The objective of this paper is to illustrate that economic institutions matter, i.e., that different rules of trade present different incentives for bidding, asking and trading in new markets, and that these different incentives lead to different price discovery patterns which yield materially different outcomes. In a laboratory tradable fishing...
Fisheries worldwide continue to suffer from the negative consequences of open access. In 1986, New Zealand responded by establishing an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system that by 1998 included 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas. We assess these markets in terms of trends in market activity,...
It is now widely recognized that property rights based fisheries management regimes are well
suited for generating efficiency in fisheries. Apart from access licences, which are very low
quality property rights, individual quotas (IQs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are the
most widely applicable and, indeed, the most commonly applied...
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been used in several countries worldwide to regulate access to
marine fisheries. While ITQs can improve the economic efficiency of fisheries, in practice they are not a
panacea and distribution and equity issues have been raised in many cases. To overcome those issues,
ITQ systems...
Entrepreneurial New Zealand harvesters created a viable diving fishery for King Clams, Panopea zelandica, in the 1970's
contributing to the development of allocation rights to harvest. Once under the quota management system (QMS), however,
allocations for allowable catch do not reflect the harvest potential for this fishery. Expectations for quota...
Changes in ownership of limited entry permits by “local” residents of the region where a fishery occurs
may have significant economic and social implications for fishery-dependent regions. This paper
examines changes in local permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries, for which a long-term decline in
rural local permit ownership is...
In the administration of its quota management system (QMS), New Zealand sets a “deemed value” fee that must be paid for any landings in excess of annual catch entitlements (ACE.) The deemed value system is an example of a price-capped cap-and-trade system (Roberts and Spence 1976). This paper argues that...
Employing an experimental approach, we examine whether the efficiency of fishery management
can be achieved under Individual Transferable Quotas regimes. We analyze the situation in
which subjects can choose one from two vessel types: a large-scale or a small-scale. The fixed
cost for the large-scale is higher than that for...
The introduction of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) fisheries management is controversial as it
typically results in fewer active vessels, fewer vessel jobs, and the remaining vessel crew earning a lower
share of vessel revenues with capital interests, including the new interest "quota ownership", increasing
their revenue share. However, the move...
In discussing property rights, efficiency and fisheries management economic literature often refers to a fishery with a hypothetical single owner, comparing it to fisheries with more fragmented ownership. Through a range of effort reductions, since the near collapse of the fishery in the early 1980s, the Exmouth Gulf Prawn fishery...