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Tegawa302_PPT.pdf

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https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/concern/conference_proceedings_or_journals/mg74qn14r

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  • Self-management has been recognized as important in successfully governing the common pool resources. This is no exception in fishery. Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen collectively manage the fishery, are garnering much attention from both regulators and academics. In this study, we aim to empirically disentangle the efficiency mechanism of pooling system. The pooling system is a management rule that self-governing fishery can implement. Under the system a group of harvesters share catch and/or profits among members. Employment of the pooling system is a collective action that a group of harvesters takes. The pooling system can induce fishers different incentives ranging from free-riding on other’s fishing effort to strengthening effort coordination such as rotation of fishing grounds and joint marketing. This research hypothesizes two factors potentially affecting these different incentives: social capital and cooperative fishing practice. Social capital refers to attributes such as trust, reciprocity and cooperation in a human relationship that is important in economic welfare. Cooperative fishing practice is often employed under the pooling system because the system can make self interests align with group interests. We collected the data from fishery cooperatives in Japan, which have a long history of self-management as well as ample cases of the pooling system. In addition to surveys with fishery cooperatives staffs and fishermen, economic experiments are used to quantify social capital.
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file details Tegawa302_PPT.pdf 2017-07-17 Pubblico Scaricare