of a capitalist tradition throughout Latin America.
25. Luis Pazos, La disputa por el ejido (México, D.F., Editorial Diana, S.A. de C.V. 1991) 31.

26. Andres Oppenheimer, Boarding on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 320.
27. Peter L. Berger "America Latina bajo una perspectiva cultural comparativa" El desafío neoliberal. Comp. David Levine. (Colombia: Editorial Norma S.A., 1992) 49.
28. Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Carlos Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Manual del perfecto idiota Latinoamericano, (México D.F.: Plaza & Janes Editores, S.A., 1996) 252.
29. Luis Pazos, ¿Por qué Chiapas?, (México D.F.: Editorial Diana, S.A. de C.V., 1994) 16. Pazos says, "The neosocialists who analyze the armed conflict in Chiapas share the premise that the [public] is absent minded." Trans. Steven Veit.
30. Robert Heilbroner, 21st Century Capitalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993) 90. Heilbroner does not specifically mention Mexico but applies this concept to contemporary world economies in general.
31. Thomas Friedman, "Globalization isn't a choice; it's a reality," Register Guard [Eugene, Or.] 1 October 1997, A13.
32. Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Carlos Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Manual del perfecto idiota Latinoamericano, (Mexico D.F.: Plaza & Janes Editores, S.A., 1996) 46.
33. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 319.

Chapter 4

1. Robert U Ayers, Turning Point, (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 1998) 126.
2. Sam Dillon, "La selección al estilo de EU." Novedades [México D.F.] 1999. A6.
3. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) 156. Castañeda states that during "...the first two-thirds of Salinas' term... the PRI resembled more a Reagan-Bush conservative experiment than a European social-democratic one." He does not equate neoliberalism with the Social-Democrats. My analysis includes many social-democratic policies under the neoliberalist umbrella.

4. Jorge G. Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1994) 322. Castañeda reports that NAFTA "... was irrevocably chosen or imposed..." and alternative regional free trade solutions discarded without formal debate. He does not equate the regional free trade solution with neoliberalism.

5. Andres Oppenheimer, Boarding on Chaos, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996) 320.

6. Tom Barry, Zapata's Revenge (Boston: South End Press, 1995) 45. Barry equates the commitments of World Bank planners and the "PRI technocrat elite" with radical economic liberalization and neoliberalist philosophy.

7. Luis Pazos, ¿Por qué Chiapas? (Mexico D.F.: Editorial Diana S.A. de C.V., 1994) 89-90.

8. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1994) 316.

9. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1994) 324. Castañeda refers to the exclusionary nature of Latin American nationalism in general.

10. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1994) 325, 461-2. On page 325, Castañeda points out that a "... few years ago, the very notion that the Latin American left could subscribe to the idea of restructuring existing mechanisms of integration would have been virtually inconceivable." Pages 461-2 reiterate this point: "... to bestow a central role also on the private sector, and to accept that the market should have a dominant function in the process, represents a major break for the left..."

11. Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed (New York: First Vintage Books Edition, 1994) 432. Castañeda quotes Francisco Weffort.

Conclusion

1. Sergio Muñoz, "Enrique Iglesias" Los Angeles Times 7 March 1999, M3.

2. Robert Heilbroner, 21st Century Capitalism, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993) 70-1. Adam Smith's Society of Perfect Liberty tackles the problem of the division of authority and the duties of each realm. In his assessment of the duties of the state, Heilbroner quotes from Smith's Wealth.

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