Catch share systems are being encouraged and considered in a variety of United States (U.S.) fisheries. Scientists, policy makers, and stakeholders (including fishermen and non-governmental environmental organizations) have different views about potential social and economic impacts and outcomes of these output- oriented systems. Thus identifying and evaluating impacts over time...
Resource rentals can be viewed as taxes on scarcity rents or as fees for access to use or utilize the
resource. The Icelandic Fishery Management Act requires that vessel owners pay a Catch fee
(Veiðigjald). This paper discusses how the Catch fee is defined by the Fishery Management Act.
Secondly...
This paper is designed to “set the stage” for the Special Session on Game Theory and Fisheries. It traces the origins of the application of game theory to fisheries economics, noting that, for the first quarter of a century after the publication of H. Scott Gordon’s 1954 seminal article, the...
Individual Transferable Quota systems (ITQ's) were implemented in the Icelandic groundfish fisheries in 1984, or twenty years ago. The system was not a 'pure' ITQ system from the beginning, notably with different regulations for different fleet segments and with several changes along the way. The current system has mostly been...
A debate is emerging over the extent to which privatization of fishery resources – private ownership and resource management without significant state oversight- is practical and socially desirable. What we term the “optimists” maintain that there are no effective limits to privatization and that the decades old fear that privatization...
The diplomatic corps of Iceland has used much of its time during the third quarter of the 20. century to convince other nations that Icelanders should control and utilise the resources of the waters within 12, then 50 and finally 200 nautical miles around the island. Icelandic politicians have used...