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Over-capacity, Regulation and Rent: A Norwegian Case Study

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Abstract
  • Traditional fisheries management schemes provide fishermen with incentives to maximise their individual share of the catch, while individual vessel quota management schemes change incentives to maximise profits from their individual share of the catch. The way that one models the fishermen’s optimisation problem in empirical studies should reflect the changed structure of the optimisation problem when individual vessel quotas are used as a management instrument. In this paper a cost function is used to model a fishery regulated with individual vessel quotas, and to derive measures of potential resource rent and over capacity for this fishery.
  • Keywords: Regulation, Fisheries Economics, Theoretical and Empirical Bio-Economic Modelling, Rent, Individual Vessel Quotas, Over-capacity
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  • Asche, Frank, Trond Bjorndal, Daniel V. Gordon. 2002. Over-capacity, Regulation and Rent: A Norwegian Case Study. Peer Review: No. In: Proceedings of the Eleventh Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, August 19-22, 2002, Wellington, New Zealand: Fisheries in the Global Economy. Compiled by Ann L. Shriver. International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade, Corvallis, Oregon, USA, 2002. CD ROM.
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Déclaration de droits
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Peer Reviewed
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